ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
ADMIN LAW FULL TEXT
C. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
1. No. L-16537. June 29, 1962.
FRANCISCO C. CALO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.
Appeal; Appeal bond filed after 30-day period to
appeal.Although the notice of appeal was
filed within the reglementary period, the appeal
has not been perfected where the appeal bond
was filed on the 31st day after notice of
judgment.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of
administrative remedies; Withdrawal of appeal,
effect of.In an administrative case, appeal to
the President of the Philippines is the last step
that the aggrieved party should take. The
withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President
is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto.
Such withdrawal is fatal.
Same; When certiorari and prohibition will lie.
A civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the instant case, appeal from an opinion or
order by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to the petitioner.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Calo, Calo & Calo for petitioner-appellant.
Ismael B. Sanchez and Jalandoni & Jamir for
respondent-appellee Delfin C. Fuertes.
Solicitor General for respondent-appellee
Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
PADILLA, J.:
In Bureau of Lands Claim No. 224 (N), Lot No.
143-A, Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City,
entitled Francisco C. Calo, claimant-contestant,
vs. H.A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes,
applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands
rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying
and dismissing former's claim and contest
against the Homestead Application No. 86871
(E-40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, ordering him to
vacate the premises within sixty days from
receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that
upon finality thereof homestead patent would
be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes. His request for
reconsideration having been denied by the
Director of Lands on 25 January 1957, Francisco
C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources the case, docketed as
DANR case No. 1549. On 28 February 1958 the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
modified the opinion of the Director of Lands
x x x in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should
reimburse Francisco G. Calo of the difference
between the value of the improvements the
latter introduced on the land in controversy and
the value of the consequential benefits derived
by him therefrom within thirty (30) days from
advice by the Director of Lands who is hereby
directed to determine the aforementioned
difference within sixty (60) days from receipt of
a copy of this decision.
Still dissatisfied with the above opinion,
Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to reconsider
it but the latter denied a reconsideration
thereof. Hence, on 1 August 1958 Francisco C.
Calo appealed to the President of the
Philippines (Annex A to Answer, p. 54, rec. of
case No. 55), but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew
it before the President of the Philippines could
act thereon (Annex A to memorandum of the
petitioner, p. 64, rec. of case No. 55).
On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo filed in the
Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for
writs of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction praying that the
enforcement of the opinions of the Director of
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Lands andthe Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Re-
sources be enjoined; that if a bond be needed
for the purpose he was willing to file it; that
after hearing the injunction be made final and
permanent; that the respondent Delfin C.
Fuertes pay him P18,000 as damages and
attorney's fees and costs of the suit; that he be
declared the owner entitled to possess the
parcel of land subject of the litigation; and for
any other just and equitable relief (special civil
case No. 55).
On 24 December 1958 the respondent Delfin C.
Fuertes filed an answer and, on 27 December
1958, an amended answer to the petition; on 29
December 1958 and 3 January 1959 the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Lands,
respectively, filed their answers. After a
preliminary hearing as provided for in section 5,
Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, on 31 July 1959
the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
part of which is-
WHEREFORE, for failure to state a cause of
action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not
exhausting all the administrative remedies
available to the petitioner in the ordinary course
of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby
dismisses the herein petition with costs against
petitioner.
The petitioner appealed, but as only a question
of law is raised, the Court of Appeals certified
the appeal to this Court.
This appeal has not been perfected within the
reglementary period, as provided for in section
17, Rule 41, for although the notice of appeal
was filed on 31 August 1959 (p. 77, record of
case No. 55) or on the 13th day from the receipt
of case No. 55 the appeal bond was filed on 18
September 1959 (p. 78, record of case No. 55)
or on the 31st day after notice of judgment. This
is enough to dispose of the case.
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is the alter ego of the President and
his acts or decisions are also those of the latter,
he need not appeal from the decision or
opinion of the former to the latter, and that,
such being the case, after he had appealed to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from the decision or opinion of the
Director of Lands he had exhausted all the
administrative remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the
President of the Philippines is tantamount to
not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is
fatal, because the appeal to the President is the
last step he should take in an administrative
case.
Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In the case at bar,
appeal from an opinion or order by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the President of the Philippines is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the
petitioner.1
The judgment appealed from already had
become final and cannot be reviewed. The
appeal is dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant. Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA
397, No. L-16537 June 29, 1962
A. CERTIORARI
7. No. L-74687. November 12, 1987.*
ANTONIO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
GREGORIO REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
thru MANUEL LAZARO, (now OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), respondents.
Evidence; Administrative Agencies; Authority of
Administrative superiors to reverse findings of
subordinates must be exercised sparingly and
only upon clear showing of error.While there
is no disputing the authority of administrative
superiors to reverse the findings of their
subordinates, this power must be exercised
sparingly and only upon a clear showing of
error. Lacking such flaw, the decision of the
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lower administrative officials should be
sustained, if only because they have closer
access to the problem sought to be resolved
and have the direct opportunity to question the
parties and their witnesses and to assess the
evidence first-hand.
Same; Same; Same; Review of decisions of
Administrative officials by their superiors to be
valid must not be whimsical, arbitrary or devoid
of substantial basis.While, as previously
remarked, the decisions of administrative
officials are subject to review by their superiors,
such review, to be valid, must not be whimsical
or arbitrary or devoid of substantial basis. There
is no question that the public respondent,
acting on behalf of the President, can reverse
the decisions of a department head although
the former is lower in rank than the Cabinet
member. But that is not the point. The point is
that, although the power is conceded, it must
be exercised, like all powers, within the limits of
the law, if substantive rights are to be protected
and justice is to be upheld.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Findings and
conclusions of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture upon a question of fact are
conclusive and not subject to review.The
public respondent, in setting aside the decision
of the Bureau of Lands, as affirmed by the
Ministry of Natural Resources, disregarded the
long line of decisions holding that the findings
and conclusions of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture upon a question of fact are
conclusive and not subject to review, in the
absence of showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition,
or mistake.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Remedy of Certiorari
applies to administrative decisions up to the
highest level and includes the decision at bar
even if rendered by authority of the
President.The writ of certiorari is available in
this case. If all administrative decisions were
conclusive upon us in any event, there would
have been no reason at all to offer this
extraordinary remedy to litigants who otherwise
would have been deprived of this only and last
resort to the courts of justice. This remedy
applies to administrative decisions up to the
highest level and includes the decision at bar
even if rendered by authority of the President.
The sacramental phrase does not remove these
decisions from the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court or inhibit us from reversing them when
warranted by a clear showing of a grave abuse
of discretion.
PETITION to review the decision of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
The land in dispute is located in Sta. Quiteria,
Caloocan City, and has an area of 13,956 square
meters. It is the subject of two separate
applications, one for sale filed by the late
Gregorio Reyes on December 21, 1967, and the
other for free patent filed by petitioner Antonio
de Leon on September 23, 1968. Both are based
on the claim of actual possession. To resolve the
conflict, the Bureau of Lands conducted an
investigation and after hearing ruled against
Gregorio Reyes,1 who appealed to the Ministry
of Natural Resources. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands was there set aside by the
assistant secretary for legal affairs,2 but he was
himself, on motion for reconsideration, reversed
by the Minister.3 The private respondents**
then elevated the case to the Office of the
President, where they were sustained.4 The
subsequent motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner was denied.5
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court was originally dismissed, and the
first motion for reconsideration was denied. We
held that the issues raised were mainly factual
and there was no showing that the findings
thereon were not supported by substantial
evidence. Upon the filing with leave of a second
motion for reconsideration, the Court decided
to take a harder look at the case, set aside the
earlier dismissal of the petition and gave due
course thereto, requiring the parties to file
memoranda.6
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As a matter of law and policy, this Court does
not review the factual findings of administrative
bodies as long as there is substantial evidence
to support them. Only in exceptional cases do
we deviate from this discipline, which is based
on a proper respect for the decisions of a
coordinate department and a just recognition of
its expertise on matters coming under its direct
jurisdiction. After the thorough study of the
pleadings filed by the parties, and of the
antecedent proceedings, we find that this is one
occasion for such deviation. The Court feels that
there is justification to review the decision here
questioned on the challenge that it was issued
with grave abuse of discretion by the public
respondent.
The reversal was made by then Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs Manuel M. Lazaro on
December 19, 1985. The petitioners motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied on
April 29, 1986, on the ground that there was
no strong and cogent reason to warrant the
reversal or modification of the decision.
The questioned decision was based on the
reports made by Land Investigator Pablo
Bautista on November 7, 1967, and December
21, 1967, as corroborated by Land Surveyor
Medardo Habal after his survey of the disputed
land on November 29, 1967. Bautista found that
the private respondent had been in possession
of the land in question since 1950, had planted
it to fruit trees and seasonal crops, and that no
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
other person was occupying it.7 Habal, for his 1968, it was planted by the petitioner and his
part, said that no one else was claiming the father to fruit-bearing trees, and there were two
land, nobody had protested his survey, and that nipa huts thereon, one belonging to the
there was no house on the said property.8 petitioner and the other to his daughter,
Catalina.11 Another report, filed this time by
The public respondent also noted that it was
Land Investigator Romeo Salvado, found that
only on December 3, 1968, that the petitioner
the petitioners possession was discontinued
had declared the said land for taxation
only in 1969 when Gregorio Reyes forced
purposes, retroactive to 1965. This was deemed
himself into the land in dispute and with the aid
an indication that the petitioner was not really
of armed men bulldozed the trees and plants
in possession thereof as he claimed and had
thereon. The petitioner complained to the
filed the declaration only to support his free
Bureau of Lands, which issued a status quo
patent application.9
order on May 4, 1970. Nevertheless, Reyes
To bolster these findings, the private ignored the same and in violation of the order
respondents submit that the land in dispute was and the Public Land Act, leased the land to Hi-
part of the lot from the Piedad Estate which had Protein Corporation, which introduced its own
been sold on July 16,1931, to the Bartolome improvements on the property.12
spouses and that this portion had merely been
While there is no disputing the authority of
inadvertently omitted in the technical
administrative superiors to reverse the findings
description of the said lot. Even so, it was
of their subordinates, this power must be
occupied by the Bartolomes (including Gregorio
exercised sparingly and only upon a clear
Reyes and his wife, who was a daughter of the
showing of error. Lacking such flaw, the decision
Bartolomes) along with the rest of the lot since
of the lower administrative officials should be
its purchase in the aforesaid year.10
sustained, if only because they have closer
Conversely, the petitioner points to the finding access to the problem sought to be resolved
of the Bureau of Lands, as affirmed by the and have the direct opportunity to question the
Ministry of Natural Resources, that his father, parties and their witnesses and to assess the
Simeon de Leon, had been in possession of the evidence first-hand.
disputed land since 1925 and until his death in
The hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, who
1950. His possession was then continued by the
made the initial investigation in the case at bar,
petitioner. According to Land Investigator Jose
had such an opportunity. It was Jose B. Isidro
B. Isidro, who inspected the land on October 30,
who conducted the hearings to resolve the
Page 4 of 22

