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Introduction
On March 24, 1989, the tanker Exxon Valdez, en route from Valdez, Alaska to Los Angeles, California,
ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The vessel was traveling outside normal
shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. Within six hours of the grounding, the Exxon Valdez spilled
approximately 10.9 million gallons of its 53 million gallon cargo of Prudhoe Bay crude oil. Eight of the
eleven tanks on board were damaged. The oil would eventually impact over 1,100 miles of non-
continuous coastline in Alaska, making the Exxon Valdez the largest oil spill to date in U.S. waters.
The response to the Exxon Valdez involved more personnel and equipment over a longer period of
time than did any other spill in U.S. history. Logistical problems in providing fuel, meals, berthing,
response equipment, waste management and other resources were one of the largest challenges to
response management. At the height of the response, more than 11,000 personnel, 1,400 vessels and
85 aircraft were involved in the cleanup.
Shoreline cleanup began in April of 1989 and continued until September of 1989 for the first year of
the response. The response effort continued in 1990 and 1991 with cleanup in the summer months,
and limited shoreline monitoring in the winter months. Fate and effects monitoring by state and
Federal agencies are ongoing.
The images that the world saw on television and descriptions they heard on the radio that spring were
of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife, and thousands of workers mobilized to clean
beaches. These images reflected what many people felt was a severe environmental insult to a
relatively pristine, ecologically important area that was home to many species of wildlife endangered
elsewhere. In the weeks and months that followed, the oil spread over a wide area in Prince William
Sound and beyond, resulting in an unprecedented response and cleanupin fact, the largest oil
spill cleanup ever mobilized; however, the scale of this spill will likely be eclipsed by the
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill originating in the bathypelagic zone of the Gulf of Mexico. Many
local, state, federal, and private agencies and groups took part in the effort. Even today, scientists
continue to study the affected shorelines to understand how an ecosystem like Prince William Sound
responds to, and recovers from, an incident like the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
In addition to the storm of March 26, the spill occurred at a time of year when the
spring tidal fluctuations were nearly 18 feet. This tended to deposit the oil onto shorelines above the
normal zone of wave action. The diversity in shoreline types in the affected areas led to varied oiling
conditions. In some cases, oil was present on sheer rock faces making access and cleanup difficult, or
rocky beaches with grain size anywhere from coarse sand to boulders, where the oil could percolate to
a sub-surface level. The spill affected both sheltered and exposed (to high wave/weather action)
shorelines. Once oil landed on a shoreline it could be floated off at the next high tide, carried to and
deposited in a different location, making the tracking of oil migration and shoreline impact very
difficult. This migration ended by mid-summer 1989, and the remaining cleanup dealt with oiled
shorelines, rather than oil in the water.
Cleanup operations continued during the summer months of 1990 and 1991. By 1990, surface oil,
where it existed, had become significantly weathered. Sub-surface oil, on the other hand, was in many
cases much less weathered and still in a liquid state. The liquid sub-surface oil could give off a sheen
when disturbed. Cleanup in 1991 concentrated on the remaining reduced quantities of surface and
sub-surface oil.
Deployment of boom around the vessel was complete within 35 hours of the grounding. Exxon
conducted successful dispersant test applications on March 25 and 26 and was granted permission on
March 26 to apply dispersants to the oil slick. Due to the large storm that began the evening of March
26, much of the oil turned into mousse. As dispersants aren't generally able to dissipate oil in the form
of mousse, it was no longer practical to use dispersants on floating oil during this response.
On the evening of March 25, a test in-situ burn of oil on water was conducted. Approximately 15,000
to 30,000 gallons of oil were collected using 3M Fire Boom towed behind two fishing vessels in a U-
shaped configuration, and ignited. The oil burned for a total of 75 minutes and was reduced to
approximately 300 gallons of residue that could be collected easily. It was estimated that the efficiency
of this test burn was 98 percent or better. Again, continued in-situ burning was not possible because
of the change in the oil's state after the storm of March 26.
Five dispersant trials took place between March 25 and March 28, but by March 29 the Regional
Response Team (RRT) decided that dispersants were no longer feasible. Because there was not enough
equipment to protect all the shorelines that could be impacted, Federal, state and local agencies
collaborated to establish shoreline protection priorities. The agencies decided that fish hatcheries and
salmon streams had the highest priority; accordingly, containment booms were deployed to protect
these areas. Five fish hatcheries in Prince William Sound and two in the Gulf of Alaska were boomed,
with the largest amount of boom deployed at the Sawmill Bay hatchery in Prince William Sound.
