G.R. No.
152716 October 23, 2003 ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner,
vs.
BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna
Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati in March 1997.1
After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property.2 The dispositive portion
of the Decision dated January 30, 1998 states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage between Elna D.
Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is hereby declared null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent to perform
the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously
acquired by creditors.1vvphi1.nt
Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR
and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is hereby awarded to petitioner, she being the
innocent spouse.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various
motions4 filed by respondent after the case had been decided. The Order
pertained to the properties held by the parties, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties,
the Court finds the following properties to be excluded from the conjugal
properties, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-137232, considering that the same is owned by petitioners
parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was
purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
July 26, 1983. xxx
Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be
distributed in the following manner:
TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:
a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m.,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)
TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:
a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq.
m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)
Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR.
Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in
the name of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
14735, being respondents exclusive property, acquired prior to his
marriage.1awphi1.nt
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject
properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Fridays Club), Ground Floor Rear
Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4
Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in proportion to
one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting all expenses for Income
Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees, clearances, etc.
Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to deliver to respondent the following:
a) the balance of his share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to May
1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals of the aforesaid
properties from June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties shall own and
enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties
adjudicated to them as stated above.
The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor
children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and
medical expenses.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the
adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children.
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time
when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-
Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the children
if she would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in the
support of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the
Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she
could use the income from the lease of said premises for the support of the
children.6
Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000
that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab
intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of
the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to
divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately
among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent
and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and
therefore pertained solely to respondent.7 1vvphi1.nt
On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the
October 5, 2000 Order of the trial court.8Respondent filed an Opposition to the
Notice of Appeal.9 On January 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice of
appeal10 and instead filed on the following day a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial
court in its Order dated October 5, 2000.11
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner
has not shown any reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as the
errors she raised were mere errors of judgment which were the proper subject of
an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.12
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also
denied by the appellate court.13
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:
1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in the Court
of Appeals in view of the fact that the questioned orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of or lack of
jurisdiction.
2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the questioned orders
were errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.14
We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals was proper because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance of its Order dated October 5, 2000, and there were no other
speedy and adequate remedies available. She asserts that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Suite 204 of the LCG
Condominium was the exclusive property of respondent, although it was
established that they lived together as husband and wife beginning March 1983,
before the execution of the Contract to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore, the
trial courts ruling dividing their properties into three, instead of two as provided
under Article 147 of the Family Code, or four, as allegedly agreed by the parties
during a conference with the trial court judge on May 3, 2000, also constituted
grave abuse of discretion.15
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner may no longer avail of
any remedy, whether an appeal or a petition for certiorari, as she had lost all the
right to appeal from the time the Decision of January 30, 1998 became final and
executory. He argues that the Order of the trial court dated October 5, 2000 is no
longer assailable because it was merely issued to execute the final and executory
Decision of January 30, 1998. He also submits that the division of the properties
into three and the distribution of 1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent,
and their children was proper, in accordance with Articles 50, 51, 147 and 148
of the Family Code mandating the delivery of the presumptive legitime of the
common children upon dissolution of the property regime. Respondent further
claims Suite 204 of LCG Condominium to be his exclusive property as it was
acquired on July 26, 1983, prior to their marriage on March 14, 1985.16
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at
law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As a general rule, a
petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy such as when
an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any
supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil
action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid
application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent
irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously
and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear
failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to
relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of. 17
The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondents submission that
all the appellate remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision
dated January 30, 1998 became final and executory. What is being questioned in
this petition is not the January 30, 1998 Decision of the trial court declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court dated October 5, 2000
dividing the common properties of petitioner and respondent into three1/3 to
petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and affirming its previous
ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property of
respondent. The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner and
respondent has long been settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the
subject of review. There were, however, incidental matters that had to be
addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a
result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order
pertained to the division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner
and respondent, pursuant to the courts directive in its main decision to dissolve
the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of the
issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, and as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court
of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However, considering the merits of the case, the
Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result in
miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their
common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to
support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held
that where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of
the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.18
We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the petition is the ownership of
Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner
and respondent should be partitioned.
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after
two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in
with respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore
fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983.
The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on
installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced
by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer
and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the
contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of
payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of
petitioner.19
In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners submission that
Suite 204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under
Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. (emphasis supplied)
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void,20 as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership
with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:21
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said partys "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household."
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage
is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown
that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner
moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage.
Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with essential
marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on
installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent
were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common
property of petitioner and respondent.
As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should
apply. There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial
court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three1/3 share
each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact,
alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-
way division of the properties1/4 share each to the petitioner and the
respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover, respondents
argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable
marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. 22
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the
property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on
co-ownership.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation
of the properties of petitioner and respondent in accordance with this Courts
ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS
ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo
Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision1 dated March 25,
1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions2 dated March 24, 1995 and
September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113, and nullified
the sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to
spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the respondent court's
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V.
Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita
Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to
Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and
revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose,
Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share
corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30)
days from notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay
the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay
the plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."3
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the
property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada,
Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460.
During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children
and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of
the three sons, as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to
Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to
Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA,
Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos."4 Annotated also in the title is the total
cancellation of said title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751),
dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-
fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the
property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for
the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary
Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian Florentino)."5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with
Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada,
brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by making it
appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen,
residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon
City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had migrated and were already
citizens of the United States of America. It also stated that when petitioners
registered the deed of absolute sale they inserted the phrase "... and that the co-
owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them.", and
that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the
complaint alleged that the other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written
notice of the sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private
respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title
with damages, claiming they had a right of redemption.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with
the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2,
and 3)6 conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33
square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly
described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners
contend that since the property was already three distinct parcels of land, there
was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr.
had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si.
Petitioners point out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to
submit the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Pasay City that separate titles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued
and registered in the names of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
With costs against the plaintiffs."7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994, the
appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In reversing the
decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of
Appeals found that:
"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the portion sold
by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do not
appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the Register of Deeds issued
TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the said deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT
No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33 sq. m. respectively.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh.
'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated that the
portion sold was the 'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square
meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of the Registry of
Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to defendants are still
undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold remains a portion of the whole.
Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27, 1979,
Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant, Cresenciana
Alejo, sold his undivided 113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration with the
Register of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp.
6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the co-
owners are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them', was
inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').
xxx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the undivided
property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners."8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam
received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November 21,
1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under Section
1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.9 Petitioners presented new evidence,
TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa,
married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that the
cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's sons.
On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning that when
the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the decision had
become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said
resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ruling that a co-ownership still existed.
"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March
1994 on purely technical grounds.
"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
denying the Motion for New Trial.
"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering petitioners to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and the costs of the suit."10
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent court erred in
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion for New Trial;
(2) whether private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled to
redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code;11 and (3) whether the award
of moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit is correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of
redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that the
disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of
absolute sale12 technically described the portion sold to each son. The portions
belonging to the three sons were separately declared for taxation purposes with
the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970.13 Jose's testimony
that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when she said they had
been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose.14 More
significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled
TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 13459415 in favor of
Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 13459516 under the name of Anita Bonode Si,
married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 13459617 owned by Jose Armada, married to
Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings. 18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of
Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion. 19 This we
have done in this case. It is our considered view now, that the trial court is
correct when it found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which
documents purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A)
was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons
was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical
description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover,
every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation
purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These
are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by
defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely
determined and identifiable. The fact that the three portions are embraced in one
certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable
or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less
exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-
owners exists."20 (citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is
that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification
they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a portion of
said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell
your share of Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each
brother was no longer available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is
no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.24 This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the
right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of
the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February
22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of
yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."25 Co-owners with actual
notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal
requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to
enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of
thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time
thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them,
would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary.26
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein
private respondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of
whether the appellate court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into.1wphi1 The same is true
with respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners
filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put a
premium on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995 and
September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August
29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004
APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN,
AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN,
MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO,
MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR.,
VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO,
ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO,
JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA
OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O.
FORTUNO,petitioners,
vs.
FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-
BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA
OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. In an action involving property,
petitioners should rely on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged
weakness of respondents claim.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the October 31, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR CV No. 56941. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for
damages and attorneys fees are hereby deleted, the judgment
appealed from is, in all other respects, AFFIRMED. Without costs."3
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision, 4 rendered on
October 30, 1996, which decreed thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and
declares that defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente
Barrito, are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following
properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the
poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE
by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by
the Burgos Street, on the SW by a street, and on the NW
by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an
area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, presently
covered by TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito and
previously covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the
name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856
and assessed at 17,240.00.
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by
a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on the West by
Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters,
declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of
6,240.00.
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on
the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and on
the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4884 square
meters, declared under TD No. 35122 and assessed at
6780.00
as described and referred to in paragraph 9, sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the original complaint and it
is hereby ordered that:
1. The complaint and supplemental complaint
are dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to
prove their cause/causes of action by
preponderance of evidence and on the added
ground of prescription;
2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their
joint and several obligation, to defendants
Fidela Ll. Ocampo, Belen Ocampo-Barrito and
Vicente Barrito, the total sum of 15,000.00
for attorneys fees and other expenses of
litigation and 50,000.00 for moral damages;
3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the
cost of this suit.
4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice
of lis pendens annotated at plaintiffs behest in
the Certificates of Title covering the properties
in question, of defendants be cancelled; and
the plaintiffs, their agents and representatives
as well as successors-in-interest are ordered to
respect the right of ownership of said
defendants thereto, and to vacate and restore
the lawful possession of all portions of said
properties to herein defendants, their agents,
representatives and successors-in-interest."5
The Facts
The CA adopted the RTCs summation of facts as follows:
"Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax, the
following summation of the relevant and material antecedents of the
case by the court a quo, is substantially correct --
This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by
plaintiffs against the defendants.
The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the
spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they
begot ten (10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix, Andres,
Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and
Luis. Of the aforementioned children, the following are
already dead, namely: Felix, who is survived by his
widow, Melita F. Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon
and Miguel; Andres, who is survived by Juana Ocampo
and children Jose, Andres, Imelda, Violeta and Mercedita;
Jose, who is survived by his children Antonia, Elias and
Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who is survived by Ernesto O.
Fortuno; Luis, who is survived by his children Rose,
Ricardo, Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis,
Jr.; and Luisa, who is survived by Carlos Llorin and
children Mecita, Manuel, Carlos, Jr., Carmelita and
Marilou L. Arellano.
The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of
the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo,
they acquired several parcels of land and, upon their
death, left the following properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land
situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines
Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo
and Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the Burgos
Street, on the SW by a Street, and on the NW
by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo,
containing an area of 1,119 square meters,
more or less, presently covered by TCT No.
RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo,
declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at
17,240.00;
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San
Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the
North and East by a barrio road, on the South
by a creek, and on the West by Lot 237, with
an area of about 300 square meters, declared
under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of
6,240.00; and
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North
by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the
South by Lot 10325, and on the West by Lot
10322, with an area of about 4,884 square
meters, declared under TD No. 35122 and
assessed at 6,780.00.
that all the above named parcels of land are actually
owned in common by the children of the late spouses Jose
Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although the land
denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly
registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but
acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by
all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to
partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo
and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so
and moved by a common purpose, both of them
mortgaged to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a)
of the complaint to secure the payment of a 110,000.00
loan, the proceeds of which were x x x exclusively to the
benefit of said defendants only; that the same defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo have been
receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of
their co-heirs amounting to not less than 2,000.00 a year;
and, that because of their relationship, they undertook
earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but
because of defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo[s] utterly unreasonable and unjustified
actuations, the same failed.
xxx xxx xxx
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be
rendered ordering the partition of the properties described
in paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or
otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances on TCT No.
RT-4389(983) which they had caused to be annotated
thereon, particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB;
requiring Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to refrain
from further encumbering said properties or otherwise
subjecting the same to any lien and for that purpose, a
writ of preliminary injunction to be issued against them to
enjoin the commission of such acts; ordering defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to submit an
accounting of the fruits and other produce they had
received from said properties; further ordering Fidela
Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to indemnify plaintiffs
the sum of not less than 15,000.00 by way of attorneys
fees and related expenses of litigation, plus the costs of
the suit; and, further granting plaintiffs such other
remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint dated 2
December 1987 which was granted by the Court as there
was no opposition to it.
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants
Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses;
that on 30 September 1987, TCT No. RT-4389(983) in
the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the
lot described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the original
complaint was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito,
married to defendant Vicente Barrito, on the strength of
an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly
executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor
on 13 January 1984; that at the time the Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when TCT
No. 1364, Registry of Camarines Sur, was issued to
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and
donees were notoriously aware that said parcel of land
was among the lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867
of which the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the mother of
the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are defendants, that
said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and
sisters, and that the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the
exclusive owner thereof; that the transfer of defendants
Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the
ownership over said property now subject of this partition
is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive
plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as
they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original
parties plaintiffs and defendants herein; that defendants
Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the spouses Belen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito have not acted in good faith,
deliberately causing damage and injury to the plaintiffs by
their avaricious desire to obtain sole ownership of said
properties through dubious and illegal means that the
defendant spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente
Barrito, through dubious means and undue influence over
Fidela Ll. Ocampo, a very old spinster whom they have
lately taken into their custody, succeeded in having the
latter execute this supposed deed of donation inter vivos;
that defendants have not acted with justice, honesty and
good faith, causing injury to plaintiffs rights in a manner
inconsistent with morals and good customs, hence, are
liable for moral damages of not less than 50,000.00; and
that to set an example for the public good and to deter
others similarly minded from doing so, defendants should
be assessed exemplary damages of not less than
50,000.00.
Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring
the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos allegedly executed by
Fidela Ll. Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and
Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and void, (b) ordering
defendants Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to
reconvey so much of the property subject thereof as
pertain to the plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly
and severally, to indemnify plaintiffs such amounts as this
Honorable Court may consider fair and reasonable by way
of actual, moral and exemplary damages, inclusive of
attorneys fees and related expenses of litigation, and (d)
granting plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito
allege that the original defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her
predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has been the absolute
owner in fee simple of the property by virtue of the
issuance of the certificate of title in her name; that her
predecessor-in-interest held the same certificate of title to
the same parcel of land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of
all encumbrances and adverse claims and was in
notorious, public, and actual possession of the property in
concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January
1984, when said predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed
the property by donation inter vivos which she accepted
in the same public instrument; that TCT No. 1364 was
issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the strength
of the donation inter vivos executed in her favor by her
predecessor-in-interest and has since 30 September 1987,
been the absolute owner thereof; that since 1949 none of
the plaintiffs ever questioned the absolute ownership and
title of defendant Belen Ocampo-Barritos predecessor-in-
interest over the property making the decree of
registration incontrovertible; that it is fatal for plaintiffs
cause of action to allege that defendants exerted undue
influence over Fidela Ll. Ocampo for the latter to
execute the deed of donation while clearly admitting in
both the original and supplemental complaints that
defendants are residents of Mindoro Occidental a far
away place from Nabua, Camarines Sur, the place where
the same predecessor-in-interest admittedly resides; and,
that Belen Ocampo-Barritos title cannot be collaterally
attacked in these supposed partition proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendants pray that the case be dismissed for utter lack
of merit and plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants the
sum of 200,000.00 for moral damages, 50,000.00 for
exemplary damages, 100,000.00 as compensatory
damages, to pay attorneys fees in the amount of
15,000.00, and for other just and equitable remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
As the Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, defendant
Fidela Ll. Ocampo alleges that she is the true and absolute
owner of the real properties described in paragraph 9 of
the original complaint having acquired the same by
lucrative title and has, since becoming owner thereof,
been in actual possession thereof excepting the portion of
the lot described in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint and
covered by Torrens title which was and is still being
unlawfully occupied by plaintiffs Quiens; that the
properties have been declared for assessment in
defendants name as exclusive owner thereof and since
her acquisition of said properties, has paid the taxes
thereon; that defendant had exercised continuously all the
legal incidents of ownership on said lands to the exclusion
of and adversely to the public, plaintiffs herein included;
that the [D]eed of Donation Inter Vivos and the
subsequent transfer of the property mentioned in
paragraph 9 of the complaint to other defendants Belen
Ocamp[o]-Barrito is valid conveyance which binds the
said property; and, that assuming that plaintiffs have a
cause of action, the same is barred by laches.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that judgment be
rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiffs
to indemnify such sum as will be proved as well as [s]uch
amount as this Court may assess by way of moral and
exemplary damages and costs, including necessary
expenses for litigation, and for just and equitable
reliefs."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
According to the appellate court, other than the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership7 executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence
was offered to establish petitioners claim of co-ownership. The CA held that
this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of
testimonial and documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to
prove their defenses. Communal ownership of the property in question was
supposedly not proven, either, by the ancient photograph showing Spouses
Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo with their ten children in front of the
disputed property; or by another picture showing the name "Oniang Ocampo --
1-15-61" engraved on the said house or building.
The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners that the title to the subject
property had been placed in the name of Fidela, because their parents followed
the Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest son or
daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that upon the death of the eldest
sibling, the properties would revert to the younger brothers and sisters.
According to the CA, however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove
that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that place.
The CA also dismissed petitioners contention that common ownership was
indicated by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and
lived on the subject property. It ruled that fraternal affection could have been the
motive that impelled respondents to allow their relatives to use it.
In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that respondents were
able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer
Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela,
and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages and attorneys fees,
because the trial court had failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable
bases therefor.
Hence, this Petition.8
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. Where the evidence presented, oral and documentary, on the
question of co-ownership, is overwhelming as it is unopposed,
unrebutted and unimpeached, has co-ownership been proved?
"2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public possession by
co-owners, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that there is no co-ownership?
 "3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile and
inconsistent, did the courts commit a grave misapprehension of facts
when they gave credence to it?
"4. Where a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives
the heirs of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?
"5. Where a declaration against interest has not been opposed,
assailed, rebutted or impeached, did the courts commit grave abuse
of discretion in holding there is no such declaration?"9
At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed
property?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Ownership of the Subject Property
At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3) properties originally
involved in the litigation brought before the RTC, petitioners appeal dealt only
with the first one, referred to in the Statement of Facts above -- a parcel of
residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
In their CA appeal, petitioners declared that "the focus of this case is on the first
[property] which is located at downtown Poblacion of Nabua and therefore a
valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters in all."10 Because petitioners had
not questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the other properties, then the
adjudication of these matters became final. Thus, only one property is left for
resolution in the present proceedings.11
Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order
a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership.12 The settlement of the issue of ownership is the
first stage in an action for partition.13 This action will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action are in fact
required by the Rules of Court14 to set forth in their complaint the nature and the
extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition
thereof until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. 15
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.16 Petitioners chief evidence of co-
ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-
ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence
could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that
were adduced by respondents, as will be expounded below.
Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned
property that eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their
parents -- Spouses Ocampo -- whose deaths passed it on to the children.
Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof of ownership of their
predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-
owned, the former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by
Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership
of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim.
First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, 17 referring to
the subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix
Ocampo as buyer. The document dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence
of two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary public.
The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this document, which
they never contested. According to them, the land in question was the conjugal
property of their parents; and that upon the latters deaths, the former inherited it
in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal property of Spouses Ocampo,
then petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such ownership by
their alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to do so, how then
can they prove the transfer to them of ownership that has not been established in
the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer to another a right greater
than that which one has;18 thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher
than its source.19
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his "exclusive
ownership" of the property, "having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having]
been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for
more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in
[the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons."20
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had
been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that
Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of
dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 (983),21which named the former as owner in
fee simple; and a Declaration of Real Property,22 evidencing payment of real
property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen
also presented a Real Estate Mortgage23 executed by the former as absolute
owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the
original petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen
correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and
recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Co-
ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was
mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of ones interest
in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others.25 The
effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be
allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership.26 In this case,
Fidela mortgaged a definiteportion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership.
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos27 executed on
January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows
the immediate source of the formers claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of
title to the property from the donor to the donee.28 Petitioners stubbornly rely on
the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of
her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of
the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were
proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of
Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document
relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTCs ratiocination:
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself
made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the
properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be
considered as a declaration against Fidelas interest since the alleged
acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985
when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year
previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her
properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she
had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare
against."29
Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be
considered as a declaration against interest. A statement may be admissible as
such a declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; 3) at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was
contrary to his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed the declaration to be true.30
As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-
ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her right
over the property had already been extinguished by the prior act of donation.
Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have acknowledged co-
ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an interest to
declare.
Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1365431 as proof of her
ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is
the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to
defeat the face value of respondents TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of
regularity of issuance.32It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers
and titling of the subject property -- commencing in 1948 and eventually leading
to the sole ownership of Belen in 198433 -- it was only after 1984 that petitioners
started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named therein.34 But given the circumstances of this
case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again, we
stress, Belen clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the property in
question and thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated allegation of
co-ownership thereof.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax
Declaration35 indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on
the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document
to prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should
have relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of
respondents claim.36
Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was
sufficiently proved by their witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita
Ocampo. We disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of
documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on
the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-
serving as they are.
As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster their claim of co-
ownership, we affirm the CAs disposition showing the flimsiness of their claim
as follows:
"The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants
really proved nothing. The ancient photograph showing the spouses
Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo together with their ten
children, simply proved that there was such a picture taking of the
spouses with their children. But the photograph does not prove
communal ownership by appellants over the disputed parcels of land;
neither does it prove that the said properties were indeed owned by
the spouses Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on
transferred to and commonly owned by their children. By the same
token, the picture exhibited by appellant showing the name Oniang
Ocampo -- 1-15-61 (or Apolonia Ocampo, one of the children of the
spouses Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in the house or building,
does not prove communal ownership of the properties in question. At
best, it is susceptible of various meanings, like: that of Oniang
Ocampo was born on 1-15-61, or that she got married on that date, or
that she was celebrating a special event on the date mentioned, or
that she even died on the date mentioned. And even assuming ex
gratia argumenti, that the said engraving proved ownership over the
 disputed building, some such fact can only work to the prejudice of
herein appellants. Why? Because it would mean that only Oniang (or
Apolonia) was the owner of the building and that the building is not,
therefore, a communal property of the children of the late spouses
Chino Jose and Juana. Adverting to this piece of evidence, the Trial
Court postulated --
The engravings on the house ONIANG OCAMPO
BLDG. -- 1-15-61 cannot serve as evidence that the
property is of common ownership. At most, this can only
establish the fact that said building was constructed for a
certain Oniang on 15 January 1961. If, indeed, the
property is of common ownership, there could not have
been any difficulty to engrave thereon HEIRS OF JOSE
OCAMPO and JUANA LLANDER-OCAMPO -- 1-15-
61 instead of ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-
61."37
Neither can we accept petitioners contention that co-ownership is shown by the
fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up
businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the
litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been a
good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the
property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties cannot
be presumed.
Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses Ocampo placed the
subject property in the name of only one person in accordance with a Chinese
custom. As mentioned earlier, that custom consisted of placing properties of
parents in the name of the eldest unmarried son or daughter, with the implicit
understanding that ownership thereof would later revert to the siblings.
In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such custom existed and was
practiced in that place,38 Belen presented evidence that clearly negated any claim
of ownership by the formers predecessors-in-interest. Having shown that the
property in question was originally owned by one Adolfo Ocampo -- not by
Spouses Ocampo, from whom petitioners derive their right -- the claim of
custom becomes immaterial.
The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not necessarily favor
petitioners and prove that the property in question is indeed co-owned. If they
felt that her testimony would prove their cause, then they could have easily
called her as an adverse or a hostile witness.39 But since respondents were
confident in the documents they presented in court, they did not see any need to
call her as a witness.
Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating her properties, when
she is still alive and needs money in her old age. They clearly overlook the
nature of a donation.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing
or a right in favor of another who accepts it.40 Once perfected, a donation is
final; its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground
therefor.41 A donation may in fact comprehend the entire property of the
donor.42 At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of all
their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by them.43
In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject property,
petitioners are contradicting even themselves. On the one hand, they assert that
she would not have disposed of her property, since she would need it in her old
age; on the other, they argue that it was not hers alone anyway. It should be clear
that the law protects donors by providing that, without any reservation of
sufficient means for themselves, the donation shall be reduced upon the petition
of any person affected.44
To be sure, petitioners arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the
Deed of Donation itself. The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced
to writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon;
and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. 45
Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the donation. Never was
there any intimation that she had either been coerced or defrauded into entering
into it. As all the essential elements of a donation -- consent, subject matter and
cause46 -- have been satisfied, we see no reason to entertain any doubt about the
Deed pertaining thereto.
The question of why the land was registered several years after the donation is
purely speculative. What is important is that there was a duly proven Deed of
Donation, which formed the basis of Belens claim and led to the registration of
the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidelas filing of an unlawful detainer suit after the date
of the Deed of Donation. Again, we remind petitioners that because this action
involves property, they should rely on the strength of their own title, not on the
alleged weakness of the claim of respondents. At any rate, the burden of proof of
the claim of co-ownership rests on the former.
Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review of factual findings
of the courts below. It is a settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and
conclusive are the factual findings of the trial court, if supported by clear and
convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court does not review
those findings -- especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this
case.47 From the records of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that
would impel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts below have
not overlooked essential facts that, if considered, may produce a different
outcome. The trial court correctly explained thus:
"This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear the
tell-tale [signs] of truthfulness or perjury like the flush of face, or
the tone of voice, or the dart of eyes, or the fearful pause [--] and
finds that credibility is with the defendants [herein respondents].
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence is with defendants whose
testimonial evidences are buttressed by their documentary
evidences."48
Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for damages and
attorneys fees for respondents failure to show any factual, legal or equitable
bases therefor.49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152766 June 20, 2003
LILIA SANCHEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001
as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by
her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita
Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
Sanchez.1 On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in
the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 19952 by all six (6) co-owners
in her favor.3 Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private
respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the
aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City
sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of
private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of
the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of
her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this
order, nor even inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having
filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27
July 1998 decision of the MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property.
On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the
sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house
without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as
the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel
who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC
denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.1wphi1 On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other
tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of
the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly
that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under
Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There
is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to
this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits
to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding.4
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts
in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them.
Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice.5 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on mere technicalities.6
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of
petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have
been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his
client.7 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records
that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his clients interest,
which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals - 8
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its
operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case
owing to appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason
would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has
already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax
procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such
as the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number
of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination
and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other
elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.9
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural
infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner.
Besides, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
resolve the present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any
partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in
question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the
dispute on the property held in common.
In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco 10 we held:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to
counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon
the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however,
should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances;
otherwise, in the courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might
foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice.
It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell ones rights down the river, by just
alleging that he just forgot every process of the court affecting his clients,
because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a
notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership.
Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion
of co-ownership11 was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be
granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion which
two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided.12 Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the private right
of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive
manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same."13
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-
owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single
object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the
subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and
obligations of the co-owners.14
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement
of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a
fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-
owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership
is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.16
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is
an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He
may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the
other co-owners.18 But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing
is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.19
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the
Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right
to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect
her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property.
Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent
Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the
questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are
ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to
effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6
portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122904. April 15, 2005]
ADORACION E. CRUZ, THELMA DEBBIE E. CRUZ, GERRY E. CRUZ and
NERISSA CRUZ-TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, SUMMIT FINANCING CORP., VICTOR S.
STA. ANA, MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, RAMON G. MANALASTAS,
and VICENTE TORRES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Petitioners are assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R.CV No. 41298 which reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch CLXIII, Pasig in Civil Case No. 49466 and dismissed petitioners
complaint therein for annulment of certain deeds, and the November 21,
1995 Resolution,[3] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Herein petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners Thelma
Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, as well as Arnel Cruz, who was one of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 49466. Petitioners filed said case on February 11, 1983
against Arnel Cruz and herein private respondents Summit Financing Corporation
(Summit), Victor S. Sta. Ana and Maximo C. Contreras, the last two in their capacities
as deputy sheriff and ex-officio sheriff of Rizal, respectively, and Ramon G. Manalastas
in his capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal.
The Complaint[4] alleged that petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a
parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal. Yet the property, which was then covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 495225, was registered only in the name of
Arnel Cruz. According to petitioners, the property was among the properties they and
Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of Delfin Cruz, husband of Adoracion Cruz.
On August 22, 1977, petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of Partial
Partition,[5] distributing to each of them their shares consisting of several lots
previously held by them in common. Among the properties adjudicated to defendant
Cruz was the parcel of land covered at the time by TCT No. 495225. It is the subject of
this case.
Subsequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing
to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had been
subdivided and individually titled in the names of the former co-owners pursuant to
the Deed of Partial Partition. This arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of
Agreement[6] executed on August 23, 1977 or a day after the partition. The tenor of
the Memorandum of Agreement was annotated at the back of TCT No. 495225 on
September 1, 1977.
Sometime in January 1983, petitioner Thelma Cruz discovered that TCT No.
495225 had already been cancelled by TCT No. 514477 which was issued on October
18, 1982 in the name of Summit. Upon further investigation, petitioners learned that
Arnel Cruz had executed a Special Power of Attorney[7] on May 16, 1980 in favor of
one Nelson Tamayo, husband of petitioner Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, authorizing him to
obtain a loan in the amount of One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P104,000.00) from
respondent Summit, to be secured by a real estate mortgage on the subject parcel of
land.
On June 4, 1980, a Real Estate Mortgage[8] was constituted on the disputed
property then covered by TCT No. 495225 to secure the loan obtained by Arnel Cruz
thru Nelson Tamayo from respondent Summit. Since the loan had remained outstanding
on maturity, Summit instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and at the
foreclosure sale it was declared the highest bidder. Consequently, Sheriff Sta. Ana
issued a Certificate of Sale[9] to respondent Summit, which more than a year later
consolidated its ownership of the foreclosed property. Upon presentation of the
affidavit of consolidation of ownership, the Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled
TCT No. 495225 and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 514477 in the name of
respondent Summit.
 In their complaint before the RTC, petitioners asserted that they co-owned the
properties with Arnel Cruz, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence,
they argued that the mortgage was void since they did not consent to it.
In ruling in favor of petitioners, the trial court declared that with the execution of
the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioners and Arnel Cruz had intended to keep the
inherited properties in a state of co-ownership. The trial court stated that respondent
Summit should suffer the consequences of incorrectly assuming that Arnel Cruz was
the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property. It found respondent Summit negligent
in its failure to inquire further into the limitations of defendant Cruzs title. Thus, the
trial court declared that only the undivided share of Cruz in the mortgaged property was
validly transferred to respondent Summit although it granted petitioners prayer for
nullification, per the dispositive portion of its Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants, as follows:
1. Declaring the Special Power of Attorney, the Real Estate Mortgage, the
Public Auction Sale, the Certificate of Sale, the Affidavit of
Consolidation, executed by defendant Summit Financing Corporation,
and the Consolidation of Ownership null and void ab initio;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to cancel TCT No. 514477, and
to issue, in lieu thereof another TCT, in the name of Arnel E. Cruz,
with the same annotations on the Real Estate Mortgage inscribed on
September 16, 1980 and thereafter.
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs, the
amount of P10,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees, plus costs.
4. Dismissing defendants (sic) counterclaims, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
With the exception of Arnel Cruz, the other defendants, who are herein private
respondents, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Private respondents as
appellants therein argued, among others, that the trial court erred in not holding Arnel
Cruz as the sole and exclusive owner of the mortgaged property, in not holding
petitioners in estoppel, and in not finding that under the Memorandum of Agreement the
parties thereto merely agreed to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Private respondents also questioned the trial courts nullification of the special power of
attorney and its declaration that respondent Summit was grossly negligent in not
verifying the capacity of Arnel Cruz.[11]
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. Theright to enjoy and dispose of the property, as well as the right to constitute a real
appellate court stressed that the Memorandum of Agreement does not contain any
proscription against the mortgage of the subject property although it provides that the
parties thereto are entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties covered by Agreement which diminishes the right of Arnel Cruz to alienate or encumber the
it. In that regard, the appellate court noted that petitioner Adoracion Cruz had executed two properties allotted to him in the deed of partition. The following provisions of the
other real estate mortgages on the other parcels of land, which were not objected to by her agreement, which recognize the effects of partition, negate petitioners claim that their
supposed co-owners. Thus, it upheld the validity of the real estate mortgage executed byconsent is required to make the mortgage in favor of respondent Summit valid, to wit:
Nelson Tamayo on behalf of Arnel Cruz, without prejudice to petitioners right of action
against Arnel Cruz for the collection of the proceeds of the loan.[12]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the Court of
Appeals denied it in the assailed Resolution dated November 21, 1995.
Hence, the present petition which at the bottom presents the issue whether or not
the real estate mortgage on the property then covered by TCT No. 495225 is valid.
Resolution of the issue in turn depends on the determination of whether the mortgaged
property was the exclusive property of Arnel Cruz when it was mortgaged. If answered
in the affirmative, then there was nothing to prevent him from exercising ownership
over the said property.
