G.R. No.
L-48268 October 30, 1978 only have commenced in 1977 and prescription could
HEIRS OF SEGUNDO UBERAS vs. COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL
Facts
The plaintiff assailed the decision of the CFI in
dismissing the complaint filed by heirs of Segundo
Uberas against Soledad Rapiz, and the children of
Pedro Uberas on the ground of prescription and
contending that the action is imprescriptible because
it is one for partition and to quiet title to the property in
question, declaring the declaration of heirship and
deed of sale executed by defendants to be null and
void ab initio. The plaintiffs are the children and
successors in interest of Segundo Uberas and Albino
Uberas, while the defendants are the surviving spouse,
Soledad Rapiz, and the children of Pedro Uberas, as
well as Alejandra Uberas who is impleaded as an
unwilling co-plaintiff. Segundo, Albino, Francisca,
Pedro and Alejandra, all surnamed Uberas, the first
four (4) already deceased, are legitimate children of
the spouses Juan Uberas and Dominga Mendoza who
originally own the land in question. Through fraudulent
acts and malicious scheme, the land was transferred
under the name of the surviving spouse, Soledad
Rapiz, and the children of Pedro Uberas, and later
claimed sole ownership and possession of the entire
property. As already indicated, respondent court in its
questioned order, dismissed the complaint on the
ground that it was barred by prescription "as more than
ten (10) years had elapsed counted from the
registration of the extrajudicial declaration of heirship
and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title solely
in the names of Pedro Uberas and Alejandra Uberas.
The complaint was raised November 3, 1977 while
the title was transferred to Soledad Rapiz and her
children December 2, 1966. Reconsideration of the
dismissal order having been denied by respondent
court,petitioners filed the present petition for review.
Issue
Whether or not the action for quieting of title for the
said property is imprescriptible.
Held:
Yes, the action for quieting of title for the said property
is imprescriptible. That an action to quiet title to
property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible
and that where there are material facts to be inquired
into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by
the parties which will determine the legal precepts to
be applied, as in this case, the complaining party
should be given full opportunity to prove his case is
fully applicable here according to Faja vs. Court of
Appeals. Also, respondent court manifestly failed to
take into account the averments of petitioners'
complaint that they "and defendants are co-owners
and possessors of the property" and that "the
malicious and illegal acts committed by defendants
were known to the plaintiffs only during this year 1977,
after Soledad Rapiz and her children were already
claiming full ownership and possession of the whole of
the property," thus, the period for prescription would
not lie. Wherefore, the respondent court's order of
dismissal is set aside and the case is
remanded to respondent court for trial and
determination on the merits.
G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009
DBT Mar-bay Construction, Inc.
vs Ricaredo Panes, etc.
Ponente: Nachura
Facts:
A parcel of land was conveyed by Regalado to DBT
through a dacion en pago for services rendered. On
June 24, 1992, the respondents Panes and his sons
filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages and
petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT.
In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful
owner of the land which he had declared for taxation
purposes in his name. Respondents alleged that per
certificate issued by the DENR the land was verified to
be correct and on file.
Respondents also claimed the Ricaredo and his
immediate family had been and still are in actual
possession of the subject property, and their
possession preceded the 2nd world war. To perfect his
title, Ricaredo filed with the RTC QC.
Respondents averred that in the process of complying
with the registration, it was found out that a portion of
the land was with the subdivision plan of Regalado
which was conveyed by Regalado to DBT.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses
Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses
Tabangcura) filed their Answer with Counterclaim,
claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for
value when they bought a house and lot covered by
TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being
a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof,
on June 30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin
entered and occupied the property, Spouses
Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property
before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which
rendered a decision in their favor.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that
it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject
property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by
B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents
were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo
was a mere claimant whose rights over the property
had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed
his application for registration; that the other
respondents did not
allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle
them to the relief prayed for in their complaint; that
the complaint was premature; and that the action
inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.
RTC's Ruling:
The testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the
property since he was only 16 had not been rebutted;
Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the land for
more than 30 years vested him equitable ownership.
DBT filed a motion for reconsideration based on the
grounds of prescription and laches. While this motion
was still pending, judge Bacalla died.
Then an intervenor claimed that portions of the subject
land was part of the estate of certain Don Jose de
Ocampo.
CA's Ruling: CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002
and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000.
The CA held that the properties described and
included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San
Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and
Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property is
located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's
testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters
between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved
or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson
committed a procedural infraction when he entertained
issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its
Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in
the pleadings and proceedings prior to the rendition of
the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of
laches and prescription clearly appeared to be an
afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for
Reconsideration was not based on grounds
enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.
