Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
Defendants.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
MOTION......................................................................................................................................... 1
MEMORANDUM .......................................................................................................................... 1
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc.,
944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) ...........................................................................................11, 14
Dept of Parks and Recreation for the State of California v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc.,
448 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................9
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Statutes
15 U.S.C. 1125(1)(a).....................................................................................................................9
Other Authorities
LR 7-1(a)(1)(A) ...............................................................................................................................1
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Case 3:17-cv-01297-YY Document 8 Filed 08/23/17 Page 8 of 28
Pursuant to LR 7-1(a)(1)(A), undersigned counsel for plaintiff Heart, LLC certifies that
plaintiffs counsel conferred in good faith with counsel for defendants Heart Pizza, LLC and Micah
Camden in an effort to resolve the dispute by telephone conference. The parties were unable to
reach an agreement.
MOTION
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), Heart, LLC (Heart) respectfully moves this Court for
a preliminary injunction against Heart Pizza, LLC (Heart Pizza) and Micah Camden
(Camden). As detailed in the supporting memorandum that follows, Heart Pizza and Camden
have willfully and intentionally used Hearts trademark as the name of their competing business.
Heart is entitled to a preliminary injunction because Heart has established, for the reasons
set forth in the supporting memorandum below that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits of its
trademark claims; (2) it is suffering irreparable harm to its goodwill and reputation and will
continue to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief; (3) the balance of hardships tips
sharply in Hearts favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction protects consumers from confusion
Heart, therefore, respectfully moves the Court to issue an order preliminarily restraining
Heart Pizza and Camden from using the HEART trademark or any mark, logo or designation that
This Motion is supported by the following memorandum, as well as the concurrently filed
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a clear case of knowing and intentional trademark infringement. Heart has operated
two cafs and a coffee roasting business in Portland for over seven years under the trademark
HEART. In late February 2017, defendant Camden, a long-time customer of Heart, opened up his
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own restaurant under the name Heart Pizza a mere block and a half (.1 mile) away from one of
Hearts cafs. Camden owns and operates that business as defendant Heart Pizza. Since the
opening of that initial restaurant, Heart Pizza has quickly planted two more restaurants in the
Portland area purportedly with plans to open many more in the near future. That defendants knew
they were acting unlawfully and with the intent to usurp Hearts goodwill as evidenced by the fact
that Camden falsely represented to third parties that he had permission from Heart to use the same
Heart has received numerous inquiries indicating that a significant number of its customers
are confused and associate defendants restaurant with Heart. Thus, because of this evidence of
actual confusion, Heart will be able to establish a likelihood of confusionthe touchstone test
for trademark infringement. Further, every relevant factor supports a finding that defendants have
created a likelihood of confusion among an appreciable number of Hearts customers and potential
customers. The continued erosion of Hearts goodwill will irreparably harm Heart and thus
The origins of Heart date to 2008, when Wille Yli-Luoma (Yli-Luoma) started roasting
coffee beans in his own home. On October 20, 2009, Yli-Luoma opened up doors to his business
under the HEART mark. (Declaration of Wille Yli-Luoma (W. Yli-Luoma Decl.), filed
concurrently herewith 2.) Since that time, Heart has expanded to 45 employees and has operated
two cafs in Portland in addition to its business of sourcing, roasting, and selling coffee as well as
a retail business selling its own coffee products, coffee brewing equipment, a variety of dishware,
shirts, hats, bags and gift items all under the trademark HEART. (Id. at 2.) After its first caf
located at Northeast 22nd Avenue and East Burnside in Portland, Heart opened its second shop in
2013 on Southwest 12th Avenue and Alder. Heart is scheduled to open a third caf in Southeast
Portland by the end of this summer. (Id. at 4.) Hearts cafs serve not only its own specialty
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coffee drinks, but also a variety of food items, served all-day. With the Southeast Portland caf,
Heart will introduce significantly more food items to its menu, a change that it plans to incorporate
into its already existing cafs as well. (Id. at 5.) Plans are also underway to move the Southwest
12th Avenue location a block away to a much larger space to accommodate Hearts significant
