Pesigan v. Angeles
No, it
Limitations of Crimes
Aquino
April 30, 1984
Digest by PS Magno
Short Version:
Cant confiscate carabaos being transported
because the law providing such forfeiture
wasnt published in the Official Gazette yet.
Facts:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan are carabao
dealers. They transported 26 carabaos and a
calf from Sipocot, Cam Sur to Padre Garcia,
Batangas.
They had with them the ff.
A health certificate from the
provincial vet of Cam Sur
A permit to transport large cattle
under the authority of the provincial
commander
3 certificates of inspection from the
Constabulary
Despite these, the carabaos were confiscated
at Basud, Camarines Norte, by Lt. Zenarosa,
the police station commander, and by Dr.
Miranda, the provincial vet. This was based
on EO 626-A, providing that no carabao,
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another xxx (otherwise,
these) shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture xxx
The Pesigans filed a case against Zenarosa
and Miranda for recovery of the carabaos as
well as damages.
RTC ruled against the Pesigans.
CA affirmed.
Issue and Dispositive:
Are the Pesigans bound by EO 626-A?
was not yet published during the time they
transported the carabaos.
Ratio:
The confiscation happened on April 2, 1982.
EO 626-A was published in the Official
Gazette on June 14, 1982, 2 months after the
commission of the act.
NCC 2 provides that laws become only
effective, 15 days after publication.
Laws here include circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties
Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the
regulations, and make the said
penalties binding on persons affected
This rule applies in a case of a violation of
EO 626-A because it provides for
confiscation and forfeiture, which makes it a
penal sanction.
The public must first be informed of
that provision, through the
publication in the Gazette, before
violators of the EO may be bound
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires
that all Presidential executive orders
having general applicability should
be published in the Official Gazette
o "Every order or document
which shall prescribe a
penalty shall be deemed to
have general applicability and
legal effect."
PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO II [132 s 523] - F: the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make
Private resp. Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged known to the people in general. If the
w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could be legislature had intended to make the printed
arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash date of issue of the OG as the point of
the information on the ground that the info. reference, then it could have so stated in the
did not charge an offense, pointing out that at special effectivity provision of BP 22.
the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, w/c was about the 2nd week of May
'79 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not
yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the
motion contending, among others, that the
date of the dishonor of the check, 9/26/79, is
the date of the commission of the offense.
Resolving the motion, the court granted the
same and held that BP 22 cannot be given a
retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioner submitting for review respondent
Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.

HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr.

committed the act complained of in May '79
(at the time he issued the check-- the law
penalizes the act of making or drawing and
issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
fact of its dishonor), there was no law
penalizing such act. Following the special
provision of BP 22, it became effective only
on 6/29/79. The copy editor of the OG made
a certification that the penal statute in
question was made public only on 6/14/79
and not on the printed date 4/9/79.
Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of
publication of BP 22. Before the public may
be bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, the law must be published and the
people officially informed of its contents.
For, it a statute had not been published before
its viol., then, in the eyes of the law, there was
no such law to be violated and, consequently
the accused could not have committed the
alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that
"This Act shall take effect 15 days after
publication in the OG." The term
"publication" in such clause should be given
003. LORENZO M. TAADA,
ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA,
in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , effectivity of laws where the laws
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacaang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 | April 24, 1985 | En Banc
| Petition for Mandamus
Escolin, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version:
In this petition for mandamus, Petitioners
want the respondent public officials to
publish several presidential issuances. The
respondents argue that based on Art. 2 of the
CC , publication in the Official Gazette is not
a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates. The Court
held that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned
Facts:
- In this case, the petitioners seek a writ
of mandamus to compel the
respondent public officials to publish
in the Official Gazette several
1
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
- Respondent public officials argue that
based on Art. 2 of the CC1,
publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the
themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. Since the
presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have legal
standing to bring the petition
2. WON publication in the Official
Gazette is a condition sine qua non for
the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force
and effect.
Reasoning:
1. YES
- In Severino v. Governor General, the
Court held that while the general rule
is that a writ of mandamus should be
granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private
interest to be subserved independent
 of that which he holds with the public
at large, and that it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be
subserved, when the question is one
of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the
relator need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws
2. YES
- Art. 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
- The Court cited Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 (An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication
and Distribution of the Official
Gazette)2 , stating that its clear object
is to give the general public adequate
notice of the laws governing them. It
is a requirement of due process.
Otherwise the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat
would have no basis.
- Publication is all the more important
in the case of issuances made by the
President since his activities are not
as widely covered by mass media as
the legislature. Publication is thus the
only way to inform the people of
presidential issuances.
2
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
- The wording of Sec. 1 of CA 638 uses
the word shall which indicates that
it imposes upon the respondent public
officials an imperative duty.
- Presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and
effect.
- Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the
assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned
- Question: What about acts enforcing
PDs prior to their publication and
prior to the courts declaration of their
invalidity on ground of non-
publication?
o It depends on whether rights
have already been vested
before the law was declared
unconstitutional by the court.
- In this case, none of the PDs in
dispute have been implemented or
enforced by the government
Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
1. Fernando, C.J., concurring with
qualification
- He doesnt agree that publication of
legislative and presidential issuances
should always be published in the
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
 Official Gazette in order to be
effective.
- First, he reasons that while
publication is essential, there is no
such requirement in the Constitution
that legislative and presidential
issuances be published in the Official
Gazette.
- Second, declaring matters enforced
under the subject unpublished
presidential issuances would set open
matters already deemed settled.
- Third, Art. 2, CC expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette is
subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." The CC is only
a legislative enactment. It does not
and cannot have the force of a
constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concur.
2. Plana, J., concurring with
qualification
- The Constitution does not require the
publication of laws in the Official
Gazette as a prerequisite to their
effectivity.
- He makes two observations about
Art. 2, CC:
o Such provision does not apply
to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will
take effect.
o Clearly recognizes that each
law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that
it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
- Also with regard to C.A. 638, it only
provides for a uniform publication
and distribution of the Official
Gazette. It does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws.
o Said law enumerates what
should be published in the
Official Gazettem among
them important legislative
acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the Congress
and all executive and
administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as
have no general
applicability.
- An earlier law of general application
cannot nullify or restrict the operation
of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only the
Constitution can do so.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
3. Melencio-Herrera, concurring
- He adds that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree
but the decree becomes effective only
fifteen (15) days after its publication
in the Official Gazette, it will not
mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of
effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
4. Teehankee, J., concurring
- His point is that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in order
to comply with the constitutional
requirements of due process.
- He says that the respondents position
would nullify and render nugatory
Art. 2, CC.
MRCA v. CA Digest

Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a

complaint against private respondents
spouses (who were defendants in said civil
case). Said case was dismissed by the trial
court due to the non-payment of proper filing
fees when petitioner failed to include include
in the complain the amount of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and litigation expenses sought to be
recovered.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said
ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by
petition for review. Petitioner contends that
the Manchester ruling does not apply to the
case since said court decision was not
published in the Official Gazette. It should be
noted that petitioner filed said complaint ten
months after the promulgation of the
Manchester ruling.
Issue: w/n court rulings need to be
published in the Official Gazette order to
be effective
HELD: NO.
Publication in the Official Gazette is not a
prerequisite for the effectivity of a court
ruling even if it lays down a new rule or
procedure. It is a well-established doctrine
that the procedure of the court may be
changed at any time and become effective at
once so long as it does not affect or change
vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of Lands)
As such, the court granted the petition and
held that the Manchester ruling should apply
to the case of the petitioner though it was
modified by the Sun Insurance case where the
court allowed the payment of docket fees
within a reasonable period but not beyond the
reglamentary period. Petitioner was allowed
to amend the complaint and specify therein
the amount of damages it seeks from
defendant and pay the proper filing fees
Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides
GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989 an enumeration of what shall be published in
the Official Gazette. It provides that besides
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized legislative acts, resolutions of public nature
9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by of Congress, executive, administrative orders
petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being and proclamations shall be published except
unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned when these have no general applicability.
them over to the custody of the Bureau of
Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District
Collector of Customs ordered the release of
the cargo to the petitioner but this order was
subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The
reversal was by virtue ofCustoms
Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in
implementation of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which
provides that in protest and seizure cases
where the decision is adverse to the
government, the Commissioner of Customs
has the power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec.
12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending
that these were not published in the Official
Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1
was however published in the Official
Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO

