DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Upon motion of
ORTEGA vs. CEBU City
G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009
CASE: These are consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and
Arminda Ortega (Spouses Ortega) and petitioner City of
Cebu (Cebu City) assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petition
FACTS:
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in
Hipodromo, Cebu City. ne-half of the above
described land is occupied by squatters. On
September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed
an ejectment case against the squatters before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of
[the spouses Ortega]. The case eventually
reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
decision of the MTCC. The decision of the
MTCC became final and executory, and a writ
of execution was issued on February 1, 1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City
Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion
(2,856 square meters) of [the spouses Ortegas]
land (which is occupied by the squatters), and
appropriating for that purpose. The amount will
be charged against Continuing Appropriation,
repurchase of lots for various projects. The value
of the land was determined by the Cebu City
Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19,
series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to
said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a Complaint
for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the
spouses Ortega].
On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order
declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right
to take the property subject of the instant case,
for public use or purpose described in the
complaint upon payment of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed
Commissioners (one of whom was the City
Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC] issued
another Order dated May 21, 1999, fixing the
value of the land subject to expropriation at
ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00)
per square meter and ordering [Cebu City] to
pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE
MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just
compensation for the expropriated portion of Lot
No. 310-B.
The Decision of the [RTC] became final and
executory because of [Cebu Citys] failure to
perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ of
Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to
enforce the courts judgment.
[the Spouses Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order
dated March 11, 2002 for execution or
garnishment.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay
Execution, Modification of Judgment and
Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the
price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to
be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond
the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its
socialized housing program. The motion was
denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July
2, 2003 Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a
Notice of Garnishment to Philippine Postal
Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu
City, garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank deposit
therein.
Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari before [the CA]. Cebu City] filed
before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve, Quash
or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending
that Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in
Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an existing
bank account and that the garnishment of [Cebu
Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal
Bank was illegal, because government funds and
properties may not be seized under writ of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgment, on obvious reason of public policy.
The [RTC] issued an Order dated March 8,
2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys]
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Direct the New Manager of Philippine Postal
Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished
Amount, which was granted by the [RTC].
[Cebu City] filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the same was denied.
ISSUE: WON the determination of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative.
RULING: It is well settle in jurisprudence that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial
prerogative.
The determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statue, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of
the decreed compensation.
 LBP vs. RUFINO
G.R. No. 175644 October 2, 2009
CASE: Challenged in these consolidated
Petitions for Review is the December 15, 2005 Decision
of the Court of
Appealshttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/o
ctober2009/175644.htm - _ftn4 affirming with
modification that of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 98-6438
setting the valuation of respondents 138.4018-hectare
land taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) at P29,926,000, exclusive of the value
of secondary crops thereon.
FACTS:
Respondents Jose Marie M. Rufino (Rufino),
Nilo M. Resurreccion (Resureccion), Arnel M.
Atanacio (Atanacio), and Suzette G. Mateo
(Suzette) are the registered owners in equal
share of a parcel of agricultural land situated in
Barangay San Benon, Irosin, Sorsogon.
By respondents claim, in 1989, they voluntarily
offered the aforesaid property to the government
for CARP coverage at P120,000 per hectare.
Acting thereon, petitioner Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition dated October 21,
1996 declaring that out of the total area
indicated in the title, 138.4018 hectares was
subject to immediate acquisition at a valuation
of P8,736,270.40 based on the assessment of
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
Respondents having found the valuation
unacceptable, the matter was referred by the
provincial agrarian reform officer of Sorsogon to
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the
conduct of summary administrative proceedings
to determine just
compensation.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurispru
dence/2009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn6