Issues:
(1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of
prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion
for Reconsideration? (2) Which between DBT and the
respondents have a better right over the subject
property?
Held:
(1) Affirmative. The facts demonstrating the lapse of
the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise
established by the evidence. However, the conclusion
reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was
erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action
filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an
action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because
respondents' possession of the subject property has
rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of
title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches.
Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or
conduct alleged to constitute the same must be
intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive
prescription over the subject property is baseless.
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive
prescription of ownership of lands registered under the
Land Registration Act shall be governed by special
laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD
No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the
instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is
immaterial and inconsequential.
Note:
- action for reconveyance can be barred by
prescription. When an action for reconveyance is
based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years
from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the
original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the
issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world and therefore
the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken
place at the time of registration.
VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not
be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary
dispute.
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is
the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their
lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide
the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic)
to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or
less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more
or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo
Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.
Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of
his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion
is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680
square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.
The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the
fish pond which they claim is within their area.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over
the northern portion of the property with an area of
approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a
bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes,
thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly
encroach to their property but the defendant said that
he merely reconstructed the same.
Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were
denied thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action
RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously
a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and
in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon a title to real property or any interest
therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a
cloud to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and
defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of
partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance
therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that
the only controversy is whether these lands were
properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the
proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit
instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for
recovery of possession de facto, also within the
prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners,
in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully
threshed out.
FELIX BUCTON AND NICANORA GABAR
BUCTON, petitioners, vs. ZOSIMO GABAR,
JOSEFINA LLAMOSO GABAR AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: This action for specific performance filed by
the plaintiffs prays, inter-alia, that defendants-spouses
be ordered to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of
sale of the western half of a parcel of land having an
area of 728 sq. m. covered by TCT No. II of the office
of the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental. Plaintiffs'
evidence tends to show that sometime in 1946
defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar bought the above-
mentioned land from the spouses Villarin on
installment basis, to wit, P500 down, the balance
payable in installments. Josefina entered into a verbal
agreement with her sister-in-law, plaintiff Nicanora
Gabar Bucton, that the latter would pay one-half of the
price (P3,000) and would then own one-half of the
land. In January, 1947 the spouses Villarin executed
the deed of sale of the land abovementioned in favor
of defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar, Exhibit I, to
whom was issued on June 20, 1947 TCT No. II,
cancelling OCT No. 6337. Plaintiffs then sought to
obtain a separate title for their portion of the land in
question. Defendants repeatedly declined to
accommodate plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a sale between
Josefina and Nicanora.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that petitioner
Nicanora paid P1,500.00 to respondent Josefina as
purchase price of one-half of the lot now covered by
TCT No. II, for respondent Court of Appeals found as a
fact "that plaintiffs really paid for a portion of the lot in
question pursuant to their agreement with the
defendants that they would own one-half (1/2) of the
land." That sale, although not consigned in a public
instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and
binding between petitioners and private respondents,
for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract
of sale or real estate produces legal effects between
the parties. Although at the time said petitioner paid
P1,000.00 as part payment of the purchase price on
January 19, 1946, private respondents were not yet
the owners of the lot, they became such owners on
January 24, 1947, when a deed of sale was executed
in their favor by the Villarin spouses. In the premises,
Article 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of
law to the buyer or grantee," is applicable. Petitioners
therefore became owners of the one-half portion of the
lot in question by virtue of a sale which, though not
evidenced by a formal deed, was nevertheless proved
by both documentary and parole evidence.
Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Heirs of Cornelio Glor
G.R. No. 104813, 21 October 1993
Facts: In 1950, then twelve-year-old Eutiquio Pureza
and his father cleared and cultivated Lot 13, Pls-84 of
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision which
measured more or less 54,406 sq.m. They
introduced in 1954 improvements such as trees of
coconut, jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and bananas.
Upon the land's release for disposition, the Bureau of
Lands surveyed it in Eutiquio Pureza's name.