20-87 need to be published in the OG to
take effect

NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to
circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an
administrative order of the Commissioner of
Customs addressed to his subordinates, the
custom collectors. Said issuance requiring
collectors of customs to comply strictly with
Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to
particular persons or a class of persons (the
customs collectors), hence no general
applicability. As held in Tanada v.
Tuvera, It need not be published, on the
assumption that it has been circularized to all
concerned.
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG
SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES -
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort
William McKinley, was later on renamed
Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it
for a national shrine. The excluded area is
now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein
respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274
and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476,
President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads:
"P.S. This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without
the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 172 which
substantially reiterated Proclamation No.
2476, as published, but this time excluded
Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Through the years, informal settlers
increased and occupied some areas of Fort
Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General
Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No.
1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB),
primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,
Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP). Thus, on 1 September 2006,
COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the
Petition and declaring the portions of land in
question alienable and disposable, with
Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was an
integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and
was therefore, controlling. The intention of
the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the COSLAP.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of
Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions.
The Court of Appeals First Division rendered
the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAOs
Petition,
Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the
said Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum
was considered published also at the time the
Proclamation was published.
HELD:
No. Considering that petitioners were
occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan
(subject lots), their claims were anchored on
the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They
allege that the former President intended to
include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio
as disposable public land when he made a
notation just below the printed version of
Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the
handwritten addendum was not included
when Proclamation No. 2476 was published
in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots
were declared as reclassified and disposable
lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos
has the force and effect of law. In relation
thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement
of publication is indispensable to give effect
to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the
completion of the laws publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed
with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the
landmark case Taada v. Hon. Tuvera.
Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note
never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6,
Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette
shall be prima facie evidence of its
authority." Thus, whether or not President
Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan
is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply
put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law.17 This Court
cannot rule that a word appears in the law
when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain
Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.' This does not
mean, however, that courts can create law.
The courts exist for interpreting the law, not
for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our
courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will
not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
another legislation that would amend the law
to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
Case Digest of Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F:
Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children
and heirs of the deceased Emiliana
Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover
from the petitioner the possession of the land
and its improvements granted by way of
homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of
mortgage of the improvements on the land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment
of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest.
In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was
to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest
thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not
have any effect; in clause VI, the parties
agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the
mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the
land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that
w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the
owner of the land would file a motion in the
CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325
be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another
be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in
clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA
fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the
stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would
execute an absolute deed of sale of the land
in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for
the same amount of the loan including unpaid
interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that
in case the motion to be presented under
clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-
Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would
automatically become void and the mortgage
would subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage
deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to
pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax
on the land and its improvements. For this
reason, she and the petitioner entered into
another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the
land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend
to the payment of the land tax, would benefit
by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and
his receipts of the fruits of the land,
considered as integral elements of the
contract of antichresis, are illegal and void
agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien
and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec
116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA
held that petitioner acted In BF in taking
possession of the land bec. he knew that the
contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,
and further, that the latter could not sell the
land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act
2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF
when he knows that there is a flaw in his title
or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it
is invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the
petitioner should be deemed a possessor in
GF bec. he was unaware of any flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c
it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the
keynote of the rule. From the facts as found
by the CA, we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a
flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case,
the question is w/n GF may be premised upon
ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law
may not be the basis of GF but excusable
ignorance may be such basis (if it is based
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the
petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec.
he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage
of the improvements he proceeded on the
well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession
thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits,
he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the
petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of
sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of
GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents
may elect to have the improvements
introduced by the petitioner by paying the
latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel
the petitioner to buy and have the land where
the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be fixed by
the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
Puzon v Abellera Digest Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be
applied retroactively
G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989 YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code
prohibits the retroactive application of laws
Retroactivity unless expressly provided therein, such rule
Facts: allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls
The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD
(substituted upon her death by Domondon) 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid
was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel from the time they were issued. This implies
of land situated in Baguio City, a land which that the intent of the law is to recognize the
was previously part of the public domain but effects of certain acts of ownership done in
was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another good faith by persons with Torrens titles
case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme issued in their favor before the cut-off date
Court declared that all titles issued under RA stated, honestly believing that they had
931 are null and void since the said Act was validly acquired the lands. And such would
applicable only to places covered by be possible only by validating all the said
cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on
Baguio which was covered by a townsite their respective dates of issue. However, the
reservation. validity of these titles would not become
This same ruling was subsequently operative unless and after the conditions
incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the stated in PD 1271 are met.
title "An act nullifying decrees of registration
and certificates of title covering lands within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to
RA 931 which took effect on December 22,
1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain
titles of lands that are alienable and
disposable under certain conditions and for
other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was
reverted to the public domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction sale
due to the non-payment of taxes.\Petitioner
took interest and subsequently won the bid. A
year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In
this connection, the petitioner filed a case to
consolidate his ownership of the lots.
Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the
auction sale and filed an opposition to the
petition for consolidation filed by petitioner.
The trial court ruled that said auction sale is
null and void and that the assessments were
illegally made. This was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence this petition with
petitioner contending that the tax assessments
were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative
effect.
Acosta v Plan

Facts:
Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against
private respondent Magday at the CFI of
Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants
they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to
elevate the entire records of the case to CA
(as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court).

On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge

dismissed the appeal for failure to file a
record on appeal, hence this petition. Under
the Rules of Court then in force, a record on
appeal was indeed required to be filed by a
pauper appellant although it did not have to
be printed.

Issue: Whether or not a timely submission

of a record on appeal is required for the
perfection of an appeal by a pauper
litigant

NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken
this case before it could be decided, a record
on appeal is no longer required for the
perfection of an appeal. This law was given
retroactive effect.

As held in People v Sumilang, being

procedural in nature, those provisions may be
applied retroactively for the benefit of
petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending
undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent.'
BPI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L- to another, with the obligation of safely
66826, August 19, 1988 keeping it and of returning the same. If the
CORTES, J: safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the
principal purpose of the contract, there is no
Facts: deposit but some other contract.

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife

maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings
account and a peso current account. An
application for a dollar drat was
accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch
manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain
Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia
indicated that the amount was to be charged
to the dolar savings account of the
Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the
name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.
Comtrust issued a check payable to the order
of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the
withdrawal from his account, he demanded
an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer,
Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto
Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he
encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check
for P8450 issued by the manila banking
corporation payable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between

petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?

Held: The document which embodies the

contract states that the US$3,000.00 was
received by the bank for safekeeping. The
subsequent acts of the parties also show that
the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return
it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus,
Zshornack demanded the return of the money
on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract

defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging
Dacudao vs. DOJ investigated. They maintained that DO 182
[Civil Law: Effectivity of laws; general rule: was issued in violation of the prohibition
no retroactive effect; exception: when law is against passing laws with retroactive effect.
procedural in nature]
Issue: Whether or not the assailed
Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia issuances can be given retroactive effect.
R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of
Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall
Department of Justice, Respondent have no retroactive effect. However,
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013 exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
Facts: The petitioners filed a case of The reason is that a remedial statute or a
syndicated estafa against Celso Delos statute relating to remedies or modes of
Angeles and his associates after the procedure does not create new rights or take
petitioners were defrauded in a business away vested rights but operates only in
venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation
Department Order 182 which directs all already existing rights. The retroactive
prosecutors in the country to forward all application is not violative of any right of a
cases already filed against Celso Delos person who may feel adversely affected, for,
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the no vested right generally attaches to or arises
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate from procedural law.
action. However, in a separate order which is
Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said
that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of
Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not
be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in
Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the
complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the
secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent
Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the department Order and the
Memorandum, which according to the
violated their right to due process, right to
equal protection of the law and right to
speedy disposition of the cases. The
petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage
cases already filed and pending at the
Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro City.
They contended that the assailed issuances
should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being
Guingona v Carague Digest all loans to protect and maintain the credit
Facts: standing of the country.
Petitioner senators question the
constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget which was authorized by PD 81.
Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec
31), and PD 1967 be declared
unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees. While
respondents contend that the petition
involves a political question
(repeal/amendment of said laws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has

been impliedly repealed by the 1987
Constitution

NO.
(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or
amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that
construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the

questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient
standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as

amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it
when they shall become due without the need
to enact a separate law appropriating funds
therefor as the need arises. The purpose of
these laws is to enable the government to
make prompt payment and/or advances for
 Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest
Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding acarromata in
Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon
owned by the defendant (used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two
horses are attached), came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata went close
to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery
wagon pass by. However, instead of merely
passing by, the horses ran into
the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with
her child and overturned it, causing a serious
cut upon the plaintiffs head.
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not
negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case. It is
believed that acts or performances which, in
a long time, have not been destructive and
which are approved by the society are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by
the society is that they are beneficial rather
that prejudicial. One could not easily hold
someone negligent because of some act that
led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair
therefore to render the cochero negligent
because of such circumstances.