conflicting claims of possession of the petitioner
and Gregorio Reyes, examined them and their
witnesses and inspected the disputed property.
His report of December 5,1968, was in favor of
the petitioners. Notably, not even the private
respondents impugn his integrity and
impartiality and in fact even cite him to support
their own position that de Leon had abandoned
the property by selling it in 1968 and 1969.13
By contrast, the motives of both Bautista and
Habal have been questioned by the petitioner,
and for good reason. The record shows that it
was Bautista who advised Gregorio Reyes to file
his sales application,14 and by some
happenstance, it was also Bautista who was
assigned to investigate the same. It is also not
denied that Habal was retained by Reyes to
conduct the survey of the land in dispute,
presumably for a corresponding
compensation.15 Given such circumstances, we
find it not unreasonable to suppose, and even
expect, that the reports of these two individuals
would be, as in fact they were, favorable to
Reyes.
It is worth noting that in his decision reversing
the Ministry of Natural Resources, the public
respondent merely rejected the report of Isidro
and opted in favor of the reports of Bautista and
Habal, but without saying why except to note
that Bautistas report was earlier. No effort was
made to explain away their apparent bias as
directly challenged by the petitioner. The
reports were simply and completely accepted to
sustain the private respondents stand. There
was also no mention of Land Investigator
Salvado, who reported on August 12, 1983, that
Reyes had violated the status quo order of the
Bureau of Lands and recommended that he be
held civilly and criminally liable. His report was
totally ignored.
Besides invoking the reports of Isidro and
Salvado, the petitioner presented two witnesses
who both testified that he and his father had
been in continuous possession of the land in
dispute, raising fruit-bearing trees there. Pastor
Buenaventura swore he was born in Sta.
Quiteria in 1917 and Ricardo Javier claimed he
transferred to the place in 1938, and both were
positive that the de Leon father and son were
occupying the disputed property until it was
bulldozed in 1969.16 Giving credence to this
evidence, the Bureau of Lands in its decision
declared:
Evidence for the protestant (herein petitioner)
bears heavily upon the facts that he has been in
actual and physical control of the property since
1925 through his predecessor-in-interest
Simeon de Leon. The preliminary investigation
report submitted by Land Investigator Jose
Isidro relative to his free patent application as to
the fact of possession confirmed the
testimonies of his witnesses, who are long time
residents and native-born of the barrio where
the land is situated. The final investigation
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
report on the application stated, among others,
that the cultivation and occupation of the land
in question by Antonio de Leon has been
continuous, notorious and exclusive since 1925,
and the improvements on the land as
ascertained by the investigator during his ocular
inspection on October 30, 1968 were clearly
indicated on the sketch drawn at the back
thereof consisting of ten guava trees, two
guyabano trees, fifty atis trees, two star apple
trees, three tieza trees, several bamboo
grooves, patola, camote patch, a nipa house
owned by the applicants daughter Catalina de
Leon. In a desperate bid to obliterate traces of
improvements by Antonio de Leon, respondent
bulldozed and destroyed them, and in their
stead replaced them with his improvements, to
give it a semblance that it was he who is in
actual possession of the land. Forthwith,
Antonio de Leon lodged a complaint before the
barrio captain and wrote this office to inform
that on June 30, 1969, Gregorio Reyes, in
company with a number of armed men and
with a bulldozer forcibly entered the land
covered by his Free Patent Application No. (III-l)
4649. Once inside the premises his (Gregorio
Reyes) men destroyed many of his (Antonio de
Leon) improvements.17
The private respondents allegation that the
petitioner had sold the land in question was
never established. Their counsel tried hard
enough to draw an admission to this effect but
all he got from the petitioner was a consistent
Page 5 of 22

