albert the great on metaphysics 553

theology of Pseudo-Dionysius on the other, inasmuch as it is the negative

theology of the latter that inspires Albert to develop the restricted view
of transcendental terms that he does. Finally, Aertsens suggestion that
Alberts thinking is more complicated in its conception of the nature of
metaphysical knowledge than de Libera allows is certainly justified, while
his observation that Albertan metaphysical terms are only transcenden-
tal within the creaturely order, that is, only horizontally and not verti-
cally, seems to be well borne out by the texts we have seen in Alberts
De causis.
In conclusion, we may suggest that the thought of Albert the Great on
the topic of metaphysical knowledge is a fascinating combination of the
diffferent elements that will be systematized in diffferent ways by subse-
quent philosopher-theologians. Thomas Aquinas will adopt certain fea-
tures and render them consistent by never allowing that God falls under
the subject of metaphysics as a property; accordingly, he must then pres-
ent a more elaborate theory of analogy than that found in Albert to try to
justify theological language within the scope of natural reason. Henry of
Ghent and, following him, Duns Scotus will take up the Avicennian side
of Alberts thought and systematize it by eliminating the idea that God
is a topic of metaphysical knowledge only as the cause of the subject of
the science. Alberts own position is a mixture of both of these elements,
presaging in diffferent ways the history of metaphysics and philosophical
theology in the Latin West.

2.Metaphysics and Its Relation to Theology in Alberts Thought

Henryk Anzulewicz
The centerpiece of Alberts metaphysics is his paraphrase of Aristotles
work of that name. But it has been observed that Alberts philosophical
vision is broader than that of many of his peers, including that of his stu-
dent Thomas.24 His philosophical work, even if we think of the central

24Henryk Anzulewicz, Die Denkstruktur des Albertus Magnus: Ihre Dekodierung

und ihre Relevanz fr die Begriffflichkeit und Terminologie, in Llaboration du vocabu-
laire philosophique au Moyen ge: Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et
Leuven, 1214 septembre 1998, organis par la Socit Internationale pour ltude de la Phi-
losophie Mdivale, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel, Rencontres de Philosophie
Mdivale 8 (Turnholt: 2000), 369396, at 370372, 376381; Anzulewicz, Pseudo-Diony-
sius Areopagita und das Strukturprinzip des Denkens von Albert dem Grossen, in Die
Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter, ed. Boiadjiev, Kapriev, and Speer, 251295, at 253270;
554 henryk anzulewicz

Aristotelian sciences of metaphysics and physics, is theological in a

sense that could not be ascribed today to our historical Aristotle (Alberts
Aristotle is one of the remote authors of the thought of the Liber de cau-
sis): the entire created world is infused with form that flows, under the
mediation of higher causes, out from and back to God. It may not be
accidental, then, that Albert penned paraphrases on all of the works of
the Dionysian corpus immediately before turning to the Corpus Aristo-
telicum. And so, before we delve into the details of Alberts most mature
metaphysical paraphrases, the Metaphysica and the De causis et processu
universitatis, it is appropriate to reflect in a broad way on Alberts com-
prehensive understanding of wisdom, first through a consideration of
the relationship between its two main formsmetaphysics and revealed
theologyand then by way of a reflexion on the typically Aristotelian
primacy of the former within philosophy proper. Subsequently, we shall
examine key sources of Alberts metaphysics apart from the Aristotelian:
the Platonic and the Arabic sources. We address these issues which afffect
the interpretation of Alberts thought globally, as well as of his First Phi-
losophy in particular, in the next four sections.
Already in his early work De IV coaequaevis, Albert draws a parallel
between metaphysics, the study of being as being, and the discipline that
Augustine defines as cognitio de divinis (cognition about divine matters;
De trin. 13.19.24), namely, as Albert elsewhere calls it, sacred doctrine or
simply theology (as it shall be henceforth called): he considers both to
be science (scientia) and wisdom (sapientia).25 As also in later works, he
does not count theology as a science or wisdom that is purely theoreti-
cal (speculativa), since it is also afffective (cum afffectu) and for the sake
of an end other than itself, as are the practical sciences.26 By contrast,
metaphysics is an unqualifiedly theoretical science (scientia speculativa
simpliciter): a habitus of speculative intelligence, which, according to Aris-
totle (Metaph. .1), deals generally with being as being and its properties.
Albert clarifies and develops the notions of two kinds of wisdom in
Book 1 of his Super Sententiarum. Aristotle, observes Albert, did not iden-
tify a science whose truth is beatifying, whose end is in no way amidst

