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PATANJALI: A CRITIQUE
T. S. Rukmani
Department of Religion, Concordia University
Starting with Mircea Eliade, who worked intensively in the field of Yoga, scholars
have been intrigued by the concept of dharmamegha-samadhi. There is no uniform
understanding of this important stage in samadhi among Yoga scholars. Eliade iden-
tified asmitanugata-samprajnata-samadhi (samadhi accompanied by the sense-of-I)
as dharmamegha-samadhi, calling it:
the cloud of dharma, a technical term that is difficult to translate . . . but that seems to
refer to an abundance . . . of virtues that suddenly fill the yogin. . . . [H]e has a feeling of
Enough in respect of all knowledge and all consciousnessand this complete renun-
ciation leads him to asamprajnata-samadhi, to undifferentiated enstasis.1
Hariharananda Aranyaka, in his glossary to his Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali, de-
scribes dharmamegha-samadhi as The final state of concentration, when the devo-
tee becomes disinterested even in omniscience and omnipotence. 2
Both Eliade and Aranyaka seem to suggest that dharmamegha is the last stage of
samprajnata-samadhi. Usharbudh Arya, much like Eliade, also seems to indicate that
this is the higher stage of asmita-accompanied samadhi and then goes a step fur-
ther and states that it is the initial stage of acognitive asamprajnata-samadhi. Dhar-
mamegha is endless; the yog dwells only in his own essential nature. 3 On the other
hand, Georg Feuerstein, while admitting that dharmamegha is the precursor to ulti-
mate liberation, also mentions that The dharmamegha-samadhi is the highest form
of supraconscious ecstasy (asamprajnata-samadhi). It is the final moment in the
. . . yogic journey when the primary constituents of nature resolve into their transcen-
dental matrix. And he equates this to liberation or self-realization.4 Feuerstein is not
clear as to whether dharmamegha-samadhi stands for the precursor to . . . libera-
tion or liberation itself. And Ian Whicher, like Feuerstein, understands dharma-
megha to be a synonym of asamprajnata-samadhi: Thus dharmamegha-samadhi is
more or less a synonym of asamprajnata-samadhi and can even be understood as the
consummate phase of supracognitive samadhi or enstasy, the final step on the long
and arduous yogic journey to authentic identity and aloneness. 5
In the light of these different understandings of the term dharmamegha in the
Yogasutras, we will try here to look at the original Yogasutras, along with the com-
mentaries of Vyasa, Vacaspati Misra, Vijnanabhiksu, Sankara, and Nagojibhatta, and
see if we can come up with some consistent comprehension term
of the usage of this
in the Yogasutras.
Dharmamegha-samadhi, according to Patanjalis Yogasutras, is a stage when
there is a continuous flow of vivekakhyati (insight) attained by the yog through prac-
Philosophy East & West Volume 57, Number 2 April 2007 131139 131
> 2007 by University of Hawaii Press
tice of the highest detachment (paravairagya).6 This arises only when there is detach-
ment even toward insight itself.7 Nirbja samadhi or asamprajnata closely follows the
stage of dharmamegha. Thus, it appears as the last stage of samprajnata-samadhi,
whose immediate result is asamprajnata. This is the understanding one gets of
dharmamegha from Patanjalis Yogasutras. It therefore appears, at least from the
Yogasutras, that some of our above-mentioned scholars of Yoga have not correctly
represented Patanjali. Moreover, almost all commentators, beginning with Vyasa,
have identified dharmamegha with prasamkhyana and also as the stage of jvanmukti
in Yoga. Let us see if there is justification for such a reading of dharmamegha from
the Yogasutras themselves.
The one and only instance where Patanjali uses the term dharmamegha is in the
Kaivalyapada.8 The translation of that sutra is In the case of one who has no interest
left even in the highest state of elevation (prasamkhyana) (and) who has continuous
insight (vivekakhyati), there arises the samadhi known as dharmamegha.