At the height of containment efforts, it is estimated that a total of 100 miles of boom was deployed.
Almost all the types of boom available on the market were used and tested during the spill response.
Due to the size of the spill, it was necessary to employ inexperienced workers to deploy and tend
booms, and this led to some boom being incorrectly used or handled, and sometimes damaged. Some
boom sank because of improper deployment, infrequent tending, or leakage and/or inadequacy in the
buoyancy system. Other problems included fabric tears in boom due to debris, and tearing at
anchorage points from wave action. In some cases, ballast chains were ripped off during boom
recovery if the boom was lifted by the chain. One estimate suggests that 50 percent of the damage to
larger boom came during boom recovery. For self-inflating booms, it was important to keep the
inflation valves above the water during deployment so that the boom did not become filled with
water and have to be replaced.
Aerial surveillance was used to direct the deployment of booms and skimmers for open water oil
recovery. Visual overflight observations as well as ultraviolet/infrared (UV/IR) surveys were used by
the USCG and Exxon to track the floating oil. Satellite imagery was also tested as a method to track oil
but was not very useful because of the infrequency of satellite passes over Prince William Sound
(every 7 to 8 days), cloud cover, and lengthy turn around time for results.
The primary means of open water oil recovery was with skimmers. In general, most skimmers became
less effective once the oil had spread, emulsified and mixed with debris. To save time, it was most
practical to keep skimmer offloading equipment and oil storage barges near the skimmers. The most
used skimmers during the response were the Marco sorbent lifting-belt skimmers that were supplied
by the U.S. Navy. Once oil became viscous, the sorbent part of the skimmer was removed and the
conveyor belt alone was sufficient to pull the oil up the ramp. The pump that came with the skimmer
had difficulty offloading viscous oil, so that other vacuum equipment was used to unload the collected
oil. The Marco skimmers were generally not used close to shore because they draw between three
and four feet. In general, the paddle belt and rope mop skimmers were the most useful for recovery of
oil from the shoreline. The skimmers were placed on self-propelled barges with a shallow draft.
Sorbents were used to recover oil in cases where mechanical means were less practical. The drawback
to sorbents was that they were labor intensive and generated additional solid waste. Sorbent boom
was used to collect sheen between primary and secondary layers of offshore boom, and to collect
sheen released from the beach during tidal flooding. Pompoms were useful for picking up small
amounts of weathered oil. Towing of sorbent boom in a zigzag or circular fashion behind a boat was
used to collect oil and was more efficient than towing the boom in a straight line. Sorbent booms
made of rolled pads were more effective than booms made of individual particles because these
absorbed less water and were stronger, and did not break into many small particles if they came apart.
Early on in the response, storage space for recovered oil was in short supply. To combat the storage
space problem, water was decanted from skimmers or tanks into a boomed area before offloading. As
a result, the remaining viscous oil mixture was difficult to offload, the process sometimes taking up to
6 to 8 hours. High-capacity skimmer offloading pumps, in particular grain pumps, were the most useful
in transferring viscous oil.
The oil remaining on the Exxon Valdez, was completely offloaded by the end of the first week in April
1989. After offloading operations were completed, the tanker was towed to a location 25 miles from
Naked Island in Prince William Sound for temporary repairs. Later in the summer of 1989, the vessel
was brought to California for further repairs.
Shoreline treatment
Shoreline assessment was a prerequisite for the implementation of any beach cleanup. Assessment
provided geomorphological, biological, archaeological and oiling information that was used for the
development of site specific treatment strategies. Cleanup operations were scheduled around specific
activities such as seal haulout activity, seal pupping, eagle nesting, fish spawning, fishing seasons, and
other significant events as much as possible.
In 1989, hoses spraying seawater were used to flush oil from shorelines. The released oil was then
trapped with offshore boom, and removed using skimmers, vacuum trucks (useful for thick layers of
oil) and boom (sorbent, snare, pompoms). For hard to reach areas, or locations with weathered oil,
heated seawater was used to flush oil from the shoreline.
Converted vessels and barges were used for beach washing operations. It would take several days to
outfit a conventional barge with the equipment needed to heat and pump the water. Smaller vessels
that were used for beach washing early in the spill were re-outfitted for bioremediation later in the
response.
Along with the large-scale beach washing, manual cleanup, raking and tilling the beaches, oily debris
pickup, enhanced bioremediation and spot washing were used to cleanup the oil. In some locations,
oil was thick enough to be picked up with shovels and buckets. In addition, mechanical methods were
used on a few sites, including the use of bulldozers to relocate or remove the contaminated beach
surfaces. Mechanical rock washing machines, which were manufactured for the spill, were not used to
clean contaminated rocks and return them to the beach.
