Professional Documents
Culture Documents
To execute their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala realty some of its
properties.
Tala realty simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties for 20
years, renewable for another 20 years at the respondents option with a right
of first refusal in the event Tala realty decides to sell them.
August 1992, Tala realty repudiated (renounced) the trust, claimed the titles
for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and goodwill,
with a threat to eject the bank
From 1995 to 1998, Banco Filipino filed 17 complaints against Tala realty,
Nancy Ty (petitioner), Pedro, Remedios, and their respective nominees for
reconveyance of different properties with 17 regional Trial Courts (RTCs)
nationwide, including Civil Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the
RTC of Malabon (Malabon case) subject of the present case.
The bank then moved for pre-trial, which Tala Realty again opposed due to
pendency of G.R. No. 132703 which assailed the CAs affirmance of the denial of the
motion to dismiss, this time in Iloilo City (Civil Case No. 22493). Nancy also filed her
own opposition, citing two cases, G.R. No. 132703, and G.R. No. 130184, this time
the CAs reversal of the dismissal of the Quezon City case.
The RTC suspended the proceedings. After six years, the RTC issued an order
directing the counsels to inform it of the status of the pending cases.
Nancy filed her manifestation, informing the RTC of the Supreme Courts rulings in
the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and in G.R. No. 132703,
and reported on the other cases involving the same parties decided by this Court,
such as G.R. Nos. 129887, 137980, 132051, 137533, 143263, and 142672, as well
as the other related cases decided by the Supreme Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 144700,
147997, 167255, and 144705.
The bank also filed its own manifestation with motion to revive proceedings, citing
the rulings in consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130184 and 139166, and the
decisions in G.R. Nos. 144700, 167255, and 144705, commonly holding that there
existed no forum shopping, litis pendentia and res judicata among the respondents
reconveyance cases pending in the other courts of justice.
In her comment/opposition to the motion to revive, Nancy held that the case should
not be revived, as it involves the same issue of implied trust which the Court in G. R
No. 137533 ruled that was void for being in contravention of the limitation imposed
by the General Banking Act on the bank (the 50% rule)
The RTC ordered the revival of the proceedings, citing that there is no res judicata in
this case because there are other independent causes for each of the parties to
sought be recovered.
The Court of Appeals denied her petition for certiorari, holding that res judicata does
not apply in this case since the Supreme Court ruled in G.R. No. 144705 that G.R.
No. 137533 does not put to rest all pending litigations involving the issues of
ownership between the parties since it involved only an issue of de facto
possession. In this case, the trust agreement was only raised in an ejectment case,
not an issue involving ownership.
Nancy elevated her case to the Supreme Court. According to her, G.R. No. 137533 is
controlling in this case and therefore, this case should not be revived in accordance
with the doctrine of res judicata.
G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and
166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established. Under the doctrine,
when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where
facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are
the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule
involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular
sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based upon the judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the
sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue]. (italics
supplied)
Virtucio v. Alegarbes
Facts: Alegarbes filed a homestead application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed
land. In 1955, the land was subdivided into three lots as a consequence of a public
land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner. Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, The
Director of Lands denied Alegarbes' protest. An order of execution ordering
Alegarbes to vacate the subject lot was issued, but he refused. In 1997, Virtucio
filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership. The RTC ruled in favor of
Virtucio. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner
of the lot by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v.
Alegarbes, which involved the same factual circumstances and in which the CA
ruled against Alegarbes.
Issue: Whether or not the CAs decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes constitutes judicial
predecent and should be applied to the case at bar
Held: No. It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139
allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case. The latter
cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just because
it involved similar factual circumstances.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and ownership before the RTC. The RTC ruled infavor of Virtucio. The CA reversed
the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 by virtue of
acquisitive prescription.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition. He argues that the period of acquisitive
prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 when Alegarbes filed a protest
before the Director of Lands. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate
said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in
Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by
acquisitive prescription?
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive,
that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article
1106. Other names for acquisitive prescription are adverse possession and
usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are
lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another
name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of
prescription should not be interchanged. Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to
the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on
the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code.
Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively
toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When
no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the
respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his
homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive
prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a judicial
summons can effectively toll the said period. Only in cases filed before the courts
may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records show that
it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore,
correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to
retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession
for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land.
DENIED.
The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and
set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published
in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondents application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12,
1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador
and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally
owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds
of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943.
Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who
continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in
1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the
certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following
documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador
and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties;
(3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineers
Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6)
certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior
Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration
should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11)
of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed
of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that,
upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic
map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then
Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that
the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area
verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga
confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77
m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on
the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the
request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No.
3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the
elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was
merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on
March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the
preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always
remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already
changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic
map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method
used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50
m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna
Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake
extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part
of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by
the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless
even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of
12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of
the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject
properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily
mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts finding that the elevations of the subject
properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part
of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed
to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands
not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain
part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable."
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
"under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968."