By Decision of November 21,
1997,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2
009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn7 the
DARAB sustained LBPs valuation upon
respondents failure to present any evidence to
warrant an increase thereof.
Meanwhile, upon the DARs application,
accompanied with LBPs certification of deposit
of payment, the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon
partially cancelled TCT No. T-22934
corresponding to the the property) and issued
TCT No. T-47571 in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. The Republic thereupon
subdivided the property into 85 lots for
distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries
under Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
On February 23, 1998, respondents lodged with
Branch 52 of the Sorsogon RTC (acting as a
Special Agrarian Court) a complaint for
determination of just compensation against
Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as then DAR
Secretary, and LBP. Respondents contended
that LBPs valuation was not the full and fair
equivalent of the property at the time of its
taking, the same having been offered in 1989 at
P120,000 per hectare.
LBP countered that the property was acquired by
the DAR for CARP coverage in 1993 by
compulsory acquisition and not by respondents
voluntary offer to sell; and that it determined the
valuation thereof in accordance with RA 6657
and pertinent DAR regulations.
The DAR Secretary argued that LBPs valuation
was properly based on DAR issuances.
The trial court appointed the parties respective
nominated commissioners to appraise the
property. Commissioner Jesus S. Empleo
appraised the property based on, among other
things, the applicable DAR issuances, average
gross production, and prevailing selling prices of
the crops planted thereon which included
coconut, abaca, coffee, and rice. He arrived at a
valuation of
P13,449,579.08.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisp
rudence/2009/october2009/175644.htm -
_ftn12 Commissioner Amando Chua of Cuervo
Appraisers, Inc., used the market data approach
which relies primarily on sales and listings of
comparable lots in the neighborhood. Excluding
the secondary crops planted thereon, he valued
the property at P29,925,725.
Eugenio Mateo, Sr. (Mateo), attorney-in-fact of
respondents Rufino, Resurreccion, and Atanacio,
declared that Commissioner Chua erroneously
considered the secondary crops as merely
enhancing the demand for the property without
them significantly increasing its value; and that
the coffee intercropping on the property which
yielded an estimated profit of P3,000,000,
spread over a 12-year period, should be
considered in the determination of just
compensation.
By Decision of July 4,
2000,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2
009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn15 the trial
court found the market data approach to be
more realistic and consistent with law and
jurisprudence on the full and fair equivalent of
the property. Applying the average rate of
P216,226 per hectare, it arrived at a valuation of
the 138.4018-hectare property at P29,926,000,
to which it added P8,000,000 representing 50%
of the value of trees, plants, and other
improvements thereon, bringing the total to
P37,926,000.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration, while
the DAR filed a Notice of Appeal. By Order
dated August 21, 2000, the trial court denied the
motion of LBP prompting it to also file a Notice
of
 Appeal.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence
/2009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn17
By consolidated Decision of December 15,
2005,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2
009/october2009/175644.htm - _ftn18 the
Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts
valuation of P29,926,000 as just compensation.
The appellate court found that, among other
things, it would be specious to rely on the
DARs computation in ostensible compliance
with its own issuances; that Commissioner
Empleo failed to consider available sales data of
comparable properties in the locality; and that
the value of secondary crops should be excluded
as the same is inconclusive in view of
conflicting evidence. Petitioners and
respondents filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration which were denied by the
appellate court by Resolution of November 28,
2006.
ISSUE: WON the factors specifically
identified by law and implementing rules are to be
considered in determining just compensation..
RULING: While the determination of just
compensation is essentially a judicial function which is
vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
the SC nonetheless disregarded the RTCs determination
when the judge did not fully consider the factors
specifically identified by law and implementing rules.
In LBP vs. Banal, the Court ruled that
the factors laid down in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and the
formula stated in DAR AO 6-92, as amended, must be
adhered to by the RTC in fixing the valuation of lands.
LBP vs. J.L. JOCSON AND SONS
G.R. No. 180803 October 23, 2009
FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a 27.3808-
hectare portion (the property) of two (2) parcels
of tenanted rice land located at Barangay
Magallon Cadre, Moises Padilla, Negros
Occidental, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-72323 and T-72324
registered in the name of J. L. Jocson and Sons
(respondent).
The property was placed under the coverage of
the governments Operation Land Transfer2
(OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 27 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
which valued the compensation therefor in the
total amount of P250,563.80 following the
formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 228.
The valuation was later increased to
P903,637.03 after computing the 6% annual
interest increment due on the property per DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994,
which amount respondent withdrew in 1997,
without prejudice to the outcome of the case it
had filed hereunder to fix just compensation.
Finding the DARs offer of compensation for
the property to be grossly inadequate,
respondent filed a complaint on July 18, 1997
before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Br. 46, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC), against the Land Bank (petitioner), the