This sutra comes in the wake of the description of the wise one who sees the
distinction between the intellect and purusa (visesadars).9 The citta (mind) of such
a one devotes itself to kaivalya and its means, that is, viveka (insight).10 At this stage
the subliminal impressions (samskaras) of activity are burned, and only the viveka-
samskaras exist.11 And then, in IV.29, Patanjali says that dharmamegha occurs
when one becomes disinterested even in the highest prasamkhyana. Thus, in sutra
IV.29 there seems to be a distinction drawn between prasamkhyana and dharmame-
gha. If prasamkhyana stands for the highest stage of viveka (insight), then sutra IV.29
suggests that dharmamegha closely follows this prasamkhyana. It suggests a state
when there are only vivekasamskaras as residue in the citta, and dharmamegha
results as the limit of prasamkhyana or samprajnata-samadhi.
This is the meaning understood by almost all the commentators starting with
Vyasa. But while Patanjali continues and in sutra IV.3012 only mentions that at this
point there is a cessation of all klesas (afflictions) and all karmasayas (samskaras of
activity), the commentators all infer that this cessation of klesa and karma means
jvanmukti. Continuing on the same lines, in IV.32 Patanjali mentions that the gunas
have now completed their task,13 which Vyasa understands as: on the appearance
of dharmamegha the basis of the gunas comes to an end. 14 After a brief interlude
on what sequence or karma stands for in IV.33,15 Patanjali defines kaivalya in
IV.34.16 Vyasas introduction to this last sutra states: when there is cessation of the
sequence of activity of the gunas, there is kaivalyam. 17 Once Vyasa declares that
on the cessation of klesas and karma the vidvan becomes liberated, 18 confusion
has set in. Practically all commentators after that accept the equation between dhar-
mamegha and jvanmukti. We will discuss this question later.
Meanwhile, there is a further question that has to be dealt with here, namely
whether or not prasamkhyana and dharmamegha are synonyms. While IV.29 sug-
gests that prasamkhyana is the highest viveka, and dharmamegha arises when one
is disinterested even in that, commentators beginning with Vyasa have equated pra-
samkhyana with dharmamegha. Under I.2 Vyasa says that when the mind has the
remainder of rajas removed then it tends toward dharmamegha, and that is the
T. S. Rukmani 133
what is known as vaskara, which is the detachment that is associated with this
stage.32
But following this sutra, the next sutra (I.16) states that the highest detachment is
absence of greed toward the gunas.33 The distinction between apara (lower) and par-
avairagya is that the former is detachment from objects whereas the latter is clear
knowledge without an object (jnanaprasadamatram). From Aranyakas commentary
it does not seem to be different from the dharmamegha described in I.2, for he says it
is only devoid of both rajas and tamas and is just an insight into the difference be-
tween sattva intellect and purusa.34 Vyasa also adds that kaivalya follows almost im-
mediately after paravairagya (nantaryakam kaivalyam).35
Again the point is stressed that prasamkhyana, caramadeha, paravairagya, and
dharmamegha are all just immediately before kaivalya. So far we have only evidence
to equate prasamkhyana with dharmamegha. And since only asamprajnata-samadhi
can result in kaivalya it is difficult to understand how a yog attaining dharmamegha
can be a jvanmukta. To complicate matters further, Vyasa mentions under I.18 that
the means to asamprajnata is paravairagya, or, in other words, dharmamegha is a
means to asamprajnata.36 Sankara, the Vivaranakara, goes a step further, and under
IV.29 says that dharmamegha is so called because it rains the highest dharma called
kaivalya.37 So, if a jvanmukta is a kevalin, then the dharmamegha stage cannot be
equated to the jvanmukti stage. We would either have to argue that there is no con-
cept of jvanmukti in yoga or have to consider the jvanmukta as only a way of
describing a yog who has reached the highest stage of samprajnata-samadhi.