Godofredo (Jose Olviga's son and brother of
petitioners Virgilio and Lolita Olviga-Olila) protested
thesurvey but without respect to the half-a-
hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng
Amihanan-Silanganan" which he claimed. Godofredo's
protest is of public record in the Bureau of Lands and
itstated that he admitted the lot belonged to Eutiquio
except for the half-a-hectare portion included in the
survey. Eutiquio filed a homestead application in 1960
for Lot 13, but since no action was done on his
application, he transferred his rights to the lot in 1961
to Cornelio Glor, Sr.. The Bureau of Lands'
records did not disclose why there was no action for
Eutiquio's homestead application and the proposed
transfer of rights to the land to Cornelio, Sr. The elder
Cornelio was sickly and since his wife Angelita was
unschooled, she and her children failed to follow up
Eutiquio's homestead application in the cadastral
proceedings held at the Municipal Court of
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Angelita
testified that she was never notified about the outcome
of said proceedings. The non-posting of the hearing of
cadastral proceedings was confirmed by Virgilio. The
Olvigas were Glors' neighbors. Jose claimed on the
other hand adjoining lands Lot 12 and 13 in the
cadastral proceeding. He falsely omitted that there
were persons claiming possession and adverse
interests in Lot 13 and Eutiquio's sale of rights to
Cornelio Sr. in 1961. Thus in 1967, the lands were
awarded without contest to Jose Olviga and
subsequently registered under Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-12713. Jose requested later in 1971 that
the land be splitted into two separate lots with separate
titles. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were
subsequently issued to Lots 12 and 13 respectively,
and he later on transferred Lot 13 to his daughter
Lolita and her husband Jaime Olila. Cornelio's widow
Angelita filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon an action against the heirs of Jose Olviga to
reconvey that parcel of land to her and her heirs. The
RTC rendered judgment in Angelita's favor after due
trial, and it ordered the Olvigas' to reconvey the land
and pay attorney's fees. Jose Olviga's heirs appealed
the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, but it
affirmed the trial court's judgment in its 13 January
1992 decision (CA-G.R. CV No. 30542). It also found
that spouses Jaime and Lolita Olviga-Olila were not in
possession of the disputed land nor innocent
purchasers for value and that the Glors and their
predecessor-in-interest Eutiquio Pureza were the
possessors.
Issues addressed by the Supreme Court: The Olviga
heirs asked for petition for review of the CA's
decision and the following issues were raised,
1. Whether or not plaintiffs' action is for quieting of title
that does not prescribe, and assuming
their demand is for reconveyance of the land being
based on implied trust, prescribes in ten (10)
years?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point
of reference being the date of registration of the deed
of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property. But this rule applies only when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe.
2. Whether the Glors' cause of action accrued not in
1967 but in 1988, and as mere homestead
transferees, cannot maintain an action for
reconveyance? It was also held that the Glors and
their predecessors-in-interest Cornelio Glor, Sr. and
Eutiquio Pureza were in actual possession of the
property since 1950. Their undisturbed
possession gave them continuing right to seek aid of
a court of equity to determine nature of Olviga's
adverse claim, who in 1988, disturbed their
possession. Thus, the right to quiet the property's title
which seeks reconveyance and annulment of any
certificate of title, accrues only from the time the
possessor was made aware of the adverse claim and it
is only from that time that the statutory period of
prescription commences to run against him/her. It also
stated that the actual possessor of a piece of land
claiming to be its owner may wait until disturbance of
his/her possession or the attack of his/her title before
taking steps in vindication of his/her right because his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by one who is in possession.
Heirs of Valientes vs. Hon. Ramas Digest
G.R. No. 157852: December 15, 2010
HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, Petitioners, v.
Hon. ReInerio (Abraham) B. Ramas, Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 29, 9th Judicial
Region, San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur and Vilma
V. Minor, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Valientes
who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel of
land in Zamboanga delSur. In 1939, Valientes
mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to
the spouses Belen. In the 1950s, the Valientes family
purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the
subject property from the spouses Belen. Through an
allegedly forged document captioned VENTA
DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the
subject property between Valientes and the spouses
Belen, the latter obtained title over the land. On
February 28, 1970, the legitimate children of the late
Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Upon
the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and
sale in favor of private respondent Minor, the present
possessor of the subject property. On June 20, 1979,
Minor filed with the then CFI a "PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF
ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN THE TITLE IN HER
POSSESSION" which the RTC granted. On the other
hand, petitioners filed a complaint for the cancellation
of the title in Minors possession and its
reconveyanceto them. On this complaint, Minor filed
an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum
shopping and litis pendentia, which the RTC
dismissed. Undeterred, Minor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was granted. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration based on this decision
which was denied. They appealed it to the CA, which
although found that there was no forum shopping nor
litis pendentia, dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription and laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription or laches has already set
in to bar the filing of the case at hand.
HELD: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED
CIVIL CODE; PRESCRIPTION
When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject
property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of
title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at
bar, petitioners are not in possession of the subject
property. In this case, if it were to be considered as
that of enforcing an implied trust, should have
therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance
of TCT to spouses Belen.But, the case was instituted
beyond the prescriptive period.
As to the alternative defense of petitioners, applying
Arts. 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, thus
entitling them to a 30 year period to assail the title, the
Court ruled that the applicable law in this instant case
is Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree (since it is more
specific that the general rules of the above mentioned
articles of the Civil Code). Under the Torrens System
as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of entry of the decree of registration, without
prejudice to an action for damages against the
applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.
