Anti-wiretapping Act of 2009

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia

G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The
private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the
case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
declaring the trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration
by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations
from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for
withdrawal of their complaint.

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about
the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. After enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement
is agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the office of the
Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who
were alerted earlier before the exchange.

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the
case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against the complainant.

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the
appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known
as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in
the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class
of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law.

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device"
within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a
telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that
its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons;
or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof
as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept,
or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are
not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200.
Anti-Sexual harassment Act of 1995

ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, complainant, vs. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, Presiding Judge, Court of
Tax Appeals, respondent.

Facts:
On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the United States, bringing gifts for the
three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and
greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek. while
respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get something in her
office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas."
Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.On
the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her
but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to enter his chambers alone.Weeks later,
after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant and
her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her. In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant,
requesting her to go to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany
her.Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left. The last incident happened the next
day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss
the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested
that they should act as if they met by accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys
table which was separated from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in
front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed
to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk.
Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office.
When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached
complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant
instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards
him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat
on his chair and covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself
inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note[3] stating, sorry,
it wont happen again.

Issue: whether or not, the respondent judge commit sexual harassment.

Held: no.
a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying
the employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect said employees;
2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.'
"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor.
"In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege that Judge Acosta
demanded, requested or required her to give him a buss on the cheek which, she resented. Neither did Atty.
Aquino establish by convincing evidence that the busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual favors,
discriminated against her continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In fact, complainant continued to perform her work in the office with the usual
normalcy.Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there ever was, did not interfere with her working condition
(Annexes "9" - "9-FFF"). Moreover, Atty. Aquino also continued to avail of benefits and leaves appurtenant
to her office and was able to maintain a consistent outstanding performance. On top of this, her working
area which, is at the third floor of the CTA, is far removed from the office of Judge Acosta located at the
fourth floor of the same building. Resultantly, no hostile or intimidating working environment is apparent.
"In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing
Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence
of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given
malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.[
DIGITEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
VS
MARIQUIT SORIANO
492 SCRA 704 (2006)
Forced resignation must be sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and credible evidence.
Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice President for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino) and
Senior Executive Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional dispute against
Severino and Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted by her superiors.
After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was forced to resign due
to professional and sexual harassment. She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former colleagues
in testifying to the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons involved with Digitel
stating that the employees of the company were being forced not to testify against Go and Severino. In
defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses that testified that the acts alleged by Soriano din not happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC.
Hence,this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and sexual harassment, thus amounting
to constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Sorianos own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if not downright puny. An
analysis of her statements shows that her own conclusion that she was being sexually and professionally
harassed was on the basis of her own suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.
She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently professionally harassed by
respondent Severino. The latters alleged words: How come you claim you know so much yet nothing
ever gets done in your department? do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish professional
harassment. Aside from these words, the complainant could only venture to allege instances in general and
vague terms. As to the facts allegedly constituting sexual harassment advanced by Go and Severino, after
an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their respective counter-affidavits and further
considering the other supporting documents attached to the respondents pleadings, it is found that these
far out weigh the Sorianos own evidence
A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor present at the party of Digitel,
reveals, however, that she merely concluded that the employees of Digitel were instructed or harassed
not to testify in favor of Soriano when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel employee who kept
avoiding to meet with such tendency to threaten resignation every time higher management would refuse
her demand to transfer subordinates who had administrative differences with her, we therefore have no
doubt that complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent Severino refused to heed her demand that
Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her subordinates, be transferred to other departments. We also have no
doubt that such resignation does not constitute constructive dismissal, much less an illegal one.
Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for
sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her
ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must
be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related
sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise
of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.