TimeandSpace 10061756

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T I M E A ND A

j p bo
c t a i m l (Ewa n
S HA D WO R T H H . H O D GS O N .
T O N A M O O E N I E O E A O T I A T E P A 1 02 E I H E K A I HM I N

.
L O ND O N
L O NGM AN G R E E N L O NG M A N
, , ,
R OB ERT S ,
A ND G R E EN
.
1 865 .
C O NT E NT S .
PAR T I .
I NT R O D UC TI O N .
1 . A p p ea l s to co n sc i u n e
o s ss
CH A P T E R I
THE S C OP E O F M E T AP HYS I C .
S ubj e c t a nd O bj e c t
Ne c e s s it y a nd Univers a l it y
pi i
Th e t e rm a r o r
M t phy i i phil phy

e a s c s o so
M t phy i nd ligi o n
e a s c a re
C git
o go um o er s
M t phy i nd p y h l o gy
e a s c a s c o
M t phy i nd nt o l gy
e a s c a o o
CH A P T E R I I .
T H E N T UR A E OF T H E C OG NI T I O NS O F T IM E AND SPACE .
Fi rs t nd int nt i n
a nd s e c o e o s
El m nt s
e nd
e p t f ph n m n
a a s ec s o e o e a
Th f m l l m nt in c n i u n
e o r a e e e o sc o s es s
Th unit y f ph n m n in p
e o e o e a s ac e
Th unity f ph n m n in t im
e o e o e a e
Ti nd
m e a p pu bj ts ac e a s re o ec s
Th xh u ti di i ibility f t im nd p
e e a s ve v s o e a s ace
Th in ni t y f t im
e nd s p c o e a a e
vi C ONTENT S .
CH A P T E R II I . P S YCH O L OG I CAL .
T H E OR G N O F T H E I I C OG NI T I ONS O F T I M E A ND S PACE .
Th e bj t f P y h l gy
o ec o s c o o
Th l f th i
re e c a s s e s o eo r es
Th y f S ul
eo r o a o
Th y f n Eg
eo r o a o
Th ph n m n n o f R c t i n
e e o e o e e o
T h phy i l gi l t h
e y s o o ca eo r
O igin f t h f m l l m nt
r o e o r a e e e
CH A P T E R I V .
PR E S ENTAT I ON AND R E P R E S ENT AT I ON .
24 Th e pi i l g
em r ca e o
25 R p e t ti n
re s e n a o
26 Th i m m di t
e nd e a e a re m o te o bj ec t
27 R m t bj t in
e o e o ec s c o nn c z tio n
CH A P T E R V .
S P ONT ANE O US R E D INT E GR A T I ON

28 R e dint e gra t i o n
29 A na ly i s s o f re di t e n g ti n ra o
~
30 R ult
es s o f the a n ly i a s s
31 V lit i n
o o
32 D ivi i n s o o f fun t i n in n c io u n
c o s co s s es s
CH A P T E R VI .
V O L UNT AR Y R E D INT E GRAT I ON .
A b t t nd g n e l n t i n
s ra c a e ra o o s
Th i n t u
e r a re
Th l w f P
e i m o ny
a o a rc
C it i l n d
r ca ui i t i ning
a
aq c s ve re a s o
T h p in ipl
e f c q ui it i
r s ning
c e o a s ve re a o
Indu t i n nd D du t i n
c o a e c o
R l t i n f i t i l nd q ui it i
e a o o ning cr ca a ac s v e re a s o
Th t h e o d E s ndi E xi t ndi C gn s
ree r e rs , s e s e o o c en d i
, ,
C ON TENT S . vii
PAR T II .
CH A P T E R VI I . M ET ALOG I CAL .
D I VI S I O N 1 .
PO ST ULAT E S AND T H E
T HE C ONCEPT -
FO R M .
41 . E xi t n nd N u
s e xi t n
ce a o -
e s e ce
42 . C n i u n
o sc o nd t h ught s ess a o
43 . O igin f t h l w
r f th ugh t
o e a s o o
44 . Th C n p t f
e o ce -
o rm

45 . S k
o m e re m a r n H g l L gi s o e e s o c
Th e n tua n pt re o f co ce s
So m e c x m in d a se s e a e
T h l gi c l bj t nd t h l gi c l unit
e o a o ec a e o a
C t eg i s
a f m f t h o ught
o r e o r o r s o
Th m bin ti n
e co f o n pt a o o c ce s
Th im p rt f p p it i n
e o o ro o s o s
C t g i l p p iti n
a e o r ca ro o s o s
Hyp th t i c l p p o iti n
o e a ro s o s
D i jun c ti p o p it i n
s ve r o s o s
Hyp th t i o di jun t i p p iti n

o e c s c ve ro o s o s
S yll gi mo s s
1 t C t g i l
s . 2d Hyp th eti l
a 3d
e o r c a . . o ca . . D i sjune
ti 4 t h Hyp th tive di jun ti
. . o e co -
s c ve .
E m pi i l nd f m l
r ca ning a o r a re a s o
R i w f t h n ly i f t h l w f L gi
ev e o e a a s s o e a s o o c
D I VI s IO N
0
o .
R AT I O S UFF I C I E N S .
59 . Ca u s e a nd Rea so n
60 Th e
. f m l u o r a ca se
61 . In t uiti n nd th o ught
o a
62 . Nihil A b l ut i so
viii C ONTENT S . :
CH A P T E R VI II .
R EAS ON .
63 Int uit ive

. in re e c t o
64 . R ning t i n
easo re ec o
65 . R t p t f m t phy i l phil phy

e ro s ec o e a s ca o so
Pl t A i t tl
a o P t A i t t li n phil
. r s o e . o s -
r s o e a o so phy .
G i d n B un Do r t nd h ia uc o r o . es c a r es a s s c es s o r s .
66 . Ot h d in f t h
er o m an s o e re a s o
R l t i n b t w n t hi nd p h y i o
e a o E t hi e ee e c a s . c . Co n
n t i n f t hi nd l w
ec P t y
o o e c a a . o e r .
67 . P g ro o f ci n
res s g n lly s e ce e e ra
CH A P T E R I X .
68 . Cl i t io n o f id
a ss ca ea s
69 . Th in t n c s x m in d
re e s a e e a e
70 . F it h
a
71 . Th l gic l id
e o Of G d a ea o
E P I L O G UE
I N T R O D UC T I O N .
1 . writer o f the followin g pages submits them

THE ,
not without a sense o f their i m perfection to the judg ,
ment o f his contemporaries The questions t reated .
o f labour under o n e kind Of dif culty pec uli arly

their o w n It is not every reader who will be pre
.
pared to admit that in o n e part o f metaphysical

, ,
enquiries the proof to be required di ffers in its nature

,
from the proof to be required in the purely obj ective

sciences But that it is s o follows from the nature
.
o f the matter at once subj ective and objective In .

,
the purely Objective sciences a writer need have no

doubt about his facts ; he can protect h i mself by de
ni t i o n s and by distinctions and can always make ,
clear what the precise object is about whic h he rea ,
sons For instance in P olitical E conomy he can

.
, ,
obviate ambiguities in his Object matter by dening -

Wealth to mean every commodity which has an
exchangeable va l ue and consequent o n this d e ni ,
tion he can dene P roductive Labour to mean labour

,
which produces such commodities ; for every one is

agr eed that there are such commodities and such
labour But where this has not been done but is
.
,
still in process o f doing there every man must be ,
judge for hi mself whether his o w n internal e x p e ri

,
ence bears o u t the assertions Of the writer Fo r the .
facts o f metaphysic like those o f e very purely o b je c

,
I NTR O D U C T I O N .
tive science are facts of consciousness and their o b

, ,
sc u t i and the dif culty o f observing them make

r
y
their interpretation o r their analysis doubtful The
, ,
.
very questions at issue are What are the facts ? What,
is their analysis and Is there any phenomenon

answering to a given denition o f which there is
no judge but consciousness itself Such qu estions .

,
for instance are the a nalysis of the cogni tions of

,
time and space t h e analysis of consciousness in its

,
simplest concrete shape the q uestion whether we are

,
immediately conscious of the Will and s o on If the ,

.
meanin g of the term red was no t su fciently agre ed

upon we should have to appeal to the consciousness
,
o f indivi duals to decide what colour should be dis
t i ngui s h e d by this name ; and those who were colour

blind would be heard before the decision was arrived
at but not afterwards
,
.
A great part of metaphysic not by any means ,
the whole of it and a continually though slowly de

,
creasing part is in this un x e d and undetermined

,
state ; and it is natural that this sh ould be the case

with t his the most complicated and dependent of all
branches o f knowledge though it is one which from
, ,
the universal and obvious presence o f some O f its

elements was cultivated among the earliest In this
, .
u n x e d part of metaphysic the appeal to c o n s c l o u s
ness must still be per mitted ; there the proofs must

not only be examined but performed by every one
for himself with a View to the establishment of a
,
sufcient consensus of judgments and the aim o f the

m etap hysical writer in this part o f his ta sk must be
,
not to give convin cing inferential proofs of his posi

tions but t o state and describe the phenomena s o as
,
to lead and as sist the reader in nding the proofs

I NT R O D U C TI ON .
for himself o r in other words t o aid h i m in going

, ,
through the trains of reasoning in such an original

and independent way as can alone procure I do not
, ,
sa
y the conclusions here reached but any real
,
c o n
el usion at all .
By the term consciousness in this E ssay is a l

, ,
ways meant consciousness as existing i n an in di vidual

conscious being ; and proofs drawn from such a con
s c i o u s n e s s can have no validity for other conscious
individuals unless they themselves recognise their

,
truth as descrip tions applicable to the p rocedur e and

phenomena o f their o w n consciousness D octrines .
,
if true will ultimately be recogni sed as such by all

,
individuals whose consciousness is formed o n the same

type that is by all h um a n b e i n gs
, ,

.
C H AP T E R I .
TH E S C O PE O F ME TAPH Y S I C .
52
'
u e u o v u wa a a c a v uew wv : o i Be u a
y s
,
a
l / .
Arist o tl e
l
2. THE true opposite o f the term metaphysic is

empiric whether empiric is employed in dealing with
,
states o f consciousness o r with external phenomena .
States of consciousness and external phenomena whe ,
ther abstract o r concrete whether considered as parti

,
o nlar and unclassied o r as general and classied are ,
known to us by experience either direct o r indirect ,
by perception o r by inference ; that is to s a y they ,
are the data o f empirical knowledge o r science ; while

metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions o f
such data Thus Kant says in the P rolegomena
. I , ,
that metaphysical cognition is a cogni tion which lies

o n the far side o f o r beyond
,
experience je ns e i t

, ,
der E rfahrung liegende E rke nn t ni s s .
M etaphysic takes its stand at the point o f junction

between the mind which knows and the world which
is known and deals with the relations which obtain
,
between them s o far as thes e relations are necessary

,
and uni versal M etaphysic may therefore be a p

.
r o a c h e d both from the side o f psychology o r the

p ,
laws of consciousness and the organ o f consciousness ,
and from that o f physical science o r the laws of ex ,
ternal phenomena In saying this I am not forget

.
ting that external phenomena are presented to us

TH E S C O P E OF M E TAPH YS I C
only in consciousness nor o n the other hand that

,
states Of consciousness when reected o n are as , ,
obj ective as external phenomena I t is enough that .

this difference Of aspect this di stinction z en 0s (a p n
, ,

has given rise to a division o f existences m r o o p kn ,
a di vision o f them into mind and matter and their ,
appropriated sciences psychology and the physic al

,
sciences F ollowing the route o f either o f thes e

.
groups o f sciences w e come to ground which is com

,
mon to it with the other group the common ground ,
o f phenomena with a double aspect subjective and ,
objective This common ground o f psychology and

.
h
p y si o
,
phenomena in their most abstract shape is ,
the proper eld o f meta physic I t considers pheno .
mena as they possess an obj ective and a subj ective

aspect and not as they are dependent o n a series o f
,
events in the kingdom o f mind o r o n a series o f ,
events in t h e kingdom o f matter I t is an ana l ysis o f .
phenomena as such Standing thus at the meeting

,
.
point o f the two groups o f cognitions psychological ,
and physical metaphysic cont a i n s as its proper object

, ,
matter those cogni tions only which a r e com m on to

,
all objects o f knowledge and to all modes o r states o f

consciousness In other words it is onl y certain
.
,
univers a l modes o r forms o f consciousness and o f

objects external to consciousness which are the o b
j e c t matter o f metaphysic
-
The reason o f this i
. s ,
that all the others fall properly i n to their places in

the other sciences to which they belong whi le thos e ,
which are uni versal both in consciousness and in i t s

,
obj ects are dis t inguished broadl y by this charac

,
t e ri s t i c from the rest and besides the place which

, ,
t hey hold in any o f the other sciences have a n ,
other place i n that science o r mode o f contempla ,

THE S C O PE OF ME TA P HY S I C .

tion which brings into o n e View both object a nd

,
subject as the two only constituents of the whole

imaginable o r conceivable universe The import .
ance and also considering the constitution of our

,
minds t h e necessity o f this latter science called

, ,
metaphysic rests o n the fact that thi s di stinction o f

'
subject and object is the most general and ul timate

distinction at which we can arrive in all knowledge .
If the human mind is compelled to push its enquiries

-
to the furthest point attainable by it it is to this ,
distinction that it will come the last from what ,
ever point o f View it may start and whatever road ,
o r science it may take It is the ul timate di stinction

.
in the analysis of the un iverse from the human point

o f View and therefore it is the starting point of meta
,
physic which is the applied logic o f the universe the

, ,
method o f stating the problem in its lowest terms .
Some may suppose that there is a point of view

from which this distinction o f subject and obj ect o r , ,
what is the same thing o f consciousness and the o b ,
j e c t s o f consciousness is not the ultimate and highest

,
di stinction possible but some other di stinction b e

,
tween existences as for instance that o f Inn er and

'
O uter o r that o f F orm and M atter

, F rom such a ; .
point o f View states o f consciousness themselves

,
would stil l be classed as what i n fact they are , ,
sp ecial modes o f existence and perhaps under the , ,
rst distinction as outward mani festations o f an i n

,
ward spirit o r under the second di stinction as forms

, , ,
into which the matter o f the external world is cast

and moulded N o w what is there to show that a
.
method of regarding the universe founded upon such

distinctions as these is n o t more complete and l e gi t i
mate than a method founded on the distinction of
TH E S C O P E OF M E TAP H YS I C .
subject a n d obj ect ? This onl y consideratio n so far ,
as can be at present evident namely that it adopts , ,
a single term o r category that o f existence into , ,
which to introduce its distinctions , a category un

explained unconnected meani ngless ; that it leaves
, ,
vague and undetermined because o ut o f relation to ,
any thing else the totality of the phenomena which

,
it proposes to class i fy and th us in fact starts with

~
assuming an Absolute O f such a single non relative

.
,
-
,
existence it must be admitted that it has no meaning ,
and no predicates that it is in short pure nonentity

,
and merum nih il If however it should be replied

.
,
that by existence is meant relative existence such ,
existence as is relative to us and our capacities this ,
is only to admit in other words the greater validi ty

o f the di stinction between subj ect and obj ect Fo r .
by a relative existence is meant an Objective exist

ence an existence the correlate o f consciousness the
, ,
only existence which in fact we can conceive o r ima

gine Let this objective existence be divided o r dis
.
t i n gui s h e d as it may it w il l still be o n e a spect o nl y

,
o f the ul timat e distinction into subj ect and object ,
o r rather it will itself involve its opposite the s ub ,
j e c t i v e aspect ; and the fu r ther distinctions i ntro

d u c e d into it will be distin ctions o f the object o f

consciousness only and not o f an absolute existence

,
apart from c onsciousness .
. 3 N ow with reference to the doctrine that the

cognitions which are the Object matter o f m e t a p h y s i c
,
-
are necessary as well as uni versal it must be remarked ,
that the term necessary is but the correlate of the

term u ni vers a l ; what the latter is in the world o f
.
objects that the former i s in the world o f conscious

ness Whatever is necessary in thought exists al so
.
10 T HE S C O PE OF ME TAP H YS I C .
al ways without exception in the Object of thought ;

and whatever exists always without exception in the
object o f thought is necessary in thought It is not .
said that whatever exists always in things i n them

,
- -
selves is necessary in thought for o f things i n them

,
- -
selves we have no experience ; but s o far as any thing ,
is an object for us whatever is uni versal in the obj ect

,
is necessary in the subject N ecessity is a term which

.
has meani n g only i n reference to o ur cognition ; it is

subjective in its reference ; while the term uni ver
sa l i t
y is Objective not referring
,
however to existence
per s e but to Objective existence for us We shall
,
.
have to consider in the course of these pages whether

any causal relation obtains between these two corre
lates necessity and universality F or the present it
, .
is enough to explain that no necessity can be a d

,
m i t t e d to exist in the obj ective world that what we

;
call a necessary sequence i s necessary solely in refer
ence to our un derstanding because we refer the con ,
sequent to a special antecedent and bring it thus ,
under some law which we think o f as xed at least ,
s o far as the particular case un der consideration is
concerned ; and that the only thing which c orresponds

to o u r notion o f necessity in nature is the phenomenon
o f universality U niversality means that the thing
.
,
in question whatever it is never is otherwise ; n e c e s

, ,
si t
y means that we cann ot conceive it otherwise
,
In .
the former case there is no i mpossibility in troduced ;

in the latter case there is an impossibility but it is ,
o n e of thought not o f fact subj ective not objective .

,
Like the terms subject and object themselves the ,
terms necessity and universality are but two as

e c t s inseparable from each other of the same phe
p ,
,
no m eno n .
TH E S C O PE OF ME TAP H YS I C .

drawn o n paper exists only when three lines m eet

each other at three angles ; the three lines and the

three angles are the a priori elements o f the triangle ;
but they are not previous to it in point o f time but ,
exactly simultaneous for the length and position o f

,
each line and the size o f each angle are determined

, ,
respectively by the length and position o f the Other

lines and the size o f the other angles that is by the , ,
other elements o f the triangle Before the triangle .
was formed there were neither the lines o f such and

,
such a length and position nor the angles of such a n d

,
such a size . The triangle is the brief synthetical

expression for these lines and these angles and the , .
lines and the angles are the analysis o f the triangle .
N ow any of these elements o f the triangle whic h ,
being given the rest are deducible or all these ele ,
ments taken together may be called the a priori

,
elements o f the triangle ; but in neither case are they

prior to the triangle in order of time but only i n ,
order of logic And if the term a p riori is applied

.
to any o f the metaphysical elements o f objects it must ,
be in this second sense of the term and not in a sense ,
implying priority in order o f time .
Applying these remarks to time and space the ,
results o f any analysis may be considered prior i n

logic to the whole analysed and therefore a priori to
,
that particular Obj ect ; but time and space are a priori

m r inasmuch as they are a priori to all O b
je c t s of cognition to cogni tion and existence itself
,
.
Themselves cognitions generalised from experience ,
and in that poin t o f view later than experience in

f l
order time t h e y a r e discovered to have been also
O
,
elements of those very cogni tions o f experience from

which they are generalised present in them as con
,
TH E S C O P E OF M E TAP H YS I C . 13
st element s undistinguished before an alysis A s

i t u e nt .
to their becoming known to us as separate cognitio ns ,
they are later than many other cognitions ; but as to

their own existence in knowledge unseparated they ,
are simultaneous with all and every other c ognition .
The question of the origin o f these cogni tions wil l be

discussed in C hapter I II but with reference to the .
mind of man as he now exists and to a l l his other ,
cognitions these two cognitions o f time and space at

,
least are a priori in the sens e just explained ; that

,
i s are elements o f any and every particular e x p e ri

,
ence entering into every o n e o f them as its necessary

,
So far as to the leading features and distin o

5 .
Me a
5
t phy i c i
.
s s
tions o f metaphysic as a separate phenomenon It ,

.
phil o s o ph y .
remains to regard it as a whole and in relation and ,
contrast with other branches Of knowledge M eta .
physic is properly speaking no t a science but a phi

, ,
l o so p h y ; that is it is a science whose end is in itself

, ,
in the gratication and education o f the m i nds which

carry it o n not in any extern al pu r pose such as the
, ,
founding o f any art conducive to the welfare of life .
This is the distinction between science and philo

sophy that science does not include its o w n end but
, ,
is pure knowledge whose end is something external

to itself while philosophy is carried o n for the sake
,
o f the learning and knowing a l one which it involves .
N or is this the popular distinction between intel

lectual pursuits which lead to something and those ,
which only as it is called sharpen the mind Int el

, ,
.
lectual pursuits which are employed to sharpen the

mind are already pursued f o r an end external to
themselves and cann ot deserve the name o f philo
,
sophy. P hilosophy i s p l e a s ura b l e and noble emotion

_
14 TH E S C O PE OF M E TAP H Y S I C .
no less than knowledge ; the two elements are i n

se p arable are logically and not empiric a l ly di scerned
,
.
In other words its end is in itself The need to

,
.
phil osophise is rooted in o u r natur e as deeply as any ,
other of our needs Tutti gl i uomini naturalmente

.
desiderano di sapere says D ante a true philosopher , , ,
i n the opening passage o f his C onvito translating ,

Aristotle s words at the beginning o f his M etaphysic ,

II o Z vveg o c v n o z 7 05 si B m z g y o wm : $ 66 9 1
' '
And P lato '

.

says in the Sophistes m i x xl vxfyv y e fa / ew ao z o u

( , y ) z J
m p 7 56005 z v o c wo o zi m v A nd the attempt to satisfy

'
this need has at all times produced phi losophies ,
which have been founded o n the special sciences as

they from time to time existed and which have taken ,
from the growth and development o f these latter their

o w n form and colour F or the great problems which
.
in all ages have proposed themselves to man such as ,
these Whence he and the world came ; Whither they

,
go ; What is the meani ng o f the whole scene o f ex

i s t e n c e as it unfolds itself before him and of which
, ,
he himself is a part ; Is it truer to explain it by the

analogy Of this o r of that fam i liar phenomenon as
, , ,
o f a dream a tragic or a co m i c drama o f a battle o r

, ,
a war o r a lawsuit o r a j ourney these questions

, ,

and such as these must fo r ever whether answerable ,
o r unanswerable whether conceived as questions o r

,
only as meditations possess for him the profoundest

,
interest ; and to attempt their solution must be o n e

o f his most attractive labours N o w the very con .
di tion o f prosecuting the enquiry is metaphysic that ,
is the analysis o f the phenomena whose history and

,
import is to be studied Before the laws o f the s u c .
cession of phenomena and therefore also before the ,
laws o r law o f their tendency and n a l end the ,

. TII E S C O P E OF M E TAP HY S I C . 15
.
nature o f the phenomena must be analysed This .
analysis o r static a l study o f the nature o f phenomena

is metaphysic M odern philosophy has attained at
.
least to this that it can no t only state the problem to

,
be solved but also lay down the conditions o f its

,
solution with certainty and precision This we o w e .
chiey perhaps to D escartes and Kant But each

, ,
.
age as it advances to a greater distance from these

,
fathers o f modern philosophy must perforce alter ,
something in the systems which they moulded and ,
r e state the o l d questions in terms allied to the a d

-
v a nc i n discoveries o f the sciences o n which meta

g
physical philosophy is founded .
I t is idle to object against metaphysical philosophy

that it is not a special science ; and yet it is into such
an obj ection that most o f the com plaints commonly
made against it are resolvable Fo r i n fact all men .
who reect are metaphysicians a n d a l l sciences have ,
a metaphysical side ; a system o f metaphysic is m erely

a gatherin g up in to o n e conn ected whole the scattered
notions which each reectin g man entertains respect
ing the ultimate nature and scope o f his o w n pursuit .
The difc ul ty is to carry the metaphysic a l method

far enough M en soon become tired o f distingui shing
.
logic a l ly ; they demand that the objects o f reasoni ng

should be exhibited empiricall y or as concrete wholes ,
and ask what the external end o r good is in such

enquiries A s men are most familiar with the special
.
sciences which are a ll empiric a l o r employed with

,
whole objects abstract like the gures o f geometry

, ,
o r concrete li ke those o f the s u n a n d stars they are

,
apt to demand that a ll science sh a l l be r e d uc e d t o the .
same shape that is that metaphysic shal l cease to be

, ,
metaphysic by giving up its distinguishing charac

16 TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP H Y S I C .
This demand when it is made without pre

t e ri s t i c .
,
vion s exam i n ation o f the nature and claims o f meta

physic itself appears to me to be o n e o f Bacon s Idols
,
o f the Theatre E ven Auguste C omte thought that

.
i n establishing his P hilosophie P remi ere in the P oli ,
tique P ositive v o l iv page 1 7 3 which c orresponds

,
. .
,
to the P rima Philosophia of Bacon and is a system ,
o f the few mo st general laws o f a l l the sciences philo
S ophicall y arranged an ana lysis not o f phenomena as

,
such but o f the uni verse of phenomena as a whole

he was carrying the metaphysical method far enough .
He went somewhat farther indeed i n his latest work , , ,
the Synth ese Subj ective but even there he did not ,
g o beyond the notion o f a system o f general laws o f
empi rical phenomena and o f thought occupied with ,
empirical ph e nomena as such In my view, however ,

.
,
this is but a small part o f true metaphysic It goes .

beyond this and refers even such general laws as

,
these to their condi tions and elements without rest ,
i n g satised with h aving it shown that they are the

result o f a complete induction If we are t o have a .
philosophy o r a science which is i t s o w n end o r r e

,
ward i t must advance to the ultimate possible li m it

, ,
and not stop short at the point o f arranging inductive

principles in a philosophic a l mann er ; for this may
aim onl y at the external reward o f aiding the special
sciences .
6 Lord Boli n gbroke in his rst Letter to P ope

.
, ,
Works v o l v page 8 3 4 edi t 1 8 0 9 distinguishes his

, . .
-
, .
,
F irst Phil osophy from what he cal ls metaphysical

pneumatics and from ontology o n the o n e hand and , ,
o n the other from the P rima P hilosophia of Bacon .
P roceeding t o d e s c ri b e what his F irst Philosophy is

he denes it by its theology o r

TH E S C O PE OF ME TAP H Y S I C . 17

theism and natural religion o r ethics
,
I have a l .
ready distingui shed metaphysic from such philosophy

as the P rima P hilosophia o f Bacon and shall later ,
o n distinguish it a l so from ontology ; but I cannot
admit that ethic o r reli gion o r theology are the o b

je c t s o f metaphysic M etaphysic has to .take account
indeed o f every class o f phenomena but i t s special ,
business is with the elements universal and necessary

o f all phenomena alike a s such It must explain all
,
.
without exception and deny none o n pain o f being

,
untrue . But it approaches phenomena from t h e

cogni tive side and treats them a s cogni tions not as
, ,
feelings o r emotions Since the implication o f matter

.
wi th form i n phenomena is univers a l and the i m p li ,
cation o f different ki n ds o f matter with each other is

almost universal the distinction expressed by the
,
Aristotelic if o r the Spinozistic qu a tenus is o f almost

, ,
uni versal application ; and is besides the onl y method , ,
o f obviating the illogical vagueness o f such expres

sions as this rather than that thi s more than
,

that expressions which hav e their ground in the
,
same almost univers a l implication just spoken o f .
F eelings and emotions are the object matter o f ethic -

,
religion and theology rather than o f metaphys i c

, ,
.

What is the reason and extent o f this rather than ?
It is this that since feelings a n d e m o t i o n s are also at

, , '
the same time cognitions metaphysic treats t hem s o ,

'
far as they are cogni tions and ethi c s o far as they are ,
feelin gs and emotions C ogni tions are the object .
matter o f ethic ; n o t however in their character of

cognitions but only s o far as they are feeli n gs o r
,
emotions This is the rst step in the limitation o f

.
ethic ; the next step is that not all feelings and e m o ,
tions as such are the Object matter o f ethic but only

, ,
-
,
C
those feelings and emotions which contain o r with ,
which is combin ed a feeling o r emotion o f a pleasure

,
able or painful kind E thic thus becomes the general

.
s 01 enc e o f practice as distinguished from pure speen

,
lation E thic is a systematic cognition of feelings

.
,
metaphysic o f cognitions .
R eligion is a term for a p articular and important

class o f ethical emotions namely those which are of , ,
a spiritual kind o r which satisfy the sense o f delight

,
i n g i n what is right as distinguished from what is

wrong that is which satisfy the conscience R e
, ,
.
l i gi o n consists of emotions Thou shalt love the .
Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy ,
soul and with all t h y mind ; and thy neighbour as

,
thyself o n these two commandments hang all the

Law and the P rophets M a t t h xxii 3 7 But now .

. . .
,
looking away from the particular emotions which

constitute any particular religion the C hristian for ,
instance religion itself in the abstract h a s never been

,
in vestigated o r its nature analysed with sufcient

, ,
accuracy It w ill however be fo un d I apprehend

.
, ,
that it consists in the union o f two charact eristics ,
1 s t that it is an emotion o f some particular kind as

, ,
love o r hope ; 2d that the moral goodness o f this

, ,
emotion is self evident that is the emotion is felt as

-
, ,
an ultimate end i n itself as being its o w n warrant , ,
needing a n d admitting no proof o f its moral goodness

beyond its actual presence in consciousness All .
those emotions and only tho s e which contain this

, ,
second characteristic are religious emotions R eli .
gion is spiritual emotion .
Theology is the e m b o d i rn e nt o f religion in doc

trines that is in cogni tions which give it a shape
, , ,
cognisable by the in tellect and relate either to the ,

20 TH E S C O PE OF ME TAP H Y S I C .
o ne Of the two things distinguished by it namely , ,
consciousness are together the fact which D escartes

,
here asserts to be beyond the possibility o f doubt .
The rst reection is the rst certainty the rst cer ,
tainty as distinguished from undoubting acquiescence .
And thus reection is t h e starting point o f p h i l o so

phy ; the Object asserted b y it as certain conscious -
ness is the thing which is the object o f philosophy of

, ,
which reection is one mode There are then two .
senses in which the C ogito o r the Co gi t a t ur o f D es

cartes is to be taken one In which it stands for the ,
act o f reection the other in which it stands for o n e

,
o f the two objects o f reection consciousness gene ,
rally He begins by seeing what thin gs he is not

.
certain o f beyond the possibility o f doubt N early .
every thing is in this category ; at last he puts the

question about Sense ; M editatio II Sentire ?
nempe etiam h o c non t sin e corpore e t p e rm ul t a ,
sentire visus sum in s o m ni i s qu ae d e i nd e a ni m a d v e rt i

me non s e n s i s s e : Here sense is n o t distinguished
from the objects o f sense ; it therefore shares their
uncertainty He proceeds : C ogitare ? hic i nv e ni o
.
,
c o
g i t a t i o e st h a ec sola ,
a me divelli n e
q ui t ego s u m , ,

ego existo c e rt u m e s t ,
Here at last he can d i s
.
t i ngui s h consciousness from i t s obj ects the operation ,
from the res ul ts In the next page he follows up .
his enquiry : Sed quid igitur s um ? res c o gi t a n s ;

quid e s t h o c ? nempe d ub i t a n s i nt e l li ge n s a f rm a n s , , ,
ne a ns
g volens
, nolens i m a,gi n a n s quoque ,
e t s e n ,

tiens . E t s e nt i e n s here sense is distinguished
,
from its objects and is become part o f the i n d ub i t

able operation o f reection itself o f the C ogito o r the ,
Co gi t a t ur Here is the rst answer to the question

.
What is it to exist o r What is existence ? E xistence ,

TH E S C O PE O F M E TAP H Y S I C . 21
is consciousness generally i n some o r all o f its modes ; ,
o r in other words that exists which is revealed by

,
consciousness .
No w the current theory I believe is this that , , ,
existence o r Being far exceeds consciousness ; that

many things exist o f which we actually have n o t and ,
many other things o f which we cannot h ave the least ,
knowledge ; that consciousness may and does make

progress in penetrating into the former eld that o f ,
actually unknown existence and in making many ,
things actually known to us which before were a o

t u a l l y unkno w n but existing beyond o u r knowledge ;
,
while it is debarred from all progress whatever in

the latter eld that o f unknowable existence which
, ,
nevertheless is actually existing b e yond o ur possi

b i l i t y o f knowledge If we s o conceive consciousness
.
,
may be likened t o a candle shining in a vast circle o f

darkness which it tends to ill uminate more and more ,
while beyond this circle is a space o f neither light n o r

darkness which cannot by its nature b e ever illu
, , ,

m i n a t e d by the candle s rays however powerful they ,
may become There is thus formed a notion o f an

.
exi stence real and actual but o ut o f all relation to

, ,
consciousness not only unknown at present but un

, ,
knowable for ever ; an Obj ective existence which can

never become subj ective an existence absolute per , ,
s e a world Of things i n themselves

,
- -
.
But to this existence I prefer t o give the name

n o n objective existence
-
for I think it wi l l becom e
,
clear as we advance that consciousness is li mited,
onl y by existence no less than existence is lim i ted

,
only by consciousness ; that the two thin gs are c o

extensive ; that each is the opposite aspect o f the
other the gold and silver side o f the same shield
, .
22 TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP HY S I C .
F rom whichever side we approach that side seems ,
to us the smaller of the two appears as a li m i t i m ,
posed O n the other If we approach from the s ub .
e c t i v e side aski ng what we c a n know what can

j , ,
become an object o f o u r consciousness then we r e ,
present to ourselves possible existence as far exceed

ing consciousness and consciousness as conquering
,

certain limits o f existence w o n from the void a n d ,
formless in ni te If o n the other hand we approach

.
from the obj ective side and ask what exists o r is ,
capable o f existing then existence seems a small part

,
o f what we can imagine o r conceive to exist to be as ,
it were an oasis o f rm actu al ground in the m i ddle

o f the desert o f the great M ight b e o r M ight have -
,
-
been In the rst case there appears to be a great

.
eld o f non objective existence in the second case o f

-
, ,
non existing i magination o r conception The truth

-
.
appears to be that existence and consciousness are

,
coextensive one as wide as and not wider than the

, , ,
other . N o n objective existence and non re a l con

-
,
-
s c i o u sn e s s in conceiving o r imagining are terms with ,
o u t meaning Whatever can be present in conscious

.
ness has some degree o f reality the only question i s , ,
how much o r o f what sort how permanent how

, , ,
arrived at There may be names which are names

.
only whether the things supposed to be signied by

,
them are supposed to lie in non objective existence -
o r in non real c onsciousness

-
And if we attempt .
to describe the subordinate position supposed to be

occupied either by consciousness to non objective ex -
i s t e n c e or by existence to non re a l consciousness this

,
-
,
very description is and can onl y be by means o f , ,
expressions which i n regard to this case are gura

tive being drawn from cases o f real consciousness
,
T HE S C O PE OF ME TAP H Y S I C . 23
and re a l existence . The language borrowed from

experience within time and space i s here made use o f
to express o ur relation t o thi ngs supposed for the
moment to exist beyond time and space beyond c o n ,
s c i o usne s s . How else can absolute impossibili ty o f

knowledge be characterised except by gurative lan ,
guage ? Fo r whatever man can name that he th i nks ,
he can in some way know and that by naming the ,
unknowable he bri ngs it within the grasp of his know

ledge ; and whether he in fact is s o o r n o t he n e c e s
, ,
s a ri l makes h i m s e l f i n the proceedings o f hi s con

y
s c i o u s n e s s m i xn y A t e o v O n the o n e hand then the
-
/
( a
g .
, ,
attempt to characterise existence beyond the possi

b i li t y o f o ur knowledge requires the use o f gurative
expressions drawn from existence within o ur know
ledge ; and o n the oth er hand there is a natural and ,
spontaneous assumption that every thing that exists

stands in some nameable relation t o o ur conscious
ness All the meani ng o f the names applied to ex
.
i s t e n c e beyond consciousness is drawn from existence

within consciousness ; and there is a spontaneous as
sumption that we are warranted in applyi n g those
names In other words the terms applied to non
.
,
objective existence such as absolute per s e beyond

, , ,
experience t ranscendent and s o o n have a connota

, , ,
tion but no Object denoted by them Y et the very

,
.
making use o f them implies the assumption that there

is something denoted by them If then there is .
, ,

something denoted by them this something has pre ,
d i c a t e s drawn from actu a l experience and is o f the ,

'
same nature as objects o f actual experience E ither .
the term n o n objective existence is a name without

-
meaning o r the object to which it is applied is an

,
object within the range o f o ur knowledge In the .

24 TH E S C O PE OF ME TAP H Y S I C .
latter case it is synonymous with objective existence ,
o r existence simply Agai n with regard to the term

.
,
existence E ither the term existence h a s a meani ng

.
,
o r i t h a s none ; if it has none it would be better to ,
cease employing it ; but i f it has a meaning then it ,
must be to the extent o f that meaning an intell i gible

, ,
object o f consciousness So that we can name n o .
thin g with a meaning In the name but what has

, ,
objective existence o r existence fo r consciousness .
T o s um up all in a few words it I s Impossible to ,
know that any thing exists without at the same ,
time knowi ng somethin g o f what it is o r o f what we ,
imagine it t o be .
It i s the assumption o f the subordi nate position o f

consciousness t o existence o f this primary relation of ,
limiti n g and limited o f revealer and revealed which

, ,
is the ultimate ground o f the distinc t ion between

phenomena and things i n themselves the Kantian - -
,
D inge a n sich If a limit which would n o t other

- -
.
,
wise have existed is imposed by the Subject that is

, , ,
by the fact that a l l existence h a s t o be made k nown

to us if at all through consciousness then we must
, ,
assume the possibil ity Of ther e existing both in the ,
things we are conscious o f and also beyond them that ,
is both as to quality and as to quantity both as to

, ,
i n tension and as t o protension something which we ,
do not a n d cann ot know ; not only which we cannot

know perfe c tly but which we cann ot know even
,
i m perfectly that is at all

,
The primary dualism
,
.
o f subject and Object when conceived as the s ub

,
ordi n ation o f consciousness to existence the limita ,
tion o f existence by consciousness the revelation o f ,
existence within certain lim its subjective in their

,
nature by consciousness if unbala nced by the coun

, ,
TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP H Y S I C . 25 .
ter conception o f the subor di nation o f existence t o

consciousness gives an intended meani ng t o the ex
,
pression thi ngs i n themselves and at the s ame t ime

- -
,
b a nishes them from o ur consideration ; a dm its t h e

possibili ty o f their existin g but condemns them to ,
a n o n objective existence ; and if the term existence

-
has a meaning this conception i s self contradi ctory

,
-
.
But the same primary du a l ism when conceived a s a ,
duali sm o f two equal and coextensive factors o r mem

bers mutu a l ly li mi tin g each other is the ground o f
, ,
the expressions All knowledge is relative and Al l

, ,
existence is relative existence And o ne consequence .
o f disregarding metaphysic and busying the mind ,
exclusively with Objective exi stence is that obj ects , ,
themselves the phenomena o f experience come t o

, ,
be considered as things i n themselves ; and thus the - -
popular view o f them i s practically and as by a kind ,
o f forgetfulness adopted by men o f science who

, ,
would be the last willingly t o accept it .
Let us adopt fo r a moment this hypothesis o f a

thing i n itself a D ing a n sich No w what is this D in g
- -
,
- -
.
a n sich which we reject from knowledge and from

-
objective existence o r rath er what is it not ? C on ,
s c i o u s n e s s we will suppose for the moment carves ,

,
o u t from existence the obj ective world ; the D ing

a n sich is that which c annot be reached o r affected
-
by consciousness ; and thus wherever we nd an ,
uni versal law o r mode o f consciousness there we ,
assume that we may be in contact with the D ing

a n sich
-
If things which exist in time and space
.
are t o that extent knowable by u s then the D ing

, , ,
a n sich which is by hypothesis unknowable must be

-
, ,
independent o f those forms ; and if things which can

impress o r a ffect o ur sensibil ity a re s o far kn owable ,
26 T HE S C O P E OF ME T AP H Y S I C .
then the D ing a n sich cannot be capable o f i mpressing

- -
o u r sensibility for otherwise it would be knowable

,
.
Thus we are guided in o ur notions of what it is not ,
and ipso facto unable to conjecture what it is It .
will be seen in the course o f the E ssay whether there

are any positive grounds for supposing that relative
existence is in ni te in any sense ; that is for holding ,
that there can be n o existence beyond some at least

o f o ur capacities for knowledge F or it may well .
be that o ur consciousness may be li m ited in some

respects and unlimited in others ; if now in any r e
spect it is unlimited in that respect it will include
,
all existence ; objective and relative existence itself

will be u nl imited in that respect ; and the D ing a n -
sich will in that respect vanish If the necessary and .
universal forms o f consciousness are themselves i n

ni te then the D ing a n sich if it exists at all must be
,
- -
, ,
included in them and i n that respect o r to that ex

, ,
tent cease t o be a D ing a n sich

,
- -
.
O n the non existence o f the D ing a n sich s e e

- - -
,

Schell ing s V om Ich Oder ti ber das U nbedin gte
, ,
Vol i o f collected Works p 2 1 0 And o n the

. .
,
. .
complete mutuali ty o f the subjective and O b jective

kingdoms s e e his masterly E inl eitung in the Ideen
, ,
z u einer P hilosophie der N atur V ol ii o f collected . .

,
Works It is the lasting servic e o f the post Kanti

.
-
philosophers F i c h t e Schelling and Hegel each in l l l S

, , , ,
degree to have established the doctrine o f the perfect

,
coextensiveness and mutuality o f existence and con

s c i o u sn e s s But it is not necessary it is even for
.
,
bidden by the method in which alone this doctrine

can be proved to follow them i n characterising this
,
coextensiveness and mutuality as identity o r as the ,
Absolute The union of the inni te and the ni te

.
,
28 . THE S C O PE OF M E TAP H Y S I C .
vielen versagt scheint D aher die Unfa h i gke i t sich

.
,
'
die reine Subjekt O b je kt i v i t a t der absoluten F orm a l s

-
absolute E inheit z u denken But I ask by what .

,
'

right can that which constantly appears as third
.

be transformed into that which is in itsel f rst
It can only be done by abstracting from the form O f
time i n o ne moment in order to exhibit the obj ect
,
in its essence o r value an essence simultaneous with

,
the object itself and then the next moment r e intro

,
-
d u c i ng the form o f ti m e i n order to exhibit the object

,
in its essence as prior to the obj ect as a phenomenon .
Taking for instance any series o f phenomena i n order

, ,
o f history the last phenomenon o r the result o f the

, , ,
series is analysed into its elements in order of logic ;

and then that element which is most important in
order o f logic where abstraction is made o f time
, ,
being necessary to the existence o f the whole pheno

menon analysed is considered to have been present
,
as a cause from the rst in the earliest phenomenon ,
o f the series in order o f history It is true that what .
is rst i n order of history is Often last in order of

cognition ; but where the cogni tion is a logi cal c o gni
tion considering i t s o b je c t staticall y and classing its
, ,
elements i n order o f logical im portance there it does ,
not follow that what is last i n order o f cogni tion o r ,
rst in order o f logic is rst also in order o f history

,
.
Thus founded on the dualism o f subject and o b

,
je c t conceived as two equal and coextensive members

,
o r factors there arises before us the conception o f the

,
world di stingui shed not divided into two ki n gdoms

, ,
the kingdom o f knowi n g and the ki ngdom of being , ,
a principium c o gn o s c e n di a n d a principium e x i s t e n d i .
A s in a court o f justice guilt does not exist till it is

proved s o here existence is nothing until known
, .
TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP H Y S I C . 29
But we require if possible some more speci a l know

, ,
ledge O f this dualism ; we wish t o s e e the modu s

operandi o f consciousness its method and its nature ;
, ,
to s e e whether besides witnessing t o the fact and to

, ,
some particular modes o f existence it witnesses also

, ,
to any necessary o r u ni versal modes o f it I t was .
such questions as these which received an answer in

the doctrines o f Kant as to time and space which ,
doctrines will be reconsidered i n these pages The .
doctrines o f Kant form a system which n o t only is

more complete than any that preceded it but also ,
contains principles which are the rm e s t foundation

for the labours o f succeeding phi losophers The mar .
v e l l o u s system o f Hegel reposes o n a Kantian basis ;
but reasons wi ll be given later o n for the conclusion ,
that this was not the true edice which should have
arisen o n that foundation The fundamental prin .
c i l e s still remain and the following pages are an

p ;
attempt rst to analyse and interpret them and then
, , ,
to raise o n them the true superstructure o f philo

sophy M uch will be found in thi s E ssay which has
.
been said and in many instances far better said by

, ,
other post Kantian writers Schel l ing Hegel C ole

-
, , ,
ridge Schopenh auer Sir W Hamilton M r M ansel

, ,
.
,
.
,
P rofessor F e rri e r M r J S Mill M r H Spencer

,
. . .
,
. .
,
for instance ; resemblances to whose doctrines and ,
diff erences from them and at the same time also

,
some o f my many obligations to their writings wi ll ,
disclose themselves to the reader a s he proceeds .
What is distinctive and new i n it will I think be , ,
found to arise chiey from its keeping more exclu

si v el
y t o a purely metaphysic al as distinguished ,
from either a psychological or an ontological point ,
of view .
TH E S C O P E OF ME TAP H Y SI C .
8 . What is the difference between psychology

and metaphysic ? A difference in their object matter -
.
The Object matter o f psychology is the mind o r con

-
,
s c i o u s n e s s in relation to the bodily organs whic h a r e
its seat ; that of metaphysic is consciousness in rela

tion to its obj ects . P sychology is thus a special part
o f physiology that part which links physiology to
, .
metaphysic ; it is a special science o r a portion o f

special science and may be called the natural history
,
o f consciousness To put the distinc tion between

.
metaphysic and psychology in another shape it may ,
be said that psychology regards the mind and its

states o f consciousness as members o f the kingdom o f
Being alone ; while for metaphysic they in common ,
with all other kinds o f obj ects are considered as mem ,
bers o f both the kingdoms of Being and Knowing .
Thus psychology is occupied not only with the organs

o f consciousness its material conditions and its con
, , ,
d i t i o n s o f existence but also with its results con

,
s i d e r e d as Objects that is with the laws o f the asso

, ,
c i a t i o n o f ideas and l i a t i o n o f Opinions and systems

,
o f philosophy as concrete phenomena o f conscious

,
ness ; while metaphysic is busied with these obj ects

onl y s o far as they are objects o f consciousness ; in
order rst t o di st inguish in them their subjective
, ,
from their objective aspect and secondly to analyse , ,
them into their component parts and classify the ,
elements which compose them .
.9 M etaphysic has been characterise d in I as , ,
the appli ed logic o f the u ni verse A s such it is an .
entirely statical and not a dynamical theory In .
other words it is no theory of the causae e x i s t e n d i of

,
the world o r of conscio usness ; it does not give the

origin or the genesis o f existence ; this s o far as it is ,
T HE S COP E OF ME TAPH Y S I C . 31
possible is the task o f the special empirical sciences

, ,
whether physical o r psychical But it is the causa .
e s s e n di o r nature
,
o f the world o f existence which
,
metaphysic undertakes to examin e ; to analyse the

structure o f Objects as objects o f consciousness and to
, ,
resolve them i nto their elements It does n o t pretend .
to determine whether the ultimate elements which it ,
reaches in its analysis existed separately prior to the ,
wholes o r empiric a l obj ects which are their synthesis ,
n o r to show how this is possible Such a problem .
would be o f a dynamical nature There is no reason .
given in metaphysic for supposing that historically in ,
the order Of nature the si mple existed before the ,
compound stil l less that the a priori elements existed

,
separately before the empirical objects which yield

them to o u r analysis What is rst in analysis is .
last in synthesis and vice vers a ; but both analysis

,
and synthesis whether employed upon particular

,
obj ects o f perception o r upon general notions o r uni

versals are modes o f static a l enquiry and warrant
, ,
no conclusion as to what is rst and what last in

dynamical enquiry o r in the order o f history How
,
.
consciousness is produced how motion arises in o b ,
e c t s h o w feelings come to b e combined with c o ni

j , g
tions how the world itself came into existence
, ,
these are questions with which metaphysic has n o

thing to do ; metaph ysic has but to accept the facts
as they are and to an a l yse them into their simplest
,
elements What and where are the elephant the

.
,
tortoise and the stone these are dynami cal not

,

,
statical empirical not metaphysical questions ; they

, ,
relate to the history of empirical events not t o the ,
analysis Of facts .
T o mistake the ultimate elements in an alysis for

the rst empirical e xistences i n historical o rder o f

time and from this to suppose that metaphysic can
,
o r ought to assign a cause o r causes o f existence to
the universe is to transform metaphysic into onto

,
logy N ot indeed by the route of t h e D ing a n sich

.
- -
,
o r by that o f an imagined substance o r substratum of
objects but by a route not less cert ain If in meta

,
.
physic we can go s o far back in a n a l y s1 s as to name ,
elements o f objects which are themselves a priori o r

logically previous to all experience and non empi -
ri c a l
,
it is directly contrary to o ur o w n procedure
and principles to make these into caus ae e x i s t e n d i of
empirical objects ; for to do s o we must rst trans
form them i n to empiric a l obj ects themselves .
O ntology rests on the transformation o f a b s t r a c

tions into complete objects o r complete existences .
But all ontological systems do n o t adopt the same

kind o f abstractions to transform in to complete exist
e nc e s . O n e route t o ontology has just been pointed
o ut
,
that which adopts abstract elements o f objects
o r o f cog ni tions for this purpose There is another
.
which adopts abstract aspects o f phenomena that is , ,
either their Objective o r their subjective aspect An .

instance o f the rst is Spino z a s system instances of ,

the second are Schelling s and Hegel s Spinoza re .
gards the Absolute as Substance Schelli ng as R eason

, ,
Hegel as M ind All such transformation is foreign

.
to metaphysic whose last word is a nalysis

,
.
C HAP T E R II .
TH E NAT UR E OF TH E C O G NI T I ONS O F T IM E AND S PAC E .
ni
I n ni t um i l li n c i d e m q ue p e r o m a ni s ,
tu hi
A q e e o ni t um p p i in
ro r o s e ne v e id tu r .
G i
o rd a n o B ru n o .
1 0 H UME
. has the merit o f being o ne o f those phi
l o s 0p h e rs w h o have kept closest t o phenomena them
selves without m i xing up with the analysis o f them
,
considerations o f their possibl e origin o r causes ; phe

nomena a r e with him t h e beginning middle and end , ,
o f his investigations But in doing this h e produced