3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who
was driving his delivery wagon at the time of
the accident, was actually a good servant and
was considered a safe and reliable cochero.
He also claims that the cochero was tasked to
deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for
that purpose the defendants employee tied
the driving lines of the horses to the front end
of the delivery wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and
made noises that frightened the horses
causing them to run. The employee failed to
stop the horses since he was thrown upon the
ground.
The court further held that it is a universal
practice of merchants during that time to
deliver products through horse-drawn
vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left during the accident. It
has been practiced for a long time and
generally has not been the cause of accidents
or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the

defendant was guilty of negligence. The court
specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903
of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to
reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who

has furnished a gentle and tractable team
(of horses) and a trusty and capable
driver, is liable for the negligence of such
driver.
 Armigos v CA Digest
Facts:
1. The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a
complaint against the herein petitioner with
the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur,
for the collection of damages and attorney's
fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the private respondent.
2. A copy of the decision was received by the
petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following
day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal
with the said municipal court, and on 24 June
1977, he completed the other requirements
for the perfection of an appeal, including the
filing of an appeal bond and the payment of
the appellate court docket fee. However,
when the case was elevated to the CFI for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding
judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period;
consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
3. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June
1977, when he received a copy of the
decision of the municipal court, to 24 June
1977, when he perfected his appeal, only
fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the
decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The
petitioner contended that the computation of
the period to appeal should commence on the
hour he received copy of the decision, so that
the first of the 15-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June
1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and
the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23
June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June
1977.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's
contention is correct
NO.
1. The Court considered the day as synonymous
with the date. Consequently, the 5th day shall
be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of
the time when it was submitted.
2. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code
to the effect that "In computing a period, the
first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not identical to
Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provided that "Unless otherwise
specially provided, the time within which an
act is required by law to be done shall be
computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; and if the last be Sunday or
a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well
as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which
stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules
of Court, by order of a court, or by any other
applicable statute, the day of the act, event or
default after which the designated period of
time begins to run is not to be included. The
last day of the period so computed is to be
included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal
holiday, in which event the time shall run
until the end of the next day which is neither
a Sunday or a legal holiday."
3. Human memory is frail - Human memory on
dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no
reasonable certainty of its correctness. What
more for the exact hour when a pleading,
order or decision is received by a party? The
period laid down by the law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional.
CASE DIGEST ON NAMARCO V.
TECSON
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CASE DIGEST ON NAMARCO V.
TECSON [29 S 70 (1969)] - F: On 10/14/55,
the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil
case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et
al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55
served upon defendants in said case. On
12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the
properties, assets, rights, and choses in action
of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment
creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a
complaint against defendants for the revival
of the judgment rendered therein. Def.
Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint,
upon the ground of prescription of action,
among others. The motion was granted by the
court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was
certified to the SC, upon the ground that the
only question raised therein is one of law,
namely,
ISSUE: W/n the present action for the revival
of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for
judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from
the time the judgment sought to be revived
has become final. This in turn, took place on
12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the
judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on
10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken
therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the
date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired.
Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee
maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law
speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that
years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960
and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of
365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days,
from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65.
Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no
question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21
to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If
the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the
year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what
year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong
to the year where it falls, and therefore, that
the 366 days constitute one yr.
HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by
appellant shows that its theory contravenes
the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the
connotation of each "year"-- as the term is
used in our laws-- to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which
became final on December 21, 1955
prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code
computes "years" in terms of 365 days each,
the action has prescribed on December 19,
1955, since the two intervening leap years
added two more days to the computation. It is
not the calendar year that is considered.]
GONZALES VS GONZALES
Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article
147-Property Regime of void marriage]
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco
and Erminda got married in 1979. Four
children were born from this union. During
the time they lived together, they acquired
properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza
business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the
nullity of their marriage based on Mario's
alleged psychological incapacity, and for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties. She managed their
pizza business and worked hard for its
development. Mario denied she was the one
who managed the pizza business and claimed
that he exclusively owns the properties
"existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision,
rendered its judgment and ordered the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains and divide the conjugal properties
between Francisco and Erminda. Not
satisfied with the manner their properties
were divided, Francisco appealed to the CA,
which in turn affirmed the trial court
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own
the properties existing during their marriage.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda
are co-owners of the properties in question.
The marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is
declared void ab initio by the trial court
which was later affirmed by the CA.
Consequently, their properties shall be
governed by the provisions of Article 147 of
the Family Code.
These provisions enumerate the two
instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when
a man and woman capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage; and (2) when a man and woman
live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership,
properties acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that
properties acquired during the cohabitation of
the parties have been acquired through their
joint efforts, work or industry and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta
Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City.
As of June 1948, the newly-weds were
already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano
left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against
the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on
the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was
issued by the Nevada Court. On September
13, 1954, Escano married an American
Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California and by him,
has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On
July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint
for legal separation and damages against VE
and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that
Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving
of an award for damages because they are
guilty of contributory negligence in failing to
take up proper and timely measures to
dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving
her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign
divorce and marrying another man (Moran).
This theory cannot be considered: first,
because this was not raised in
the court below; second, there is no evidence
to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's
previous theory of alienation of affections in
that contributory negligence involves an
omission to perform an act
while alienation of affection involves the
performance of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a
Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against
Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, her denial of consortium, and
desertion of her husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine
law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law,
under the NCC then now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce but only provides for
legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce
decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a
patent violation of the declared policy of the
State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art.
17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give
rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens to the detriment of those
members of our society whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her
divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our
law, which was hers at the time) constitute a
wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's
feelings in a manner "contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code,
Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10)
authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral
damages, an additional effect of legal
separation has been added to Article 106. It
was plain in the decision that the damages
attached to her wrongful acts under the codal
article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our
law to be incompatible with the respect
accorded to individual liberty in civil cases.
Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts
the conjugal abode can be denied support
(Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where
the wealth of the deserting spouse renders
this remedy illusory, there is
no cogent reason why the courtmay not
award damage as it may in cases of breach of
other obligations to do intuitu personae even
if in private relations physical coercion be
barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest
precise cogi and factum".
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned
RICHARD UPTON case on the ground that the property involved
G.R. No. L-68470 is located in the Philippines so that the
October 8, 1985 Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
citizen of the Philippines while private proceeding.
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
USA. They were married in Hongkong in ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign

1972 and begot two children. The parties divorce on the parties and their alleged

were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. conjugal property in the Philippines?

Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent

time to Theodore Van Dorn. Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in Complaint

the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business For the resolution of this case, it is not

in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the necessary to determine whether the property

parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to relations between Alice and Richard, after

render an accounting of that business, and their marriage, were upon absolute or relative

that Richard be declared with right to manage community property, upon complete

the conjugal property. separation of property, or upon any other

regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the Nevada divorce of the parties.
ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings The Nevada District Court, which decreed

before the Nevada Court wherein respondent the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over

had acknowledged that he and petitioner had petitioner who appeared in person before the

no community property as of June 11, Court during the trial of the case. It also

1982. obtained jurisdiction over private respondent

The Court below (presiding judge: Judge who authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case to agree to the divorce on the ground of private respondent as an American citizen.
incompatibility in the understanding that What he is contending in this case is that the
there were neither community property nor divorce is not valid and binding in this
community obligations. jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney
he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP It is true that owing to the nationality
& GRAD LTD. to represent him in the principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
divorce proceedings: Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
xxx xxx xxx same being considered contrary to our
You are hereby authorized to accept service concept of public police and morality.
of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
behalf and do all things necessary and proper which may be recognized in the Philippines,
to represent me, without further contesting, provided they are valid according to their
subject to the following: national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the marriage from the standards of American
ground of incompatibility. law, under which divorce dissolves the
2. That there is no community of property to marriage.
be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
be adjudicated by the court. respondent is no longer the husband of
xxx xxx xxx petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioners husband
There can be no question as to the validity of entitled to exercise control over conjugal
that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
United States. The decree is binding on own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, assigned to the court presided by the
VICTOR AND GEILING et al respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989 A motion to quash was filed in the same case

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil

citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, filed this special civil action for certiorari and

a German national, were married in prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking

Germany. After about three and a half years the annulment of the order of the lower court

of marriage, such connubial disharmony denying her motion to quash.

eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce

proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of

Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, the RPC thus presupposes that the marital

promulgated a decree of divorce on the relationship is still subsisting at the time of

ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. the institution of the criminal action for

More than five months after the issuance of adultery.

the divorce decree, Geiling filed two

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
the time of the filing of the complaint for
of Manila alleging in one that, while still
adultery, considering that it was done after
married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair
obtaining a divorce decree?
with a certain William Chia. The Assistant
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order
Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation,
denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and
recommended the dismissal of the cases on
another one entered DISMISSING the
the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
However, upon review, the respondent city
TRO issued in this case is hereby made
fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing
permanent.
the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against
NO
the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of
adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a as private respondent is concerned in view of
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to
the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing
of the criminal action. This is a logical
consequence since the raison detre of said
provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case.
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons Under the
same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be

whether it is necessary in the commencement
of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and
the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

PEOPLE vs. RITTER
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Heinrich Stefan Ritter
FACTS
On or about October 10, 1986,
accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in
Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the
accused told them to take a bath. When
Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
told to remove her clothes by the accused and
to join him in bed. At that time, Jessie was
already asleep but Rosario touched him to
call his attention. When he looked, he saw the
accused placing his penis against the vagina
of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate
but it would not fit. The following morning
the accused left after paying the children.
Rosario then told Jessie that the accused
inserted something in her vagina. Sometime
the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he
asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said
"Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the
evening of that same date, he saw Rosario
and she was complaining of pain in her
vagina and when he asked her, she said that
the foreign object was not yet removed.
Seven months later, Rosario was
brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt,
unconscious and foul smelling. After 6 days,
Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead
subsequent to her operation with a portion of
a sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina.
A case for Rape with Homicide was
filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo rendered a decision declaring
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing
the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused. The Supreme Court
however, reversed the judgment of the lower
court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in
a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability
RULING
It does not necessarily follow that the
appellant is also free from civil liability
which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The
well-settled doctrine is that a person while
not criminally liable may still be civilly
liable. While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who
ran away from her grandmother's house.
Circumstances forced her to succumb and
enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who
have certainly suffered mental anguish,
anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and
incredulous death as reflected in the records
of the case. Though the SC is acquitting the
appellant for the crime of rape with homicide,
it emphasizes that it is not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless.
It is only the constitutional
presumption of innocence and the failure of
the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts
of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier
stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert
the vibrator whose end was left inside
Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. The Court cannot
convict on probabilities or possibilities but
civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the
payment of indemnity on the facts found in
the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed

acts contrary to morals, good customs, public
order or public policy (Article 21 Civil
Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant
has abused Filipino children, enticing them
with money. The Court cannot overstress the
responsibility for proper behavior of all
adults in the Philippines, including the
appellant towards young children. The sexual
exploitation committed by the appellant
should not and cannot be condoned. Thus,
considering the circumstances of the case, the
Court awarded damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot in the amount of
P30,000.00.

The appealed judgment is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario
Baluyot.
Joyce Ardiente v. Spouses Javier and Ma. Yes. The court ruled that the principle of
Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan De Oro abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil
Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr. Code was violated. It provides that "every
GR. NO. 161921, July 17, 2013 person must, in the exercise of his rights
"Principle of Abuse of Rights" - Article 19 and in the performance of his duties, act
of the Civil Code with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
FACTS:
A right, although it is legal for being
recognized by law as such, may nevertheless
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with
become the source of illegality (Globe
Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold,
Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when
conveyed, and transferred all their rights and
it is exercised in a manner that does not
interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to
conform with the norms enshrined in Article
the former. It has been agreed by the parties
19 and the same causes damage to another.
that the water bill will remain in the account
The person exercising an abuse of right is
of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma.
thus liable for damages caused to another.
Theresa's water supply was disconnected
The herein petitioner is liable for damages by
without notice. She complained to the
ordering the cutting of the water supply of the
Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and
respondent without giving notice about such
she found out that the account has become
intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are
delinquent. She paid the three months due
likewise liable for damages by disconnecting
and wrote a letter through her counsel to the
the water supply without prior notice and for
COWD to explain why her water supply was
their subsequent neglect of reconnecting the
cut without notice.
water supply even when the respondent
already paid the delinquent account.
The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar
Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente
who requested the disconnection of the water
supply. A complaint for damages was filed
against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by
Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma.
Theresa on the ground that the defendants
committed abuse of their rights. The ruling
was upheld by the CA on appeal with
modification on the award of the amount for
damages.Hence this petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a
pregnant mother who wished to obtain an
abortion, sued on behalf of all woman
similarly situated in an effort to prevent the
enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing
all abortions except those performed to save
the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make
criminal all abortions except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother are an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to
procure or attempt an abortion except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe
sought a declaratory judgment that the
statutes were unconstitutional on their face
and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas
County District Attorney from enforcing the
statutes. Appellant alleged that she was
unmarried and pregnant, and that she was
unable to receive a legal abortion by a
licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford
to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a
legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly
situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her
right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly
invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the
concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and
sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights
or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of
the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally
enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.
At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement
of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable
offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was
ever a firmly established common law crime
even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the
historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the product
of a Victorian social concern to discourage
illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has
been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators. The second reason is that the
abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore
the States concern is to protect pregnant
women. However, modern medical
techniques have altered the situation, with
abortions being relatively safe particularly in
the first trimester. The third reason is the
States interest is in protecting the prenatal
life. However, this is somewhat negated by
the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be
prosecuted for the act of abortion.
right to privacy. However, it does allow for
regulation and proscription of abortion when
the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a
compelling state interest, such as the health
of the mother or the viable fetus. The court
declined to address the question of when life
begins.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of

the first trimester, the abortion decision must
be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant womans attending physician, and
may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate

end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related
to maternal health based upon the States
interest in promoting the health of the
mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the

State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the
preservation of the mothers life, based upon
the States interest in the potential of the
potential life of the unborn child.

Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an

abortion is not universally accepted, and the
right to privacy is thus not inherently
involved in this case.

Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion

statute that forbids all abortions except in the
case of a life saving procedure on behalf of
the mother is unconstitutional based upon the
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita
Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the
parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again
became pregnant. As she was then employed
in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved
to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita
incurred a third abortion of a two-month old
fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00.
Her husband did not know of, nor consented
to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private
respondent, sued petitioner for damages
based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering
Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the
suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
injuries it received, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take
place from one that lacked juridical
personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive
personality of a conceived child under Article
40 of the Civil Code because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive. In the
present case, the child was dead when
separated from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not
entitled to damages. However, such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased child.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality
so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones
who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This
personality is called presumptive personality.
It is, of course, essential that birth should
occur later, otherwise the fetus will be
considered as never having possessed legal
personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
11FEB
34 SCRA 132 | July 31, 1970 | J. J.B.L. Reyes
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her
parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought
an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
which dismissed her complaint for support
and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already
married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force and
intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied
by Icao and had to stop studying. She then
claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorneys fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to
dismiss in light of Quimiguings failure to
allege the fact that a child had been born in
her complaint. The lower court dismissed the
case and subsequently denied further
amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for
support and damages from defendant despite
failure to allege fact of birth in complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant
had right to support of the child she was
carrying and an independent cause of action
for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40)
recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to
support from its progenitors, even it is only
en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of the
same Code holds that, just as a conceived
child, it may receive donations through
persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article
29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for damage caused per Article
21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported
by Article 2219, which provides moral
damages for victims of seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and
remanded for proceedings conformable to
the decision; with costs against Icao.
De Jesus v Syquia 58 Phil 866

Facts:
This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus,
as mother of two infants, for the purpose of
recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia
damages arising from (1) breach of promise
to marry, (2) to compel the defendant to
recognize Ismael as his natural child and pay
maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at
the barbershop where she works as a cashier.
Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a
constant visitor at her home, and wrote a
letter to the priest saying that if the child was
a boy, it will be christened in his name. On
his trip to China and Japan, he was writing
letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in
good condition so that junior will be
strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her
and the child to live in a house where they
lived together for 1 year as a family, with
expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She
became pregnant again, but soon Syquia left
her to marry another woman.
Issue:
WON (1) there would be damages for the
breach to marry. (2) WON Syquia is
compelled to recognize Ismael loanco as his
natural child
Held:

The SC upheld the decision of the trail court

in refusing to give damages to Antonia for
breach of promise to marry. The action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing
in civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise.