Oiled storm berm was mechanically relocated in some cases so that these areas, which normally
would not receive much wave action, would be more exposed and cleaned by natural processes. If the
oiling in the berm was significant or persistent it was tilled to free the oil or washed to optimize the
cleaning.
Recommendations were made to restrict the movement of berm to the upper third of the beach to
ensure its return to the original location.
Beach applications of dispersants were tried in several locations. Corexit 7664 was applied on Ingot
Island, followed by a warm water wash. No significant change in oil cover or the physical state of the
oil was observed as a result of the treatment. Some ecological impacts were observed in the treated
areas. It appeared that the effects were largely due to the intensive washing more than to the use of
Corexit 7664, and were evident in intertidal epibenthic macrobiota.
In addition, the dispersant BP1100X was applied to a test area on Knight Island. Toxicology studies
indicated that the upper and lower intertidal biota were different from pre-application communities
the day after dispersant application, and returned to pre-treatment levels after seven days.
In May of 1989, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Exxon conducted bioremediation
trials at two test sites on Knight Island in Prince William Sound. On the basis of these tests and other
trials later in the summer, Exxon recommended the use of the bioremediation enhancement agents,
Inipol (Inipol EAP22manufactured by Elf Aquitaine of France) and Customblen (Customblen 28-8-0
manufactured by Sierra Chemicals of California), and subsequently treated over 70 miles of
shoreline in Prince William Sound with these agents.
Winter monitoring of the effects of bioremediation consisted of surveys of more than 20 beaches in
Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. These studies determined that oil degradation had been
enhanced on the shorelines monitored, but some debate existed over whether bioremediation was
solely, or even largely, responsible.
Cleanup operations in 1989 ceased by the end of September. All parties involved in the response
agreed that continuation of cleanup into the Alaskan winter would jeopardize the safety of cleanup
crews. In addition, it was speculated that the winter storms in Alaska could significantly remove oil
from shorelines, including sub-surface oil. By the end of the 1989 cleanup, more than 25,000 tons of
oiled waste and several hundred thousand barrels of oil/liquid waste were collected and disposed of
in landfills.
Cleanup in 1990 began in April and ended in September. Surveys in the spring of 1990 showed that
oiling conditions had been reduced or changed over the winter. Surface oil in 1990 was significantly
weathered but sub-surface oil was relatively fresh in some locations. Cleanup techniques in 1990
focused more on manual methods of treatment such as hand wiping and spot washing as well as
bioremediation. Mechanical equipment was used on a few sites.
Bioremediation was more extensive in 1990, with 378 of the 587 shoreline segments treated that year
receiving bioremediation application. In general, Inipol was applied in cases where surface oiling
existed and Customblen slow release pellets were preferred for treating beaches with sub-surface
oiling. Generally, beaches were given one to three treatments over several months. Concern over the
possible toxicity of Inipol led to recommendations for application of only Customblen on some sites.
By the spring of 1991, the scope of the cleanup effort was greatly reduced. Manual cleanup,
bioremediation, and very limited use of mechanical equipment were employed. Cleanup took place
from May of 1991 through July of 1991.
An important observation that resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill was that natural cleaning
processes, on both sheltered and exposed beaches, were in many cases very effective at degrading oil.
It took longer for some sections of shoreline to recover from some of the invasive cleaning methods
(hot water flushing in particular) than from the oiling itself.
Economic impacts
The State of Alaska funded a several studies of the short term economic impact of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill.
1. Recreational Sport Fishing Losses. This loss was estimated based on the impacts of the spill
on sport fishing activity. One must consider the impact on the number of anglers, the number of
sport fishing trips, the areas fished, the species fished for, and the length of these trips. For 1989
the loss was estimated to be between $0 and $580 million dollars; for 1990 the range was $3.6
million $50.5 million dollars.
2. Tourism Losses. The spill caused both negative and positive effects. The major negative
effects were:
1. Decreased resident and non-resident vacation/pleasure visitor traffic in the spill-
affected areas due to lack of available visitor services (accommodations, charter boats, air taxis).
2. Severe labor shortage in the visitor industry throughout the state due to traditional
service industry workers seeking high-paying spill clean-up jobs.
3. Fifty-nine percent of businesses in the most affected areas reported spill-related
cancellations and 16% reported business was less than expected due to the spill.
The principle positive impact was strong spill-related business in some areas and in certain businesses
such as hotels, taxis, car/RV rentals and boat charters.