.
a picture o f the universe as if it were unconn ected ,
the work o f chance incoherent ; especia l ly was this

,
the case with his theory o f causation whi ch led Kant ,
to undertake a still more searching investigation o f

phenomena resulting in a discovery in phenomena
,
themselves o f the principl e o f their connection and

consistence He did this by directing his attention
.
to an o l d distinction which had its origin with the

philosophers o f Greece and was always considered
o n e o f the cardinal distinctions o f philosophy the ,
-
di stinction o f M atter and F orm This di stinction

.
,
taken together with that between analytic and syn

thetic judgments is the corner stone t h e guiding
,
-
,

thread in Kant s work the Kritik der R einen V er
, ,
nun ft ; and o n that point p hi losophy 1 s st l standin g

il .
The application which Kant made o f this di stinction ,
the part icular shape which his system built upon it

,
D
34 TH E NAT URE O F TH E C O G NITI ONS
assumed has been often and in many points success

, ,
full y attacked ; yet the distinction remains a n essen

,
tia l and an ulti mate one and especially s o in that

,
matter to which he rst applied it the theory o f per ,
c e p t i o n ; the distinction itself apart from the theory

,
which Kant built upon it is sound And this dis

, .
tinction will be buil t upon throughou t the course of

this E ssay with what success remains to be proved
,
by the event .
But there is another distinction onl y less import ,
ant and g eneral than that between matter and form ,
which owing its origin equally to Grecian antiquity

, ,
is also equally applicable and essential n o w to meta

physical questions ; and o n this distinction in a d ,
dition to that between matter and form and in con ,
junction with i t I hope t o establish the theory o f thi s

,
E ssay Aristotle drew the distinction between 7 5 57 77

. 5

and Bevr ga o zm a in the C ategories ; the Schoolmen ,
o r rather I believe the N o m i n a l i s t s among t h e School
men transformed this distinction into o n e between

,
prima and secunda intentio anim i S e e William o f

.
O ckham Summ a t o t i u s Lo gi c ae P ars I cap xii xiv

, ,
. . . .
N ow without entering into the question as to the

exact meaning attached by Aristotle o r the School
m e n to these phrases I will give what I think is the
,
true modern shape of the distinction as available for ,
philosophical discussions a t the present day retaining ,
the nomenclature o f the N o m i n a l i st s and distinguish

ing rst from second intentions .
It is a current theory at the present day that all ,
perception includes comparison ; n o t onl y that a pro

cess t a k es place in the nerves or brain which is equi
valent to or r esults in comparison but that when we ,
perceive any object we perceive it as a di stinct obj ect

36 T HE NA T U R E OF T HE C O GNIT I O NS
act perception o f all other objects is an act o f com

,
parison The rst and simplest obj ects of perception

.
are complex all other obj ects of perception are com

,
pounds o f these .
But now are the rst and simplest objects o f per

c e t i o n complex ?
p The reply can only be N ame any '
,
object that is not s o abstract o r c o n c r e t e a thought

, ,
o r a th i ng There will be found t o be none ; and for

.
this assertion to be proved true I trust rather to the ,
course o f this E ss a y as a whole than to any remarks

which I could make here at once The object per .
c e i v e d and the act of perceiving it are then each of
them complex even in the case o f the least possible

,
object or moment of consciousness .
But to call the act and the obj ect complex is to

c all it distinguishable into parts o r elements in itself ;
for otherwise it would be simple Here then we . .
reach the distinction mentioned in the preceding

chapter between empirical and metaphysical objects ;
empirical Objects are complex complete objects , ,
met aphysical Objects are incomplete elementary o b , ,
c t s o nl y in combination forming complex complete

j e , ,
o r empirical Objects See the distinction between

.
metaphysical and physical analysis stated and applied

to the distinction between matter and form in Cior ,

dano Bruno s D ialogue D e la C ausa P rincipio e t U no ,
;

III
. vol i p 2 5 2 Wagner s edit The same holds
. . .
,
.
o f acts ; empirical acts are complex and complete

;
metaphysical acts are the elements or moments o f these .
And both metaphysical acts and metaphysic a l objects

differ from empirical acts and objects by having an

existence only in logic M y ? (M r/a v vegy efga B o f}
,
.
N ow the case O f the metaphysical objects or ele

m ents in perception I leave for the present content ,
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 37
with having h ere shown their nature and position .
But I follow up the c ase o f the metaphysical acts ,
elements o r moments of the empirical act O f percep

,
tion since this will lead most readily to the d i s t i n c

,
tion between rst and second intentions The s i m .
l e s t empirical act o f perception includes it has been

p ,
seen three elementary acts : 1 s t the perception o f

,
element A 2d the perception o f element B 3 d the

, ,
perception o f their relation ; these three taken t o

gether constitute the empirical perception o f the
object A o r o f the element A as a n obj ect But
,
.
how is it known that these are the elementary acts

and these the elementary objects included in the em
i r i c a l perception when by hypothesis the three ele
p ,
mentary acts and Objects cannot be known separately ?
Solely by analogy from cases where an empirical o b

j ec t is compared with other empirical Obj ects and
perceived in consequence as what it is ; where fo r
instance an object is perceived as a marble statue
from being classed with former o r other instances o f
marble statues F rom the analysis o f the doubly
.
concrete case names are given to the elements in the

analysis of the simply concrete case where the mem ,
bers o f the analysis are not concrete perceptions but

elements o f perception We name the metaphysic a l
.
elements of analysis as if they were empiric a l objects

o f perception ; but this cannot alter thei r nature and
give them independ ent existence Let us now ex .
amine the d oubly concrete case farther What is the .
character o f the three acts o f perception wh ich c o n

s t i t ut e it ? They are not all exactly alike If I had .
never seen marble statues before should I be unable

,
to s e e this o n e if it were presented t o me ? I should

not be unable If I had had no sight before sho ul d
.
,
38 TH E NAT U R E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
I be unable to s e e this marble statue if it were pre

sented to me ? I should still s e e it If I had had .
no sensations at all before the statue was presented

to me should I be unable to s e e it o n i t s being pre
,
sented ? I should s t ill s e e it I should have the .
sensation o f whiteness and o f a certain extension o f

whiteness but I should not know what that sensation
,
o r that extension was If now I had seen other o b

.
e c t s I should know something more o f this sensation

j ,
by comparison with them ; if I had seen other marble

statues I should know that this was o f the same sort
, ,
though I should not know the m e a nm g o f its being

o f the same sort o r o f the term sameness
,
Here we .
have the three concrete acts contained in the doubly

concrete act o f perception The rst is that which .
presents o r in which is present ed the object in ques

tion as it would be presented to a man w h c had had
,
no other perceptions The second is that in which

.
certain other Objects marble statues I n thi s case are

, ,
presented o r represented as the case may be ; and ,
the third is that in which the object o f the rst act

is classed with or excluded from the objects o f the
second act Here are three concrete acts o f percep
.
tion s o closely connected together and performed s o

quickly that they can only be di stinguished by close
,
mental inspection ; but yet each act a complete em

p i ri c a l act n o t only,
existing logically o r as a meta
physical act and with a separate character o f its o w n
,
.
The rst o f these three acts o f perception I call a

perception Of an object in its rst intention ; when
we perceive an obj ect as a man would perceive it
who s a w I n I t an object for the rst time or when we ,
voluntaril y abstract from a p erceived obj ect all that
is imported into it by o ur perceptions o f other rela

OF TI ME A ND S PAC E . 39
tions and obj ects in both o f these cases I call it

,
having before us an object in i t s rst intention The .
rst case arises in perception and witho ut volition ,
the second arises in reasoning and in consequence o f

volition; the rst case is intuitional the second 10 ,
i c a l ; the rst a percept the second a concept The

g ,
.
second o f the three acts composing the doubly con

crete perception may o r may n o t give an Obj ect in its
rst intention ; if a man had seen but o n e marble
statue before the representation o f that would be a
,
rst intention ; but usually the class to which an

object is referred in perception is perceived as an
object or collection o f objects in the second in tention .
The third o f the three constitutive acts gives already

an object in its second intention fo r we cannot s up
,
pose that the relation whi ch is its object is thought

, ,
o f o r perceived i n such an abstract way as would
make it fall under the second o r logic a l class o f rst

intentions F inall y the whole doubly concrete per
.
c e t i o n itself the perception o f the Obj ect as a marble

p ,
statue is a perception o f the obj ect in its second i n

,
tention ; and this is the perception which is properly

opposed to the rst o f the three constitutive percep
tions namely that o f the object in its rst intention
, ,
.
F irst intentions may accordingly be dened a s Objects

i n relation to consciousness alone ; second intentions ,
as objects in relation to other objects in consciousness .
The di stinction between rst and second i n t e n

tions though arising in perception can onl y be em
ployed by logic ; it is discovered in perception by
an a l ytical reasoning ; it is a fact in all domains o f
consciousness but it is a n in strument only i n reason
,
ing
. The neglect o f this di stinction I believe t o
vitiate more arguments than the neglect o f any other
40 THE NA TU RE OF T HE C O GNIT I ON S
logical di stinction perhaps with t h e sole exception o f
,
that between the caus ae e x i s t e n d i e s s e n d i and cog , ,
n o s c e n di O n this di stinction between rst and second

.
intentions h a n gs that between deni tion and d e s c ri p

tion for the doctrine that all perception incl u des
comparison taken without the limits here assign ed to
,
it has naturally led to the conf usion between the two

,
kinds of acts It was thought that all perception not

.
only included but could be analysed into acts o f com

parison and as description was the result o f compari
, ,
s o n therefore i t was concluded de ni tion must be a

, , ,
result o f comparison also and therefore only a more ,
accurate kind o f description The fact however i s .

,
that it is as necessary to keep description and d e ni

tion separate as it is to keep separate rst and second
,
intentions D eni tion is the exp ression Of a rst

.
intention descrip t ion o f a second intention ; denition

,
ought to give those qualities of an object which b e

long to it by itself without reference to other objects
, ,
o r to whether these qualities belong to other objects
a lso ; description ought to give those qualities which
show the tness o f an object for such and such a pur

pose its similarity to its rank and importance among
, , ,
other objects ; de n ition gives the analysis o f an O b

j ec t, description characterises it D enition and de .
s cription supply a corrective fo r the unavoidable

ambiguity i nvolved i n the shortness o f single nam
The name o f an object may be meant to be taken o r
may be actually taken to mean either the rst or ,
second intention o f the ob ject it is applied to or a m ,
b i gu o u sl y to cove r both E xpand the name however

.
i nto a sentence or a phrase and it is more easily seen ,
w hether it results in a denition o r a description

,
whether the sentence presents a n object intended to

OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 41
be kept strictly and solely before the mind in the

traits mentioned o r whether its equ a lity o r inequality
, ,
its similarity o r dissimilarity to other objects its

, ,
relative position and importance is the thin g present ,
to the mi nd o f the speaker It may be as ked How

.
,
can a deni tion express a rst intention since a d e ,
ni t i o n consists o f t w o objects at the very least con

, ,
n e c t e d together since it expresses the analysis of the

,
Object o r name t o be dened ? The answer i s that ,
any object however complex may be made a rst

, ,
intention by keeping it alone before the mind and

separat ing it from other objects ; it may include any
number o f relations within it but m ust not be com
,
pared with objects without it It is then an obj ect

.
in relation t o consciousness a l one as distin guished ,
from an object in relation t o other obj ects in con

s c i o u s n e s s ; an object taken in relation to other objects
in consciousness is a different obj ect from itself o u t

o f that relation ; the t w o sets o f obj ects together b e
come a new object i n the rst intention The d i s .
tinction o f objects of rst and second intention is

discovered to exist i n very simpl e cases o f empirical
perception but this di stinction found in nature and
, ,
independent o f o u r volition is capable of being a p

,
plied vol untarily to other cases in reasonin g ; the

process o f nature in perception can be repeated v o l un
t a ri l y in reasoni ng . The discovery o f it i n perception
shows that it is a natural and legitimate process it ,
does n o t restrict the process to the spontaneous pro

c e e d i n s o f consciousness The names of simple feel
g .
ings o r the feelings themselves cannot be dened for ,
instance the sensation White If a denition is a t

.
tempted i t must be by a reference to something else ,
for instance by its causes as the meeting of a parti

,
T HE N AT UR E OF TH E C O GNITI O N S
o nlar ray of light wi th the retina o r by its effects as, ,
the absorption o f rays O f heat o r by its relations as the

, ,
opposite o f black ; and in these cases there arises a de

scription o f White and we have before us a new object
,
composed o f the original Object White and some o f , ,
its relations to other obj ects and the description o f

,
White is a deni tion not o f the original obj ect but

o f this together with some o f its relations to other
objects ; and o f this object there is perhaps no single

n a me but the d efinition serves for one and this object
, ,
is an object of the rst intention The same phrase .
may be a deni tion o f an object and a description o f

part o f it a denition of it i n its rst intention and a
,
description of that part Of it in its second intention .
There may be names o f complex obj ects as well as o f

simple objects there may be descriptions o f complex
,
objects as well as simple ; but there can be denitions

only o f complex objects There may be names o f
.
simple obj ects o f the rst intention as well as o f com

plex objects of the rst intention ; but there can be
denitions only o f complex objects o f the rst i nt e n
tion ; which is equivalent to saying that deni tions
belong t o reasoning a voluntary process of conscious
,
ness while names belong both to spontaneous and to

,
voluntary processes o f consciousness both to percep ,
tion and to reasoning F rom this it also follows that

.
denitions are not necessarily denitions o f names ,
there may be denitions o f objects o f which there are

not names and there may be names o f objects of
,
which there are not denitions Both names and .
deni tions are marks for others o r expressions fo r ,
ourselves o f objects of consciousness ; marks which

,
have their distinctive properties and uses The fol .
lowing is a distinction o f objects which wa s current

44 T H E NA T UR E OF T HE C O GNI T I O NS
whom are and some Of whom a r e not patriots and ,
I indicate his comparative value among men by the

description But if in saying these words I x my
.
thoughts o n what D emosthenes is irrespective of ,
what other men are and place him as an Obj ect

,
before me as a man who feels and acts from the

,
feeling o f love to his country I ha ve before me an ,
entirely different object an Object composed o f D e

,
m o s t h e n e s and his cou ntry and his feelings and acts

towards his country ; and this is an obj ect in the
rst intention and the words which convey o r ex
,
press this Object are a denition and not a d e s c r i p

tion ; they may not be a perfect denition the perfect ,
denition o f an Obj ect s o complex as a human being

would ll a book but they are part of a denition
,
and not part of a description The use o f names and

.
phrases in the rst intention implies neither praise

nor blame but states simply facts o f analysis ; but
,
their use in the second intention involving com ,
parison with others nearly always implies either

,
praise o r blame ; and thus the confusion between

the two intentions is not onl y the fruitful source o f
errors in reasoning but o f quarrels in practice when ,
words spoken in the rst intention without arriere ,
pense are understood in the second i ntention as i m

,
.
plying blame D eni tions and descriptions have n o

.
marks in grammatical form o r structure by which

they can be distinguished from each other ; if they
had the subj ect would have been cleared up long
,
ago ; but the Objec t s which they expr ess the things ,
signied by them are essentially different It is o f

,
.
the utmost importance in reasoni ng to distinguish

which kind of object or s i gni c a t um it is which i s
expressed or concealed by a word or s et o f words ;
, ,
whether that object is a rst or a second intention ,
and the set o f words a deni tion o r a description .
True as it is that the subtilty of nature far surpasses

the subtilty o f thought it is no less true that the ,
subtilty of thought far surpasses the subtilty o f lan

guage It may be hoped that some day o r other
.
, ,
language will develop forms corresponding to the

above di stinguished forms o f consciousness .
1 1 I return now to the point passed over shortly

.
before the consideration of the analysis o f objects into

,
their metaphysical elements and make an appl ication ,
o f the distinction now established between rst and
second intentions An analysis o f any obj ect conned

.
strictly to that object itself witho ut drawing its rela ,
tions to other objects into the analysis is an analysis ,
Of the object in its rst in tention Such an analysis .
will include neither the cause nor the mode of origin

Of the object analysed nor its importance o r meaning
,
compared with other Obj ects ; it wil l classify not the ,
Object as a whole but its parts as parts o f the Object ;

,
it wi ll not classify its parts as si milar o r dissimilar to

corresponding parts i n other objects but solely with ,
respect to their functions in the object itself to which

they belong The result will be to give the elements
.
o f the object analysed and not its aspects o r any of

,
its aspects Take now any empirical phenomenon

.
,
from the simplest to the most complex isolate it from ,
others treat it as an obj ect of the rst intention and

, ,
analyse it as such without askin g how it came to be

,
what it is or whence it derived its characteristics o r

, ,
what other things it is li ke It will be found that .
a l l its characteristics fa l l into two classes ; some are
material or particular feelings others are form a l

, , ,
o r particular forms in which these feelings appear

'
.
46 TH E NAT U R E OF TH E C O GNITI O NS
E very feeling must exist a certain length Of tim e fo r ,
and some feelings must exist also I n a certain position

in space and some also i n a c ertain extent o f space
,
.
The time and the space i n which feeli n gs exist is

called the formal element o f the p henomenon ; t h e
feeling whatever may be its kind is call ed the ma
, ,
t e ri a l element of the phenomenon Whether spac e .
is always include d in every phenomenon whether it ,
is always a part o f the formal element in phenomena ,
may be left for the present undecided ; it is clear that

time always is so for if we had not a feeling in some
,
duration however short we should have it not at all

, ,
empiric a l ly S O that leaving o ut o f View the ques

.
,
tion whether the formal element a l ways includes space

as well as time it is still quite certain that a formal
,
and a material element is i n cluded in every empirical

phenomenon These t w o elements are entirely dif
.
fe r e nt in kind from each other : and there is nothing

in any phenomenon whatever which does not fall
under o ne o r other o f these two heads I d o not .
know what it is o r h o w to name it if there is any ,
such ; but if there is then as Hume says I desire

, , ,

that it may be produced Here then we have the .
two ultimate heterogeneous inseparable e lements o f

, , ,
all phenomena in their rst intention namely F eelin g ,
and Tim e o r as it may turn o ut afterwards Time and

,
Space ; and these names F eeli n g Time a n d Space , , , ,
are names o f the elements in their rst intention ;

names o f them in the second intention a r e M atter and
F orm o r material and formal elements o f phenomena
, .
E very phenomenon as such contains these two ele

ments time o r time and space o n t h e o n e side and
, , , ,
feeling o n the other T hi s i s empirically and e x p e ri

.
menta l ly certain ; o n this a s a veriable fact I tak e

my stand and shall appeal to the experience o f e very

,
o n e whether it is not so whether he knows any phe ,
n o m e n o n which does not contain these t w o elements ,
and farther whether he knows any phenomenon which

contains more than these two elements ; for I shall
attempt to show that no phenomenon o r variety o f
phenomena as such however rare o r complex c o n
, , ,
tains any thing which cannot be reduced to o r ana

lysed into these This is the analysis of phenomena
.
i n their rst intention .
It is generally supposed that two other things are

elements o f phenomena either besides o r instead o f ,
those which have been mentioned These two ele .
ments which are supposed to be elements o f all and

,
every phenomenon w ithout exception are the Sub ,

A
j ec t and the O bject long with whatever
. any
intelli gence knows says P rof F e rri er; it must as
.
, ,
the ground o r condition o f its kn owledge have some ,
cognisance o f itself Institutes of M etaphysic Sect

.

,
.
I P rop 1
. . . E very phenomenon accordin g to this ,
whatever other elements it may contain must contain ,
as e l e m e nt s a n obj ect and a subject ; o n e o f its elements

'
must be the object another must be the subj ect The

,
.
meaning o f this I apprehend to be that feeling itself , ,
the material element of perception is capable o f being ,
considered by itself as an object of the rst i ntention

, ,
o r at least by way of abstraction and without re ud

p j g
i n g the question whether it is o r is not separable from
the formal element ; that feeling itself considered in
its rst intention is capable o f further analysis and ,
that s o an a l ysed it consists o f o r at any rate contains

as elements a Self and a N o t self F eeling according -
.
,
to this view is not an ultimate obj ect o r element

, ,
m a de objective but is capable o f ana l ysis P heno

, .
48 TH E NA T URE OF TH E C O GNITI O NS
mena s o far as they contain feeling and s o far only

, ,
abstracting from their formal element are not inde ,
composable but two inseparable elements are present

,
in them which combined constitute feeli ng that i s , ,
constitute every determinate particular feeling no ,
matter which These elements a re Self and N ot self

.
-
.
It seems to me that to st ate this theory is to di sprove

it ; to bring it clearly before the mind s eye is to
show its i ncorrectness Fo r what are these elements ?
.
What is Self what impression does it make what is

, ,
it i n its rst intention ? What is N o t self its impres -

,
sion in the rst intention ? Is it not clear that w e

have no distinct notion of either o f these elements as ,
we have of the feeling of light o r sound o f the time ,
a sound lasts o r o f the space a light occupies ? Is it

,
not clear also that we must ask these questions about

them and so must refer them to o ne o r other o f the
,
before mentioned elements o f phenomena the formal

-
,
o r the material ; that if they were known to us dis ,
t i ngui sh a b l e by us as elements of phenomena it would ,
be as modes o r a mode o r particular ki n d o f feeling ?

, ,
Whatever then Self and N o t self may be they are -

,
not elements o f phenomena generall y .
If however they are not elements o f phenomena

generally they must fa l l under the second mode of
,
looking at phenomena they must belong to pheno ,
mena considered n o t in their rst intention but in ,
some o f their second intentions ; they must arise in

phenomena in consequence o f a l ater introduced dis -
tinction from a comparison o f some phenomena with

,
others from the relations Of a phenomenon to others

,
and not from its elements within itself This they .
do ; and the distinction in question between Self and

N o t self being fundamentally the same as that b e

-
,
O F T I M E AND S PAC E . 49
tween Subject and O bject is o n e which applies t o a l l

,
phenomena w ithout exception ; it is the fundamental

distinction in philosophy although it is n o t a di s t i nc
,
tion at all in di rect ana l ysis of phenomena ; the reason

of which is evident for a l l philosophy is reection ;
,
and these notions Subject and O bject arise rst and

, , ,
are the rst to arise in reection and are i n fact

, ,
that object which distinguishes reection from dir ect

consciousness This distinction is the Object which
.
,
as the obj ect o f a particular mode Of consciousness ,
di stinguishes that mode from others ; consciousness

drawing thi s di sti nction o r having thi s distinction
,
as its obj ect is called reection It wo uld no doubt

,
.
simpli fy matters very much and would therefore be ,
very desirable if circumstances would pe rm i t to s up

, ,
pose that consciousness is i n i t s ultimate and simplest

empirical perceptions reective as well as perceptive .
The richer the germ the easier it is to imagine the

,
growth o f the entire tree from it But o n the other .
hand the fewer the elements in the germ the more

, ,
complet e i s the explanation if it succeeds which , ,
deduces from it the tree .
U su a l ly this question is treated without distinction

o f rst a n d second intentions P henomena are no .
sooner mentioned than it is considered how they

arise o r what they relate to instead o f what they
, ,
are P henomena are divided into subj ects and o b

.
e c t s a n d then straightway are asserted to arise from

j ,
the meeting o f subj ects and objects O r if subject .
and object are held not to be phenomen a then phe ,
n o m e n a are said to arise from a conjunction of an
Unk nown which underlies consciousness with an

Unknown which underlies objects But known o r .
,
unknown subject a nd object are straightway assigned

,
E
TH E NAT U R E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
as the condi tion o f the existenc e o f phenomena and ,
phenomena explained by a reference to their mode o f

origin o r by a disti nction between them and what is
,
called absolute existence The phenomenon becomes

.
thus a tertium quid arising from the meeting of two

,
factors known o r unknown called the subj ect and

, ,
t h e obj ect ; and each o f the t w o factors is besides

often supposed to contribute something from its o w n
fund towards constituting the phenomenon ; either
t h e subject contributes the matter and the Obj ect ,
the form ; o r vice vers a ; o r else the object contri

butes both and the subject contains the c o nt ri b u
tions ; o r the subject contributes both and creates
the obj ect as their receptacle But what is the fact ?
.
D o either o f the two elements material and formal, ,
bear marks of a subjective o r an obj ective origin of ,
being contributed by the subj ect o r by the object ?

Is either o f them subjective and n o t objective or o b ,
e c t i v e and not subjective ? I am entirely at a loss

j
to determine which o f the two elements should most
properly have either character exclusively attributed
to it They both appear to me to be equally and
.
alike subj ective equal ly and alike objective and to

, ,
bear both characters at once I can indeed attend

.
to the subjective character o f either o f them and I ,
can attend to the Obj ective character o f either o f

them ; but this is by a voluntary act and an act o f ,
abstraction I cannot avoid seeing them in both

.
characters alternately Both characters o f each o f

.
the two elements are entirely independent of my w il l

when once I have made the distinction o f subject and
Object every thing appears to me as bearing both
,
characters ; this onl y depends o n my will which ,
character at any particular time I will a ttend to .

52 T HE N AT U R E OF TH E C O GNI TI ONS
among objects ; but i n either way whether viewed ,
from the obj ective Or subj ective point of view each ,
aspect contains the same two elements formal and ,
material The annexed diagram may help t o make

.
my meani n g clearer .
The two ele ments matter and form in the phe

, ,
no m e no n ,
are distinguished by direct attention I n
perception ; the two aspects subjective and Objective
, ,
are distinguished by attention in reection ; but the

analysis o f the process o f reection the origin and ,
nature of the two aspe cts subjective and objective

, ,
the introduction o f the cognitions Subj ect and O b

,
j c e t into phenomena o r t h e transformation of phe

, ,
n o m e n a i nto modes o f consciousness and modes o f
existence is reserved for the next chapter where it

, ,
will be introduced in a diff erent connection Keeping .
however this further examination in reserve it will ,
be useful to dwell o n the distinction between the two

modes o f e xamination a little more at length P he .
n o m e n a in their rst intention are objects of con
s c i o u s n e s s consistin g o f two elements form and mat

,
ter ; phenomena i n their second intentions are ex

i s t e n c e s which in addition to this character o f being
,
objects of consciousness are related objectively to

,
each other These two characters a r e p o s s e s s e d by

.
a ll phenomena without exception and must be p o s ,
sessed also by those if any such should di sclose them

,
selves which a ppear to be the conditions o r contri

,
buting causes o f the rest M ind and matter subjectsu

,
an d objects if they assume a distin ct place among

,
phenomena as causes or conditions o f other phe

nomena must be themselves also phenomena and
, ,
present the characteristics o f phenomena ; that i s ,
must consist o f elements in their rst intention and ,
possess a s ubjective and Objective as pect in their

second intention S O that in accordance with this
.
view we shall have nothing before us but phenomena ,
i nstead o f having before u s phenomena resulting from

the concurrence o f two unknown substances mind on ,
the o ne side and existence o r matter on the other o r

, ,
composed o f the contributions o f two kinds o f ex

i s t e n c e s m ental o r absolute o n the o n e side and
, ,
material or absolute o n the other What is cal led .
mind and what are called existences and that which

, ,
Kant calls der t ra n s c e n d e nt a l e G egenstand will have ,
melted in to phenomena o ut o f which indeed they,
origina l ly g rew We shall no longer be able to s a y

.
with the N o m i n a li s t s such and such a conception is

not a real existence it is a mere ction o r intention

,
o f the mind nor with the R e a lists such and such
an object has no t rue existence it is merely em ,
p i ri c a l for a l l phenomena are at once both objective
and subj ective and i f they are the o n e must of n e

,
c e ssi t
y be the other In the. next place it wil l be
seen that theories o f perception are a part not o f
metaphysic but o f psychology o f the science which ,
examines the laws o f the conditions and causes o f

consciousness as obj ects not Of that which an a l yses
,
the phenomena o f consciousness themselves ; o f a

54 TH E NAT UR E O F TH E C O GNITI ONS
scienc e in short which treats o f obj ects in some o f

their second intentions And it follows that what .
are called o n the theory o f a representative percep

,
tion impressions images and ideas o f objects are

, , , ,
the objects themselves and no t merely evi dence o f ,
the obj ects ; that in fact there are no objects but

these s o called evidences o f objects F rom the sub .
e c t i v e side o r in their subj ective aspect these

j , s o ,
called evidences o f Obj ects are not merely evidences

to the mi n d but they are the mind itself Thus
, .
,
with whichever o f the t w o we begin the mind per ,
c e i vi n o r the object perceived w e nd o n e thing

g ,
only before us namely the phenomenon which was

, , ,
before thought t o be onl y the intermediary between

the mind and the object And be it Observed that .
this o l d division into three mind obj ect and inter , , ,
mediary exists equally o n a theory o f immedi ate

,

presentative as o n a theory o f mediate representa

, ,
tive perception The difference between them is

,
.
solely this that o n the former theory the i n t e rm e

,
diary phenomena are t h e result o f the contact o f

mind with the object are that which springs fr om ,

the concurrence o r o ut o f the contributions o f two
thin gs o r substances more o r less unknown and mys
,
t e ri o u s called mind and object ; while o n the latter

,
theory the intermediary phenomena are the me di um

and condition Of that concurrence But in the view .
here brought forward both min d a n d the object , ,
whether conceived as entirely unknown o r more o r

less known are wrapped up in and developed out of
, , ,
the phenomena analysed ; h o w much known and ,
how wrapped up in and developed o ut o f phenomena ,
must remain undetermined till the process o f r e e c

tion is examined in the following chapter P heno .
mena alone remain in the world and mind and the ,
obj ect are no longer separate empiric a l things o r ,
separate unknown things or separate absolute things

, ,
but two inseparable aspects o f phenomena F rom .
o n e side the world is a ll mind from the other all

,
existence It is impossible that any thing should

.
exist unless possibly present to consciousness ; it is

impossible that any thing should be present to con
s c i o u s n e s s unless possibly existing A nd since con .
s c i o u s n e s s and existence are completely correlative
and coextensive therefore it is impossible that any

,
thing absolute shoul d exist N either o n the side o f .
the unknown mind nor o n that o f the unkn own exist

,
ence is it possible that an absol ute can exist o r be ;

,
for eve ry thing whatever exists call it what we will

, , ,
is relative to consciousness o r has a subjective side

,
.
If it is argued that we may imagine o r conceive an

existence transcen ding o ur faculties and beyond the
range o f o ur knowledge I reply that the very doing
,
so bri ngs it within them fo r we are furnishing an

,
instance o f t h e very thing which i s here observed ,
namely conceiving o r imagining an existence and

,
supplying it with a subjective side ; such existence

would be while imagined o r conceived to exist pre
, ,
sent as a possible existence in consciousness ; its

essence qua existence would exist for it would be
, , ,
already present in consciousness as possible as ana ,
l o go u s in point of existence t o all actual existences ,
in b eing s o present Analogous there lies the point

.
.
Unknown existence s o far as it is existence must be

, ,
a n alogous to known existence either the word exist

;
ence has a meaning o r it has not ; if it has it is the ,
same in both cases and if it has not then it has no

, ,

m e aning in the phrase known existence I nd all

.
56 T HE NA T UR E OF T H E C O GNI TI ONS
philosopher s wi th two exceptions with exc eption of ,
the met aphysi c al ontologists such as Schell i ng and ,
Hegel who deduce every thing from mind and of the

, ,
empiric a l ontologists who deduce every thing from

,
matter ( in their sense o f the term ) with these two

exceptions I nd all philosophers conceiving the

,
world as produced by two independent factors ,
o u sl
y conceived both in their nature and in their
connection with each other ; for instance mind some ,
times as the coefcient sometimes as the mirror of

,
matter but still two separate independent factors

, ,
mind and matter ; and this whether they nd these ,
two factors both immediately present to conscious

ness in every i n stance o f external perception with ,
P rof F e rri e r o r only inferred to be present from

.
,
those perceptions and their Objects which is the more ,
usual way I o n the c ontrary conceive the world

.
not as produced by two factors these o r any others , ,
but as presenting t w o characters o r aspects in o n e o f ,
which it is entirely mind in the other entirely mat ,
ter ( to adopt terms in their current m e a m ng though

, ,
more suitable to the current theories than to mine ) .
M ind a nd matter become transformed in my theory , ,
from factors i nto aspects of the world each o f which ,
is an aspect o f the other and the world i n d i e r e nt l y

'
o n e o r the other according as it is regarded

,
My .
theory therefore is no t a theory of causation but o f ,
analysis o f the world a n applied Logic o f the world

,
as I have already said .
I f these conclus i ons s o far as they respect the

,
complete correlation o f existence and con sciousness ,
are a ccepte d by any o ne with difc ul ty the cause ,
will not be far to seek T h e cause will be the habit

.
Of regarding the existence o r non existence o f parti -

OF T I M E AND S PAC E . 57
o nlar obj ects as entirely independent minds o f o ur ,
and o f our imaginations concerning them F rom .
this habit we reason to the world o f existences in

general and conceive that this also is independent
, ,
as to its existence o r non existence o f o ur minds and

-
,
imaginations When we speak o f the existence o f a

.
particular Object i n a particular time and place w e ,
mean that it could be seen touche d o r otherwise

'
, ,
perceived if we were present at that time and place ;

,
s o also o f the world o f existences in general we mean ,
by i t s existence now and here that it is present to

consciousness now and here The parallel is exact .
,
and we argue thus : as the presence o f the particular

thing there and then was independent o f o u r con
s c i o u s ne s s s o the presence o f the world o f existences
,
here and now is independent Of o ur consciousness ,
and s o a l so the presence o f other absolute o r un ,
known existences is independent o f o ur conscious

,
ness True the p a rallel is exact ; but both cases

.
,
include the same fallacy The absence o f the parti

.
o nl ar thing was not its absence from consciousness

,
but from presentative consciousness it could not be ,
seen o r touched o r perceived presentatively If it .
were absent from consciousness altogether we could ,
not bring it before the m i nd and s a y o f it that it w a s

absent T o go back to the o l d phrase when we
.

,
speak o f the existence o f a particul ar thing in a par

t i c ul a r place and time we mean
,
what that it
could be seen touched o r otherw ise perceived if we
, ,
were present at that place and time Is this being .
independent of c ons c iousness ? It is o n the con ,
t r a ry explain ing existence to mean capability o f being

,
perceived ; it is making actual existence equival ent

to being actually perceived a nd actual existence at a
,
particular place and time equivalent to being actually

perceived at that place and time And so al so in the
.
case o f existences generally ; by the absence o f the

whole world o f existences is meant its absence from
presentative consciousness ; if it were absent from
consciousness altogether i t s absence could not b e
,
brought before the mind at all Such an absence .
would be equivalent to the ceasing o f consciousness .
The fallacy in both cases is the same ; exi stence is

not the equivalent O f presentative consciousness but ,
i s in dependent o f presentative consciousness ; and that

whether we are thinking o f the existence o f an object
o f daily experienc e o r o f worlds unknown F rom .
this it is argued that existence is independent o f con

s c i o u s n e s s altogether which is equally false both in
,
the case o f particular fami l iar objects and o f imagined

worlds Such is the nature o f the fallacy ; but what
.
is its history and h o w come we to be deceived by it ?

,
Through neglecting the disti nction between obj ects

in their relation to consciousness alone and objects in
their relations to other Objects in consciousness b e ,
tween objects i n themselves and objects in their origin

and causes that is the distinction between rst and
, ,
second intentions When we s a y that particular

.
objects existi ng in a particular place and time are

independent o f o ur conscio usness we mean that the ,
causes o f their existence there and then as objects

are not to be found in us but in other objects ; we
,
mean that w e di d not produce them but that some ,
thin g else independent o f us was the condition o f

their existence Independence i n this sense in which
.
,
i t is truly asserted o f objects is then fallaciously a p

,
plied t o Objects conside red in themselves o r in rela

tion t o consciousness only ; and the assertio n that ,
60 TH E NAT U RE O F THE C O GNITI O NS

c i sm o n P lato s theo ry
the $2077 M etaph : B x n cap o f ,
. . .
4 , 5 and which
,
as I remember with pleasure
,
was ,
rst pointed o ut t o me by P rof J M Wilson o f . . .
C C C O xford E xistence i s obscure enough as it

. . . .
is without inventing a second existence beyond it

,
.
The true a n swer to the question What is existence ? ,
is not ontological but metaphysical It is impossible .
to refer existence the most general class o r name of

,
a ll to a higher o r more comprehensive class o r genus

,
.

To use Aristotle s phraseology it is im possible to ,
make it a species by differentiatin g the genu s to which

it belongs for it is itself the highest genu s But it
,
.
may be possible to point o ut its characteristics its ,
propria some quality or qualities which are coex

,
tensive with it belong t o it in all its instances and

, ,
belong to all instances of it s o far as they are exist

e nc e s There I s o n e s uch characteristic namely that
.
, ,
o f being present in consciousness taking conscious ,
ness in its widest sense and includi n g therefore both

possible and actual presence in consciousness This .
is an analytical and therefore a metaphysical not an

,
ontologic a l answer to t h e question What is exist ,
ence ? Analytical not indeed from the point o f view ,
o f di rect perception but o f reection as has been ,

,
explained already Whatever therefore can be per .
c ei ve d conceived o r imagined exists ; exists either

, , ,
potentially o r actually in the past o r present or future ,

.
It is necessary to classify existences and no t t o con ,
foun d o n e kind with another o r value all a l i ke F or ,

.
metaphysical purposes the classication s hould be i n

stituted by asking how objects are present in con
s c i o u sn e s s F irst presentative must be di stinguished
.
,
from representative perceptions in t he former the ,
Object is as a rule more vivid than in the latter

, ,
.
OF TI ME AND S PAC E . 61
R epresentative perceptions again are divisible into

those which are capable and those which are incapa
ble of verication by presentation o r by testimony ,
founded o n the presentations of others A nd r e p r e .
s e n t a t i v e perceptions which are capable o f v e r i c a
tion may again be divided i nto those which are capa

ble of verication at present and those which are ,
conceived as capable of verication at some distant

t ime. In short some scale o f truth must be intro
,
;
d u c e d into the conception o f existences by which ,
they may be distinguished from each other .
1 2 I come now to the speci a l subject o f this

.
chapter the consideration o f the form al element o f

,
c onsciousness in its rst intention O f the two points .
o f view already distinguished the objective and the ,
subjective the subjective is the onl y o n e which is

,
necessarily universal ; in adopting the Objective poin t

o f view abstraction is made o f the subj ective but in
, ,
adopting the s ubj ective it is impossible to abstract

from the obj ective The subjective contains both
.
aspects at once the obj ective only o ne The s ub je c

,
.
tive point o f view therefore is the o n e proper to this

chapter to the consideration o f all objects in their
,
rst intention .
F eeling is the material element in consciousness ,
the element which in some mo di cation o r other c o n

s t i t u t e s all consciousness The question is What is .
,
the formal element combined with feel i ng in a ll cases ,
whether it is time o r t i rn e and space o r time and

, ,
motion or motion alone o r space a l one o r S pace and

, , ,
motion o r whether there are any other form a l ele

,
ments in addition to o r in exclusion o f these ; and

,
again What are the connections o f these with feeling

,
and with each other whether o n e is derived from ,

62 T HE NAT UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
another an d which are the original and which the

,
derived elements ; such in general a r e the questions

to be answered .
F eelin gs may b e roughly classi ed as foll ows

1 s t the feelings o f the ve special senses which have
,
dened organs sight touch hearing taste and smell ;

, , , , ,
2d feelings which have as yet no specially dened

,
organs such as hunger the sensus communis in all

, ,
its branches feeli ngs o f heat and cold o f musc ul ar

, ,
tension and others these t w o classes are commonly

,

,
called sensations ; 3 d feelings whic h arise onl y in ,
redintegration Of the feeli n gs o f the t w o rst classes ,
such as desire aversion love hate anger fear joy

, , , , , , ,
grief adm i ration feeli n g o f right and wrong o f hon

, , ,
o u r and di shonour o f justice and injustice o f e ffort

, ,
and resolution and many others all Of which are

, ,
called emotions and which are a l so s ometimes dis

,
t i ngui s h e d either by differences in kind o r by d i f

,
fe r e n c e s only in degree into two classes emo t ions , ,
a n d passions These three classes comprehend all

.
feelings N Ow every feeling whether sensation o r

.
,
emotion must occupy some duration o f time however

,
short ; it could n o t be a feeling if it did not ; and

this I think is immediately and empirically certain to
every o n e But only two o f these feelings must in
.
and by themselves occupy extension in S pace as well

as ti me ; these two feel ings are the sensations Of
sight and touch ; and o f these sensations o f sight , ,
cannot be assumed t o occupy by themselves more

th a n t w o di mensions o f space namely length and , ,
breadth o r supercial extension ; sensations o f touch

,
a l so appear primaril y or in the rs t instance that is

, , ,
in one single touch uncompared with others to o c ,
c up
y only supercial extension o r two dimensions o f
OF T I M E AND S PAC E . 63
space The questions accordingly have been raised

.
,
rst whether space in its three dimensions i s not

,
capable o f analysis into its two di mensions occupied

by sensations o f sight and by single sensations of
touch and secondly whether these two di mensions
, ,
o f space are not themselves capable o f analysis into
s e n s a t i c n s occupying time successively If the latter .
were the case the entire range o f o ur feelings would

,
be capable of an a l ysis into two elements onl y time ,
and feeli n g .
Another series o f questions has been opened up

by the current distinction o f feeli ngs into internal
a n d external .Taki ng its origi n from the apparent
place of the Object perceived from the di stinction ,
between the body of the Observer and objects external

to his body the distinction between the intern a l and
,
external sense was origin a l ly a distinction between

feelings which arose withi n the body and those which
arose from obj ects outside the body But when this .
distinction between body and external objects gave

place in consequence o f physiological and psycho
,
logical investigation to a more subti l o n e between a

,
m i nd o r soul dwellin g somewhere and somehow in

,
the body and things external to the mind o r soul

, ,
among which the body itse l f was included then the ,
d istin ction between the internal and extern a l sense

had to support itself o n other considerations ; and the
two senses were then distinguished from each other
by their respective forms the internal sense was that
,
which had tim e the external sense was that which

,
had space for its form Time and Space became the
,
.
distin guishin g characteristics of the two senses the ,
internal and the external Since however the mind

.
w a s conceived a s a single mind a s the unity o f these

,
64 TH E NAT U RE OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
nternal and external , an d not as consist

i
'
t wo se nse s,
ing of two isolated senses the perceptions o f the one ,
sense were necessarily conceived as passin g over into

perceptions o f the other sense A ccordingly what .
,
the external sense was to outward obj ects that the ,
internal sense became to the externa l sense and ,
translated the S pace relations o f the external sense

into time relations of the in ternal sense ; the internal
sense becam e in fact the mind and the external
, , ,
sense became its organ for supplying it with i nt e l l i

gence o f every thing outside itself inclu di ng the body ,
which it inh abited All feelin gs which existed only

.
in relations o f time that is in succession and not , , ,
also i n relations o f S pace a n d these feeli ngs only , ,
constituted the m i nd properly s o called ; and these

feelings existed as Hume observed literally no w h er e
, ,
the greatest part o f beings he says do and must
, ,
exist after this manner Treatise o f Human N ature .

,
P art iv Sect 5 The distinction o f internal and

. . .
external objects thus became a distincti on between

the mind and objects ; in other words the distin ction ,
between Subject and O bject coincided with that b e

tween objects i n ti me and Obj ects in S pace Those .
things alone were objective which occupied space ,
those were subjective which occupied onl y time .
What was internal was mental what was external ,
was m aterial Y et the mind itself was conceived as

.
existing in the body an external obj ect and couse , ,
quently as having position in s pace ; and the mind

was the object o f psychology Hence from the ex .
,
planation o f the terms mental and internal to mean

existing in time onl y arose the insoluble c o nt ra di c ,
tions o f a mind existing onl y in ti me a n d yet having

a p osition in space and having a position in space,
OF TIM E A ND S PAC E . 65
d
a n yet not occupying space ; besides the difficulty
o f seein g how a mind ,
conceived as an obj ect not
occupying S pace could be brought into connection
,
with space occupying objects Kant though adopt

-
.
,
ing the distinction of internal and external sense ,
does not fall into the error of makin g this distinction

coin cide with the mind as the object o f psychology

, ,
and the world of materi a l objects ; for he replaces the

mind by his U nity o f Apperception the Ich denk e a , ,
subj ective act which binds together all states o f con

s c i o u s n e s s and all phe no mena and o f which the i n
,
ternal and external senses are modes o f operation ;

the Ich denke can never be a n Object by itself Y et .
since the distinction o f the internal and external sense

may be retained together with the notion o f an o b
e c t i v e mind to which they belong it will be useful
j ,
to devote a few words to its consideration ; and as it ,
was S hown before that the distinction o f the material

and formal elements in consciousness di d not coincide
with that between Object and subject so now I wil l ,
attempt to Show the same in the distinction between

the form a l element in the internal and external
senses .
I will attempt to Show four things ; l s t That ,
phenomena which are perceived in two dimensions o f

Space phenomena o f the senses o f touch and S ight
, ,
although a l so occupyi n g time do not o w e their o c c u

,
patiou o f supercial extension to their occupation of

time but that their S pace relations are n o t capable o f
,
-
analysis into relations o f time ; which is the answer

to the second of the two questions proposed above ;
2d That phenomena occupying time do not o w e their
,
objectivity t o their being referred to phenomena o c

c u
py g i n space ; 3 d
,
That phenomena occupyi n g spac e
F
66 TH E NAT UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ON S
do n o t o w e their subjectivity to their being perceived

in time ; 4t h That phenomena o f both kinds in time
, ,
and in space owe both their objectivity and their

,
subjectivity to reection irrespective o f their being

,
represented in reection as occupyi n g space o r time .
1 s t If we had not the senses o f sight and touch

.
we should be wi thout any cogni tion o f S pace F eel .
ings which coexisted in o ur bodies would appear as a

succession either o f S imple and deni te o r complex ,
and indenite feeli n gs Analysis o f coexistent feel

,
.
i n gs would be nothing else than resolvi ng the com

plex in to a succession o f S i rnp l e feelings P henomena .
would be nothing but a series o r succession o f feel

ings now simple now complex With sight however
, ,
.
the case is different The eye Opened to the light

.
sees a w h o l e surface o n e small portion o f it distinctly

, ,
the rest indistinctly ; it sees part bright part dark , ,
part clear the rest obscure ; this is the phenomenon

,
o f seeing ; and I cannot conceive h o w any o n e can
suppose that the space relations o f thi s surface of

-
light are reducible to relations o f time It is enough .
to contrast the two things in their Si mplest forms , ,
with each other to s e e the di fference in ki n d between

,
the two ; the form o f sight is as different from the

form o f hearing as the sensation o f sight from the
,
sensation o f hearing The i n terpretation o f the phe

.
n o m e n o n o f seeing is another thing ; the comparativ e
magni tude o f the parts o f the surface their compara ,
tive shape and distance may need other senses to ,
bring them into notice the sensation o f muscular,
tension and o f the degree o f effort i nvolved i n it in ,
the machinery o f the eye for i nstance But the ex ,

.
tended surface is seen a t once and is seen as some ,
thing diff erent from feelings which are not extended .

68 TH E NATU R E OF T H E C O G NI T I O NS
A
are if more brief and compendious y e t more explicit

, ,
and distinct than the time relations which they are -
supposed to express and what they lose in poin t o f

,
time they acquire in another direction in space I ,

.
conclude then that time relations and space relations

, ,
- -
o f supercial extension are di fferent in ki nd and can ,
not be resolved o n e into the other .
2d Suppose a man not to have the senses of sight

.
and touch but only those senses which presen t feel

,
ings in succession ; would those feeli n gs which he

h a s in succession be unre a l o r less re a l than before ? ,
E very one will answer that they would be equall y

real They will be phenomena just as much as if
.
,
they were accompanied with other feeli n gs which

occupy dimensions o f space Their connection with .
those other feelings can alter nothing in their reality ,
as rst intentions though it suppli es them with new

,
relations and in this way with new signi cance But

, .
this reality is the ground o f their afterwards appear ~
ing as w ill be seen in the answer to the 4t h point

, ,
objective ; that i s their reali ty is the ground o f their

,
obj ectivity .
3 d P henomena occupying space do indeed all o f

.
them also occupy time but this is no t the cause o f ,
their having reality The reality o f these phenomena

.
,
as o f those which occupy onl y time consists in the ,
feeling which they contain not in the form in which ,
that feeling appears In both cases the reality o f the

.
phenomenon is in its being felt not in the mode of ,
its being fel t And its reality is the ground o f its

.
subjectivity .
4 t h Both kinds of phenomena are equally real

.
,
for both contain feeling ; but as yet they are pheno

mena only they are present in consciousness but not
, ,
o r TI ME A ND S PAC E . 69
present as either subjective o r obj ective The re a l ity 1

g}
. m .
6 H
o f either kind does not depend upon the reali ty o f
'
12
the other ; o n e km d I S more complex than the other f l
.
o rm a
,
but the additional character which that kind possesses 2352213

1 6
(30 8 1
is n o t a modication o f the time relations common t o

both kinds but an addition o f a new and di fferent
,
nature The reality o f each is independent of the

.
other and depends upon the feeling which each pos

,
sesses equally The reality is the ground of the dis

.
tinction o f subjective and objective not the difference ,
i n the form of the two reali ties It is within the

'
re a l ity o f the phenomena o r within the phenomena

,
so far as they are real o r contain feeling that the ,
distinction into objective and subjective arises and ,
not within them so far as they contain a di fferent

kind o f form If the distinction o f Objective and s ub
.
e c t i v e arose from the different kind o f form in phe

j
n o m e n a then this distinction wo ul d be already there
,
as soon as the two ki nds o f phenomena had arisen ;

and would not be remaining still to arise in them .
But it has not already arisen in them but they ,
are as yet mere phenomena mere feel ings possessin g

,
equal reality o r unreality It must be from some

.
thin g i n the phenomena still t o be differentiated

, ,
that the distinction o f objective and subj ective arises ,
a n d not from what is already differentiated namely , ,
t h e form a l element into time and S pace E very de .
v el o m e n t o f a new character in phenomena in the

p ,
present case o f the new character of subjectivity and

objectivity is a sinking back into the nature o f the
,

phenomenon in which it is developed ; Hegel s word
for it is V ertiefen ; it is a bringin g out of something
latent in the phenomena and each new character o r
,
forward movement of development is also a back

ward movement o r the stirring up deeper and deeper

,
depths and the bringing to light o f som e cause a

,

,
caus e o f the kind known as potentia l ity o r

from below or beh i nd the phenomenon which de
v el o s itself and both e ffect and cause energy and
p , ,
potentia l i ty begin to exist at t h e same mom ent N ow

,
.
it is a commonplace o f philosophical criticism that ,
we must not mistake the occasions of o ur com i ng to

the knowledge o f a nything for the coming into exist
ence of the thin g itself ; for instance we must not ,
mistake t h e i n crease in the returns o f crime owing ,
to the more perfect means o f statistical information ,
for an increase in the amount o f crimes committed ;

and i n application of this rule it may be supposed
that o ur coming to the knowledg e o f the newly de
v el o e d characters in phenomena namely their s ub
p , ,
j e c t i vi t y and objectivity is not coincident with t h e

,
rst existing o f these characters in phenomena but ,
that they existed previo usly as subjectivity and o b

j e c t i vi t
y and
,
we afterwards nd it o u t But how is .
this possible ? How is it possible that they S hould

exist previously i n phenomena as subj ectivity and
Objectiv ity without being perceived as such ? It is
,
impossible for it is a contradiction i n the terms

,
.
Their previo us existence was a potential o n e 001 0250 2: ,

1

vegy e qo 0 055
r
z And their potentiality is an inference
.
,
arising as w il l be seen more clearly from the C hapter

,
o n the R atio S u f c i e n s from the form o f time ; an

,
inference from their actuality that is from the actual

, ,
development of the new character in consciousness .
N othing new can arise without bringing with it the

inf erence o f its potentiality previous to its arising .