As for the recognition of the child, the

acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by
the production of more than 1 document of
indubitable authenticity.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante himself.
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948 It has been the constant doctrine that the
estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, directly becomes
FACTS: vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service The reason for this legal fiction, that the
Commission issued a certificate of public estate of the deceased person is considered a
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the "person", as deemed to include artificial or
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice
said intestate estate through its Special or or prejudice resulting from the impossibility
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to such legal obligations of the decedent as
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily survived after his death unless the fiction is
productive capacity of two and one-half (2- indulged.
1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from the said plant in The estate of Fragrante should be considered
the Municipalities of San Juan, an artificial or juridical person for the
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that purposes of the settlement and distribution of
Fragantes intestate estate is financially his estate which, include the exercise during
capable of maintaining the proposed service. the judicial administration of those rights and
the fulfillment of those obligations of his
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution estate which survived after his death.
of the legal representative of the estate of
Fragante for the latter as party applicant and The decedent's rights which by their nature
afterwards granting the certificate applied for are not extinguished by death go to make up
is a contravention of the law. a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for
the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
ISSUE: legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent.
It includes those rights and fulfillment of
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended obligation of Fragante which survived after
an artificial judicial personality. his death like his pending application at the
commission.
HELD:

The estate of Fragrante must be extended an

artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had
lived, in view of the evidence of record,
would have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has not changed except for his
death, and the economic ability of his estate
to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent
Dumlao vs QPPI (Article 37 of the Civil
Code)
Dumlao vs Quality Plastic Products
Incorporated G.R. No. L-27956
Original
text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri197
6/apr1976/gr_27956_1976.html
juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, was lost through
death (Article 37 and 42, Civil Code).
Consequently, the execution sale of Oria's
land is also void.

Case Digest
Facts:

Herein petitioner Dionisio Dumlao, acting as

the administrator of the testate of Pedro Oria
along with other heirs of Oria's estate, sued
Quality Plastic Products Inc. for auctioning
the nine and six-tenths hectares land of Oria
which was used as security. In a previous
case, dated February 28, 1962, the CFI of
Pangasinan rendered judgement ordering
Oria along with other sureties to pay
solidarity to Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
failure of which will result to the foreclosure
of the surety bond. The sale commenced on
November 20, 1962.
The petitioners contend that QPPI does not
have jurisdiction over the estate of Oria
because Oria died on April 23, 1959, long
before June 13, 1960 when the case against
them was filed, therefore Oria did not have
juridical capacity on the day the summons
was served.

Issue: Whether or not QPPI lacked

jurisdiction on the contention that Oria lost
his juridical capacity upon death.

Ruling:

The CFI of Pangasinan's judgement against

Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have
been, validly served with summons. His
Eugenio v. Velez
Facts: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters
unaware of the formers death on August 28,
1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that she was
forcible taken from her residence sometime
in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated 28
September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988)
to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a
corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner,
he had already obtained a burial permit.
Petitioner claims that as her common law
husband, he has legal custody of her body.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can
claim custody of the deceased.
Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters. Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial - if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or
a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common
law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush
aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce
a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists in
case law to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any
case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from
even legally marrying Vitaliana.(Eugenio vs
Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990).
CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V.
NAVARRO
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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V.
NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while
the battle for the liberation of Mla. was
raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN,
Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/
their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr.
(JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought refuge in
the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club. During their stay, the bldg.
was packed w/ refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on
fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started
shooting at the people inside the bldg,
especially those who were trying to escape.
the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the
ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his
son decided to abandon the premises to seek
a safer haven. They could not convince AJ,
who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and
his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife dashed out
of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN,
Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier
and immediately dropped. The others lay flat
on the ground in front of the Club premises to
avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many
people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr.,
Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid
shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3
days, until they were forced to leave bec. the
shelling tore it open. They fled but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired
at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have
occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls;
2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA
found that the deaths occurred in the
following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd.
AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.
HELD: Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can
be made, the presumption (in the Rules of
Court) does not step in, and the rules of
preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record
from w/c reasonable inference of
survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be
drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness)
testimony competent and sufficient for the
purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains
facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the
statutory presumption out of the case. It is
believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable
inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN,
Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died
before the son can not be ruled out, it must be
noted that this possibility is entirely
speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it
was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed,
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from
the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must
have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or
less, and so died w/in that interval from the
time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have
perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but
the probabilities that she did seem very
remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse
of the club occurred about 40 minutes after
JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed
AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s
death and the breaking down of the edifice
was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer
than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the
inference that AJ was still alive when her son
expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides
the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have
been killed. All these causes are speculative.
xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by
falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of
concrete and its collapse, more likely than
not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not
cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in
the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's
departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in
inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii)
of R 123 does not require that the inference
necessary to exclude the presumption therein
provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can
be inferred" that are required to be certain as
tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of
inference the rule can not mean beyond
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it
may be plain enough to justify a finding of
fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died
before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure
foundation in evidence. The opposite theory
is deduced from established facts w/c,
weighed by common experience, engender
the inference as a very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.
Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet
vs.
Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs
of the port of Cebu, resp.
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed
by the petitioner to compel Natividad to issue
a certificate of Philippine registry in favor of
the former for its motor vessel Bato.
Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its
stockholders are British subjects. It is the
owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato
built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916,
of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was
brought to Cebu in the present year for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands.
Application was made at Cebu, the home port
of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for
a certificate of Philippine registry. The
Collector refused to issue the certificate,
giving as his reason that all the stockholders
of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands. The instant action is the result.
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to
Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection
of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the
corporation from owning vessels, and
because classification of corporations based
on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No.
2761 deprives the corporation of its property
without due process of law because by the
passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Bato and left
with the naked title to a boat it could not use
. Hon. Jose Diokno as Sec of Justice,
Issue:
Whether the Government of the Philippine
Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to
corporations having alien stockholders
Ruling:
Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. No
application for a certificate of Philippine
register shall be approved until the collector
of customs is satisfied from an inspection of
the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be
engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of
domestic ownership as such ownership is
defined in section eleven hundred and
seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. Upon
registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons
gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall
be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less,
the taking of the certificate of Philippine
register shall be optional with the owner.
While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation
having alien stockholders, is entitled to the
protection afforded by the due-process of law
and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell
&. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the
Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong
to that vicious species of class legislation
which must always be condemned, but does
fall within authorized exceptions, notably,
within the purview of the police power, and
so does not offend against the constitutional
provision.
Harry Stonehill,Robert Brooks, John
Brooks and Karl Beck, petitioner
vs.
Prosecutors and Judges, respondents
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction to restrain the
respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and/or
representatives from using the effects seized
by the police officers from the petitioners
offices and residences by virtue of search
warrants.
Facts:
Upon application of the Respondent-
Prosecutors and Respondent-Judges, a total
of 42 search warrants were issued on
different dates against petitioners and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,
directing any peace officer to search the
petitioners and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences and to
seize and take possession of records to all
business transactions.
Petitioners questioned the validity of the
search warrants and alleged that they are null
and void, mainly, because they do not
describe with particularity the books and
things to be seized.
Respondents alleged that the said search
warrants are valid and issued in accordance
with law, that the defects, if any, were cured
by petitioners consent
Issue:
Whether the petitioners can assail the legality
of the search warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof
Ruling:
No. The petitioners herein and the
corporations of which they are officers have
personalities separate and distinct from each
other.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.
Moreover, the Government's action in
gaining possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the
corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants.
Mambulao Lumber Company, plaintiff-
appellant
vs.
Philippine Natl. Bank and Anacleto
Heraldo, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Cam-Norte, def-appellees
This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI
of Manila dismissing the complaint against
both defendants and sentencing the plaintiff
to pay the defendant the sum of P3,582.52
with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per
annum from Dec. 22,1961 until fully paid and
the costs of the suit.
Facts:
In seeking the reversal of the decision, the
plaintiff contended that its total indebtedness
to the PNB has been paid by the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale of its real property and
the additional amount remitted by it to the
Bank.
On the belief that the proceeds of the above-
stated sale is insufficient to cover the
Plaintiffs debt, PNB sent a letter to the
Provincial Sheriff of Cam-Norte requesting
him to take possession of the chattels
mortgaged to it by the plaintiff and sell them
at public auction.
Plaintiff alleged that the auction sale of the
chattels mortgaged is void for being violative
of the agreement provided in the mortgage
contract:
in cases of both judicial and extra-
judicial foreclosure under Act 1508, as
amended, the corresponding complaint for
foreclosure or the petition for sale should be
filed with the courts or the Sheriff of Manila,
as the case may be
Herein appellant claims moral damages on
account of the said violation.
Issue:
Whether Mambulao can validly claim for
moral damages
Ruling:
No. An artificial person like herein appellant
corporation cannot experience physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or
social humiliation which are basis of moral
damages
A corporation may have a good reputation
which, if besmirched, may also be a ground
for the award of moral damages. The same
cannot be considered under the facts of this
case, however, not only because it is admitted
that herein appellant had already ceased in its
business operation at the time of the
foreclosure sale of the chattels, but also for
the reason that whatever adverse effects of
the foreclosure sale of the chattels could have
upon its reputation or business standing
would undoubtedly be the same whether the
sale was conducted at Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, or in Manila which is the
place agreed upon by the parties in the
mortgage contract.
Jose Maglutac, pet. vs. NLRC
These petitions for Certiorari seek to review
the Decision of respondent NLRC, affirming
the finding of the Labor Arbiter that
complainant was illegally dismissed by
Commart but deleting the award for moral
and exemplary damages in favor of the
complainant and absolving Jesus Maglutac
from any personal liability.
Facts:
Jose Maglutac was employed by Commart
(Phils.) Inc. in 1980 as Manager of Energy
Equipment Sales. In 1984, he received a
notice of termination signed by the VP-Gen
Mgr, and Corporate Sec of CMS Intl., a Corp
controlled by Commart.
Jose Maglutac filed a case for illegal
dismissal against Commart and Jesus
Maglutac, pres and Chairman of the BD of
Commart. Jose alleged that his dismissal was
part of a vendetta drive against his parents
who dared to expose the massive and
fraudulent diversion of company funds to the
company presidents private accounts.
In this petition, Jose Maglutac raised the
issue that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion and contravened existing laws
and jurisprudence in holding that resp. Jesus
should not have been held liable in solidum
with the resp. Corp
Issue:
Whether Jesus Maglutac should be held
jointly and severally liable with Commart
Ruling:
Yes. The president or presidents of the
corporation may be held liable for the
corporations obligations to its workers.
Since a Corp is an artificial being, it must
have an officer who can be presumed to be
the employer being the person acting in the
interest of the employer, otherwise, any
decision that may be rendered against the
latter would be useless and ineffective for
there would be no one against whom it can be
enforced.
The same circumstance is obtaining in the
instant case in the light of the manifestation
of Commar that it had become insolvent and
that It had suspended operations.
The Labor Arbiter therefore correctly ruled
that Jesus T. Maglutac was jointly and
severally liable with Commart not only
because he was the most ranking officer of
Commart at the time of the termination of the
complainant, it was likewise found that he
had a direct hand in the latters dismissal..
Northwest Airlines- petitioner
v.
CA and C.F. Sharp & Company-
respondents
This is a petition for review on certiorari
which seeks to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of
the petitioner's complaint to enforce the
judgment of a Japanese court.
Facts:
Northwest Air and Sharp through its Japan
branch, entered into an International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the former authorized the latter to
sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to
remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by
defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the
said agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in
Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with
claim for damages.
A writ of summons was issued by the District
Court of Japan. After the two attempts of
service were unsuccessful, the judge of the
Tokyo District Court decided to have the
complaint and the writs of summons served
at the head office of the defendant in Manila
through diplomatic channels.
Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff
Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not
having appealed the judgment, the same
became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision
in Japan, hence, a suit for enforcement of the
judgment was filed by plaintiff before the
RTC of Manila.
Issue:
Whether a Japanese court can acquire
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation
doing business in Japan by serving summons
through diplomatic channels on the
Philippine corporation at its principal office
in Manila after prior attempts to serve
summons in Japan had failed.
Ruling:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice
therein.