customer growth. Heart plans this expansion for spring or summer 2018. (Id. at 6.) Given the
success and positive customer buzz, Heart has plans to further expand in the future, including
short-range plans to open in Seattle. Heart has already received offers to open cafs in Seattle as
In addition to its caf business, Heart continues to grow its roasting business. Heart has
become very well known within the coffee industry because of the consistency and quality of the
raw material (coffee beans) it buys. Heart competes with all roasters worldwide to purchase the
best possible green coffee. Only a select few roasters in North America have access to the same
Heart owns and has continuously used the HEART trademark since 2009. During its years
of use, Heart has expended considerable time, effort, and expense in the advertisement and
promotion of its products and services under the HEART trademark. (Id. at 9.) Heart has
successfully capitalized on social media platforms and word of mouth advertising to create
significant buzz related to its cafs and products. In January 2016, Heart was awarded a
Sprudgie award by the Sprudge Media Network (recognized as the largest coffee news coverage
in the industry), recognizing Heart as the best in coffee in the world. The award was based on
public voting by Sprudge readers. (Id. at 13; Ex. 4.) In 2013, Heart was named the fifth best
coffee roaster in the country by Thrillist.com, a significant, New York-based online media brand
covering the food, drink, travel, and entertainment industries. (Id. at 10; Ex. 1.) In July 2014,
BuzzFeed, a popular New York-based Internet media company, named Heart as the first of 25
Coffee Shops Around The World You Have to See Before You Die. (Id. at 12; Ex. 3.) In
January 2017, TransWorld SNOWboarding magazine also featured Heart as part of how Yli-
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Luoma switched careers, previously working as a professional snowboarder to one of the best
known coffee roasters in the world. (Id. at 14; Ex. 5.) Heart was also named a Good Food award
winner as one of the best coffee roasters nationally in 2013. (Id. at 11; Ex. 2.)
customer of Hearts caf located at Southwest 12th Avenue and Alder in downtown Portland. In
fact, Camden came into Heart almost daily from about January to March 2017. (Id. at 18.)
Camden is an owner and co-founder of Blue Star Donuts, located at SW 13th Avenue and
Washington, a block away from Hearts caf. (Id. at 16; Declaration of Parna A. Mehrbani
(Mehrbani Decl.) 2; Ex. 1.) Customers frequently visit both Blue Star Donuts and Heart,
frequently commenting to Hearts employees on the combination of Blue Stars donuts with
Hearts coffee. (W. Yli-Luoma Decl. 16, Ex. 6.) Blue Star Donuts even contacted Heart in 2015,
requesting that Heart create a unique coffee blend for Blue Star. Heart declined this collaboration.
(Id. at 17.)
In about late February, 2017, Camden opened another business only a block and a half
from Hearts Southwest 12th Avenue location, boldly naming it Heart Pizza. (Id. at 17.) Similar
to Hearts own caf, Heart Pizza is a small space with only a few tables with a focus on take-away
orders. Heart Pizzas logo used a black and white block-letter style font similar to the font used
by Heart:
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(Id. at 20; Mehrbani Decl. 3; Ex. 2.) Heart uses the above font in both white on black (as
(W. Yli-Luoma Decl. 3; see also e.g. Ex. 1 at p. 2, Ex. 3, Ex. 4, Ex. 5 at pp. 3 and 5, Ex. 6 at
That defendants willfully misappropriated Hearts goodwill is not only evidenced by the
fact that Camden was a frequent customer of Heart and the similarity of their logos, but also
because Camden falsely represented to third parties that he had permission from Heart to use the
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same name, knowing he had not received any such permission. Camden and/or Heart Pizza
retained an independent website developer to build defendants website. That developer was
familiar with Hearts business because he had previously assisted Yli-Luoma in developing
Hearts website. (Id. at 21.) When the developer learned that Camden intended to call his new
business Heart Pizza, the developer pointed out to Camden that there was already an existing,
nearby caf doing business under the name HEART. (Id. at 21.) In response, and as reflected
in text messages, Camden informed the developer that Yli-Luoma and Heart had granted Heart
Pizza permission to use the HEART mark. That statement was and is false. The developer
presented this information to Yli-Luoma in April 2017. (Id. at 22-23; Ex. 7.) After Yli-Luoma
clarified that he had not given Camden permission to use his trademark, the developer confronted
Camdens and Heart Pizzas unauthorized use of the identical mark for identical restaurant
services marketed to the same clientele through the same channels in such propinquity to Hearts
own business has caused actual confusion causing consumers to mistakenly believe that Heart
This actual confusion exists and is ongoing. Heart has received numerous inquiries clearly
indicating that a significant number of its customers are confused and associate defendants
restaurant with Heart. Heart employees have regularly received inquiries from customers who
clearly were confused and thought that defendants business was affiliated with Heart. After it
became clear that this confusion was significant and frequently recurring, some of Hearts
employees began to log some of these occasions where customers were confused. (Id. at 25.)