denial.18 It was never proved that the alleged
deeds of sale were authentic and had been
signed by the petitioner, who said he could
never manage to write his full name, which was
the signature on the instruments. The alleged
vendees were never presented at the hearing.
The private respondents also did not offer the
testimony of a handwriting expert to prove the
genuineness of the signature on the challenged
deeds of sale. There was also a supposed
affidavit of de Leons daughter Catalina
affirming that her hut had not been bulldozed
by Gregorio Reyes but had been destroyed
during a typhoon, but this too has no
evidentiary value. As the alleged affiant was
never presented and could not be examined on
the said sworn statement, it must be rejected as
hearsay.
The Minister also found that the tax
declarations made by Gregorio Reyes referred
not to the land in dispute but to the lot
purchased from the Piedad Estate by the
Bartolome spouses, his parents-in-law.19 The
private respondents argument that the
disputed land was part of the said lot is
weakened by the fact that Reyes filed a sales
application therefor and so impliedly admitted it
was public land. Then there is Reyes assertion
that the Bartolomes had merely allowed or
tolerated de Leons occupation of the land
because he was their relative. This claim, if true
at all, would only disprove the reports made by
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
Bautista and Habal that no one but Reyes was at petitioner. The basis of the reversal, to wit, the
the time of their inspection occupying the land. reports of Bautista and Habal, have been
discredited for partiality and refuted by the
We are satisfied from an examination of the
private respondents themselves when they
evidence of record that the petitioner, as his
argued that the petitioners possession of the
father before him, was in continuous possession
land was only tolerated. This was an implicit
of the disputed land from 1925 and raised fruit-
admission that the petitioner was actually
bearing trees therein. In 1969, Reyes forcibly
occupying the land at the time they said they
ousted de Leon from the said property and
had no possession of it. Moreover, the public
destroyed the trees and structures on the said
respondent did not consider the other official
property. Thereafter, despite the order of the
reports submitted by Isidro and Salvado and just
Bureau of Lands requiring the parties to
dismissed them out of hand notwithstanding
maintain the status quo pending the resolution
that these were the very bases used by the
of their dispute, Reyes leased the property to
Bureau of Lands in deciding for the petitioner.
the Hi-Protein Corporation, which itself
introduced improvements on the land. The public respondent, in setting aside the
decision of the Bureau of Lands, as affirmed by
While, as previously remarked, the decisions of
the Ministry of Natural Resources, disregarded
administrative officials are subject to review by
the long line of decisions holding that the
their superiors, such review, to be valid, must
findings and conclusions of the Director of the
not be whimsical or arbitrary or devoid of
Bureau of Lands and approved by the Secretary
substantial basis. There is no question that the
of Agriculture upon a question of fact are
public respondent, acting on behalf of the
conclusive and not subject to review, in the
President, can reverse the decisions of a
absence of showing that such decision was
department head although the former is lower
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition,
in rank than the Cabinet member. But that is not
or mistake.20
the point. The point is that, although the power
is conceded, it must be exercised, like all The writ of certiorari is available in this case. If
powers, within the limits of the law, if all administrative decisions were conclusive
substantive rights are to be protected and upon us in any event, there would have been no
justice is to be upheld. reason at all to offer this extraordinary remedy
to litigants who otherwise would have been
Our finding is that such power was not properly
deprived of this only and last resort to the
exercised in this case, to the prejudice of the
courts of justice. This remedy applies to
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administrative decisions up to the highest level
and includes the decision at bar even if
rendered by authority of the President. The
sacramental phrase does not remove these
decisions from the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court or inhibit us from reversing them when
warranted by a clear showing of a grave abuse
of discretion.
The petition is granted. The writ must issue.
It bears emphasis that whereas the petitioner is
a humble farmer applying for a free patent over
the only land he and his father before him have
tilled all these many years, the private
respondents are subdivision owners who really
do not need the disputed property as much as
the petitioner. We are elated that the facts and
the law of this case have tilted in favor of the
party with less privileges in life and thus given
meaning to the constitutional ideal of a more
equitable distribution among our people of the
bounties of the earth.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs dated December 19,
1985, and the Order of the Deputy Executive
Secretary dated April 29,1986, are SET ASIDE
and the Order of the Minister of Natural
Resources dated March 8,1985, is REINSTATED,
with costs against the private respondents. It is
so ordered. De Leon vs. Heirs of Gregorio Reyes,
155 SCRA 584, No. L-74687 November 12, 1987
E. Habeas Corpus
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
3. CASIMIRO BAYANI, petitioner and appellant, into the territory of the United States have the
vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, right to be represented by an attorney if they so
respondent and appellee. desire. They have a right to present witnesses in
support of their request to enter. Their attorney
1.ALIENS; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
has the right to present whatsoever pertinent
RIGHT TO A FULL, FREE AND FAIR HEARING.
and material questions which he may desire to
While the hearings before the board of special
such witnesses, as will demonstrate or will tend
inquiry, of the department of customs, are
to demonstrate the right to such alien to enter
summary, in that no special pleadings, etc., are,
the country. The burden of proving his right to
required, they are nevertheless judicial in
enter the territory of the United States is upon
character, and the persons whose rights are
the immigrant who seeks that privilege. To
inquired into by it are entitled to a full, free, and
sustain that burden he has a right to call and
fair hearing just as in any other cases where the
present witnesses. To that end either he or his
rights of individuals are being determined.
attorney should be permitted to ask such
While the decisions of the customs
pertinent and material questions as will tend to
administrative officers are final upon the
support his contention. A. denial of any of these
question of the right of an alien to enter the
rights is not authorized in law, and amounts to
territory of the United States, unless there has
an unfair and unjust hearing. It is the duty of the
been an abuse of the power and discretion in
board of special inquiry to make an effort to
them vested, the courts will not hesitate to
arrive at the truth by hearing all of the
review the decision of such officers whenever it
witnesses and to permit them, without
is alleged and proved that they have abused the
intimidation, to state all of the facts, and to
power and discretion conferred upon them, or
answer all of the pertinent questions put to
where they have acted in open violation of the
them, either by the attorney or by the board.
law. The essential thing in such investigations, as
well as in all other judicial or quasi-judicial APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First
proceedings, is that there shall have been an Instance of Manila. Del Rosario, J.
honest effort to arrive at the truth by methods
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
sufficiently fair and reasonable to amount to
due process of law. Chas. E. Tenney for appellant.
2.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO HAVE ATTORNEYS; RIGHT OF Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
ATTORNEY TO PRESENT QUESTIONS DIRECTLY
TO THE WITNESS.Aliens seeking admission JOHNSON, J.:
Page 7 of 22