It took petitioners 28 before filing this case. This period
is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its
right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners
claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently
unconvincing.
The Decision of the CA and the Resolution are
AFFIRMED.
Calacala vs RP
Facts:
Spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala,
predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at
Barangay Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a
criminal case then pending before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses
offered their aforementioned parcel of land as a
property bond in said case.
For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled
arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI ordered the
bond forfeited in favor of the government, and,
following the bondman's failure to produce in court the
body of the accused, rendered judgment against the
bond in the amount of P3,500.00.
Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of
Execution[1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a
levy on the subject parcel of land and to sell the same
at a public auction to satisfy the amount of the bond. In
compliance with the writ, the deputy provincial sheriff
issued on 26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy[2] addressed
to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan who, on 19
August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT
No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject
parcel of land was held on 24 September 1982, at
which respondent Republic submitted its bid
for P3,500, which is the amount of the judgment on the
bond. Hence, on that same day, a Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale[3] was issued in favor of the Republic as the
winning bidder.
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was
registered and annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as
Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala
a period of one (1) year therefrom within which to
redeem their property. Unfortunately, they never did up
to the time of their respective deaths on 13 January
1988 and 8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of
the deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a
complaint[4] for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of
Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against
respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez. In
their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-
R and raffled to Branch 53 of the court, petitioners
prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No.
83188 and 83793 on TCT No. T-21204 or the
declaration of said entries as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed
a Motion to Dismiss[5] grounded on the (1) complaint's
failure to state a cause of action and (2) prescription of
petitioners' right to redeem.
Issue: whether the trial court's dismissal of petitioners'
complaint for Quieting of Title was proper
Held:
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy
may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding,
which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on
the complainant's title to real property or any interest
therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the
party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable
title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in
this case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title
not on the strength of any independent writing in their
favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's
failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a
writ of possession over the property in dispute within
ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of
Sale.
Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or
inactions of respondent Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had
over land in question from the very moment they failed
to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption.
Certainly, the Republic's failure to execute the acts
referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from
the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any
way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure,
petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule
of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the
effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to
secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of
possession over the property thus acquired, within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of
Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose
property has been previously foreclosed and sold. As
correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's
failure to do anything within ten (10) years or more
following the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale cannot give rise to a presumption that it has
thereby waived or abandoned its right of ownership or
that it has prescribed, 'for prescription does not lie
against the government', nor could it 'be bound or
estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials
and employees' .
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to
redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute,
the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best
a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that
is already vested in the purchaser.
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any
legal title over the property subject of this case and are
bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first
requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject matter of the
action, is miserably wanting in this case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue,
as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of
the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5
October 1982. On this score, the second requisite of
an action to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a
plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is
likewise absent herein.
G.R. No. L-38387 January 29, 1990
HILDA WALSTROM, petitioner-appellant, vs.
FERNANDO MAPA, JR., VICTORINO A. MAPA,
MARIA C.M. DE GOCO, FERNANDO MAPA, III,
MARIO L. MAPA, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, respondents-
appellees.
Facts:
Cacao Dianson, has a free patent application, he filed
with the District Land Office in Baguio City a letter
protesting the construction in April, 1956 by Josefa
Abaya Mapa of on the parcel of land (described as
"portion A") of one of the parcels of land covered by
his Free Patent Application.
The controversy was referred to Bureau of Lands
Investigator Antonio Mejia. He found that Josefa
Abaya Mapa has filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application, the same was awarded to her on May 12,
1934. The purchase price has been paid in full in 1943
evidenced by an Official Receipt. Cacao Dianson filed
a Free Patent Application for the same parcel of land
on June 1, 1956, alleging that the said land was first
occupied by his father, Dianson, in 1884.
The regional land officer of Dagupan City decided that
Free Patent Application of Cacao Dianson should
exclude Portion "A" which is covered by the
Miscellaneous Sales Application of Josefa Abaya
Mapa. Two years after the death of Dianson, Walstrom
filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that
Dianson is her predecessor in interest, the motion for
reconsideration resulted in setting aside the decision of
the Regional land officer. Mapa then appealed to the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reinstated the decision of the Regional land officer,
then Gabriela Walstrom filed for motion for
reconsideration but was denied. While Walstrom filed
for a second motion for reconsideration of the order of
DANR, Mapa filed a motion for execution. DANR
granted the motion for execution. Walstrom then filed a
petition for relief with the DANR but then pending the
petition, she died. The heirs of Mapa pursued the
case. This petition of Walstrom remained unresolved,
according to petitioner Hilda Walstrom, daughter of
Gabriela Walstrom, she was compelled to file an action
in the court because the 1 year prescriptive period
provided for in Sec 38 of Land Registration act was
about to lapse.