But this potentiality is not actu a l ity has not the ,
character which is its v gy em Subjectiv ity and o b

.
jec t i vi t y exist rst when they exist actually The y.
do not exist actually in the p henomena o f direct per

c e tio n
p Time
. and space do exist actually i n the
phenomena o f di rect perception ; we are actually con

scious o f them though we do not reect that we are
conscious o f them and though we have not distin
,
ui sh e d them from their content But Obj ectiv i ty

g .
and subjectivity we are not conscious Of at a ll unti l

we reect o n di rect perceptions They then rst .
exist actually and their previous potentiality is then

,
rst inferred Time and space have no potentiality

.
,
fo r they are always and in every thing actu a l

, ,
I .
conclude therefore that since the distinction o f o b

,
j e c t i vi t
y and subjectivity has still to arise in pheno
mena it does not arise from the di stinction o f the
,
two kinds o f form in phenomena time and S pace ,

.
It is difc ul t to s e e what use there would be for

the terms objective and subjective supposing them ,
to depend o n the difference o f form in phenomena ,
unl ess they were intended to express a different

degree o f re a l ity in the phenomena di ffering a s to
form And this is the meaning which is usually
.
attached to those terms ; the term objective signi es ,
as usually employed something more re a l than s ub

,
e c t i v e ; and t h e term subjective usu a l ly signies

j
something comparatively unreal So that i f the two.
ki n ds o f phenomena are equ a l l y real and yet the ,
terms objective and subjective coincide respectively

with these two kinds o f phenomena either the terms ,
objective and subjective must cease to signify di ffer

ence in p o in t o f re a l i ty o r the characters which they
,
,
signify must depend o n something else besides the

difference in form o f the two kinds o f phenomena ,
that is they must depend on some di stinction in the

,
A T U RE O E
THE N T HE C O GNITI ONS
feeling they contain If however the terms objective
.
and subjective do n o t coincide respectively with these

two kinds o f phenomena then they may depend on
,
the feeling o r material element in phenomena , in

virtue o f which phenomena are real without s i gni ,
fy i ng a difference in degree o f reality between the

classes of phenomena which they are employed to
designate The distinction into objective and Sub
.
e c t i v e is o n e which arises within the reality o f phe

j
n o m e n a and distinguishes that reality into two kinds
, ,
not different in poin t o f degree o f reality but in point

of the character o f that reality When many pheno .
mena have occurred in consciousness that is at a , ,
certain advanced point in the history of every in di

vidual man a di stinction is drawn between what is
,
common to all phenomena and what is peculiar to

S ingle phenomena o r sets o f phenomena They are .
recogni sed as being all alike in bein g feelings and ,
different i n being partic ul ar determ i nate feelings as

the rst they are all o n e as the second they are all
,
different The rst perception that phenomena are

.
all alike in being feelings is the rst dawn o f r e e c

tion ; it is the rst generalisation in matter o f con
s c i o u s n e s s ; phenomena have already been compared
with o n e another i n their differences o f feel ing and

form and already formed into groups which we call
,
usually objects nurse and mother table and food , ,
&c. 65 0 have been alread y distinguished ; but that

.
these groups have any connection o f kind with each

other has not yet been perceived ; the rst perception
that they are all alike in being feeli ngs is the rst
perception that they are subjective and at the same ,
instant also that they are obj ective that is are still as
,
di fferent as before from each other in their deter

minate particular qualities They were before per .
c e i v e d as diff erent they are now perceived as the

,
same ; which gives new meaning t o the previously

perceived difference They were phenomena they.
,
are now objective and subj ective ; each and all phe
n o m e n a are both at once and bear both characters at
,
once C onnected as feeli n gs and i n this com mon

.
,
character they a l together form a group lik e the

, ,

groups o f objects a l ready formed ; but it is a group

o f a different character and expressed by a di fferent

word ; Baby has become I ; not that any thing

is proved by the word but that my meani ng is ren,
dered clear by it The perception o f self o r self

.
,
consciousness the perception that feelings are m i ne

, ,
is in fact the same thing as that which is expressed

by saying that feelings are all alike feeling What .
ever things are ali ke in o n e point are o n e in that

point ; when these things are feeli n gs they are sub
j ec t i vel
y o n e for
,
feeling is a word which we all
un derstand by experience as well as by any e x p l a
nation ; there is no understanding it and we must ,
content ourselves with fami l iarity ; it is alre a d y a

subj ective word and if we would have an explana
,
tion we must explain the word subj ective by feelin g ,
a n d not feeling by subj ective .
This operation of reection refers equ a l ly to phe

no m ena in space and to phenomena in time ; for
both are equally feelings and both are equ a l ly real ,
.
P henomena o f both classes have acquired a double

character a r eference to each other and a reference
,
to consciousness o r as it has been previously ex

,
pressed a subjective and a n objective aspect each o f ,
which aspects contains both elements of the pheno

menon the form a l and the material
,
.
TH E NA T U R E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
The consideration o f this fourth poin t has caused

me to make a spri n g in the regular development o f
the subject to pass over the forma l element directly
,
present to consciousness and take up the thread at ,
the point o f reection ; the reason being that the di s

tinction o f objective and subjective is as yet usually
considered t o b e involved in that o f time and space
relations if n o t as a necessary element yet at least as
, ,
a condi tion o f all phenomena The purpose o f meta .
p hysic is to arrive at the lowest empiric a l phenomena

o f consciousness then at their elements whether o n e ,
, ,
two o r more ; to trace as it were the stream o f con

,
s c i o u s n e s s and of existence to its source o r sources ,
and to decide the relation o f these sources to each

other The sources o f a l l phenomena must be di s
.
covered ; whether th e re are any sources which belong

to all phenomena without exception ; whether all the
sources do s o ; and if any do no t whether these are
, ,
deducible from the others o r have an independent

existence It must be remembered that in isolating
.
any phenomenon whatever even an element o f con ,
s c i o u sn e s s we treat it as if it were an empirical or

,
complet e object and as if there might have been a

,
time previous to its coming into existence This .
method which is common to all reasoning does not

, ,
however make the elements o f consciousness into
empiric a l objects but leaves them at the conclusion

,
o f the process just what they were at the beginni ng

,
unl ess reasons shoul d have been discovered in the

course o f it for considering them to be di fferent .
To reason about an element o f consciousn ess is to

assume for the purposes o f reasonin g that it is a
, ,
complete object ; a nd the reasoning ended the as

, ,
sumption is dropped .
TH E NAT UR E OF TH E C O GNITI O N S
together those relations with phenomena of the other

senses and gives these phenomena relations to the
,
rest in S pace A distinct portion of space is marked

.
o u t by the senses o f touch and S ight combined with
the sense o f muscular tension all thre e o f which ,
senses involve time relations ; this space is called

-
the body and within it sensations o f hearin g taste

, , ,
smell hunger heat cold and others together with

, , , , ,
the emotions are perceived as arising and existin g

, ,
a ll perceived as in themselves occupyi n g time and ,
from this connection perceived as also occupying ,
though not perhaps lling a denite portion o f space ,

.
That portion Of Space in three di mensions called the

, ,
body gives unity in point o f space to all its feelings

,
whether inte rn a l o r e xternal that is to all its world , ,
o f phenomena But inasmuch as it is a portion o f

.
space in three di mensions the portions of space from ,
which it is marked o ut must have three dimensions

also for they are perceived as enclosing it o n all
,
sides ; and in fact the three space dimensions o c c u -
pied by other phenomena are perceived pari passu

with the same three dimensions in the body itself ;
the body is perceived by being separated from other
phenomena o f sight and touch .
We started however with only t w o perceived

di m ensions of S pace and have ended w i th the per
,
c e t i o n of three which are involved in the perception

p ,
o f o ur o w n bodies as solid Obj ects surrounded on all
sides by other objects at various distances This .
perception has been produced by the combination o f

three senses sight touch and muscular tension none
, , , ,
o f which alone could give it If any single sense .
alone could give the perception o f the t hird d i m e n

sion of s pace as M r Abbott in his Sight and Touch
,
.
argues that sight can the work o f the metaphysicia n

,
C 11 H
in this point would be much S implied But I c a n

. .
12
not admit that S ight a l one can give this perception Thl f nt i
.
.
e o rm a l
e em e n
When for instance we s e e an object passing as we c n i n

, , ,
o s c o us e ss .
know a f t erwards behind another and conce a l ed by it

, ,
what is really seen is the concealment o r becoming

invisible o f o n e at the moment o f its contact with
the other ; and it is referring this phenomenon t o a
suppo sed cause and not ana l ysing the phenomenon
,
itself to s a y that o ne o f the objects must be behind

,
the other What is depth o r distance in depth in

.
, ,
its rst intention ? It has no explanation no analysis , ,
but itself the third dimension o f space But how

,
.
does it diff er from the other t w o dimensi ons o f space ?

In requiring the two former to be given in order to
its being understood A s up e r c i e s must be taken
.
,
and then objects o u t o f that s up e r c i e s are in depth ;

that is a point o f departure must be taken to con
,
trast it with directions from which it is excluded

,
.
N o w in empiric a l perception this point of departure

,
is given only by sensations o f touch Imagine a man .
xing his eye o n a point in the horizon turni n g ,
round and thus combini n g sensations o f muscular

tension with sight and coming again to the same
,
observed point in the horizon ; this will no t give h i m

a perception o f the circul ar gure of the horizon ; he
will s e e the same s up e r c i e s repeated as often a s he ,
turns completely round but he w ill not know that

,
he is in the centre o f it ; he will have n o xed

point wherewith to contrast the coloured s up e r c i e s .
Imagine him no w to s e e hi s o w n body in addition ,
and this will be a xed part o f the same s up e r c i e s ;

but still a part o f a s up e r c i e s only n o t the central,
part of a circular s up e r c i e s but only a xed part o f

,
TH E NA T URE O F THE C O GNITI ONS
it while the other parts are changing Suppose him .
however n o w t o be endowed with touch and to touch ,
as well as see his o w n body ; then the xed part of

the visual landscape o r coloured s up e r c i e s always
, ,
seen when any other parts o f t h e l a n dscape are seen ,
becomes in addition t h e onl y object o f touch the ,
onl y object which he perceives by both the senses o f

S ight and touch He gains by the addi tion o f the
.
,
sense o f touch a point o f dep a rture from which to

,
measure the s up e r c i e s which he s a w previously as

,
onl y supercially extended ; and the third di mension

Of S pace means for hi m now di stance from something
actually tangible The meani ng o f the third di m e n
.
sion o f S pace is originally then the distance from

, ,
o ne tangible point to another in objects o f sight .
Whatever may be the proportions in which these two

senses o r that o f muscular tension contribute after
, ,
wards to the interpretation o r measurement o f com

a r a t i v e di stances o r magnitudes f li n ear r super
p o ,
o
c i a l extension o r o f depth the sense o f touch is

, ,
indispensable a s a constituent o f the perceptions in

which depth r st becomes an Object o f consciousness .
E qually inadequate is the sense o f tou ch either ,
alone o r combin e d with muscular tension b ut w ithout ,
sight to supply perceptions in which the third d i m e n

,
s ion o f S pace is perceived Sensations o f touch alone ,

.
o r combined with those o f muscul ar tension can give

,
a succession of feel ings o f supercia l extension but ,
cannot bind these sens a tions into a solid whole with

o ut the combination o f vis ual sensations I can .
touch a surface but I do not solely from that kn ow

,
in what direction the series o f touches go nor dis ,
t i ngu i sh a direction o f a surface from a direction

vertic a l to it The only kind o f cases where a com
.
O F T I ME A ND S PAC E . 79
bination o f a whole series Of touch sensations into a -
solid whole is apparently possible i s in grasping a

small object where the ngers meet each Other a s
,
well as touch the surface all round Here we have .
an entire series o f touches o n the outside o f a n o b

jcet just as in the above case o f vision we had an
,
entire series o f visu a l images seen from the inside

o f the object the horizon ; we receive the i m pression
,
o f resistance at all poin ts but we get no perception

,
o f the solid S pace between those points No r if we .

,
did receive this p erception could we extend the ex

,
e r i e n c e to other cases where the series o f touches

p
could not be complete that i s t o Space generally fo r
, , ,
there is nothing to connect the t w o kinds o f cases ;

without sight we cannot perceive o u r o w n bodies as
solid and consequently not space genera ll y in three
,
dimensions Sight therefore is an essential consti

.
tuent o f the perception o f depth But again the .
s ame remark must be made here namely that this , ,
fact does not show in what relative proportion touch

and sight are necessary t o the measurement o r inter
r e t a t i o n o f magnitudes T h sense o f muscular
p e .
tension alone is obviously less competent than touch

to give the perception o f depth o r distance for it ,
does not even give that o f supercial extension .
If we could assume space in its three di mensions ,
and Objects occupying it a s a l ready existi ng in and

,
by itself and needing only to be perceived by us

, ,
then perhaps sight alone o r touch alone would suf ce

, ,
to this perception ; for the question then would be

o n e o f mere in terpretation But to assume this is in
.
fact to assume that we possess the perception o f S pace ,
as a form of consciousness previous to its becom i ng

,
lled by sensible impressions These t w o apparently .

TH E NAT U RE OF T HE C O G NITI ONS
opposi te ass umptions are fundamentally the same ; in

both of them space is conceived as lying before us, as
an absolute to be perceived and i n terpreted But if
,
.
the very existence o f space is its being perceived and ,
if Consequently in reasoni ng about it it must be con

, ,
c e i v e d as rst coming into existence when it is rst
perceived then we have t o account not only for its

,
interpretation but for its original perception ; and the

senses have to produce its perception and its exist
ence And for this purpose the senses have to be
.
exam ined separately in order to s e e what each sense

,
by itself involves and how much it can separately

,
contribute to the c Om p l e t e perception o f space in

three di mensions Sight contributes at the least
.
, ,
perception o f supercial extension ; s o also touch ; the

combination o f the two produces at the l e ast per , ,
c e t i o n s of the three di mensions for part o f the visual

p ,
s u e r c i e s is pushed t o a distan c e from the xed part

p ,
the body when we touch the bo d y and not the rest

,
o f the s u e r c i e s and yet the part of the s u e r c i e s

p , p
so pushed remains a s up e r c i e s stil l T his is the .
origi n the creation of the third dimension Of S pace

, , ,
when reasoned o f as if it were an empirical Object .
Sight and touch however come into operation toge

ther and consequently the perception o f the third
,
dimension o f space begins simultaneously with that

o f its superci a l extension The object a nd the state
.
o f consciousness called perception o f things in space
Of three dimensions is a highly complex state and

object but not necessaril y later in time than any of
,
the simpler states o r objects o f which it is composed ;

it is we who import the notion of growth i n time into
it by o u r analysing it into its element s and then
,
composing it a fresh by their combination In other .

words the senses o f sight and touch contain the

,
logical elements b ut not the historical causes Of the

, ,
perception o f objects in three dimensions .
Logical language and the language of reection ,
together with the modes of thought this language

expresses being that necessari ly used by us in ana
,
lysing the phenomena o f perception we naturally but , ,
not therefore correctly imagi ne that perception a d

,
v a n c e d by the same stages a s those which we have
discovered in the analysis o f its Obj ects and that it ,
n o t o nl y reached that result which we an a l yse but ,
that it reached it by the same route and gained ,
successively the same stages as o u r two processes , ,
analytical and synthetical successively traversed and

,
reached Fo r inst a n ce we have a nalysed Space into

.
,
three di mensions a n d therefore imagine that percep

,
tion s a w rst o n e of these and then the others ; o r we

distin guish the rst and second from the third and ,
then imagine that perception saw the rst and second

together as distin guished from the third But there .
is nothing to show that this was the case Visual .
perception sees a s up e r c i e s but it does not s e e a

,
s u e r c i e s as distinguished from a solid ; if it did so

p ,
it must have previously seen the solid It sees what .
we afterwards in order to distinguish it from a solid

, ,
call a s up e r c i e s It has never conceived the ques

.
tion whether there is any thing behind the s up e r c i e s

o r not ; it sees colours which may be either super
c i e s or solid and which turn out to be solid

,
A .
s u e r c i e s without a solid and a li ne o r a point

p ,
without a s up e r c i e s are obj ects o f abstraction p r o

, ,
visional images only ; and when it is said on o ne side

and admitted o n the other that Sight sees onl y a,
'
coloured s up e r c i e s it is meant that this is the least

, ,
G
TH E NAT UR E OF T HE C O GNITI O NS

0o c m y x oc i o y ,
which in o ur reective and logical lan
'
v
7
guage can be expressed to be seen ; that sight sees

this at the least without asking h o w far it may go
,
towards the next logical mark o r division trinal ex ,
tension which would in clude too much and without

, ,
entering in any way into t h e question what potenti

a l i t i e s may b e involved in this perception o f super
c i e s ; for the phenomenon o f sight the coloured ,
surface has not been yet analysed by t h e perceptive

,
conscio usne ss The addition of touch to S ight com

.
,
b i ne d in time does not add a new distinct direction

,
to an o l d distinct one do es not add depth as d istin

,
u i s h e d from surface to surfa ce as distinguished from

g
depth ; but it changes t h e previously potential super
c i e s into an actual solid ; it makes us s e e into t h e
s u e r c i e s and perceive it as o r transform it into
p , , ,
solidity Space in three dimensions therefore does

.
, ,
no t become such by a composition of distinct sepa ,
rate parts o r directions but by a combination o f

, ,
se nsatio ns in to one indivisible whole a whole which , ,
although complex is not separable except logically

,
and provi sionally .
Since space in three dimensions is an indivisible

though c omplex whole it does not arise i n c o n s e ,
u e n c e of comparison o r reasoning which are pro

q ,
cesses concerned with complete empirical objects o r ,
with abstractions treated as such objects But in .
perceiving s p a Ce in three dimensions no such empi

r i c a l o r complete ob ect has been arrived at u ntil
j ,
space itself has been perceived ; and the three d i m e n

sions of space are not capable o f being treated as
such empirical objects until the y have been abstracted
,
from S pace itself as a whole In the perception of

space there is synthe sis but no t comparison ,

.
TH E NAT UR E OF T HE C O G NIT I O NS
togeth er and not because each succession is a motion
, ,
that objects in three dimensions arise .
It may now be objected that there is more than

these elements there is their combination ; and that
,
-
this combination is motion The answer is this

.
,
their combination is time F eelings succeeding o n e .
another i n time are combined already ; if those feelings

are also in space they are still combined as before in
,
time ; that is their succession is their combination ;

,
and are besides combined in space by their space

relations . Their combination has already been a c
counted for that is r e ferred t o its proper element in
, ,
the analysis A ccounted for in this sense it has been

.
fully ; but accounted for in another sense it has not

been and the mixing up these t w o senses in which
,
phenomena can be accounted fo r is a common source

o f error. Was it meant by asking after the com
bination o f feelings in motion to ask how they came
to be combined o r what was the cause o f their being
,
combined in stead o f asking what was the analysis o f

,
the phenomenon o f their being combined ? Was it

meant to ask how feelings come to be combined with
time and space relations the material with the
,
formal element o f cognition a n d h o w phenomena

come to contain these t w o elements at all ? These
are questions w hich are not answered here and ,
which never h a ve been answered ; they involve an

attempt to sprin g beyond the last elements o f con
s c i o u sne s s and they move only by emp loying the
,
cogni tions the cause of which they ask for they are
intelligible only because they contain the cognitions
which they seek to render intelligible .
M otion is sometimes conceived as the combination

o f feelings in time with feelings in sp a ce o r o f the ,
O F T I M E A ND S PAC E .
85
time rel a tions wi th the S pac e relation s in feelings o r

- -
,
i n
as a succession o f feelings in space relations -
,
which sense it has been already analysed ; and some

times i t is conceived as the cause o r the fact the ,
obj ective fact as it is called o r the occult cause o r

,
fact as it is sometimes called underlying that c o m ,
bin ation Here comes o ut the result o f dividing the

.
world into t w o sets o f obj ects subj ects o r min ds o n ,
o n e side and Objects known o r knowable by these

,
subj ects o n the other O n this supposition there

.
must be occult facts o r occult causes which are ,
known only by their e ffects o r manifestations which ,
are phenomena ; there must be occult facts o r occult

causes on the side o f the subjects which are known ,
only by their e ffects o r manifestations the cognitions ,
o r states o f consciousness E verywhere are Things

.
i n themselves unknowable but imagin ed as existing ;

-
,
imagined as the double o f phenomenal existence in

order to account for it ; there must be a cause o f
every thing it is said even o f the ele ments o f
, ,
phenomena ; multiply then these elements by 2 and ,
call the result their cause And that this is really

.
the origin o f the conception o f Things i n themselves - -
o r occult facts o r causes is shown in this instance by

,
the exact similarity in nature and position between

the real c o mbination o f feelin gs namely time and the , ,
imagined one , motion as an occult cause M otion .
contains nothing but the formal element in cognition ;

it is Simply that element made into an object by itself
a l one without a material element and supposed t o ,
be the Object perceived in i t s manifestations in per ,
c ei vi n pheno m ena
g .
O n e o f the questions which was proposed at the

begin ning o f this section has no w been answer ed ,
TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
namely whether motion was o n e o f the formal

,
elements in consciousness It has been Shown that .
it is not but is an empirical fact o r phenomenon

, ,
capable o f analysis into feeling time and supercial , ,
extension o f Space And if motion is thus put aside

.
,
I do not know what other claimant there can be for

s uch a rank Fo r force about which s o much is
.
,
s aid in physical science is but motion considered as

,
determined to a particular direction o r mode and ,
s ometimes to a particular degree o r measure o f

in tensity . B ut the claim o f space in its thre e ,
dimensions to that rank may yet b e contested In

, ,
.
fact it has been shown that this cognition spac e in ,
three dimensions do es not spring up full formed

,
with the rst o r simplest exercise o f consciousness ,
but that its growth can be traced through com

b i n ation of the data o f the t w o senses o f touch and
s ight ; besides which its being original only with
,
two o f the senses and with those two only in

,
c ombination while the majority o f the senses a r e

,
o ri i nally without it
g seems to show
,
that it is not
u ni versal in phenomena o r necessary in conscious
n ess
. N o w if its necessity in consciousness required
,
the support o f a theory o f its being an innat e o r

connate form o f an obj ective min d then these con ,
s iderations would be fatal to its claim ; for they

would S how that the connection between that p sy
c ho lo i c a l object and this its form o f consciousness
g
was not universal and without interruption but that ,
the mind might and originally did operate without

operating under this form But t h e necessity and .
consequent universali ty o f space i n three d i m e n ,
s ions is not dependent o n any objective s c ho lo i

, p y g
cal theory Space is necessary not becaus e it i s a
.
,
native form o f the operation o f the mind but b e ,
cau se being irreducible to any thing else it is all

, ,
embracing and exhaustive in its nature and occupies ,
the whole eld o f being True the particular

.
,
phenomena in which it arises may be pointed o u t ,
namely the two senses o f sight and touch in com

,
bination ; these are its sources o r the phenomena in,
which it is involved But in the rst place these

.
, ,
cases never arise alone but always in conjunction

,
with some Of the other phenom e na o f which the

entire consciousness is composed ; and then this ,
being s o the nature o f the cognition o f space s o

, ,
combined with the rest determines its n ecessity for

, ,
its nature is such that no feeling can escape it ; it

combines with the rest as their frame and dwelling
place from which they can afterwards only be
,
released provisionally and durin g a process o f a h

s t ra c t i o n
. True space is composite ; but it is com
,
posed only o f itself true it is not like time present

,
in every moment o f every feeli n g b ut except by an , ,
effort o f volition every moment o f every feeling is

,
present in it Space is the necessary formal element

.
of the senses of sight and touch taken together ; but

it is the necessary formal element Of the other feel
ings only on the supposition that these two senses
are an inseparable part o f the consciousness which is
the c omplex of those other feelings in other words ,
it is only for an individual human consciousness as ,
we nd it actually existing that Objects i n space are

,
inseparable from Objects in time but this is enough

for the purposes o f analysis of an individu a l human
consciousness .
1 3 With the arising o f phenomena in three

.
dimensions arises also the distinction o f the pheno

THE NA T UR E OF T HE C O GNI T I ONS
mena into thos e within and those without the body :
F o r the perception o f the third dimension of space
takes place onl y in distinguishing the body as a solid
and tangible Object from the space surrounding it ,
which must be therefore perceived as solid o r in three

di m ensions The phenomena are thus conceived as
.
capable o f being separated from each other in the

third dim ension o f space Another conception is con .
n e c t e d with this that o f matter as impenetrable ; in

,
which sense s o far from being taken t o mean as in

, ,
this E ssay only the material element in conscious

,
ness it means masses o r molecules o f some impene

,
t r a b l e stu ff which is in some way o r other the oppo

,
site o f feeling o r consciousness P utting these two .
conceptions together there ari ses the conception of a

,
world which is a congeries o f material obj ects s ur ,
rounding the body o n all sides and endowed with ,
qualities which operate upon each other and u pon ,
the body and produce changes in it which modify

,
the states of the consciousness seated within it .
It is easy to imagine how these two conceptions

were combined s o as to produce the conception o f a
,
world o f materi a l objects The quality o f impene .
t r a b i l i t y is nothing else than the sensation o f touch

including o r combined with the sense o f muscular
tension I do not speak Of the causes o r antecedent
.
conditions o f this quality but o f what it is for con ,
s c i o u s n e s s alone and if we are told o f or imagine

;
Objects which are i m penetrable but in s o sli ght a ,
degree that we cannot perceive them to be such actu

ally but can only infer the quality by proof of its
,
e ffects as for instance in the case o f the air o n a

, , ,
still day yet it is plain that the inferred resistance

,
or impenetrability o f the a i r is o nly und erstood o r

imagined by referring it to cases o f actually p erceived

resistance In the great majority o f instances o f actu
.
ally experienced tangibility th is sensation i s aecom

'
a ni e d by sensations of sight and by sensations o f

p ,
sight i n which a continuity o r contact o f surface with

the body is seen Break the visible continuity and
.
the sensation o f touch ceases renew o n e and the other ,
is renewed Again other sensations such a s odour

.
, ,
a n d sound become stronger in proportion as the tan

,
i b l e obj ect is brought nearer to the body and weaker

g ,
as it is removed When we actually have sensations

.
o f touch we actu a l ly have also in most cases a

, , ,
variety o f other sensations ; but this is the case with

no other o f the sensations to any thing like the same ,
degree N 0 other brings with it the other sensations

.
we may hear s e e smell in some cases even taste

, , , ,
without touchin g or feeli n g any muscular tension ;

but if we touch we can also do some o n e o r more o f
,
the rest Touch then with the sense o f muscular

.
,
tension is a sense with which all o r any o f the rest

,
can be comb i n ed ; at the same time it is impossible to

be closer to any object than in touching it ; the object
supposed to be touched is in visible continuity with
the b o dy ; and the quality o f impenetrability is not
capable of bein g expressed o r c o nceived ultimately in
any other way than a s a sensation o f touch combined
with mu scular tension .
Suppose n o w the very frequent case o f obj ects ,
which have been touched removed to a distance but ,
still visible ; they will be represented as tangible we ,
sh a l l remember that we touched them ; yet the s ur

face stil l actually visible is n o longer actually tangible .
The t w o senses are no longer in combination but w e ,
know by experience that a tangible surface must be

T H E NA T URE OF THE C O G NIT I O NS
also visible though a visible o n e need not be tangible ;
,
we remember that the more distinctly visible any ,
thing is the easier it b ecomes t o touch it and that

, ,
the same holds good of the other senses Tangibil ity .
is thus conceived as the condition o f the other senses ;

and sin ce w e represent the once touched and still
visible object as tangible we now make it the seat o f ,
visibility and consider the object as tangible to be

,
the object proper a n d the other sensations visibility

, , ,
Odour sound and taste as inherent in o r dependent

, , ,
o n it
. The cognition o f space in its three dimensions
havin g been already gained this Obj ect is then r e ,
ferred to some part o f space distant from the body ,
and space thus becomes lled with tangible obj ects ,
that is with different masses o f matter in which the

,
other sensations inhere .
The removal however of the seat o f these sensa

tions to a distance while they are felt all the time in
,
the body compels a change in o ur way of regarding

,
them ; they must be regarded as caused in us by a

property Of the tangible object ; in other words we ,
cease to look at the sensations as obj ects for con

s c i o u s n e s s alone and to ask what is their range as
,
sensations and we begin to enquire how they are

,
produced in the tangible objects and t ransmitted

from them to o ur bodies P henomena which are .
visible but not actually touched become thus removed

by the imagination to a d istance because conscious , ,
ness argues with itself if they were at the surface of

,
the body they could be touched ; S ince they a re not

touched they are not at the surface of the body
,
.
Where are they then ? Somewhere in that third

dimension o f space which has been already discovered .
They must exist in the two rst dimensions of space ,

TH E NAT UR E OF TH E C O GN I TI ONS
the space between us and the s un ; a Sound or an

odour occupies the space b etween us and the tangibl e
object perceived by these senses Suppose conscious .
ness to be placed at any intermediate spot with t h e

requisite media the atmosphere for instance and i t

, ,
would have the same sensation The sensation is .

there if its conditions are ; and by being there i s
meant that if consciousness were there it would have

,
the sensation just as in the case o f other objects

,
.
This is the view which I wish to establish in place of

the conception above described o f what I may call
, ,
.
the duplicity o f phenomena as cause there and effect ,
here as quality in the tangible object and feeling

, ,
caused by the quality in the body o f the obs erver ,

.
F eelings and qualities are convertible or at least ,
equivalent terms o n e the subjective aspect o f t h e

, ,
other ; where o n e is there is the other ; and t h e,
same causes are the causes of both .
The question is o n e concerning the distribution o f

the contents o f space The erroneous conception i s .
,
that the extension represented as tangible is the ex

tension actually seen ; the true conception is that t h e ,

e xtension actually seen is continuo u s with but n o t ,
the same a s the extension represented as tangible ;

,
that the visibility o f the extension is combin ed with

its tangibility but not conned to the limits to which
,
its tangibility is conned If I take the object t o .
mean its tangibility combined with its visibility then ,
the object occupies all the space as far as it is visible ,
while its tangibility occupies a small portion at the ,
c entre o f that S pace

,
The s un for instance is not
.
,
,
the object seen when we s e e li ght but is the tangibl e ,
centre o f the obj ect light ; a tree o r house or any

,
other su c h Object in the same Wa y is the tangible

, ,
.
OF TI M E A ND S P AC E .
93
object at the c entre O f the coloured rays which are

the visible object P erhaps the object is audible
.
,
odorous gustable as well as tangible and visible ; if

, ,
"
so,
it occupies the whole o f the space occupied by t h e
widest o f these properties Suppose now the Object .
to be presented t o consciousness ; part o f it only as

just described is presented the rest is represented ; ,
the parts not actually touched the rays o f light o r ,
colour of sound o f taste not falli ng o n the senses of

, , ,
the body are represented So that whether we take

,
.
,
the obj ect in the widest sweep o f its qualities o r ,
limit it to the sweep Of its tangible qu a l ity only we ,
must have a large portion o f it an Object o f r e p r e

s c utation The common opini on limits the obj ect not
.
,
t o the sweep Of its presented tangible quality but to ,
that o f its tangible quality presented and represented .
It can derive no support from the coincidence o f i t s

limit with the distinction between presentation and
representation ; for both views equally overstep this
line The rest o f the qualities o f the object m their
.
wide sweep it calls e ffects o f the object I n those t a n

g i b l e limits e ffects
,
o f the motion o f its particles .
Here are two opinions both describing the same

,
Object but in different ways ; o n e describes the

,
phenomena as consisting o f an object and its

e ffects the other as consisting o f a combinatio n o f
,
objects .
The test to which I bring these two conceptions

is the distinction between rst and second intentions .
A re no t e ffects o f an Object themselves objects

Have they not a nature a kind o f their o w n pre
, , ,
v i o u s to being known as the e ffects o f another object ?
Is n o t the term effect applied to them in their second

and no t in their rst intention ? They may be e ff ects
T H E NA T U RE OF TH E C O GNIT I O NS
o f some other object or o f some constitution o r cause
,
in that other Object ; but the present question is ,
what they are for consciousness alone and not what ,
their relation is to other objects in consciousness or ,
what they are in that relation N o w for conscio us .

-
ness alone every quality is a sensation and the single ,
name of colour sound and so o n expresses the two

, , , ,
things rst the sensation then the sensation as ex

, ,
tended i n space o r as quality All these qualities

,
.
,
except tangibility may certainly be considered also

,
as e ffects o f the motion o f tangible particles if it is ,
remembered at the same time that they are some

thing else for consciousness alone namely sensations , ,
o f sight sound and so on

, ,
But if they are conceived .
as inherent in the tangible objects and yet as direct ,
objects for consciousness they become reduced all to ,
o n e quality tangibility as the sensation of motion in

, ,
tangible particles ; and then we must consider tangi

b i l i t y as the onl y sensation which is absurd The ,
.
sensations other than touch cannot be analysed in ,
their rst intention into sensations of touch though

, ,
their antecedent conditions may perhaps be so ana

lysed that is though they may be found to depend
, ,
upon different kinds o f motion in tangible objects .
C onceive them as qualities inherent i n the tangible

object only and they become themselves modes o f
,
tangi b ility ; but conceive them in their own shape as

sensations and they occupy space in three dimensions
, ,
precisely as tangibility itself does .
On e of these theories has been called true the ,
other erroneous ; but are not both true and each of ,
them compatible with the other ? They are i n c o m

patible onl y if both are regarded as metaphysical
conceptions or conceptions of ultimat e analysis ; but
,
TH E NAT UR E OF T HE C O G NITI ON S
s t a nt lpresent as a complex o f feelings in conscious
y , ,
ness When the action and reaction o f feelings o n

.
each other in space is in question those feelings b e ,
come to us qualities since we abstract from their

,
relation to the mind ; when we ask what they are to

ourselves they remain feelings And this is the case
,
.
wherever we may imagine ourselves to be : a feeling

does not cease to be a feeling and begin to be a quality
at a hairsbreadth distance from the body o r nervous
matter ; light which is a feeling extends from the s un
in all directions and is felt by the sense o f sight
,
everywhere ; in all space it is a qu a l ity and in all ,
space it is a feeling .
The world Of qualities as diffe rent from the world

,
o f feelin gs arises only in consequence o f an abstra e

,
tion supposed to be complete from the consciousness

which perceives them ; and this supposed complete
abstraction is thought to be possible and natural onl y
in consequence o f dividing consciousness in space from
its feeli ngs and making both into obj ects But this
,
.
complete abstraction is a delusion and impossible ,
because even while the separation is being made

, ,
both the things separated are Obj ects and feel ings o f
the same consciousness ; the qualities themselves are
feeli ngs when present to consciousness for the pur
pose o f being divided from the mind and the mind is ,
in the same case P sychological division in space o f

.
the m i nd from its feelings makes both members o f

the division into an absolute into obj ects each o f ,
which is supposed to exist even if the other should

not exist But metaphysical disti n ction makes these
.
qualities again into feelings notwithstanding that ,
th ey may occupy the whole o f sp ace F eelings and .
qualities are t h e t w o aspects o f the same world ; but

S PA C E 97
'
O F T I M E A ND .
'
for metaphysic the world is a world of fe e l i ngs s i n c e ,
the conception o f feeling includes that o f something

felt that is quality but the conception of quality
, , ,
does not include that of feeling .
V ery early the distinction was drawn between

objects which touched o ne another and obj ects o n e
o f which had besides this the sensation of being
, ,
touched by the other A ll obj ects could be felt onl y

.
by means of touch in the former sense if the Obj ect

felt did not itself touch the body which felt it it ,
must put in motion something which did ; and t h e

question was what this medium 7 0 {A ss a i d was ;
, ,
-
,
whether it belonged to the feeling body as in the ,
case Of the senses of touch and taste or was some ,
thing foreign to it as in sight and hearing Arist

,

. .
D e Anima ii i 6 e t seqq Touch i n the rst sense

,
.
,
.
,
which may be called contact was evidently an ,
i nterpretation o f touch in the second sense that is of , ,
touch as a sensation ; the closeness between objects

in contact was an inference from the sensation of
closeness in the sensation o f touching visible objects .
A ristotle showed that even obj ects o f touch were not

strictly close to the part of the body which felt them ,
but were felt through a medium just as the objects

of the other senses were though this medium was ,
part of the body itself D e Anima iii I I But the

.
,
. .
imagination had already rmly established the notion

o f objects bein g separate independent existences led ,
thereto by the sense of touch wrongly interpreted ,
a n d a ll enquiry had t o be conducted on that basis .
The consequence was the distinction between objects

and their qualities by which the objects were known
,
as au di ble visible tangible and s o on Take for

, , , .
instance a visibl e and tangible object as the object of

H
98 T HE NA T U RE OF TH E C O G NI TI O NS
enquiry e g a table ; it has the tangible quality

,
. .
hardness the v isible quality brown ness Both these

, .
qualities are known if either is by an e ffect they , ,
produce in the medium between the object and the

sensitive part i n our bodies A s an Object the table .
requires this medium as much in the sense of touch ,
in order to produce the s ensation O f hardness as i n ,
the sense o f sight to produce that o f brownness .
The object is not immediately touched there is the

skin covering the nerve extremities and the nerve -
,
substance itself o r as A ristotle called it the 0025 5

, ,
intervening The original opinion was that the o b

.
j c et touched was immediately present to the sensitive

part in touch to Show that there was a medium was
virtually to S how that the Object s o conceived was a
ction of the imagination and that the object touched ,
was the quality Of tangibility not a supposed object ,
Of which this was a quality inherent ; for i n that case

a quality in the medium would be what was i m
mediately present to the sensitive part o f the body .
And thus we may read a profound meaning into

A ristotle s words D e Anim a i i i 1 2 K a o ko v 03
'
.
, ,
.
77 2
32 77 02
077; 3 3
05 097 0e 027 M c eTv 15 (1 211 00 091701 ;
7 07 1
'
7 0

Bez The 8707 was0
''
z ou 7 0
511 39
00 0 177 0
511 51 0
711 00vev 7 57g zz Mg .
the object itself the substance o f which the qualities

,
were properties or accidents o r in modern G erman , , ,
the D ing a n s i c h z Y et though Aristotle established

- -
clearly that in touch we perceive a quality and not

the thing itself he s a w neither that after this there
,
was no ground remaining to believe in the existence

o f the 37 77 nor that the co nf usion between the {1707
x
,
d tangibility was the cause o f t h e di stinction drawn

between an object in itself and its qualities a n d he
continued to argue on t h e same basis o f an u nknown
T H E NA T UR E OF T H E C O G NI T I O NS
feelings consequently are in the body in the same
way as those o f the sense o f touch are All the .
senses are in this way a kind of touch in the sense of

contact but each with a peculiarity of its own which
,
procures it its name All feelings o f all the senses

.
, ,
are continuous indivisible into an objective part and

,
a subjective part and solid ; but one kind alone is

,
the feelin g o f touch ; from the three dimensions of

which latter kind of feeling when Combined with ,
sight all the other feelings derive not tangibility but

,
solidity The formal element is transferred from

.
touch and sight to other feelings ; its o w n material

element remains peculiar to touch B ut it may be .
objected here that if we are not justied in trans

, ,
ferring the material element of tangibility to objects

of sight and sound by association neither ar e we jus ,
t i e d in transferring the formal element of solidity to

the other senses besides touch and sight Transfer .
,
it may be said both or neither B ut solidity and

,
.
tangibility I reply are quite different th ings and

, ,
stand on quite different grounds The sensation of .
touch is the last of a series of conditions on the com

l e t i o n o f which the perception of solidity ari ses the
p
perception of a body as solid arises from the combi
nation o f feelings of sight and touch i n supercial
extension with their time relations The perception -
.
o f our own body as solid arises in this way and the

;
perception o f our own body as solid gives solidity to
every thing about it ; for if the space which it oce n
pies is solid the space which surrounds it must be
,
solid also ; for the body is perceived as solid only by

being distinguished from Objects o n all sides of it .
The perception o f solidity therefore is not due to

associati on as the transference o f tangi bi lity to O b
,
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 1 01
jec tsof sight is Solidity is always

. perceived when
it has been perceived once but tangibility may be ,
erroneously inferred .
P henomena whether o f one or more or all the

,
senses exist accordingly both in time and in three

,

dimensions of space NO here and there in phe .

n o m e n a is possible ; there is only one continuous phe
n o m e n o n in which and o f which are all its di fferences

, ,
parts a n d kinds There is one consciousness and o n e

,
.
universe ; each fact is the counterpart but not the

cause or the e ffect o f the other C onsciousness with .
all its modes o f feeling and its two modes of form is

one and indivisible the universe with all its quali
ties and its two modes of form the same two modes ,
as in consciousness is o n e and indivisible also Sight

,
.
reveals continuity of supercial extension touch and ,
sight together reveal continuity of supercial and

solid extension Suppose now that in these modes
.

o f extension an empty place were found that in the

,
surface revealed by sight a portion was dark and i n

visible that i n the surface revealed by touch a por
,
tion was intangible and did not affect the nerve of

touch cases which are frequent ; then the dark por
,
tion and the intangible portion being contrasted with ,
the light and the tangible portions become portions ,
o f space have position and gure

,
Space suffers no .
rupture but its material c o element o nl y What is

,
-
.
the cause o f this phenomenon ? Has it not been

'
shown that the material element is equally essential

to consciousness with the formal ? If then the mate
rial element vanishes anywhere ought not there the ,
formal element to vanish also ? Th e sol ution is that ,
the place left empty o f the material element is l led

w ith the representation of that element ; there is no
1 02 T H E NA T U R E OF THE C O GNI T I O NS
P
A RT I . material element in presentative perception at that
place but the gap is bridged over either by a mate
,
rial element supplied by representation from what ,
ever source this may be draw n o r by a representation ,
o f the gap becoming lled without designating by .
what kind of material element The dark portion o f .
the visible surface is only itself present to conscious

ness by being contrasted with the light portions ; t h e
intangible portion o f the tangible surface i s only pre
sent to consciousness by being contrasted with the
tangible portions In other words the formal element
.
,
I S always actually and presentatively present in all

consciousness the material element may be present
,
in representation onl y and provisionally Hence the .
power which we have o f forming an image of space

a nd of time without any particular material element ;
in this image the material element is only provision

ally present But the material element can never be
.
present in consciousness without the actual presence

o f the formal element Some time or some time and
.
,
space together every feeling must occupy I do not

,
.
sa
y
,
some denite time some denite gure
, ; these
may be provisionally present But while we can .
banish matter from time and space and keep it only ,
provisionally there that is without specifying what

, ,
kind of matter it is to be we cannot so banish time

,
and space from matter Sensations o f sight and of

.
touch must always be in time and space ; sensations

o f the other senses must always be in time The .
cause of this is probably to be sought in the innite

number o f modications of the material element while ,
the formal element has but two modications ti m e ,
and space Time and space may be presented as

.
empty without any particular material content ; in

,
1 04 T H E NA T UR E OF T HE C O GNI TI ONS
this shows that the o l d division into an internal sub

e c t i v e and an ext e rnal obj ective sense is correct
j ,
the fact is that there are two separate kinds and two
separate portions o f time contained in those feelings
which occupy space as well as time ; there is o ne
time element which is subjective and o f the same
-
kind as that occupied by feelings which occupy time

alone and there is another which is objective and is
,
occupied by the feelings in exactly the same objective

way i n which they occupy space Tangible and visi .
ble objects are present in consciousness for a certain

time subjectively they occupy space objectively and
,
for that time ; but not onl y for that time but also for ,
as long as they occupy s p ace ; they have a place and

a duration in time in the world of objects as well as ,
a place in space When I s e e an o a k it exists for a

.
,
minute in my mind but it exists ve hundred years

,
objectively and in the same objective sense as that in

,
which it is said to exist as part of the visible and tan

g i b l e landscape . There is therefore an objective
, ,
and a s ubjective time though you have only men

,
t i o n e d one the subj ective

,
.
If I should not succeed in answering this o b je c

tion I hope that the plainness with which I have
,
exhibited it will shield me from the imputation of

wishing to leave any dif culties dark My answer to .
this objection is that the o a k considered as occupying

,
this second portion of time this objective portion of,
time does not exist as part o f the object o r p h e n o m e

,
non of presentative perception with the analysis of ,
which we are more directly concerned The oak ex .
i s t i ng in that second Objective portion of time the

, , ,
ve hundred years is an object o f representation onl y

, ,
believed on evidence interpreted by my experience o f

OF TI M E A ND S PAC E . 1 05
time in presentative perceptions The universe in its . I um I .
c H n
e n t l r e d u ra t l o n pr i or to th i s actually present moment
0 o 0
0 0 0
,
14
nay even thi s actually present moment I tself I f I t be
.
Tl e u ni t y o f
,
i
1222
p l
true that
L nt nj p l t d ej l in d
e m o m e o ei a r e es a o e m o ,
is in the same case There remains therefore no .
other time in presentative phenomena than the time

wh ich I spoke o f as the only o n e the same in kind ,
with the time involved in feelings which exist in time

o nly ; and this time is both objective and subj ective ,
equally the o n e equally the other as is discovered by

, ,

reection ; that is it is mine and the tree s both at
,
once Similarly with space ; the visible and tangible

.
landscape O f which the o a k w a s a portion is the only

extended object present in presentative perception .
Beyond an exten t which M r Bain describes as a .
range of about a third o f a circle right and left up , ,

and down all other visible and tangible Objects are
,
present to consciousness onl y in representation T h e .
object which I have before me in presentation is this

portion o f space and the rst portion o f time the ,
minute lled together by certain feelings If I mix

,
.
up with them or add to them in the followi ng min ute

, ,
representative perceptions I may in that next minute ,

have before me the ve hundred years o f the oak s
life and ages before that also and also the whole
, ,
depth of sky above and beneath the earth E urope , ,
E ngland the eld of many one with the o a k there

, ,
standing the events that have passed around it and

,
that may pas s before it is gone and i n times when it ,
shall have gone and been forgotten The s o called .