Petitioners insist that the Memorandum of Agreement expressly created
a pro-indiviso co-ownership over the property.[13] Thus, petitioners argue that the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the mortgage considering
that it was executed without their knowledge and consent.
On the other hand, private respondents rely on the provisions of the Deed of
Partial Partition in claiming that defendant Cruz was already the exclusive owner of
the disputed property at the time it was mortgaged. To further bolster their claim,
private respondents assert that each of petitioners also executed real estate mortgages
on the properties allocated to them in the partition deed as absolute owners in fee
simple.
This Court finds no merit in the petition.
Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the
properties owned in common. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and
[14]
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every
act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[15]
From a reading of the following provisions of the Deed of Partial Partition, no
other meaning can be gathered other than that petitioners and Arnel Cruz had put an
end to the co-ownership, to wit:
That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the
following registered real properties . . .
That there are no liens and encumbrance of whatsoever nature and kind on the above-
described real properties except . . .;
That the said liability was actually inscribed and annotated in the aforesaid titles on
July 19, 1967 . . .;
That since July 19, 1967 and up to this writing two years have already lapsed and no
claim has been filed against the estate of said Delfin I. Cruz . . .;
That the parties hereto mutually decided to end their common ownership pro-indiviso
over the above-described properties and agreed to partition the same as follows:
(1) To be adjudicated to THELMA E. CRUZ: . . .
(2) To be adjudicated to NERISSA CRUZ-TAMAYO: . . .
(3) To be adjudicated to ARNEL E. CRUZ:
(a) . . .
(b) Lot 1-C-2-B-2-B-4-P-4, (LRC) PSD-264936
(c ) . . .
(d) . . .
(4) To be adjudicated to GERRY E. CRUZ: . . .
(5) To be adjudicated to ADORACION E. CRUZ: . . .
That the contracting parties warrant unto each other quiet and peaceful possession as
owners and possessors of their respective shares in the partition . . . [16] (emphasis
supplied)
In the aforesaid deed, the shares of petitioners and Arnel Cruzs in the mass of co-
owned properties were concretely determined and distributed to each of them. In
particular, to Arnel Cruz was assigned the disputed property. There is nothing from the
words of said deed which expressly or impliedly stated that petitioners and Arnel Cruz
intended to remain as co-owners with respect to the disputed property or to any of the
properties for that matter. It is well-settled in both law and jurisprudence, that contracts
are the law between the contracting parties and should be fulfilled, if their terms are
clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. [17]
To be considered a co-owner, one must have a spiritual part of a thing which is
not physically divided, or each of them is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which
is truly abstract.[18] In Dela Cruz v. Cruz, et al.,[19] this Court denied the prayer for legal
redemption of plaintiff-appellant therein because the portions of appellant-plaintiff and
of the defendant spouses are concretely determined and identifiable, for to the former
belongs the northern half, and to the latter belongs the remaining southern half, of the
land.[20]
Petitioners do not question the validity or efficacy of the Deed of Partial
Partition. In fact, they admitted its existence in their pleadings and submitted it as part
of their evidence. Thus, the deed should be accorded its legal dire effect. Since a
partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him,[21] it follows that Arnel Cruz acquired absolute ownership over the
specific parcels of land assigned to him in the Deed of Partial Partition, including the
property subject of this case. As the absolute owner thereof then, Arnel Cruz had the
[22]
estate mortgage over the same without securing the consent of petitioners.
On the other hand, there is absolutely nothing in the Memorandum of
That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the
following registered real properties . . .
That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually
partitioned and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her;
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or
sale of their respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed
among themselves and by these presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that
they shall share alike and receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot
or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of this deed of
partial partition;
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting
parties herein up to and until the last lot is covered by the deed of partial partition above
adverted to shall have been disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided
and their respective shares received by each of them.[23] (emphasis supplied)
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the parties only bound themselves to
share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties. The agreement does not direct
reconveyance of the properties to reinstate the common ownership of the parties. To
insist that the parties also intended to re-establish co-ownership after the properties had
been partitioned is to read beyond the clear import of the agreement and to render
nugatory the effects of partition, which is not the obvious or implied intent of the
parties.
Moreover, to ascertain the intent of the parties in a contractual relationship, it is
imperative that the various stipulations provided for in the contracts be construed
together, consistent with the parties contemporaneous and subsequent acts as regards
the execution of the contract.[24] Subsequent to the execution of the Deed of
Partition and Memorandum of Agreement, the properties were titled individually in the
names of the co-owners to which they were respectively adjudicated, to the exclusion
of the other co-owners. Petitioners Adoracion Cruz and Thelma Cruz separately sold
the properties distributed to them as absolute owners thereof. Being clear
manifestations of sole and exclusive dominion over the properties affected, the acts
signify total incongruence with the state of co-ownership claimed by petitioners. Thus,
this Court holds that the real estate mortgage on the disputed property is valid and does
not contravene the agreement of the parties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41298 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161136 November 16, 2006
WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD and LOLITA A. VAGILIDAD, Petitioners,
vs.
GABINO VAGILIDAD, Jr. and DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-68318 dated March 19, 2003 and
November 13, 2003, respectively, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch II, in Civil Case
No. 2825 dated January 26, 1999.
The facts are stated in the assailed Decision3 of the appellate court, viz.:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253, situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique,
measuring 4,280 square meters, was owned by Zoilo [Labiao] (hereafter
ZOILO) as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2301 issued on March 3,
1931. Sometime in 1931, ZOILO died. Subsequently, on May 12, 1986, Loreto
Labiao (hereafter LORETO), son of ZOILO, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr.
(hereafter GABINO JR.) a portion of Lot No. 1253 (hereafter Lot 1253-B),
measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by LORETO.
In view of the death of ZOILO, his children, LORETO, Efren Labiao (hereafter
EFREN) and Priscilla Espanueva (hereafter PRISCILLA) executed an
Extrajudicial x x x Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987, adjudicating the
entire Lot No. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to LORETO. On January 29,
1987, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16693 was issued in favor of
LORETO, EFREN and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T-16693 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the said property, was issued in the
name of LORETO alone.
On July 31, 1987, GABINO JR., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the Surrender
of TCT No. T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253, with the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose City, Sixth Judicial Region, against LORETO, docketed as Cadastral
Case No. 87-731-A. The plaintiff alleged that, being the owner of x x x Lot No.
1253-B, under TCT No. T-16694, by virtue of the sale that took place on May
12, 1986, he is entitled to ask for the surrender of the owners copy of TCT No.
T-16694 to the Register of Deeds of Antique in order to effect the transfer of
title to the name of the petitioner. However, as per motion of both counsels[,]
since the parties seemed to have already reached an amicable settlement without
the knowledge of their counsels, the trial court issued an Order dated March 21,
1994 sending the case to the archives.
On September 21, 1988, [GABINO JR.] paid real estate taxes on the land he
bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No. 1038 where the property was
specified as Lot No. 1253-B. GABINO JR. thereafter sold the same lot to
Wilfredo Vagilidad (hereafter WILFREDO) as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 7, 1989. On even date, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land
involving the opt-described property was also executed by LORETO in favor of
WILFREDO. The aforementioned deeds, which were both executed on
December 7, 1989 [and] notarized by Atty. Warloo Cardenal[,] [appear] to have
been given the same entry number in his notarial books as both contained the
designation "Document No. 236, Page No. 49, Book No. XI, Series of 1989[."]
Corollarily, on February 14, 1990, the sale of Lot No. 1253-B to WILFREDO
was registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Antique under
Entry No. 180425. Consequently, TCT No. T-18023, cancelling TCT No.
16694, was issued in favor of WILFREDO pursuant to the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 7, 1989.
On October 24, 1991, spouses WILFREDO and LOLITA obtained a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity) in the amount of 150,000.00
and mortgaged Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the said loan and the transaction
was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 186876.
Subsequently, the xxx real estate mortgage was cancelled under Entry No.
191053 as per inscription dated November 17, 1992 in xxx TCT No. 18023.
Subsequently, WILFREDO obtained another loan from Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP for brevity) in the amount of 200,000.00 and mortgaged
Lot No. 1253-B as collateral of the xxx loan and the transaction was inscribed at
the back of TCT No. 18023 as Entry No. 196268. The said loan was paid and,
consequently, the mortgage was cancelled as Entry No. 202500.
On September 29, 1995, spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad
(hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Document, Reconveyance and Damages, with the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 11, against spouses WILFREDO and
Lolita Vagilidad (hereafter LOLITA), docketed as Civil Case No. 2825. The
plaintiffs claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B which was
sold to him by LORETO in 1986. They alleged that [GABINO JR.] is a nephew
of defendant WILFREDO. They likewise raised that when GABINO SR. died,
defendant WILFREDO requested GABINO JR. to transfer the ownership of Lot
No. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDOs name for loaning purposes with the
agreement that the land will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. They
added that, pursuant to the mentioned agreement, plaintiff GABINO JR.,
without the knowledge and consent of his spouse, DOROTHY, executed the
Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO
receiving nothing as payment therefor. They pointed out that after defendant
WILFREDO was able to mortgage the property, plaintiffs demanded the return
of the property but the defendants refused to return the same. The plaintiffs
claimed that the same document is null and void for want of consideration and
the same does not bind the non-consenting spouse. They likewise prayed that the
defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiffs not less than 100,000.00 as actual
and moral damages, 10,000.00 as attorneys fees and 5,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
For their part, the defendants, on January 15, 1996, filed their Answer, denying
the material allegations of the plaintiffs. Defendants claimed that they are the
lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B. They alleged that LORETO, with conformity
of his wife, sold to them Lot No. 1253 on December 7, 1989 for 5,000.00 and
the transaction was registered with the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Antique under Entry No. 180425. They added that, subsequently, TCT No. T-
18023, covering Lot No. 1253-B, was issued in favor of the defendants. Hence,
they claimed that the plaintiffs be directed to pay the defendants 200,000.00 as
moral damages, 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, 20,000.00 as attorneys
fees and 30,000.00 for litigation expenses.4
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners WILFREDO and LOLITA and held
that LORETO did not validly convey Lot No. 1253-B to GABINO, JR. on May
12, 1986 since at that time, the heirs of ZOILO had not partitioned Lot No.
1253.5 It ruled that LORETO could only sell at that time his aliquot share in the
inheritance. He could not have sold a divided part thereof designated by metes
and bounds. Thus, it held that LORETO remained the owner of the subject lot
when he sold it to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989. It further found that there
was no proof that WILFREDO knew of the sale that took place between
LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing pronouncements and a preponderance
of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. FINDING the defendants WILFREDO VAGILIDAD and
LOLITA VAGILIDAD to have duly acquired ownership of Lot No.