see also Anzulewicz, Die Rekonstruktion der Denkstruktur Alberts des Grossen: Skizze
und Thesen eines Forschungsprojektes, Theologie und Glaube 90 (2000), 60212.
25Alb., De IV coaeq. q. 38.1, Borgn. 34, 550b551b; see also, e.g. Alb., Summa de mir.
scient. dei 1, prol., Ed. Colon. 34/1, 2, lns. 7276; tr. 1.1, 6, lns. 5257.
26Alb., De IV coaeq. q. 38.1, Borgn. 34, 550b, 551a, 552b. See also below, notes 28 and 30.
 albert the great on metaphysics 555

creatures.27 Hence he separated the notions of the true and the good from
each other, and he accordingly divided the science of the truth that is
in things from the science of the good that is in things. But the science
whose end is the truth pertaining to the Christian religion is about an end
that combines intellection and afffectivity. Thus, to the question whether
theology is practical or speculative, Albert answers that it is properly an
afffective, not an intellective, science.28 Yet theology is not mere moral
science: it is pursued for its own sake in the highest sense, not for the
sake of character, as are moral sciences. Unlike metaphysics, theology is
not universal by the universality of a single subject, such as being: it does
not consider things insofar as they are things.29 As its general subject, it
speculates about things, not in themselves, but insofar as they bring about
in some way a participation in beatitude.30 And it investigates God, not as
its general, but as its special subject; and not absolutely, but as principle
and end.31 Theology is the science that is wisdom to the highest degree
insofar as it is about the highest things in the highest manner: about God
through the principles of faith based on divine revelation.32 By contrast,
the sciences discovered by the philosophers are also called wisdoms since
they concern lofty things, but not in the highest manner, insofar as they
are based only on principles that are available to reason.
In Super III Sententiarum, which treats of the gift of wisdom, Albert
unites metaphysics and theology in contradistinction to practical wisdom.
Wisdom (sapientia) in the broad sense of the word (large), he observes,
is derived from tasting alone (sapere) and is twofold: practicaland so,

27Alb., Super I Sent. d. 1, a. 4, Borgn. 25, 18b.

28See also Alb., Super I Sent. d. 1, a. 4, Borgn. 25, 19; Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1,
q. 3.3, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 13, lns. 5871.
29Alb., Super I Sent. d. 1, a. 3, Borgn. 25, 18a; see also below, note 44.
30Alb., Super I Sent. d. 1, a. 2, Borgn. 25, 16. Albert, Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 2,
Ed. Colon. 34/1, 8, ln. 46p. 9, ln. 2, later clarifies that theology is about, not every-
thing knowable, but all of the knowable insofar as it inclines toward piety. But piety is
cultus that is perfected by virtues and deeds and leads to salvation. Hence, theology is the
science of those things that pertain to salvation. Piety is its proximate, but salvation its
ultimate end.
31 Albert, Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 2, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 9, lns. 1018, later qualifies
while repeating this claim, acknowledging that theology is of course also about God as
he is in himself: [T]heologia nomine ipso non dicit nisi rationem vel sermonem de deo,
sermo autem de deo debet esse declarativus dei, non secundum esse et substantiam tan-
tum, sed secundum quod est principium et finis eorum quae sunt, quia aliter imperfecte
cognoscitur. Non autem est principium et finis nisi per ea quae ad exitum rerum ab ipso
et ad reductionem rerum ad ipsum pertinent. Et haec sunt quae pertinent ad salutem
hominis. See also below, notes 48, 54, and 56.
32Alb., Super I Sent. d. 1, a. 4, Borgn. 25, 19a.
556 henryk anzulewicz