It is settled that matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service
of process upon a defendant are governed by
the lex fori or the internal law of the forum.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan
where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial
service of process on SHARP. As to what this
law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may
not be taken judicial notice of and must be
pleaded and proved like any other fact. It was
then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural
law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Andaya v. Abadia et al
This is an appeal praying for the reversal of
the orders of the RTC Q.C. Maintaining that
the RTC and not the SEChas jurisdiction over
his complaint, petitioner argues that the court
a quo should not have dismissed Civil Case
filed by him against the respondents.. He
asserts that the complaint is based not so
much on plaintiff's attempted removal but
rather on the manner of his removal and the
consequent effects thereof.
Facts:
Before the RTC of Q.C., Andaya filed an
action for Injunction and Damages with
Restraining Orders and/or Preliminary
Injunction against Abadia et al, alleging that
the latter acting in concerts and pursuant to
an illegal and nefarious scheme to oust
petitioner from his then positions as President
and General Manager of the AFPSLAI, with
grave abuse of authority and in gross and
deliberate violation of the norms of human
relations and of petitioner's right to due
process, illegally, maliciously and with
evident bad faith, convened a meeting of the
AFPSLAI Board of Directors and illegally
reorganized the management of AFPSLAI by
ousting and removing, without just and
lawful cause, petitioner from his positions
therein, causing petitioner moral and
exemplary damages.
The Court ruled that it has no jurisdiction on
corporate matters. Hence this appeal
Issue:
Whether the RTC and not the SEC has
jurisdiction over the petitioners complaint
Ruling:
The allegations against herein respondents in
the amended complaint unquestionably
reveal intra-corporate controversies cleverly
concealed, although unsuccessfully, by use of
civil law terms and phrases. The amended
complaint impleads herein respondents who,
in their capacity as directors of AFPSLAI,
allegedly convened an illegal meeting and
voted for the reorganization of management
resulting in petitioner's ouster as corporate
officer. While it may be said that the same
corporate acts also give rise to civil liability
for damages, it does not follow that the case
is necessarily taken out of the jurisdiction of
the SEC as it may award damages which can
be considered consequential in the exercise
of its adjudicative powers. Besides,
incidental issues that properly fall within the
authority of a tribunal may also be considered
by it to avoid multiplicity of actions.
Consequently, in intra-corporate matters such
as those affecting the corporation, its
directors, trustees, officers, shareholders, the
issue of consequential damages may just as
well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC.
Moreover, mere allegations of violation of
the provisions of the Civil Code on human
relations do not necessarily call for the
application of the provisions of the Civil
Code in place of AFPSLAI By-Laws.
Good Earth Emporium Inc and Lim Ka
Ping, petitioners
v.
CA and Roces-Reyes Realty Inc.,
respondents
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision CA reversing the decision of
respondent Judge RTC of Manila, which
reversed the resolution of the Metropolitan
Trial Court Of Manila denying herein GEEs
motion to quash the alias writ of execution
issued against them.
Facts:
A lease contract was entered into between
ROCES and GEE. A five-storey building was
the subject of which, upon failure of the latter
to pay its rentals, ROCES filed an ejectment
case against the petitioner. The MTC of Mla
rendered a decision ordering GEE and all
persons under him to vacate the premises and
surrender the same to ROCES and pay the
plaintiffs the rental.
GEE filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution but the same was denied by the
MTC for lack of merit. In 1987 the RTC of
Manila reversed the decision of the MTC
finding that the amount of P1 million
evidenced by Exhibit "I" and another P1
million evidenced by the pacto de retro sale
instrument were in full satisfaction of the
judgment obligation.
On further appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and reinstated the
Resolution of the MTC of Manila. GEEs
m/r was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was full satisfaction of
the judgment debt in favor of respondent
corporation which would justify the quashing
of the Writ of Execution
Ruling:
The fact that at the time payment was made
to the two Roces brothers, GEE was also
indebted to respondent corporation for a
larger amount, is not supportive of the
Regional Trial Court's conclusions that the
payment was in favor of the latter, especially
where the amount was not receipted for by
respondent corporation and there is
absolutely no indication in the receipt from
which it can be reasonably inferred, that said
payment was in satisfaction of the judgment
debt. Likewise, no such inference can be
made from the execution of the pacto de retro
sale which was not made in favor of
respondent corporation but in favor of the
two Roces brothers in their individual
capacities without any reference to the
judgment obligation in favor of respondent
corporation.
Respondent court was correct in stating that
it "cannot go beyond what appears in the
documents submitted by petitioners
themselves in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence" that would support its
claim that the judgment obligation has indeed
been fully satisfied which would warrant the
quashal of the Alias Writ of Execution.
It has been an established rule that when the
existence of a debt is fully established by the
evidence (which has been done in this case),
the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the
debtor who offers such a defense to the claim
of the plaintiff creditor.
Pabalan and Lagdameo, petitioners
vs.
NLRC, LA and the Sheriff of the NLRC,
respondents
This is a petition for certiorari on the decision
of the NLRC affirming the ruling of the LA
which ordered the petitioners to pay jointly
and severally with the Philippine Inter-
Fashion Inc.
Facts:
Eighty-four (84) workers of the PIF filed a
complaint against the latter for illegal transfer
simultaneous with illegal dismissal without
justifiable cause and in violation of the
provision of the Labor Code on security of
tenure as well as the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130. Complainants demanded
reinstatement with full backwages, living
allowance, 13th month pay and other benefits
under existing laws and/or separation pay.
The LA ruled in its favor.
In a M/R, the NLRC affirmed the appealed
decision. Hence, this petition alleging lack of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of jurisdiction in
adjudging herein petitioners as jointly and
severally liable with the PIF
Issue:
(1) Whether the respondents acquired
jurisdiction over the peitioners
(2) Whether the officers of the PIF could be
held jointly and severally liable with the
corporation for its liablility
Ruling:
1. Yes. Record shows that while originally
it was PIF which was impleaded as
respondent before the LA, petitioners also
appeared in their behalf through counsel.
Thereafter when the supplemental position
paper was filed by complainants, petitioners
were impleaded as respondents to which they
filed an opposition inasmuch as they filed
their own supplemental position papers. They
were therefore properly served with
summons and they were not deprived of due
process.
2. No. The settled rule is that the corporation
is vested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from the persons composing it,
including its officers as well as from that of
any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Thus, a company manager acting in
good faith within the scope of his authority in
terminating the services of certain employees
cannot be held personally liable for damages.
Here, complainants did not allege or show
that petitioners, as officers of the corporation
deliberately and maliciously designed to
evade the financial obligation of the
corporation to its employees, or used the
transfer of the employees as a means to
perpetrate an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of existing obligations, the
circumvention of statutes, or to confuse the
legitimate issues. Hence petitioners can not
be held jointly and severally liable with the
PIF corporation
Remo Jr., petitioner
vs
IAC and E.B> Marcha Transport
Company Inc., respondents
This is a petition for review of a resolution of
the IAC seeking the reversal and the
reinstatement of its earlier decision which set
aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal
ordering the defendants (B/D of Akron) to
pay jointly and severally with Akron Coprada
(later changed to Akron Transport Intl. Inc.)
Facts:
Feliciano Coprada, as President and
Chairman of Akron, purchased thirteen
trucks from private respondent on January
25, 1978 for and in consideration of
P525,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. After the lapse of 90 days,
private respondent tried to collect from
Coprada but the latter promised to pay only
upon the release of the DBP loan. Private
respondent sent Coprada a letter of demand.
In his reply to the said letter, Coprada
reiterated that he was applying for a loan
from the DBP from the proceeds of which
payment of the obligation shall be made.
Upon inquiry, private respondent found that
no loan application was ever filed by Akron
with DBP.
After an ex parte reception of the evidence, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants ordering them to
pay jointly and severally.
Issue:
Whether the IAC erred in disregarding the
corporate fiction and in holding the petitioner
personally liable for the obligation of the
Corporation
Ruling:
Yes. The environmental facts of this case
show that there is no cogent basis to pierce
the corporate veil of Akron and hold
petitioner personally liable for its obligation
to private respondent. While it is true that
petitioner was still a member of the board of
directors of Akron and that he participated in
the adoption of a resolution authorizing the
purchase of 13 trucks for the use in the
brokerage business of Akron to be paid out of
a loan to be secured from a lending
institution, it does not appear that said
resolution was intended to defraud anyone
and more particularly private respondent. It
was Coprada, President and Chairman of
Akron, who negotiated with said respondent
for the purchase of 13 cargo trucks. It was
Coprada who signed a promissory note to
guarantee the payment of the unpaid balance
of the purchase price out of the proceeds of a
loan he supposedly sought from the DBP.
The word "WE' in the said promissory note
must refer to the corporation which Coprada
represented in the execution of the note and
not its stockholders or directors. Petitioner
did not sign the said promissory note so he
cannot be personally bound thereby.