1253-B containing an area of 1,604 square meters, more or less,
situated in San Jose, Antique;
2. SUSTAINING the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18023 covering the subject Lot No. 1253-B and issued in the name of
the defendant WILFREDO VAGILIDAD, married to the defendant
LOLITA VAGILIDAD;
3. DISMISSING the complaint of the plaintiffs GABINO
VAGILIDAD, JR. and MA. DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, as well as
the counterclaims of the defendants WILFREDO VAGILIDAD and
LOLITA VAGILIDAD and of the defendants LORETO LABIAO
and FRANCISCA LABIAO; and
4. PRONOUNCING no cost.6
GABINO, JR. and DOROTHY filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 26, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case
No. 2825, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered: (1)
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale [of Portion of Land] dated December 7,
1989 executed by appellee LORETO in favor of appellee WILFREDO null and
void; (2) ordering the defendants-appellees WILFREDO and LOLITA to
reconvey Lot No. 1253-B to plaintiffs-appellants GABINO, JR. and
DOROTHY; and (3) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiffs-
appellants 100,000.00 as moral damages, 10,000.00 as attorneys fees and
5,000.00 as litigation expenses.7
The appellate court ruled that the sale made by LORETO in favor of GABINO,
JR. on May 12, 1986 is valid. The rights of LORETO to succession are
transmitted from the moment of ZOILOs death in 1931. Thus, when LORETO
sold the 1,604-square meter portion of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO JR., he already
had the right as co-owner to his share to Lot No. 1253, even if at that time the
property had not yet been partitioned. Consequently, the sale made by LORETO
in favor of WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 is void because LORETO and
FRANCISCA were no longer the owners of Lot No. 1253-B as of that time. The
appellate court also held WILFREDO and LOLITA liable for moral damages for
falsifying the fictitious deeds of sale on December 7, 1989.
WILFREDO and LOLITA moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
in the questioned Resolution dated November 13, 2003. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari raising the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING ARTICLE 1349 AND ARTICLE 1460 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE IN THE CASE AT BAR.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 1544 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE AND THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE SALE THAT
THE BUYER WHO IS IN POSSESSION OF THE TORRENS
TITLE AND HAD THE DEED OF SALE REGISTERED MUST
PREVAIL.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING ARTICLE 1391 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND
THE DOCTRINE THAT IN CASE OF FRAUD, ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN FOUR (4)
YEARS FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AWARDING PRIVATE RESPONDENT MORAL DAMAGES,
ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.8
We deny the petition.
I
First, petitioners contend that the Deed of Absolute Sale between LORETO and
GABINO, JR. does not have a determinate object. They anchor their claim on
the following discrepancies: (1) the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
LORETO and GABINO, JR. is Lot No. 1253 with an area of 1,604 square
meters; (2) the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land between
LORETO and WILFREDO is a portion of Lot No. 1253, known as Lot No.
1253-B, also with an area of 1,604 square meters;9 (3) the Deed of Absolute Sale
between LORETO and GABINO, JR. shows that its object, Lot No. 1253, is not
registered under the Land Registration Act nor under the Spanish Mortgage
Law; and (4) the property subject of this action, Lot No. 1253-B, was taken from
Lot No. 1253 containing an area of 4,280 square meters previously registered in
the name of ZOILO under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-
2301.10 With these discrepancies, petitioners contend that either the Deed of
Absolute Sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. does not have a
determinate object or that Lot No. 1253-B, the subject parcel, is not the object
thereof. Hence, absent a determinate object, the contract is void. They rely on
Articles 1349 and 1460 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate, as to its kind. The
fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence
of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of
a new contract between the parties.
Art. 1460. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physically
segregated from all others of the same class.
The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is
entered into, the thing is capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.
Petitioners err. The evidence on record shows that Lot No. 1253-B, the subject
parcel, and the lot described as Lot No. 1253 in the Deed of Absolute Sale of
May 12, 1986 between LORETO and GABINO, JR., are the same. In the Deed
of Absolute Sale, Lot No. 1253 is described, viz.:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253 of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose), with the
improvements thereon. Bounded on the North [by] 1254 and 1255; on the South
by road; on the East by 1253 and road on the West by 1240-Angel Salazar;
containing an area of 1,604 square meters more or less declared under Tax
Declaration No. 4159.11
In the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land of December 7, 1989 between
LORETO and WILFREDO, the subject parcel is described, viz.:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1253. Ap-06-00271) of the Cadastral Survey of San
Jose, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 936), situated at Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Bounded
on the N. and E. along lines 1-2-3 by lot 1255; San Jose Cadastre; on the S.
along line 3-4 by Road; on the W. along line 4-5 by Lot 1240; San Jose
Cadastre; and on the N. along line 5-1 by Lot 1254, San Jose Cadastre
containing an area of [Four] Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (4,280) square
meters, more or less.
of which a portion of land subject of this sale is hereinbelow (sic) particularly
described as follows, to wit:
A portion of Lot No. 1253-B of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose, situated at
Atabay, San Jose, Antique. Bounded on the North by Lot No. 1254; South by
Road; West by Lot 1253-A; and on the East by Lot No. 1253-C; containing an
area of 1,604 square meters, more or less.12
The description of Lot No. 1253, the object of the Deed of Absolute Sale, as
"not registered under Act No. 196[,] otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law"13 is a stray description of the subject
parcel. It is uncorroborated by any evidence in the records. This
description solely appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the discrepancy was
not explained by LORETO who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale as vendor.
LORETO does not, in fact, deny the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale. He
merely counters that the Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly a mortgage.
However, LORETOs claim that it was one of mortgage is clearly negated by a
Certification14 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue dated May 12, 1986. It
certified that LORETO was not required to pay the capital gains tax on the
transfer of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR. because the property was classified as
an ordinary asset.
To be sure, petitioners could have easily shown that LORETO owned properties
other than Lot No. 1253 to bolster their claim that the object of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was different from Lot No. 1253-B which is the object described
in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. They did not proffer any
evidence.
The trial court itself comprehensively traced the origin of Lot No. 1253-B. It
clearly demonstrated that the subject parcel was originally part of the registered
lot of ZOILO. It also showed how the subject parcel was eventually bounded by
Lot No. 1253-A on the West and by Lot No. 1253-C on the East, as the lot
would be later described in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land.
The trial court found that ZOILO previously owned Lot No. 1253 under OCT
No. RO-2301 issued on March 3, 1931. On November 14, 1986, Entry No.
167922 was inscribed in the certificate of title, per Order dated March 30, 1978
of Judge Noli Ma. Cortes of the then Court of First Instance of Antique, stating
that it was a reconstituted certificate of title.15 Lot No. 1253 was subdivided by
virtue of a subdivision plan dated June 19, 1987. On January 20, 1987, an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate executed by LORETO, EFREN and
PRISCILLA was entered as Entry No. 170722. The OCT of ZOILO was
cancelled by TCT No. T-16693 in the names of LORETO, EFREN and
PRISCILLA on January 29, 1987. TCT No. T-16693 was cancelled on the same
day by TCT No. T-16694 in the name of LORETO alone. The TCT was
partially cancelled by the issuance of TCTs covering Lot Nos. 1253-A, 1253-C
and 1253-D. The TCT of Lot No. 1253-B was issued in the name of
WILFREDO married to LOLITA on February 15, 1990. WILFREDOs TCT
No. T-18023 appears to be a transfer from LORETOs TCT No. T-16694.
II
Next, petitioners contend that the appellate court should have upheld the title of
WILFREDO under Article 1544 of the Civil Code and the doctrine of double
sale where the buyer who is in possession of the Torrens Title must
prevail.16 First, petitioners title was issued pursuant to the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989. Second, WILFREDO
did not see any encumbrance at the back of the title of the subject lot when he
purchased it from LORETO on December 7, 1989. Thus, since he is not bound
to go beyond the certificate of title, he has acquired the subject property in due
course and in good faith.
We disagree. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states, viz.:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Petitioners reliance on Article 1544 is misplaced. While title to the property
was issued in WILFREDOs name on February 15, 1990, the following
circumstances show that he registered the subject parcel with evident bad faith.
First, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989
between LORETO and WILFREDO is tainted with blatant irregularities. It is a
fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land and the Deed of Absolute
Sale between GABINO, JR. and WILFREDO are of even date. Both Deeds had
the same object Lot No. 1253-B. Both deeds were notarized by Atty. Warloo
Cardenal and bear the same entry in his notarial register: Document No. 236,
Page No. 49, Book No. XI, Series of 1989.
Second, the testimony of a disinterested witness, Febe Mabuhay, established the
irregularity. Mabuhay used to work as secretary for Atty. Cardenal and co-
signed as witness in both Deeds. She stated that Atty. Cardenal instructed her to
prepare the two documents in the last week of November 1989. She was present
when GABINO, JR. signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. She testified that after
GABINO, JR. left, LORETO and his wife FRANCISCA arrived and signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land.17 The Decision of the court a
quo further states, viz.:
[Mabuhay testified that when she prepared the two documents, she] noticed the
similarity of Lot No. 1253 as technically described in both documents but she
did not call the attention of Atty. Warlo[o] Cardenal. [She likewise stated that
Atty. Cardenal] specifically instructed her to assign the same document number
to the two documents notarized on December 7, 1989.18
Third, the testimony of Atty. Ernesto Estoya, then Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, supports the claim that there was bad faith in
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Atty. Estoya
brought the notarial record of Atty. Cardenal for the year 1989 pursuant to a
subpoena. He stated that he had not brought both Deeds as required in the
subpoena because "Doc. No. 236; Page No. 49; Book No. XI; Series of 1989" as
entered in the notarial register of Atty. Cardenal could not be found in the files.
He further explained that the last document on page 48 of the notarial register of
Atty. Cardenal is Document No. 235, while the first document on page 49 is
Document No. 239, leaving three unexplained gaps for document numbers 236,
237 and 238. Atty. Estoya stated that he was not the one who received the 1989
notarial register of Atty. Cardenal when the latter surrendered it since he
assumed office only in 1994.19
Fourth, we give credence to the testimony of GABINO, JR. that LORETO and
WILFREDO had employed the scheme to deprive him and his wife of their
lawful title to the subject property. The facts speak for themselves. WILFREDO
knew that he could not use the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in his favor by
GABINO, JR. because the latter had no title to transfer. Without a title,
WILFREDO could not use the subject property as collateral for a bank loan.
Hence, LORETO, who had refused to surrender the title to GABINO, JR. and in
whose name the land remained registered, had to execute the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Portion of Land in favor of WILFREDO. Hence, it was convenient for
WILFREDO to deny the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale of December 7,
1989 between him and GABINO, JR. But the evidence on record shows that
after he was able to register the subject property in his name on February 15,
1990, WILFREDO used the title as collateral in the loans that he contracted with
the Philippine National Bank on October 24, 1991 and the Development Bank of
the Philippines on December 1, 1993. This supports the claim of GABINO, JR.
that WILFREDO needed the lot for loaning purposes.
With these corroborating circumstances and the following irrefragable
documents on record, the evidence preponderates in favor of GABINO, JR. One,
he acquired Lot No.1253-B from LORETO on May 12, 198620 by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Two, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a
Certification, also on May 12, 1986, for the exemption from the payment of
capital gains tax when LORETO sold to him the subject parcel. Three,
GABINO, JR. paid the real estate tax on the subject parcel in 1987. Four, he
filed a Petition for the Surrender of LORETOs title on July 31, 1987 so he
could transfer the title of the property in his name.