moral science is called wisdom; and theoretical, as in Aristotles three

definitions of the wise person (Metaphysics 1.2, 982a816).33 Wisdom in
the narrow sense (stricte) is used of that which is its own cause of know-
ing (sciendi) and of that whose end is within it, so that it is not sought
for the sake of another, but other ends are for its sake. Albert links this
narrower notion of wisdom, not to tasting alone (sapere), but to flavor
(sapor) as well, and therefore to what is, absolutely speaking, flavorful
(quod est sapidum simpliciter), which is none other than divine things.
In this sense, he concludes, only divine science (scientia divina) is wis-
dom, and especially that science that is according to piety (secundum
pietatem): theology.34
In his question-commentary on Aristotles Ethics (ca. 125052), Albert
appears again to group metaphysical and theological wisdoms together,
now under the designation contemplation of separate substancesthe
most honorable endeavor (honorabilissimum), since toward it all human
action and thought is ordered.35 God himself, says Albert, performs the
operations of this contemplation, and he rewards them the most. Alberts
responses to objections bring out characteristics of wisdom that are of
special interest for understanding metaphysics. Wisdom (of metaphysics)
has the highest degree of certitude in demonstration (certitudo demonstra-
tionis) because of its middle terms; not because they are the most proxi-
mate and enter substantially into the things known through them, but
because they are prior to all other definitions, are underived, and serve in
turn as the ultimate causes of all other demonstrative knowledge.36 In a
parallel way, metaphysical wisdom is about the highest divine things, not
merely because a part of it concerns God and separate substances, which
are called divine according to the whole of their being.37 But in fact the

33Alb., Super III Sent. d. 35, a. 2, Borgn. 28, 646b647a. See also Alb., Super Iob, 28.12,
in Alb., Commentarii in Job additamentum ad opera omnia, ed. Melchior Weiss (Fribourg-
im-Breisgau: 1904), col. 31516.
34Alb., Super III Sent. d. 35, a. 2, Borgn. 28, 647a, with backreference to Super I Sent. d. 1,
a. 4, Borgn. 28, p. 18b. See also Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 1, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 6, lns.
5861; and note 30 above.
35Alb., Super Ethica 6.10.535c, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 460, lns. 3452. For the claim that meta-
physics is most liberal, since it is about God, see Alb., Super Ethica 1.7.36 ad 3, Ed. Colon.
14/1, 34, lns. 4244.
36Alb., Super Ethica 6.10.535 ad 2, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 460, lns. 5878; see also 6.10.534 ad 1,
459, lns. 2734, in addition to Section 3E below.
37See Alb., Super Ethica 6.10.535 ob 4, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 460, lns. 47 (an objection con-
ceded by Albert); also ibid., prol. n. 4c, Ed. Colon. 14/1, 3, lns. 5461: [I]n prima philosophia
subiectum potest dupliciter assignari, scilicet id de quo principaliter intendituret sic dic-
itur esse subiectum deus, unde et scientia divina dicitur, quamvis de eo non determinetur
 albert the great on metaphysics 557