The question that all this raises is whether or not Vyasa, the first commentator,
has been accurate in interpreting prasamkhyana as dharmamegha. If we can remove
the equation between prasamkhyana and dharmamegha as synonyms then there can
be a solution to this enigma. We have therefore to look at those sutras themselves
where Vyasa equates these two terms and then draw our own conclusions as to the
correctness or otherwise of this position.
The first sutra, as pointed out already when Vyasa connects the two terms, reads
as yogascittavrttinirodhah; that is, yoga is restraint of the modifications of the mind.
Even if this necessitates a definition of what yoga is and what the modifications of
the mind are and the two types of yoga, there does not seem to be any necessity
for equating the highest stage of samprajnata called dharmamegha with prasam-
khyana here, unless it was very much part of the tradition, and so Vyasa, respecting
the tradition, could have mentioned it. But one redeeming feature here is that he
calls it the highest prasamkhyana (param-prasamkhyanam).38 So perhaps the highest
prasamkhyana is after all dharmamegha.
The next sutra is I.15, where vairagya or detachment is defined. Its technical
term is vaskara in Yoga. Here Vyasa equates vaskara with prasamkhyana and in
the next sutra distinguishes it from paravairagya (superior detachment). Kaivalya
closely follows this paravairagya. So even in this sutra Vyasa is covered, for prasam-
khyana is only a lower vairagya and is not equated to dharmamegha. Thus, in the
Samadhipada, Vyasa maintains that there is a paravairagya that can be equated to
the highest prasamkhyana, which can be the same as dharmamegha.
T. S. Rukmani 135
mamegha, whereas he has defined anyatakhyati, vairagya, vaskara, rtambhara-
prajna, samprajnata, and asamprajnata-samadhis.
The fourth pada is important, for it is only in this pada that Patanjali has the only
single reference both to dharmamegha and prasamkhyana, in IV.29, as mentioned at
the beginning of this essay. In IV.25 Patanjali introduces the word visesadars,44
which seems to be the same as anyatakhyati. In such a one there is wisdom and ces-
sation of egocentric thoughts, and he is getting close to liberation (kaivalya). In such
a one insight is not continuous as yet, and the intervening samskaras are to be
burned through samskaras of knowledge (anyatakhyati) (IV.28). And then comes the
crucial statement that in one who loses interest even in prasamkhyana (the highest
state of elevation) and has continuous vivekakhyati (insight) there arises the samadhi
known as dharmamegha. This sutra is not ambiguous at all. It is only after prasam-
khyana that dharmamegha comes into being.
Vyasa has the same understanding of IV.29 and states that dharmamegha is a
consequence of the detachment from prasamkhyana. Patanjali then adds in IV.30
that From that there is cessation of klesa and karmathe that here being anuvrtti
of dharmamegha from IV.29. Patanjali says nothing about jvanmukti in IV.30, but
Vyasa equates this stage to the jvanmukti state. In IV.31, as in III.49 earlier, it is men-
tioned that the yog has infinite knowledge (jnanasyanantyat) at this stage; so,
according to Patanjali, this stage has to be equated with anyatakhyati in III.49 and
nothing more, certainly not jvanmukti.
My reading of the Yogasutras does not convince me that Patanjali had the idea
of jvanmukti in mind at all. I have all along maintained that Yoga is an indepen-
dent system of thought and have pointed to the many ways in which Yoga differs
from Samkhya even though there may be some basic metaphysical agreements.45
While jvanmukti can fit Samkhya, Yoga, with its twofold division of yoga as sam-
prajnata and asamprajnata, cannot easily accommodate jvanmukti. So the radical
stand would be to disagree with Vyasa and all the commentators who argue for
a jvanmukta stage, similar to the Samkhya or Advaita Vedanta stance.
It is revealing to see, however, that Bhoja does not fall into this trap at all. Under
IV.29, he defines prasamkhyana as the reflection on the intrinsic nature of the mutu-
ally dissimilar tattvas systematically.46 And then he goes on to say that in one who
has this quality and is disinterested in it, due to the non-rising of other thoughts, there
is only the residue of all-encompassing vivekakhyati, which results in dharmamegha.