It appears from the record that the appellant
arrived at Manila, on the 21st day of August,
1917, on the steamship Loongsang and
requested permission to enter the Philippine
Islands upon the ground that he was a citizen
thereof, having been born in said Islands. His
right to enter was inquired into by a board of
special inquiry. At the conclusion of said inquiry
his request to enter was denied. An appeal was
taken to the Collector of Customs and the
decision of the board of special inquiry was by
him confirmed. Thereupon a writ of habeas
corpus was petitioned for in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. At the conclusion of the
hearing on said petition the writ was denied
and the present appeal was perfected.
The appellant now alleges that he has not been
given a full, free, and fair hearing before the
board of special inquiry, and that the order
denying him the right to enter the Philippine
Islands should be set aside and that he should
be granted a new trial on the merits. The
appellant now alleges that the record of the
proceedings before the board of special inquiry
shows that said board had abused its authority
in not giving him a full, free, and fair hearing;
that it appears from the record that the said
hearing was in great part made up of leading
and misleading questions and untrue
statements, calculated to confuse the witnesses
and not adapted to discover the real merits of
the petitioner's rights; that the board failed to
present questions and refused to permit the
attorney for the appellant to present questions
which would bring to light the real, material,
and important facts justifying his right to enter
the Philippine Islands; that the Court of First
Instance failed to find from the record that the
board of special inquiry had abused its
authority, power and discretion in refusing the
appellant permission to land in the Philippine
Islands, and that the decision of said board was
arbitrary, frivolous and capricious and was not
sustained by the evidence.
In reply to said alleged errors the Attorney-
General, Quintin Paredes, admits that appellant
has not been accorded a free, full, and fair
hearing and recommended that he be given a
new trial. The Attorney-General in his brief said:
"The issue raised by this appeal is whether the
record shows abuse of discretion and authority
on the part of the board of special inquiry which
heard this case. Counsel for appellant directs
attention to some very illadvised action on the
part of members of the board in their
examination of the witnesses in this case. The
misstatement of material facts to witnesses
(rec., pp. 10 and 12) and the barring of a
witness before she had concluded her
testimony (rec., p. 12) unquestionably are
serious irregularities. And in the opinion of the
undersigned, this petitioner was not accorded
such a hearing as the law contemplates and
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
assures immigrants. It is recommended that the
record be remanded to the immigration officials
with instructions to grant this applicant a new
hearing.
"Respectfully submitted."
While the hearings before the board of special
inquiry are summary in that no special
pleadings, etc., are required, they are,
nevertheless, judicial in character, and the
persons tried by such a board are entitled to a
full, free, and fair hearing just as in any other
cases where the rights of individuals are being
inquired into. Such individuals have the right to
be represented by an attorney, if they so desire.
They have a right to present witnesses to
support their request to enter. Their attorney
has a right to present whatever pertinent
questions he may desire to such witnesses, as
will demonstrate or will tend to show the right
of the immigrant to enter the country. (Edwards
vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. Rep., 598; Ang Eng Chong
vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. Rep., 614; Go
Kiam vs. Collector of Customs, R. G. No. 7099;1
Loo Bun Hian vs. Collector of Customs, R. G. No.
7074;1 Lim Yiong vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil. Rep., 424; Ex parte Lam Pui, 217 Fed. Rep.,
456; Jouras vs. Allen, 222 Fed. Rep., 756; U. S.
vs. Ruiz, 23 Fed. Rep., 431 [?]; Ex parte Petkos,
212 Fed. Rep., 275; Ex parte Ung King leng, 213
Fed. Rep., 119; Lim Ching vs. Collector of
Customs, 33 Phil. Rep., 186; Ex parte Gregory,
210 Fed. Rep., 680; Louie Dai vs. U. S., 238 Fed.
Page 8 of 22