Issues:
*Whether or not Walstroms civil complaint against the
respondents praying for nullification of the Mapas
sales patent and certificates of title issued by the
register of deeds under Section 38 of Act 496 or the
Land Registration Act is valid.
Ruling of the Court
SEC. 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act
provides that a decree of registration may be reopened
or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon
the concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit: (a)
that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b)
that he has been deprived thereof;(c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has
not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser
for value.
An examination of the records of the case shows non-
concurrence of the essential elements enumerated
above.
The first element is patently not present because the
petitioner cannot allege that she has already a real and
dominical right to the piece of property in controversy
since the decision of the regional land officer was
upheld by the DANR secretary. That the petitioner's
Free Patent Application shall exclude the disputed
portion "A" of Lot No. 1, which, instead, shall be
included in the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales
Application.
The second element is also absent, the petitioner
cannot aver that she was deprived of property because
she did not have a real right over portion "A".
As to the third element, the records are bereft of any
indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title.
The court also finds that the lower court was correct in
holding that the case does not fall under any of the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Instead of invoking Section 38, the petitioner
should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her
petition with the DANR. The petitioners fear that since
the one-year prescriptive period for seeking judicial
relief provided for in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration
Act was about to lapse, she was compelled to file the
action to nullify said patent is not correct.
The court has ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran
that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens
title already issued in the name of another person, he
can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to the rightful owner. After all, the
Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect
one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation
and thus holds title in bad faith.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this
case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it
imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property.
The court upheld the decision of the trial court.
ARDELL v. BARTOLOME G.R. No. L-
4656 November 18, 1912
FACTS: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and
respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the
existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin.
On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de
Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without
an judicial authorization or even extra judicial
agreement the administration of the properties of the
late Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a
house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in
Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in
Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice
land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land
in Candon, Ilocos Sur. Vicenta filed an action in
court asking that the judgement be rendered in
restoring and returning to them one half of the total
value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages
from the aforementioned properties. However,
respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to
give the plaintiff her share of the said properties.
Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband,
Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their
occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta
Street.
ISSUE: Is defendant Matilde Ortiz, as co-owner of the
house on Calle Escolta, entitled, with her husband, to
reside therein, without paying to her co-owner, Vicenta
Ortiz, one-half of the rents which the upper story would
have produced, had it been rented to a stranger?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not
liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property
was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a
co-owner. Each co-owner or tenant in common of
undivided realty has the same rights therein as the
others; he may use and enjoy the same without other
limitation except that he must not prejudice the rights
of his co-owners, but until a division is effected, the
respective parts belonging to each can not be
determined; each co-owner exercises joint dominion
and is entitled to joint use. Matilde Ortiz and her
husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as
a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the
record shows no proof that, by so doing, Matilde
occasioned any detriment to the interests of the
community property, nor that she prevented her sister
Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to
her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower
floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was
duly made to the plaintiffs.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673,
July 26, 1996
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV
program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for
public viewing by the respondent Board of Review
for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB).
These TV programs allegedly offend[ed] and
constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law because of petitioner
INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its
attacks against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the
actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal
by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC.
The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not
act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series
of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another religion.
The CA also found the subject TV series indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.
Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC
appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to
review petitioners TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent
Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioners religious program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the
CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the
respondent Boards X-rating petitioners TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to
AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review
petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power
to review petitioners TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term television
program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the
respondent Board has the power to review and
classify] should not include religious programs like its
program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed.
[The Court however] reject petitioners
postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the
eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule
that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind
but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile
area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court]
shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for
the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its
exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse
its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioners religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted
with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent
Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking
either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-
called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court
as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives
it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional
scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no
difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When
the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech
for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the

petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City
of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty
of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.

The records show that the decision of the

respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video
tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint
on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing
of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the
life of a reality already on ground.

SERING v. PLAZO- Action for Ejectment

Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring
an action in ejectment.

FACTS:
Sering won an ejectment suit against Spouses Plazo
and Suan. On appeal with the CFI, respondents
learned that Sering is not the sole owner of the
property and they moved to implead the other co-
owners because they think that they are indispensable
parties to the case. Court granted and ordered Sering
to amend complaint.
Due to the failure of the petitioner to amend the
complaint, the case was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the other co-owners are indispensable to the
ejecment case

HELD:
No, according to Art 478 Anyone of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment (whether the action is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer). The matter to be
determined is the prior physical possession of the
plaintiff which was correctly alleged.