He then defines dharmamegha as that which rains the superior dharma that is nei-
ther dark nor bright and that achieves the ultimate goal of purusa.47 And in IV.30,
while Vyasa et al. understand it to be the state of jvanmukti, Bhoja just states that
48
there is cessation of the klesas and the different kinds of karma. So, it appears that
Bhoja seems to be more faithful to the sutras themselves. Since traditionally Bhoja
comes after Vyasa in time, it is indeed amazing to notice how he is not influenced
by Vyasas bhasya at all.
Coming back to Vyasa and the other commentators who have been influential
over a long period in promoting the jvanmukti idea in Yoga, it is still relevant to
find some understanding of the situation, if we can view the stage of dharmamegha,
Notes
17 gunadhikaraparisamaptau kaivalyamuktam.
18 klesakarmanivrttau jvanneva vidvan vimukto bhavati (VyBh).
T. S. Rukmani 137
19 tadeva rajolesamalapetam svarupapratistham sattva-purusanyatakhyatimatram
dharmameghadhyanopagam bhavati. tat param prasam khyanamityacaksate
dhyayinah (VyBh I.2).
20 pratanukrtan klesan prasamkhyanagnina dagdhabjakalpanaprasavadharmi-
nah karisyatti (VyBh II.2).
21 prasamkhyanavato dagdhaklesabjasya sammukhbhutepyalambane nasau
punarasti, dagdhabjasya kutah praroha iti (VyBh II.4).
22 kriyayogena tanu-krtah satyah prasamkhyanena dhyanena hatavyah (VyBh
II.11).
23 napantakleso na prasamkhyanadagdhaklesabjabhavo veti (ibid., II.13).
24 T. S. Rukmani, Tension between Vyutthana and Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras,
Journal of Indian Philosophy 25 (1997): pp. 613628.
25 asuddhasyavaranamalapetasya prakasatmano buddhisattvasya rajastamob-
hyamanabhibhutah svacchah stithipravaho vaisaradyam . . . tada yogino bhava-
tyadhyatmaprasadah bhutarthavisayah karmananurodh sphutaprajnalokah
(VyBh I.47).
26 tasya rtambhareti samjna bhavati, anvartha ca sa, satyameva bibharti (VyBh
I.47).
27 . . . tasya na pratyayantarani bhavanti. tatah sarvatha vivekakhyatiriti. tadasya
dharmameghah samadhirbhavati (Tattvavaisarad, in Yogasutras IV.29).
28 . . . punarjvannneva mukto bhavati (ibid., in Yogasutras IV.30).
29 prasamkhyanavato vivekasaksatkarino jvanmuktasya dagdhaklesabjasya
(Yogavarttika II.4).
30 atah ksnaklesah kusalascaramadeha ityucyate (VyBh II.4).
31 tatascaramadeho jvanmukta iti (Bhasvat II.4).
32 cittasya visayadosadarsinah prasamkhyanabaladanabhogatmika heyopade-
jna vairagyam
yasunya vaskarasam (VyBh I.15).
33 tatparam purusakhyatergunavaitrsnyam (Yogasutras I.16). jnanasyaiva
parakastha vairagyam (VyBh I.16).
34 jnanasya yah prasadascaramotkarso rajolesamalahnata, ata eva sattva-
purusanyatakhyatimatrata (Bhasvat I.16).
35 etasyaiva hi nantaryakam kaivalyamiti (VyBh I.16).
36 samadhirasamprajnatah tasya param vairagyamupayah (VyBh I.18).
37 kaivalyakhyam param dharmam varsatti dharmamegha iti samjna (Vivarana
IV.29).
38 See note 19 above.
39 See note 20 above.
40 See note 29 above.
References
Whicher Ian, The Integrity of Yoga Darsana: A Reconstruction of Classical Yoga. New
York: State University of New York Press, 1998.
T. S. Rukmani 139