Petitioners likewise err in their argument that the contract of sale between
LORETO and GABINO, JR. is void on the ground that at the time of the sale on
May 12, 1986, LORETO had a right to dispose only an aliquot part of the yet
undivided property of ZOILO. The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is
subject to the rules of co-ownership under the Civil Code.
Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have
in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. 21 Before the
partition of the property held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. 22
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-
owner. LORETO had a right, even before the partition of the property on
January 19, 1987,23 to transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot
even without the consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute
another person for its enjoyment.24 Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue
of the sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the vendor LORETO had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction.25
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to GABINO, JR.
Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7,
1989 the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253-B.
Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have,"26 LORETO
could not have validly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 what he no
longer had. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the sale made by
LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to
transfer the ownership of the subject property at the time of sale.
III
Petitioners contend that since the subdivision plan of Lot No. 1253 was only
approved on January 19, 1987, the appellate court can not presume
that the aliquot part of LORETO was the parcel designated as Lot 1253-B.27
Petitioners err. The mere fact that LORETO sold a definite portion of the co-
owned lot by metes and bounds before partition does not, per se, render the sale
a nullity. We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong28 that the fact that an
agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not
render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract
must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.29
In the case at bar, the contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on
May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized.1wphi1 At the time of sale,
LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property
or some 1,42630 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO,
JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the
property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.31 Be that as it may, the co-heirs of LORETO
waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that
they have previously received their respective shares from the other estate of
their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION.32 The rights of GABINO, JR. as
owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively
transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion
of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance
of the title to the subject property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of
property is not a means of acquiring ownership.33 Its alleged incontrovertibility
cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of title
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud.34
IV
On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to
apply the rule that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes after the
lapse of four years.35 They cite Article 139136 of the Civil Code and the case
of Gerona v. De Guzman.37
We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals,38 viz.:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it
is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla,
which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four
years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on
Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25,
1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code
not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 xxx. It must be stressed, at this
juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new provisions. They have
no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure,
the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive
period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired
under false pretenses.39
[Thus,] under the present Civil Code, xxx just as an implied or constructive trust
is an offspring of xxx Art. 1456, xxx so is the corresponding obligation to
reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this
context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is
applicable[, viz.:]
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
1) Upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment.40 (emphases supplied)
Thus, in the case at bar, although the TCT of WILFREDO became indefeasible
after the lapse of one year from the date of registration, the attendance of fraud
in its issuance created an implied trust in favor of GABINO, JR. under Article
145641 of the Civil Code. Being an implied trust, the action for reconveyance of
the subject property therefore prescribes within a period of ten years from
February 15, 1990. Thus, when respondents filed the instant case with the
court a quo on September 26, 1995, it was well within the prescriptive period.
V
On the issue of damages, petitioners contend that the grant is erroneous and the
alleged connivance between Atty. Cardenal and WILFREDO lacks basis.
We disagree. The evidence on record is clear that petitioners committed bad
faith in the execution of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land
dated December 7, 1989 between LORETO and WILFREDO. As stated by the
appellate court, viz.:
xxxx From the series of events, it can be reasonably inferred that appellees
WILFREDO, LORETO and Atty. Cardenal connived in attempting to deprive
appellants of Lot No. 1253-B, hence, the appellants entitlement to moral
damages. Further, it is a well-settled rule that attorneys fees are allowed to be
awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the
party for whom it is sought. xxxx To protect themselves, the appellants engaged
the services of counsel and incurred expenses in the course of litigation. Hence,
we deem it equitable to award attorneys fees to the appellant xxx.42
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-68318 dated March 19,
2003 and November 13, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 154486 December 1, 2010
FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE,
substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO JARANTILLA and
TOMAS JARANTILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to modify the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals dated July 30, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40887, which set
aside the Decision3 dated December 18, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-50464.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
The spouses Andres Jarantilla and Felisa Jaleco were survived by eight children:
Federico, Delfin, Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael and
Antonieta.4 Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is the grandchild of the late
Jarantilla spouses by their son Federico Jarantilla, Sr. and his wife Leda
Jamili.5 Petitioner also has two other brothers: Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.
Petitioner was one of the defendants in the complaint before the RTC while
Antonieta Jarantilla, his aunt, was the plaintiff therein. His co-respondents
before he joined his aunt Antonieta in her complaint, were his late aunt Conchita
Jarantillas husband Buenaventura Remotigue, who died during the pendency of
the case, his cousin Cynthia Remotigue, the adopted daughter of Conchita
Jarantilla and Buenaventura Remotigue, and his brothers Doroteo and Tomas
Jarantilla.6
In 1948, the Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves the
real properties of their deceased parents.7 With the exception of the real property
adjudicated to Pacita Jarantilla, the heirs also agreed to allot the produce of the
said real properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of Rafael and
Antonieta Jarantilla.8
In the same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio Deocampo entered
into an agreement with the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita
Jarantilla to provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support
to any commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement.
This business relationship proved to be successful as they were able to establish
a manufacturing and trading business, acquire real properties, and construct
buildings, among other things.9 This partnership ended in 1973 when the parties,
in an "Agreement,"10 voluntarily agreed to completely dissolve their "joint
business relationship/arrangement."11
On April 29, 1957, the spouses Buenaventura and Conchita Remotigue executed
a document wherein they acknowledged that while registered only in
Buenaventura Remotigues name, they were not the only owners of the capital
of the businesses Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street, Manila), Remotigue
Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and Remotigue Trading (Cotabato City). In this
same "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," they stated the participating
capital of their co-owners as of the year 1952, with Antonieta Jarantillas stated
as eight thousand pesos (8,000.00) and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.s as five
thousand pesos (5,000.00).12
The present case stems from the amended complaint13 dated April 22, 1987 filed
by Antonieta Jarantilla against Buenaventura Remotigue, Cynthia Remotigue,
Federico Jarantilla, Jr., Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, for the
accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the
delivery of her share corresponding to eight percent (8%), and for damages.
Antonieta claimed that in 1946, she had entered into an agreement with
Conchita and Buenaventura Remotigue, Rafael Jarantilla, and Rosita and
Vivencio Deocampo to engage in business. Antonieta alleged that the initial
contribution of property and money came from the heirs inheritance, and her
subsequent annual investment of seven thousand five hundred pesos (7,500.00)
as additional capital came from the proceeds of her farm. Antonieta also alleged
that from 1946-1969, she had helped in the management of the business they co-
owned without receiving any salary. Her salary was supposedly rolled back into
the business as additional investments in her behalf. Antonieta further claimed
co-ownership of certain properties14 (the subject real properties) in the name of
the defendants since the only way the defendants could have purchased these
properties were through the partnership as they had no other source of income.
The respondents, including petitioner herein, in their Answer, 15 denied having
formed a partnership with Antonieta in 1946. They claimed that she was in no
position to do so as she was still in school at that time. In fact, the proceeds of
the lands they partitioned were devoted to her studies. They also averred that
while she may have helped in the businesses that her older sister Conchita had
formed with Buenaventura Remotigue, she was paid her due salary. They did
not deny the existence and validity of the "Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital" and in fact used this as evidence to support their claim that Antonietas
8% share was limited to the businesses enumerated therein. With regard to
Antonietas claim in their other corporations and businesses, the respondents
said these should also be limited to the number of her shares as specified in the
respective articles of incorporation. The respondents denied using the
partnerships income to purchase the subject real properties and said that the
certificates of title should be binding on her.16
During the course of the trial at the RTC, petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr., who
was one of the original defendants, entered into a compromise agreement17 with
Antonieta Jarantilla wherein he supported Antonietas claims and asserted that
he too was entitled to six percent (6%) of the supposed partnership in the same
manner as Antonieta was. He prayed for a favorable judgment in this wise:
Defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr., hereby joins in plaintiffs prayer for an
accounting from the other defendants, and the partition of the properties of the
co-ownership and the delivery to the plaintiff and to defendant Federico
Jarantilla, Jr. of their rightful share of the assets and properties in the co-
ownership.181avvphi1
The RTC, in an Order19 dated March 25, 1992, approved the Joint Motion to
Approve Compromise Agreement20and on December 18, 1992, decided in favor
of Antonieta, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, the Court renders judgment in favor
of the plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla and against defendants Cynthia Remotigue,
Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla ordering the latter:
1. to deliver to the plaintiff her 8% share or its equivalent amount on
the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 35655, 338398, 338399 &
335395, all of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; TCT Nos.
(18303)23341, 142882 & 490007(4615), all of the Registry of Deeds
of Rizal; and TCT No. T-6309 of the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato
based on their present market value;
2. to deliver to the plaintiff her 8% share or its equivalent amount on
the Remotigue Agro-Industrial Corporation, Manila Athletic Supply,
Inc., MAS Rubber Products, Inc. and Buendia Recapping
Corporation based on the shares of stocks present book value;
3. to account for the assets and income of the co-ownership and
deliver to plaintiff her rightful share thereof equivalent to 8%;
4. to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of 50,000.00 as
moral damages;
5. to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of 50,000.00 as attorneys
fees; and
6. to pay, jointly and severally, the costs of the suit.21
Both the petitioner and the respondents appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals. The petitioner claimed that the RTC "erred in not rendering a complete
judgment and ordering the partition of the co-ownership and giving to [him] six
per centum (6%) of the properties."22
While the Court of Appeals agreed to some of the RTCs factual findings, it also
established that Antonieta Jarantilla was not part of the partnership formed in
1946, and that her 8% share was limited to the businesses enumerated in the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. On July 30, 2002, the Court of
Appeals rendered the herein challenged decision setting aside the RTCs
decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court, dated 18 December 1992 is SET
ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered ordering that:
(1) after accounting, plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla be given her share
of 8% in the assets and profits of Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue
Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City;
(2) after accounting, defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr. be given his
share of 6% of the assets and profits of the above-mentioned
enterprises; and, holding that
(3) plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla is a stockholder in the following
corporations to the extent stated in their Articles of Incorporation:
(a) Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc.;
(b) MAS Rubber Products, Inc.;
(c) Manila Athletic Supply, Inc.; and
(d) B. Remotigue Agro-Industrial Development Corp.
(4) No costs.23
The respondents, on August 20, 2002, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
but the Court of Appeals denied this in a Resolution 24 dated March 21, 2003.
Antonieta Jarantilla filed before this Court her own petition for review
on certiorari25 dated September 16, 2002, assailing the Court of Appeals
decision on "similar grounds and similar assignments of errors as this present
case"26 but it was dismissed on November 20, 2002 for failure to file the appeal
within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.27
Petitioner filed before us this petition for review on the sole ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT PETITIONER FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR. IS ENTITLED
TO A SIX PER CENTUM (6%) SHARE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
REAL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE OTHER DEFENDANTS USING
COMMON FUNDS FROM THE BUSINESSES WHERE HE HAD OWNED
SUCH SHARE.28
Petitioner asserts that he was in a partnership with the Remotigue spouses, the
Deocampo spouses, Rosita Jarantilla, Rafael Jarantilla, Antonieta Jarantilla and
Quintin Vismanos, as evidenced by the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital the Remotigue spouses executed in 1957. He contends that from this
partnership, several other corporations and businesses were established and
several real properties were acquired. In this petition, he is essentially asking for
his 6% share in the subject real properties. He is relying on the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, on his own testimony, and Antonieta
Jarantillas testimony to support this contention.