DAR, and the tenant-beneficiaries, for
"Determination and Fixing of Just
Compensation for the Acquisition of Land and
Payment of Rentals."
The complaint prayed that petitioner and the
DAR be ordered to compute the just
compensation for the property in accordance
with the guidelines laid down in Section 17 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the
DAR claimed that the property was acquired by
the government under its OLT program and
their valuation thereof constituted just
compensation, having been made pursuant to the
guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
By Decision of May 19, 2003, the SAC, after
noting the report contained in a Compliance
submitted on February 29, 2000 of the
Commissioners appointed to receive and
evaluate evidence on the amount of
compensation to be paid to respondent, fixed the
just compensation at P2,564,403.58 (inclusive of
the P903,637.03 earlier withdrawn).
In arriving at the just compensation, the SAC
adopted a higher valuation (P93,657.00/hectare)
which the DAR had applied to a similar
landholding belonging to one Pablo Estacion
adjacent to respondents.
Both petitioner and the DAR filed motions for
reconsideration of the SAC Decision but the
same were denied, prompting petitioner to
appeal to the Court of Appeals via petition for
review pursuant to Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657
vis a vis Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Assailing the SACs decision fixing the amount
of just compensation for respondents properties
at P2,564,403.58 as a violation of P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228, petitioner insisted that the
SAC erred in using P300.00 as the government
support price (GSP) in 1992, instead of P35.00
as provided under E.O. No. 228, considering
that respondents property was acquired under
OLT pursuant to P.D. No. 27.
The appellate court dismissed petitioners
petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228,
as claimed by petitioner, or R.A. No. 6657, as claimed
by respondent, should govern in determining the
value of the property.
RULING: In no uncertain terms that Republic Act
No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where
the Court found it more equitable to determine just
compensation based on the value of the property at the reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at
time of payment. P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, with
legal interest of 12% per annum from date of
This was a clear departure from the filing of the complaint until full payment, or in
previous Court stance in Gabatin vs. LBP where it the event that said property can no longer be
declared that the reckoning period for the determination returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just
of just compensation is the time when the land was taken compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00
applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228. and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal
interest of 12% per annum from the date of
filing of the complaint until full payment. In
addition, respondents prayed for payment of
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
EUSEBIO vs. LUIS and costs.
G.R. No. 162474 October 13, 2009 Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but
the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in its
Decision dated November 28, 2003.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
CASE: This resolves the Petition for Review on CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying February 27, 2004.
that the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
November 28, 2003, affirming the trial court judgment, ISSUE: WON the owners action to
and the CA Resolution dated February 27, 2004, denying recover the land or the value prescribe.
petitioners motion for reconsideration, be reversed and
set aside. RULING: Where private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring title
FACTS: either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the
owners action to recover the land or the value does not
Respondents are the registered owners of a prescribe.
parcel of land with an area of 1,586 square
meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City Petitioners must be disabused of their
of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a belief that respondents action for recovery of their
municipal road now known as A. Sandoval property, which had been taken for public use, or to
Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On claim just compensation is already barred by
February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City prescription.
passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments
to respondents for said parcel of land. However,
the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, n
Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993,
assessed the value of the land only at P150.00
per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995,
respondents requested the Appraisal Committee
to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the
value of their land.
One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated
November 25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P.
Eusebio calling the latters attention to the fact
that a property in the same area, as the land
subject of this case, had been paid for by
petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square
meter when said property was expropriated in
the year 1994 also for conversion into a public
road. Subsequently, respondents counsel sent a
demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor
Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00
per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as
just compensation for respondents property. In
response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated
September 9, 1996 informing respondents that
the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the
amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
On October 8, 1996, respondents filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages
(Civil Case No. 65937) against herein petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 155. Respondents prayed that the
property be returned to them with payment of
 CITY OF ILOILO vs. CONTRERAS-BESANA
