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has a right not just to speak, but also to speak without any kind of inhibition or fear,
i.e. with freedom.
1.3.1. It is most humbly put forth that Article 19(2) provides for the various grounds on
which the right to freedom of speech and expression can be restricted, including
defamation, contempt of court, etc. In the case of Chintaman Rao v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh6, the Honble Bench of this court had held that reasonable
restriction can only be imposed by subjecting the issue at hand to due consideration
so that the right is not unnecessarily infringed upon.
1.3.2. In another case of the Honble Supreme Court, it had been held hat restricting the
fundamental right concerning freedom of speech on any grounds other than the ones
laid down in Article 19(2) shall defeat the very purpose of the constitution to confer
this right on Indian citizen to protect their views which are essential for the
Democracy.7
1.3.3. It is reverentially submitted that in the case of S. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram8, the
Honble Court noticed that the debate about the conflict between the provisions of
Article 19(1)(a) and that of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India inclines
towards the need to preserve the interest of the citizens over the special interests
unless the community interest is at stake as a direct result of the act. None of these
requirements, as laid down by the Honble Court can be seen to be met with in the
case at hand.
1.3.4. It is therefore contended before the respected bench that construing the applicants
article to be exceeding his fundamental right shall deprive a valuable citizen of the
protection that the Constitution confers equally on all its citizens.
said that the views presented by the applicant are a fair criticism of the decision of
the Constitution Bench.
regard to the same. Criticism of the Government is well within the ambit of this
right. 11Citizens are certainly entitled to express their grievances and to endeavour to
get them redressed through lawful means. The applicant here has exercised his
fundamental right and holding him liable for punishment under sedition shall be
against the very provisions of the constitution.
2.2.2. It is reverentially submitted that in Justice (Retd.) Markandey Katju v. The Lok
12
Sabha & Ors. , this court had said that In any event, Article 19(1)
(a) guarantees free speech and expression and makes no distinction and imposes no
caveats, whether such speech is popular or dissenting in nature. It further
emphasizes the fact that barring citizens of India from expressing a view which
differs from that of the Government will deprive them of their fundamental right. It
is not justified to charge the applicant with sedition for the rightful exercise of a
right which has been conferred upon him by the very Constitution of India.
2.3.1. It is humbly submitted that Section 505 of I.P.C.13 defines Statements conducing to
public mischief as WHOEVER MAKES, PUBLISHES OR CIRCULATES ANY
STATEMENT, RUMOUR OR REPORT, -
(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to
any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence
against the State or against the public tranquillity;
This section, like other sections of the same kind which deal with liberty of a
citizen, must be construed very strictly in favour of the defence.14
2.4.1. It is humbly submitted that in the landmark case of Kedarnath Singh v. State of
Bihar15, the apex court had laid down the essentials of Sedition as given in section
124A as follows:
The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with explanations, make it
reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as
would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public
peace by resort to violence
2.4.2. The case before this court involves peaceful expression of opinion regarding the
NJAC Act by the applicant in the form of the article. The content also clearly
indicates the absence of use of any objectionable language. The applicant, who is
the author, speaks of his intention for the betterment of the country. Hence, no
ground, whatsoever, exists to hold the applicant guilty under section 124A & 505 of
the IPC.
2.4.3. It is most respectfully suggested that in the case of Kishori Mohan v. State of West
Bengal, the Honble Supreme Court had touched the topics of the distinction
between law and order, public order and security of state, and had mentioned that
mere criticism of the Government is not capable of threatening public order by
disturbing public tranquility. It is therefore requested before the Honble Bench that
the Applicant shall be freed of all Charges filed against him under section 124A and
505 of IPC as his expression falls well within the ambit of a fair criticism, and hence
it is not capable of causing any public upsurge, or being qualified as a seditious act.
2.4.4. It is humbly submitted that the decision of the supreme court in the Kedarnath case
was upheld by a division bench of the court in the case Sri Indra Das v. State of
Assam 16:
If on the other hand we were to hold that even without any tendency to disorder or
intention to create disturbance of law and order, by the use of words written or
15 Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955; Common cause and Ors. v. Union of India,
2016(4)RCR(Criminal)768;
16 Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, 2011 (3) SCC 380.
2.4.7. It is humbly submitted that in the case of Arun Jaitely v. State of UP20, the Honble
Court of Allahabad adjudged that for any article or speech to fall within the ambit of
section 124A of IPC, it was important that the same qualified as having a pernicious
tendency of creating public disorder, thereby discharging him of all allegations. In
the absence of such a tendency, it shall be unjust to charge a person for sedition.
This had also been said in a previous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors21., and in recent decision of N. Sengodan v.
Secretary to Government, Home (Prohibition and Excise) Department, Chennai
and Ors. 22.
carve an exception in respect thereof or exclude clause (c) of Section 190(1) from
the width of its operation.24
3.2.1. It is reverentially submitted before the Honble Bench that in the case of
Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal25, the apex court had
interpreted section 190 of CrPC by comprehending the term Cognizance to mean
that the Judge knows about the all facts about the complaint and the allegations
made, and he/she then decides to judge its validity. In the case before the Honble
bench today clearly shows that the Judicial Magistrate had crossed this threshold
way back in time as he had now filed a complaint case in the District Court. His
actions can therefore be understood to prove that the magistrate had not just taken
cognizance of the issue, but also violated the laws of the land. This was also
reiterated in the case of Kishun Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar.26
3.2.2. The requirement of a sanction as a prerequisite for taking cognizance was a
principle which was reiterated in the case of Aveek Sarkar v. State of Bengal27, in
which the judge said under the provisions of Section 196 of CrPC no court has
been given the authority to take cognizance except with the previous sanction of the
State Government. To the mind of this court having regard to the language of
Section 196 CrPC (supra) the use of the expressions shall and previous make
the intention of the legislature clear.
3.2.3. It is humbly submitted that in the case of Arun Jaitley v. State of UP28 it was held
that the Magistrate clearly erred in proceeding to exercise jurisdiction under
Section 190(1)(c) and therefore, the order taking cognizance of the alleged offence
and issuance of summons cannot be sustained. In the given case as well, the
magistrate did not attain prior sanction and hence, erred in proceeding to exercise
his jurisdiction.
3.2.4. in a case where no sanction was given in accordance with the provision of
Section 196, the entire proceedings were liable to be quashed. This was given in
the case of Manoj Rai & others v. State of MP29, which further proves the point that
the magistrate committed procedural illegality by initiating the proceedings without
undertaking due procedure and hence, the proceedings are liable to be quashed on
these grounds.