-
objective portion o f time then turns o ut to be time , ,
as the form of an object of representation not o f pre

scutation But nothing I n representation is o r can
.
1 06 T H E NA T U RE OF .
T HE C O GNI T I O NS
be more real than things perceived in presentation .
So that if this portion o f time is called Obje c tive to

di stinguish it from the minute in which it is per
c e i v e d it cannot be in the sense that what is s ubjee
,
tive is less real than what is objective .
Will however any one maintain that the d i s t i n c

tion between subjective and objective coincides with
that between representation and presentation that ,
every thin g which is merely represented is merely

subjective every thing which is really presented is
,
really Objective ? In that case every thing not con ,
t a i n e d in the actual object o f the present moment is

merely subjective ; the course of the world up to the
present moment the space o f sky seen at the Anti
,

podes our own ancestors are m erely subjective ; nor

, ,
will it avail to reply that they are now indeed s ub ,
e c t i v e but have been actually presented to conscious

j ,
ness once that our ancestors have lived in a world Of

,
people to whom they were objects of presentation ;

for the people themselves the consciousnesses to ,
whom they were objects of presentation are them ,
selves merely subjective too all alike are Objects o f ,
Ou r representation The addition of a further cha

.
r a c t e r i s t i c to those Obj ects cannot make them more
real if the added characteristic is itself also merely

,
subj ective The Objects then o f representation not

.
, ,
onl y are now subj ective but wher e they do not , ,
belong to the actual experience of the person re p r e

senting them i e where they are imagined as well as
,
. .
represented they have never been any thing else ;

,
w hile as obj ects of former presentation they are i n

fe r e n c e s from obj ects of present or actual presenta
tion This conclusion is inevitable on the supposition
.
that the distinction between subjective and objective

"
1 08 T H E NA TUR E OF THE C O GNIT I O NS
Obj ects a n d e v e n t s which it mirrors o n the othe r

'
These classes o f objects have their separate a nd a p

r 0 r i a t e times and spaces in which th ey exist and in
p p
which they are perceived to exist ; but both are o b
e c t i v e and subj ective in the same sense that is both
j , ,
are what are commonly called obj ects and neither is ,
a subject The distinction between the two kinds of

.
time and space occupied respectively by the obj ect

, ,
as an object o f this mind and by this mind itself a s

, ,
contain ing their image in its consciousness is accord ,
i ngl y a distinction which arises in a particular kind of

reection on the phenomenon of representation a n d ,
not in this phenomenon of representation by itself ,
that is as it rst arises in consciousness or as it is

, ,
interpreted by reection alone in its proper sense .
But in order here to decide the question o f the

unity o f phenomena generally whether presentative ,
o r representative in time the nature of representa

, ,
tive phenomena must be examined What then is .
the phenomenon of representation as distinguished

by reection proper from the phenomenon o f pre
s e nt a t i o n ? The obj ect o f representation is distin
ui s h e d from that o f presentation solely by an i n
g
fe ri o r degree o f vivi dness distinctness and complete
, ,
ness in its material element The events and objects

.
of yesterday from noon to midni ght were presented

to me yesterday and occupied twelve hours To day .
-
they are represented to me and occupy ve minutes .
They are equal ly objects in both cases and equally ,
subjective In both cases their pre sence in the mind

.
and the time they occupy in that can be distin

ui sh e d in the kind f reection above described
g ,
o ,
from the time the events themselves occupy as O b

j e c. t s In both cases the times occupied are equal ,
OF TI M E AND S PAC E . 1 09
are really the same In the presentation the time is

.
twelve hours ; in the representation the time is ve

minutes .
NO you object ; the objective time in the
,
representation is twelve hours the subj ective is ve

,
minutes Hence the difference

. Times which con
tain the same events and o b j ects are the same length
o f time ; but do the ve minutes and the twelve
hours in representation contain the same events ;
that is are they lled with the same material ele
,
ment ? C ertainly they are Just as the small circle

.
of the retina contain s the same colours and forms

which are spread out over the whole surface o f the
object seen so the ve minutes contain the same
,
objects and even ts which are spread o ut over the

twelve hours in the representation A s the object .
in the former case was o n e object i n supercial ex

tension o f space so here in the representation o f the
,
events and objects of a day there is one obj ect in o ne

time which may be called ve m i nutes o r twelve
,
hours according as we consider it as part of the mind

or as part of the other Objects mirrored by the mind .
D istinguished however into two objects by reection

proper that is distinguished into two objects of ve
, ,
minutes and twelve hours respectively but without ,
being placed in different portions of space that i s , ,
in the mind and without it ; distinguished therefore

into two aspects of the same object what is the ,
-
difference be t ween them ? The difference between

them in this c a s e is solely the difference in the
distribution of the material element In the ve .
minutes that element is gathered together in the ,
twelve hours it is separated by spaces of time pro

visionally n o t actually present The twelve hours
.
contain just s o much material element as c a n be con

1 10 T H E NA T U RE O F THE C O GNI T I O NS

t a i ne d by v e m i nutes and this diff erence in length

is rectied by the recollection that there a re gaps
containing other matter which is omitted In other .
words the ve minutes o r twelve hours Obj ects o f

, ,
representation are a repetition o f part only and that

, ,
a less vividly present part o f the same twelve hours ,
as an object o f presentation This omission o f the .
matter enables the twelve hou rs to be the equivalent

O f the v e minutes since if all the matter was con
,
t a i n e d in them which was contain ed in presentation ,
they would require a n equal length of time in r e

presentation ; it would require from noon to mid
night to day t o represent the events and objects con
-
t a i n e d in t h e time from noon to midnight which

were presented yesterday Th e same remarks a p
.
ply to the case of the ve hundred years o f the

o a k tree ; only that in this case these years are not
-
remembered but imagined If events su fcient to.
ll every minute of ve hundred years were i m

i n e d o n e by o n e not one minute but ve hundred
a
g ,
years would be required for t h e purpose In all .
cases o f representation there is a decrease either i n

vividness or in amount o r in distinctness of the
, ,
order o f occurrence of the material element o r in all ,
at once in the object represented compared to the

, ,
obj ect as it was presented Somethin g is omitted ,.
either from the material element itself or from its ,
arrangement or from both in the object o f presen

, ,
tatie n ; and the object with these om i ssions is the

object of representation In order to signalise that
.
there are such omissions and that the obj ect o f ,
representation is a faithful transcript or repetition o f

the object of presentation only s o far a allowance is
made for such omissions the object of representation
,
1 12 T HE NA T URE OF TH E C O GNI TI O NS
second in which they are represented The twelve .
hours and the second are o n e object in o n e time:just

as the visible landscape and the impression on the
retina are o n e obj ect in one space .
If representation diffe r s from presentation only

in the vivi dness distinctness and arrangement o f its
, ,
material element then the formal element in presen

,
t a t i o n and in representation is the same ; there is n o

diff erence between presentation and representation in
so far as their formal element is concerned In an .
Object presented and in the same object represented

the time and the space occupied is the same ; the two
Objects di ffer only i e in point o f position in
. .
their times of being present to consciousness ( which

as will b e seen farther on is the characteristic S i g
n a li s e d by the term Sameness and in certain changes
) ,
in their material element There is no correspond

.
ing change in their formal element Just as it was .
shown above that in presentative perception a space

,
empty o f feelin g was still space the matter o f which

,
was supplied by representation from other parts of

space s o also in the objects o f representation the
,
omitted material element is what is supplied by r e

presentation the formal el ement remains the same as
,
before It makes no difference whether the object

.
present in consciousness is one of presentation or re

presentation the formal element in it is equally vivid
,
in both cases I do not s a y that it is equally distinct

.
or the arrangement of its parts the same because d i s ,
t i n c t n e s s and arrangement o f parts depend upon the

material element contained in the object as well as
upon its formal element ; in other words upon the ,
division of the formal element by the material as w ill ,
be seen farther o n The p r e s e nc e no t of particular

.
,
'
OF TI M E AND S PAC E . 1 13
lengths gures o r arrangement o f part s in the

, , ,
formal element but o f the formal element itself in

,
the object is equally certain and equally vi vi d in

,
representation and in presentation The same might .
be said o f the material element itse l f taken generally ,
and in the abstract that is Of feeling if the word

, , ,
feeling could be understood as meaning not this o r

that particular feeling but merely as signi fying that
,
representation invol ves feeling of some kind o r other

equally with presentation O f feeling however the .
, ,
modes are innumerable of the formal element the ,
modes are only two time and space ; s o that we can

,
S peak o f time and space in their rst intention with a

denite precision incompetible to the object feeling , ,
in its rst in tention for feeling has inn umerable

,
modes while time and S pace have o nl y di vi sions

,
.
O r to put the case in another way it may be said ,
that feeling is one obj ect divided by time and space

and co e xtensive with them ; but the feelin g here and
the feeling there and there and there diff er from
, , ,
each other in kin d as well as in position and quan

,
tity in time and space and that innumerably and i n

,
nitely while the parts of time and space so divided

, ,
though equally innumerable and innite diff er not ,
from each oth e r in kind And this I believe is what .
is meant by those who maintain that wh i le feeling is , ,
a general and abstract term time and space are not ,
general and abstract but particular terms indi catin g

, ,
objects o r forms of thought of a particular nat ure .
There is a time and a space d istinct from every par

t i c ul a r portion o f either of them ; the relation b e
tween those portions and time and space generally is
that o f parts t o a whole But there is no such thing
.
a s feeling distinct from every particular feelin g ; the

1 14 T HE NAT UR E OF T HE C O G NITI ONS
relation between these is that between a l ogical ab ?
stract and general term and a logical concrete and

particular term ; feeling in the abstract can never be
anything but a provisional image but time a nd space ,
are always also an actual image ; feeli ng generally

and time and space generally are wholes o f very dif
fe r e nt kinds and in t w o very di fferent senses
,
.
If then there is only o n e time and only o n e space ,
and if these are equally vivid in representation and in

presentation we may truly say that time and space
,
are always presented even in representation The

,
.
di fference between presentation and representation

lies solely in the material element When I look .
straight before me I see a surface occupying about
a third o f a circle right and left up and down this

, ,
is the object o f presentation When I recall the fact

.
th at I can turn round and s e e a similar surface o n all

sides of me the material element contained in those
,
represented surfaces is less v ivid th an i n the pre

sented surface and they are said to be represented
,
on that ground ; but the space contained in them is

as vividly present as in the presented surface and is ,
presented t o me in them while the material element

,
is represented only When I interpret these surfaces

.
by experiences drawn from the sense o f touch the ,
surfaces become solid and I nd myself in a space o f

,
three dimensions presented to consciousness just as

before O n e and the same space in three dimension s
.
is presented to me disclosed indeed partially by one

,
sense partially by another but completely by all

, ,
together There is one consciousness and corres

.
,
pondingly there is o n e space whatever may be the,
cause o f there b eing but one o f each But what is .
meant by there being but one consciousness ? This ;

116 TH E NAT U R E OF TH E C O GN ITI O NS
of consciousness ; for by necessary I mean as was

said in the preceding chapter the subjective aspect of ,
universality It is impossible to be conscious and

.
not be conscious of a feeling in time and space The .
proof o f their necessity is di rect practical empirical , , ,
inevitable Since however we never have feeling in

.
the abstract but always some determinate feeli ng ,
and determinate feelings are inn umerable while time ,
and space modes of the formal element are two only ;

, ,
'
in other words since feeling in its rst intention is

,
informal unlimit e d and we can only know about it

, ,
that it is in consciousness not wh at it is while time

, ,
and space we can know in their rst intention not

, ,
only that they are in consciousness but also what ,
they are ( a distinction which has already been pointed

o ut as o n e o f the greatest importance between the
qually necessary formal and material elements in
, ,
consciousness ) I shall cease noticing except incident

, ,
ally the necessity o f the material element and speak

, ,
only o f that of the formal element time and Space ,

.
I t may be said that we can have feelings not in space .
I admit that the majority o f our feelings all except ,
those Of the senses o f sight and touch can be r e p r e ,
sented i n consci ousness with abstraction made o f

.
other feelings occupying space and of space relations ; -
I admit that in representation the abstraction o f tim e

from space is possible s o as to represent feeli n gs in
,
time alone without S pace though it is impossible to

,
represent feelings in space without time But I assert .
that fee lin gs s o abstractedly represented as occupy ing

time alone are provisional objects onl y and never are ,
represente d without the proviso tacitly made that

they exist in space as well as in time I do not admit .

Hume s postulate that wh atever we can imagine to
,
e xist separately can possibly really exist separately .
Whatever we imagine to e xist separately does actu

ally exist separately in the way in which we imagine
it ; now we imagine time to be provisionally separate
from space ; it is therefore provisionally separate from
S pace I do not grant that because we c a n provision
ally separate them they can exist actually separate
,
.
This postulate rests on the theory o f two substances ,
o f the Object and its evidence in the mind which I ,
renounce M y imagini n g two things separate is taken

.
for evidence o f their being p ossibly separate in a

world of absolute existences N o M y imagining
. .
two things separate is their being separate s o far as ,
I can and do imagine them to be s o And this I .
ad m it to be the case with time and space namely , ,
that I can represent ti me to myself in a provisional

image independent of space space in a provisional
,
image independent o f time except the time occupied

in representing it and feeling in a provisional image
,
independent o f either o r both except the time o c c u

,
pied in representing it ; consequently that the pro ,
visional image of space includes as its pro visionally

,
present elements time and feeling ; but that time

,
may be represented in a provisional image o f which

feeling is a provisional element but space only a p ro
,
visional accompaniment F eelings i n time are never

.
presented or represented separate from the provisional

accompaniment o f space ; though this may be owing
to their constant association by the simultaneous ex
e r c i s e o f the di fferent senses or to some laws of nature
,
which are the obj ective aspect of that association .
C onsciousness has two formal modes time and space , ,
different but inseparable and simultaneous ; the two

s enses which reveal space ,
sight and touch exist ,
118 T H E NA TU R E OF TH E C O GN ITI ONS
s imultaneously with those which reveal time by itself ;
hence their inseparability in any way excep t provi
s i o na l l
y; and hence the di fference in the modes o f
connection between them namely that in all ti m e
, ,
there is involved space as its accompaniment in all ,
Space there is involved time as i t s element .
No w as t o the necessity o f time a n d S pace it i s ,
not said that they are necessary per s e o r obj ectively , ,
but that t hey are necessary to o ur consciousness o r ,
subjectively U niversality or presence in all Objects

.
,
without exception is necessity subjectively o r i n

, ,
consciousness ; they are two sides o r aspects o f the

same phenomenon N ecessity if used in an objective
.
,
sense can only be a conditioned necessity ; for i n

,
s t ance i f it rains the earth w ill be wet ; the earth

, ,
will n o t necessarily be wet unless o n the supposition

that it rains So in time and S pace objectively if I
.
,
sa a l l existence is necessarily existence in time and

y
,
space you directly ask me why ? that is under what

, ,
condi tion I assert that it i s s o N o w universality

.
cannot have an ob j ective condition for then it would ,
not be universality There i s then no obj ective con

.
di tion of this universal fact ; and its necessity consists

onl y in the knowledge o f the fact that is it is its , ,
subj ective aspect .
It is sometimes held that time and space are

merely generalisations from experience A ll abstract .
and general cogni tions may be generalised from e x p e

ri e n c e and as those o f time and space are general
,
and abstract in the highest degree they also may be ,
gene ralised in the same way But this property .

,
which they possess in common with other general

and abstract cogni tions does not prove that they do
,
not possess other properties which are peculi ar to

1 20 T H E NA T UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
unable t o present o r represent a ny object or any
feeling to o ur consciousness e x c e p t un d e r these forms .
In other words time and S pace are necessary not b e

,
cause we know the causes which produce them not ,
because they depend o n an innate or supersensu al

constitution o f the mind or soul but solely because,
their negation is inconceivable It is the mo ment of

.
consciousness which is decisive for itself and while it

l asts
. The effort to escape from these forms o f c o n
s c i o u s n e s s is convincing to any man o f their necessity
to him at that moment at any rate E very such .
e ffort only rivets them faster for it supplies an i n

,
stance of doing against your wil l the very thing

which y o u labour not to do Yo u are trying to
.
miss a mark which you are under an absolute com

pulsion to hit So long as this is the case so long
.
,
must the marksman regard his mark as necessary .
The view here taken rest s o n no theory o f the o b

j e c t i ve constitution Of the mind E very
. theory
which regards the mind and its forms o f thought as
objective existences cannot attri bute necessity in
, ,
the present sense to either o f them as such The

,
.
argument fo r the necessity o f time and space can

receive no support from any such theory ; and o n the
other hand it cannot be weakened by any such theory ,
by any explanation relating t o their origin o r condi

tions of existence such as will be found in the fol
,
lowing chapter What time and space as cognitions

.
,
o r as forms o f feelin g are is a question to be kept

, ,
e ntirely distinct from the question as to how we o r

,
minds involved in bodies come by them Their

,
.
nature value and importance to consciousness alone

, , ,
are distinct from their history .
It is quite true th a t this s ubjective necessity is an

OF T I M E AND S PAC E . 1 21
e mpirical fact and it may appear to some that all PCHA RT1 11
,
.
cognitions which come from experi ence that is all

. .
, ,
15
e m pirical facts are matters Of fact only and never Ti d Sp
.
m e an ac e
bj t
, ,
p as ur e o ec s.
contain in themselves necessity o r a cognition that

they m ust be as they are as well a s that they are s o ; ,
and that therefore this subjective necessity is o n e in

appearance only But the appearance is in this case
.
the reality It is not an inference from the pheno

.
menon but an inseparable aspect o f the p h e n o m e

,
non itself I t is to the empirical evidence o f the

.
necessity of time and S pace that appeal is made t o ,

the fact in every one s experience that time and space
are irremovable from consciousness either in imagina ,
tion o r actual inspection o f obj ects Let any o n e try .
to think at all and all his thoughts will presuppose

,
them ; or starting intentionally from Within them h e

w ill nd himself unable to transcend o r go beyond
them The negation o f every other object is con
.
c ei va b l e only n o t o f these ; for what is negation

,
itself b ut the removing an Object in imagination out

o f time and S pace ? C onsciousness is feeling in the
forms o f time and space .
Taking now time and space as separate objects ,
in which the material element is provisiona l ly pre

s ent the following de n itions o f them o r anal yses o f
, ,
them in their rst intention arise ; part o f which de ,
ni t i o n s h a s been proved by what h a s already been

said and part remains still to be proved in what
,
fol lows T i rne and Space as such objects are called

.
the pure Object .
T I ME Time has o n e di mension length

.
It is .
innitely divisible in thought ; it is innitely exten

sible in thought It admits o f no min imum in divi .
sion and of no maximum in extension F or these

,
.
1 22 T HE NA T UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ON S
reasons it contains every thing ; nothing is short

enough to slip through it nothing long enough to ,
outr un it It is one in nature for all its parts are

.
,
still time It is incompressible for no sin gle par t

.
,
can be anni hilated .
S PAC E Space has three dimens i ons

.
length , ,
breadth and depth

,
It is innitely divisible in
.
thought ; it is innitely extensible in tho ught It .
admits of no minimum in division and o f no maxi ,
mum i n extension F or these reasons it contains .
every thing ; nothing is small enough to slip through

it nothing is great enough to o utstand it It is o n e
,
.
in nature for all its parts are still space It is i n

,
.
compressible for no single part can be ann ihilated

,
.
We thus obtain such a datum as is required by

M r Spencer in his P ri n ciples o f P sych ology P art
.
,
chap I 2 as the beginn ing of all philosophy ; a

.
,
.
datum within the limits o f consciousness a beli ef o r ,
a cogni tion The characteristic o r second intention

.
, ,
o f such a datum namely that i t must be an imme

, ,
diate ineradicable belief does not give the datum ,
itself in its rst intention does not tell us what the ,
datum is Belief is no datum but the characteristic

.
,
o f certain classes of data F eeling the material ele .

,
ment i n conscio usness though a necessary and uni ,
versal eleme nt and ineradicably certain offers no

, ,
criterion for distinguishing o n e phenomenon from

another for it is the same in all phenomena alike ; it
,
is impossible to s a y w h a t it is in its rst intention . .
Time and space alone uni te the properties of being

imme di ately and ineradicably certain of being uni ,
v e rs a l l present in a ll phenomena of being knowable

y ,
in their rst intention and dened as what they are ,
and of being in nature the same in all obj e cts however ,

1 24 TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O G NITI O N S
Witho ut such an element the process o f reasoning ,
contains no more truth than the process o f wal king

or of eating With such an element it is the process
.
,
o f acquiring true and systematic knowledge All .
men reason ; the question i s what is the n ature of ,
that process which all alike perform and of the re ,
s ul t s which all alike reach It will be my endeavour

.
to S how and to Sho w by analysis t hat this process

, ,
and its results whatever they may be do as a fact

, ,
contain a necessary element and the same necessary , ,
element which is contained in the process of presen

t a t i v e perception and in the simplest instances o f con
s c i o us n e s s
. N 0 one not even the Sceptic doubts
, ,
the reality o f a phenomenon while it is a p h e n o m e ,
non The Sceptic doubts not its reality but its truth ;
.
he doubts that i t s nature can be discovered because ,
he doubts that its nature is perceived But its nature .
is perceived ; in every phenomenon is perceived its

formal and its material element ; and the same formal
element i s perceived i n every phenomenon namely , ,
i t s time and its space The criterion and its proof

.
,
instead o f m o v m g m a V I CI O us c ircle coincide ; instead ,
Of presupposin g each other as a condition they are ,
given at once in o n e c ognition ; both characters are

borne at once both by time and by space N either .
the formal nor the material element need any demon

s t r a t i o n for they together constitute the phenomenon
,
.
But the formal elemen t as being the same in all phe

,
no m e na ,
is the source o f their truth the starting ,
point Of all demonstration The criterion therefore .

,
which the Sceptics requir e to be proved is as certain ,
as the phenomena to which it is to be applied and ,
about which the Sceptics do not doubt See Sextus .

E mp P y rrh Hyp lib II cap 9 5 t a w 7 1 $ 0021 EM S g
. . . . . . . 1 .
OF TIM E A ND S PAC E . 1 25
I GMT h e most important feature in time and PA RT I .
CH 1 L
space I S the i r d ivi s ib il ity Wi thout res i duum or the i r
.
exhaustive divisibility It will be seen in the second Th i l g

i
. ut i e c s v
P art that on this property depends the whole of logic t i d p m e an s
and the postulates D i visions are in troduced into

.
pure continuous time and space by the material ele

ment in cognition ; where o n e sensation ends another ,
begins ; where o n e colour for instance ends o r where ,
one sound ends another begins ; and in emotions

, ,
when we cease to be affected by one feeling we ,
begin to be affected by another There is nothing .
intermediate between the two sensations or feelings .
Wherever we are conscious o f a difference in feeling ,
whether it is between colours on a surface o r between ,
feeling resistance to touch and ceasing t o feel it o r ,
between the presence and absence o f any feeling ,
there time and space are divided N ow between two .
such states of consciousness we are accustomed to

speak as if a line o f division existed o r as if a point ,
o f time intervened which lines o r points were them

,
selves portions o f space o r of tim e r) By using this

l a nguage we render ourselves liable to o n e o f two
opposite errors and lay ourselves open to one o f two
,
opposite objections E i t her this line in space and

.
this point in time are conceived as occupyi ng space

and time a n d then they become themselves subject
,

to be divided again in conformity to Aristotle s prin
,
ci p i c N at A u s c lib VI cap I
,
. . .
3 77 0
61 J uve t g 0
.
x . 1 001 2
.
5 .

1 21 0
5 1; 0 1 05 1 27 2 and t h en we have only added to the
5 0
,
portions o f time and space which need to be divide d ,
and have not really divided them at all ; o r the lin e is

conceived as length without bre a dth and the point i s ,
conceived as containing no q uantity of time and both ,
thus become unreal inasmuch a s they are i nc o nc e i v

,
TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O G N I T I O NS
PART 1 able as separate objects o f consciousness If we choose .
CH II
.
to adopt the terms point lin e surface as divisions o f

. .
, , ,
16
The ex h ti Space and the term point o r present moment as a
.
a us ve
di i ib ility f division of time we must bear in mind while we do
v s o
, , ,
ti
m e an d p s a c e. , ,
so that these terms are names no t o f objects but o f

,
operations o f events the resul t o f which they ex

, ,
press ; that they have no separate existence but are ,
modes of representin g the fact of a divi sion i n con

s c i o u s n e s s ; the instantaneous change in the current

o f o u r consciousness a n d of which we are conscious , ,
is rendered plai n to us under the gure o f a visual

lin e o r point of demarcation a
line o r point which ,
cannot be an object o f consciousness except the two ,
Objects which it divides are present in consciousness ,
when it exists as a modication part o r element of , , ,
that whole divided object .
Space metaph ysically considered has nothing to

, ,
do with the geometrical abstractions of points lines , ,
and surfaces A S these terms are used in geometry

.
they are abstractions o r qualities o n which the a t ,
tention is xed to the exclusion o f other qualities

which are equally essential to the nature o f the o b
j c et common to both A point has no parts and no .

magnitude that is we attend to its position al one
, , .

A line is length without breadth that is we a t

, ,
tend to its length alone A surface h a s length and .

breadth alone that is we abstract from its depth , , .
These are concepts or as I prefer to call them at , ,
present provisional images o f obj ects o f perception

, , ,
formed by abstraction for certain scientic purposes .
If now we speak of space being divided by points ,
lines and surfaces meaning such abstractions as just

, ,
described we lay ourselves open to misunderstand

,
ing either as i f we asserte d space to be divided by

,
1 28 T H E NA T UR E OF TH E C O G NI T I ONS
out what this condition is namely that the divi , ,
sions points lines and surfaces are hypostasised by

, , , ,
mathematic that is made into or treated as if they

, ,
were empirical Objects from which abstraction o f ,
length breadth and depth could be made The di

, ,
.
visions in mathemati c and metaphysic are the same

ultimately that is are inseparable from the objects
,
which they divide but the difference is that while , ,
in metaphysic they bear this character all along from ,
beginning to end o f its procedure ( for the scope of

metaphysic is to examine what they really are ) in ,
mathematic they reach it only by abstraction of pro

e r t i e s which have been attributed to them by mathe
p
matic itself for its o w n purposes ; mathematic rst
imagines that its divisions have a separate empirical ,
existence and then abstracts from them portions o r

,
elements of this existence it rst makes them c o n

crete and then makes them abstract in order to i n
, ,
v e s t i a t e how space and time may be divided and

g ,
the relations which its divided parts bear to each

other

.
Space metaphysically considered is not divided by

points lines and surfaces at all understan d the terms
, , ,
as we will either as geometrical abstractions o r as

, ,
e mpirical visible o r tangible Objects Wh en two s e n .
s a t i o n s limit ea c h other in consciousness when we ,
are conscious o f a change in sensation space is a l ,
ready divided ; and if a line o f demarcation is per

i v e d it is as the result o f the process and not as
,
the condition o f it ; that is the obj ects o n both sides

,
of the demarcation are perceived before the demarca

tion itself The same is the case with sensations in
.
time The change from o n e sensation to another is

.
i nstantan eous a n d the moment in which it take s

,
OF TI ME AND S PAC E .
place is empirically indivisible E ven when there i s .
a series o f changes each s o slight that we cann ot ,
name can hardly even perceive it even then the

, ,
moment when we do perceive each change in the

series is indivisible There is no time occupied in .
the passage for we are conscious all the time and

, ,
are conscious o f none Hence the division is ex .
h a u s t i v e without residuum
,
Time is bisected i n a .
moment no time elapsing between the two segments

,
.
The indi v isibility of the moment o f division change , ,
o r transition in consciousness is the fact which con

, ,
s t i t u t e s or necessitates the indivisibility o f the point
o r l i ne of demarcation in objects considered as such , ,
both in tim e and S p a c e l t We have nothing t o d o /
with the points lines and su rf aces o f geometry and

, , ,
are clear o f all such controversies as whether these

are portions o f Space or not ; whether solids consist
o f or are divisible into o r are formed by the motion
, ,
o f surfaces ; whether surfaces hold similar relations
to nes a nd li n es to points ; and whether poin ts

, ,
lines and surfaces exist really as they are geometri

,
cally conceived to exist ; and clear also of t h e c o r

responding questions about time such as whether ,

time is composed o f present moments 7 0s v u and , ,
how long such a present moment is to be conceived

to last .

It is enough for the metaphysician that
experience shows that by means of the materi a l ele ,
,
ment in consciousness di visions are introduced into ,
time and space divisions which occupy no portion of

,
time and space except as belonging to t h e portions

,
which they divide and which therefore cannot be ,
ag a i n divided These di visions are n o t objects by

.
themselves either empirical or provision a l they are

,
not portions of time and space they cann ot be pre

K
THE N A T UR E OF T H E C O GNI TI ONS
sented to consciousness alone apart from t h e s e n ,
s a t i o n s o f whic h they are divisions but they inhere

in sensations ; they are dividings not divisions modes ,
o f sensation acts o f consciousness ,

wh ich do not b e ,
come independent Obj ects because we afterwards ex

press them by empirical extended signs as li nes and

,
points D id these acts occupy an empirical moment

.
o f time we should be conscious o f them during the

,
transition ; but this is not the case we are conscious

only o f the change when it has happened and when ,
the terminus a quo and the terminus ad qu em are

visible at once E mpirically speaking and with r e
.
ference to the minima o f consciousness I n time and

space it is true to s a y B e o t m ev 5 0 BZ OV for as an
,

empirical moment of time the moment o f transit i s

indivisible .
The moment that we x o u r attention o n the

division itself that moment we erect it into an object
, ,
and must conceive or imagine it as occupying time

and space and not merely as dividing them ; but this
,
need not and can not be as occupying time and space

, ,
by itself but together with the feelings o n each S ide

,
o f it between which it is the limit

,
This is a second .
step ; we have the division completed before we need

to take this step and we need to take the step at all
,
only in the interest of the geometer o r mathematician

o r logician not in that o f the metaphysician until he
,
becomes a logician The considera t ion of divisions .
as instrumenta divisionis o f time and space as objects ,
expressed by points lines and surfaces belongs to , , ,
the m athematician ; that o f time and space themselves

and their division in consciousness apart from the ,
mode in which that division is expressed i s the busi ,
nes s o f t h e metaphysician .
1 32 T HE NA T URE OF T HE C O GNITI O NS
It remain s t o consider the inni ty of time

17 .
and space In ni ty no less than necessity when pre

.
d i c a t e d of time and space is a relative term that is , ,
applicable to consciousness only or to Objects in rela ,
tion to a Subject Those two objects in o r under .

,
which we perceive all other Objects are themselves ,
obj ects o f consciousness and have no absolute cha

ra c t e r A s such objects they are innite that is
.
, ,
they cann ot be transcended by consciousness but ,
must always be b efore the mind when it is conscious .
C onsequently they cann ot be seen or thought of as

complete wholes It is this character o f time and .
space which is marked by the word Inni te .
Aristotle who seems to have tried to eliminate

,
the innite 7 0 from philosophy as far as he

,
could is yet constrained to admit that it leads to con

,
t r a d i c t i o n s to deny the innite in all senses o f the

term In the N at A u s c book I I I ch 6 he says
. . . . .
,

071 0
"
0
07 1 11 0 3
0 7 21 01) 2 1 07;
0 71 77 0AA00 00
0 6V007 00

B o u va
,
077A0V '
0
7 5 xg o vo v 307 001
7 00 7 2 0 7 1; da y ) m e ? 7 5

Az um i , 70001 7 00 t a / 977 013 01 001 27 00 5 1; 1 025 1 8 700
( g 5 3000 ;
0 100 307 001 0 7 0011 00001 5 1 071 9 01 1) 1 3

0 7 01 ;
( 0 0
1 1 7 27
5 01 ;

o
g at /11 177 001 v0x203 001 , 01 001 7 177 05 027,
'
z o u 0731 011 07 1

307 1 , 7 3; 0 06
0 The umpire which he needs he nds
.
in his ruli ng distinction o f 061 0071 ; and t w eA xem But 1 1 1 .
this is vague to modern minds and requires i n t e rp r e ,
t a t i o n ; and moreover A ristotle does not follow it to

the ful l extent o f its guiding power for he will not ,
all ow an 017 9 15 01 10007 02 7 5 005 201 1 in space to exist even

: 1
001 02705 1
1 But it is a weighty support to the view
.
taken in this E ssay that the in nity of time and that ,
o f space eg 3 17 in some sense is placed by A ristotle

n ,
/
, ,
among the facts to be explained by a ny true theory

of these m a t t e r s f
OF TI M E A ND S PA C E . 1 33
But even against the relative innity which is

here maintained as appertaining to time and space
there are arguments brought forward apparently con ,
elusive arguments which bring us back to the posi

,
tion of A ristotle in search of an umpire for they seem ,
to S how that the conception o f an innite in any sense

is an impossible o n e that is that it involves contra
, ,
dictions ; and consequently that we can think neither

o f time nor of space nor o f any other nameable obj ect
whatever as innite .
The relative innity here maintained has two

modes in space and two in time ; that is time is i n ,

nite in extension z 007 00
,
and in division z oo 7 00 ,
and S pace the same ; in other words time ,
and space cannot be divided s o far that they are not

divisible farther nor extended s o far that they are
,
not extensible farther ; and must be so represented

in thought N ow it is these assertions which are on
.
the other side alleged to contain implicitly contra , ,
dictions ; a n d since it is asserted at the same time

that the opposite V I e w to this the view namely that
.
time and space are nite that is that i n division and

, ,
extension a point can be reached beyond which we

can neither divide nor extend farther is also o n e ,
which involves contradictions ; and that since by the ,
logical laws o f contradiction and excluded middle

one of these views must be false and the other its , ,
contradictory must be true while both as involvi ng

, ,
contradictions can be shown as is alleged to be false

, , ,
the mind in its consciousness is thrown into contra

dictions with itself from which there is apparently no
escape But it is the business of philosophy to recon
.
cile apparent contradictions not to acquiesce in them

, .
C ontradictions unsolved are the stronghold Of s c e p t i

1 34 THE NA T UR E OF T HE C O GNITI O NS
c i sm ,
and that class of contradictions now und er d i s
c u s s i o n was the stronghold of the philosophical sect
o f Sceptics in G reece contradictions which were not

,
solved but overridden by N e o P latonism Kant a t -

.
tempted their solution i n the Antinomies o f P ure

R eason ; and Hegel took them up and incorporated
them in his logical system which renders his system ,
the most profound and complete system of O ntology

which has ever been proposed ; but it is un s a t i s fa c
tory not because it incorp orates and therefore solves
,
these contradictions but because it does s o only by

,
recourse to O ntology He maintains that Co n t ra d i c

.
tion is the ultimate essence and the ultimate law of

all things o f the universe and all its parts from the
,
greatest to the least thus bringing all things indeed

,
to the same level but not by bringin g the c o nt r a d i c

,
tory up to the level of the non contradictory but by -

,
bringing the non contradictory down to the level of

-
the contradictory ; and this is only possible by trans

forming logical and relative notions into absolute
entities that is by making the assumption that me
, ,
t a p h y s i c is a science of the Absolute that is an , ,
O ntology O ntology i s like an attempt to leap O ff

.

from one s o w n shadow ; it attempts to predicate a
second intention o f the Sum of things as such ; as if
the Sum o f things could as such be related to any , ,
thing else i n consciousness and as if it must not ,
always be related to consciousness itself ; reect on

this relation o f the Sum o f things to consciousness
, ,
and then that consciousness i s included in the Sum o f

things and the consciousness which reects on both
,
together takes the place o f that consciousness now _
included in the Sum of thin gs ; repeat the process for

ever and nothing further comes o ut of it never is an
, ,
T HE N A T UR E OP T HE C O G N ITI ONS
tum . Nunc te ,
D ae d a l e ,
rogo ; h ae d uae partes sunt
n e ni t ae an i n ni t ae ? D F i ni t ae P h I t a ex d uo b u s
. . .
ni t i s c o m p o n e r e t u r i n n i t u m quod r e p ugn a t D . .
F a t e o r e rr o r e m . I n n i t ae sunt P h Jam in S c y l
. .
lam incidis : ita partes e s s e nt aeq u a l e s toti ; i n ni t um

e ni m inni t e a equale e s t ; P raet e r e a vides ut r a m q ue
partem in puncto a t e rm i n a ri ; non igitur ni b u s e t
terminis caret .
The argument proceeds farther but rests always ,
o n the same principles which are here involved ; a n d
as I am not goin g to al lege either the obj ection sup

posed by We r e nfe l s nor with Spinoza and C larke
,
that innite quantity is not composed o f parts at ,
least as an esc ape from this reasoning I need not ,
quote the rest o f the passage I agree with the re .
mark quoted in the same note from C larke that i n ,
nites are not equals ; and for the answer to this rea
soning I look to the di stinction between voluntary
and involuntary modes of consciousness which I h o ld ,
to be the ground of the distinction between c o n c e i v

ing and imagining a concept being an imagination
,
o r a perception sei z ed and li mited by volition as will

,
be more fully drawn o ut in a following chapter .
A 1 001 7 777 05 05 7 .I nd that umpire in the d i s t i nc

tion between voluntary and involuntary logical and ,
i ntuitive processes between perception representa

, , ,
tion imagination and these lim i ted by volition The

, ,
.
strength of the arg ument quoted above li es in a covert

passing over from o n e mode to the other in s ub s t i ,
tutin g a denition for an intuition and in substituting

a wrong denition o r in including in the Object de
,
ned what was not included in it as perceived What .
is the meani ng o f Inni ty as mai n tained above in this

E ssay ? It is that space i n this case the line b e
, , ,
OF T IME A ND S PAC E . 1 37
cannot be s o far extended in either di rection as t o be PA RT 1 .
CH H
incapable o f further extension A fortiori i t s l im i t
'
.
,
f ii t y
l
c a m i o t be assigned But an assigned limit is requi Th e i ii o f
ds
.
t un e an
Site in order to compare it as to its lengt h with

, ,
another line o r to compare the two li n es ab ac toge

, , ,
ther and to as sert M a ni fe s t um est has partes inter

, ,
se esse ae q ua l e s They are not known as equals

.
u ntil a limit has been assign ed to them besides the ,
common limit in the point a This assumption o f .
equality therefore violates the hypo thesis U ltra ter ,
minos b e t c i n i n ni t um protendi But it may be .
said A re not two i n ni t e s equ a l though we do not

,
know their limits ? I answer that th ey are not until ,
the objects to which the name is applied in each i n

stance are compared Thus there is substituted for
.
the object o f perception named innite that is , ,
object o f which we can never s e e the whole a dened ,
object o f which solely because it is dened we are

, , ,
supposed to s e e the w hole The obj ects the t w o .

,
lines extended from the point a are not equal but , ,
they have one property i n common that o f being ,
greater than we can present to ourselves in conscious

ness ; they are equal not qu a tenus Objects but q ua ,
tenus innite ; their innity is equ a l not their length ; ,
but the question is not about the length o f their i n

ni t y but about the in ni ty o f their length ; and
,
about this whether it exists at all The deni tion

, .
o f both from the same point o f view the logical cate ,
gory o r genus under which they fall that o f i n ,
ni tes is the same ; but the objects are no t the same

, ,
nor is their extent the same If the matter o f the .
comp a rison instead of be i ng the same as two l ines o r

, ,
two spaces had been di fferent as for instance a line

, ,
o f time and a line o f space o r a line and a surface o r

, ,
1 38 THE NA T UR E OF THE C O GNITI O NS
a line and a solid the fallacy would be seen in a

,
moment But the case is really the same when two

.
,
o b jects o f the same kind as when two objects o f dif

,
fe r e nt kinds are compared It makes no difference .
at all whether the two Objects compared together fall

alike under o n e o r two o r more denitions of kind .
It is as objects that they are compared together dif ,
fe r e nt i n numero and in this case o f the in nite lines

, , ,
in order to s e e whether they are equal or with refer ,
ence to their equality in point of extent ; and that

they are both to be dened as in ni te does not Show
that they are but in fact precludes their being de
, ,

ned as equal And this appears to be C larke s
.
argument or part o f it
,
.
Let us x our attention o n the facts as perceived .
It is perfectly true that in making innite space or ,
innite time a distinct obj ect o f consciousness we

, ,
are compelled to introduce a limit into them To .
become a distinct object is to become subject to

limitation The o bject space limited by conscious
.
,
ness is not innite s o far as it is included within

,
those limits s e t by consciousness but the conscious ,
ness o f space is extensible ad i n ni t um we can go ,
o n being conscious o f further and further portions o f
limited space without ever reaching a limit not s e t

by ourselves by w e a rm e s s I n exertion of conscious
,
ness ; and all these further portions o f space ar e still

space in kind each portion is limited only by another
,
o f the same nature Here we have an innite serie s

.
o f limited ,
nite portions o f space ; but now comes
,
o ut another fact in the production o f this series .
Wherever we are compell ed to draw o ur line and

stop we perceive time and space beyond which w e
, ,
resolve not to present in detail o r a s a distinct object

1 40 TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ON S
being its modes We cannot make time and space

.
,
as inni te a distinct obj ect Why ? Because o ur

,
.
consciousness i s limited in i t s degree o f power And .
again keeping in view the distinction to be hereafter

, ,
more fully explained between conceivi n g and i m ,
a
g i ni n
g,
we must conceive time and space as nite .
Why ? Because consciousness in o n e of its modes ,
namely conception is voluntary limitation or i m p o s

,
ing o f a limit We must imagine them as innite

. .
Why ? Because s o long as we are conscious we are

conscious of time and space T i me and space are
.
.
limited only by incapacity of exhausting them that ,
is o f continuing to be conscious o f them ; and the

,
limit imposed upon them is imposed by o u r volition .
C onception is imagination limited by a voluntary e f

fort and for a certain purpose But when an obj ect .
is li m ited by volition the object s o limited is not the

'
contradi ctory of an unlimited obj ect u nless that o b ,
e c t is volunta rily unl im i ted ; for the two objects are

j
then not limited and u nl imited secundum idem The .
obj ect time o r space is limited and unlim i ted at once

, , ,
and is o n e object but is not lim i ted and u nl imited

,
in the same sense o r from the same point o f view

,
.
Time and space as nite are concepts that is are , ,
limited by voli tion ; as such they are not c o nt r a d i c

tories o f time and space as innite ; this would r e
quire that their innity should be im posed by voli
tion which it is not Time and space as nite are
,
.
modes o f voluntary consciousness o f consciousness ,
adopting a purposed limitation ; as in nite they are

modes o f involuntary consciousness which we can ,
never transcend s o long as we are conscious at all

Aristotle tells us N at A u s c b 1 1 1 cap 6
, 7. . . . . . .
that the Pythagoreans and others against whom he ,

o r TIM E AND S PAC E . 1 41

was arguing dened the innite 7 0 01 7 21g01 as that
, ,
1
,
05 32 307 1
01 He himself starting from the con
.
,
0 0
t e m p l a t i o n Of the innite 14 01 7 0 1 1 1 9 01
9 denes it as 0 11
,
that 05 002 7 1 32 207 1

'
1 But though neither d e ni
01 .
tion is adequate o r correct taken alone yet taken ,
together they are applicable to both modes o f the

innite in time and to both i n space Thus the true
,
.
denition o f the innite is Quod nihil ultra s e habet

praeter s e ipsum Time is never limited except by
.
time ; S pace never except by Space ; but both are

limited by themselves always Thus Hegel says .
,
Logik Book 1 Abschnitt 1 p 1 3 6 Werke v o l 3

,
. . .
, ,
. .
D arin selbst dass etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist

, ,
d a r i i b e r bereits hinausgegangen ist That is a ll limi .

,
t a t i o n involves an outside as well as an in side This .
fact is nothing else but the fact o f the innity of

intuition o r imagination in time and space .
The problem of the innity o f time and S pace has

been thrown into a complete shape in o ur days by
Sir W Hamilton and M r M ansel ; and it must be
. .
remembered that prudens qu aestio d i m i d i um scientise

e st
. The question is not simply I S there an innite ,
in time and space o r is there not ? But it is The

innite is impossible therefore its contra di ctory onl y
,
exists namely the nite yet the nite is impossible

, ,
therefore its contradictory onl y exists namely the ,
in nite ; reconcile these reverberated contradi ctions .
The way which has been taken here seems to offer a

satisfactory solution o f this problem fo r it has shown ,
o n the one h and that there i s not onl y negative but

,
positive ground for afrming the innite in one sense ;

and not only negative but positive ground for a f rm
ing the ni te in another sense ; and on the other
h and that the innite in the sense in which it is a f
,
1 42 T HE N A T UR E OF T HE C O G N ITI O NS
rmed is not open to the charge of involving contra

dictions ( fo r the innite is not a concept but a per
cept ) and thus ne c essitating the substitution o f the
,
nite ; and that the ni te also in the sense i n which

it is afrmed is equally secure from the same charge ,
and thus necessitating the substitution o f the innite .
In other words it has been shown that the nite

,
and the innite are not contradictories but products ,
o f consciousness in two separate parts of its domain
o r in two separate functions .
But now if it is admitted that the apparent con

,
t r a d i c t i o n involved rst in each View taken separately

, ,
and secondly and consequently in the two views taken

together has been dissolved and that time and space
, ,
are shown to be i n o n e sense nite and in another ,
in nite a further question arises which is this

,
Of,
the two attributes nite and innite resting each o n ,
its o w n ground and predicated from i t s o w n point of

view which is the most essential the most funda
, ,
mental expressing best the nature o f time and space ;

,
o r
,
what comes to the same thing which point of ,
view is the most commanding which is that to which ,
the other is subordi nate ? There can be but one

answer It is that point of view which keeps equally
.
in sight both O bject and subject Time and space .
when they are treated as Obj ects only their subje e ,
tive character bein g lost sight o f for the moment ,
when they are considered as h a v mg already become

Objects o f consciousness are then regarded as nite
,
.
The point o f view from which they are called nite ,
i s that from whi ch they are regarded as obj ects of

cogni tion onl y That from which they are called
.
inni te is one from which the moment o f their passing

in to consciousnes s i s seized and xed o n in which ,
C H A P T E R III .
P SYC HOLO GI CAL .
TH E O R I G I N OF TH E C O G NITI ONS OF TI ME AND S PAC E .
I I 9 f 9/ 0/
c u 7 1 ye v e o
'
w r a t/ 7 a m
,
06 o vm a v 6 1!
18 . HE RE
we leave that central point of view which
em b races at once subject and object and pass over ,
into the objective kin gdom that of obj ects as such ,
and their conn ections between them selves We .
make abstraction o f the principium c o gno s c e nd i and ,
consider only the principium e x i st e nd i C ogni tions .
themselves are existences for they are objects ; the ,
evi dence o f their existence is o u r conscio usness If .
what has been said i n the precedin g chapter o f the

nature and value o f the two cognitions time and ,
space as the starting point o f all philosophical ana

,
-
lysis and the ens unum in multis in a ll cognitions is

, ,
admitted it is o f secondary im port a nce what theory

,
is held as to their origin in the m i n d .
The objective kingdom is the ki ngdom of e m p i ri

cal that is complete objects as Opposed to elements
, , ,
o f objects o r members o f analysis of objects which

, ,
have become obj ects only in conjunction with each

other Such elements o f objects can never be re
.
garded as causes o r the cause o f the objects o f which

they are elements ; for in the rst place all the ele
ments o f the obj ect give and receive meaning and

existence from each other rst in combination and ,
in this same combination the object a l so which they

compose rst exists ; the object and its elements are
simultaneous in existence and not o n e precedent the
, ,
other subsequent ; and in the second place were the ,
elements regarded as existing rst and separately a ,
further cause would have t o be sought a cause o f ,
their being brought into conjunc t ion in the object .
All causation all history must accordingly be dis

, ,
t i ngui s h e d from metaphysical analysis and must be ,
conceived as obtain ing between empiric a l o r complete

obj ects considered as former and latter in point of
,
time .
The result o f the analysis in the precedi ng chapter

w a s that every instance o f cons ciousness contained
,
two elements formal and material that is some par

, , ,
t i c ul a r feeling in some partic ul ar time and some par

t i c ul a r space ; which is equivalent to saying that ,
every obj ect o f consciousness contained two elements ,
form a l and material that is some partic ul ar quality

, ,
in some p a rticular time and some particul ar space ;

for that which is feelin g from the subj ective point of
view is quality from the obj ective The elements in .
every cognition are time space and feel i ng and in

, , ,
every object are time space and quality C onsci

, ,
.
o u s n e s s is feeling in time and space ; obj ects are

qualities in time and space But when it is said .
,
C onsciousness generally i s feeling in t i me and sp a ce ,
attentio n must be c a l led t o an ambiguity in the term

feeling as in a l l genera l and abstract terms It is
,
.
the same ambiguity whi ch kept up the N o rni n a l i s t

and R eali st controversy and is s o natura l and almost
,
unavoidable that its inuence has long outlived as it ,

1 46 T HE O R I G IN OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
long p receded that controversy When an abstract

,
.
and general term is used for instance roundness is it

, ,
imagin ed by speaker o r hearer to be an object itself

apart from all and every particular and determinate
instance o f roundness from which it is generalised ?
,
E very one will say that it is not ; but not every one
will be on his guard again st s o employing and imagin
ing it In the case o f feeling this abstract and gene
.
,
ral term feeling may be taken as indicating the class

o f all the particular and determinate feelings without
,
spec i fying any of them or it may be taken as indi

,
cating feeli n g by itself as a real substratum but with

, ,
o ut any particular determinate feeling ; i t may be

imagined either as havi n g no determination but still ,
real ly existing o r as having some determination but

, ,
o n e not specied o r expressed In the latter sense it

.
may be called a provisional im age but a p rO V I S I o n a l ,
image doubly abstract o r doubly provisional ; for rst

,
all particular modes o f the formal elements o f time

and space are abstracted from secondly the deter ,
minate feel ings are abstracted from that i s are r e , ,
t a i n e d provisionally only in the general and abstract

notion expressed by the term feeling And this is .
the sense in which the term wil l be employed here .
See Hume who refers to Berkeley o n this subj ect

, , ,
Treatise of Human N ature P art I 7 ,

. .
C onsciousness then being feeling in time and

space the three elements being I n every instance and
,
in every object Inseparable constituting one complete

, ,
empirical object o f consciousness it foll ows t hat to

, ,
assign the cause or invariable condition of the origin

Of its o n e element time and S pace is impossible with
, ,
o u t assignin g also the cause o r invariable condition o f
the origin of its oth er element feeling ; and thus the ,

1 48 T HE O R I G IN OF T HE C O GNIT I O NS
there employed to make this clear was a circle sup ,
posed to be seen from two sides by a person changing

his point o f view from o n e S ide to the other ; and this
person symbolised reection But in fact reection .
arises within those very phenomena a n d is o n e o f ,
them It neither di vides t h e aspects from each other

.
,
nor itself fr om either o f them ; but distinguishes them

into feelings and qualities every phenomenon being ,
feeling and quality at once ; and for reection both

feelings and qualities are objects but only qualities ,
are objects for direct consciousness ; for feelings are

perceived by reection as di rect consciousness itself .
But in the mode o f reection which is entered o n in

this chapter psychological not metaphysical reection
, ,
the object o f enquiry is the m i n d an Obj ect consisting ,
partly o f feelin gs and partly o f qualities ; which latter

must be included in the Obj ect since the c i r c um s c ri p
,
tion o f the feelings is given by them ; and since the

former the feelings o f the mind are circumscribed by
, ,
the latter the body they are divided in S pace from

, ,
other feelin gs P sychological reection therefore may

.
be represented as standi ng between the two obj ects o f

which it examines the connection between the mind ,
o n the o n e side and the world Of quali ties outside it
o n the other the mind occupying a di stinct portion

;
o f space by being placed in the body N ow any par .
t i c u l a r portion of the world o f feelings may have an

origin and a history conditions o f existence and of
,
development a place in order o f time in the whole

,
world o f feelings as well as a place in space ; and the

,
question of this chapter is what are the condition s of

,
existence what objects feel i n gs o r qualities must

, , ,
invariably precede the appear ance of that portion o f ,
the world of feelings known a s the mind This i s the .