G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009
CASE: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeks to overturn the three Orders
issued by Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch
32.
FACTS:
On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint
for eminent domain against private respondent
Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros
Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. The
complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land
registered in Javellanas name to be used as a school
site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner alleged that the
Subject Property was declared for tax purposes to
have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total
value of P43,560.00.
On December 9, 1981, Javellana filed his Answer
where he admitted ownership of the Subject Property
but denied the petitioners avowed public purpose of
the sought-for expropriation, since the City of Iloilo
already had an existing school site for Lapaz High
School. Javellana also claimed that the true fair
market value of his property was no less
than P220.00 per square meter.
On May 11, 1982, petitioner filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had
deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the
Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner
claimed that it was entitled to the immediate
possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 1533 after it had deposited
an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of
compensation.
Javellana filed an Opposition to the Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Possession citing the same
grounds he raised in his Answer that the city
already had a vast tract of land where its existing
school site was located, and the deposit of a mere
10% of the Subject Propertys tax valuation was
grossly inadequate.
On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order
which granted petitioners Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner to
take immediate possession of the Subject Property.
Thereafter, a Writ of Possession was issued in
petitioners favor, and petitioner was able to take
physical possession of the properties sometime in the
middle of 1985. At no time has Javellana ever denied
that the Subject Property was actually used as the site
of Lapaz National High School. Aside from the filing
by the private respondent of his Amended Answer on
April 21, 1984, the expropriation proceedings
remained dormant.
Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed
an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged
that when he finally sought to withdraw
the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner,
he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. In
support of this contention, private respondent
presented a Certification from the Philippine National
Bank stating that no deposit was ever made for the
expropriation of the Subject Property. Private
respondent thus demanded his just compensation as
well as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution
and a negotiated sale were unsuccessful. It bears
emphasis that petitioner could not present any
evidence whether documentary or testimonial to
prove that any payment was actually made to private
respondent.
April 2, 2003, private respondent filed a Complaint
against petitioner for Recovery of Possession, Fixing
and Recovery of Rental and Damages. Private
respondent alleged that since he had not been
compensated for the Subject Property, petitioners
possession was illegal, and he was entitled to
recovery of possession of his lots. He prayed that
petitioner be ordered to vacate the Subject Property
and pay rentals amounting to P15,000.00 per month
together with moral, exemplary, and actual damages,
as well as attorneys fees.1avvphi1
On May 15, 2003, petitioner filed its Answer, arguing
that Javellana could no longer bring an action for
recovery since the Subject Property was already
taken for public use. Rather, private respondent could
only demand for the payment of just compensation.
Petitioner also maintained that the legality or
illegality of petitioners possession of the property
should be determined in the eminent domain case and
not in a separate action for recovery of possession.
Both parties jointly moved to consolidate the
expropriation case and the case for recovery of
possession which motion was granted by the trial
court in an Order dated August 26, 2003. On
November 14, 2003, a commission was created to
determine the just compensation due to Javellana.
On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a
Motion/Manifestation dated November 19, 2003
claiming that before a commission is created, the trial
court should first order the condemnation of the
property, in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Javellana likewise insisted that the fair market value
of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the
date when the court orders the condemnation of the
property, and not the date of actual taking, since
petitioners possession of the property was
questionable. Before petitioner could file its
Comment, the RTC issued an Order dated November
21, 2003 denying the Motion.
Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus
Motion to Declare Null and Void the Order of May
17, 1983 and to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10%
or P254,000.00. Javellana claimed that the amount is
equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of the
Subject Property, as determined by the Iloilo City
Appraisal Committee in 2001, at the time when the
parties were trying to negotiate a settlement.
On December 12, 2003, the RTC issued the First
Assailed Order, which nullified the Order dated May
17, 1983 (concerning the issuance of a writ of
possession over the Subject Property).
Neither party sought reconsideration of this Order.
Nonetheless, about six months later, the RTC issued
the Second Assailed Order, which it denominated as
an "Amended Order". The Second Assailed Order
was identical to the first, except that the reckoning
point for just compensation was now the "time this
order was issued," which is June 15, 2004.
 After the parties were able to fully ventilate their
respective positions, the public respondent issued the
Third Assailed Order, denying the Motion for
Reconsideration , and ruling as follows:

The Order dated June 15, 2004 among other things stated that
parties and counsels must be bound by the Commissioners
Report regarding the value of the property not at the time it
was condemned but at the time this order was issued.

ISSUE: WON the correct reckoning point for the

determination of just compensation is at the time the
expropriation complaint was filed in court.

RULING: YES. Just compensation is to be ascertained

as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
filing of the complaint.

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated

coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure,
under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just
compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing
of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the
general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value
of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation.

Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18

years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit
was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his
inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts
purportedly deposited, private respondent not only accepted
the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not
interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the
end. As such, private respondent may not recover possession
of the Subject Property, but is entitled to just compensation.

The City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking
private respondents property without payment of just
compensation.
 REPUBLIC VS. MANGOTARA
G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010
CASE: Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for
Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules
45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from
actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and
reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for
Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules
45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks
to set aside the issuances of Judge Mamindiara P.
Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City,
Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106, particularly,
the: (1) Resolution dated July 12, 2005 which, in
part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of
the Republic for the latters failure to implead
indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2)
Resolution dated October 24, 2005, which denied the
Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria
Cacho (Doa Demetria) applied for the registration of
two parcels of land. Both parcels are situated in what
was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province,
which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy.
Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte.
Doa Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase
from Gabriel Salzos. Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1
from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced
by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by
Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon.
Doa Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2 from
Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have
inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who
died without issue.
Only the Government opposed Doa Demetrias
applications for registration on the ground that the
two parcels of land were the property of the United
States and formed part of a military reservation,
generally known as Camp Overton.
On December 10, 1912, the land registration court
(LRC) rendered its Decision in those land property
applied by Doa Demetria.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land
occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog
in the southern part of the large parcel object and her
application as to all the rest of the land solicited in
said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new
survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be
presented, excluding all the land not occupied and
cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be
made and the corrected plan presented on or before
the 30th day of March, 1913, with previous notice to
the commanding general of the Division of the
Philippines.
Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC
judgment, Doa Demetria appealed to this Court. In
its Decision dated December 10, 1914, the Court
affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10,
1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the
court below were fully sustained by the evidence
adduced during trial.
Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again
called upon to settle a matter concerning the
registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v.
Court of Appeals.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming
to be the late Doa Demetrias son and sole heir, filed
before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two
original certificates of title (OCTs)
Teofilos petition was opposed by the Republic,
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of
Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC
initially dismissed Teofilos petition for
reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate
evidence to show the prior existence of the titles
sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the
proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of
decrees. Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing
and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC
refused. When elevated to SC in Cacho v. Mangotara,
the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC,
with an order to the said trial court to accept
Teofilos amended petition and to hear it as one for
re-issuance of decrees.
In opposing Teofilos petition, the Republic and NSC
argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional
infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-in-
interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doa
Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject
parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in
Doa Demetrias name; and that the issuance of the
decrees was dubious and irregular.
After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its
Decision granting Teofilos petition and ordering the
reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364
and 18969.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the
petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and
18969 .
Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the
1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of
the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos.
10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees
had in fact been issued and had attained finality.
As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of
registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and
OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doa
Demetrias name.
The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the
termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four
cases involving the same parcels of land were
instituted before the trial courts during and after the
pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. In the Resolution
dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the
seven Petitions considering that they either originated
from the same case or involved similar issues.
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed
on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority
 (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC), and the latters mortgagee, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint
was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge
Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
2729 dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop,
and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. Its existence was extended until October
10, 1988.
On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA,
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 reserving in
favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City,
measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares,
to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the
Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this
parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed,
ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for
Expropriation.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997
Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of
land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed
with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and
to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated
September 28, 2004 seeking to implead in Civil Case
No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their
respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and
AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to
admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that
the Republic was without legal personality to file the
same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move
for the execution of the decision in the ISA case
within the prescriptive period of five years, hence,
the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an
independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC
further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of
more than six years of the Republic in seeking the
substitution and continuation of the action for
expropriation effectively barred any further
proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by
laches.
In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated
November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing
the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1
denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file
and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-
Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did
not file any motion for execution of the judgment of
this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for
execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled
that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which
effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest
mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the
RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No.