For example, on April 15, 2017, a customer inquired are you any relation to the pizza place I
noticed right around the corner? On April 20, a customer asked do you guys have a pizza spot?
On May 1, a customer asked do you guys do pizza by the slice? On May 11, a customer asked
are you affiliated with the Heart Pizza people? Similarly, on May 21, a customer asked are you
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affiliated with Heart Pizza? (Id. at 26; Ex. 8.) On June 19, 2017, a representative of the sign
company with whom Heart works, asked if Heart was affiliated with the pizza business.
(Declaration of Rebekah Yli-Luoma (R. Yli-Luoma Decl.) 2.) On June 24, 2017, two people
asked Rebekah Yli-Luoma, another member of Heart, noting that they had seen a pizza box with
the HEART mark on it, whether Heart was affiliated with defendants business. Also, defendants
customers have carried pizza boxes with defendants logo on it into other businesses. When asked
where they bought it, those customers said they got it at Heart. These customers had assumed
Customers looking for Heart in a simple Google search are also likely to be confused. As
depicted below, when a search is done on Google asking for Heart near me while in downtown
Portland, both Heart and defendants businesses appear. (Mehrbani Decl. 4; Ex. 3.)
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opened up two other restaurants under the same name. (Id. at 7; Ex. 6.) Media references
indicate that defendants intend significant future growth. (Id. at 5-6; Exs. 4 and 5.) Such growth
is consistent with Camdens past restaurant businesses he has established, including Little Big
Burger, which grew exponentially only to be sold to a national chain. (Id. at 8; Ex. 7.)
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm if preliminary relief
is not granted; (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) that a preliminary injunction
is in the public interest. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d
1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)).
defendants. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, [t]wo particularly probative factors [in the
infringement analysis] are the similarity of the marks and the proximity of the goods. Stone
Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 862 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2017). In this case, the
defendants infringing use is substantively identical to Hearts own mark, the services are the same,
and the use is only a block and a half away from Hearts downtown caf. Further, both the evidence
of actual confusion as well as defendants intent to deceive customers makes defendants liability
clear. See Id. at 1137 (evidence of actual confusion is particularly potent and choosing a
deceive.). Moreover, Heart will be irreparably harmed if defendants are not enjoined, as the
significant and consistent confusion of customers and the rapid expansion of defendants business
threatens to debilitate the reputation and goodwill Heart has developed in its own mark. Finally,
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this district has recognized that the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent trademark
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof in a manner that is likely to cause
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
trademark infringement claim, Heart need only prove that: (1) it has a protectable ownership
interest in the HEART mark; and (2) defendants use of Heart Pizza creates a likelihood of
consumer confusion. Dept of Parks and Recreation for the State of California v. Bazaar Del
1. Heart owns the protectable HEART mark. It is indisputable that Heart owns
valid rights in the HEART mark and that mark is protectable. Heart has used the HEART mark in
interstate commerce in the sales of coffee beans since 2010, wholesale and retail store services
since 2009, and coffee roasting and processing since 2010. Here in Oregon, Heart has used the
HEART mark on caf and restaurant services since at least as early as October 20, 2009. (W. Yli-
Luoma Decl. 2.) Heart owns an Oregon state trademark registration for the HEART mark, Reg.
No. 46513. (Complaint, ECF No. 1, Ex. 3.) Heart also owns two pending applications in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Serial Nos. 87/414,220 and 87/414,233. (Id. at Exs. 1-2.)
The Ninth Circuit has identified eight factors that may be considered in determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists: 1) strength of the mark; 2) proximity of the goods; 3) similarity
of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) marketing channels used; 6) type of goods and
1
The standards for establishing trademark infringement and unfair competition are virtually
identicalboth turn on the same likelihood of confusion analysis. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288, n.2 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7) defendants intent in selecting the
mark; and 8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). This list of factors (commonly referred to as the Sleekcraft factors)
is neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and it is not necessary to establish that all (or even a majority
of) the factors favor the plaintiff; all that need be shown is that, on the whole, the evidence favors
a finding that confusion is likely. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290-
Although it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that all (or even a majority of) the
factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion analysis support such a finding (see id. at 1290-91),
here every such factor does. Most tellingly, not only is there evidence of likelihood of confusion,
as explained below, this presents the rare case where much of the likelihood of confusion analysis
can be dispensed with because of the substantial evidence of actual confusion. Further,
defendants bad intent here is key. Defendants not only knew of Hearts trademark rights, they
felt compelled to misrepresent that they had authorization to use the HEART mark when they had
no such permission.