OF TI ME A ND S PAC E . 1 49
s ense in which alone it is legitimate to speak o f the

origin or conditions o f existence o f consciousness .
But since I am about to examine some classes o f

already existing theories a nd this distinction as here
,
drawn i s no t recogni sed in them but consciousness ,
is treated as capable o f isolation as an object by ,
itself without reference t o the condition Of this isola

,
tion namely its inhabiting a particular portion o f the

, ,
world o f qualities I Shall not at rst insist o n this

,
point but take consciousness in the way in which it

,
is presented in those theories And it will after .
wards be poi nted o ut how the want o f this di stinction

enables theories whic h are at least legitimate while
,
partial and subordinate to pass into theories o f the

,
same class which are illegitimate because put forward

as complete ; for instance it will be seen how the ,
partial and subordinate psychological theories which ,
refer consciousness respectively to a soul and to a

brain become theories of absolute idealism and a b s o
,
lute materialism .
1 9 A ll theories possible and actual as to the

.
, ,
origin o f consciousness may be divided rst into , ,
such as place its cause in an obj e c t outside o f c o n

s c i o u s n e s s inferred t o be its cause from examination
,
of the phenomena and such as place its cause in an

,
obj ect within consciousness revealed by an analysis ,
o f consciousness itself Another division o f such

.
theories is the division into such as are idealistic ,
seeking the cause o f consciousness i n an immateria l

object o r essence and such as are materi a listic seek
, ,
i n g its cause i n a material Object and its properties .
A third di vision is into such a s place t h e cause o f

consciousness in an object o r essence considered stati
cally and such as place it in a movement o r an ac
,
150 TH E O RI G I N OF TH E C O GNITI O NS
t i vi t y, which theories may b e called dynamical All

theories must fall since these divisions are each of

,
them exhaustive under o n e alternative at least o f

,
each o f these three pairs .
Taking the rst of these divi sions as a basis the ,
theories o f the other t w o divisions may be referred

to it Then under those theories which infer an
.
obj ect to be the cause o f consciousness will fall

those idealistic theories which assert an immaterial
so ul considered as an Object existing statically and
, ,
those materialistic theories which assert a mat erial

object as the brain o r nervous matter to be the
, ,
cause of consciousness considered also statically

, ,
o r as existing previous to its operation U nder .
those theories which hold that the cause o f con

s c i o u s n e s s lies within consciousness and is revealed ,
by an analysis o f consciousness will fall those ideal ,
i s t i c theories which assert an E go considered dyna ,
m i c a ll
y as pure or absolute activity whatever may ,
be the laws regulating the development o f th i s a c

tivity ; these theories are found in the works o f
F i c h t e Schelli n g and Hegel among others There
, , ,
.
will thus be three classes o f theories : rst thos e ,
which inf er an external immaterial obj ect called a ,
Soul to be the invariable condition o r cause of con

,
s c i o u s n e s s ; secondly those which nd by analysis

,
an internal immaterial activity called by F i c h t e the ,
E go by Schelling the R eason by Hegel the Spirit

, , ,
as the cause o f consciousness this activity bein g also ,
the Absolute the cause o f all things as well as o f

,
consciousness and the s um as well as the cause o f

,
all its effects and thir dl y those which i n fer an ex,
ternal material object such as the organi sed body

, ,
o r the brain or ne rvous matter belonging to such a

, ,
152 T HE O RI G IN OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
to b oth the materialistic and idealistic branches at

once and my classication will be s o far unsuited
,
for the explanation o f the theory The M onads again .
are aid to be the true atoms o f nature the ele

(3 ) s ,
ments of things ; and ( 9 ) those M onads which have

perception more d istinct and accompanied by memory
are called Souls Although therefore the above dis .
t i n c t i o n s can be appli ed to all theories yet they are ,
not suitable to the explanation o f all ; if any o n e

Shed to explain Leibni tz s theory he must d o s o ,
not by pointing o ut these distinctions but by point ,
ing o ut other distinctions o r principles which Leib

nitz employed or along which he moved in tra, ,
versing and obliteratin g these .
Agai n it is difcult to brin g under any single

,
head o f the present division the theory of M C ousin ; .
for although he maintains that t h e soul l e moi is , ,
inferred as the supporter o f consciousness by a prin ,
c i l e which i s call ed the law o f substance loi des

p ,
substances yet he holds that it is inferred in every

,
a c t o f sensation the rst as well as subsequent acts

'
.
,
See for instance his P remiers E ssais Anne 1 8 1 6

, , , ,
v
. ix Since it immediately accompanies every act
.
o f sensation it should be di scoverable by the an a l ysis

,
o f that act notwithstanding that it is an inferenc e

,
and not a perception M C ousin maintains that we . .
do not perceive the substance but infer that some ,
thing exists which we call by that name and argues

accordingly that it would be no valid obj ection to
ask What this substance itself was ? for its existence
,
onl y is inferred and not its nature perceived But .
the act o f i n ference at least must be known t o u s ,
which accompanies o r is involved in the act of per

c e tio n I think it will become apparent as we pro
p .
c eed ,
that this substance supposed t o be inferr ed is .
nothing but what I call the formal element in per

c e
p t i o n .
20 T ospeak now o f the rst class Of theories

.
those which infer an i mmateria l substance t o be the

cause o f consciousness In the rst place it is i m
.
,
possible to imagine a substance strictly im m ateria l

accordi n g to the explanation o f matter gi ven in the
preceding chapter namely a s a partic ul ar feeling in
, ,
a particular ti me and s pace ; fo r nothing can be pre

sent i n consciousness without being present as some
feeli ng ; the feeling in consciousness is the matter o r
qual ity o f the object I do n o t s a y that the feeli n g
.
must be o n e o f those o f the v e deni te senses T h e .
soul may be i magined as a substance which h a s quali

ties o r a quality which have n o obj ective names as
qualities but only subjective names as feelings The
,
.
soul may be i magined t o be an obj ect which if we ,
had presentative perception o f it would excite the ,
feeli n g o f j oy o r pride o r love o r reverence o r such

, , , ,
li k e N othing can possibly be more opposed to my

.
theory than to deny the existence o f obj ects o f whi ch

we have not o r have never had presentative percep
, ,
tion Such feeling would be the matter o f the soul

. .
But this would be to make the soul material if my ,
phraseology were adopted ; it would be to make it

immaterial in the sense in whi ch ide a l i sts have usu
,
ally employed t h e term Such is the notion whi ch I .
frame to myse l f Of the me a n in g o f those who speak

o f the soul as an immateri a l substance ; and I thi nk
that this mean in g is logically correct that such an ,
Obj ect is capable o f bein g imagined o r conceived with

o u t inconsistency .
But from this it does not follow that such an

154 T HE O R I G IN O F TH E C O GNITI O NS
object i s the Cause of consciousness it d oes not fol low

that because we can represent it as an obj ect o f pre
,
s e n t a t i v e perception it is actually at any time an

,
object of presentative perception It exists true but .

, ,
how ? A s an obj ect o f representation imagined a c ,
cording to the requirements o f an Obj ect of possible

presentation It is an Object o f possible not of a et u a l
.
, ,
presentation F rom this a further step is requisite to

.
imaginin g it as the invariable condition of the origin

of consciousness T w o steps must therefore be taken
.
by the idealist of this school rst from the possible ,
to the actual secondly from actual existence to exist

,
ence in the relation of cause to a particular effect I .
believe t hat it is the need o f taking the latter step

which has led idealists o f this school to take also the
rst step ; that the need o f accounting for certain
phenomena in consciousness has led them to infer t h e
actual existence of the Obj ect which seemed to them ,
alone capable of explaining the phenomena i n ques

tion I will mention and examine the principal of
.
these phenomena and attempt to show that the o b, ,
jc e t inferred to account for them furnishes no better

explanation o f them than the material obj ect does ,
the brain o r nervous matter in an organised body ,
which is undoubtedly an object of presentative per

c e
p t i o n .
These principal phenomena o f consciousness are ,
s o far as I know the following : l s t the tot a l differ

, ,
ence in kind between consciousness and every other

affection or quality o r mode o f existence in objects ;
, , ,

2d the unity or oneness in ev ery moment o f con

,
s c i o u sne s s no matter how multiform the obj ects of

,
that moment of consciousness may be o r whether ,
they are a combination o f presentations o r o f r e p r e

!
)
C
'
TH E O RI G I N OF T HE C O G NITI ONS
an i mmaterial substance and the material sub stanc e
o f brain o r nerve In this case the soul is conceived
.
,
as a force analogous to the vital force and the nerv e

,
force and this mi n d force is the supporter o f c o n

,
s c i o u sne s s there is an immaterial substance t h e ,
soul but it has a force o r mode o f action o f i t s o w n

, ,
and on this m i nd force in reaction with nerve force

depends consciousness All o u r perceptions o ri .
i n a t e in the action and reaction which take place

g
between the nervous system and the m i nd says ,

M r M orell Introd t o M ental P hilosophy page 1 0 6

.
,
.
,
.

At p age 3 6 he had said The view we have taken ,
in the previous chapter o f the vit a l and mental forc es

is Opposed to the common notion that the body with
its functions is o ne thing the mind and its functions ,
another Physiology has rendered this notion wholly

.
untenable The alternative o f the o l d dualistic theory

.
,
however is by no means t o force us into materialism

,
.
So far from that we may hold that there is already ,
a nascent spark o f intelligence i n the primary cell ,
from which the i ndividual man is developed and that ,
this is in fact the s o ul in its primary unconscious

, ,
state already commencing that series o f acts which

,
reach up in o n e unbroken chai n t o the highest efforts

, ,

o f reason and will So that although it is a force
.
o n which consciousness depends yet this force b e ,
longs to an i mmateria l substance as its supporter the ,
Spark o f intelligence in the primary cell and the

force belonging to it supported o r exerted by it is , ,
Objective and unconscious whether it is considered ,
as belonging to an immaterial or to a material s ub

stance ; i n short the same observations are applicable
to this mode of conceiving it as t o the former There .
fore in whichever way the supporter o f consciousness

, ,
the conscious substance is conceived whether a s i m

, ,
materi a l o r material o r as the force o f an immaterial

,
o r o f a material substance the gap between conscious

,
ness and objects is not bridged the causation o f o n e ,
by the other is as inexplicable in o n e way as in the

other Al l that can be said o f the causation o f o ne
.
phenomenon by another is after A B N o two

,
-
,
.
phenomena are perfectly S im ilar It may be that o f .
t w o phenomena equ a l ly invariable as antecedents o f

,
a third phenomenon the o n e which is most similar t o

,
it is said to be its cause ; but it serves no purpose to

invent a phenomenon S imilar t o the o n e t o be a c
counted for when there is already a phenom enon
,
di scovered as its invariable antecedent o n the gro und ,
that this actually existing phenomenon I s n o t s uf

c i e nt l
y sim i lar t o the phenomenon t o be accounted fo r .
The second ground for maintai ni ng the existence

o f an immaterial substance as the supporter o f con
s c i o u s ne s s is the u ni ty o f consciousness known by the ,
name o f the u ni ty o f apprehension We are con .
scious o f objects as u ni ts and however diverse these

,
Objects may be and whether they are objects o f pre

,
s e n t a t i o n o r o f representation o r contain both o n e

,
and the other they are still combin ed i nto o n e single

,
Obj ect in a single moment o f consciousness The .
supporter o f that consciousness therefore it is argued , ,
must be a single in di visible unit ; and since no mate

rial substance is indivisible it must fart her be M a
,
t e ri a l
. N ow if this indivisible and i mmaterial uni t
is itself a n obj ect o f consciousness in the moment of
consciousness s o as t o be used as a standard fo r i n
,
t r o d u c i n g un ity into the objects perceived along with

it it must be discoverable by the analysis o f consci
,
o u s n e s s in reection and becomes conceived therefore

,
1O8 T HE O R I GI N OF T H E C O GNITI ONS
as a n E go and not as a Soul it is d irectly perceived in

,
consciousness and not inferred ; it becomes in f act the

unity of apperception and not of apprehension But .
if it is conceived as a soul and not as an ego if it is

, ,
inferred and not directly perceived to exist as a

, ,
single indivi sible and i mmaterial u ni t then there is ,
no way in which such an unit can be represented to

consciousness except as a mathematical point ; and no
mathematical poin t has a complete empirical exist , ,
ence but always involves an extended substance of

, ,
which it is a boundary o r in which it lies S O far .
then from bei ng capable o f serving as the cause of

consciousness such an unit has no complete empi
, ,
ri c a l
,
existence o f its own Supposing it to be a
.
point existin g in an extended material substance it ,
becomes a mode o f the existence of that substance ,
a differentiation o r a property of it So far from .
offering a better explanation o f the u nity of a p p r e

h e n s i o n than is o ffered by a material substance it ,
cannot properly be said to offer any explanation at

all Is there any insuperable dif culty in supposing
.
unity of apprehension to arise in a compound mate

rial substance such as the brain o r nervous matter ?
,
I cannot s e e that there is ; there is indeed a great

dissimilarity between consciousness and objects whic h
are not conscious ; but the unity of apprehension
offers no such dif culty ; the unity o f apprehension
fully corresponds to the unity O f objects apprehended .
What is the unity o f apprehension ? That an object

is perceived as o n e and that objects differing only in
,
point of their times o f bein g perceived a re perceived

as the same The perception of difference precedes
.
the perception of sameness both logically and histo

rically We start from the p erception of a single
.
1 60 TH E O RI G I N OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
PART 1 . u nity of time that is to consist in the very thing

,
which it is introduced to account for ? This is no

thing but the old process o f doubli ng the pheno
menon to be accounted fo r .
The third argument is the sense of indi vi dual per

s o n a li t
y o f personal identity throughout life
,
F rom .
this it is inferred that there must be an I mmaterial

,
soul the supporter o f this sense o f identity The

,
.
body changes all its particles o f matter during life ,
yet the conscious being feels that he is the same per

s o n from childhood t o Old age If memory it is .
,
argued depended solely o n the changing matter o f

,
the body we shoul d preserve no memory o f what we

,
were when o ur body consisted o f a completely dif

fe r e nt s e t o f material particles from those whi ch it
consists o f at any present time ; t h e particles would
have vanished and the memory attached to them and
,
dependi n g o n them would have vanished also T o .
this it may be replied that though the particles o f

,
matter in the body vani sh and are replaced by others ,
yet the change is gradual enough to allow that qua

l i t y in the van ishing particle o n which consciousness
, ,
and memory depend to be communicated to the par

,
tiele which takes its place ; and thi s is true in what

ever way we imagine to ourselves the connection
between the material particles and consciousness ,
whether as wax and seal o r as some kind of move

,
ment mechani cal o r molecular or magnetic ae com ,
a ni e d o r unaccompanied by heat o r light o r sound

p .
A ll such gures are o f course only aids to the imagi

nation i n default of knowledge But whatever the .
nature o f the operation which goes on in the brain

may be each particle whic h takes the place o f a
, ,
vanishing o ne has this quality o r this nature c o m m u

,
O F T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 61
m icated to it becomes a part o f the o l d structure and

, ,
bears its part in s upporting the consciousness which

the o l d structure supported The body then is in .
o n e sense the same body from chil dh ood to Old age ,
notw ithstanding the ch a n ge i n its particles ; and it is

in a sense exactly paral lel to this that the conscious
ness o f the in di vidual is said t o be the same through
o ut life P articular feelings and thoughts vani sh
.
and are replaced by others ; the body o f t h e child

does n o t more differ from the body o f the man than ,
the thoughts o f the child from the thoughts o f the

man The u ni ty o f organi c growth and develop
.
ment o f the body is exactly parallel to the unity in

growth and development o f the consciousness which
is attached to it In t h e brain are stored up impres
.
sions qu a l ities o r modes o f operation the causes o f

, , ,
memory which are communicated to and the n pre

,
served by every fresh particl e o f matter which is

t a k en up into the brain The brain becomes richer
.
in these impressions qualities o r modes o f operation

, , ,
and they constitute o n e part o f the life o f the brain ,
and make with each other a conn ected whole So .
also do t h e thoughts and images in consciousness and ,
this i s what is meant by personal identity If the .
supposition o f an immaterial soul was adopted we ,
should stil l have t o suppose that this immaterial

soul was subject to changes to the exchange o f the
,
thoughts o f the chil d for those o f the man ; the bind

i n g o f these together is all that the immaterial soul is
adopted in order to explain But this bond is found
.
a s readily in the organi c unit o f the development o f

y
the brain as in the u ni ty o f an immateria l soul and
, ,
therefore it is superuous to have recourse t o the

latter supposition .
1 62 TH E O RI G IN OF TH E C O G NITI ONS
The fourth argument is the sense o f effort o r v o

li t i o n the consciousness of Wil l
,
Properly indeed .
this is an argument for the existence o f an ego not ,
for the existence o f an im m aterial soul ; the object is

thought to be directly envisaged in the moment Of
volition not to be in ferred in order to account for the
,
phenomenon o f volition ; but Since this distinction is

i
not alw ays drawn I will s a y a few words o n it here

,
.

The sense o f e ffort l e ffo rt voulu as for instance in
, ,
the phenomenon o f attention is among the simplest ,
and earliest states o f consciousness perhaps as early ,
historic a l ly as any ; it is an immediate not an i n ,
ferred fact o f consciousness E ffort is a sensation

,
.
which we perceive immediately as we perceive anger , ,
fear hunger warmth and s o o n This sense o f e ffort

, , ,
.
has been thought notably by M ain e de Biran to

, ,
reveal to us immediately the M oi o r substantial i m ,
materia l Self ; and it was thought that the self reveals

itself to itself in its consciousness o f its own volition .
But the sense o f effort whether it is effort for a dis ,
tinct purpose o r volition proper o r only i n d e t e rm i

, ,
nate effort reveals the self neither more n o r less nor

,
in any other sense th a n other perceptions do They .
all contribute to self consciousness which is the rst-

,
reective act o f consciousness in which self and not ,
self are for the rst time perceived In other words v o .

,
l i t i o n is not reection All reection is volition that .

,
is i nvolves sense of effort for a purpose ; but all sense

,
o f e ffort for a purpose i s not reection Attention .
involves sense o f effort indetermi nately but it does ,
not involve envisaging self as an object E ffort again .
is roused by an in t erest felt but it does not require ,
that we Should be conscious that w e are feeling an

interest This would suppose an ana l ysis o f the feel
.
1 64 TH E O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
kind is Conc e ived as existing objectively the e x p l a

, ,
nation o f that freedom as a fact is quite a s i na d e

u a t el supp li ed by the supposition o f an immaterial
q y ,
as by the supposition o f a material substance as the ,
ground and supporter o f the attribute o f freedom .
It is as dif cult to suppose a n immaterial substance

isolated from others and originating actions by itself
, ,
as a material substance ; it is as dif cult to imagine

an immaterial as a material substance producing a c
tions entirely arbitrary in the sense o f follow i n g no,
law and being incapable o f prediction ; it is as di f

cult to imagine an immaterial as it is to imagine a
material substance producing judgments unaffected
,
by desires or entertain ing desires uncontrolled by

,
judgments o r originating actions which have n o form

,
and no content I admit that to conceive these things

.
i n either way seems to me equally impossible ; but

what I contend for i s that it is as impossible in o n e
,
way as in the other ; and this being so it remains ,
onl y to attempt to throw some light on the pheno

menon o f freedom as a fact o f consciousness by the
, ,
analysis o f the phenomenon o f reection .
21 To come now to the second class o f theories

.
,
those which place the cause o f consciousness in an

i mmaterial E go o r an i mmaterial ac t ivity which is
,
at once subject and object o f every moment o f con

s c i o u s ne s s and therefore to be discovered by analysis
,
of the object o r o f the moment of perception ; foremost

among the supporters of which Kant himself is t o be
reckoned See his Transcendental deduction o f the
.
C ategories Kritik der R einen V ernunft Werke v o l

, , ,
.
2
. ed R osenkranz und Schubert page 9 0 1 1 6 He
.
,
-
.
speaks of the transcendental apperception as bei n g at

once trans cendental and a state o f consciousness ,
OF T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 65
dieses rein e ursp ru ngl i c h e unwandelbare Bewusst

se n
y ,
page 99 and this I can conceive in no other
way than as being what I call an aspect o f a state o f
consciou sness but an aspect perceived at once in the
,
same act by which the obj ect o r state o f conscious

ness is itself perceived He seems to have con
.
s i d e re d every state o f consciousness to have had

three such inseparable aspects as containing or being ,
at once a consciousness o f the identity o f self o r the

conscious Subj ect o f the identity o f the function o f
,
being conscious and o f the identity o f the empirical

,
object perceived ; o f these three aspects the c o n

s c i o u s n e s s o f the identity o f the action o r function ,
Handlung was the condition o f the other two the

, ,
transcendental uni ty o f apperception See the pass .
age a t page I O O E ben di ese t ra n s c e nd e nt a l e E inh eit

,
zuerst m e l i c h macht What Kant sought to ex

g .
plain t o himself was h o w was the fact o f uni ty o r

,
oneness anywhere and everywhere to be accounted

, ,
fo r.
He s a w that there was this cognition in all con
s c i o u s n e s s a n d in a l l objects o f consciousness uni ,
v e rs a l l
y and without exception It must therefore .
have o r be some transcendent a l condition i n nature ,
com m on to all its instances every o n e o f which s up ,
posed i t and in every o n e o f which it also was mani

,

fe s t e d . The conception was like that o f P lato s 7 0 ,
1 310
7 0 17 and 7 0 00200177 01 only reappearin g in the
, ,
kingdom o f mind and consciousness instead o f in the

kingdom o f existences Like that too it w a s but a .
doubling o f the phenomenon to be accounted for a ,
choosing o f o n e aspect o f the phenomenon and ele

va t i n
g it into the condition o f the phenomenon It .
makes n o difference h o w that U nity is regarded

which is conceived as the condition o f phenomenal
1 66 T HE O RI G I N o r T HE C O G NI T IO NS
ity for all unity which can be brought before o ur
u
n ,
consc io u sness at all consists o f t w o elements at the
least time and feeling and any condition o f these
,
elements becomi n g united o r being referred to each ,
other must itself consist o f these two elements E very

,
.
:
existence can be analysed into elements which have

no existence apart from each other .

Kant s Ich denke is then the reappeara n ce o f

Plato s 7 0 31 but it is after passing it through the
1
,

crucible o f D escartes C ogito ergo Sum It is the .
C ogito ergo Sum analysed and made into an actual

and universal element o f all knowledge and a ll exist
ence an element which is at once their cause and
,
their consequent But it was not this with D e s

.
cartes With D escartes it arose in answer to the

.
question What is the ultimate certainty o f whi ch it

,
i s I mpossible to doubt o r What is that fact which

, ,
contains its o w n certainty combined with its exist

ence ? The si mplest fact containing at once these
t w o elements existence and certainty is the fact o r
, ,
state of consciousness c a l l e d r e e c t i o n and the s i m
l e s t ex ression o f this fact is C ogito Sum Ich

p p o r -
denke a fact which may be combined with o r form ,
par t of any other state o f consciousness but which

, ,
is not essentia l to a l l It is composed o f elements

.
which a r e themselves complete states o f conscious

ness It is therefore the central point o f philosophy
.
but not o f experience the starting poin t o f exam i na

,
-
tion o f consciousness and interrogation o f nature but ,
not of consciousness itself Y et i n some way it is .
containe d in all consciousness for it is developed ,
out o f it and is the return of consciousness upon i t

,
self The question is how and in what manner con

.
t a i n e d in and developed out of consciousness Just .

1 68 THE O RI GI N OF T HE C O GNITI ONS
but by attention dwell ing upon it and analysing
, ,
it I can distinguish its feeling from its form its

, ,
material and its formal element Attention and its

results must not be confounded wi th reection and

its results ; the rst rough perception without the
analysis o f attention can b e di stinguished it i s true , ,
from perception together with such attention ; but

then this second analysing perception can be dis
t i ngui sh e d a l so n o less from perception reecting
as well as analysing Thos e who nd the ego i n .
direct perception seem t o me t o distinguish only

two things the rst rough perception o n the o ne
,
hand from perception analysing and reectin g at

once o n the other But there a r e thre e things not
.
,
two to be distinguished perception attention and

, , , ,
reection By reection I distin guish the I t h e

.

,

feeling from the obj ect the particular mode o f
, ,
the feeling the colour sound taste 800 There is

, , , ,
.
neither substratum o f the colour no r substratum o f

the feeling If in reection I x my thoughts o n
.
the feeli ng I may call it the subject ; if o n the mode

,
o f the feeling I may call it the object In seeing an .

,
external object I do no t feel that I am and that the

object is but I have a feeling under the forms Of
,
time and space ; I am conscious and am conscious ,
o f an Obj ect exist i n g in time and space I am awar e

o f the feeling o f the space it occupies and o f the tim e
, ,
it occupies ; but before I can di stinguish the feeling

from feeling generall y the incomplete from the com ,
p l e t e moment o f consciousness the act of conscious ,
ness from its result I must have represented o r redin

,
t e gr a t e d the feeling in consciousness and compared it
with others that is I must have reected upon it

, ,
.
The question how consciousness is related t o o r

,
OF T IM E A ND S PAC E . 1 69
distinguished from self consciousness i s o ne o f the

,
-
most difcult in philosophy It is the most central .
and the most important question in phil osophy just ,
as the Ich denke i s the most central a n d important

point in the system o f Kant There are t w o chief .
ways o f answering it E ither self consciousness dif

.
-
fers from consciousness onl y as a develope d di ffer ,
e nt i a t e d
,
whole differs frOm the same whole unde
v el o e d and und i fferentiated for example a s a plan t
p ,
from i t s seed in which case s elf consciousness would

,
-
be capable o f discovery in consciousness by a s uf

c i e nt l y searching and properly di rected analysis ,
and a l l consciousness would be rightly described as

self consciousness ; and this i s the theory o f Kant
-
,
Jacobi and many others ; o r self consciousness dif

,
-
fers from consciousness as o n e phenomenon differs

from another whic h it invariably under certain c o n ,
d i t i o n s supplants and succeeds but which except fo r

, ,
this relation can n o t be called the s a me with it as ,
fo r example o n e mode o f physical force such as fric ,
tion passes into another such a s heat o r as elec

, , ,
t r i c i t y passes into o r is supplanted by light ; and

this is the theory which I wish to establish here .
In both cases consciousness is potentia l self con -
s c i o u sn e s s
,
the 06000001 ; o f which sel f consciousness is -

the v gy em but this distinction o f A ristotle s is very
wide and embraces many modes o r i nstances The .
question is this : Is consciousness the lowest mode o f

self consciousness but self consciousness still ; o r is
-
,
-
self consciousness a differentiation o f consciousness

-
which cannot be traced at a l l in consciousness ?

When we are fully self conscious do we merely ana
-
lyse an obj ect and s e e clearly in it a circumstance

,
which i s already there diml y present to conscious

,
1 70 T HE O R I G IN OF TH E C O GN ITI ONS
ness or does that circumstance rst arise when we

,
are rst clearly conscious o f it ? And if the latter

alternative in these two questions is true and s up ,
posing i t to be a l ready established is there not then , ,
as a separate question an easy explanation at hand

, ,
why the opposite alternatives S hould appear s o pro

bable as they have done in the fact o f the extreme ,
di fculty w e have in throwing ourselves back in

imagination Into a position once occupied but long
Since abandoned the readi ness with which we i m
,
agine ourselves always t o have felt what w e at pre

sent feel the comparative in ability as it would be I n
,
,
this case to separate direct consc i ousness from self
,
consciousness when we have long accustomed o ur

selves to speak o f feelings as ours that is as a l
, ,
ways combined with self consciousness ? Both sides -
admit that potentially self consciousness is contained -
in consciousness ; but t o me it appears that it can

only be said to be actually present in consciousness
when it is clearly perceived as an obj ect and when ,
self and not self are counter di stinguished ; and that

- -
this is rst done in reection preceded by many i n ,
stances o f perception The question is by n o means

.
o n e about mere words and nomenclature but about ,
the analysis o f simple elementary feeling the material ,
element in dir ect perception which I main tain cannot ,
be analysed into a self and a n o t self does not con -

,
tain a self and a not self though it does contain a

-
forma l element a n d which comes to contain a self

,
and a not self in a particul ar act later tha n and de

-
pendent o n perception namely the act o f reection

, ,
.
P erhaps the decisive solution o f the question awaits

the clearer because more practised insight o f the
future .
1 72 T HE O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNI T I ONS
in to which it was divided ; the thread which corre

s o n d s to the time and the colour which corresponds

p
to the feeling are contin uous and the unity thus ,
introduced into the series o f determinate colours is

the result o f generalisation o f the provi sional image ,
colour from the several determi nate colours When

,
.
stat e s o f consciousness are the Object matter Of the -
generalisation the generalisation i s called reection

, ,
because it is the obj ect itself which generalises from

itself because the same series o f feelings prolongs
,
itself in t h e act o f generalising from its previous

states instead o f having a series o f objects before it
,
different from itself The u ni ty o f feeling generally

.
,
o r in the abstract in a continuous time is a fact i n

,
consciousness which is rst discovered by reection ,
cannot be given by a single perception but must be ,
collected from many perceptions before it is itself an

object o f perception In other words we do not per .
c e i v e a n object to be one and the same object by
referring it to a continuous feeli ng still less by re ,
ferring it t o an Ich denk e but we di scover that there

is a conti n uous feeli n g determi ned into many special
feelings after havin g many times experienced such
,
Special feelin gs connected in a continuous time F eel .
ing in a conti n uous time as a fact and not the know ,
ledge o f this fact constitutes the simple perception o f

,
every single object If it S hould be asked Why and

.
,
how it comes to pass that feelin g is continuous that ,
is combined with time at al l that we ever have the

, , ,
feeli ng of oneness it must be confessed that no answer

,
can be given N o cause O f the fact can be assigned

.
,
but only the analysis o f the fact O neness is an ulti .
mate fact in consciousness as it i s in every single ,
object o f consciousness The same question might .

O F TIM E A ND S PAC E . 1 73
be asked in the case o f every thing from the most ,
concrete to the most abstract objects o f all O neness .
in a material obj ect a n d oneness in consciousness o r ,
the feeli n g o f oneness are not di fferent facts o n e o f

, ,
which can be explained by the other as its cause but ,
they are the objective and subjectiv e aspects o f o n e

and the same fact beyond which in the way o f as
, ,
signi n g causes a t least we cannot reach

,
.
D id we go no farther than the stage Of direct per

c e t i o n s however richly o ur senses furnished us with
p ,
them we should have no knowledge but o f pheno

,
mena and the relations between them whether these ,
were phenomena in time alone o r in time and space

,
together ; we Should have no knowledge o f their rela

tions to what we call ourselves o r o f ourselves in ,
relation t o them And in many ani mals except man

.
, ,
and in man himself in his infancy we may suppose ,
this to be the case T h e notion o f Self is in troduced

.
by reection which itself contai ns and in essence con

,
sists o f the same simple unity o f apprehension but of ,
apprehension applied t o a particular kin d o f complex

object an object composed o f previous cases o f c o n
,
s c i o u sne s s,
o f an apprehension in which their o n e
common feature is contrasted with their many di vers e

features the general indeterm i nat e feeling with the
,
particular determinate feelings It remains now to

.
describe the process o f reection in order to s e e h o w

,
the notion o f self is introduced by it o r superinduced ,
upon t h e simple perceptions The unity o f a p p r e

.
h e n s i o n in reection is called U ni ty o f A pperception .
And here is reached the poin t s o often referred t o in

the present and precedi ng chapters .
R eection is a genera l isation di ffering from other

,
generalisations in hav ing modes o f consciousness as

1 74 T HE O RI G I N OF TH E C O G NITI O NS
such for its obj ect matter ; it is consciousness of per
-
c e t i o ns s o
p far a s they contain the common element
o f fee l ing abstracting from their other diff erences

,
.
In point o f being feelings they are all alike however ,
much o ne determinate feeling differs from another a ,
sound from a colour a colour from a taste o r o n e

, ,
colour from another for instance It is inevitable,

.
that familiarity with the perceptions should bring to

light this ground di fference existing in all of them
-
,
namely that what they all are in common shoul d be

,
dis t inguished from what some are and others are n o t .
R eection rst draws then follows up this distinction

, ,
and in vestigates the element comm on to all s o far as

it is common and not determinate The method pur .
sued by reection i n this is the following The r e .
e c t i ng consciousness considers those feelings which

are nearest to it i n point o f tim e it gets as close to ,
its object as it can ; that i s it turns its look back o n

,
the feeling o f the moment immediately previous to

itself that is represents o r redintegrates it in con
, ,
s c i o u sn e s s R eection is a particular kind o f redin

.
t e gr a t i o n di stinguished from other kinds by its parti

,
c ul a r object which object is the common element o f

,
feeling the feeling comm on to all instances o f feeling

, ,
a logical and provisiona l object In fo l l o w m g this .
course reection perceives that it has produced the

same phenomenon in poin t o f ki nd with that which it
, ,
s e t out to examine Instances have been produced

.
i n the course o f reecting o f the same phenomenon ,
of feeling o f determinate kinds and in separate but

continuous moments of time ; and these instances
have been produced by the same reecting conscious
ness The chain Of feeling o r the series o f feelings
.
has prolonged itself and since it h a s been prolonged

, ,
1 76 TH E O R I GI N OF TH E C O G NITI ONS
deni tely marked ; it includes o r may include if ,
memory is clear enough all past states o f conscious

,
ness but nothing which has not been conscious ness

,
.
This whole is the P erson the identical man the E m

, ,
i r i c a l E go as he appears t o himself as the object o f

p ,
consciousness the Object o f that consciousness by

,
which it has been produced as an Object in its pro

gress The phrase E mpirical E go will be fam i l iar to
.
readers o f Schelling See his V om Ich Oder ber

.
,
das Um b e d i ngt e S a m m t l Werke vol 1

,
.
,
. .
But a name must be found also for the general

and provisional term F eeling as existing i n d e t e rm i
,
nate and in time for its existence in time gives it

,
continuity as a provisional image a nd time is i t s ,
substance when it is regarded as existing ; but it

must be a name which does not express more than
the analysis warrants us in assigni ng to it a nam e ,
which does not impl y that it has empirical existence ;

and for this purpose let the name of Subj ect be chosen ,
a n d in order t o d i s t i n ui s h it from the empirical ego

, g ,
let it be called the P ure E go The name Subject .
will distinguish it from its objects whether d e t e rm i ,
nate feelings o r determinate qualities ; the name P ur e

E go will d istinguish it from the complex o f thos e
determ i n ate feel i ngs the empirical e go
,
The nam e .
o f Subject bes t marks the fact that t h e feelin g i n
tended by i t is gener a l and provisional and never an ,
object by itself Whenever feeling exists empirically

.
it exists determinately and in a moment of time which

,
is an empirical obj ect and has empirical duration If .
we divide in thought this least empirical moment o f

time or feeling in time the feeling vanishes but t h e
, , ,
time remains ; the time becomes an incomplete mo

ment a 061 001s 1 g but it still remains as time present to
, ,
OF T I M E A ND S PAC E . 1 77
o ur consciousness But what has becom e o f the de

.
terminate feeling ? I t does not exist as feeling any

more o ur sensibility is not ac ute enough to perceive
,
it below the point c a l led by hypothesis the least em

p i ri c a l moment It has not
. become feeling generally
o r in the abstract for this is a generalisation from all
,
the empirical determinate feelings and cannot there ,
fore include a case which is not a determinate feeling .
Sir W Hamilton would perhaps s a y that the feeling

.
had become latent ; but what is a feeling which is not

felt ? To say that it is latent is only to s a y t h a t it is
,
not a feeling There i s only one adequate mode o f

.
conceiving the phenomenon of the vanishing o f feel

ing in an incomplete moment o f time It remains .
potential o r latent not as feeling but as organ o r as

, , ,
a mode o f the material organ to which it is attached ;

the sensibility of the organ is no t di visible so far as
the form in which that sensibility Operates Starting .
then from the incomplete moment o f time and letti ng

it continue till it is complete that is til l it is long, ,
enough for feeling to arise in it we see that a deter ,
mi n ate feeling is the result o f a completed moment of

time and that consciousness arises at the end of the
,
moment At that instant we have an obj ect of con

.
s c i o u sne s s Suppose that the next complete moment

.
o f time is a moment of reection and its Object will

,
be the previous complete moment In this way we .
may be a l ways conscious but never conscious that we

,
are conscious but onl y that we have been so ; except

indeed as has been already said by inference in which
, , ,
sense we may be said also to be conscious that we

Shall be conscious hereafter The present moment .
of consciousness i s the darkes t spot in the whole

series o f moments o f reection The fact that con .
N
1 78 TH E O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
is eeting in point of time that it escapes

s c i o u s ne s s ,
observation in the moment o f consciousness s o that ,
we are never conscious that we a r e feeli n g but onl y

that we have felt the fact that we are never able to
,
-
seize consciousness itself but only its product war ,
rants u s in di stinguishing a Subject from an O bject .
C ould consciousness be its o w n imme di ate Object ,
could reection and perception be o n e could sensi ,
b i li t y be as innitely divisible as its form then every ,
thing would be in differently subj ective and objective ,
we should distinguish neither subject nor object in

phenomena the ultimate dualism o f metaphysic would
,
be done away with and existence and consciousness

,
would constitute a true Absolute .
If we were to follow up this clue i t would pro ,
bably occur t o us that the s o called substance o f the

-
soul is time just as the s o called substan ce of exter

,
-
nal tangible and visible objects is space Time has .
been called the form o f the inner sense space the ,
form of the outer sense ; but both in ner and outer

sense belong t o o ne conscious being and this o n e ,
conscious bein g as an existing object is now under

investigation The question before us is D oes the
.
,
reection of this conscious being o n itself discover ,
in its object itself a constant and complete Object to

, , ,
which its changing states are attached or with which ,
they are bound up so that this constant and com

,
p l e t e object may be considered as the invariable con
di tion of consciousness and its changing states ? The

answer given by the analysis o f reection is that the ,
only constant element in the object O f reection is

time which is also the form o f the inner sense Time
, .
therefore is the condition o f the subjective unity o f

the objects of the inner sense of the series o f states
,
1 80 TH E O R I G IN OF TH E C O GNI TI ONS
condition apprehension That which is a pe e n

o f .
l i a ri t y o f some states o f consciousness is not to be

erected into a con di tion o f existence of all states o f
consciousness
The same erroneous procedure is found in Schel
ling the error o f ja d o p t i ng as the cause o f a pheno
, ,
menon the differentia o r the denition o f it It is

,
.
seen in the rst sentence o f the System des Trans

cend Idealismus S a m m t l Werke v o l 3
.
,
Alles
.
,
. .
Wissen beruht auf der Ue b e r e i n s t i m m ung eines O b

e kt i v e n mit einem Subj ektiven But knowledg
j e .
does not r es t up o n the agreement o f an obj ective w ith

a subjective but may be described as being such an
,
agreement ; there is no causal conn ection between
the two things knowledge and the agreement of an

,
obj ective with a subjective ; each is another term for ,
or mode o f regarding the other But let this be ,

.
exhibited more particularly In the same work at .
p 3 6 7 v o l 3 Schelling say s : M an i i b e rl a s s e sich

.
,
.
,
ganz der u nw i l l ki i rl i c h e n Succession der V o r s t e l l un

gen s o werden dies e V orstellungen s o mannigfaltig
, ,
und verschieden s i e seyu m Oge n doch als z u E inem ,
identischen Subjekt ge h Ori g erscheinen R e e kt i r e .
ich auf diese I d e nt i t a t des Subjekts in den V o r s t e l

'
lungen s o entsteht mir der Satz : Ich denke D ieses

,
.
Ich denke i s t es was alle V orstellungen begleitet und

,

die Co nt i nu i t a t des B e w u s s t s e y n s zwischen ih nen
unterh a lt O n this it is to be remarked that in
.
,
every series o f perceptions in all consciousness there , ,
is a continuity of the consciousness of the feeling or ,
feelings In reection this continuity of feeling is

.
xed upon by the attention observed and called the , ,
Ich denke The fact is the continuity of feeling

.
,
the expression or characterisation of it when isolated ,

by the attention is the Ich denke The fa ct aecom

,
.
a ni e s inseparably all the V orstellungen the expres

p ;
sion for it arises afterwards in reection But Schel ,
.
lin g here maintains not onl y that the Ich denke a c

compani es all the V orstellunge n which wo uld be ,
tr ue in s o far as this that t h e fact now c a l l ed Ich

,
denk e does s o but a l so that it i s the cause o f the

,
phenomenon o f their continuity unterh a lt di e C onti ,
n ui t a t des B e w u ss t s e n s zwischen ihnen But it is

y .
clear that this is not the case S ince the thought Ich ,
denk e itself invol ves continuity o f consciousness and ,
is onl y possible in a continuous time C ontinuity o f .
consciousness and Ich denke a re t w o terms for the

s ame thing ; the rst is a name for it as an object
o f perception unseparated from the phenomena the ,
second as an object o f reection isolated in a p ro ,
visional image from t h e phenomena ; they are not

two objects but o n e object in two shapes Co n
,
.
t i nui t y o f consciousness is common t o a l l possibl e

m odes o f consciousness ; but t h e thought Ich denke
belongs to o ne mode o f consciousness onl y namely to ,
reection .
The Ich o f the Ich denke bec o mes according t o ,
Schelli n g its own object in intellectual intui tion

, ,
intellektuelle Anschauung I adm it that Intellectual.
intuition is a good name for reection ; but I deny

that under either name it reveals any other E go
, ,
than the empiric a l e go o n the o ne hand and that ,
general o r provisional image the Subject o n t h e , ,
other There are two reasons why the Subject can

.
not be conceived as a complete o r empirical obj e ct ,
rst because it appears as abstract and genera l feel

,
ing never given in perception except as an abstrae

,
tion ; secondl y because when we try t o think o f it a s

, ,
18 TH E O R I G I N O F TH E C O GNITI ONS
existing separately we must think o f it a s existing

,
in an incomplete moment Of ti me ; fo r if we thi n k o f

it as in a completed moment o f time it i s n o longer ,
general and abstract but a determin ate objective feel

ing the materi al element in a perception
,
.
The analysis o f reection is no w complete It .
will be Observed that I have used the word obj ects

i n speaking o f phenomena previous to reection both ,
in this and the prece di ng chapter although pheno ,
mena become Objective and subj ective and feelings ,
are distinguished from qualities rst in reection ,

.
NO other course was open t o me and fo r thi s reason , ,
that language the articulate language o f men is rst

, ,
formed when reection h a s arisen and thus describes ,
objects and has names for objects only as they appear

to a reecting consciousness Things as they appear.
t o consciousness previous t o reection are not de

scribed i n such language but are s o far as the lan
, ,
guage is concerned no n existent ; language itself is

,
-
a late product o f consciousness a n d expresses things

,

a s they appear at the stage when it arises If any .
ani ma ls besides man were found to have a language

g rounded o n generalisation this would I th
,
i nk be
justly regarded as a proof that they had reected and
w ere possessed o f reason Fo r they could har dl y
.
h a ve generalised s o much and s o xedly as to possess

a language without having also genera l ised the com
,
mon element o f feeling But though phenomena

.
h ave been spoken o f a s if they were a lready di stin

g u i sh e d into their subjective and objective aspects
,
into feelings and qualities before reection has arisen

, ,
this must not make us forget that this was onl y an

imperfect way o f speaking a n d that the way i n which
,
this distinction arises in reection had still to be

1 84 T HE O R I G IN OF TH E C O GNI T I ONS
gu i s h i ng o the
f course o f feelin g i nto pure and deter
minate feelings in time alone abstracting provision

, ,
a l ly from space : no matter what space these feelin gs
m a
y occupy reection ,
considers them only s o far as
they occupy time R eection abstracts provisionall y

.
from space that is from the particular space occ u pied

, ,
by the feelings the s u ccession o f which it exami n es

,
.
Though all these feeli n gs occupy o r are placed i n

s ome portion o f space yet this circumstance is a b
,
s t ra c t e d from and o nl y their succession is considered

,
.
In this consideration arises the distinction between

the Subject t h e incomplete moment of time and its
, ,
objects the whole series o f determinate feelin gs

,
.
P henomena have resolv e d themselves in to this dis

tinction ; the objects o f the Subject are a succession .
o f feelings But this abstraction was only provisional

.
,
for these feelings a l so occupy o r are contained in

s pace the comparatively constant feelin gs which
, ,
are the body and the less constant feelings which

,
s urround it o n a ll sides and the feelings which a c,
company these two classes such as the emotions t h e , ,
position o f which i s d if cult t o determine These all .
occupy Space and time together are a succession of ,
feelings and a succession o f feeli ngs in space relations -

.
When I take the feelings as a whole in these t w o , ,
rel ations at once as distinguished from the same

,
feelings with provisional abstraction o f space I con ,

,
sider them as qualities ; for they are considered as

statical and xed in space and in the whole o f tim e ;
they become the universe o f quali ties but without
ceasing to be feeli n gs When any particul ar s e t Of .
feelings is xed on and considered in these two rela

tions at once it becomes a complex o f qualities with
, ,
a certain gure in Space and duration o f time yet i n ,

O F T I ME AND S PAC E . 1 85

this case t o o without ce a sing t o be a complex o f

feeli ngs When I take a succession of these parti
.
c a lar objects some occupying a larger and some a

,
small er space some occupying an indeni te and some

,
a deni te position in space I am said to have trains

,
o f thought o r association o f ideas ; and this is t h e
condition in which consciousness is norm a l ly found ,
and which i s the groundwork o f all its elaborate and

completed reasoni ngs .
Qualities in the metaphysical sense o f the term

a r e then to be distinguished from qualities in t h e
psychologic a l sense In the former they are feelings

.
considered as occupying space as well as ti me ; in the

latter they are feelings considered as occupying all o r
any space except that occupied by the mind whi ch ,
is the place o f their effects and o f their evidence .
Qualities in the metaphysical sense are the Objectiv e

aspect o f feelings objective to reection when having
, ,
drawn the distinction between Subj ect and O bject it ,
proceeds t o distinguish its method in doing this from

the facts o r objects i n which its method is involved .
I t s method i s to abstract provisionally from S pace

but t h e objects i n which that method I s Involved all
occupy space Its method then is t h e subjective
.
aspect o f its objects And this method is the s ub

.
j e c t i v e aspect o f the empirical ego ; the objects o f i t
a r e the objective aspect Both together are the o b

.
e c t o f reection and therefore both together are the

j ,
obj ect o f metaphysic a l enquiry .
Al l thoughts which arise in reection are m o d i

cations di fferentiations o f this thought that the O bject
, ,

is different from the Subject ; o r in Kant s phrase , ,
they are accompani ed by a n Ich denke The two .
aspects o f phenomena subjective and objective a r e

, ,
186 TH E O R I G IN OF TH E C O G N ITI ONS
therefor e in reection as inseparable yet a s distin ct

a s the two elements formal and material are di stinct
, ,
and inseparable in direct perception .
It is impossible here and I d o not pretend to ex

, ,
h i b i t even in outline t h e various idealistic theories o f

the E go o r in any way t o enter o n their respective
,

merits Hegel s logical idealism will be i n some mea
.
sure discu s sed i n another part Here I have offered .
onl y an analysis o f reection which seems to me to ,
take away t h e common ground o n which all idealistic

theories o f the E go must stand Fo r whether t h e .
in di vidual E go is deduced from t h e Absolute o r t h e ,
Absolute from the individual E go it is reection in ,
both cases which furnishes t h e content o f the c o n c e p

tion formed It makes no d ifference whether t h e
.
universe is considered as o ne vast person o r the i n ,
divi dual person as the constructor o f an ideal universe ;

reection is equally the source o f the conceptions a p
plicable to both If reection is a mode o f intuition
.
,
and if its analysis h a s been rightly given an answer ,
has been supplied not onl y to the i ncorrect conclusions

o f theories o f intellectual intuition but also to theories
,
which do no t recognise reection as intuition at all .
But the question o f the possibility o f a purely logical

ide a l ism such as Hegel s requires a more direct and
, ,
express treatment and must be postponed fo r the

,
present ; and for this reason that Hegel is as careful ,
to bring together the t w o domains o f nature and his

tory
, and y vem g as I am to keep them apart ;
,
and as the y vem g is with hi m inseparably bound up

with the 000 00 and this 000704 is o f a logic a l nature his
1
, ,
theory of the origin o f consciousness and o f its forms

cann ot be understood until the natur e o f hi s l ogic is
considered a n d this w ill nd i t s proper place in the
,
1 88 TH E O R I G IN OF THE C O GN ITI ONS
E m p n d ung, feeling is in a si milar manner t h e

o r ,
completion of the rst step in the return of the Idea

to itself out of its differential state to its state o f
, ,
identity with itself as G eist ; that is it is the rst

, ,
step in the third part o f the E n c y c l o p i d i e the P hilo ,
s ophie des G eistes So far from considering feeling

.
as an ultimate element o f consciousness the material ,
element incapable o f analysis Hegel derives it ulti

, ,
mately from thought in Some o f its forms a n d con ,
s iders that t h e ultimate nature o f feeli n g consists i n
the circumst a n ce o f what is general allgemeines , ,
becoming also particular o r determinate bestimmt , ,
w ithout losing its character o f generality D as N icht .
animalische he says e m p nd e t eben d e s sh a l b nicht

, , ,
weil in demselben das Allgemeine in die Bestimmt

heit versenkt bleibt in dieser nicht f ur sich wird
,
.
D as ge fa rb t e Wasser zum Beispiel ist nur f a r o ne

, ,
unterschieden v o n seinem Ge fa rb t s e yn und v o n sein er

Unge fa rb t h e i t Wa re ein und dasselbe Wasser z u
.

gleich a llgemei nes und ge fa rb t e s Wasser s o w i i r d e ,
d iese unterscheidende Bestimmtheit fur das Wasser

s elber s e n dieses somit E m nd ung haben ; denn
y , p
E m p n d ung hat E t w as dadurch dass d asselbe in ,
sei n er Bestimmtheit sich a l s ein a l l ge m e m e s erhalt .
Phil osophie des G eistes E ncycl 399 . Werke . .

,
vo l 7 d di p This i rst to take feeling

.
,
2 v 1
. 1
5 . s .
, ,
in o n e o f its second intentions instead o f in its rst

intention ; and secondl y and consequently it is to , ,
deduce feeling from what I should call the formal

element Of consciousness as it appears i n thought .