1. Existence value. Economists tried to estimate the damage to so-called non-use or existence
value of the Prince William Sound region in the wake of the spill. This is an attempt top measure
what cannot be observed in the market: the value to the public of a pristine Prince William Sound.
They estimated existence value using contingent valuation, a survey approach designed to create
the missing market for public goods by determining what people would be willing to pay (WTP)
for specified changes in the quantity or quality of such goods or, more rarely, what they would be
willing to accept (WTA) in compensation for well-specified degradations in the provision of these
goods. The results suggest an aggrragete loss of $4.9 to $7.2 billion dollars. In effect, these
amounts reflect the public's willingness to pay to prevent anotherExxon Valdez type oil spill given
the scenario posed.
2. Replacement costs of birds and mammals. These costs include the relocation, replacement
and rehabilitation for some of the shorebirds, seabirds and the marine and terrestrial mammals
that may have suffered injury or were destroyed in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The values range
from $20,000 to $300,000 dollars per marine mammal (sea otters, whales, seal lions, seals), $125
to $500 dollars per terrestrial animal (bears, river otters, mink, deer), and $170 to $6,000 dollars
for seabirds and eagles.
In addition to the estimated area of remaining oiled beach, several other important points were
evident:
Acute Mortality
Marine mammals and seabirds are at great risk from floating oil because they have routine contact
with the sea surface. Oiling of fur or feathers causes loss of insulating capacity and can lead to death
from hypothermia, smothering, drowning, and ingestion of toxic hydrocabons. Scientists estimate
mass mortalities of 1000 to 2800 sea otters, 302 harbor seals, and unprecedented numbers of seabird
deaths estimated at 250,000 in the days immediately after the oil spill. Mass mortality also occurred
among macroalgae and benthic invertebrates on oiled shores from a combination of chemical toxicity,
smothering, and physical displacement from the habitat by pressurized wash-water applied after the
spill.
Long-term impacts
The persistent nature of oil in sediments produce chronic, long-term exposure risks from some
species. For example, chronic exposures for years after the spill to oil persisting in sedimentary refuges
were evident from biomarkers in fish, sea otters, and seaducks intimately associated with sediments
for egg laying or foraging. These chronic exposures enhanced mortality for years.
Indirect effects can be as important as direct exposure. Cascading indirect effects are delayed in
operation because they are mediated through changes in an intermediary. Perhaps the two generally
most influential types of indirect interactions are: (1) trophic cascades in which predators reduce
abundance of their prey, which in turn releases the preys food species from control; and (2) provision
of biogenic habitat by organisms that serve as or create important physical structure in the
environment.
Scientists have found that indirect interactions lengthened the recovery process on rocky shorelines
for a decade or more. Dramatic initial loss of cover by the most important biogenic habitat provider,
the rockweed Fucus gardneri, triggered a cascade of indirect impacts. Freeing of space on the rocks
and the losses of important grazing (limpets and periwinkles) and predatory (whelks) gastropods
combined to promote initial blooms of ephemeral green algae in 1989 and 1990 and an opportunistic
barnacle, Chthamalus dalli, in 1991. Absence of structural algal canopy led to declines in associated
invertebrates and inhibited recovery of Fucus itself, whose recruits avoid desiccation under the
protective cover of the adult plants. Those Fucus plants that subsequently settled on tests
of Chthamalus dalli became dislodged during storms because of the structural instability of the
attachment of this opportunistic barnacle. After apparent recovery of Fucus, previously oiled shores
exhibited another mass rockweed mortality in 1994, a cyclic instability probably caused by
simultaneous senility of a single-aged stand. The importance of indirect interactions in rocky shore
communities is well established, and the general sequence of succession on rocky intertidal shores
extending over a decade after the Exxon Valdez oil spill closely resembles the dynamics after the
Torrey Canyon oil spill in the UK.
State of recovery
The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council published a study in 2004 to assess the state of the
resources injured by the spill. Fifteen years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, it is clear that some fish and
wildlife species injured by the spill have not fully recovered. It is less clear, however, what role oil plays
in the inability of some populations to bounce back. Anecosystem is dynamic ever changing and
continues its natural cycles and fluctuations at the same time that it struggles with the impacts of
spilled oil. As time passes, separating natural change from oil-spill impacts becomes more and more
difficult.
The Trustee Council recognizes 30 resources or species as injured by the spill. Depending on their
status as of 2002, these have been placed in one of five categories:
Not Recovering
These resources are showing little or no clear improvement since spill injuries occurred: Common loon
Cormorants (3 species), Harbor seal, Harlequin duck, Pacific herring, Pigeon guillemot.