Further many different types of likely confusion, including initial interest confusion, can
give rise to trademark infringement. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354
F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, infringement occurs if the average purchaser would be
likely to believe that the infringers product has some connection with the trademark owner.
Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th
Cir. 1987) (citations omitted, emphasis added). Such likely confusion may be in the form of
customers mistakenly believing that the junior trademark users services originate from, are
sponsored or endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with the senior trademark user. J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 23:10 (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter
McCarthy).
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Finally, a likelihood of confusion need not exist at the time a consumer makes a decision
to purchase the allegedly infringing product; likely confusion created before a purchase is
actionable even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion. Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Brookfield
Commcns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entmt Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (when consumer
mistakenly reaches defendants website believing it is affiliated with plaintiffs similarly named
website, plaintiffs trademark is infringed even if consumer is fully aware of the mistake before
buying goods from defendants site); see also, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v.
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991) (likelihood of post-sale
confusion and/or confusion on the part of non-purchasers is actionable). Thus, if customers who
encounter the defendants restaurant name are even temporarily likely to believe defendants goods
or services have some association with Heart, trademark infringement has occurred. In this case,
as explained below, every relevant Sleekcraft factor favors a finding that the defendants mark is
of (1) its conceptual strength and (2) its commercial strength. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). Conceptual strength refers to where a term falls on the
spectrum of trademarksthat is, whether the term is generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or
fanciful. See, e.g. McCarthy 11:1-11:4; 11:83. Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful words used
as marks are inherently distinctive. Id. at 11:4. An arbitrary mark is a word that is common in
the language, but is arbitrarily applied to goods or services that does not even suggest some aspect
of the goods and services. Id. Apple used on electronic devices and computers is an arbitrary
mark. Heart used on coffee and cafs is likewise arbitrary. Because the term Heart as applied
The second step in the analysis of strength is the strength of the mark in the marketplace.
The commercial strength of a mark may be evidenced by substantial use and promotion, such that
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the mark is easily recognizable by consumers. See, e.g., Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 355
(9th Cir. 1948) (finding The Stork Club strong based, in part, on the extensive use and promotion
The HEART mark is also commercially strong. During its years of use, Heart has
successfully capitalized on social media platforms and word of mouth advertising to create
significant buzz related to its cafs and products all featuring the HEART mark. As described
in detail in the facts section, numerous national publications have recognized Heart in various ways
over the course of many years, including accolades as the best coffee in the world (See W.
proximity of the goods factor addresses the extent to which the goods or services sold under the
parties respective marks are closely related to one another or are used in complementary ways.
E. & J. Gallo, 967 F.2d at 1291. Courts measure the proximity of goods by seeing if the products
are: (1) complementary; (2) sold to the same class of purchasers; and (3) similar in use and
function. See Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1150. Where the products or services at issue
compete directly, the likelihood of confusion is increased. See, e.g., Nautilus Group, Inc. v. ICON
Health and Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Ninth Circuit precedent
and upholding preliminary injunction against use of CROSSBOW on home exercise resistance
training equipment where senior trademark owner used BOWFLEX on directly competing goods).
Defendants use is proximate to that of Hearts own use of the HEART mark both in terms
of physical presence as well as the types of products and services provided. First, defendants
opened their first location a mere block and a half away from one of Hearts own location. (W. Yli-
Luoma Decl. 19.) Second, both defendants business and Hearts business are in the restaurant
industry. That one sells primarily pizza and the other primarily coffee makes no difference. As
detailed above, the parties respective restaurants share customers, many of whom have been
confused into believing they are affiliated with one another. (See id. at 16, 25-26; R. Yli-Luoma
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Decl. 2-3.) Such confusion is inevitable given that the respective parties downtown locations
are only 1.5 blocks away from one another and significantly overlap in the hours they are open for
business.
That Defendants operate a pizza restaurant and Heart a caf is not relevant, particularly
where there are less than two blocks separating the respective businesses downtown locations.