106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead
indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was
not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the
institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an
action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of
the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a
Resolution on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of
merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and
granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106
filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the
dismissal of the Expropriation Case.
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation
of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power
of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to
the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of
necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject
thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Cacho v. Government of the United States x x x, decreeing
the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of
the late Doa Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and
is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since
MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper
party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the
present case should be dismissed.
This Court notes that the Republic [has filed
reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004,
involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case
No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The
Republic], however, did not state such fact in its
"Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint
dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of
forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the
Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership
over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed
to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation
case without making a mockery of justice.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it
dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was
denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution31 dated
October 24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this
Court the consolidated Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
1. WON the owners of the property to be
expropriated is the only party to the expropriation
proceedings.
2. WON the REPUBLIC is engaging in
contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation and reversion proceedings for the
same parcel of land.
RULING:
1. Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court
described how expropriation proceedings should be
instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall
be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with
certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the
real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as
defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far
as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the
title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in
the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private
individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so
that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who
are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the
complaint.
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not
limited to the owners of the property to be
expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the
property owner alone.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not
limited to the owners of the property condemned.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or
claiming to own the property. When [property] is
taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not
necessarily the only person who is entitled to
compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term
owner when employed in statutes relating to
eminent domain to designate the persons who are to
be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule
in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all
those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a
vendee in possession under an executory contract.
Every person having an estate or interest at law or in
equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the
award. If a person claiming an interest in the land
sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is
given the right to intervene and lay claim to the
compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for
Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights
of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of
Instructions No. 127775 dated November 16, 1982
expressly recognized that portions of the lands
reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also
dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate
occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an
idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of
MCFC.
Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a
defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1
evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for
Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper
party.
2. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when
it instituted both expropriation and reversion
proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct
remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each
other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the
institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is
reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to
expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
The SC disagree that the complaint in Civil Case No. 6686
seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201
(a.f.), with all their derivative titles, and reversion. The
Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order
dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and
AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause
of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there
was no showing that the late Doa Demetria committed any
wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the
Republic. Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply
to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend
to lands beyond the public domain. By the own judicial
admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question
are privately owned, even before the same were registered in
Doa Demetrias name.
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee. In Estate of the
Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, reversion was defined as an
action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the
mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the
Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for
reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than
fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the
conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest
land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made
through mere oversight.
The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This
same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which declares "[a]ll
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. x x x" No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; it is indispensable that there be
a showing of the title from the State.
Just because OCTs were already issued in Doa Demetrias
name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for
reversion. The Court further finds that the Complaint of the
Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently states a cause of
action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud
was committed in the registration or that the Director of Lands
requested the reversion.
 REPUBLIC VS. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010
CASE:
FACTS:
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school
operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(the Republic) through the Department of Education.
PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in
Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the
property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were
registered in the name of respondents Primo and
Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas).
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923
and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four
lots.
As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds
partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new
titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and
Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name
of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the
name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot
4. Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the
property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued
in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the
Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the
school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and
subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been
tax-declared in the name of the City Government and
PPS built significant, permanent improvements on
the same. These improvements had also been tax-
declared.
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that
although PPS sought permission from them to use the
property as a school site, they never relinquished
their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the
property since they had no need for it at that time.
Thus, it has remained registered in their name under
the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been
partially cancelled.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS,
demanding that it vacate the disputed property. When
PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the
Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case
0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with
application for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction.
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision,
dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics
immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled
that the Republics consent was not necessary since
the action before the MTCC was not against it.
Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render
judgment in the case before it. The MTCC denied the
motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the
case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. Later, the
RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which
then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to
the RTC.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the
Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It
held that the Mendozas had the better right of
possession since they were its registered owners.
PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any
document to prove the transfer of ownership of the
land in its favor. PPS moved for reconsideration, but
the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the
grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches
from recovering possession of the school lot; (2)
sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas
relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City
Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3)
Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name
of the City Government since 1957 for taxation
purposes.
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA also rejected the Republics claim of
ownership since it presented no documentary
evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor
of the government. Moreover, even assuming that the
Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in
1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took
steps to have the title to the property issued in its
name or have its right as owner annotated on the
Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions,
the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the
Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its
action.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the
Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. WON the failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings
covering a property that the government had taken
constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
possession.
2. WON it is the value of the property at the time of
the taking that is controlling for the Court to award
just compensatyin even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceedings.
RULING:
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to
the taking of his property by the government for public use, he
thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as
the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long
time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had
taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession.
The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the RTCs power to
award just compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine
just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in
an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property
or its value and damages. As to the time when just
compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property
was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before
the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the
value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
LBP VS. LIVIOCO
G.R. No. 170685 September 22, 2010
CASE: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing
the August 30, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),
as well as its December 5, 2005 Resolution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is the
government financial institution established to aid in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) as well as to act as financial intermediary of
the Agrarian Reform Fund.
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of
30.6329 hectares of sugarland located in Dapdap, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Sometime between 1987 and 1988, ivioco offered
his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter,
for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS)
form he submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is
adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an international
paper mill.
The DAR referred Liviocos offer to the LBP for valuation.
Following Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and
DAR Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991, the
LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of
P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then promptly
informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the
claim proceeds have been "kept in trust pending [his]
submission of the [ownership documentary] requirements." It
appears however that Livioco did not act upon the notice
given to him by both government agencies. On September 20,
1991, LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as
compensation for Liviocos 26 hectares.
It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a
reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that its value
had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for
sale. The request was denied by Regional Director Antonio
Nuesa on the ground that there was already a perfected sale.
The DAR proceeded to take possession of Liviocos property.
In 1994, the DAR awarded Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) covering Liviocos property to 26 qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to
recover his property but the same proved futile. The first case
he filed in 1995 was for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and damages against the DAR, LBP, Register of
Deeds, and the farmer-beneficiaries. In its final and executory
Decision, the CA sustained the validity of the CLOAs.
Livioco then filed in 1998 a petition for reconveyance before
the DAR Regional Office. The case eventually reached the
CA, which dismissed the petition on the ground that the
validity of the compulsory acquisition had already been
decided with finality in the earlier CA case.
As the disputed property was eventually acquired through
Compulsory Acquisition, its reconveyance to the petitioners
was properly disallowed by the DAR. The certifications by
other government agencies that the land was identified as a
resettlement area [are] of no avail as the DAR is vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
Upon the request of DAR, LBP made two amendments to the
valuation. At first, they reduced the acquired area from
30.6329 hectares to 23.9191 hectares. Later, they increased the
acquired area to 24.2088 hectares. The remaining 6.4241
hectares of the property was determined as not compensable
because this comprised a residential area, a creek, road, and a
chapel. The total value for 24.2088 hectares was P770,904.54.
Livioco was informed on August 8, 2001 that the payment was
already deposited in cash and agrarian reform bonds and may
be withdrawn upon submission of the documentary
requirements.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he
believes was an outrageously low valuation of his property,
Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of
just compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders
before Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City on December 18, 2001. He maintained that
between 1990 and 2000, the area where his property is located
has become predominantly residential hence he should be paid
his propertys value as such.
Livioco then presented evidence to prove the value of his
property as of 2002. According to his sworn valuation, his
property has a market value of P700.00/square meter. He also
presented the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal value
for residential lands in Dapdap, as ranging from P150.00 to
P200.00/square meter. He then presented Franklin Olay
(Olay), chief appraiser of the Rural Bank of Mabalacat, who
testified and certified that he valued the property at P800.00
per square meter, whether or not the property is residential.
Olay explained that he arrived at the said value by asking the
buyers of adjacent residential properties as to the prevailing
selling price in the area. There was also a certification from
the Pinatubo Project Management Office that Liviocos
property was valued at P300.00/square meter. Livioco prayed
that just compensation be computed at P700.00/square meter.
Only LBP filed its Answer and participated in the trial. It
justified the P3.21/square meter valuation of the property on
the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA
6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991.
LBP objected to respondents theory that his property should
be valued as a residential land because the same was acquired
for agricultural purposes, not for its potential for conversion to
other uses. LBP presented its agrarian affairs specialist who
testified that, due to the increase in the acquired area, she was
assigned to amend the claim of Livioco. She computed the
total value thereof at P770,904.54, using the DAR
Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991. The only other
witness of LBP was its lawyer, who explained the legal basis
for the DAR administrative orders and the factors for land
valuation provided in Section 17 of RA 6657.
Apparently aware that neither party presented relevant
evidence for the proper computation of the just compensation,
the trial court issued its April 2, 2003 Order requiring the
reception of additional evidence.
Based on the records, the next hearing took place on July 10,
2003 where none of the parties presented additional evidence,
whether testimonial or documentary. Nevertheless, the trial
court proceeded to rule in favor of Livioco.
Defendants Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of
the Philippines are, therefore, ordered to pay [respondent] the
amount of Php700.00 per square meter multiplied by 24.2088
hectares representing the entire area taken by the government
from the plaintiff.
Defendants Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of
the Philippines are, therefore, ordered to pay [respondent] the
amount of Php700.00 per square meter multiplied by 24.2088
hectares representing the entire area taken by the government
from the plaintiff. The trial court was of the opinion that
Livioco was able to prove the higher valuation of his property
with a preponderance of evidence. In contrast, there was a
dearth of evidence to support LBPs P3.21 per square meter
valuation of the property. Not a single documentary evidence
was presented to substantiate its valuation.