whole science is about divine things (divina) in a second, broad sense

of the word, in which sense things are called divine according to part of
their being (secundum partem esse).38 In this sense, the first principles of
substance and the other genera are called divine. For, according to part
of their being, the being that they have in matter, they are not divine; but
according to the being of substance (esse substantiae)which is within
the first principlesinsofar as such things do not depend on matter
(secundum quod non dependent ad materiam), they are entirely divine in
the second sense of the word.39 Contrast this passage with the very difffer-
ent explanation of the divina of metaphysics in the later Metaphysica:
In first philosophy, all things are called divine because God is included in
their definition. For...all things go out from the first divine principles and
are in them as artifacts are in the mind of the artist. And, just as artifacts
are traced back (resolvuntur ad) to the light (lumen) of the first active intel-
lect and are defined through it, so all things are traced back to the light of
the separate substances, and the separate substances are themselves traced
back to the light of Gods intellect, through which they subsist and through
which they are defined as through a first principle. And, this is the cause of
this wisdoms being called divine and theology.40
In Book 10 of the Super Ethica, Albert expressly addresses the question
whether theological and philosophical contemplation are the same. In
both, he answers, are found: (1) intellectual intuition of spiritual things;
(2) being for the sake of resting in God as the highest felicity.41 But they
difffer in habit, end, and object. Theological wisdom contemplates through
a light infused from God rather than through an acquired habit. Its end
is vision in patria rather than in via. And its object difffers, not as to sub-
stance, but as to its mode of contemplating. For the philosopher con-
templates God according as he or she possesses God as a demonstrative
conclusion, whereas the theologian contemplates him as existing beyond
reason and understanding. Thus, the philosopher relies on the certitude
of demonstration, whereas the theologian relies on the first truth because

in qualibet parte eius, sed alia omnia determinantur propter ipsumvel id de quo com-
muniter determinatur in scientia, et sic ens est subiectum eius.
38Alb., Super Ethica 6.10.535 ad 3, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 460, lns. 7385; see also 6.10.534 ad 1,
459, lns. 2734, and note 127 below.
39See Section 9 below on the primary mode of substance. See also Alb., Super Dion.
epist. 9, Ed. Colon. 37/2, 539, lns. 4657 and 539, ln 83p. 540, ln. 19: in theology, just as in
metaphysics, things without matter are considered.
40Alb., Metaph. 6.1.3, Ed. Colon. 16/2, 305, lns. 3849. For this sense of divina, and the
background in Averroes, see notes 14, 21, and 236.
41Alb., Super Ethica 10.16.927c, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 774, ln. 82p. 775, ln. 13.
558 henryk anzulewicz

of itself, not because of reasoned argument, even if he or she possesses rea-

soned argument. Therefore, even if philosophy begins in wonder, it ends
in knowledge, so that only the theologian as such marvels (miratur).42
In a roughly contemporary question-commentary on Dionysiuss Epis-
tles, Albert contrasts the mode of reasoning from principles in the two wis-
doms as he addresses the question: does it sufffice in theology to know and
say the truth without refuting errors? For other sciences, he answers, the
truth that is communicated by necessary syllogistic connections, because
it is derived from the principles of reason, has a cogency that draws even
opponents, once refuted, to itself.43 But the truth of theology is beyond
the principles of reason and is made clear by the pure divine light that
informs the conscience so as to consent to it. Hence, through such truth,
errors cannot be refuted unless it is first accepted as a foundation (503,
lns. 1420). To the objection that it belongs to the most noble science to
prove the principles of all other sciences, Albert responds that theology,
unlike metaphysics, is not first because of the universality of its subject,
to which all other sciences are in some way subordinated.44 Rather, all
other sciences serve theology because it uses them. So, Albert does not
ascribe one Aristotelian attribute of the wise person to the theologian,
namely, to order all of the disciplines and to establish for them their first
principles. Nonetheless, he does not hesitate to afffirm elsewhere, with the
help of al-Frb and al-hazl, that theology, like metaphysics, is first in
the order of nature, though last in the order of study and discovery.45
It may appear at first that Albert here separates out all philosophical
consideration from theology. But in the same work he responds to an
objection to this efffect by indicating how theology uses philosophy:
Although the mode of natural philosophy is not preserved in theology,
nonetheless, natural things are introduced into it. And for this reason, phil-
osophical consideration belongs to it; namely, because theology, although
it uses natural things, nonetheless does not use them insofar as they are
naturalbecause it does not consider their motionsbut only insofar as
there is a vestige in them, and again [even then] it does not proceed in the