See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding sit-down
pizzeria, PIZZERIA UNO, provided similar services to a fast food taco restaurant, TACO UNO,
identical to the HEART mark. Courts assess the similarity of marks in terms of their sight [i.e.,
appearance], sound, and meaning. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1993). Similarity in any one of these aspects may cause likelihood of confusion. Beer Nuts,
Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986). Further, identical marks
paired with identical goods can be case-dispositive. Stone Creek, 862 F.3d at 1136. As noted by
the Ninth Circuit, cases involving identical marks on competitive goods are rare and hardly ever
find their way into the appellate reports because liability is open and shut. Id. at 1136-37 (citing
McCarthy 23:20.)
This is such an open and shut case. Heart Pizza incorporates, in its entirety, the
HEART mark.2 Also, defendants operate a competing business in the restaurant industryin fact
defendants operate a caf only a block and a half away from Hearts own business.
confusion is not necessary, evidence that actual confusion exists is particularly potent. Stone
2
The descriptor pizza has little, if any, tendency to differentiate the marks as a whole from one
another. The word pizza is merely descriptive of the food sold by defendant. Because
consumers are likely to (and indeed have) affiliated defendants business with that of Heart, it is
clear that the term pizza does nothing to distinguish defendants restaurant and only suggests
that perhaps Heart has ventured into different food categories in addition to its primary coffee
business.
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Creek, 862 F.3d at 1137; see also Academy of Motion Picture, 944 F.2d at 1456 (quoting
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352) (evidence of actual confusion is persuasive proof that future
confusion is likely); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Commcns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004)) (evidence of actual confusion
provides strong support for the likelihood of confusion). In addition, a showing of actual
confusion constitutes persuasive proof that future confusion is likely. Network Automation, 638
F.3d at 1151. As detailed above, numerous customers have been actually confused and have
and defendant market their services through the same channels, the likelihood of consumer
confusion is increased. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. This is particularly so where the services are
marketed through a niche marketplace, such as on social media sites. See Quia Corp. v. Mattel,
Inc., No. C 10-1902 JF (HRL), 2011 WL 2749576, *4 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011).
Heart devotes significant resources relative to its respective size to advertising and
promotion via social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube and it is believed
that defendants do as well. This is exactly the kind of overlapping niche marketing that makes
confusion likely. See Quia, 2011 WL 2749576. As part of its reliance on social media, Heart is
heavily dependent on word of mouth promotion. As a result, the fact that one of the defendants
restaurants is only one and a half blocks from Hearts own caf means that the word of mouth
advertising between patrons and potential patrons are taking place amongst the same, relatively
f. The type of goods sold by both defendants and Heart, and the degree
of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser favors Heart. It is well settled that consumers
pay less attention when buying lower priced items than when buying more expensive items.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060; see, e.g., Seven Elephants Distrib. Corp. v. Earthquake Sound Corp.,
No. CV 06 4761 GAF (RZX), 2007 WL 977391 *1, *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2007) (issuing
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preliminary injunction; holding that parties car stereo amplifiers priced at between $100 and $300,
and selling for as little as $45, respectively, were relatively inexpensive products making
consumer confusion likely). This is particularly true where, as here, the goods and services are
both inexpensive and in competitive proximity. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70,
In the context of the restaurant industry, fast-food restaurants are considered impulse
Elbys Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982). In Frischs, plaintiffa
network of family restaurants who own the mark Big Boymoved for a preliminary injunction,
requesting that defendants, a competing network of restaurants, be enjoined from using the Big
Boy mark. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the casual degree of
Frischs Restaurants, 670 F.2d at 648. Notably, the court reasoned that the products promoted by
defendant do not trigger intensive consumer research, making it unlikely that consumers will
Further, the fact that defendants restaurant focuses on pizza and Heart primarily focuses
on coffee does not alter the analysis. See, e.g., ChiChis Inc. v. Chi-Mex., Inc. 568 F. Supp. 731
(W.D. Pa. 1983). In ChiChis, plaintiff used the CHICHIS mark in connection with a family-
owned Italian-American restaurant and the defendant used CHI-CHIS for its franchised family-
style Mexican restaurant. The court was not impressed by the distinction drawn by the defendant
between Italian food and Mexican food, and found that the long-time, regionally well-known
Italian restaurant was entitled to protection from a rapidly expanding chain of casual Mexican
eateries. The court found a likelihood of confusion and ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Id.
mark. Although intent to confuse is not required to prove trademark infringement, evidence of
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such intent is a factor that favors a finding that confusion is likely. When the alleged infringer
knowingly adopts a mark similar to anothers, reviewing courts presume that the defendant can
accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be deceived. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354; see
also, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1963)
(where defendant knew of plaintiffs mark and deliberately adopted a similar mark, the only
possible purpose could have been to capitalize upon the popularity of the name chosen). Thus, a
presumption of intent to deceive. Stone Creek, 862 F.3d at 1139. Finally, such deceptive intent
is entitled to great weight in the ultimate determination of likelihood of confusion. Id. (quoting
Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 1998).)