LBP sought a reconsideration of the adverse decision arguing

that the court should have considered the factors appearing in
Section 17. It stressed that in failing to consider the propertys
productive capacity (capitalized net income), the court placed
the farmer-beneficiaries in a very difficult position. They
would not be able to pay off the just compensation for their
lands because it is valued way beyond its productive capacity.
The same was denied by the trial court.

Upon respondents motion, the lower court ordered LBP on

March 29, 2004 to release as initial cash down payment the
amount of P827,943.48, inclusive of legal interest accruing
from the time of taking on September 20, 1991 (the date when
LBP informed the Register of Deeds that it has earmarked the
said amount in favor of Livioco).

LBP sought a reconsideration of the said order. It clarified that

the just compensation deposited by LBP in the account of
respondent was only P770,904.54 for the 24.2088 hectares. It
likewise asked that the release of the deposit be subject to
respondents compliance with the release requirements of the
ownership documents. The records are silent as to the courts
action on the motion as well as to the execution of this order.

Petitioner turned to the CA to no avail. The CA affirmed the

trial courts decision in toto.

A motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29,

2005, which was denied in a Resolution dated December 5,
2005.

ISSUE:

WON the fair market value of an expropriated property is

determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking.

RULING:

For purposes of just compensation, the fair market

value of an expropriated property is determined by
its character and its price at the time of taking.
There are three important concepts in this definition
the character of the property, its price, and the
time of actual taking.