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted
only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no
information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title
under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its
application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject
properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian
thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the
application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting
that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article
4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out
that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC
prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of
specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject
of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily
follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the
manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the
possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive
and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The
possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties
presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain
why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared
for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the
respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year.
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when
the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the
tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A
doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario
Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself
said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also
told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a
Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must
award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also
free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter
was deported.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed
her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court
dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of
the New Civil Code.
HELD: YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court
reinstated.
RATIO: The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the
filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their
right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to
give effect to the law makers will.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC decision to deny the Bans heirs of their right of legal
redemption is valid
HELD: The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision
granting the Bans heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was
based on the provisions of article 1623 NCC. A written notice must be issued by the
prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings submitted by the parties
showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written
notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may be
exercised does not exist. In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the
vendor is mandatory.
From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence.
The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this
is appeal to reverse such decision.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero
HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an
accident. It has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal
practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced
by such practice has acquiesced for years.
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are
approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial
rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of
some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the
cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time
to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the
accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause
of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus,
its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. According to the CTA,
the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final
adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap
year. According to the CA, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000
should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is
clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.
Issue: Whether or not the counting of the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claim
of refund is governed by the Civil Code.
Held: Counting of 2-year period for filing claim for refund is no longer in accordance
with Art 13 of the Civil Code but under Sec 31 of EO 227 - The Administrative Code
of 1987.
As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days,
and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12
calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law,
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.
In the case at bar, there are 24 calendar months in 2 years. For a Final Corporate
ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should start from Apr 15, 1998 and end on
Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is 1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 . 24th
month - Mar 15, 2000 to Apr 14, 2000. National Marketing v. Tecson, 139 Phil 584
(1969) is no longer controlling. The 2-year period should start to run from filing of
the final adjusted return.
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on
the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final
adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Montajes v People
Facts: Alfredo (Montajes) was charged and convicted for Direct Assault against
Barangay Captain Jose (Rellon) when he allegedly tried to hit the latter with a bolo
when he stopped a benefit dance which already exceeded the time allowed for it.
The Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista Agusan del Norte convicted him, and his
appeal to the Regional Trial Court was also denied, hence, Jose filed a petition
(motion) for extension of time to file a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
for 15 days, counted from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007. It appears that he
received the copy of the RTCs order denying his motion for reconsideration on May
4, 2007. He then filed his Petition for Review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed his petition for review outrightly for being
filed out of time. The CA noted that Jose received the copy of the RTC order denying
his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007, hence he had 15 days within which
to file the petition for review. Considering that May 19, 2007 fell on a Saturday, it
was error for Jose to compute his extension of time on the first working day after the
deadline (Saturday, May 19), or on May 21, 2007 since when a party is granted an
extension of time, the 15-day reckoning period should start from the last day which
is Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to the CA. His motion for reconsideration
denied, Jose filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing
that his petition was not filed out of time since he filed it pursuant to Section 1, Rule
22 of the Rules of Court; based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition
falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last
day of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with
the CA fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the
next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in
asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and not
from May 19, 2007, Saturday. He asks that his petition be resolved on the merits
rather than on technicalities since he filed his petition for review long before the CA
dismissed the case.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC
dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working
Day is Granted) which reads:
xxxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies
in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next
working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the
next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a
Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension of time is
filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not
from the original expiration of the period.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to
declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of the last day of the period so that
when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to
be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to
file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the
period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree
was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on
the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium,
and desertion of her husband.
Held:
1. YES. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the
NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a
patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par.
of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination
in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside
the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not
countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of
injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of
moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal
separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the
damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176)
expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect
accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts
the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And
where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no
cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of
other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion
be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the Petition, the tuna processors,
including Respondent KINGFORD, withdrew from Petitioner TPI and correspondingly
reneged on their obligations. Petitioner TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California,
United States and won the case against Respondent KINGFORD.
To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition,
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City.
Respondent KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC denied for lack of
merit. Respondent KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of the RTC judge, Judge
Alameda, and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the Motion. Judge
Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding [t]he unfounded allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions in the motion. Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-
raffled, in turn, granted Respondent KINGFORDSs Motion for Reconsideration and
dismissed the Petition on the ground that Petitioner TPI lacked legal capacity to sue
in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI is a corporation established in the State of California
and not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ARGUMENT: Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to seek for the recognition
and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with RA No.
9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York
Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(Model Law), as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the
enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.
RULING: YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines,
may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance
with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. A foreign
corporations capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing
party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may
raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
a. The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made;
b. The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case;
c. The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced;
d. The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
e. The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
Not one of the abovementioned exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of
the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may
petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award. The contents
of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is not included.
Oppositely, in the rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where
the place of arbitration is in the Philippines, it is specifically required that a
petition to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and
enforceability of such arbitration agreement available to the parties before the
commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for judicial relief from the ruling of
the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction
after arbitration has already commenced should state [t]he facts showing that the
persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the RTC correctly
observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject
arbitral award, Petitioner TPI may still seek recognition and enforcement of the
award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical
exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.