Here, the facts strongly indicate malintent. Camden was a frequent customer of Heart prior
to the opening of defendants first location (W. Yli-Luoma Decl. 18), and thus was
knowledgeable about Hearts brand, its services, its popularity, and its valuable customer base.
Camden had previously asked Heart to create a collaboration coffee blend, which Heart declined.
(Id. at 17.) Camden also misrepresented to a third party that defendants had permission to use
the HEART mark (id. at 22), demonstrating knowledge that he knew such permission would be
necessary. Defendants opened their first location a block and a half away from Heart, apparently
likely. In light of the fact that the parties services directly compete, there is no need to consider
whether one party will expand into the market of the other. CytoSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharms., Inc.,
617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding this factor neutral where parties sold directly
competing products). If, however, the Court were to conclude that the parties do not directly
compete, this factor would favor Heart. There is a clear risk that defendants, given Camdens
history of rapidly building local franchises and, at least in one case selling them to national
investors, will quickly grow defendants chain of restaurants thus flooding the market with their
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infringing mark and correspondingly diluting the strength of the HEART mark and limiting Hearts
3. The fact that defendants knowingly opened their restaurant only a block and
a half from Heart weighs heavily in Hearts favor. While geographic proximity of the marks
at issue is not within the enumerated Sleekcraft factors, courts recognize that geographic
proximity is relevant to consumer confusion. Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. v. TimberStone Mgmt.,
LLC., No. 1:14-CV-00233-BLW, 2016 WL 5340302, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2016). Further,
in the restaurant industry, especially where individual restaurants rather than chains are
competing, physical separation seems particularly significant to the inquiry into consumer
confusion. Brennans, Inc. v. Brennans Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 134 (2nd Cir. 2004).
See also, Community of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration Branch of Jesus
Christs Church, 634 F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 2011); Mastros Restaurants LLC v. Dominick
Group LLC, No. CV 11-1996-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 2091535, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 11, 2012). See
also Ewe Group, Inc. v. Bread Store, LLC, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2014); Suisman,
Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray, & Greenberg, P.C. v. Suisman, No. 3:04-CV-745 (JCH), 2006 WL
387289, (D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2006). In Mastros, plaintiff, an owner of a steakhouse in Scottsdale,
Arizona, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging
that defendants competing restaurant infringed on their mark. In response, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that none of the Sleekcraft factors favored the plaintiff. The trial court
denied the defendants motion, noting thatwhile some of the factors weighed against a finding
WL 2091535 at *7. Since the restaurants of both plaintiff and defendant were located in
Scottsdale, the court found the restaurants to be geographically proximate, a fact that favored
confusion. Defendants intentionally opened their flagship restaurant a mere block and a half away
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from Hearts downtown caf. See Solutech, Inc. v. Solutech Consulting Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp.
2d 1082, 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2000) ([W]hen identical marks are used in the same geographic area for
next inquiry is whether plaintiff will likely be irreparably harmed if an injunction does not issue.
Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2009).
In trademark cases, courts have found irreparable harm in the loss of control of a business
reputation, a loss of trade and loss of goodwill. CytoSport, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. As the court
explained:
617 F. Supp. 2d at 1080-81 (citation omitted) (holding that likelihood of confusion among
consumers threatened to cause plaintiff substantial and irreparable harm, which supported
preliminary injunction); see also Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. All Profl Realty, Inc., Nos. CIV.