It has not been clearly shown that petitioner

had any part or participation in the
perpetration of the same. Fraud must be
established by clear and convincing
evidence.

Universal Rubber Products, petitioner

vs.
CA, Converse Rubber Corp, Edwardson
Manufacturing Corp Inc. and Navarro,
respondents
CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. institution w/c antedates by almost a
RAMIREZ thousand years any other personality in
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case digests

CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ

[7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been
appointed by the pltff parish priest, took
possession of the church on 7/5/01. He
administered if as such under the orders of his
superiors until 11/14/02. His successor
having been then appointed, the latter made a
demand on this def. for the delivery to him of
the church, convent, and cemetery, and the
sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and
other prop. of the church. The def., by a
written document of that date, refused to
make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest
of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/
the Pope at Rome and his representatives in
these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church,
the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against
def., alleging in his amended complaint that
the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of
the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the
books, money, and other prop. belonging
thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the def. render an
account of the prop. w/c he had received and
w/c was retained by him, and for other relief.
The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of
the pltff.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that

the Roman Catholic Church has no legal
personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an
Case Digest on Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas
(Capacity to Act)
Facts:
The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for
payment, including the appellant Vicente
Villanueva who acted as surety to the
loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was
in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva,
wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her
husband was declared insane on July 24,
1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized
by the court as guardian to institute the proper
legal proceedings for the annulment of
several bonds given by her husband while in
a state of insanity.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not suffering from monomania
of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion
that the person does not have capacity to act.
(2) Whether or not the appellant, was
incapable of entering into contract at the time
the bond was executed on December 15,
1908.
Held:
The court affirmed the trial court
decision that Villanueva possessed the
capacity to act. The SC held that there is no
evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a
judicial decision, that a person suffering from
monomania of wealth is really insane and
therefore is deranged and incapable of
binding himself in a contract. From the
testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente
has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that
he had property of his own and was not
deprived of its management, as well as the
fact that he had never squandered any large
sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no
direct proof that showed that at the date of the
giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of
insanity. The witnesses who as physicians,
testified that they observed insane periods in
Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,
but none at the time of the execution of the
said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also
shown that the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management
over his estate knowing full well that he was
insane.
http://pinaylawyer.com/2010/11/11/case-
digest-on-standard-oil-co-v-arenas-capacity-
to-act/
Case Digest on Mercado v. Espiritu (Legal
Age)
Facts:
The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole
heirs, along with their two sisters, to a 48
hectare tract of land which belonged to their
mother the sister of the defendant. The
defendant cajoled, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their
land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its
original value. The plaintiffs demand the
annulment of the sale, the return of the land,
and the remuneration of the thing benefited
by the defendant.
According to the Defendant, the
plaintiffs mother had sold a portion of the
original land to the defendant for a sum.
(instrument exhibit 1)The plaintiffs father
subsequently, mortgaged the remaining
parcel to the defendant for a sum to cover his
childrens welfare after his wifes death.
(Pacto de retro; instrument exhibit 2) The
plaintiffs had alleged themselves of legal age
and ratified the absolute and perpetual sale of
the land in consideration of the P400
(instrument exhibit 3). Cross-complaint filed
for damages due to the malicious and
unfounded complaint by the plaintiffs.
http://pinaylawyer.com/2010/11/11/case-
digest-on-mercado-v-espiritu-legal-age/
Case Digest on Braganza v. Villa Abrille
(Minor Signing Contract)
Facts:
Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned
from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese
war notes and in consideration thereof,
promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2%
per annum in legal currency of the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the
war. Because they have no paid, Abrille is
sued them in March 1949. The Manila court
of first instance and CA held the family
solidarily liable to pay according to the
contract they signed.The family petitioned to
review the decision of the CA whereby they
were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa
Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for
consideration of the minority of the Braganza
sons when they signed the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18
respectively, are to be bound by the contract
of loan they have signed.
Held:
The SC found that Rosario will still
be liable to pay her share in the contract
because they minority of her sons does not
release her from liability. She is ordered to
pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC
reversed the decision of the CA which found
them similarly liable due to their failure to
disclose their minority. The SC sustained
previous sources in Jurisprudence in order
to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be
actual and not constructive. It has been held
that his mere silence when making a contract
as to his age does not constitute a fraud which
can be made the basis of an action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the
provisions of the contract, are still liable to
pay the actual amount they have profited
from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if
the written contract is unenforceable because
of their non-age, they shall make restitution
to the extent that they may have profited by
the money received. In this case, 2/3 of
P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when
converted to Philippine money is equivalent
to P1,166.67.
http://pinaylawyer.com/2010/11/11/case-
digest-on-braganza-v-villa-abrille-minor-
signing-contract/
Case Digest on Bambalan vs. Maramba
and Muerong
Case:
APPELANT: Isidro Bambalan Y Prado
APPELEE: German Maramba and Genoveva
Muerong
DECIDED: January 30, 1928 DECISION:
Dispositive part of judgment affirmed
OPINON: J. Street
Facts:
Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first
husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and
German Maramba in 1915.
Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the sole
heir of his estate.
In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced
Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to
sell their land as payment for the loan.
Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced
because they were threatening his mother
with imprisonment.
Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalans
first cedula to acknowledge the document.
Important Statutes:
Civil code, Art. 1327. The following cannot
give consent to a contract: (1)
Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or
demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do
not know how to write. (1263a) Civil code,
Art. 1390. The following contracts are
voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting
parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a contract; (2)
Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.

Issues:
Whether or not Bambalan sold the land to
Maramaba and Muerong Court

Analysis:
Whether or not Bambalan sold the land to
Maramaba and Muerong

Contract has been vitiated to the extent of

being void because:
1.The vendor was a minor.
2.His age was well known to the purchaser.
(Maramba bought plaintiffs ceedula)
3.Mercado vs Espiritu CANNOT be applied:
Plaintiff did not pretend to be of age.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/4664576/Bamba
lan-v-Maramba-and-Muerong
Domingo Mercado et al vs Jose Espiritu
December 16, 2013
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ADVERTISEMENTS
37 Phil 215 Civil Law Obligations and
Contracts Parties to a Contract Liability
of a Minor
Margarita Espiritu was the owner of a 48
hectare land. In 1897, she died and the land
was left to her husband (Wenceslao
Mercado) and her children, Domingo
Mercado, Josefa Mercado and 3 other
siblings.
Apparently however, during the lifetime of
Margarita in 1894, she executed a deed of
sale transferring about 71% of her land
(covering 15 cavanes of seeds) to her brother
Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu) for
P2,000.00. After her death, Wenceslao had a
hard time making ends meet for his family
and so he took out a loan from Luis in the
amount of P375.00. The loan was secured by
the remainder of the lot. Later, that loan was
increased to P600.00.
In May 1910, Luis entered into a notarized
agreement with Domingo and Josefa
whereby the two, while purporting to be of
legal age, acknowledged the sale and the loan
previously entered into by their parents with
Luis. In the same agreement, the siblings
agreed that for and in consideration of the
amount of P400.00, they are transferring the
remainder 29% (covering 6 cavanes of seeds)
to Luis.
But later, the siblings contested the said
agreement. Luis later died and he was
substituted by Jose. It is the contention of
Domingo et al that the agreement is void
because they were only minors, 19 and 18
years of age respectively, when the contract
was entered into in May 1910 (21 being the
age of minority at that time).
ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement
between Luis and Domingo et al in May 1910
is valid despite the minority of the latter
party.
HELD: Yes. In the first place, their minority
of Domingo and Josefa was not proven with
certainty because of the loss of official
records (got burned down). However, even
assuming that they were indeed minors, they
are bound by their declaration in the
notarized document where they presented
themselves to be of legal age. Domingo
claimed he was 23 years old in the said
document. The Supreme Court declared: the
sale of real estate, made by minors who
pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to have them annulled in pursuance
of the provisions of Law.
Further, there was no showing that the said
notarized document was attended by any
violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit.
"xxx Misrepresentation made by a party as to
his age does not estop him from denying that
he was of age or from asserting that he was
under age, at the time he entered into the
contract, for the breach of w/c an action is
brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the
liab. resulting from misrepresentation has its
juridical source in the capacity of the person
making the misrepresentation to bind
himself. If the person making the
misrepresentation cannot bind himself by
contract, he cannot also be bound by any
misrepresentation he may have made in
connection therewith. A person entering into
a contract must see to it that the other party
has sufficient capacity to bind himself."
(Young vs. Tecson, 39 OG 953.)
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA
FACTS:
Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first
husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura
received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and
German Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died
leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his
estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba
forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a
minor, to sell their land as payment for the
loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was
forced because they were threatening his
mother with imprisonment. Muerong and
Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to
acknowledge the document.
ISSUE:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and
Muerong is valid.
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-
mutes who do not know how to write.
(1263a)
Civil code, Art. 1390.
The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been
no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
Posted by Jay Gerochi at 5:06 AM

RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he
was a minor at the time of execution. The
Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs.
Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because
the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and
the defendant knew him as a minor.

Important Statutes:

Civil Code, Article 38.

Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of

being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
interdiction are mere restrictions on the
capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as
easements.

Civil code, Art. 1327.

The following cannot give consent to a

contract:
 Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Ramon
Alcantara, March 4, 1950

Facts:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of
sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and
his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon
Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels
of land to petitioner Sia Suan
On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao
(husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from
Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon
Alcantara, informing him that Ramon
Alcantara was a minor and accordingly
disavowing the contract.
After Gaw Chiao responded to
the letter, Ramon Alcantara went to the office
of Gaw Chiaos counsel ratifying the sale.
Ramon Alcantara received from
Gaw Chiao the sum of P500 as payment for
the sold parcels of land.
On August 8, 1940, an action
was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna for the
annulment of the deed of sale on the ground
of his minority at the time of sale.
Action was denied and S i a S u an , Gaw
Chiao, Ramons father and
brother, Nicolas and Antonio Azores were
absolved
Ramon brought the case to CA;
CFI decision reversed.
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao filed a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Ramon Alcantaras
execution of the deed of sale is valid despite
being a minor at the time of its execution.

Held:
Ramon Alcantara in his minority may not be
allowed to execute the deed of sale but his act
of ratification, the contract was given a
binding effect.
BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00,
which is P46,666.66, which when converted
FACTS: to Philippine money is equivalent to
Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from P1,166.67.
De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war
notes and in consideration thereof, promised
in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum
in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years
after the cessation of the war. Because they
have no paid, Abrille sued them in March
1949. The Manila court of first instance and
CA held the family solidarily liable to pay
according to the contract they signed. The
family petitioned to review the decision of
the CA whereby they were ordered to
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2%
interest, praying for consideration of the
minority of the Braganza sons when they
signed the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18
respectively, are to be bound by the contract
of loan they have signed.
RATIO:
The SC found that Rosario will still be liable
to pay her share in the contract because the
minority of her sons does not release her from
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000
+ 2% interest.
However with her sons, the SC reversed the
decision of the CA which found them
similarly liable due to their failure to disclose
their minority. The SC sustained previous
sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and
not constructive. It has been held that his
mere silence when making a contract as to his
age does not constitute a fraud which can be
made the basis of an action of deceit.
The boys, though not bound by the provisions
of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual
amount they have profited from the
loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written
contract is unenforceable because of their
non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they may have profited by the