42See Alb., Super Ethica 10.16.927c, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 774, lns. 7379; and, on Arist.,
Metaph. A.2, 982b1721: Alb., Metaph. 1.2.6, Ed. Colon. 16/1, 23, lns. 4143; 1.2.10, 27,
lns. 6265.
43Alb., Super Dion. epist. 7, Ed. Colon. 37/2, 502, ln. 78p. 503, ln. 2.
44Alb., Super Dion. epist. 7, Ed. Colon. 37/2, 503, lns. 3339.
45Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei, prol., Ed. Colon. 34/1, 3, lns. 5053; this order is usu-
ally ascribed to metaphysics or to divine science as wisdom, as, with al-hazl, in Super
Ethica 6.9.530c, Ed. Colon. 14/2, 455, lns. 6277.
 albert the great on metaphysics 559

mode of natural philosophy. And, much less does it take up mathematics....

Also, it accepts divine things, not in the mode of first philosophy, as made
evident by the motions of the heavens, but insofar as there are articles of
faith about them.46
Albert goes on to give examples of things introduced into theology. Among
them are: lower things, as symbols, such as a rock; comparatively noble,
though still corporeal things, such as light; created spirits, such as angels;
and human laws in historical examples and signs.47
In the Summa theologiae it becomes clear how theology borrows from
the philosophical sciences not just for symbols. In the prologue, his
first account of theologys subject, Albert again takes up the theme of
vestiges:
[T]heology...as a whole is about God according as through all his works
he reaches boldly from one end to another and disposes all things gently.
For, in this way he comes to be known in all things: in the efffects of nature,
on the one hand, through a trace (vestigium) and an image; in the works of
reparation, on the other, through the likeness of grace; and in the acts of
beatitude or glory through the consummation of glory.48
Among the vestiges of God in creatures, Albert goes on to explain, are
signs by which something of God is with probability naturally known.49
In three of the vestiges, the perfection of every creature is found: being,
the true, and the good, the triad highlighted by the Liber de causis.50 And
so, examination of these satisfies the first of the following three ways in
which Albert takes philosophy to be integrated into theology:
To the further question [i.e. whether natural knowledge is at all helpful for
faith], the older [authorities] Praepositinus and William, namely, of Aux-
erre, have responded suffficiently well. They assigned three reasons why it is
good to seek arguments for matters to be believed. One [reason] is so that
what is believed may be better known. But what is known in two ways is
better known than what is known in one. And so, what is known by faith
and reason is better known than what is known by faith alone. The second
[reason] is for the sake of bringing to the faith the simple, who are rather

46Alb., Super Dion. epist. 9, Ed. Colon. 37/2, 540, lns. 3653.
47Alb., Super Dion. epist. 9, Ed. Colon. 37/2, 540, lns. 77p. 541, ln. 24.
48Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei, prol., Ed. Colon. 34/1, 1, lns. 2330, quoting Wisd. 8:1.
49Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 15, c. 2, a. 1, pt. 1, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 60, lns. 6769.
50Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 15, c. 2, a. 1, pt. 2, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 61, lns. 4244;
62, lns. 3870.
560 henryk anzulewicz