2:10-2751, CIV. 2:10-02846, 2011 WL 221651, *1,12-13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011). Where there
exists evidence of actual confusion, the plaintiff has met its burden of proving the loss of control
of its reputation and goodwill necessary to support a finding of irreparable harm. TravisMathew,
LLC v. Leisure Society Unlimited, LLC, No. SACV 12-213-JST (MLGx), 2012 WL 1463548, *4
(C.D. Cal. April 26, 2012) (finding irreparable harm existed based solely on evidence of actual
confusion) (emphasis added); Mrs. U.S. Natl Pageant, Inc. v. Miss U.S. Org., LLC, No. 12-CV-
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The overwhelming evidence of actual confusion based on defendants use of the HEART
mark supports a finding that Heart faces exactly the same injury that courts have determined to
constitute irreparable harmconfusion of consumers and loss of Hearts ability to control the
reputation and public perception of its trademark. Thus, Heart has more than satisfied the
As noted above, defendants have a well-known history in the Portland Metropolitan area
of quickly building up restaurant chains, and in one case, selling it to national investors. (Mehrbani
Decl. 5-8; Exs. 4-7.) In only five short months, defendants have already opened three Heart
Pizza restaurants. In addition, their plans for future expansion are made clear in early interviews
pizza, (the first of what could be many Heart Pizza locations). (Id. at 6; Ex. 5.) Such rapid
expansion threatens to engulf and render irrelevant the HEART trademark and cause it to forever
lose its distinctive and source-identifying quality. In contrast, if an injunction issues, defendants
hardship would consist only of discontinuing use of the infringing name pending trial.
Defendants would still be free to conduct exactly the same business it currently operatesselling
exactly the same goods through exactly the same channels to exactly the same customers. As
defendants have no legitimate interest in infringing Hearts trademarks, any harm resulting from
a preliminary injunction, including economic harm, must be discounted. CytoSport, 617 F. Supp.
2d at 1081; Sunquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Park City Solutions, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 680, 699 (W.D.
Pa. 2000) (Park City sought to closely align itself with Sunquest, including with Sunquests
logo[;] Park City cannot now claim that it would suffer harm by being forced to right the wrong
that it committed.)
In considering whether injunctive relief is appropriate, courts must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Production Company v. Village of
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Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)); see also Intl Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc.,
4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993) (In evaluating the balance of hardships a court must consider the
impact granting or denying a motion for a preliminary injunction will have on the respective
enterprises.).)
The balance of the equities favors Heart. Heart has invested significant time, capital, and
human resources in building its HEART brand. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., 149
F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) (finding these factors dispositive in weighing the equities).
Defendants, to the contrary, are a nascent business. Changing its name at this juncture will not
result in great harm. In any event, as a knowing infringer, defendants cannot complain of any such
This district has noted that preventing consumer confusion is in the public interest. Adidas
Am., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 125051 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. Heller, No. CV 1401383
MMM (MRWx), 2014 WL 6685662, at *9 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (The most basic public
interest is the publics right not to be deceived or confused.).) Other courts agree. See Century
21, 2011 WL 221651 at *13 (In the trademark context, the public interest is usually the right of
the public not to be deceived or confused.); TravisMathew, 2012 WL 1463548 at *4 (the public
has an interest in protect[ing] the investment in a mark by the owner) (citations omitted); Warner
Bros. Entmt v. Glob. Asylum, Inc., No. CV 129547 PSG CWX, 2012 WL 6951315, at *23
(C.D.Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (the most basic public interest at stake in all Lanham Act cases [is] the
interest in prevention of confusion, particularly as it affects the public interest in truth and
accuracy.), affd sub nom. Warner Bros. Entmt, Inc. v. Glob. Asylum, Inc., 544 Fed. Appx. 683
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 730 (3d Cir. 2004)). An
injunction that prevents consumer confusion in trademark cases, as this injunction does, serves the
public interest. Am. Rena Intl Corp. v. SisJoyce Intl Co. Ltd., 534 Fed. Appx. 633, 636 (9th
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Over the last seven years, Heart has invested a significant amount of time, effort and
resources into promoting and protecting its mark. (See W. Yli-Luoma Decl. 2-15.) The use by
Heart Pizza of a confusingly similar mark undermines all of the efforts Heart has made to date,
and the resulting confusion that now exists in the marketplace in no way benefits the public.
Accordingly, where not only a likelihood of confusion exists, but actual confusion exists, the
public interest also weighs in favor of granting an injunction. CytoSport, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1081;
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants have created not only a likelihood of confusion but also significant actual
confusion as to the relationship of their own business and Heart. Thus, Heart respectfully requests
that this Court enter a preliminary injunction pending a final determination of this action.
LANE POWELL PC
By s/Parna A. Mehrbani
Kenneth R. Davis II, OSB No. 971132
Parna A. Mehrbani, OSB No. 053235
Telephone: 503.778.2100
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