Recovery unknown
Limited data on life history or extent of injury is available. Current research is either inconclusive or
not complete: Cutthroat trout, Dolly Varden, Kittlitzs murrelet, Rockfish Subtidal communities
Recovered
Recovery objectives have been met: Archaeological resources, Bald eagle, Black oystercatcher,
Common murre, Pink salmon, River otter, Sockeye salmon
Recovering
Clams, Wilderness Areas, Intertidal communities, Killer whale (AB pod), Marbled murrelet, Mussels,
Sea otter, Sediments
Human uses
Human services that depend on natural resources were also injured by the spill. These services are
each categorized as recovering until the resources they depend on are fully recovered: Commercial
fishing, Passive use, Recreation and tourism, Subsistence
Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there was no baseline date available for the abundant number of
species existing inPrince William Sound. Because of this lack of data, numbers of oil spill-related
casualties and recovery rates have been difficult to determine.
Criminal Settlement
Plea Agreement
Exxon was fined $150 million, the largest fine ever imposed for an environmental crime. The court
forgave $125 million of that fine in recognition of Exxon's cooperation in cleaning up the spill and
paying certain private claims. Of the remaining $25 million, $12 million went to the North American
Wetlands Conservation Fund and $13 million went to the national Victims of Crime Fund.
Criminal Restitution
As restitution for the injuries caused to the fish, wildlife, and lands of the spill region, Exxon agreed to
pay $100 million. This money was divided evenly between the federal and state governments.
Civil Settlement
Exxon agreed to pay $900 million in ten annual installments. The final payment was received in Sept.
2001. The settlement contains a reopener window between Sept. 1, 2002 and Sept. 1, 2006, during
which the state and federal governments may make a claim for up to an additional $100 million. The
funds must be used to restore resources that suffered a substantial loss or decline as a result of the oil
spill, the injuries to which could not have been known or anticipated by the six trustees from any
information in their possession or reasonably available to any of them at the time of the settlement
(Sept. 25, 1991).
ExxonMobil hired its own scientists to study the impacts of the spill, and they come to different
conclusions than many of the results published by government agencies and peer-reviewed academic
journals. Exxon's scientists acknowledge the lingering pockets of oil in the sediments, but they argue
that they do not pose a serious risk. It is their position that that there are now no species in Prince
William Sound in trouble due to the impact of the 1989 oil spill, and that the data strongly support the
position of a fully recovered Prince William Sound ecosystem.
The Exxon Valdez also triggered major improvements in oil spill prevention and response planning.
1. The U.S. Coast Guard now monitors fully-laden tankers via satellite as they pass through
Valdez Narrows, cruise by Bligh Island, and exit Prince William Sound at Hinchinbrook Entrance. In
1989, the Coast Guard watched the tankers only through Valdez Narrows and Valdez Arm.
2. Two escort vessels accompany each tanker while passing through the entire Sound. They not
only watch over the tankers, but are capable of assisting them in the event of an emergency, such
as a loss of power or loss of rudder control. Fifteen years ago, there was only one escort vessel
through Valdez Narrows.
3. Specially trained marine pilots, with considerable experience in Prince William Sound, board
tankers from their new pilot station at Bligh Reef and are aboard the ship for 25 miles out of the
70-mile transit through the Sound. Weather criteria for safe navigation are firmly established.
4. Congress enacted legislation requiring that all tankers in Prince William Sound be double-
hulled by the year 2015. It is estimated that if the Exxon Valdez had had a double-hull structure,
the amount of the spill would have been reduced by more than half. There are presently three
double-hulled and twelve double-bottomed tankers moving oil through Prince William Sound.
Two more Endeavor class tankers are under construction by ConocoPhillips, their expected
induction into service is 2004 and 2005.
5. Contingency planning for oil spills in Prince William Sound must now include a scenario for a
spill of 12.6 million gallons. Drills are held in the Sound each year.
6. The combined ability of skimming systems to remove oil from the water is now 10 times
greater than it was in 1989, with equipment in place capable of recovering over 300,000 barrels
of oil in 72 hours.
7. Even if oil could have been skimmed up in 1989, there was no place to put the oil-water mix.
Today, seven barges are available with a capacity to hold 818,000 barrels of recovered oil.
8. There are now 40 miles of containment boom in Prince William Sound, seven times the
amount available at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill.
9. Dispersants are now stockpiled for use and systems are in place to apply them from
helicopters, airplanes, and boats.