easily led by persuasive argument.51...The third [reason] is for the sake of

convicting of contradiction those without faith who cannot be convinced
except through reason, as Augustine says....52
If the Summa theologiae thus finds a role for philosophy within theology, it
continues to contrast theology with metaphysics. In the course of Alberts
formal presentation of the subject of theology, we find an extended dis-
cussion of the subject of metaphysics, in which he distinguishes three
senses of subject:
The subject in the sciences is assigned in three ways. [First,] namely, as
what is aimed at (intenditur) principally and in the principal part of the
science; just as God is said to be the subject of first philosophy because in
its principal part, God and the divine substances, which are separate, are
aimed at. Hence, [first philosophy] used also to be called theology by the
ancient philosophers, since assignment of names should be based on what
is ultimate and best [in a thing]. In a second way, the subject in the sci-
ences is assigned from that about which (de quo) and about whose parts the
properties (passiones) are proved; just as being (ens) is called the subject of
first philosophy insofar as one and many, potency and act, necessary and
possible being are [properties] proved (probantur) of being. In a third way,
the subject of a science is what it contains for the sake of the goodness
and clarity of [its] teachingand such is whatever serves (quaecumque sunt
adminiculantia) the subject in the first and second senses, through which
the subject in these senses is brought to light; just as first philosophy con-
cerns the stances of the ancients, the principles of demonstrations, what
is said in one way or in multiple ways, and also definition (in itself or as
physical definition) and the principles of each [i.e. of these two kinds of]
definition. And, in all the general sciences it is necessary that there be this
threefold determination of the subject.53
Accordingly, continues Albert, the subject of theology can be understood
in three corresponding senses: (1) God, after whom the discipline is named;
(2) Christ and the church, or, the incarnate word with all his sacraments,
which he perfects in the church; or, in short, the works of reparation as
proceeding from the head of the church, God qua enjoyable (fruibile) as
an ultimate end; and (3) things and signs, in the Augustinian formula.54

51 For theologys use of probable argument, see ibid., 1.5.3, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 19, lns.
5283.
52Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei. 1, q. 15.3.2, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 80, lns. 1427.
53Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 3.1, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 10, lns. 6687. For other
instances of this plural way of taking the subject of metaphysics, see notes 37 and 233.
54Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 3.1, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 10, ln. 90p. 11, ln. 11.
 albert the great on metaphysics 561

Subsequently, Albert presents the subject of theology as he conceives

it in a single formula: the enjoyable (fruibile), or what is related to it as
a sign or as useful.55 In response to objections there, he explains why
even where metaphysics overlaps with theology, their considerations are
diffferent:
[F]irst philosophy is about God according as he underlies (substat) proper-
ties of the first being insofar as it is first being. But [theology] is about God
according as he underlies what is attributed to him through faith....[Fur-
thermore,] there are two modes of revelation. One mode is through the light
(lumen) that is connatural to us. And, in this way the philosophers have
received revelation. This light can only be from the first light of God, as
Augustine says in the book On the Teacher, and this has been best proved
in the Book on the Causes. The other light is for contemplating supra-worldly
matters, and this is elevated beyond us. By this light this science is revealed.
The first [light] shines (relucet) in per se known [propositions], but the sec-
ond in the articles of faith.56
Thus, concludes Albert, although other sciences may materially treat the
same matters as are treated in divine science, they are not treated in the
same way: in the former they are treated as being and parts of being, as
underlying properties that flow from what is essential to them; in the lat-
ter they are treated in relation to the enjoyable (fruibile) and as underly-
ing properties attributed to them as such (lns. 5562).

3.Albert on Metaphysics as First and Most Certain Philosophy

Bruno Tremblay
As we have seen, metaphysics for Albert is the study of being as
being,57 undertaken with the ultimate goal of knowing its principles
and causes, chief among which is God,58 for whom being, as is stated in
the Liber de causis and as Section 11 explains, is a first efffect or primum

55Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 4, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 15, lns. 2123. For fruibile, see
also ibid. tr. 2, q. 7, 9.
56Alb., Summa de mir. scient. dei 1, q. 4, Ed. Colon. 34/1, 15, lns. 3650.
57Alb., Metaph. 1.1.2, Ed. Colon. 16/1, 3, ln. 31p. 5, ln. 58, and 4.1.2, 162, ln. 45p. 163,
ln. 34.
58See Alb., De causis et proc. univers. 2.1.1, Ed. Colon. 17/2, 58, ln. 34p. 60, ln. 5; and
2.5.24, 191, lns. 1723. According to Albert there, the intended goal is finally reached with
the considerations of Metaphysics 1113 and the Book of Causes; see the translations in
notes 22 and 483.