Rep., 68, 74; Ex parte Lee Dung Moo, 230 Fed.
Rep., 746; Ex parte Tom Toy Tin, 230 Fed. Rep.,
747; Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. Rep., 883;
Ex parte Wong Foo, 230 Fed, Rep., 534.)
The decisions of the customs administrative
officers are final in cases like the present, unless
there has been an abuse of the power and
discretion vested in them. The courts, however,
do not hesitate to review the decision of such
administrative officers whenever it is alleged
and shown that they have grossly abused the
power and discretion conferred upon them, or
where they acted in open violation of the law.
(Ko Poco vs. McCoy, 10 Phil. Rep., 442; Chin Yow
vs. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, 11; U. S. vs. Ju Toy, 198 U.
S., 253; Ex parte Lung Foot, 174 Fed. Rep., 70;
Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15 Phil. Rep., 559; Lim Yiong
vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. Rep., 424.)
An alien seeking to enter territory of the United
States, even though the hearing is summary, is
entitled to a free, full, and fair hearing before he
is denied the right to enter. The right to a
hearing includes the right to have the evidence
considered by the board. He is not only entitled
to have the evidence which he presents
considered, but he is entitled to present all of
the evidence which he has and which is
germane to the question of his right to enter.
While the board of special inquiry is not
technically a judicial body and the procedure is
not technically judicial, nor are the proceedings
defined by any particular rules or statutes,
nevertheless, the board is required, under the
procedure which it adopts, to give the
immigrant or the alien an opportunity to show
by proof that his request should be granted.
(Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. Rep., 598.)
It appears from the record that all of the
witnesses presented by the appellant were
people of humble origin and very ignorant. They
were not accustomed, perhaps, to scenes of
judicial proceedings. They were therefore,
naturally, under the strain born of timidity and
known ignorance. For that reason they were
easily excited and intimidated. The board should
have allayed their fears and put them, as far as
possible, at their ease, at least to the point of
indicating to them that they were under the
protection, so long as they obey the law, of
judicial authority. This the board did not do.
Upon the contrary the board, with the evident
intent to confuse and to unduly excite the
witnesses, made statements to them which
were positively untrue and unsupported by any
part of the record. And not only that, but the
board actually intimidated one important
witness, apparently without reason, by
informing her that she could give no further
testimony in that case and that she was
therefore forever barred from testifying before
it. The entire examination by the board from the
beginning to the end, of all of the witnesses,
was made in a spirit of hostility. For that reason
the board was rendered incapacitated to
properly and judicially weigh and consider the
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
evidence impartially. Where the record itself
discloses the fact that the evidence is weighed
in the spirit of hostility there cannot be that
impartial, f free, f full and f fair hearing
contemplated by the law. (Ex parte Tom Toy Tin,
230 Fed. Rep., 747; Jouras vs. Allen, 222 Fed.
Rep., 756.)
It is the duty of the board to make an effort to
arrive at the truth by hearing all of the
witnesses and to permit them, without
intimidation, to state all of the facts and to
answer all of the pertinent questions put to
them either by their attorney or by the board.
(Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. Rep., 833.)
The essential thing in investigations like the
present as well as all other judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings is that there shall have
been an honest effort to arrive at the truth by
methods sufficiently fair and reasonable to
amount to due process of law.
The burden of proving his right to enter the
territory of the United States is upon the
immigrant who seeks that privilege. To sustain
that burden he has a right to call and present
witnesses. To that end either he or his attorney
should be permitted to ask such pertinent and
material questions as will tend to support his
contention. A denial of any of these rights is not
authorized in law and amounts to an unfair and
unjust hearing. If witnesses are presented by
the board to dispute or to overcome the proof
Page 9 of 22

adduced by the immigrant then, of course, the
latter, either by himself or by his attorney, has a
perfect right to test the credibility of such
witnesses by a proper crossexamination. (Ex
parte Ung King leng, 213 Fed. Rep., 119.)
After a careful examination of the record we are
persuaded that the recommendation of the
Attorney-General should be adopted. It is,
therefore, hereby ordered and decreed that the
record be returned to the court whence it came
with directions that the judgment appealed
from be reversed and that an order be issued
directing and commanding the board of special
inquiry to give to the appellant a rehearing as
speedily as the f facts and circumstances will
permit, and without any findings as to costs, So
ordered Bayani vs. Collector of Customs., 37
Phil. 468, No. 13283 January 23, 1918
B. Question of Fact
5. G.R. No. 60054. July 2, 1991.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ANDRES
LOMABAO, and JOSE M. MASAYA,
respondents.
Administrative Proceedings; Labor; Evidence.
In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required
as basis for a judgment of the legality of an
employers dismissal of an employee, nor even
preponderance of evidence, substantial
evidence being sufficient. Particularly as regards
proceedings of the precise nature in question,
the Labor Code provides thatx x the rules of reasonable doubt is required for conviction;1 in
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and
its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. x
x And this Court has ruled that the ground for
an employers dismissal of an employee need
be established only by substantial
evidence, it not being required that the
formers evidence be of such degree as
is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
PETITION for review from the judgment
of the National Labor Relations
Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
Benjamin R. Reonal for petitioner.
Eugenio C. Lindo for private
respondent.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
NARVASA, J.:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of
proof and adjective rules vary depending on
whether the cases to which they are meant to
apply are criminal, civil or administrative in
character. In criminal actions, proof beyond
civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of
evidence, as support for a judgment;2 and in
administrative cases, substantial evidence, as
basis for adjudication.3 In criminal and civil
actions, application of the Rules of Court is
called for, with more or less strictness. In
administrative proceedings, however, the
technical rules of pleading and procedure, and
of evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they
generally apply only suppletorily;4 indeed, in
agrarian disputes application of the Rules of
Court is actually prohibited.5
5 The Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board provides that:
Unless adopted herein or by resolution
of the board, the provisions of the Rules
of Court do not Quite incredibly, these
familiar and elementary propositions
were disregarded in the judgment a
quo. The error is serious and must be,
as it is here, corrected.
The facts are fairly simple and quickly
recounted.
Page 10 of 22