Such is a very brief S ketch o f Hegel s system s o ,
far as is r equisite to understand the position which

the question o f the origin o r the history o f tim e , , ,
space and consciousness occupies with him ; and it is

,
O F T I ME AND S PAC E .
1 89
clear t h a t no t h i ng said in this chapter from the point ,
of view adopted here of the relation of the history o f

a part to the nature o f the whole can be an answer
:
to a theory founded o n such a totall y opposite view

as Hegel s The answer to Hegel s theory requires
.
an examination into the nature of logic and the con ,
t r o v e r s y must be a logical one N othing decisive

.
can be brought forward therefore in the rst part o f

this E ssay What I think has been now shown is
.
,
that self consciousness is on the o n e hand n o t an ele

-
ment in a l l cases o f consciousness and o n the other ,
not a simpler b ut a more complex phenomenon than

consciousness ; and farther that self consciousness ,
does not reveal to us any E go o r Subject O bj ect but -

,
only the empirical ego o n the o n e hand and the pure

ego or Subj ect on the other ; neither of which can be
regarded as the cause either o f consciousness o r o f
self consciousness still less o f their forms time and
-
, ,
space either generally o r in the mind ; and that self

,
consciousness as the more complex phenomenon o f

,
the two must be explained by a reference to c o n

,
s c i o usne s s
,
and the object of self consciousness by a -
reference to the obj ect o f conscio usness by statin g it ,
in terms of time space and feeling and pointing out

, , ,
the addi tional element namely reection which it

, ,
contains The Subj ec t such as it is indeterminate

.
, ,
feeling in incomplete moments o f time lies within ,
consciousness is discovered therein by reection ; and

,
o n account o f its incomplete nature is incapable of
being the cause o f consciousness P sychology there .
fore is debarred from all theories o f the E go as the

cause of consciousness for the whole ground where
,
the E go could be fo und is searched by reection and ,
the E go not found there But whether physiological

.
1 90 THE ORIGIN OE T H E C O GNITI ONS

psychology will ev er succeed in establishing by i n
ference the existence o f an immaterial Soul o r as I , ,
should prefer t o express it an intangible and m v 1 s i b l e

,
Soul as the cause o f consciousness and i n inserting

, ,
such a soul between the material organ the brain o r ,
nervous matter and consciousness o r in placing it

, ,
before both consciousness and the material organ as

the invariable condition o f both the o n e and the
other this is a question which cannot perhaps yet

,
be decided in the negative and which it is not in ,
place to discuss here What science would gain by

.
this being established is not clear ; a more compli

c a t e d cause would be substituted fo r a simpler o n e ,
but then this would be by hypothesis demanded by

, ,
the facts But until this has been done it remains

.
,
to the metaphysician to have recourse to that cause

o r invariable condition o f consciousness which is an
empirical obj ect o f presentative perception to follow ,
the physiological path as far as it leads him secure ,
that on that path he is at least o n the safe road

towards truth .
But before proceeding to consider the third class

o f theories o f the origin o f consciousness let m e be ,
allowed to ill ustrate by a comparison the process of

con sciousness developing into reection a process ,
which has al ready been described as accurately and

un u r a t i v e l as the language at my command per
g y
mits C onsciousness in this process may be c o m
.
pared to a man walking backwards who does not s e e ,
each step as he t a kes it but only immediately after

,
it has been taken ; who sees the ground beneath his

feet only when he has passed over it not while it is ,
bei n g passed over He sees the past but neither the

.
,
present nor the future landscape It spreads to his .

1 92 TH E O RI G I N OF TH E C O G NITI ONS

p l et ed an d the uncompleted moment o f Co n

no t in
S CI o u sne s s a fact rst told to us by reection this
, ,
fact seems to me to be o n e ground at least o f the , ,
ineradicable sense o f freedom which we call free ,
dom o f the will D as gebe ich dir says Jacobi .

, ,
ohne Widerrede z u : dass das G ebiet der F r e i h e i t

das G ebiet der Un vvi s s e nh e i t s ey Ich set z e nur .
noch hin z u : E iner dem M enschen unu b e rw i n d l i c h e n .
Werke v o l 2 page 3 2 2 But I do not know that

,
.
,
.
Jacobi would have given his words such an a p p l i

cation .
22 I come now to the third clas s o f theories

.
,
that class usually but wrongly distinguished as ma

t e ri a l i s t i c a n d which ought properly to be distin
,
g ui sh e d as physiological F or the rst class of theo .
ries is also materialistic according to the true meaning

of the term Some matter the Soul of t h e s e theories
.
must possess o r it would not be an Object at all

,
.
If m a t t er su re t h e m o s t re ne d
, ,
High wro ught a nd t em p e re d int o m ind ,
S o m e d a rling d a ught er o f t h e d a y ,
A nd b o di d by h
e er n ti
a v e ra y;
this it may b e but it is matter unmistakeably still

,
.
Both these classes o f theories are materialistic in the

same sense Of the term and both become equally o b ,
e c t i o n a b l e if it is Objectionable to be o n e sided only

j ,
-
,
if they are put forward as the whole account to be

given of consciousness if they profess to decide the ,
nature o f consciousness by an enquiry into its origin

and history in the mind O n this point I must s a y a .
few more words before entering into the physiological

theory .
The analysis of the phenomenon of reection has

brought us back t o the conception o f subject and

OF T IM E AND S PAC E . 1 93
object as t w o aspects o f the same thing c o extensive

, ,
-
and coeval with each other the conception which ,
was exhibited though imperfectly in the diagram in

, ,
the preceding chapter And since reection is the .
last e ffort o f consciousness the nal analysis which ,
is reached by reection must be the ultimate analysis

and nature o f the thing analysed ; the conception ex
h i b i t e d by it cannot be overridden by o r made sub ,
ordin ate to any other mode o f conceiving obj ects

,
.
A ccordingly every thing that follows I n this chapter

, ,
the enquiry into the history and origin o f conscious

ness must be entirely subordinate to that conception
,
o f the nature o f consciousness a n d its obj ects as two ,
aspects o f o ne and the same thing But how is this .
t o be done ; in what way can the origin o f conscious

ness be conceived when it has been shown that it
,
is coeval and coextensive with its Obj ects wi th its ,
forms time and space and with its materi a l element

, ,
o r feelings ,
these being innite both in time and
space ? T o enquire into the origin o f consciousness
is to suppose that there was a time when and a space ,
where it did not exist ; yet reection has forbidden

,
us to suppose that there ever was such a t i In e and

such a space C an consciousness have a beginn ing
.
i n time and S pace and yet be coeval and coextensive

,
wi th t i me and space ; or be coeval and coextensiv e

with its objects and yet be preceded by some o f i t s
,
objects as its causes ? The individual consciousness

seems to have an origin in time and space before ,
which obj ects existed ; and t o await its end in time

and space after a short l ife after which objects wil l
, ,
exist as before Y et these objects before and after

.
life are objects only o f the individ ual consciousness ,
and when either of these two relatives are taken

0
1 94 T HE N AT U R E OF T H E C O G NITI O NS
away the other which is only its relative must it

, , ,
seems share its fate Here is a manifest c o n t r a d i c

.
tion or at any rate what seems to be such ; and the

,
pro of o f the difculty being really felt is the fact of

the many the o ries ad o pted in order to escape from it .
Three ways have been struck into corresponding to ,
the three classes of theories exhibited i n this chap

ter and ado p ting the same principles respectively
, ,
in order to explain t h e origin and history o f the

world o r o f consciousness E ach o f these ways is .
essentially a theory o f an Abs o lute and each trans ,
fo r ms the theory o f origin from a subordinate theory

into a theory sometimes covertly and sometimes pro
fe s s e d l y complete and all embracin g C orrespon di ng
-
.
to the rst class o f theories there is the theory o f

thorough goin g Idealism It escapes from the d i t
-
.
culty o f supposing that the individual consciousnes s

has an origin in time and space and yet that time ,
and space and Objects exist only as objects o f con

s c i o u s ne s s by conceiving that the obj ective side Of
,
the eq uation o r pair o f relatives that is the objec t s , ,
of consciousness are a mere appeara n ce a mirror o f

, , ,
the other side consciousness itself ; that consciousness

,
is the only real existence while its obj ects are a ,
phantasm o f consciousness thrown o ff by it and last ,
ing only w hile consciousness exists consciousness ,
existing absolutely and in itself and o u t o f reference ,
to any obj ect whatever C orrespondi n g to the third

.
class of theories is the theory o f thorough going ma -
t e ri a l i s m ; as idealism anni hilates Obj ects s o mate

,
ri a l i sm consciousness The origin of consciousness

.
is here directly in question C onsciousness is c o n .
c e i v e d as a phantasm o r a mi rror o f objects which

, ,
exist really i n time and S pace of magnitudes which ,

1 96 T HE NA T U R E OF TH E C O G NITI O NS

to unfold all th at it has i nit in Hegel s phraseology , ,
to become a n und fur sich all that it is already an

- - -
sich How s o ? Its natur e is to be subject and o b

.
.
jc e t two o p p o s I t e s always and sometimes c o nt r a di c

, ,
tories at once It is all subject but it is all o b

,
.
,
jc e t ; it is all obj ect and subject but it is neither ,
alone ; therefore it is Begriff for a Begriff o r C on '

,
cept form is that which is the Identity o f c o nt r a d i c

-
tories In other words the nature of the Absolute

.
,
der Begriff is to produce ever new forms because

,
it contains i n itself N egation N egation is the e s .
s e n t i a l point in the Begri ff a n d two negations com ,

l e t e every Begriff ; and the Begriff itself is the 7 07
p 1
071 0 1 o f the Absolute ; negation therefore is the

1
mai n spring o f its development o r history The his .
tory and the nature are one and the same thin g ; it is
only the special determi nate forms o f existence the ,
inadequate C oncepts Begriffe which have an origin

, , .
Such briey and inadequately expressed is one view

of the grandest idea which the mind o f man has ever
conceived .
Thus the theory of the second class has no par

tial theory o f origin o f origin considered as sub
,
ordinate to nature corresponding t o it because I t

, ,
contains both itself and precludes the possibili ty

,
o f a partial the o ry fou n ded o n the same prin ciple .
The two partial theories o f origin are theories o f the

rst and o f t h e third class R easons have already .
been offered for rejecting theories o f the rst class :
the third class o f theories has yet to be examined .
But the question remains to be previ ously answered ,
how the apparent contradiction is to be solved b e

tween the equal claims O f nature and origin the ,
avoidance o f which contradiction was the motive

which caused the substitution o f the theories o f a b

solute idealism and absolute materialism in the place
o f subordi nate and partial theories corresponding to
them O n what principle can the question o f origin

.
b e m a de subordi nate to the question o f nature ? The

true answer is the same in some respects with that o f
Hegel It is that the questions o f nature and his
.
,
tory o f consciousness and its objects are though no t ,
identical yet inseparably combined ; but that S ince

,
both o f them nature and history are in nite in time

, ,
and space no question o f origin can arise about them ;

,
while questions both o f history and origin arise with

respect to any and every particular Obj ect o f con
s c i o usn e s s . The history o f consciousness is founded
in its nature as much though n o t i n the same way
, ,

as in Hegel s theory The history of consciousness
.
is founded in its nature not because its nature i s t h e

,
C oncept form and contains N egation but because

-
,
Ti m e is o n e o f its forms ; consciousness begins to

have a history as soon as it begins t o exist and that ,
is at any point y o u can reach the furthest going back ,
into innite time A ll particular Obj ects o f consci

.
o u s n e s s o n the other hand have an origin as well a s a
history ; and o n e o f these particular objects o f con

s c i o u s n e s s is the connection o f the empirical ego with
that small portion o f the universe which i s most fr e

quently presented actually and may be presented ,
always to consciousness that is with the body inha , ,
bited by it In other words the conscious life o f the

.
empiric a l ego is the obj ect o f the investigations of

psychology C onsciousness is a term o f very wid e
.
meani ng and therefore may embrace very di fferent

,
particular meanings Henc e the apparent c o nt ra d i c

.
tion If consciousness i s taken to me an either the

.
1 98 TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
Subject o r the subjective aspect o f phenomena it h a s ,
no origin ; if it is taken to mean the conscious life o f

the empirical ego as distinguished from the u ni verse
, ,
it has an origin as a particular obj ect o f consci

,
o u s n e ss
. The conscious life o f an individual o r o f ,
the empirical ego may be imaged as a ring sliding

,
along a pole from end to end to which ring cords

, ,
are attached going o ff from it in all directions s o as ,
to make it the centre o f a globe of which the cords

are radii D urin g life that is from the ti me when
.
, ,
the ring i s p ut o n the pole to that when it falls o ff

at the other end it is in con nection with inni ty by
,
means o f the cords The cords represent the percep

.
tions and their objects in innite time and sp a ce

"
The ring and the cords in the comparison are both

tangible Obj ects and S I m i l a rl y the empirical ego in
,
connection with its body is itself an obj ect o f c o n

s c i o us n e s s in just the same sense as other obj ects are
,
namely it is o n e o f the objects which constitute the

,
Obj ective aspect o f phenomena ; it is as much an o b

j c e t a s those Obj ects are which are farthest removed
from it i n space and time ; before reection entered
there was no difference at all bot h were phen omena ; ,
after reection both became objects differing in s pace

, ,
and time relations the conscious life o f the empirical

,
ego occupying that portion o f space which i s always

nearest to the centre which the Subj ect always per ,
c ei ve s or may perceive whenever it perceives any

, ,
thing in space and that portion o f time which i m

,
m ediately precedes the moment o f reection The .
connection o f this portion o f time and space with

the more distant portions of both is the question o f
psychology .
Any moment however Short in the cours e o f the

200 TH E NA T U R E OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
tion ; when we imagine the future that is follow t h e , ,
chain o f e ffects instead o f causes o f existence that ,
which is last in order of perception is also as a rule , ,
last in order o f existence Both the past and the .
future the past dating back from the time o f birth

, ,
and the future dating forward from the present m o

ment o f consciousness are Obj ects o f the imagina ,
tion and are both constructed out o f the same fund ,

,
namely the fund o f perceptions presentative and r e

,
presentative which have been present from the ti me

,
o f birth to the present moment of consciousness The .
l ife time bein g a xed moment i n ti m e with time

-
, ,
before it and after it causes t h e s e obj ects which are

,
imagined last t o be placed at the furthest point of

time from itself ; that is earliest I n past time latest , ,
in future time ; and thus the apparent anomaly o f ,
what is last in order o f knowledge being rst in order

o f time is removed
,
There is thus a double order
.
,
o f knowledge and o f existence ; a progress in two
directions at once fo r the order of knowledge is itself

,
a prolongation of the order o f existence in a forward

direction while the Objects which it imagines as
,
existing i n past time are a prolongation of the order

'
of knowledge in the reverse direction This i s what .

I understand t o be in Heg el s mind when he speaks
of the progress o f the development o f the Begriff
being a progress at once in two di rections a R u c kke h r ,
and a F ortgang a V ertiefen into and an E ntw ickelung

,
out o f its essence E verywhere what Hegel says

.
must be interpreted as alone it can be expressed by

, ,
a reference to t h e forms o f time and space The .
forms of time and space he at the root of all the con

c e t i o n s he forms o f the universe and o f thought I
p .
do not s a y only that the language he employs a n d

O F T IME A ND S PAC E . 201
must employ involves depends o n and e xpresses , ,
those forms for th is is by n o means conclusive ; but

,
that the meaning o f that language itself rests entirely

o n time and space and the thoughts represent Objects
,
only in those forms .
E very thing which is n o t contained in the i nc o m

l e t e moment of consciousness the Subj ect i s an o b
p , ,
e c t o f consciousness and every thin g h a s existence

j ,
in the same sense ; the objects o f existence pre v ious

to birth are obj e c ts o f imagin ation that is object s , ,
not simply represented but constructed o u t o f o b ,
e c t s represented representations in a new shape

j ,
.
P ast and future Obj ects each kind dating from t h e ,
present moment are present in consciousness as past

,
and future because ti me and S pace are forms o f

,
every moment o f consciousness P ast and futur e .
objects are revealed to us and exist in present c o n

s c i o u s n e s s as the long line o f Banquo s descendants
a r e rev ealed by the glass carried by the eighth o f
the royal phantoms in M acbeth Their existence as .
past and future objects in cludes in it a reference to

the present moment of consciousness The empirical .
ego belongs to past present and future time The

, ,
.
connection of the empirical e go with the body belongs ,
as an object of representation and not o f imagination ,
to the present and part of the past time only A ll .
objects without distinction have the same title to

existence namely presence in consciousness but all
, ,
have not the same certainty duration or truth , , .
That there has been a course o f existence prior t o

the birth o f the empirical ego into the body o r , ,
what is the same thing o f the body into the em ,
p i ri c a l ego
,
no consciousnes s can doubt A lthough .
this is an object of the imagination it is no t on ,

.
202 TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O G NITI O N S

that account uncertain It is the province o f r e a s o n .
s
ing to decide o n the certainty o r the truth o f objects

and classes of objects U p to the present moment o f .
consciousness then there has been a series o f obj ects

, ,
and events empirical taking place in the order o f

, ,
existence and o f which the connection o f the body

,
with the empirical ego is part The invariable con .
n e c t i o n s between the Objects and events contained in
this series and in the future as well as in the past

, ,

since C ujus rei ordo est etiam p rze d i c t i o e s t are , ,
the eld o f enquiry o f the special sciences P sych .
ology investigates the invariable antecedents o f t h e

conscious life o f the empirical ego ; not what c o n
s c i o u s n e ss is but which objects o f consciousness a r e
,
they which invariably precede i n order o f exist ,
ence those feelings o r objects o f reection which

,
exist in the body during life and the removal o f ,
which invariably precedes the cessation o f those feel

ings . The physiological class o f th eories o n this
question remains to be examined .
A ccording t o the physiological theories the ex ,
i s t e n c e o f the conscious li f e o f the empirical e go ,
o r o f the connection o f the empirical ego with t h e
body depends o n the existence o f nervous mat

,
ter and its degrees o f development depend o n the

,
degrees o f development o f that nervous matter in

quantity and complexit y B ro u s s a i s in the l s t chap .

ter of his work D e l I rri t a t i o n e t de la F olie v o l 1 ,
. .
page 4 2 d edit expresses himself thus : O n voit

. .
,

q u e l i rri t a b i l i t est commune a tous les et r e s v i

vants depuis l e vgtal ju s q u a l homme e t q u elle
, ,
est continue tandis que la sensibilit est une facult

propre a certains animaux qu elle n est pas con ,

tinne e t qu elle n e s e manifeste que sous d e s con
,
204 TH E NA T UR E OF TH E C O GN ITI ONS
seek the causes of the conscious life o f the empirical

ego in something which is not included in that con
scious li f e itself ; they both infer a cause and do not ,
nd it b y an a l ysis o f the feelings caused Co n se .
quently no ph ysiological theory can logically confuse

the brain with its feelin gs o r thoughts ; the separa
tion o f the two things i n kind is provided for by the
metaphysical di stinction between feelin gs and quali
ties F eelings can never be qualities unless they are
.
considered as gathered up into xed portions o f

space The brain itself is such a complex o f feelings
.
,
but t h e fe e l i ngs supported o r caused by the brain a r e

by the hypothesis by the condition o f the enquiry
, ,
exempted from such a transformation into qualities ,
for it is their connection as feelin gs with the brain as

a complex o f qualities which is being examined The .
inference o f a cause supposes it to be different frOm

its effect and no t contained in it
,
.
F our things are to be di stinguished the Subject ;

,

the empirical ego o r the world Of feelings ; the uni

,
verse of obj ects o r the world o f qualities ; the brain

, ,
a particular obj ect consisting o f certain quali ties a s ,
the cause of the connection o f the empirical ego with

a small and distinct portion o f the world o f qualities .
The S ubj ect is n o empirical o r complete object any ,
more than time space and feelin g are The union

, ,
.
of the three last constitutes empirical o r complete

phenomena ; the uni on o f phenomena with t h e Sub
jcet constitutes empirical o r complete objects T h e .
Subject taken a l one would be necessarily conceived

as out o f all time and space in other words the a t
, ,
tempt to consider it as an object is di r ectly self con -
t r a di c t o ry ; the moment it is conceived as an obj ec t

by uni on with phenomena that moment it i s c o n
,

OF T I ME A ND S PAC E . 205
c ei ve d as xed in time and space as belonging to the ,
empirical ego The natural tendency o f every o n e is

.
to conceive every thing as an empirical object to ,
make even the elements and aspects o f phenomena

empirical and to deal with them as such P ure
,
.
metaphysic which refuses t o hypostasise u ltimate

,
elements and aspects o f phenomena has thus n e c e s ,
s a ri l
y an unsatisfactory because incomplete appear
ance ; and there will always be a tendency to trans
cend it and make some o f its elements and aspects
,
empirical and therefore absolute An idealist who

,
.
should hypostasise the Subj ect might say If the Sub ,
c t is a necessary aspect o f phenomena and pheno

je ,
mena are eternal and innite a parte ante must no t ,
the Subject be s o also ? But this is t o make the

Subj ect into somethin g which besides being a mem ,
ber o f a relation has a separate and complete exist

,
ence o f its o w n ; just as fo r instance master and s e r

, ,
vant are members o f a relation and o n e cannot be a ,
master without havi ng a servant nor a servant with ,
o u t having a master yet a man who is a master can

,
exist as a man without h aving a servant and a man ,
who is a servant the same Here the existence sepa .
ra t el as men is a prior condition o f the subsequent

y
relation o f master and servant But the Subject has .
no such prior separate existence the only existence ,
which it has is as an aspect of phenomena ; and this

does not require that it should alone exist in the , ,
time and space relations which the complete pheno

mena exist in The Often employed comparison of
.
light and darkness is much more to the point in this

case The rst act of creation in the book of G enesis
.
is Let there be light : and there was light The .
arising o f light created an innity and an eternity o f

20 TH E NA T U R E OF TH E C O GNI TI ON S
darkness a parte ante ; at that mo ment red by the

'
arising of light there bega n to be darkness which had

,
existed from eterni ty Light created darkness in the

.
sense o f giving it a meaning and a nature ; fo r dark

ness is o n e o f those things which have meaning o nl y
in reference to something else the rst intention o f
,
which is a second intention D arkness is the negation

.
o f all feeling of sight ; light o n the contrary has a
rst intention it is t h e feeling of sight ; in its second

,
intention it is the negation o f darkness Hence light .
gives existence to darkness which nevertheless o c c u

,
pies an eternity and an innity previous to the exist

ence o f light So must the relation o f the Subj ect
.
and objects prior to it be conceived ; the Subject gives

existence t o Objects which have existed previously
,
i n the sense o f giving them a meaning and a nature ;

fo r though contained in all phenomena it i s not o b
served to be contained in them and the moment o f ,
its being rst observed is called the moment o f its

rst coming into existence ; and it is thus treated
provisionally as a nite object whic h has a beginnin g ,
notwithstanding that its nature is to be no obj ect at

all and consequently t o escape from all notion o f
,
begin nin g and ending What is true o f the Subject

.
is true also o f the empirical ego and the world of

qualities the two members o f the distinction between
,
the subjective and Obj ective aspect o f phenomena for ,
the Subject is that moment o f time on the completion

o f which this distinction and consequently the two
,
members o f it arise These three the Subj ect t h e

, .
, ,
empirical ego the world of qualities are coexistent

, ,
and coeval aspects of phenomena and constitute the ,
entire metaphysical analysis or logic Of phenomena .
Wh en any one of them is taken and considered as an

208 TH E NA T UR E OF T HE C O G N ITI O NS
another yet without resorting to a n Absolute In

,
.
those theories the question o f nature and the question

o f history hold an equal rank E mpirical obj ects .
make mind what it is as its causes and m i nd makes ,
objects what they are i n their nature Both min d .
a n d its obj ects are empirical objects and yet each is ,
the cause o f the o t her O bj ects are the cause of the

.
existence of mind and yet mind i s the cause o f the

,
existence o f Obj ects since without mind obj ects would

,
not be what they are and therefore we could not tell

,
that they were the cause of mind And if it is said .
that objects cause mind rst and then appear to it in ,
a new Shape as the Objects we are acquainted with

, ,
this is to have recourse to an Absolute in the shape

o f the D ing a n sich - -
E ach claims to be the cause of
.
the existence o f the other that is the cause o f the , ,
other in the same sense in which that other makes

the same claim These claims a r e not only i n c o m
.
l e t e taken separately ; that would be by itself no

p , ,
objection ; but they are contradictory and incapabl e

o f combination unless by making o n e or the other
,
o f the two objects o r both together

,
an Absolute ,
.
Transform however all obj ects into modes o f con

s c i o u s n e s s that i s into the Objective aspect o f m i nd
, , ,
and transform mind into the subjective aspect o f

objects a n d the question o f history and ori gin is at
,
once subordinated t o the question of nature What .
is an object a quali ty time space motion causation

, , , , , ,
the series o f obj ects in time the series o f obj ects i n ,
space ? Take each separately and think o f it and ,
the answer must b e a mode o f consciousness But .
in this the question o f history is decided ; the history

or the sequence o f causes o f any Object however far ,

back it may go is a mode o f consciousness ; that is to

,
O F TI ME A ND S PAC E . 209
say is included in the question o f nat ure . There is

,
nothing previ ous to consciousness for those things ,
which were supposed to be previous to i t are modes

o f itself ; the laws which govern the sequences and
coexistences o f these modes are all that can be e n

quired into There is nothing but time beyond time ;
.
nothing but Space beyond space ; the s um of thin gs ,
existence which is the objective aspect o f conscious

,
ness has no second intention for it has nothing out

, ,
side itself or before itself in relation to which it

,
stands C onsciousness and its objects are coeval and

.
i nseparable two aspects of the same thing which

, ,
have no cause o f existence o ut of themselves but ,
only a law o f existence within themselves Thus .
the question o f origin and history dealing with em ,
i r i c a l objects is subordinate t o the question o f na

p ,
ture de a ling with metaphysical elements and aspects

o f Objects .
It is not only in this part of psychology that d i f

c ul t i e s arise from the separation o f mind from its
objects as two empiric a l obj ects di fferent in nature

,
.
Here the dif culty is to s e e h o w objects can be the

cause o f consciousness as an Object when conscious ,
ness is the cause o f them at the same time Later .
o n
, a difculty will be suggested by the course o f
the discussion as to the mode o f the action and re
action o f mi n d o n objects o f sight and touch and ,
these Objects o n mind ; how for inst a n ce a feeling o f

pain can cause the Shutting o f an eye o r the with ,
drawing o f a hand from a sunbeam or a candle It

,
.
is not only the physical action of the sensitive and

motor nerves that is present and operative here ; the
feeli ngs o f pain are not only present by the side of
and a l ong with these physical processes but are links ,
21 0 TH E O R I G IN OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
in the chai n of events are caused by the ac tion on

,
the sensitive nerve and produce the action on the

,
motor nerve If not why should exactly those a c

.
,
tions be p ro d u c e d ii t vh i c h withdraw the eye and the

hand from the source o f pain the sunbeam o r the ,
candle ? To escape from the pain a nal cause is , ,
plainly the directing power the motive in these , ,
actions ; feelings are a causative link in the series o f

phenomena not merely an accompani ment o f a series
,
Of phenomen a in the nerves and muscles Here then .
m i nd must react o nphysical bodies How is this to .
be conceived ? It is clear that mind and physical

bodies must be brought under some common cate
gory or have some commo n nature
,
.
.23 Aft er the physiological theories o f the o ri

gin o f the com m on s li fe o f the empirical ego comes
the consideration o f the physiological theori es o f t h e
origin o f the formal element in the cogni tions o f the
conscious individu a l mind namely o f the cogni tions
, ,
o f time and space These theories may be reduced

.
,
so far as I know to three all o f similar nature and

, ,
distin guished only by their respective degrees o f com

p l et ene s s
,
according as they are founded o n a singl e
class o f circumstances o r o n the combination o f this

,
with a second o r with a second and a third class

, .
They all seek t h e causa e x i s t e ndi o f the cogni tions o f

time and space during the conscious li f e in objects ;
, ,
they a l l consider time and S pace existing in objects , ,
as the cause o f their existing a l so in the cognitions o f

the individual T h e rst o f thes e thre e theories i s
.
,
that time and S pace being universally present in O b

j e c t s of presentative perception
, in every state of the
consciousness o f an indi vidua l from bir t h to death ,
and being the only points in which a l l objects how ,

21 2 T HE O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNITI O NS
o f origin in the conscious li fe o f the empirical ego is

but the complement o f the theory of the nature of
these cogni tions s o far as they are necessary ; while
,
in the Vi ew o f many o f those who hold o r reject , ,
such a theory o f their origin as the present it is con ,
s i d e r e d to be antagonistic to and destructive of that
theory o f their nature in which they are exhibited as

necessary ; and this i n consequence o f not keeping
clear the distinction between the questions of history
a n d nature Sim il ar has been t h e case with other
.
doctrines in other subjects for instance i n anthro ,
p o lo
gy with the doctrine of development o f species
by natural selection ; the dignity and nature o f man

has been thought to be endangered by any theory Of
his ori gin that di d not consecrate a special creative
act to the production o f mankind ; but the question
is here also what man is what his powers and endow
, ,
ments are not how he or they came to be what they

,
are what the steps are by which his present actual

,
position has been reac hed It is o f the greatest i m.
portance to keep these two questions o f history and ,
nature distinct ; and the question of the history of

,
any particular thing includes that o f its origin as the ,
rst li nk in its history In psychology and meta .
physic it is especially important for the careful dis ,
tinction of these two questions can al one prevent us

from falling into the onesidedness which is the r e
proach of a materialism which has treated the ques
tion o f origin as if it was the whole question over ,
riding superseding or supplying with a ready made

, ,
-
answer the question o f nature ; which has thus given

,
half truths for whole truths and i n d o I ng s o prepared

,
the way for a falling back into two opposite errors ,
the transformation o f obj ects into a deceitful appear

OF T I ME AND S PAC E
. 21 3
ance o n the o ne hand and into an absolute exis tenc e

, ,
o n the other .
A ccording t o this second theory the cognitions ,
o f time and space are with the l ife o f the empirical

,
ego o f which they form a part functions o f the brain

, ,
and appear as a kind o f intellectual instinct ; nor is

there a n y thing absurd in regar ding cogni tions a s ,
well a s feelings and actions as functiona l o r i n,
st i nc t i ve
. It is very probable that the phenomena
which we call instinct the actions which we class as
,
instinctive a r e due to transmitted habits actions

, ,
performed s o invariably during countless generations ,
that though at r st performed with consciousness

,
and discovered by a tentative process they are at ,
last performed unconsciously and S pont a n eously for ,
instance the action o f the young o f mam m alia seek

ing the breast Instinctive actions include both reex
.
and consensual nervous actions ; those are instinctive

which appear t o be performed fo r a purpose i n order ,
to an e n d but yet without apparent kn owledge o r

,
perception of the end fo r which they are done o r in ,
which the kn owledge o f the end is not the moti ve o f

the action The terms in stinct and instinctive are
.
thus popular rather than scientic ; they are the r e

s ul t s of a crude and not an exact theory o f the phe
n o m e n a to which they are applied ; and it was thi s
character of an end being sought blindl y and without ,
apparent knowledge o f it which attracted attention

, ,
and caused the phenomena to be attributed t o some

divine o r supernatura l o r un known power ; a power
which inspir ed the action as it were i n its o w n supe
, ,
rior wisdom and knowledge o f what was tting and

requisite for the ends o f nature And what reason is .
there again st supposing that a mode o f cognition as

T HE O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNITI ONS
well as a mode o f action h a s in this way become

habitual and functional ? N othing o r very little is
indeed known o f the pr ocess which takes place in the
nervous matter o f the brain in consciousness ; but
it i s impossible t o suppose that consciousness takes
place wi thout action o r movement o f some sort in
the nervous matter It has been Shown I n the last
.
chapter that movement is an all pervading pheno -
menon belonging to the kingdom o f objects though ,
not an ultimate element o f objects The movements .
to which some cogni tion s a re attached may fo r aught ,
that i s known to the contrary and in accordance ,
with much which is known have become habitual,
and functional s o that the cogni tions attached to

,
them may share in their habitu a l that is their func , ,
t i o na l nature ; o r t o put it in another light that par t ,
o f the movement essential to cogni tion which is a

p ,
ro ri a t e d t o the formal part f the cogn ition may

p p o ,
be the same i n all c a ses o f cogn ition and then the ,
cognitions attached o r resulting n a mely tim e and , ,
space will derive their uni versal o r functiona l p r o

,
perty from this part o f the movement

.
.
The thir d theory I will put in the form o f a s ug

gestion The bra in h a s been singled o ut a s the cause
.
o f the conscious li f e o f the empiric a l e o yet n o t in

g ,
isolation without the concurrence o f and action and

, ,
reaction with other objects but in such a sense that

, ,
the entrance o r addition o f a brain to other obj ects

completes the series o f circumstances o n the comple
tion o f which the conscious li fe arises Both the con .
s t i t u t i o n o f the brain and that o f other objects are
contributors to the existence o f the conscious life with

its properties such as have been described N ow it .
is well known that the nerves o f the special senses

21 6 TH E O R I G I N OF TH E C O GNI TI ONS
of the nervous matter togeth er with t h e

c o n s t i t II t i o n
constitution o f the Object perceived ; that a sound o r

light shall be perceived depends upon the nerve that ,
it shall be such and such a sound o r light depends

upon the object M ay not the same hold good in the
.
case o f the formal element in the same perceptions ?

Why should w e attribute the appearance o f sensations
in the forms o f time and space solely to the object ,
and not also to the constitution o f the nerve ? It is

true that the time and the space occupied by percep
tions in the brain are not the same as the time and
the Space occupied by those same perceptions in the
rest o f the world o f qualities ; in a short moment of
consciousness we can represent to ourselves a year a ,
century or an age ; in a short moment o f conscious

,
ness and in a small portion o f nervous matter the ,
surface o f the retina w e can present to ourselves a

,
large portion o f the expanse of heaven ; in a short life

time and in a conned abode we can reproduce and ,
even produce in imagination the perceptions of a ,
great par t o f the worlds o f hi story and astronomy .
But may not the same conception hold good here

which held good in the case o f the matter o f percep
tions ? M ay it not depend o n the constitution o f the
nervous matter that we have ti me and Space at all in
o u r perceptions and on the particular constitution o f
,
the objects perceived that we have thi s and that size ,
length gure and order in the perceptions ? It is

, ,
true that if we consider the perceptions as they exist

,
in t h e brain the relations o f the time and the space

,
which they occupy there to the tim e and the space

occupied by them in the rest of the world O f qual ities
have not beendetermin ed ; that though the time they ,
occupy in the brain i s deni te yet the s pace is inde

,
O F T IM E AND S PAC E . 21 7
nite except in the cases o f the extremities o f the

nerves o f Sight and touch But the same may b e .
said of the sensations or matter o f perceptions ; i n the

bra i n thes e are indeni te and irrespective o f the par
,
t i c ul a r sensations o f particular obj ects ; the nerve

constitution supplies only a limit t o the kind that , .
is to the variations o f the particular obj ective sensa

,
tions So a l so the brain can be conceived as supplying

.
a limit to the kind o r to the variations o f the par t i

c ul a r S ize gure length a n d* o r d e r in time and space
, , , , ,
o f the perceptions of Obj ects The constitution o f t h e.
brain as p ossessing extension and duration deter

, ,
mines that obj ects shall ap pear as possessing time a n d

space relations wh ile the constitution o f the objects
, ,
in the rest o f the world of qualities outside the brain ,
determines what partic ul ar relations these shall be , .
Thus the time and space and qualities o r matter

o f Obj ects come equally from within equally from ,
without the bra i n ; and owe their origin equ a l ly to

,
the constitution o f the brain equally t o the c o n s t i t u ,
tion o f other objects This being supposed to be their

.
rst o r1 g1 n I n the conscious lif e of the empirical e go ,
room is then left fo r the habit o f t h e rst theory a n d

the inheritance o f the second t o operate to continue ,
the work and to give the sense o f necessity to these

,
elements of perceptions But the question o f origin

.
i n the conscious life o f conditions o f existing o f both

,
elements forma l and material since both elements

,
'
are equ a l ly necessary should be decided by analogy

,
.
If the material element is due partly to the c o n s t i t u

tion o f the brain irrespective o f other objects it is ,
accordin g to analogy to suppose that the formal ele

ment is s o too ; and that objects appear in conscious
ness in the conscious life o f the empirical ego as
, ,
21 8 O R I G IN OF TH E C O G NITI ONS OF TI ME AND S PAC E .
extended not onl y because they have extension them

,
selves but partly because the nervous matter has

,
extension ; that they appear as having duration partly

because the nervous matter as well as the objects , ,
has duration It i s more according to analogy t o

.
suppose the cogni tions o f tim e and space coev a l with

the conscious life because the nervous matter in which
,
it arises occupies time and space than to suppose t h e ,
conscious life s o far as relates to the form o f its per

,
c e t i o ns
p ,
existing rst a s a tabula rasa o r sheet o f
whi te paper which is rst mo di ed and written o n

,
from without ; for the nervous matter in which it

arises is n o t such a tabul a rasa but has both form ,
a n d duration O r if the gure o f a tab ul a rasa is

.
adhered to it ought to be employed with the addition

,
o f a

per impossibile for even a tabula rasa has ex
, ,
tension and duration Indeed it appears to be i m p o s

.
sible to suppose conscious lif e arisin g in a n e xtended

and enduring material substance and yet arising not ,
mo di ed o r c o nditioned by the pro perties o r modes

o f that substance as well as by the objects which
,
excite that substance t o reaction .

220 PRE S ENTATI O N AND R E PR ESENTA TI ON .
laws but the laws o f i t s nature as exhibited in the

,
combination o f its elements and I n the history o r ,
progress o f its development ; the general and some

times the universal laws to which its combinations
and its development anywhere and everywhere are
found to conform .
The empirical ego is t h e complex o f all feeli n gs

o r states o f consciousness as distinguished by r e e c
,
tion from the qualities which are their obj ective

aspect These states o f consciousness are either di
.
rect o r reective perceptions o r they may contain ,
both direct percep t ion and reection R eections or .
reective processes in consciousness are therefore

themselves part o f the empirical ego and the objects ,
o f a further reection ; they hold two positions bear ,
two characters rst as phenomena o f the empirical

,
ego states o f consciousness simply o r direct percep

, ,
tions second as processes o f reection inasmuch as

, ,
their Objects are other states o f consciousness which

have preceded them In the present chapter abstrae
.
tion will be made o f this their second character or ,
their character as reective and they will be con ,
s i d e r e d onl y in their rst character a s direct percep

.
tions o r s tates of consciousness The eighth chapter

:
will be devoted to consider them in thei r character

o f reective processes It must be remembered that
.
investigation like the present is itself an exercise

o f reection .
The empiric a l e go must o n the other hand for .

.
the purposes o f the present enquiry be disti n guished ,
from objects as qualities which do not enter into it as

feeli n gs The body to which the consciousness of
.
,
the empirical ego belongs enters into it as a complex ,
of feelings a n d a s such is combined wit h every o ne o r

, ,
PRESENTATI ON A ND R E PR ESENTATI ON . 221
nearly every one o f its stat e s o f consciousness ; but

,
the brain which is the cause of its conscious life does

not do s o ; it may be represented in some unf requent
states o f its consciousness but it is not commonly pre
,
sent as a feeling in the empirical ego It is uni ver .
sally present as a contributing cause o f the existence

and continuance and its changes are present a s con
,
tributing causes o f the changes o f the feelings in the ,
empirical ego ; but this is a fact known by in ference ,
and when we draw this inf erence o r examine the con

n e c t i o n between the brain and the empiric a l ego that ,
is reason psychologically o r as psychologists then

, ,
rst the brain is present as a feeling and an obj ect o f

representation The brain therefore as a complex of
.
,
qualities has no more to do with the analysis Of the

,
combination and development o f the feelings o f the

empirical ego than the air we breathe o r the food
, ,
we eat o r the earth we stand o n ; all these are parti

,
c ul a r objects o f the empirical ego necessary t o its ,
existence indeed but forming an innitesimal part of

,
the complex o f its feelings To make these into o b .
j ects o f enquiry in enquiri ng into the empirical ego

, ,
woul d involve giving a history o f the objects o f con

s c i o u sn e s s in a l l its branches such as astronomy , ,
geology civil political and philosophical history

, , , ,
chemistry a n atomy physiology and s o o n But it

, , ,
.
is the laws o f development o f the empir ic a l ego not ,
the history o f that development whi ch is the pur ,
pose o f the remainder o f this E ssay Leaving then .
the brain and its connection with consciousn e ss apart ,
I shall endeavour to exhibit a n accurate picture o f

t h e complex o f feelings presented o r represented in
the empirical ego .
O f t h e four things di s tinguished from each other

22 PRESE NTA TI ON AND R E PR ESENT ATI ON .
in the empi rica l ego has no w been distin

2 2 , o ne , ,
u i s h e d more at length from t w o o f the others the

g ,
S ubject o r reection as such a n d t h e brain ; the

,
fourth is the world o f q u a h t i e s which is in fact the ,
objective aspect o f the empiric a l e go The world .
o f qu a l ities and the world o f feelings are identical .
There is no division between t w o Objects the feeling ,
here the quality there ; but both a r e the same It

,
.
is nevertheless with t h e subjective aspect o nl y that

we have to do here ; though it might appear that ,
since both were the same it would be indiff erent,
whi ch aspect should be chosen fo r examination It .
is not in di fferent for this reason In their subjective

,
.
aspect objects can be presented in their rst i nt e n

tion as they are t o consciousness alone without re
, ,
ference to their relations t o any other objects ; the

same Objects as qualities are very often incapable o f
being presented in their rst intention and without a ,
reference to their causes o r e ffects o r some other r e

, ,
lation to other Objects Th e ultimate analysis o f any

.
object will a l ways be fo und presented in the form o f

a feeling and no t o f a quality ; when any quality is
named there will always the further question arise
,
And what is that ? The answer wi l l be a feeling .
Heat is a quality ; it may be a n alysed into motion ,
and a particular ki n d o f motion o r combination o f

motions is heat ; that is o n e kind o f motion is p r o
,
d uc e d by another o r composed o f others and the rst ,
kind o f motion heat when described a s s o produced

, ,
o r composed is described by a second intention

, Heat .
in its rst intention however when it is so pro

, ,
d u c e d what is it ? The onl y answer possible is that

, ,
it is heat as a feeli ng Beyond this w e cannot go

. .
The subjective aspect includes the objective in it ,

224 PRESENTATI ON AND R E PR ESENT A TI ON .
the latter is no perfect correlate o f the former The .
dictum is undeniably true but it does not for all

,
that destroy the correlation The subtilty of nature

.
is a fact o f inference and representation wherever it

has not been completely fathomed and perceived by ,
o r translated into the subtilty o f the intellect there

, ,
it is inferred and represented as existing and as ,
remaining to be some day perhaps perceived and

fathomed It exists no doubt ; a n d exists as an
.
inference and a representation not yet translated ,
into subjectivi ty in its completeness The existing .
subtilty of the in tellect is far inferior to this r e p r e

sented subtilty of nature ; but on the other hand the ,
subtilty o f the intellect completely adequate to the

,
subti lty of nature exists also in representation and

,
by inference onl y that it is referred to the future as

, ,
that of nature to the past and the present Some .
day o r other all the subtilties o f nature will be per

c ei ve d
,
and the subtilty of the intellect brought up
to a correlation with them Both subtilties are i n
.
fe r e n c e s and representations only o n e is represented

,
as past and present the other as future The pre

,
.
sent degree O f subtilty Of the intellect is cert am far

inferior to the present inferred and represented
, ,
subtilty o f nature ; and man is regarded as the dis

coverer o f a previously existing object ; and in this
sense the di ctum o f Bacon is true without doing any ,
vi olence to the conception of the perfect correlation
o f the two aspects o f phenomena .
Since the world of q ua h t i e s is the correlate o f the

world o f feelings and the general laws of both are
,
under examination if any general laws of one of the

,
two correlates are discovered they must also appear

,
.
a s general laws o f the other There cannot be

.
PR ESENT A T I ON A ND R E PRESEN TAT I O N . 225
general laws of consciousness which a re not general

laws of Objects ; and this it wi ll be found there are ,
and that they bear both characters objective and ,
subjective Since however these laws are discovered

.
by reasoning the proper place for their statement

,
will be when the reasoning process is examined that ,
is in the chapter on voluntary re di ntegration E very

,
.
universal law o f consciousness is also an universal law

o f objects ; and every law o f obj ects universal in a ,
particular eld such as chemistry o r mechanics is

, ,
also an u ni versal law o f consciousness when occupied

in that eld P resentative perceptions are the source
.
from which all others are derived and from th e ir ,
vivid and inevitable nature they give the law to

all others Y et they are no t entirely constant and
.
unch a ngeable ; on the contrary they are capable of

,
modication by representative perceptions to which

they have themselves given birth Two kingdoms .
thus arise o ne Of Objects presented and represented

, , ,
considered a s constant and unmodied whether pre ,
v i o u s to o r in consequence o f mo di cation ; the other
Of objects presented and represented considered as

, ,
subj ect to o r in course o f modication ; the rs t

, ,
is what is commonly meant by the term laws o f

nature the second is what is commonly meant by
,

the term man s empire over nature It wo ul d be .
more correct to call the rst the world as it is at

any particular moment ; and to call the second the
world as it might be o r as capable o f modi cation in
,
certain ways The second is entirely subordi n ate to

.
the rst for the very circumstances and laws which

, ,
constitute and govern the modication o f the world ,
are circumstances and laws which belong to and are ,
part o f the world as it actually is P resentative and

, .
Q
226 PR ESE NT ATI ON A ND R E PR ESENT ATI ON .
representative perceptions inseparably mingled to ,
gether constitute one u ni verse of qualities and o f

,
feelings o n e universe governed by laws under which

,
it functionates in one unchangeable course but in ,
the bosom of which and among those very laws , ,
there are found some which mo di fy the Operations

performed under the guidance o f others ; and since ,
the proportion o f the latter s e t of laws is small in

comparison to the former s e t the latter appear to b e ,
changers of the general order o f the u ni verse ; the

truth being that the laws which govern the entir e
,
order o f the universe embrace both sets o f laws both ,
the modifying and the modied ; and this order of

the universe this unchangeableness Including change
, ,
it is which alone deserves the title o r can be ex

, ,
pressed i n the terms o f universal and necessary laws ,
o f t h e world o f empirical objects .
The change and modication here s a i d to be i n

t r o d u c e d into the world as it actually is at any par ,
t i c ul a r time is n o t the change o r mo di cation o f o n e

,
s e t of objec t s i n nature by another s e t such as for ,

,
instance the change introduced into the nature o f

,
plants o r ani mals by transplantation into different

soil climate o r circumstances ; or such as the change
, ,
introduced into inorganic matter by the implanting

o f organi c matter o r vice vers a

o r the evolution of
,
force o r motion Of o n e kind from force o r motion o f

another kind and the reaction o f the o ne o n the
,

other A l l such cases o f change however striking

.
, ,
are instances o f the reg ul ar and general course o f

nature of the rst o f the two sets of laws mentioned
,
above The distinction here intended between those

.
two sets of laws t h e c h a nge apparently e ffected in

'
the form er by the latter is a change an d a di stinction ,

228 P R E S ENT AT I ON A ND R E P R E SE NTA TI ON .
o ffeelings has been described as a whole composed

,
o f presentations and representations of sensations

mingled together But there are certain feelings
.
which arise and are presented to consciousness rst

in the representation o f objects of sensation external
and internal These are the emotions O n their
. .
rst arising they are presented but they arise rst ,
in the representation of obj ects o f sensation When .
we begin therefore with objects o r the world Of s e n

, ,
sation we soon come to a point namely the r e p r e

, , ,
s e n t a t i o n o f i t s objects where feelings o f a new order

,
enter into consciousness ; and these though presented , ,
yet belong t o representation if representation is taken

,
to mean repres e ntation o f the world o f sensation .
These new presentations the emotions give a new

, ,
c haracter to the world of obj ects F irst the r e p r e

.
s e n t a t i o n s in which they arise are modied by them ,
and then indirectly future presentations of objects of

sense are modied a l so ; such presentations o f obj ects
o f sense as are not in harmony with the emotions are
destroyed o r avoided and such as are in harmony

,
with them are produced o r procured It is necessary .
to take a view o f the classes o f the material element

.
in cognition in order to se e the bearing o f the fol

,
lowing enquiry .
F eelings were divided i n 1 2 into sensations and

, ,
emotions and the former into sensations o f deni te

,
organs and sensations o f indeni te organs O f these .
three classes o f feelings emotions arise only in r e

,
presentation o f objects belonging to the other two

classes ; but this d oes not imply that they are com
pos ed of the feelings of those other classes How .
ever complex an emotion may be whether i t c a n be ,

e
analysed into simpler emotions o r not it c a i m o t be ,

PR ESENTA TI ON A ND R E PR ESENT AT I ON . 229
analysed into sensations ; nor can it be a nalysed into

sensations and imagination o f them as past o r future ,
probable o r improbable although perhaps imagina

,
tions o f this kind may be necess a ry as conditions o f

the arising o f the emotion ; for i nsta n ce the emotion
o f hope is very di fferent from the sensation o f health ,
o r any other pleasure o f sensation combined with the,
expectation of enjoying it ; the feeling which we c a l l

hope is something different from this though it may ,
arise immediately and be inseparable from it The .
same may be said o f desire and aversion o f love , ,
anger fe a r and I believe o f a l l t h e feelings which

, ,
we c a ll emotions and passions The same i s true of

.
moral approbation and di sapprobation o f others and ,
o f a good and bad conscience in ourselves .
There are two other feel i ngs o r mo di cation s o f

,
feeling which accompany o r can accompany all o th e rs

, ,
whether sensation s o r emotions and arise in di fferently

,
in presentation and representation o f sensibl e obj e cts ,
I mean the feelings called pleasure and pain If .
these arise in presentation and accompany sens a tions ,
they are commonl y but to the confusion o f a l l a c

,
curate thought called physical pleasure o r pai n ; if

,
in representation accompanyi ng emotions they a re

, ,
commonly called but with equ a l conf usion as a couse

,
q u e n c e mental or moral pleasure o r pain

,
E very feel.
ing if it has a certain considerable degree o f inten sity ,
o r if it lasts fo r a certain considerable length o f time is ,
accompani e d by the feelin g o f pleasure o r o f pain ; and

even a feelin g accompanied by pleasure if it attains ,
a certain further degree of i ntensity o r lasts fo r a ,
longer time begins to be accompani ed by pain ; and

,
the pleasure and pain which accompany o ther feel

,
ings are so m ixed with them that they seem t o mak e

,
23 0 PRESENTA TI ON AND R E PR ESE NTA TI O N
but o ne complex feeling ; a n d this might lead us to

suppose that all feelings were but modes o f pleasure
and pain, were not this forbidden b y the difference in
kind which is always observa ble between the m by
analysis P leasure a nd pain never are Observed pure
.
,
that is separate from other elements o f feeling toge

, ,
ther with which they compose a complex feeli n g ; to

separate them in thought from other feelings is to
represent them in a p rovisional image o f which the ,
other fe e h ngs are the parts abstracted from and pro

v i d e d for .
P leasure and pain a r e the bo undary line between

cognition and emotion for some sensations are with
,
o ut pl e asure and pain but no emotions are s o

,
E mo .
tion may be dened as feeling a rI s m g I n representa

tion invol ving pleasure o r pain Those feelings which
,
.
are no t accompani ed by pleasure o r pain belong to

cognitio n and not to emotion C ognition extends .
over all feelings whatever ; feeling extends over all

cognitions what e ver ; but the addition o f pleasure o r
pain to feelin gs ( and it must be remembered that all
feelings may be accompanied by pleasure and pain )
makes o f feeli n gs two classes o n e class to which i n
,
t e r e s t attaches the other to which interest does not

,
These two classes o f feelings and cognitions ,
distinguished from each other by the presence o r

absence o f pleasure and pain in presentation and o f ,
interest in representation ( fo r interest is represented

plea sure and p ain ) are the resp ective contents of
,
speculation and practice ; and the distinction between

these two classes is the ground o f the distinction b e
tween the t wo domains o f speculative a n d practical
kno wledge All action operation function c o n si
.
'
, , ,
dered 118 8 series o f circumstances o r events leads us

1 .
,
23 2 PRESENT A T I ON A ND R E PR ESENTAT I ON .
best policy hon esty which is an ultimate end is als o

,
useful that is productive o f certain tangible a d v a n

, ,
tages ; but this is n o t i t s claim to our esteem And .
it is I n vam to apply the logic of utility here and to ,
sa
y that the claim of honesty to o ur esteem is i t s util
ity in p r o d uc m g an approvin g conscience for hon esty ,
does not produce but is such an approvi ng consci

ence t h e happy fram e o f m i n d called an approving
,
conscience is included in the state o f m i nd called

honesty ; that i s there is no more desirable state o f
,
mind produced by honesty than honesty itself ; not

what it produces o r leads to but what it is is what, ,
the v a l ue o f honesty and o f all ultimate ends consists

in S O again with P rayer The logic o f utili ty h a s
. .
been applied to prayer and it has been argued that

, ,
if prayer does no t produce rain o r sunshine it is of ,
no va l ue ; o r again that if it only produces a n e ffect

,
in the mind o f the person praying it i s either useless ,
o r useless and hypocritic a l both But the truth is .