The core issue is whether or not the partnership subject of the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital funded the subject real properties. In
other words, what is the petitioners right over these real properties?
It is a settled rule that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court.29
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed
is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not
the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.30
Since the Court of Appeals did not fully adopt the factual findings of the RTC,
this Court, in resolving the questions of law that are now in issue, shall look into
the facts only in so far as the two courts a quo differed in their appreciation
thereof.
The RTC found that an unregistered partnership existed since 1946 which was
affirmed in the 1957 document, the "Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital." The RTC used this as its basis for giving Antonieta Jarantilla an 8%
share in the three businesses listed therein and in the other businesses and real
properties of the respondents as they had supposedly acquired these through
funds from the partnership.31
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed with the RTC as to Antonietas
8% share in the business enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital, but not as to her share in the other corporations and real properties. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Antonietas claim of 8% is based on the
"Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," a duly notarized document which
was specific as to the subject of its coverage. Hence, there was no reason to
pattern her share in the other corporations from her share in the partnerships
businesses. The Court of Appeals also said that her claim in the respondents
real properties was more "precarious" as these were all covered by certificates of
title which served as the best evidence as to all the matters contained
therein.32 Since petitioners claim was essentially the same as Antonietas, the
Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner be given his 6% share in the same
businesses listed in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
Factual findings of the trial court, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive except in the following cases: (1) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.33
In this case, we find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Both the petitioner and Antonieta Jarantilla characterize their relationship with
the respondents as a co-ownership, but in the same breath, assert that a verbal
partnership was formed in 1946 and was affirmed in the 1957
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.34 It is a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of
dividing the profits among themselves.35 The Court, in Pascual v. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,36 quoted the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Angelo Bautista in Evangelista v. The Collector of Internal Revenue37 to
further elucidate on the distinctions between a co-ownership and a partnership,
to wit:
I wish however to make the following observation: Article 1769 of the new
Civil Code lays down the rule for determining when a transaction should be
deemed a partnership or a co-ownership. Said article paragraphs 2 and 3,
provides;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a
partnership, whether such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not
share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a
partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or
common right or interest in any property from which the returns are
derived;
From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co-
ownership share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property
held in common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the
sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or
not the persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the
property. This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the
presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the
clear intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality
different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom to transfer or
assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others.
It is evident that an isolated transaction whereby two or more persons
contribute funds to buy certain real estate for profit in the absence of other
circumstances showing a contrary intention cannot be considered a partnership.
Persons who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise and agree to
share the gross returns of that enterprise in proportion to their contribution, but
who severally retain the title to their respective contribution, are not thereby
rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital, and no community of
interest as principal proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds derived.
A joint purchase of land, by two, does not constitute a co-partnership in respect
thereto; nor does an agreement to share the profits and losses on the sale of land
create a partnership; the parties are only tenants in common.
Where plaintiff, his brother, and another agreed to become owners of a single
tract of realty, holding as tenants in common, and to divide the profits of
disposing of it, the brother and the other not being entitled to share in plaintiffs
commission, no partnership existed as between the three parties, whatever their
relation may have been as to third parties.
In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to
form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and
such a community of interest, as far as third persons are concerned as enables
each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the whole
property. x x x.
The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between
the owners, though they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they
may, without becoming partners, agree among themselves as to the
management, and use of such property and the application of the proceeds
therefrom.38 (Citations omitted.)
Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a
contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or
industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the
contracting parties. The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar,
for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have agreed to, and did, contribute
money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows down to their
intent in acting as they did.39 It is not denied that all the parties in this case have
agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be able to later on share its
profits. They have admitted this fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted
one common documentary evidence to prove such partnership - the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
As this case revolves around the legal effects of the Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital, it would be instructive to examine the pertinent portions of
this document:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
PARTICIPATING CAPITAL
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla de
Remotigue, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Loyola Heights, Quezon
City, P.I. hereby state:
That the Manila Athletic Supply at 712 Raon, Manila, the Remotigue Trading of
Calle Real, Iloilo City and the Remotigue Trading, Cotabato Branch, Cotabato,
P.I., all dealing in athletic goods and equipments, and general merchandise are
recorded in their respective books with Buenaventura Remotigue as the
registered owner and are being operated by them as such:
That they are not the only owners of the capital of the three establishments and
their participation in the capital of the three establishments together with the
other co-owners as of the year 1952 are stated as follows:
1. Buenaventura Remotigue (TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND)25,000.00
2. Conchita Jarantilla de Remotigue (TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND)
25,000.00
3. Vicencio Deocampo (FIFTEEN THOUSAND) 15,000.00
4. Rosita J. Deocampo (FIFTEEN THOUSAND).... 15,000.00
5. Antonieta Jarantilla (EIGHT THOUSAND).. 8,000.00
6. Rafael Jarantilla (SIX THOUSAND).. ... 6,000.00
7. Federico Jarantilla, Jr. (FIVE THOUSAND).. 5,000.00
8. Quintin Vismanos (TWO THOUSAND)... 2,000.00
That aside from the persons mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, no other
person has any interest in the above-mentioned three establishments.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, they sign this instrument in the City of Manila, P.I.,
this 29th day of April, 1957.
[Sgd.]
BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE
[Sgd.]
CONCHITA JARANTILLA DE REMOTIGUE40
The Acknowledgement of Participating Capital is a duly notarized document
voluntarily executed by Conchita Jarantilla-Remotigue and Buenaventura
Remotigue in 1957. Petitioner does not dispute its contents and is actually
relying on it to prove his participation in the partnership. Article 1797 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the
agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been agreed upon,
the share of each in the losses shall be in the same proportion.
In the absence of stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses
shall be in proportion to what he may have contributed, but the industrial partner
shall not be liable for the losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner shall
receive such share as may be just and equitable under the circumstances. If
besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a share in
the profits in proportion to his capital. (Emphases supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that a partner is entitled only to his share as agreed
upon, or in the absence of any such stipulations, then to his share in proportion
to his contribution to the partnership. The petitioner himself claims his share to
be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. However,
petitioner fails to realize that this document specifically enumerated the
businesses covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue
Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City. Since there was
a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed went to the three
businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go
beyond the stipulations in the document. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not
err in limiting petitioners share to the assets of the businesses enumerated in the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
In Villareal v. Ramirez,41 the Court held that since a partnership is a separate
juridical entity, the shares to be paid out to the partners is necessarily limited
only to its total resources, to wit:
Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the
shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its
total resources. In other words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers,
which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be paid their
shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After all the
creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes
available for the payment of the partners shares.42
There is no evidence that the subject real properties were assets of the
partnership referred to in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
The petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to respondents properties based
on the concept of trust. He claims that since the subject real properties were
purchased using funds of the partnership, wherein he has a 6% share, then "law
and equity mandates that he should be considered as a co-owner of those
properties in such proportion."43 In Pigao v. Rabanillo,44 this Court explained the
concept of trusts, to wit:
Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while
implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of
an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the
trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied
trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on the
equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by
the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration
involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with
legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of
another.45
On proving the existence of a trust, this Court held that:
Respondent has presented only bare assertions that a trust was created. Noting
the need to prove the existence of a trust, this Court has held thus:
"As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting
its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence
of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral
evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with
extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily
be fabricated." 46
The petitioner has failed to prove that there exists a trust over the subject real
properties. Aside from his bare allegations, he has failed to show that the
respondents used the partnerships money to purchase the said properties. Even
assuming arguendo that some partnership income was used to acquire these
properties, the petitioner should have successfully shown that these funds came
from his share in the partnership profits. After all, by his own admission, and as
stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, he owned a mere 6%
equity in the partnership.
In essence, the petitioner is claiming his 6% share in the subject real properties,
by relying on his own self-serving testimony and the equally biased testimony of
Antonieta Jarantilla. Petitioner has not presented evidence, other than these
unsubstantiated testimonies, to prove that the respondents did not have the
means to fund their other businesses and real properties without the
partnerships income. On the other hand, the respondents have not only, by
testimonial evidence, proven their case against the petitioner, but have also
presented sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate their claims,
allegations and defenses. They presented preponderant proof on how they
acquired and funded such properties in addition to tax receipts and tax
declarations.47 It has been held that "while tax declarations and realty tax
receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong
evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient
for prescription."48 Moreover, it is a rule in this jurisdiction that testimonial
evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence.49 This Court had on several
occasions, expressed our disapproval on using mere self-serving testimonies to
support ones claim. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,50 a case on partition of a co-
ownership, we held that:
Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was
sufficiently proved by their witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita
Ocampo. We disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of
documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on
the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-
serving as they are.51
It is true that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over
the particular property described therein. Registration in the Torrens system
does not create or vest title as registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership;
hence, this cannot deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. 52 However,
petitioner asserts ownership over portions of the subject real properties on the
strength of his own admissions and on the testimony of Antonieta
Jarantilla.1avvphi1 As held by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v.
Orfinada, Sr.53:
Indeed, a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land
referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was
regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against
any informacion possessoria, of other title existing prior to the issuance thereof
not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property
covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on its face.54
As we have settled that this action never really was for partition of a co-
ownership, to permit petitioners claim on these properties is to allow a
collateral, indirect attack on respondents admitted titles. In the words of the
Court of Appeals, "such evidence cannot overpower the conclusiveness of these
certificates of title, more so since plaintiffs [petitioners] claims amount to a
collateral attack, which is prohibited under Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree."55
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
This Court has deemed an action or proceeding to be "an attack on a title when
its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed."56 In Aguilar v. Alfaro,57 this Court further
distinguished between a direct and an indirect or collateral attack, as follows:
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief
and as an incident to the present action, an attack is made against the judgment
granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct
attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not
yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment
had been disposed of. x x x.
Petitioners only piece of documentary evidence is the Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital, which as discussed above, failed to prove that the real
properties he is claiming co-ownership of were acquired out of the proceeds of
the businesses covered by such document. Therefore, petitioners theory has no
factual or legal leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40887, dated July 30, 2002 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9,
20051 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition
filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his
wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and
private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a
parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon
situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the
Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five
(755) square meters, more or less.2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent,
extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No.
RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the
names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent
of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner
and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and
raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,3 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property
in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6;
and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids.
In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the
aforestated manner.4
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
trial court on August 11, 2003,5 hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals,
which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate
court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed
Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home
should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the
court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held
that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses
Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family
home.6
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED
IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19,
2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE
PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON
FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-
OWNERSHIP.7
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the
co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home
duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned
while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who
is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in
the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of
age. Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from
the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the
subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that
his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said
family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a
family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to
July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent.
Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent
Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, 8 hence
there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during ones lifetime.9 It is the dwelling house
where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including
the land on which it is situated.10 It is constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family.11 The family home is deemed
constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
by law.12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is
"actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather,
the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154
of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is
constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. 13
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family
home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2)
they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall
continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to
persons who constituted the family home.1wphi1 Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of
a family on the continuing existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her
separate property as family home, the property will remain as family home for
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no
more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home will be
dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there
are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten
years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the
heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning
the property after the period provided by this article? We believe that although
the heirs will continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it will
cease to be a family home.14 (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued
existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family
or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts.