The case originated from the discovery
by Meralco employees that a person by
the name of Antonio Sanchez was
consuming electricity at the house
occupied by him at No. 2048 Amparo
Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, although he
had himself neither applied with
Meralco for electric service nor made
the requisite deposit in connection
therewith.6 It was learned that
electricity was being supplied to
Sanchezs house through a clandestine
and illicit connection to a Meralco
service line (shunting the meter base
and tapping its service drop direct to
the service wire); and household
helpers of Sanchez and the owner of
the house, a Mr. Castaeda, informed
the Meralco investigator that it was a
Meralco employee, Jose Masaya, who
had made the unauthorized electric
service connection.
The Meralco Legal Department
thereupon sent Jose Masaya a letter
charging him with a violation of the
Company Code on Employee Discipline,
and thereafter conducted a formal
investigation of the matter.7 Those who
gave testimony at that investigation
were Jose Masaya himself, and Renato
Repuyan, Meralco field investigator.
Prior to being interrogated about the
illegal connection and in response to
preliminary questions by the
investigator, Masaya stated for the
record that he had received the letter
accusing him of misconduct, that he
had a copy of the code of discipline and
understood the nature of the precise
charge against him, and that he did not
need to be assisted by a lawyer or a
representative of his Union because, in
his own words, ang sasabihin ko
naman dito ay pawang katotohanan
lamang. Thereafter, Masaya deposed
that he had indeed installed the
connection in question in the following
manner, again expressed in his own
words: Nilagyan ko ng shunt o kaputol
ng alambre ang kanilang meter base at
ang koneksiyon nito ay kinabit ko sa
malapit na service wire; and that for
that job, he had received P200 from
Antonio Sanchez. At the close of his
testimony, he also sought forgiveness
for the offense, viz.:
Nais ko po sanang ihingi ng
kapatawaran sa kumpanya ang mga
nagawa kong pagkakamali. Anim po ang
aking mga anak at kung sakaling ako ay
matanggal sa kompanya dahil sa
pagkakamaling iyon, sila po ay walang
aasahan kung hindi ako lamang. Kayat
ipinakikiusap ko sa inyo na ipaabot
ninyo sa kompanya ang aking
pagmamakaawa.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
Repuyan testified on the fact of the
undenied and indisputable installation
of the illegal electrical connection at the
residence of Antonio Sanchez (his
description of the manner of its
accomplishment being substantially the
same as Masayas own), and also, the
disclosures made to him by Sanchezs
househelpers and the owner of the
house, supra.
After the investigation, and on the basis
of the results thereof, Meralco filed
with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment an application for
clearance to terminate Masayas
services,8 serving copy on the latter.
Meralco also placed Masaya under
preventive suspension.9
A week later, Masaya filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against Meralco.
After issues were joined on the
complaint for illegal dismissal as well as
the application for clearance, and trial
had thereon, Labor Arbiter Andres M.
Lomabao rendered a decision in
Masayas favor,10 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent Manila
Electric Company is hereby ordered to
pay complainant JOSE M. MASAYA his
backwages corresponding to the period
December 8, 1978 up to April 30, 1980
and separation pay of five (5) and a half
months salary in lieu of reinstatement.
Page 11 of 22

The Arbiter was of the view that the
record of the investigation conducted by
Meralco should not be accorded
credence; that Meralcos contention
that Masaya had surreptitiously
effected the direct connection of x x
electric service was not credible,
because Masaya was employed as a
bill collector, not as a lineman collector,
hence, he does not know how to install
electrical connection; and that the
money received by Masaya from
Sanchez (P200 or P250) was not in
consideration of any clandestine
connection but was accepted as
representation expenses in following
up Mr. Sanchez application for
installation of electric facilities x x with
the Engineers Office at the City Hall of
Manila.11
On appeal by Meralco, the National
Labor Relations Commission affirmed
the Arbiters decision.12 In the
Commissions considered view13 the Commissions views, the public
x x while it is true that in
administrative proceedings, substantial
evidence only is required, the instant
case is an exception for the reason that
respondent-appellant in this case is
charging complainant-appellee of a
criminal offense, and, therefore, it is
incumbent upon the former to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of the crime, failing which, complainant-
appellee must be absolved from
responsibility. The alleged admission of
complainant-appellee during the
investigation conducted by the legal
department of respondentappellant
does not, if at all, prove beyond
reasonable doubt the criminal act
allegedly committed by complainant-
appellee in the absence of any showing
that he was given the opportunity to be
heard by counsel or at least, a
representative to confront his accuser.
There is implicit concession that under
the substantial evidence rule, the
evidence would be adequate to make
out a case of gross misconduct on the
part of Masaya; however, the
Commission theorizes that an
adjudgment to this effect was precluded
by the doctrine of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, applicable
exceptionally to Masayas case. Echoing
controlling and it is the spirit and
respondents comment points out that
since there is no causal connection
between private respondents duties to
the crime imputed to him, mere
substantial evidence is insufficient to
hold private respondent guilty of
installing electrical connection let alone
deprive him of his right to labor.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
There are two evident errors
invalidating the Commissions
conclusions.
The first is that contrary to the
Commissions view, Masaya was in truth
asked if he wished to be assisted by a
lawyer or a representative of his Union,
and his response was in the negative
because, in his own words, ang
sasabihin ko naman dito ay pawang
katotohanan lamang
The second is that in administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not
required as basis for a judgment of the
legality of an employers dismissal of an
employee, nor even preponderance of
evidence, substantial evidence being
sufficient.14 Particularly as regards
proceedings of the precise nature in
question, the Labor Code provides
that15
x x the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be
intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to the technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process. x x
Page 12 of 22