,
that prayer is a state o f m i nd which is valua b le fo r

its o w n sake o r as an ultimate end ; and instead o f
,
asking what it is useful t o prod uce the question ,
ought to be what it is in its ana lysis and its worth

, ,
determ i ned accordin gly U tility implies that all ends

.
are subordinate whereas some are ultimate In

,
.
t e r e s t is a term which i n cludes both and which is ,
therefore coextensive with the term P ractice in i t s

widest sense To judge o f objects which are ul ti
.
mate ends like honesty and prayer; by the properties

,
.
they possess of producing other objects to which as ,
produc i n g them they are subordinate whether those ,
other objects are more o r less noble than themselves ,
is to judge them by an inadequate and therefore a

misleading standard ; from which I may add the , ,
PR ES E N TA T I ON A ND R E PR ESENT AT I ON . 23 3
application o f the distinction o f rst and second i nt e n

tions would have s aved us Y et the term U tility .
would be legitimate instead o f Interest if we could ,
adopt a theory o f consciousness being o n e thing and

its Objects another thing in kind ; for then a l l Objects
o f consciousness might be represented as existing for
the sake o f something else n amely Of consciousness

, ,
itself .
Here then in Interest is the great boundary line

, ,
between E thic and M etaphysic between practic a l ,
and Speculative knowledge It is n o t coincident

.
with the distinction between the formal and material

elements o f cognition ; if it were o ur systems would ,
be much si mpler but as it is they are perhaps better

,
morticed their parts ly ing over o n e another as brick

,
layers lay their bricks ; but the di stinction between

S peculative and practical knowledge falls a h t t l e o n
the material side o f the distinction between the for
m a l and the materi a l element P leasure and pain .
,
o r interest almost universal modes of feeling are the

, ,
boundary line wi thin which all practical knowledg e

consists ; the little more which speculation possesse s
over and above practice the feelin gs which d o not
,
contain pleasure o r pai n is the circumstance which

,
assures Speculation its supremacy over practice a ,
supremacy the same in kind as that which the ju

d i c i a l functions have over the admi nistrative in a
well ordered state a supremacy which we justify to
-
,
o u r imag i nation by the epithets of calm disinterested , ,
unimpassioned reason All emotion li es within o r

.
,
o n the
'
practical side o f this boundary line and
,
while all practical knowledge is also theoretical ther e ,
is a small part o f theoretical knowledge whi ch is not

practic a l namely feelings which do no t contain plea
, ,
23 4

P R ESENTA TI ON A ND R E PR ESE NTA TI ON .
sure or pain origi n ally o r from which they have been

,
:
purged P utting this small class o f feelings aside and

.
,
using it only to remin d us that there is such a thing

,
as perfectly disin terested cognition though I am ,

-
far from doing such a contradi ctory thing as hol di n g

that such perfectly disinterested cognition is an ideal
to be admi r ed o r aim ed a t ; con tradictory I hold it

,
.
because it would be adopting as an ideal an opinion

which condem n s adoptin g ideals at all for what is an ,
ideal but a conception to which the greatest degree

o f interest is attached keeping then this small por

tion o f feelin gs in mind only as a proof that specula

tive knowledge has a wider foundation than practical ,
and comparing together the two domains o f specula

tive and practic a l knowledge the two elements which ,
each contai ns are found to be the same in kind ma ,
t e ri a l and formal but the material element i n prae

,
tical knowledge is always considered s o far onl y as

it contains o r consists o f pleasure pain o r interest , ,
.
P ractical knowledge is Spec ul ative knowledge the .
material element o f which contain s and s o far as ,
it contains pleasure pain o r interest

, ,
Specula
, .
tive kn owledge is practical knowledge abstracting

from that part o f its material element That is .
to s a y all knowledge is both speculative and prae

,
tical in two d ifferent respects ; all knowledge has

,
a speculative aspect and a practical aspect each a l ,
ways a t the least provisionally present in the other .
In the proportion which the two elements hold to

each other in any moment o f consciousness that is , ,
in the pr oportion which the feeli n gs o f pleasure and

'
pain hold to the feelings i n which p leasure and p ain

a r e abstracted f rom and vi ce vers a in that propor
, ,
tion wi ll the moment o f consciousness be r eckoned
.
23 6 PR ESENTA TI ON A ND R E PR ESENTA TI ON .
o fe ffort in cognition is called Attent ion and t h e ,
q ua h t
y which corresponds to it in the Object i s
strangeness or Incomprehensibility ; when we call any

thing strange o r incomprehensible we mean to assert ,
that it would take a greater o r less degree o f atten

tion t o make it harmonise with o ur previous know
ledge o r that it would take more attention than w e
,
could give to it i n order t o make it do s o

,
G ene .
rally then i t may be said that all phenomena what , ,
ever other feelings they consist o f include o r may ,
include the feeling o f effort as well as those o f ,
pleasure and pain a n d that even the simplest states

o f consciousness are originally o r may become ; in
their material elements highly complex The aris ,

.
ing of the sense o f effort in any object i s the arisin g

o f the phenomenon o f attention P revious to thi s .
the object was confused and Obscure ; it now begins

to become disti nct and clear The difference between .
these two stages consists in the addition o f a feeling ,
the sense o f effort a part o f the material element o f

,
the obj ect which thus is differentiated and developed

,
.
Why such a process o r such an addition takes place

at all is not to be explained but must be regarded as ,
an ultimate fact in consciousness li ke many others ,
inexplicable an ultim ate element in analysis o f the

,
phenomena It is probable besides that this sense o f

.
effort never arises but when accompanied and never ,
ceases but when it ceases to be accompanied by ,
pleasure pain o r interest E very object o f percep

, ,
.
tion contains both o r neither T o attend to any .
object o r any sensation supposes either that I feel

pleasure in it o r that I feel forced to attend to it by
,
l
the pain it causes yet in both cases without having

a distinct purpose in View either the purpose o f re ,
PR ESENTA T I ON A ND R E PR ESENTA TI ON . 23 7
taining and increasin g the pleasure o r that o f r e m o v ,
ing a n d lesseni ng the pain When there is such a .
distinct purpose in Vi ew it is a nal cause of the a t

,
tention and such attention may be designated by the

,
name voluntary as distinguished from the original

,
and spontaneous attention out o f which it S prang .
Besides the feelings already mentioned there is ,
the formal element to be taken i nto account ; and

then we shall have before us the entire obj ect o f re
e c t i o n the empirical ego the world o f feelings both
, , ,
p resentations and representations exhaustively de ,
scribed in its general outlines This yet remains to .
be done by showing the mode i n which presentations

,
and representations are combined so as t o form new ,
and more complex obj ects ; The same formal elements

which presentations and representations separately
cont a i n the same formal elements which hold them
,
together before combination with each other these ,
same formal elements time and space perform the

, ,
same of ce for them when they are combined N 0 .
categories o f the understanding except s o far a s time ,
and space themselves a r e such are required to c o m ,
bine presentations and representations into new o b

je c ts
.
26 It was said in
. 1 0 that a l l perception and ,
consequently all representative perception involved ,
combination o r synthes is and that all the more com

,
plex perceptions involved comparison A s we have .
now before us all the elements o f representation we ,
are in a position to enquire into this point When I .
s e e before me a variously coloured surface and regard
it with attention, xing my View now on o ne part ,
n ew o n another I represent o n e part while another is

,
being presented ; if I recall sensations of touch at the

23 8 PR ESE NTA TI ON A ND RE PR ESE NTA TI O N .
CH I V
same time and combine them with the sensations o f
Si I n three d i mens i ons

.
ght ,
the surface appears and
,
s es .
Th
gjgp g
breaks up into objects separate I n space and at dif
g
r t e e
a m
fe r e nt distances from the eye and from each other ,
and the entire surfa ce becomes a n object o f r e p r e s e n

t a t i o n as well as presenta tion it i s presented to S ight ,
and represented to touch N o w in the process s o .
described there are two stages ; rst the visible sur

face is partly presented and partly represented when ,
I traverse it in different directions with the eye ; s e

c o nd l it is represented to touch while presented to
y ,
sight I n both stages comparison is involved In

. .
the rst stage suppos e red in one part o f the surface

, ,
is separated from red in another part o f the surface

by a bright light ; the red in two places is perceived
as red in each o f them and the sensation of red is ,
di stinguished from the sensation o f the bright light

between the two places Instead of three moments .
o f sensation red light red there arise two red and

, , , , ,
light ; that i s , the red in one place and the red in the
other are classed a s the same sensation It makes no .
difference whether I s e e the two places o f red o r r e ,
call o ne while I s e e the other or recall them both ; ,
there is no difference in the sensation there is differ ,
ence only i n t h e p l a c e o r in the ti me and place toge

'
ther N 0 category or concept o f u ni ty o r sameness

.
is here applied ; t h e surface is d istinguished di fference ,
is introduced into it by the diff erence in the material

,
element in the sensations o f red and o f light T h e

, .
perception of the sensation red in two places is the

rst foundation o f the notion Of sameness Where is .
the di fferen ce ? In t h e sensations o f r e d a n d of light

.
Where is the samene s s ? In the sensation o f red in

two place s There is no sameness in the sensation
, .
24 0 PRESENTA TI ON AND R E PR ESENTA TI O N .
PART I . position o f the mate rial element that is in its relation , ,
to other sensations in S pace there is unity in kind and

,
difference i n position that is there is sameness Thus

, ,
.
the concept Sameness rst arises as a consequence , ,
not a condition o f the process ; and the process which

,
ends with classication is called diagnosis o r compari

s o n a putting asunder different sensations and putting
,
together similar sensations .
In the second stage o f the process also a compa

rison takes place Suppose the surface seen t o be an
.
open window with two red curtains on either side o f

it The parts of the surface which I can touch sup
.
,
pose o n e o f the curtains I have presented to two

,
senses ; two sensations characterise that portion o f

the surface and di stinguish it from the other por
,
tions ; I now move and touch the other curtain that ,
is after certain other muscular sensations I nd the

,
other red portion of the surface become distin guished

by sens ations o f touch and sensations o f touch o f the
,
same kind as those distinguishing the other curtain .
An d from the place where I now am I can repeat the

same experience with regard to the rst curtain The .
two curtain s then become by comparison the same in

every thing except in position in space But the .
light between them either cannot be touched o r if I ,
put my hand o ut I nd sensations either of warmth

o r cold o r wind or rain very different from the s e n
, , ,
s a t i o n s o f the curtains Still the open space is part

.

o f the visible surface a u d i f it does not contain sen

i
,
s a t i o ns o f touch it c o n t a i n s s e n s a t i o n s O f sight
,
N ot .
withstanding the difference of the sensations in dif

fe r e n t parts of the visible surface these parts are all ,
alike in point o f containing sensations ; th ere is same

ness between all the parts in this respect and unity ,
PRE SENTAT I ON AND R E PR ESENTA T I ON .

24 1
o f the entire surface o r object Thus the second .
stage is a repetition o f the same process o f compa

rison a s before onl y with sensations o f two senses
,
instead o f with sensations o f o ne sense And I think .
it wi ll be adm itted that if this explanation is val id

,
for the c a ses now examined it i s valid a l so for cases ,
in which the material element is more various for ,
cases where the material element includes sensations

o f the de ni tely known organs o f the indeni tely ,
kn own organs and feeli n gs which arise rst in the

,
representation o f thes e sensations All these form .
complete states o f consciousness portions o f time ,
a n d portions o f space occupied by di fferent feelings .
Anger fo r instance is a state o f consciousness in

, ,
which a certain series o f objects and events are r e p r e

sented which bear the character o r q ua h t y o f being
,
unjust cruel painful o r the li ke The emotion is

, , ,
.
combi ned with the representation and makes a part ,
o f it correspondin g in consciousness to some quality

,
o r c i rc umstance represented as existin g in the events
o r causes o f them If this circumsta n ce o r this qua

.
,
l i t y is separable from the events and in proportion

, ,
it is separable from them the emotion o f anger ,
ceas es or remits .
The same remarks apply to phenomena which o c

c u
py time alone the only difference being that here
n early a l l the sensations are represented whereas in ,
S pace a great number are presented at once An .
instance o f representation of objects both in time and

space at once and o n a large scale is Gibbo n s treat
, ,
ment o f the history o f the D ecli ne and F a l l o f t h e

R oman E mpire He there represents events not
.
in the order o f their actual occurrence but o f their ,
af nities for each other relating separately several

,
R
242 PRESENTA TI ON AND R E PRESENTATI ON
series o f events which occurred si multaneously and ,
disintegrating the o n e comp lex cable o f events into

many strands But this is a process which req
.
a prelimi nary exami n ation o f the original complex

series in order to discover which are the events which
,
belong to each separate strand ; and this is only pos

sible by Observation of the Similarities and di ssimilari
ties in the material element of the events themselves .
War religion wealth law race and so o n become

, , , , , ,
the heads under which the events are classied a c ,
cording as they contai n elements which p r e d o m i

n a nt l
y bear upon such and such feelings o r emotions
in mankind .
O bjects are phenomena combined in time and

space whether the material element is o f o n e kind
,
o r more than o n e O ne feeling i n time o r in time

.
,
and space makes an object ; and a l so any number o f

,
feelings combined i n that is considered as occupy

, ,
ing one portion o f time o r o n e portion o f time and

,
Space together is o n e object also ; but these two

,
cases require distinction for in the former case the

,
Object is simple and indecomposable empirically in ,
the latter case it is empirically but perhaps provi ,
s i o n a ll decomposable into simpler obj ects o f which

y ,
it is the aggregate The former may be c a lled the i m

.
m ediate the latter the remote object

,
In the former .
case the materia l element limits the formal ; in the

,
latter case the forma l element already lim i ted by o n e

, ,
o f the material elements which it con t ains i s the lim i t

,
to within which other material ele m ents are referred .
Take any feeling in a certain time and sp a ce and then ,
s e e what other feelings are contained in those boun
darics ; in this way a remote object arises Take the .
time and the spac e s o lim i ted and contrast it with

244 PRESENTA TI ON AND RE PR ESENTATI ON .
o f
the emotion o f aversion but this quality and the
,
OH I V
. .
aversion are o n e and the same thing o ne arises and ,
ceases and remits as t h e other does This will p ro .
bably be met by a denial and instances brought such

, ,
as that o f poison ; poison it will be said is i njurious

, ,
to my i n terest yet it does not inspire me with aver

,
sion unl ess I perceive it to be poison that is unless I , ,
perceive that it has this quality o f producing death .
This quality remains whether I perceive it o r not ,
whether I consequently feel aversion o r not whether ,
I consequently drink the mixture o r not Well let .

,
us examin e this insta n ce ; and I hope to be excused

if I dwell at some length o n it as such instances are ,
well adapted to s e t the relation of presentation and

representation and o f object to subject generally in
, ,
a clear light .
By q ua h t y is meant here as it has been through

,
out perceived quali ty The poisonous quality o f a

, .
potion when perceived is aversion in consciousness .
The e xistence o f the quali t y unperceived ( that is ,
imagined o r assumed only by us now and here for

the s a k e o f argument ) is not the cause o r at least ,
not the only cause o f its being perceived by the

,
person who is about to dr i nk the potion ; whatever

may be the cause o f the quality being perceived by
him when it i s perceived by him he feels aversion
, ,
and feels less aversion the less certain h e is that it i s

poisonous when h e is certain that it is n o t poisonous ,
he feels no aversion at a ll The question i s not as to

.
the expediency o f enquiring and feeling certain about

the existence o f the poison but as to the nature o f
,
the phenomenon o f the aversion when it arises The .
question is whether the perception o f t h e qu a lity o f

,
being poisonous i s the cause o f t h e emotion o f aver

PRESENTA TI ON AND RE PR ESEN TA T I ON .
s i on o r Whether t hat perception i s the objective

,
aspect o f the emotion The qu a l i ty o f bein g p o i

.
s o no u s is perceived in representatio n an odour o r ,
a colour presented is combined w ith a representation

o f a n injurious o r fatal e ffect o n the body ; o f cours e
it is highly important that I S hould s o represent it

( supposing it
~
to be poisonous ); it is highly important
that I S hould feel aversion and not drink the potion ;
but the onl y question here is about the connection
between the emotion o f aversion and the r e p re s e n
t a t i o n o f the potion presented as poisonous I ma i n .
tain that they are o ne and the same thing ; that it is

impossibl e t o have the representation and not t o feel
aversion and impossible t o feel aversion and n o t t o
,
have the representation o f some injurious qu a l ity If .
it is said that some people may have the representa

tion and not feel the aversion the answer is that if so
, , ,
it will be in consequence o f their having a representa

tion o f some overbalancing benet as for instance Of a ,
release from suffering by death The representation .
of the e ffect the potion will have o n the body is the

object o f which the emotio n is the subjective S ide
,
.
There is no other object but this representation ; ex

e ri e n c e o r the result o f drinking the potion has t o
p , ,
decide whether that representation was a true o n e ,
whether the object as presented will act in o ne way or

another ; if it produces death we then s a y that it b e
,
fore contained the poisonous qu a l ity and that the r e ,
presentation was true There is no other obj ect but

.
the representation If there is what is it ? The p o i

.
,
s o n o us qu a l ity itself But this is the Object o f the

.
representation o r the object a s represented Let us

,
.
examine this point We s a y that it w a s poisonous

.
after it has b een proved to be so But we speak .

24 6 PR ESENTA TI ON AND R E PR ESENTA T I ON .
proleptically if we s a y it
, p o l s o no us before the
poison i s represented a s contained i n it Suppos e .
Th the glass before us ; is it o r i s it not poisonous ?

a nd r e m o t e
That we can doubt about i t shows that it is no t pre
-
s ented as OI so n It i s then represented as such

p .
, ,
.
When it shall have produced death then we s a y that ,
it w a s poisonous all along ; a representation o f what

it has been not of what it i s even now presented a s
, , ,
.
The proleptical manner o f S peaking i s very common

and very convenient but in the o n e case it expresses
,
an anticip a tion even though there may be strongest

,
evidence in the other case a retrospection In both

,
.
cases the q u a h t y o f being poisonous i s an object o f

representation When we s a y that it is poison we
.
,
mean that it wil l be fol lowed in certain circumstances

by death The word is covers two meanings it
.

,
expresses either a fact o f presentation o r a fact o f r e

presentation and gives no distinguishi ng token a s to
,
w hich of these it is used to express The quality o f .
bei n g poisonous is a fact o f representation when i n ,
ferred before the fact o f producing death ; and how ,
ever certai n we may feel about i t we stil l are spe a k ,
ing by prolepsis if we s a y that the potion is poisonous ,
as if it were a fact o f presentation Aft er the fact o f .
death the quality is again inferred to have been pre

,
s ent as a cause o f the subsequent death a r e r e s e n

, p ,
t a t i o n again but o n e referred to the past time

,
The .
quali ty o f being poisonous is never a n object o f pre

s e nt a t i o n unl ess the poti on shoul d be seen i n the
,
operation o f producing death ; t his operation is that

o n which the whole business hinges .
E motions being attached to representations and
this admits o f no exception for suppose that we s a w ,
a murder committed before o ur eyes the horror felt ,

24 8 PRESENTATI ON AND R E PRESENTAT I ON .
p l exi t i e s o a c ombatant as
f what to be the parti
wi l l J
-
c ul a r events which will occur in obedience t o general
laws ; but into the nature and proceedings o f c o n

s c i o u s n e s s generally in the empirical ego irrespective
, ,
o f what others may know about them It is perfectly

.
true that to a third person the opi nions and feelings

, ,
o f another man are more uncertain and less capable
o f prediction than many facts in physical nature ; and
generally speaking objective quali ties a r e more easy

o f pr ediction than subj ective feeli n gs ; the history
and prediction o f things from the subjective side as ,
they will appear to another person ( the empirical

ego ) is a more complicated affair than the history
and prediction o f them as they w ill appear o r actually
are appeari ng as objects to the observer himself The .
observer has t w o sets o f objects before him the o h ,
e c t s or qualities o f nature perceived by h i mself and

j ,
the objects o r qualities o f nature perceived by another

man ; no wonder the emotions and representations ,
which belong to this second s e t o f objects appear ,
disconn ected from the qualities o f objects which b e

long to the rst s e t These t w o sets o f objects ought
.
never to have been compared together o r brought ,
into conn ection with each other ; nothing but c o n

fusion can result o r could possibly have resulted as
, ,
i n deed has been the case from such an ill ogic a l p ro

,
c e d ur e . The objects o f nature and the feelings o f

the mind as they are to o n e and the same in di vidual
, ,
are the object matter o f metaphysic that is o f t h e

-
, ,
branch o f knowledge o r enquiry which ai ms at i n v e s

t i ga t i ng the conn ection and relations o f consciousness
to objects o f knowledge to things known a nd o f
, ,
mi n d to the objective world We are then right in

judging o f emotions by sensations right in making

,
,
PR ESENTA T I ON A ND R E PR ESENTA T I ON . 24 9
b oth them objective a s well a s subjective ; but t h e

o f
error lies in as suming occult causes o r occ ul t quali ,
ties a s the gro und o f either N ot even in visible

,
.
and tangible objects is it possible to poin t o ut any

qualities which are no t resolvabl e into sensations
'
Both emotions and sensations a re the qualities o f

which they a re supposed t o be onl y the evidenc e and
So far the an alysi s o f representations c o n

as to
s i d e r e d a s complet e wholes completed moments o f,
consciousness o r complex objects The following

,
.
chapter will be devoted t o the process by which they

are produced the course o f their arising o r their
, ,
genesis ; y e t no t their psychologic a l a s di stinguished

from their metaphysic a l genesis no t their connection ,
with the tangible organ the brain and t h e change s

, ,
o r processes wh ich t a k e place in it ; no r yet the i r h i s
tory as an entire series e ither in the race o r in any

,
individual which would be the application o f meta

,
physic t o history ; but the princip le o f their genesis ,
t h e natur e o f the bond which is common t o all th a t ,
i s their metaphysic a l genesis o r analysis as states o f

, ,
consciousness dynam i c a lly a s members o f a succes ,
s ion o f moments ; in other words the conn ection and ,
relation o f moments o f consciousness to each other ,
not as in the present chapter the analysis o f them

, ,
s eparately and fo r themselves .
The moments o f consciousness form a series in ,
which each moment is an object contain ing feelings ,
o r qualities occupying a portion either o f time a l one

,
o r o f tim e and spac e together ; and this series o f
moments in their connection and concatenation with

,
each other will be t h e subject o f the following chap

,
ter I t i s true that the concat enation o f t h e mo ments

.
25 0 PR ESENTATI ON A ND R E PR ESEN TA TI ON .
o f cons c iousness depen ds o n that o f process e s o r mo

di c a t i o n s which take place in the tangible organ o f
Th consciousness the brain just as each moment o f con
,
a nd r e m o t e
,
s c i o u s n e s s by itself that is presentations and re r e

, , p
s e n t a t i o n s separately d epends upon states o r a state
,
c f the brain ; but to investigate this dependance b e

longs to psychology which i s in its earliest infancy
,
in this branch since nothing at all or very little is

,
yet discovered o f the condition o f the brai n either in

perception o r in re di ntegration o f perceptions The .
psychological causation o f redintegration I sh a l l leave

entirely aside and busy myself with attempting t o
,
discover the order in which moments o f conscious

ness a s such precede and follow each other s o far as ,
these consist o f representations and o f presentations

depending o n them ; for t o investigate the order in
whi ch the original presentations occur presentations ,
independent o f representation would be t o investi ,
gate the ul ti mate laws o f nature themselves These .
objects o f redintegration at least we are acquainted

with ; and if any invari able order can be discovered
in them we shall be entitled to call that phenomenon
,
which invariably precedes another its cause in con

s c i o u sn e s s ; and those phenomena which invariably
prece d e others that is to s a y that property o r quality
, ,
( whether belonging to the materi a l o r to the formal

elements o f the object ) which determin es what the
succeeding object shall be o r from knowing which
,
we can predict what the succee di ng object will be ,
that property in objects will be correctly designated

as their motive power i n consciousness or the ef cient ,
cause o f their redintegration This whole subject is .
commonl y known by t h e name o f the A ssociation of

Ideas .
25 2 PR ESENTA TI ON AND RE PRESENTA TI O N.
PART I counting back from the second present ation o f the

'
street .
There is another class o f cases in which the p ro

gress is not from a presentation to a representation ,
but from o n e representation to another Suppose .
that i nstead o f passi ng again through the street the

,
second day the street is suggested t o m e by some

,
thing else Then the second day I have a less vivid

.
perception o f the street than I had i n passin g through

it the day before but I sti ll have a representation o f
,
it in my mind now and a representation o f it as hav

,
ing formed part of the presentations o f twenty four -
hours ago ; and thes e t w o representations melt into

o n e just as i n the former case
,
I refer however t h e
.
certain ty o f the existence o f the street in both cases

to the presentation I n the rst case I s a y The
.
,
street certainly exists now though I may have ,
dreamed it yesterday ; in the second case I s a y The ,
street certainly existed yesterday though I only re ,
present it now I n the second case too the place s

.
,
occupied by the p resentation and t h e representation

are different as well as the times ; for on the second
,
day I am in another place and the representation o f,
the street does no t t i n with the objects o f the pre

sent landscape This chan g e o f place requires a c
.
counting for ; and this is done onl y by t h e events

which have happened in the course o f the twenty
four hours duri n g which the street is represented as
existing in its o w n landscape its landscape a s an o b,
e c t o f presentation
j .
Presentations and representations diffe rfrom each

other onl y l n degree o f vividness which includes dis ,
t i n c t n e s s in arrangement o f their parts But any .
particular object as a representation differs from the

PR ESENT A T I ON AND R E PR ESEN TA T I ON . 25 3
same object a s a presentation when the t w o are c o m

,
pared together by a subsequent reection at least in ,
point o f position in time These t w o objects h o w

.
ever mak e together but o ne object occupyin g the ,
whole o f the time which separates them ; not indeed

occupying the whole o f it with equa l certainty but ,
some parts with greater o r less degrees o f probability ;

a s fo r instance I am certain o f the existence o f the
, ,
street when I s e e it presented when I recall it next

day I am certain onl y o f its existenc e at the former

,
time ; nor am I s o certain o f i t s havi n g existed then ,
as I should be o f i t s existing n o w if I were again t o

,
have it presented ; fo r the fact o f its having been

presented is now onl y a representation Such is the .
account in general terms o f the world in which w e

li ve o r in other words o f the empirical ego c o n
, , ,
s i d e r e d as di stinguished i n to presentations and r e
presentations .
All o ur representations have been once presenta

tions o r have been formed o ut o f their elements dif
,
fe re nt l y modied and combined ; a diff erence which

is capable o f an inni te variety But here arise two .
questions which it i s well to state but which are

, ,
both unanswerable in metaphysic o r as metaphysic a l

questions ; rst why there are presentations at all ;
,
second why they have a tend ency t o become r e p re

,
s e nt a t i o n s o r t o be repeated less vividly in conscious

,
ness The rst question is equiva l ent t o askin g why

.
,
there is a world o r an existence at a l l ; a s t o which it

has been shown that we can an al yse its nature but ,
not assign its cause The second question adm i ts

.
only o f a psychological o r partia l solution Given .
the fact o f representations following presentations o r ,
the tendency o f presentations to be repeated a s r e p re

25 4 PRESENTATI ON A ND R E PR ESENTA TI ON .
"
s e nt a tio then the existence o f the brain its con

ns, ,
n e c t i o n with the rest o f the world o f qualities and ,
its consequent modications is to be regarded as i n ,
some way o r other the condi tion o f this rep roduct ion .
The sequence o f t h e representations depends ulti

mately upon the sequence o f the presentations s o ,
far as these latter are unmodied by volition and

the sequence o f the representa tions either modied ,
o r un modied by volition reacts again upon the pre

,
s e nt a t i o n s in a degree slight by itself but important

,
in its accumulat ion for it is this accumulation o f men

,
tal wealth which transforms and improves the world .
Two other questions arise however with reference

to presenta t ions and representations which may b e ,
answered partially now and perhaps completely i n

,
the far distant future The rst is What is the law

.
,
which d e t e rm l n e s whether such and such a particular

presentation shall be repeated as a presentation o r
not ; for instance whether a man who has seen a
,
particular street in London to day shall ever have it -
again presented to h i m The answ er to such ques

.
tions as these depends upon the inductive e xamina

tion o f the course o f nature and cannot be given by ,
any knowledge o f the laws o f consciousness ; n o t b e

caus e the laws and the phenomena o f nature are not
equally phenomena and laws o f consciousness b ut ,
because the phenomena requi re e x p e ri rne nt a l o b s e r

vation and comparison in their relations to each other ,
and their investigation has accordi n gly hitherto treated

the phenomena as belonging to the world o f qualities
and no t to the world o f feelings And in thi s i nv e s .
t i ga t i o n the res ul ts hitherto re a ched have been very

general and men have not yet succeeded in reducing
,
to knowledge the complicated contingencies of every

C HAP T E R V .
S P ONTANE O U S RE D INTE GRATI ON .

Ap 7
78 0 11 6311 7 1. 77 20 6
1 5 6 76 9 6 v 77
7f vf
yx
p i
c o ec
'
28 . WILL IAM H A M I LT O N has shown Lect 3 1 3 2

SI R ,
.
, ,
vo l
. 2 p 2 33 referring besides t o A ristotle and St
,
.
,
.
Augustine that the laws o f association are all o f them

,
cases o f the single law o f redintegration O f any past .
state o f consciousness whether highly complex o r ,
compar atively simple any part member o r element , , , ,
recurring again either separately o r in conn ection

with other objects and whether it be in presentation
,
o r representation h a s a tendency o r power o f calli n g

,
back and redintegrating in consciousness a part larger

a n d more complex than itself o r the whole o f the , ,
past state o f m i n d 1 n a l l its complet eness And since .
the whole o f t h e past conscious life o f an individual

is o ne connected whole any object o r any moment ,
o f this conn ec t ed series has the tendency o r power
o f beginni n g a re di ntegration which m i ght con ,
t i nu e itself until t h e whole conscious life was lived

over again in representation Any object which has .
formed part o f a complex state o f consciousness may

also have formed part o f other complex states and ,
SP O NT ANE OU S R E D I NT E GRA TI ON . 25 7
have occurred in an in nite variety o f combinat ions PA T I

"
. R .
CE V
It will have a tendency to redintegrate all o f these ;
'
f gt i
z
but it is obvious that it will not redintegrate nearly R ed u t e ra o n
all perhaps not even o n e completely for it will

,
commence redintegrating o n e and wh i le this 1 8 going ,
o n another object may come into promi nence in the

,
half ni sh e d redintegration which will change the

-
,
course o f thought and become the starting point o f

a new redi ntegration It becomes necessary there .
fore to enquire what are the partic ul ar laws o f red

integration ; what laws determine the preference o f
redintegrations o r the tendency o f particular objects
,
o r state s o f consciousness to redintegrate other par
t i c ul a r states o f consciousness .
Turning fo r a moment to the psychologic a l order

o f causes o f redintegration in order not to forget i t s ,
position and the relation it holds to the metaphysical

order a homely com parison may perhaps be o f s e r
,
vice i n connecting the two orders M any peopl e .

will remember seeing children watch the congre

a t i o n go o ut o f church o r doing it themselves as
g ,
childr en A child burns a newspaper and throws it

.
beneath the re grate ; -
Th e a m e e xt in t h e i ws t h e vi ng
c ,
v e ro re ,
Th e reg o es m y l dy a nd t h ,
g t h q ui
a e re o es e s re ;
Th er e g o es th p
e n h illu t i u p k
a rs o ,
o s r o s s a r ,
A nd th e re s c a r e c l s s illu t i u g t h c l
e s r o s o es e e rk .

But C owper s li n es do not give a ful l picture o f t h e

vagaries o f the illustrious sparks ; they oft en return
o n their steps ( having forgotten perhaps a prayer
book ) and shine where they had shone before ; they

,
linger ( having forgotten perhaps a prayer ) and ,
others joi n them to s e e what they are about ; they

8
25 8 S P ONTANEOUS R E D INTE GRA TI ON .
illuminate the deserted benches and parts

d i e r e nt
,
o f the church are perhaps many times relled with
their former occupants ; they traverse the church

again and again and only after many partial reil
,
luminations the whole becomes nally dark It is .
to these partial r e i l l um i na t i o n s o f the newspaper

tinder that I compare the process o f redi n tegration .
The brain is the tinder the perceptions and aggrega

,
tions o f perceptions are the sparks and masses o f

sparks the redintegrations are the re i l l um i n a t i o n s
, ,
only not s o short lived O f course this is not to be

-
.
pushed too far but only employed to assist the ima

,
i n a t i o n in representing the process o f redintegration

g
as arising in its tangible organ the brain ,
.
The law o r laws o f association are thought com

m o nl
y to have been already discovered ; causation ,
resemblance contrast contiguity in place and time

, ,
.
All of these Sir W Hamilton re d uces to o n e general

.
law that o f afnity It is true that all moments of

,
.
consciousness all objects o f consciousness have a f

, ,
ni t with each other for all are feeli n gs all occupy

y ; ,
time o r time a n d space together and all are parts or

, ,
portions o f o n e series o f moments o f consciousness .

,
and of o ne corresponding u niverse If however in .

,
order to come nearer to particulars we distinguish ,
this general law o f affinity into cases o f contrast ,
resemblance and contiguity in place and time o r go

, ,
farther still and add causation to the list this gives ,
us no law of the preference o f contrast to resem

blance contiguity in place o r tim e cause o r effect
, , ,
o r in short o f the preference o f any o f these to any
other of them ; still less does it give us any law o f

preference within the selected category o r p oint o ut
'
which among the causes o r effects or objects resem , ,

26 0
. S P ONTA NEO U S R E D INTE GRATI ON
s econdly the p articular objects which fall under that

notion N either in spontaneous nor in volun tary
.
redintegration are these categories o f cause resem ,
blance contiguity & c a real explanation of the de

, ,
.
t e rm i ni ng element i n the objects redintegrating .
Again supposing that we did pass from one object

,
to another through some one o r other of these notions ,
as the connecting link we should still require an ex

,
planation o f the li n k which connects that link itself

,
with the redintegrating object o r obj ect beginning,
the redintegration and t o account fo r why this rela

,
tion and no other is fixed upon retained and em , ,
ployed as a link with other objects Wh y should the .
sight of a table redintegrate the notion o f cause o r ,
e ffect or resemblance o r contrast o r contiguity in

, , ,
time o r contiguity in place ? Why should we pass

,
from any object to this class of s i x general notions

Why should we single o u t o n e o f the six in prefer
ence to the rest ? Why should these or any o n e of
them be supposed to be the determining element in
the obj ect table by means o f which it calls up o r
, ,
redintegrates in consciousness s a y a pen a chair a

, , , ,
dinn er a Bench or a Board ?

, ,
T o take an instance ; if my bookcase calls up the

notion o f the carpenter who made it because he is
connected with it as its cause this must be be c ause
,
I go through the notion o f causation to reach that o f

the carpenter ; for if it calls up the notion o f its car
e nt e r before that of its cause it is clear that car
p ,
e n t e r rather than cause should be the name of the

p
link o f association ; and the question still remains ,
What determines me to go in this particular instance

from the notion o f the bookcase to that of causation ,
in preference to the other ve notions o r any others

S P ON TA NEO U S R E D I NT E GRA TI ON . 26 1
besides th em ? All notions o f objects may be con

n e c t e d together by or under some o r all of these cate
o r i e s ; but this very fact d i s u a l i e s them for being

g q
considered as the leading threads or motive power in
producing o r calling up the notions o f particul ar o b
e c t s o u t o f or in consequence o f the notions o f o ther
j , ,
particular objects .
There is no exciting suggesting o r calling up of, ,
like notions by like o f cause by effect o f neighbour

, ,
by neighbour ; this is no true account o f the process

o f redintegration There is no afnity b etween s epa
.
rate obj ects o r their representations i n virtue o f which ,
o n e produces o r repr o duces the other It is true .
indeed that something like this may appear to have

taken place when we reect o n the redintegrating
process a n d rst begin to ask after the laws o f con
,
n e c t i o n o f obj ects supposed to be separate and inde
pendent We have however not really been step

.
, ,
ping from obj ect to object contiguous similar o r , , ,

dissimilar like the Shadowless M an in Ch a m i s s o s
, ,
tale from isl and to island There is no power o r

,
.
quality in the representations considered as images ,
o f objects by which they can summon each other

,
.
The general notions which bind them together such ,
as causation contrast contiguity and resemblance

, , , ,
though undoubtedly they form a common element

pervading them yet have no generative power and
, ,
cannot impart any such t o the perc e ptions which they

bind together Time and Space are indifferent to
.
the p articular empirical objects they may contain .
The whole chain network o r pile of network to

, , ,
which o u r past states o f consciousness may be c o m ~
pared and to which we may consider eve ry ne w

,
moment o f consciousness whether o f presentation o r ,

62 SP ONTA NE OU S R E D INTE GRA TI ON .
PART 1 . repres entation a s adding a new mesh i s o ne con

, ,
n e c t e d and cl o sely netted whole any part Of which ,

28
R e d m t e gra t i o n may come into consciousness agai n a n d some part O f ,
which must come into consciousness again in every ,
new moment Of consciousness N ot because notions .
have been t o gether in the Objects o r world Of quali ,
ties but because they have been together in con

,
s c i o u s n e s s the feelings Of the empirical ego do they

, ,
reproduce each other .
How came it t o pass that these categories were

xed upon as t h e l i n ks conn ecting Obj ects in redin
,
'
t e gr a t i o n ? It appears t o have been because Objects

were considered separately o n e by one and n o t as , ,
modications Of o n e world o r o n e consciousness Just .
as Objects Of perception were considered separate a ,
table a chair a R oman E mperor a star for instance

, , , , ,
as s o many distinct separate Objects the conjunction ,
Of which in o n e S pace made the world in which we

li ve s o the representations Of these Obj ects were con
,
si d e r e d not as moments in o n e and the same series ,
and o ne and the same consciousness but as separat e ,
Obj ects in the mind each existing for itself and con
, ,
ne c t e d ,
not i n kind a s parts Of o n e whole but by ,
mere juxtaposition in time in the empirical ego ,

.
The connection between the parts o f the series o f

i mages in the mind was then sought in the images
s o far as they were representations Of extern al O b
j e c t s that is
,
in the
,
time and space relations Of the
images to each other instead of i n the images as mo
,
ments Of consciousn e ss o r as feelings o f the empi ,
r i c a l ego . Thus not only were the representations

o r ideas as they were called im ages o f external O b ,
j e c t s for in stance my idea Of

,
a R oman E mperor an
image Of that R oman E mperor as he Once existed in
26 4 S P ONTA NE O U S R ED I NTE GRA T I ON .
s e nt a are as i mages Of Objects in perc eption a n d

tio ns ,
xed o n what they are as members Of a subjective

series o f moments Of consciousness as contain ing feel ,
ings a n d not a s containing qualities ; which is vi r tually

what Sir W Hamilton has d one i n his reassertion Of
.
the general law O f R edintegration then the enquiry

was directed into its proper channel and the process ,
o f lengtheni n g Of the chain Of consciousness in red
integration was e x hibited i n a mann er favourable t o

investigation .
29 Brown in his P hilosophy Of the Human

.
,
M ind lect 3 5 in pointin g to emotions as a source of

,
.
,
association and James M ill in his Analysis Of the

, ,
P henomena Of the Human M ind chap 3 in pointing ,

.
,
to vividness and frequency as the causes Of strength

in association and connecting vividn ess with pleasure
,
and pain came very near to what seems to me to be

,
the truth R eferrin g to the analysis Of representa

.
tions in 2 5 there will be found only two which can

,
be regarded as the elements o r qualities determining

redintegration If the re di ntegrating Object is a r e
.
presentation the factor in it which determines the

,
redintegration O f the next Object is the predominant

interest which it contains ; if the redintegrating Obj ect
is presented then either t h e pleasure o r pain o r some
, ,
represented pleasure o r pain that is some interest , , ,
is the determining factor Sir W Hamilton too in . .

,
note to his edition Of R eid p 9 1 3 states as a ,

.
,

Secondary o r C oncrete principle what may be

styled ( under protest for it is hardly deserving Of

,
the title Law ) IX The Law Of P reference .
Thoughts are suggested not merely by force O f the ,
general subjective relation subsisting between them

selves they are also suggested in proportion to the
,
S P ONTA NE O U S R E D I NTE GRA T I ON . 26 5
r el atio n Of interest ( from whatever source ) m which

these stand to the indi vidual mind This however .
,
taken as it must be in connection with its context ,
goes but a small part O f the way which the principle

it states is capable O f goi ng The method in which .
this principle Operates must no w be examined toge ,
ther with the other Operations which concur t o the

result .
In every Object there is a part which is either

pleasin g o r painful o r may become s o by the con
,
t i n u a n c e Of t h e Object in consciousness ; if it is pleas

ing that alone rivets the attention ; if it is painful
, ,
the attention is drawn to it equally but with an i n ,
t e r e s t in its absence P leasure in p r esented Objects

.
,
interest in represented Obj ects is that which occupies ,
the attention and causes that part Of the Object to

,
which it is at tached to linger in consciousness and t o

exclude the Other parts Of it from consciousness It .
is true that in objects Of presentation vividness xes

the attention irrespective Of the pleasure o r pain a t
,
t a c h e d to the part Of the Obj ect which is vivid ; but

then this very vividness while it lasts prevents us
from passing on to another Obj ect the part which is ,
vivid must lose its vividness before we can have a

n e w object in its place ; b ut the pleasure which b e
longs to any part O f an Obj ect is carried o n into the

redintegrated Object V ividness would sufce t o a c
.
c ount fo r the rst step in redintegration but not for ,
the second as will be seen when the second step is

,
described V ividness is the cause Of an Obj ect r e

.
maining in consciousness not Of its melti ng into a n

,
other Object ; pleasure o n the other hand we dwell

upon while the Obj ect t o which it was attached is let
,
g o. P leasure rst xes the attention o n a n Object ,

26 6 S P ON T ANEO U S RE D IN TE GRA TI ON :
then covers its departure by re m a m i ng while t h e ,
other parts o f it vanish O bjects Of presentation come .
and gO entirely irrespective Of our wishes o ur likings ,
and d i sli ki ngs s o long as an Object O f presentation o r

representation is vivid it remains in consciousness ,
and begi ns no series Of representations But when .
once it pleases us to dwell on it we begin i m m e d i ,
ately in spontaneous not in voluntary redi n tegration

, , ,
to forget the Object and think only Of the pleasure

, ,
and a series of representations i s s e t o n foot The .
Object originally presented or represented is then , ,
the rst in the series Of represented Objects ; tho ugh

we may be looking at it with o ur eyes it is an Object ,
o f representation We exercise no volition but spon

.
,
t a n e o u s l y redintegrat e what we may The motive .
power in this seri es the secret spring which eff ects

,
the changes in it the invariabl e factor antecedent to

every new Object in it is interest ; the interest felt in

,
the antecedent Object determines what its form shall

be and consequently how the nex t moment shall dif
,
fer from it when it arises o ut Of it .
Two processes are constantly going o n in r e d i nt e

ra t i o n the n a process f corrosion melting de
g ,
o e O , ,
cay and the other a proces s Of renewing arising

, , ,
b ecoming Unl ess by an e ffort Of voli tion which is

.
,
here o u t o f the question no Obj ect Of representation ,
remains long before consciousness in the same state ,
but fades decays and becomes in distinct

, ,
Those .
parts Of the Object however which possess an i n

, ,
t e re s t that is those which a r e attended by a r e p r e

, ,
s e n t a t i o n Of pleasure or pain resist this tendency t o

,
gradual decay Of the whole Object I do not say .
thos e parts which are most vivid ; that would be a

tautology ; but those parts are most vivid o r resist ,
26 8 S P ONT ANEO U S R E D I NT E GRA TI ON
PART I . ranges itself in i t s Old position ; but scarcely has t h e

process begun when the original law Of interest b e
,
gins to operate o n this new formation seizes o n the ,
interesting parts and impresses them o n the attention

to the exclusion Of the rest and the whole process is
,
repeated again with endless variety I vent ure to .
propose this as a complete and true account of the

whole process Of spontaneous redintegration .
Several well known phenomena are accounted for

b y this analysis O f the process Of redintegration .
F irst the difference in kind Of the Objects r e p r e

,
sented in redintegration according to the cheerful o r

melancholy mood we are in F or though it has a l .
ways been a well known fact that cheerfulness and ,
melancholy were accompanied by representations Of

very different kinds o f Obj ects yet no o ne s o far as I , ,
know h a s pointed o ut any other cause Of this a c c o m

,
a n i m e n t than the supposed suit ability o f Objects like

p
d arkness storm confusion slow music to melan
, , , ,
c ho l and Objects s u ch as sunshine owers quick

y, , ,
music to cheerfulness ; a suitability Of which no

,
other ground could be discovered than the fact Of

the accompaniment s o far as it was a fact Of pre
,
.
s e n t a t i o n ; which accompaniment accordingly as a , ,
fact Of presentation M ill in the work already quoted

, , ,
substitutes for the suppos ed suitability as an e x p l a

nation Of the phenomenon Of the accompani ment in
redintegration The connection between the two
.
circumstances the mood Of mind and the Objects

,
redin tegrated appears now to be a causal o n e t h e

, ,
interest felt being the common element in the two

Objects the redintegrating and the redintegrated
,
.
When melancholy we do not redintegrate such O b j

j e c t s as storm darkness
,
war ;,
& c because we know .
,
SP ON TA NE OU S R E D I NTE GRA TI ON . 26 9
beforehand that such Obj ects will satisfy an int erest ,

and this must be the case if s ui tability is the cause Of
the redintegration ; this would be to mak e the red

integration voluntary ; nor yet because melancholy

Obj ects such a storm darkness slow music war and
, , , , ,
S O o n have in presentation occurred together and S O

, ,
are reproduced together in redintegration the order

Of redintegration is t o o di fferent from that Of pre
s e nt a t i o n
,
and that Of presentation t o o varied to a l ,
low o f such an account being accepted as suf cient ;

but the interest in such Objects of representation is
greater in moments when we are melancholy and this ,
is o n e Of the signs Of a melancholy mood ; and then

the interest i s the motive o r efcient cause Of their
redintegration The question is not Why such and
.
,
such Objects have an interest for us whe n we are in a

melancholy mood and such and such other Objects
,
when we are in a cheerful mood ; this is an immediate

and ultimate empirical fact Of consciousness which ,
we can n o more explain o r acco unt for than we can

fo r the sweet o r sour taste Of some Obj ects o r for t h e ,
red o r green colour o f others But the question i s

.
,
Why certai n classes Of Obj ects are re di n tegrated when

we are in o n e mood and certain other clas ses when
,
we are in another mood and the answer is not only ,
that they are Of a melancholy o r cheerful nature ,
which may be called their suitability t o o ur mood ,
but in addition to this that the interest we feel in

,
them arising from this suitability is the determinin g

, ,
motive in spontaneous re di ntegrations the element ,
o r factor which is common to both the Ob j ects in
redin tegration O ther sensible qualities Of Objects

.
are xed and constant in them but the in terest they

,
possess fo r us i s not xed and constant in them a t ,

27 0 S P ONTANEOUS R ED INTE GRA TI ON .
l e ast is much less so than those sensible qualities are

and thus when the interest becomes the xed point
,
e n o m e n o n o r series Of phenomena the other ,
qualities Of those phenomena becom e pari passu u n

x e d and inconstant ; and since this is the case in
,
redintegration the series Of Objects in redintegration

,
loses that particular regularity and order which its

Objects possessed as presentations and acquires a n ,
other regularity and order determined by or turni ng ,

as it were on the pivot O f interest ,
.
Anoth er thing accounted for by this analysis is the

apparent melting Of o n e Object i n to another a well ,
known phenomenon in dr eams Scenes and faces .