153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and
within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are
compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless
of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home.15 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise:
If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will
continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the
family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death
of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or
of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as
family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the
family home shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age
of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of
the minor beneficiaryuntil he reaches legal age and would now be capable of
supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated
in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV,
the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under
Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates
all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home
without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and
great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the
grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the
family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of
the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994,
or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable
of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent
who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of
legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father.1wphi1 Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct
from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law,
comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.16 Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal,
based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is
intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It
is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in
amount.17
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to
follow the order of support under Art. 199.18 We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer
the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for
support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in
their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal
support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property
which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more
reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it
results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be
afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to
prevent these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,19 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in
a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property
at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred
by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have
ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be
appointed as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off
to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the
property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties,
the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same,
provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order
the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners
shall sell the same accordingly.21
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule
embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code.22 Under the law of intestate succession,
if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as
that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal
property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and
compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse
as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as
each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject
property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario,
4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,23 we held that an action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after
trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may
and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY
COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject
property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following manner:
Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III,
1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds
of the property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the
improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is
made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may
order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays
to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem
equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold
instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall
sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale
appertaining to the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's
occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the
action for unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. But the action cannot be
considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in the complaint that
the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy
or stealth.
Antecedents
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from
their father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's
name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of
Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790 square meters, more or less.1 On
April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of
his share, measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante
(respondent), with the affected portion being described in the deed of absolute
sale Eliseo executed in the following manner:
A portion of a parcel of land located at the back of the Pleasant Homes
Subdivision and also at the back of Don Bosco Seminary, Punta Princesa, Cebu
City, to be taken from my share of the whole lot; the portion sold to Atty.
Amante is only 600 square meters which is the area near the boundary facing the
Pleasant Homes Subdivision, Cebu City.2
On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3
portion of his share inthe property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute
sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseos siblings, and
describing the portion subject of the sale as:
That the portion covered under this transaction is Specifically located right at the
back of the seminary facing Japer Memorial School and where the fence and
house of Atty. Amante is located.3
On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition to divide their fathers estate (consisting of the
aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves.4 Pursuant to the deed
extrajudicial partition, OCT No. O-188 was cancelled, and on July 12, 1994 the
Register of Deeds issued TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 6555, TCT No.
6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to the petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and
Eliseo, respectively. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo
to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.6
Due to the petitioners needing her portion that was then occupied by the
respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the
last of which was by the letter dated November 4, 1994,7 the respondent refused
to vacate, prompting her to file against him on February 14, 1995 a complaint
for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City
(MTCC), docketed as Civil Case No. R-34426.8 She alleged therein that she
was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a
portion of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a
residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property
she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided,
and was thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondents occupation had
become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by
mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and
lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo; that the
petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in his favor
because they could plainly see his house from the road; and that the deed of
absolute sale itself stated that the sale to him was with their approval, and that
they had already known that his house and fence were existing; that before he
purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that he and his co-heirs had already
orally partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him
was Eliseos share; and that with his having already purchased the property
before the petitioner acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition, she
should respect his ownership and possession of it.9
Judgment of the MTCC
On February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioner,10 ruling that the deeds of sale executed by Eliseo in favor of the
respondent did not have the effect of conveying the disputed property to him
inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their father, which
included the disputed property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a
mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had no right to dispose of a definite
portion thereof; that as a co-owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the
respondent only the portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the
property would be subdivided; that because the disputed property was
adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, she was its owner with the consequent right of possession; and that, as
such, she had the right to demand that the respondent vacate the land.
The MTCC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, and on the basis thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the defendant; to:
1) vacate from the portion, presently occupied by him and whereon his building
stands, of that parcel of land locatedin Cebu City covered by TCT No. 6555 and
registered in the nameof the plaintiff; and to remove and/or demolish the
building and all the structures that may have been built on said portion;
2) pay the plaintiff the rentalof 1,000.00 a month for the portion in litigation
from November 21, 1994 until such time that the defendant shall have vacated,
and have removed all structures from said portion, and have completely restored
possession thereof to the plaintiff; and
3) pay unto the plaintiff the sum of 10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and the sum
of 5,000.00 for litigation expenses; and
4) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Decision of the RTC
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC,
and dismissed the complaint,12 holding that the summary proceeding for
ejectment was not proper because the serious question of ownership of the
disputed property was involved, viz:
In the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Eliseo
Quijano, one of the co-heirs of Fe Quijano, in 1990 and 1991, the defendant
Atty. Amante took possession of the portion in question and built his residential
house thereat. Itwas only in 1992 that the heirs of Bibiano Quijano executed the
deed of extrajudicial partition, and instead of giving to Eliseo Quijano the
portion that he already sold to the defendant, the same was adjudicated
toplaintiff, Fe Quijano to the great prejudice of the defendant herein who had
been in possession of the portion in question since 1990 and which possession is
notpossession de facto but possession de jure because it is based on 2 deeds of
conveyances executed by Eliseo Quijano. There is, therefore, a serious question
of ownership involved which cannot be determined in a summary proceeding for
ejectment. Since the defendantis in possession of the portion in question where
his residential house is built for several years, and before the extrajudicial
partition, the possession of the defendant, to repeat, is one of possession de jure
and the plaintiff cannot eject the defendant in a summary proceeding for
ejectment involving only possession de facto. What the plaintiff should have
done was to file an action publiciana or action reinvindicatoria before the
appropriate court for recovery of possession and ownership. However, since
there is a pending complaint for quieting of title filed by the defendant against
the plaintiff herein before the Regional Trial Court, the matter of ownership
should be finally resolved in said proceedings.13 Undaunted, the petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied her motion on November 13,
1996.14
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for review.
On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,15 affirming the decision of
the RTC, and dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the
respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the right of possession
over the disputed property.
The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed the ejectment case because a
question of ownership over the disputed property was raised; that the rule that
inferior courts could pass upon the issue of ownership to determine the question
of possession was well settled; that the institution of a separate action for
quieting of title by the respondent did not divest the MTCC of its authority to
decide the ejectment case; that Eliseo, as a coowner, had no right to sell a
definite portion of the undivided estate; that the deeds of sale Eliseo executed in
favor of the respondent were valid only with respect to the alienation of Eliseos
undivided share; that after the execution of the deeds of sale, the respondent
became a co-owner along with Eliseo and his co-heirs, giving him the right
toparticipate in the partition of the estate owned in common by them; that
because the respondent was not given any notice of the project of partition or of
the intention to effect the partition, the partition made by the petitioner and her
co-heirs did not bind him; and that, as to him, the entire estate was still co-
owned by the heirs, giving him the right to the co-possession of the estate,
including the disputed portion.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court on appeal by certiorari,16 contending that
the CA grossly erred in holding that the respondent was either a co-owner or an
assignee with the right of possession over the disputed property.17
The petitioner explains that the respondent, being a lawyer, knew that Eliseo
could not validly transfer the ownership of the disputed property to him because
the disputed property was then still a part of the undivided estate co-owned by
all the heirs of the late Bibiano Quijano; that the respondents knowledge of the
defect in Eliseos title and his failure to get the co-heirs consent to the sale in a
registrable document tainted his acquisition with bad faith; that being a buyer in
bad faith, the respondent necessarily became a possessor and builder in bad
faith; that she was not aware of the sale to the respondent, and it was her
ignorance of the sale that led her to believe that the respondent was occupying
the disputed property by the mere tolerance of Eliseo; thatthe partition was
clearly done in good faith; and that she was entitled to the possession of the
disputed property as its owner, consequently giving her the right to recover it
from the respondent.18
To be resolved is the issue ofwho between the petitioner and the respondent had
the better right to the possession of the disputed property.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorarilacks merit.
An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a
summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved.19 The sole
question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession
(possession de facto)of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of ownership by the defendant
can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Hence,even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the
court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession
especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of
possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely
provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving the title to the property.21
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed
property, the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose
of determining who between them had the better right to possess the disputed
property.
The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano
Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death.22 Prior
to the partition, the estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased.23 In a co-ownership, the undivided thing
or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro
indivisoand exercising her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may
use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.24
Even if an heirs right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled
and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 49325 of the Civil
Codegives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when
Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was
only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that
would beallotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did
not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred
only the sellers pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the
buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.26
As Eliseos successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the
right under Article 497 of the Civil Codeto take part in the partition of the estate
and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.27 Article 497
states:
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the
division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without
their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed,
unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal
opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or
assignor to maintain its validity.
The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the
property he was buying was notexclusively owned by Eliseo.1wphi1 He knew,
too, that the co-heirs had entered into an oral agreement of partition vis--vis the
estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the complaint, to
wit:
12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano was
informed by the latter that the portion sold to him was his share already; that
they have orally partitioned the whole lot before defendant acquired the portion
from him.28
His knowledge of Eliseos co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral
agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his
right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it appear to the respondent that
the partition had already been completed and finalized, the co-heirs had not
taken possession yet oftheir respective shares to signify that they had ratified
their agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos,
because he himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner
herself.29 In that sense, it would have been easy for him to ascertain whether the
representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned out, there had been no
prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise, Eliseo
would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition because it did not
conform to what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been
vigilant in protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights
reserved to him by law, particularly the right to take an active part in the
partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to. It was only on September
30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time of the first sale
transaction, and a year and two months from the time of the second sale
transaction, that the co-heirs executed the deed of extrajudicial partition. Having
been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or toobject to the
partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately
agreed upon by the Quijanos.
There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the
property thereby covered and is entitled to its possession.30 However, the Court
cannot ignore thatthe statements in the petitioners complaint about the
respondents possession of the disputed property being by the mere tolerance of
Eliseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the
defendants withholding of the possession of the property to which the plaintiff
is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right tohold
possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid
cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful,
but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful
possession must then be established. With the averment here that the
respondents possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of
tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At
least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her
predecessors tolerance, or her co-heirs permission for him to occupy the
disputed property.31 But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she
appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed
property being merely tolerated by Eliseo, as the following averment of her
petition for review indicates:
6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularly the petitioner, as
they were not duly informed by the vendor-co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano, [led]
them to believe that the respondents occupancy of the subject premises was by
mere tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon partition of the whole property,said
occupancy continued to be under tolerance of the petitioner when the subject
premises became a part of the land adjudicated to the latter;32 (emphasis
supplied) In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion that
his possession of the disputed property was in the concept of an owner, not by
the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and actually presented the deeds of sale
transferring ownership of the property to him.33

Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioners tolerance of the respondents

possession of the disputed property was not established, the possession could
very well be deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for
unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat
this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the complaint contained no
allegation thathis entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats,
strategy or stealth.

Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To
finally resolve such issue,they should review their options and decide on their
proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for the Court to leave the door open
to them in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to
be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 26, 2004
subject to the MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer action is dismissed
for being an improper remedy; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.