And this Court has ruled that the
ground for an employers dismissal of
an employee need be established only
by substantial evidence, it not being
required that the formers evidence be
of such degree as is required in criminal
cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt.16 It is absolutely of no
consequence that the misconduct with
which an employee may be charged
also constitutes a criminal offense:
theft, embezzlement, assault on
another employee or company officer,
arson, malicious mischief, etc. The
proceedings being administrative, the
quantum of proof is governed by the
substantial evidence rule and not, as
the respondent Commission seems to
imagine, by the rule governing
judgments in criminal actions.
It was thus serious error, and grave
abuse of discretion for the Labor Arbiter
and the respondent Commission, for
the reasons given, to reject and exclude
from consideration the express
admissions made by Masaya during the
administrative investigation conducted
by Meralco.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the
following facts of record, to wit:
1) the reality of the illegal electrical
connection;
2) the written communication to
Masaya that he was accused of that
illegal connection and he would be
subjected to a formal investigation
thereon;
3) Masayas acknowledgment that, The Court is satisfied that the evidence
having a copy of the companys code of
discipline, he understood the nature of
the accusation against him, and his
declining to be assisted by a lawyer or a
representative of his Union because,
according to him, ang sasabihin ko
naman dito ay pawang katotohanan
lamang;
4) his voluntary admission that it was he
who had made the illegal electrical
connection, describing the manner by
which he had made it, and that he had
received P250.00 from the occupant of
the house, Antonio Sanchez; and
5) his plea to the company for
forgiveness for having made the illegal
connection.
There is on record, too, testimony
regarding identification of Masaya by
Antonio Sanchez servants and by
Castaeda, the owner of the house
occupied by Sanchez. There is, finally,
nothing in the record to demonstrate
that Masayas admissions were made
otherwise than voluntarily; his
subsequent assertion before the Arbiter
that he had been starved into signing
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
the typewritten record of the
administrative investigation containing
said admissions is not persuasive, and
was not in fact accepted by the Arbiter
or the Commission.
sufficiently proves the commission by
Masaya of an act of dishonesty against
his employer, specifically described in
the Meralco Code on Employee
Discipline as follows:
SECTION 7. Dishonesty.
xxxxx
3) Directly or indirectly tampering with
electric meters or metering installation
of the Company or the installation of
any device, with the purpose of
defrauding the Company.
Such an offense is obviously of so
serious a character as to merit the
penalty of dismissal from employment.
The Labor Code pronounces fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative, or
serious misconduct on the part of the
employee to be lawful ground to
terminate employment. And this Court
has held that the dismissal of a
dishonest employee is as much in the
interests of labor as it is of
management. The labor force in any
company is protected and the workers
Page 13 of 22

security of tenure strengthened when
pilferage of equipment, goods and
products which endangers the viability
of an employer and, therefore, the
workers continued employment is
minimized or eliminated and
consequently labor-management
relations based on mutual trust and
confidence are promoted.17
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
is GRANTED
Jurisdiction
6. G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991.*
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture 6, Sports, DR.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of
Manila, petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO
GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction;
Commission on Human Rights; Court
declares the Commission on Human
Rights to have no jurisdiction on
adjudicatory powers over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or
political rights.The threshold question
is whether or not the Commission on
Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not,
like a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power
to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights
violations in volving civil or political
rights. The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have
no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasijudicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most
that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political
rights.The most that may be
conceded to the Commission. in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But fact-finding is
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual
conclusion in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights
violations invoking civil and political
rights.As should at once be observed,
only the first of the enumerated powers
and functions bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its
Page 14 of 22

own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as
it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It
cannot try and decide cases (or hear
and determine causes) as courts of
justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or
hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
The Commission on Human Rights
having merely the power to investigate
cannot and should not try and resolve
on the merits the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775.
Hence it is that the Commission on
Human Rights, having merely the power
to investigate, cannot and should not
try and resolve on the merits
(adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775,
as it has announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; The matters are undoubtedly and
clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education and also
within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.These are
matters undoubtedly and clearly within
the original jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Education, being within the scope of
the disciplinary powers granted to him
under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari and
prohibition to review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition at
bar, instituted by the Solicitor General,
may be formulated as follows: where
the relief sought from the Commission
on Human Rights by a party in a case
consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order
issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising
quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance
486
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cario vs. Commission on Human Rights
of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-
matter is placed by law within the
jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may
the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter
Page 15 of 22

for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are
not denied by the respondents and are
hence taken as substantially correct for
purposes of ruling on the legal
questions posed in the present action.
These facts,1 together with others
involved in related cases recently
resolved by this Court,2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday
and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as mass
concerted actions to dramatize and
highlight their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities
to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latters
attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said mass
concerted actions after the protest
rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting
classes as a last call for the government
to negotiate the granting of demands
had elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education. The mass
actions consisted in staying away from
their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours
or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more
teachers joining in the days that
followed.3
Among those who took part in the
concerted mass actions were the
eight (8) private respondents herein,
teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, who had agreed to
support the non-political demands of
the MPSTA.4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-
work order, the CHR complainants
(private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of
the principals report and given five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were
also preventively suspended for ninety
(90) days pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807' and temporarily replaced
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G,
H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807."5
3. In the administrative case docketed
as Case No. DECS 90082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr.,
Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo,
Apolinario Esber were, among others,
named respondents,6 the latter filed
separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved for
suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by xx
(the Supreme) Court of their application
for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order. But
when their motion for suspension was
denied by Order dated November 8,
1990 of the Investigating Committee,
which later also denied their motion for
reconsideration orally made at the
hearing of November 14,1990, the
respondents led by their counsel staged
a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings."7 The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cario dated December 17,
1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by
the respondents, decreeing dismissal
from the service of Apolinario Esber and
Page 16 of 22

the suspension for nine (9) months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.8
4. In the meantime, the MPSTA filed a
petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against
petitioner (Cario), which was
dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit,
Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal,
grounded on the) alleged violation of
the striking teachers right to due
process and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The
ACT also filed a similar petition before
the Supreme Court xx docketed as G.R.
No. 95590."9 Both petitions in this
Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals,
and other teacher-members so
numerous similarly situated or other
similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded.
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements
dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to
complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions,
they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to
them.10
6. Their complaintsand those of other
teachers also ordered suspended by
the xx (DECS)," all numbering forty-two
(42)were docketed as Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In
connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a dialogue on October
11,1990, and sent a subpoena to
Secretary Cario requiring his
attendance therein.11
On the day of the dialogue, although
it said that it was not certain whether
he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena
which was served at his office, xx (the)
Commission, with the Chairman
presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio
R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro,
proceeded to hear the case; it heard
the complainants counsel (a) explain
that his clients had been denied due
process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave, and (b) expatiate
on the grievances which were the
cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they
(CHR complainants) sympathize."12 The
Commission thereafter issued an
Order13 reciting these facts and making
the following disposition:
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
To be properly apprised of the real
facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter, considering
that these forty two teachers are now
suspended and deprived of their wages,
which they need very badly, Secretary
Isidro Cario, of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent
of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on
October 19,1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to
bring with them any and all documents
relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this
matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants evidence.
x x x.
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor
General, Secretary Cario sought and
was granted leave to file a motion to
dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss
was submitted on November 14, 1990
alleging as grounds therefor, that the
complaint states no cause of action and
that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case."14
8. Pending determination by the
Commission of the motion to dismiss,
Page 17 of 22

judgments affecting the striking
teachers were promulgated in two (2)
cases, as aforestated, viz.:
________________
a) The Decision dated December 17,
1990 of Education Secretary Cario in
Case No. DECS 90082, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario
Esber and the suspension for nine (9)
months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo;15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court
dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590 dismissing the petitions
without prejudice to any appeals, if still
timely, that the individual petitioners
may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained
of,"16 and inter alia ruling that it was
prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario
to issue return-to-work orders, file
administrative charges against
recalcitrants, preventively suspend
them, and issue decision on those
charges."17
9. In an Order dated December 28,1990,
respondent Commission denied Sec.
Carios motion to dismiss and required
him and Superintendent Lolarga to
submit their counter-affidavits within
ten (10) days x x (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and
resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter
affidavit."18 It held that the striking
teachers were denied due process of
law; x x they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to
the administrative charges; there had
been a violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission
was empowered to investigate; and
while expressing its utmost respect to
the Supreme Court xx the facts before
xx (it) are different from those in the
case decided by the Supreme Court
(the reference being ummistakably to
this Courts joint Resolution of August
6,1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this
Order of December 28, 1990 that the
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner
Cario, has commenced the present
action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has
made clear its position that it does not
feel bound by this Courts joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra. It has also made plain its
intention to hear and resolve the case
(i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90
775) on the merits. It intends, in other
words, to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction
over the following general issues:
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
1) whether or not the striking teachers
were denied due process, and just
cause exists for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary sanctions on
them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which
were the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize, justify their mass action or
strike.
The Commission evidently intends to
itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which
have been passed upon and decided by
the Secretary of Education, Culture 6,
Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court having
in fact, as aforementioned, declared
that the teachers affected may take
appeals to the Civil Service Commission
on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or
not the Commission on Human Rights
has the power under the Constitution to
do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice,19 or even a quasi-judicial
agency,20 it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power
to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific
Page 18 of 22

type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political
rights.
The Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law.21 This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the
constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human
Rights. The Commission was created by
the 1987 Constitution as an
independent office.23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and
superseded the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights existing at the time of
the effectivity of the Constitution,24 Its
powers and functions are the
following:25
"(1) Investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil
and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures
for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well
as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or
need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails,
prisons, or detention facilities;
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
(5) Establish a continuing program of
research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress
effective measures to promote human
rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights,
or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine
Governments compliance with
international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees
in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and
functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the
first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political
Page 19 of 22

rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as
it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or
hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Investigate commonly understood,
means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of
investigate is to observe or study defines the term as to settle finally (the
closely: inquire into systematically: to
search or inquire into: xx to subject to
an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry."27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover,
to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving
a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law
to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of investigate is
essentially the same: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or
observation, To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;"28 to inquire;
to make an investigation,
investigation being in turn described
as "(a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise,
for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."29
Adjudicate, commonly or popularly
understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues
raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: xx act as judge."30 And
adjudge means to decide or rule
upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy
xx."31
In the legal sense, adjudicate means:
To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense; and adjudge means: To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree,
or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment."32
Hence it is that the Commission on
Human Rights, having merely the power
to investigate, cannot and should not
try and resolve on the merits
(adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775,
as it has announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights
had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no
Page 20 of 22

power to resolve on the merits the
question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute a strike and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by
law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those
actions, and the failure of the teachers
to discontinue those actions and return
to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules
and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or
are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions,
These are matters undoubtedly and
clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education, being within
the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has,
as above narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved
them,33 and it appears that appeals
have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself
has had occasion to pass upon said
issues.34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or
not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether
or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded
the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed
human rights violations involving civil
and political rights, are matters which
may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary of Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse
verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually by
the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights
simply has no place in this scheme of
things. It has no business intruding into
the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going
over the same ground traversed by the
latter and making its own judgment on
the questions involved. This would
ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena
accord success to what may well have
been the complaining teachers strategy
to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in
the administrative cases against them
which they anticipated would be
adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be
permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights would
serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in
conclusions contrary to those reached
by Secretary Cario, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the
Secretarys conclusions. Reversal
thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this
Court. The only thing the Commission
can do, if it concludes that Secretary
Cario was in error, is to refer the
matter to the appropriate Government
agency or tribunal for assistance; that
would be the Civil Service
Commission.35 It cannot arrogate unto
itself the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted;
the Order of December 29,1990 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
respondent Commission on Human
Rights and the Chairman and Members
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 ADMIN LAW FT | Lizzette dela Pena

thereof are prohibited to hear and

resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits.
SO ORDERED. Cario vs. Commission on
Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483, G.R. No.
96681 December 2, 1991

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