,
and even Objects not visible but inferred change i m ,
perceptibly into other forms and characters in dream ,
ing O n e m oment you s e e one face which you kn ow

.
,
the next you see that it is not that face but another ;
yet this excites no surprise though you are conscious
,
Of the change O bjects imagined to be present b ut

.
not seen in t h e d r e a m change their character in the

'
same way The unity O f the interest prevents s ur

.
prise ; i f the interest changes its charact er if for i n ,
stance i n the dream a face which excites interest of

, , ,
a pleasant kind strongly is succeeded in consequence

, ,
Of some external change o f circumstances by a n ,
other the interest O f which is strong but painful

, ,
then surprise is felt .
Thirdly this analysis accounts for the balance

,
between habit and interest ; people who have few or

weak in terests are d ecided predominantly in their
redintegrations by habit ; those who have many or
powerful interests have redintegrations O f more v a
ri e t
y and more apparent originality Interest is the .

source O f what is called character What a man s .
27 2 S P ONT A NEO U S R E D I NTE GRA T I ON .
feeling Of interest in it reillumine s the wh ole state of

,
consciousness and recalls it as a whole Of which it

, ,
was a part i n the origin al presentation There a r e .
cases no doubt in which the interest felt is a p urely

intellectual o n e and where any obj ect at once leaves
,
standing out to the exclusion Of its other parts

, ,
notions O f relation o r cause and these again call up

,
Objects which have been most habitually presented or

represented as instances o f such cases o r such rela
tions ; here the intellectual conception O f a cause or
other relation such as contrast or resemblance is the
, ,
most interesting thing and its interest is its title to

,
prom i nence and the circumstance which makes it the

,
lin k between two Objects in the redintegration .
D reams and reveries are the instances Of the mos t

purely spontaneous redintegration without the a d ,
mixture O f volition When in dreaming we are con

.
scious Of a purpose O f a preference for having or fo r

,
not havin g such and such a representation before it ,
actu a lly arises then we must be i n a state very near

,
waking V ery Often in redintegration we do not r e

.
present the redintegrated objects a s familiar remem

bere d Obj ects but they come before us as quite new
,
This is called productive imagination and the most ,
perfect instances o f it a r e dreams N O o n e doubt s

.
that the apparent novelty Of the representations is

due to t h e novelty Of the combinations in which
their parts are represented and this apparent novelty
,
is quite as intelligible o n the theory now suggested

as on any other The more insignicant and u n
.
essential the interestin g part Of any object is the ,
more di fferent will the Object which it redintegrate s

probably be from the former Object and the wider ,
will be the range O f possible Obj ects habitually con

.
S P ON TA NEO U S R E D I N TE GRA T I ON . 27 3
ne c t ed with it ; again the more habitual an Object i s

, ,
the less likely is it to impress consciousness and dwell

o n the memory a S O n e Of the li nks in the r e d i n t e ra
'
g
tion and thus the points o f interest alone will be
,
those which w ill appear afterwards to have composed

the series There is another phenomenon wh ich
.
,
occurs sometimes o f the very Opposite character to

,
this Of apparent novelty It is when we have a

.
strong feeling Of the sameness Of Obj ects o r states Of ,
consciousness in redintegration with some o bject o r ,
state O f conscious ness which has preceded but what ,
o r where we cann ot remember I all ude to cases o f.
dreams and more rarely O f waking perceptions where

, ,
we have a strong conviction O f having been before in

the same place o r the same circumstances as those o f
the present presentation o r representation but never ,
t h e l e s s can rec a l l n o other circumstances which con

rm the conviction Sometimes we dream O f a place
.
which appears perfectly fam i liar ; sometimes we s e e

a place waki n g which appears famili a r though we
, , ,
know we h ave not seen it before and then perplexed , , ,
sa
y we must have seen it in a dream Here are cases .
Of an inexplicable sense O f famil i arity and recog n ition

Obtainin g in dreams in waki ng or in cases which
, ,
perhaps consist O f both It seems to me probable .

,
that this sense Of fam i liarity depends o n the rousing

Of the same particular feeling o f inte rest by two o r
more different perceptions ; and that from the iden
tity Of the interest we infer the identity o f the Objects
Of presentation or representation .
30 The laws O f spontaneous redintegration a c

.
,
cording to what has been said are three ; 1 s t the , ,
general law O f redintegration that consciousness is ,

.
o n e connected whole and that a n Object may call

y ,
27 4 SP ONTANEOUS R E D INTE GRA TI ON .
PART I .
up either di rectly o r indirectly through other Objects
, ,
an
y other object or the whole Of past Objects Of con
s c i o u s n e ss 2 d the rst law Of t h e method in which
; ,
this is done namely interest ; 3 d the second law of

, ,
the method namely habit The ques t ion now arises

,
.
whether either Of these latter l aws can be reduced to ,
o r subsumed under the oth er ; wheth er habit is a

particular case O f interest o r interest a particular ,
case Of habit or whether both fall under a common

,
category The latter appears to me to be the truth

. .
Habit s o far as we are conscious Of it o r conscious ,
ness Of the series O f Obj ects s o far as they are

habitual is a pleasure What the physical cause o r
,
.
ground Of this may be is a psychological question as , ,
for instance wheth e r it depends o n physical changes

,
in the brain which continue the same until some

cause arises to turn them into another channel ; this
would be habit as a fact in tangible matter But .
habit as a fact Of uniform s u c c e s s 1 o n 1 n states O f con

s c i o u s n e s s is a pleasure ; it is the pleasure Of the
sense of ease and facility o r the absence O f the sense
,
Of e ffort That is to s a y habit s o far as we are

.
, ,
conscious of it is a kind O f pleasure and in this sense

, ,
is a motive power in redintegration ; as a law Of c o n

s c i o u s n e s s it is the law O f minimising e ff ort of moving ,
in the direction Of least resistance exactly parallel to ,
the physical law expressed in these same terms B e .
s i s t a n c e 1 n consciousness is expressed by the term
eff ort
.
Interest is the representation Of pleasure or pain ;

S O that both habit and interest are referable to a
common notion pleasure Of which habit is o n e par
, ,
t i c u l a r kind and O f which interest is the r e p r e s e n

,
t atio n . That is to s a y ple a sure either directly a s

, ,
27 6 S P O NTANE O U S R E D I NTE GRATI ON .

p ain should be s o ; accordingly interest as a mode Of ,
pleasure is Of two kinds ; rst where it represents ,
pleasure it is a pleasure arising from the matter o r ,
feeling contained in its Object ; secondly where it

, ,
represents pain it is a pleasure arising from the form

or cognition Of its Object ; in the former case it is a
pleasure simply in the latter it is a pleasure of intel
,

lect It must be added that cases O f the latter kind

.
are rare and that generally where interest as a r e

,
presentation Of pain is the motive of a redintegration ,
it is S O only through voli tion or voluntary e ffort a n d ,
the redintegration is to that extent not a spontaneous

but a voluntary one .
P leasure as limited above is the determining

power O f the movement O f Objects in spontaneous

redintegration a determin ation Of t h e character of

,
the series in every succeeding moment o r a motive ,
if we consider the Objects o r moments separately .
The law O f redi ntegration is that it is determined ,
by pleasure limited as above ; this is the general fact

in all redintegrations that is the ef cient cause of , ,
their mov ement o r determi nation in other words , ,
their determi n ing l a w It is hard I grant to banish .

, ,
"
from the mind the notion O f physical impulsion or

attraction that is Of tangible bo di es pushing o r
, ,
pulli ng each other when motion force power de , , , ,
termi n ation and S O o n are spoken O f ; and even harder

perhaps to avoid thinking Of force and power as some
occult o r unknowable Thi ng i n itself behind o r under - -
,
the phenomena that is the feelings in time and space

, ,
.
The commo n inability to do t h e former that is t o , ,
banish the notion Of actions Of tangible bodies o n

each other whenthe terms motion force and power
,
.
, ,
are use d gives rise t o the d i f c p l t y which has b een

'
,
SP ON TA NEO U S R E D I NTE GRAT I ON ; 27 7
felt and which will probably be felt a ga i n t h e , ,

d i i i
culty o f representing to oneself how pleasure a mode ,
Of consciousness can be a cause o r motive in trains

, , ,
Of sponta n eous redintegration The difculty is no t .
usually felt at all though it ought to be more acutely

,
felt in the case O f voluntary redintegration ; the w ill

,
is a phenomenon s o familiar that we accept a voli ,
tion as a cause O f other phenomena as readily as we

, ,
accept a tangible body as the cause Of motion in

another tangible body A ccordi n gly where the will .
,
cannot be regarded as the e f cient or motive cause ,

55 5 767) m wz a ewg as it cannot in spontaneous r e d i nt e gr a
,
tions there recourse is usual ly had t o a tangible

, ,
psychological cause namely the cha nges in the

, , ,
brain as the e fcient cause Of redintegrations and

, ,
to the S O called laws Of association contrast and r e

-
semblan c e cause and effect contiguity in time and

, ,
place as a framework applied by ourselves afterwards

,
to the phenomena as a means Of reducing them to ,
some order and making them intelligible to o ur

selves not as laws imposed o n the brain by nature
, ,
b ut o n the re di ntegrations after they have arisen , ,
by our logic F or as it has been shown in

.
,
28 ,
if these categories are regarded as in any way e f

cient o r existing in consciousness previously to the
,
pro duction Of the Object redintegrated under them ,
they can only be causes Of a vol untary and not

Of a spontaneous redintegration they can only be ,
causes employed by some o n e who has already a

purpose more o r less denite in redintegratin g o n e
, ,
class Of Objects and not another If o n the other .
hand they should be regarded by any o ne as e i

cient but yet no t existing in consciousness previ
,
o us l to the production Of the redin te rated Object

y g
27 8 S P O NTA NEOUS R E D I NTE GRA TI ON .
in consciousness then they must be regarded as laws

,
Of the operation Of the tangible organ Of consci

o usn e s s
,
namely the brain ; b ut if S O then only in
, ,
the sense that they are expressions Of the result in ,
redintegration o f certain laws Of the Operation Of the

,
tangible organ which i n their o w n shape a s laws Of

,
that operation are u nknown o r at least unexpressed

,
by these laws Of association ; that i s they do not de

,
scribe how the brain Operates in producing re d i nt e -

s
r a t i o n but o nl y how the result is constituted which

g ,
that Operation has produced Spontaneous r e d i nt e

.
r a t i o n is a process in consciousness which requir es a

g
further analysis than these laws Of association furni sh ;
and this further analysis has been supplied by point
ing o u t the invariable factor in it namely pleasure
, ,
limited as above .
Thus the Old theory Of the laws Of association s o ,
far as it is a theory Of spontaneo us re di n tegration is ,
i ntelligible and complete only when supplemented

with a psychological theory Of the action Of the brain
in consciousness T O this action o f the brain it refers
.
for the motive o r determinin g power o f the course o f

association The redintegrated states Of conscious
.
ness are not produced by previous states O f c o n sc i o u s

ness but both are produced by the action O f the
,
brain ; and conversely there is no ground for saying

, ,
that the redintegrated states Of consciousness react

upon the brain o r modify its action s o as to caus e ,
that action to produce another state O f consciousness .
But the relation between the states Of the brain and

the states Of consciousness must be conc eived as s i
milar to that between the ivory keys O f a pianoforte
and the striking o f the strings by the hammers when ,
I run my n ger a l ong the key board The strings

-
.
28 0 S P O NTA NEOU S RE DI NTE GRA TI O N .
whatever may be done in that of spontaneous In .
them both the production o f states of consciousness

,
by states Of the brain has to be conceived ; and in

voluntary redintegration certainly the reaction Of, ,
s tates O f consciousness o n the brain h a s to be con
c e i v e d besides It is impossible there to suppose

.
consciousness to be a mere foam aura o r melody , , ,
arising from the brain but without reaction upon it

, .
The states o f consciousness are in voluntary redin ,
t e gr a t i o n links in the chain o f physical events o r cir

,
c um s t a n c e s in the extern al world When t h e s un in .
June shines in at the window I lift my hand and pull ,
down the green blind The sensation O f heat is pain

.
ful ; representing this I feel an interest in obviatin g

it ; this is a purpose o r nal cause which as efcient
, ,
produces the sensation of e ffort in lifting my hand

and pulling down the blind and a more agreeable ,
state Of sensation is the result The whole procee d .
ing is capable o f analysis into states O f consc i ousness

which follow o n e another according t o regular O b
servable laws There is rst the feeling o f the s un
.
,
the blind and the window and O f my o w n body near

, ,
it ; these Objects are states or a st a te Of feelings in

time and space together ; in this s tate arises o r into ,
it is introduced a feeling Of the heat being too great ;

,
I feel an interest in representing the painful sensation

and its removal ; I x the representation O f the r e
mova l Of the painful sensation in consciousness ; here
is voluntary eff ort ; the representation s o xed com
pletes itself by the general law Of all redintegration ,
and becomes completed with the representation o f the

Objects which must be presented to consciousness if ,
the painful sensation is t o b e re m o v e d ; those Objects

'
represented become familiar a n d involve an e o rt

, ,
S P ONTA NEO U S R E D I NT E GRA T I ON . 28 1
Whi c h is l ess painful as represented than the sensa

, ,
tion Of heat as represented ; the least painful r e p r e

,
s e nt a t i o n remains alone in consciousness that is c o n , ,
s c i o u s n e s s takes the direction O f least resistance ; and
the new Object exists with greater vividness than

when balanced by the opposite representation that ,
is it becomes a presentation namely the presented

, , ,
fact Of my hand moving and pulling down the blind ;

o n which the heat as presented ceases E xternal
, ,
.
Objects tangible and visible are modes Of feeling and

, , ,
the brain among them ; the brain is not introduced

into the series just described solely because it is not
,
included in it as an Obj ect Of consciousness ; its being

Of a visible and tangible nature would be no Obstacle
to its introduction any more than it is in the case O f
,
the blind the s un and the window The action Of

, ,
.
the brain may be inferred to exist and accompany

and condition every step Of the process ; but that will
not alter the facts as they at present stand nor intro ,
duce the brain into them as a presented Object But .
it is impossible to explain the phenomena Of voluntary

action as for inst a nce the case just described by the
, ,
mere production O f consciousness by the brain ; for ,
unless a reaction Of consciousness on the brain is i n

t r o d u c e d the particular actions performed are mean
,
i n gl e s s and no special cause for each o r any Of them

,
can be a ssigned ; for in stance what determines the ,
brain to guide the muscles to pull down the blind ?

Ca n we conceive that just this phenom enon and no
other would follow if every other circumstance r e
,
mained the same except that the feeling O f pain from

,
the heat and representation Of the means to avoid it

were absent ? If spontaneous actions are explained
as automatic o r as results Of t h e action Of a material
,
28 2 S P O NTANE OU S R E D I N T E G R A T I ON S
organ alo ne still voluntary actions cannot be explained

,
s o ; and this explanation Of spontaneous actions i n
volv e s the assumption Of the action Of external ma ,
t e ri a l tangible Objects o n consciousness ; while the

,
corresponding explanation Of voluntary actions 1 n

volves besides this the further assumption Of the
, ,
reaction Of consciousness on those Objects ; that is ,
invol ves twice the notion Of i nuence o r impulse ex

e r c i s e d by one heterogeneous Obj ect o n another ; the
two Objects being at the same time conceived as s o

heterogeneous that the notion o f their having an e n
,
t i r e l y different and independent o r1 g1 n was adopted

solely to escape from the supposed difculty O f con
c e i vi n
g either Of them as arising o u t of the other .
I argue therefore that keeping consciousness and

, ,
its s o called material and t a ngible Objects apart and

-
treating them as separate and heterogeneous Objects

Of existence i s a course which leads to insoluble con
t r a d i c t i o n s ; for though we m a y disguise their i n c o n
g rui t
y at starti
,
n g that is in the theory Of perception
, ,
if we start o n a materialistic basis yet we soon re ,
quire to employ not only the tangible Objects as the

cause Of consciousness but consciousness as the cause
,
Of the tangible Obj ects a result which might indeed

,
have been perceived as inevitable from the rst ; a n d

if we start from an ideal istic basis we have this latt er
,
difculty at the very rst setting o ut If it is main .
t a i n e d that neither can be produced o u t o f o r by the

other because they are heterogeneous then also their
, ,
mutual action and reaction when they have been pro

,
d u c e d must be admitted to be in conceivable

,
N or .
can they exist separately from the very rst for ,
then we have the same inconceivability in the very

rst intercourse between them an intercourse which,
28 4 SP ONTANE OU S R E D I NT E GR A TI O N?

distinguished from each oth er a nd the li n e b etween

feeling o r cognition and action o r volition is drawn

, , , ,
at the moment Of arising Of the external event at ,
the moment wh en the representation becomes a pre

scutation But in this account Of the matter it is n o t
.
made clear how a feeling o r cognition becomes an , ,
action h o w things s o different as these are comm

,
supposed to be a supposition which leads to the li ne

,
being drawn where it is commonly drawn can pas s ,
o n e into the other F or the i n terest in the former

.
moment is the cause O f the physical presented event , ,
in the latter moment and this interest contains the

,
volition The true account must be that the r e p r e

.
,
s e n t a t i o n O f the interest is an action in the same sens e
in which the subsequent presented event i s When .
an interest O f t his kind is included in redintegration ,
the interest is still the determining factor O f the red

integration ; but the knowledge O f the particular
Object sought o r avoided anticipating the presenta ,
tion O f it if Obtained and preventing the presentation

,
o f it if avoided is the new element which distin

u i s h e s voluntary from spontaneous redintegration
g .
V olition is anticipation Of a result a n d all interest in ,
redintegration which is anticipatory is a voli tion and ,
makes the redintegration voluntary from being spon

t a ne o us .The interest is the ef cient the anticipa ,
tion the nal cause O f the remainder O f the r edi nt e

,
~
g ra t i o n . A nticipation in an interest makes the i n
t e r e s t a nal as well as an e f cient cause ; interest in

an anticipation makes the anticipation an e f cient as
well as a nal cause V olition which i s an interest
.
,
in an anticipated Object for instance either the i n, ,
creasin g O f an experienced pleasure or the d e c r e a s ,
ing Of an e xperienced pain o r the p ro c urm g Of an ,

S P ONT ANEO U S R E D I NT E GRA TI ON ; 28 5
imagined pleasure o r the preventing Of an imagi ned

,
pain volition which in some o r other Of these ways

,

,
is interest in an anticipated Object is a nal cause ,
which has become e fcient accordi ng to the scholastic

,
saying C ausa n a l i s m o v e t ( that is becomes e f cient

, , ,
o r an 65 76 ) m wza ewg non secundum suum sse sed

)
'
3 7 e ,
secundum suum esse cognitum .
There are three degrees Of complication in red

integrations : rst when there is pleasure o r interest
,
but no sense O f e ffort ; second when there is both ,
e ffort and interest ; third when there is e ffort and

, ,
interest and anticipation R edintegrations are per

,
.
fe c t when there is interest and anticipation in a high

degree and e ffort in a low degree ; the mi ni mising O f
,
e ffort is the perfection Of redintegration ; when to

will is to perform to wish is to Obtain R e d i nt e gr a
,
.
tions Of the rst degree O f complication where there ,
i s interest but no e ffort or very little are pure e n ,
jyo m e n t ; those Of the second degree where there is ,
eff ort and interest but no nal cause are more or ,
less painful a n d bewilderin g and Of these there are ,
very few and rare instances sin ce they at once and ,
Of themselves pass into re di ntegrations Of the third

degree the p a i n being at once perceived as an Object
,
to be avoided R edintegrations Of the third degree

.
,
containi ng e ffort anticipation and interest that is

, , , ,
voluntary redintegrations are the highest and most ,
important class ; and under this class fa l l all reason

ing processes all action and conduct Of reasoni n g
,
beings and all happiness O f which such beings are

,
capable as such In the history Of the development

,
.
Of an individual from infancy the sense O f e ffort may ,
have been involved in some Of the earliest instances

of consciousness and volition t h e same T O trac e
, .
28 6 SP ONTA NE OU S R EDI N TE G R ATI ON .
the history Of the development Of an individual con

s c i o u s n e s s is not the purpose Of this E ssay but to ,
analyse particular states and particular processes O f

consciousness into their component elements ; and fo r
this purpose the logical order O f increasing com
p l e xi t
y is followed since,
metaphysic is the applied
logic Of consciousness and Of the universe .
. 3 2 The point which has now been reached is

one at which the two elements o f consciousness fo r
.
,
mal and material appear to have developed into dis

,
tinct functions or modes Of operation O f the con

, ,
scious being ; and this is a consideration which

deserves to be dwelt upon N early all enquirers.
into the nature O f man agree i n distinguishing in him

three general or cardinal functions and three only , ,
to which either separately or in combination all

operations Of consciousness may be referred These .

are to adopt Sir W Hamilton s nomenclature F eel
,
.
,
ing C ognition and C onation ; and man is accord

, ,
i ngl y considered in a threefold aspect as a feeling , ,
thinking and acting bein g N ow the rst thing that

,
.
strikes the attention in this di vision Of functions is

that it is three fol d while the elements Of conscious
,
ness are never more than two feelin g a nd form ,

.
When the feeling or material element Of conscious

ness is made the Obj ect Of consideration in a pro ,
visional image o r ser1 es Of images then man is said ,
to be a feeli n g being and to possess a function O f feel

ing When the formal element Of consciousness is
.
made the Object Of consideration in similar pro ,
visional images then the cognitive function of man

,
is inquestion But where has the function O f cona

'
tion its source ? And what is its claim to rank with

the other two functions ? I t is founded on and i n
28 8 SP ONTANE OU S RE DI N TE G R A TI ON .
PART I . i ng them to employ the wo rds with such a meaning ,
and explain that they use them only to express '
phenomena and not such occult substances essences

, , ,
causes o r gro unds (which is if I rightly understand

, ,
the phrase the distinguishing mark O f the positive

,
method Of p h il O S O p h i s i ng ) they stil l assume o r sus ,
e c t that there may be such essences o nl y without

p ,
the capability Of being known to us and Of corre ,
s o nd i n
p g to o ur capability Of knowing them O n .
this assumption or suspicion it is not the province Of

special and positive science to enter ; but it is the
province Of metaphysic and especially in cases where
the h y p o s t a s1 s m g O f phenomena interferes with and
Opposes positive results Of actual analysis .
Just as motion power and force cannot be hypo , ,
s t a si s e d s o
,
neither can conation or voli tion That .
things move o r change more or less rapidly that they ,
move and change at a ll is an ultimate empirical fact ,
in consciousness which is resolvable by analysis into

,
its elements ti me space and a plurality Of feelings

, , ,
.
N O cause o r antecedent state to time , space and feel ,
ing generally is conceivable ; time space and feelings , ,
together constitute change or succession in feelin gs .
C onsequently not the cause Of change motion power

, , , ,
or force generally but the ca use o r invariably ante

,
cedent phenomenon Of this o r that particular change

o r Object arising i n the place O f o r after another is
, ,
conceivable But this is a cause not O f change or

.
motion but O f the determination O f change o r motion ;

,
it is a determini ng cause and if not nal is efcient , ,
the 02570} z w a ewg O f this or that Object or feeling .
But as motion force and power have been h y p o s t a

, ,
s i s e d in the external and tangible w orld s o conation ,
and volition have been hypostasised in the empirical .

S P ON T ANEO U S R E D I N T E GRAT I ON . 28 9
ego ; and as the universe generally has been regarded

as nothing but an exhibition Of P ower s o all human ,
actions and thoughts have been regarded as nothing

but exhibitions Of a particular kind Of power c a l led
Will subj ect however to restrictions and l i mitations
,
arising from the uni verse o r exhibition Of other,

.
power in which the human being was placed Henc e

,
.
the Will took its place by the side Of F eeling and

C ognition as their equal at any rate and sometimes
, ,
as their source The conception O f the beginning Of

.
motion generally as disting uished from that Of t h e

,
determination o f motion is a provisional i mage o r a

, ,
conception introduced by volition itself for the pur

,
poses Of facility Of reasoning a n d supposes motion ,
already both befor e and after t h e point where it

chooses to assume the beginning M otion generall y .
is coeval with a plurality Of feelings in time and

space ; the rst difference Of feelings in th ese forms
together is motion ; ther e is n o empirical fact pre
vions to motion V olition is no beginning o r sourc e
.
Of motion but a determination Of it and the begin

, ,
ning o r source Of a new and separately characterised

portion Of it V olition impresses a character o n
.
motion and succession Of feelings it is no beginnin g ,
Of motion o r succession .
The normal state Of consciousness is a spontane

o u s state ; it is that from which consciousness starts
and to which it tends passin g through the i nt e rm e

,
diate state Of vol ition founded o n conation The vast .
importance o f this intermediate state to us practically ,
S ince it occupies in the ordinary business o f li fe o ur

whole attention and is hourly increasing in the ex
,
tent and complexity Of its Obj ects and absorbs o u r ,
in terest in the character Of a search after practical

U
29 0 R E D I N TE GRA TI ON .
and theoretical truth hi des from o ur m e w the state s ,
which a r e its sourc e and its issue Y et as t h e

. .
,
mind progr esses in its search aft er truth it lays b e ,
hind it a serie s Of spontaneous states which though ,
forgotte n i n themselves forgot t en in the form i n ,
which they appeared when new are yet the lever .
, ,
as it were and the i nstrument of all future progress ;

,
.
they have become part o f t h e mind itself which .
thenceforth is what it has become The m i nd i s

. .
'
always taki n g a fresh start and considering itself a s ,
h a ving always been as necessarily being that which , ,
it now nds i tself to be It forgets the origin o f i t s .
Opini ons and principles and considers them only a s ,

produced from its o w n fund as a trustee w h o ,

mixes his o wn and h i s cestui que trust s moneys a t .
- -

his banker s forgets how much is his o w n and how
,
much his cestui que -

.
V olunt ary redintegration i s not more independent .
o f the laws Of spo ntaneous redintegration than walk
ing is independent o f the laws Of gr a v i t a t i o n f A s

wa l king ( I borrow the illustration from C oleridge , .
who applies it i n a similar manner ) is a constant .
interruption o f and a constant returni ng to the l a w

, ,
o f gravitation s o the c onscious g uid ing o f the train

,
o f representations in voluntary redi ntegration by r e ,
fer e nce to a purp ose is a constant interruption Of

.
, ,
and a co nstant returning t o the law s o f spontaneou s

.
,
.
redin tegration In the former we keep rejecting t h e

.
representations which the l atter keeps offering to o ur

no tice if they d o n o t appear conducive to the end we
,
have in vie w the question which we propose to o ur

,
s elves to answer ; and the perceived non conducive -
ness o f the rej ected representations becomes o ur

.
guid e in xi ng at last o n repres entations which a r e

.
. , .
,
29 2 S P ONTANEO U S R E D I NTE GRATI ON .

secondly the effect o f men s vol itions o r conations
,
o n other men is for other men most important .
It is well therefore to mark O ff from others those

states of consciousness which at once involve a ,
sense Of e ffort and produce t h e e ffect o f external

actions o r events towards other men o r o n other
Obj ects and to consider these states Of consciousness
, ,
that is volitions and conations together with t h e

, ,
.
e ffects o r events which they produce in external

Objects as single but complex phenomena But if
,
.
this is done and if volitions and conations together

,
with the events produced by them are considered as

single phenomena under the name o f actions then
, ,
the distinction must also be retained by which a o

tions are divided into immanent and transitive that ,
i s into those which do not produce a change without

,
the mind o r in external Objects and those which do

, ,
pass on to such production In metaphysic however .

, ,
conations and volitions are nothing more than parti

c u l a r kinds o f states o f consciousness which like all ,
other states o f consciousness are resolvable into feel

ing the material and time and space the formal
, , , ,
e lement And as feelings are empirically inseparabl e

.
from cognitions s o also are conations and volitions ;

,
and though there may be feelings and cognitions

which are neither conations nor volitions there can ,
n o t be conations o r volitions which are not both
feeling s and cognitions When feelings sensations .

, ,
emotions conations volitions and cogni tions a r e

, , ,
spoken Of as separate O b je c t s o r separate states o f
consciousness the terms must always be understood

,
as provisional and abstract and as i rnp l yi ng a q u a ,

.
tenus er indicating the character and circumstance

,

.
which is particularly intended to be made t h e Obj ect

SP ON T ANE OU S R E D I N TE G RA T I ON . 29 3
o f discussion in the phenomena in question A s such .
provisional images cogni tions alone are the special

,
Obj ects Of metaphysical feelings and volitions o f ,
ethical enquiries ; and it is as belonging to feelings

,
and volitions that i s to the domain o f E thic that all

, , ,
knowledge and all cognit ions have a n al cause o r

serve an ultimate purpose a truth expressed s o

,
Often by A ristotle in the famous words 013 7 1 5 01 ; 1
7 562
5 1; C og ni tions and feelings exist each with
reference to the other and for the sake o f t h e other ,
just as the material and formal elements in the least

empirical moment o f consciousness exist for each
o ther and by each other a l one In volition rst an .
end a sake a n al cause and purpose is discerned ;

, , ,
in volition rst it exists A s Obj ect and subj ect

.
exist rst in reection s o nal causes exist rst in

,
volition P otentially both are co ntained in pheno

.
mena before they exist actually for consciousness ;

,
we discover afterwards that they wer e provided for .
We represent them as havi ng been potentially pre

sent i n the past ; and in the sam e way in the future , ,
higher and wider powers than we have yet any idea

o f may exist already in t h e states and modes Of con
s c i o u s n e s s and o f existence which have already been

, ,
developed in man and in the u ni verse which is now

,
a ctually his

Who shall limit the endless resur
.
rections Of fac ul ties yet dormant whose very seeds ,
may be yet uncreated ? Who shall imagine bound s

to the endless power o f development which h a s ,
already in the universe as it is already known to u s

, ,
produced such phenomena as could not possibly hav e

been anticipated until the fa ct itself declared them ,
yet all followin g o n e law and consisting o f the sam e

,
elements ? No t thos e assuredly w h o contend fo r t h e

29 4 S P ONT ANEO US R E D INTE GRAT I ON .
o f that l a w and those elements ; not

who s e e unity underlying a ll phenomena and e xist

ence and consciousness o f a piece ; for this is the v er y

c o ndition Of understandin g t h e lowest as a prophecy
o f the hi ghest a grain o f sand as the anticipation of
,
the moral law and t h e mo ral law itself as t h e promise

,
o f its o w n fullment .
29 6 VOL UN TARY R E D I NTE GRA TI ON .
reason in all their branches a r e nothing more than

, ,
modes o f time and space applied to perceptions and

redi ntegrations and that the laws o f logic themselves
,
are founded o n and a r e an application o f the sam e

, ,
forms .
To explain this position mor e fully it should b e

recalled that perception is the mini mum o f cognition
, ,
the subjective name for an obj ect B ut consciousness .
cannot rest w ith merely having formed objects it is ,
compelled to work them up into systems and this it ,
does in spontaneous redintegration ; but it cannot

stop here ; it is compel led also to dominate its o w n
spontaneous systems to remo d el organise and com
, , ,
p l e t e them which process is called the search after

,
truth All this organising and completing requires

.
no further formal apparatus no other a priori furn i

,
ture o r instruments than those cognitions o f tim e

,
and space which have already presided at the pro

,
duction Of the subject matter the perceptions and

-
spontaneous redintegrations which are to b e com

l e t e d and organised
p .
In the simplest cases o f perception t h e procedure

is entirely synthetic a combining Of separate s e n
,
s a t i o n s into a sin gle Obj ect o f perception ; but in
spontaneous redintegration the foundation is laid for

analysis by the omissions which accompany r e p r e
,
s e nt a t i o n Thinking is nothing more than a v o l un

.
tary combination o f synthesis and analysis ; we are

employed both in dismembering the Objects we have ,
and in forming others from their fragments A n .
abstraction may aris e either by attention by xing ,
the consciousness o n an attractiv e part o f the object

presented to us or spontaneously and without e ffort
,
by the mere forgetting o f some o f the features o f the

V OL UN T AR Y R E D I N TE GRA T I ON . 29 7
object B ut by an abstract notion is usually meant

.
a notion formed by voluntary attention to some parts

o f an Object to the exclusion o f the other parts ; and
,
this sense of the word wil l be retained here Sup .
pose that we have a perception o r a redintegration o f

some external Object before us for instance a house ,
.
We are attracted by some part of it which stands in

relation to some feeli ng perhaps intellectu a l as curi
, ,
o si t perhaps aesthetic as sense o f beauty o f outline

y, , ,
perhaps O f a moral o r sensuous nature as if o n e ,
room contains persons o r things which interest us .
In these cases we are rst attracted and then deter

mined to abstract o r withdraw the attention from
, ,
all other parts Of the Object and to x it on that ,
w hich interests u s The result Of this process is an

.
abstract notion It is voluntary if we suppos e that

.
the abstraction has involved a choice between two
attracting parts that is a conscious e ffort to x t h e

, ,
attention o n o n e i n stead o f o n another F rom this .
point we may a gain proceed either spontaneously o r

voluntarily by spontaneous o r voluntary r e d i nt e gra
,
tion If by the former no further e ffort o r attention

.
,
is required for the performance o f the redintegration ;

if by the latter we must have a purpose i n view an
, ,
interest beyond that o f merely dwell in g o n the S ingle

abstract notion which has interested us The redin .
t e gra t i o n itself must be instituted for a purpose and ,
with an end in view This purpose involves the com

.
parison Of t w o abstract notions Of the general same ,
ness o f which we have had a perception in the cours e

Of spontaneous redintegration The result o f the .
comparison o f abstract notions is a genera l notion ,
and this is formed o ut o f the abstract notions by a

voluntary redintegration o f them Say for instanc e .
29 8 VOL UN T AR Y RE D I NT E GR A T I O N .
that in the case Of buil di ngs we are attracted by o n e

GB VI , ,
which has a colonn ade o f pil l ars attached to it that

. .
this feature attracts o u r attention by exciting o ur

n ti n
o o s. aesthetic interest In the rst colonnaded b uil di ng
.
we s ee we attend to the pillars abstract the pill ars

, ,
from the other features Of the b uilding and make o f ,
them an abstraction The term pill ared is an a b

.
s tract but n o t yet a general

,
term It becomes a ,
.
general term only after t w o further s teps have been

taken The rst is a renewed perception or a spon
.
t a n e o u s redintegration We s e e the s ame buildin g

.
again o r a picture of it o r h ave it represented in

, ,
spontaneous redintegration We must have seen seve .
r a l pillared buildings o r had such buildings several

,
times represented in a redintegration The several .
instances are requisite to give us the content O f t h e

voluntary redintegration In spontaneous r e d i nt e
.
ra t i o n there is no reason why o n e pillared building

g
should redintegrate another ; the interest in the pil
lars sets t h e redintegration going but then gi ves way ,
t o another circumstance o f interest ; but when we
have had several instances Of pillared buildings pre

sented o r represented separately and then feel an ,
interest in this circumstanc e o f being pillared for ,
its o w n sak e then we keep rej ecting all the Objects

,
O e r e d by spontaneous redintegration exce t thos e

p
whi ch resemble t h e Object with which w e started ;
yet not because they resemble that Obj ect but b e ,
c ause the interest attaching to them is the same and

;
indeed if it was their resemblance and not their i n
, ,
t e r e s t that led us to x upon them general notions

, ,
would precede a n d condition voluntary r e di nt e gra

tions and n o t vice vers a This voluntary r e di nt e gra
.
t ion is the second step ; volition guid es the re d i n t e

3 00 VOL UN TARY R E D I N TE GRA T I ON .
Spontaneous redintegration does not include th at a l

t e rn a t i ng process which is implied in the words hold
ing together two o r more i n stances o f perception A .
s econd e ffort in addition to the original act o f atten
tion if s o we call t h e being attracted to a single point

,
Of interest is required in order that w e may move

,
backwards and forwards s o to speak o n the lines of

, ,
redintegration Y et t h e new process employed in

.
making general terms the process of voluntary redin

,
t e gr a t i o n differs only in point Ofgreater intensity and

,
complexity from t h e act o f attention with which w e

s tart in S po ntaneous re di ntegration The new Obj ect .
o f perception which interests us the aggregate o f ,
instances o f pillared buildings instead Of the singl e ,
instances is too larg e t o be comprehended by o n e

,
glance Of the mental vision and too complicated t o ,
b e satisfactorily explored by traversing it once only

a n d in o n e direction It is the interest o f the Object
.
,
its attractiveness fo r us which is the motive o r deter

,
mining power both in S pontaneous and in voluntary

,
redintegration ; but in the latter case the nature O f

the Obj ect forbids t h e easy and immediate satisfaction
Of the interest interposes Obstacles in the way o f
,
seeing all we wish to s e e the interest in the Object

,
still remains when w e have seen a single instance of

it ; in the instanc e o f t h e buildings these Obstacles
consist in t h e number and remoteness o f the Obj ects ,
the faintness o f t h e perceptions their unfrequent r e ,
currence in S pontaneous redintegration ; and we t h i i s

become conscious o f a purpose and o f a second effort , ,
a greater attention necessary to master o ur purpose

,
.
The attracting interest i n spontaneous redintegration

is transformed into a foreseen purpose in voluntary
redi n tegration is changed from an e f cient into a
,
V OL UN T ARY R E D I NT E GRA T I ON . 3 01
nal cause as an interest the knowledge o f which

, ,
and not its mere existence causes us to make t h e ,
new e ffort o f attention .
The description o f the process Of voluntary redin

t e gr a t i o n harmonises With what has been already said
Of the nature Of volition S ince voluntary r e d i n t e gr a
,
tion is but an instance o f applied conation V olition .
is conscious e ffort for a purpose Of which we are c o n

scious E very process Of nature o ur whole life is
.
, ,
activity ; when that activity meets with a felt resist

ance there is e ffort ; and when that e ffort is persisted
,
in with a purpose there is volition N ot conscious

,
.
e ffort but conscious e ffort with a purpose is volition

, , .
N or is it requisite to volition that the purpose Should

be clearly seen o r understood ; it is enough if it be
represented to the mind as a future pleasure near o r ,
distant a pleasure to be retained o r a pleasure to b e

,
acquired whether in thinking o r acting o r feeling a

, ,
pleasure which is not full y attained by the actual

rapidity o f advance made towards it o r which is ,
deni ed to us by Obstacles o r by a movement o f o ur

o w n in the opposite direction There then arises a .
discrepancy between the wish and its accomplishment ,
and we are conscious o f the progress w e make in

satisfying the wish .
3 4 Having seen how general notions are ac

.
quired let us now s e e more closely what their natur e

,
is
. It is o n e peculiarity o f them to ll no denit e
space and no denite time in the way that the O b ,
c t s do from which they are abstracted ; s o long as

j e
they remain abstract they cann ot be brought befor e

us in a complete and deni te image A n d s 1 n c e .
there is n o such thing in presentation as a horse in

general o r a man in general many persons are con
, ,
3 02 . VOL UNT ARY R E D INT E GRA TI O N .

ready to exc laim with Wordsworth s Wan
t i nu a l l y ,
derer but with a technical meaning foreign to h i s

,
34
hi nt intention
.
T e r a ure .
,
G iv e n s f ur b t c t i n s s lid f
o r o a s ra o o a c t s,
Fo r o u di pu t
r pl i n pic t u
s es a re s .
N evertheless the process Of ab s traction is i n d i sp e n s a

ble to a l l Objective thinking ; and since a ll ge n e r a l i s a
t ion is abstraction what is true o f the latter is tru e
,
also O f the former s o far as it is comprehended under

,

the latter In abstracting however we never carry

.
the process to the limit Of annihilating in thought t h e

parts which we abstract from ; but we place the O b
e c t o r the part o f the Object to which we pay atte n

j
tion i n relation with some other parts o r some other
Object and consider it never as independent but a l
,
ways as interdependent with other parts o r Object s

which we leave undeterm i n ed and provisional When .
we abstract the colour red for instance from a certain , ,
number Of coloured Objects we think it away from ,
all o f these but we place it in another Object which

,
we either imagine o r represent for the p u rpose But .
this new provisional shape o f the abstract notion red

we consider as having no necessary conn ection with
the colour red and therefore as capable Of easy dis
,
missal at any moment that a true claimant arises .
The di fference between an abstract and a concret e

notion is not that the former has not while the latter
, ,
has d e ni t e jo r particular shape o r duration but that

, ,
the former has thes e properties pro visionally only

and momentarily the latter has them constantly and
,
. .
s ecurely .
I t is Often said True we can conceive such and

'

, ,
such a thing but we cannot imagine it ; or; True w e

, ,
3 04 VOL UNTARY R E D I NT E GRA TI ON .
duration both liable to alteration O n the occurrence

,
o f a new mstance and made provisional i n order to

,
include new instances .
An abstract o r general o r provisional i mag e o r

concept may be dealt with in two ways ; either it 1 s
kept before the imagin ation and then it i s r e p r e s e nt e d
,
as part Of an Obj ect all the oth er parts o f which a r e

,
liable to change i n the way just described ; and this

,
is the only way in which any use can b e made Of it

in reasoning properly s o called ; o r it is dismissed
entirely from conscio usness as an image care onl y , ,
being taken to have the means o f recalling it when it

is wanted for comparison ; and this is done by means
Of names We name a quality o r an Operation an
.
, ,
image o r a conception and then we can at any mo,
ment recall by means o f the name the representation

signied by it And when representations are s o
.
recalled they appear in the Shap e before described ,
that i s as the xed part o r parts o f Obj ects to t h e

, ,
other parts o f which w e attach the further quality o f

being removable at pleasure We thus hold the ge
'
neral notion as it were in solution ready to combine ,
with the other parts Of the Obj ects to whi ch reasoni n g

o r presentation shall mani fest that it truly belongs .
I n whichever Of the t w o ways just described r e p r e

s c utations are dealt with that is to u se Kant s terms
, , ,
whether we reason ostensively or apagogically whe ,
ther we reason with the Obj ects before us in re p r e

s e n t a t i o n o r presentation and by comparison between
them o r reason with their names o r other marks onl y

,
before us unconverted in to their s i gni c a t e s o ur rea

, ,
soning must be conformable to the P ostulates Of

Logic ; Logic as a formal science embraces both me
t h o d s Of reasonin But ostensiv e reasonin g alone
g ,
VOL UN TAR Y R E D I NT E G RA T I ON . 3 05
properly deserves that name ; apagogic reasoning is

rather to be call ed computation o r calculation ; and
ostensive reasoning accordingly falls u nder two heads ,
rst as a series Of complete o r empirical phenomena ,
as a process o f voluntary redintegration and secondly ,
as subject to purely formal laws o r as containing a ,
purely formal element ; o r as it may also be ex,
pressed rst with referenc e to its motive o r deter

,
mini n g force the course o r courses which i t t a kes ;

,
-
and secondly with reference to the laws which that

force is subj ect to whatever may be the course taken
,
.
It is treated as the rst in the present chapter and ,
will be treated as the second in the following chapter ,
the rst Of the Second P art .
3 5 R easoni ng s o far as it keeps within t h e

.
,
limits o f what has already been observed and does

not attempt to discover o r establish new truths b e
yond the li mits o f already Observed facts for ther e

,
is another eld Of reasonin g whi ch will shortly b e

,
described and another sens e Of the word ge n e ra l i s a

,
tion namely an application o f knowledge alread y

, ,
gained to facts n o t yet observed in anticipation o f ,
them reasonin g within these limits is nothing mor e

,
than testing and completing general notions by a p

plying them to new presentative o r representative
perceptions and comparing the latter with the for
,
m er. The general notions are then mo di ed accord

ing to the result o f the comparison and the name by ,
which the general notion is signied henceforth re

s umes the entir e process that is expresses its result
, , ,
a s it before resumed the process without t h e new
presentative o r representative perception M any ge .
neral notions have been S O x e d t h a t their me a ning

is henceforth not subject t o modication Black a nd .
X
306 VOL UNTAR Y RE D I NTE G R A T I O N .
white are typical i n common parlance o f thi s class

, , .
O thers are stil l in process of modication as fo r i n ,
stance i n the popular theology o f the present day ,
the general notion signi ed by the word Inspiration .
Wh en the qua l ities and processes have been deter

mined which are properly to b e i n cluded in this
gener a l notion t h e name inspiration wil l express and
,
recall these always however in a oating prov isional

, , ,
S hape ; and thenceforth all qu a li ties and processes

which differ from those S O included in this general
notion will be excluded from it and w ill either nd ,
a place in some other gener a l notion a llied to that o f ,
i nspiration and signied probably by a cognate name

, ,
o r will b e conned to those other general notions t o
which they have hitherto belonged in common with

t hat o f inspiration R easoning lim i ted as before is
.
, ,
nothing more than this dealing with gener a l notions ,
keeping them before consciousness and apply ing to ,
them ever new and new characteristics supplied by

experiment a n d Observation to s e e if they will h a r
,
m o n i s e with the Old and if there is o n e with which

, ,
they will n o t harmonise determining which Of t h e

,
two best harmonises with the rest The canon o f .
this process o f harmonising o r rather the form of t h e

,
c anon o f reasoning which is applicable to it when it

,
is conceived in thi s general way abstracting from i t s ,
p articular methods Of induction o r deduction is this : ,
That conception o r genera l notion is the true o n e

which expresse s a l l t h e facts o f the case without ,
exception in t h e S i mplest possible shape ; o r that

, ,

which provides a place for all the phenomena with

the least expens e o f clas sication T hi s is c a l l ed the .
Law o f P arcimony It is subjective it relates pri

.
,
maril y t o o ur knowledge Of Objects and not t o their

3 08 VOL UN T ARY R E D I NTE GRA T I ON .
b eing sought to Show what precisely it is what dif ,
ference Of composition structure o r function o f his

, ,
material organism it is which is invariably and exclu

,
si v el present with all the other essential c h a ra c t e r i s

y
-
tics which a t present constitute the general c o n c e p

tion When such a d i e r e n c e is discovered it may
'
.
,
possibly compel the modication o f some o f the other

characteristics n o w included in the conception .
A passage from the Logique o f D e s t ut t de Tracy

expresses admirably this modication Of general con ~
c ep t i o ns which is reasoni n g C hapter I near the

,
. .
end . O n doit donc suivant moi s e representer

chacune des idees qui sont dans nos t etes comme un

petit groupe d i d e s lmentaires runies ensembl e
par des premiers juge m e n s duquel a u moyen d e
, ,
tous les juge m e n s postrieurs que nous en portons i l ,
sort continuellement dans tous les sens des irradia ,

tions pareilles a ces tuyaux qui s a l l o nge nt C e petit .
groupe quoique gardant toujours l e meme nom celui ,
qui en est l e signe e t l e reprsente change donc per ,

e t u e l l e m e nt d e gure e t de volume d a ut a nt plu s
p ,
que souvent une nouvelle addition en dtruit beau

c oup d a u t r e s plus ancienn es ; e t cela fait varier con
t i n u e l l e m e nt s e s rapports avec les autres groupes qui

l e touchent par d i ffe r e n s poin ts e t qui de leur c Ot e
, , ,
prouvent des a l t er a t i o n s semblables C ela peint tres.
bien a m o n avis c e qui s e passe dans notre esprit tant

que nous vivons e t la cause pour laquelle divers indi
,
vidus e t l e meme dans d i ffer e n s temps portent d e s

,
j g
u e m e n s di ffer e n s des idees exprimes par les m emes
S ignes .

Is there more in the law o f parcimony s o far as it ,
is o f a formal character than the well known forms

,
-
o f time and space ? This is the question which must -

VOL UN TARY R E D IN TE G RA T I ON . 3 09
be answered here a t the rst stage Of the description

,
Of voluntary intellectual processes Its anal ysis will

.
S how what its constituent parts are It is a practical

.
command to c onsciousness t o take the S hortest route

in representing the relation o f two points and to ,
embrace differen t Obj ects by the simplest possible

out line S O far as this command describes what t h e
.
nature o f the thing to b e done is it is merely tim e ,
and space again ; the same formal element which a p

e a r e d in perceptions and no other appears again
p , ,
when these are worked up into conceptions ; tim e

relations and space relations between Objects this is ,
w hat the formal part Of conceptions consists o f But .
this would equally be t h e case if the command had

been to take the longest instead Of the S hortest route ,
the most complicated i nstead Of t h e si mplest gure .
What remains is a law for conation not for cognition,

.
A l l reaso ni ng cogn ition involves a n activity o n an ,
e ffort resting o n and proceeding from ( in order still

, ,
to keep in view the psychological order o f causes ) ,
the material organ o f consciousness the brain ; an ,
a ctivity which has its modes Of operation and its
degrees o f energy to expend upon them The better .
the modes O f operation the more available is the

,
energy and the more it can perform

,
The law o f .
parcimony is nothing more than saying husband your ,
energy choose the shortest road and the S implest

, ,
gure There is no other stringency o f an i n t e l l e c

.
tu a l nature in the law o f parcimony but the stringency

Of practical n o t theoretical good sense It is found
, ,
.
by experience that les s energy is expended in i magin

ing a straight line than a crooked o n e Thus s o far .
as the law O f parcimony is a law of cognition it is

-
,
nothing mor e than t h e well known forms Of time and

31 0 VOL UN TARY R E D INTE GRA TI ON .
PA R TL sp ace ; what other stringency i t has is derived from

the nature o f conation and the ple a s ure which consists
in minimising e ffort .
The law o f parc i mony is expressed well in the

words employed by William o f O ckham F r u s t r a t per ,
l u r a quod e r i potest per c i o ra Summa Tot

p a . .
L o gi c ae P ars 1 cap 1 2
,
. Its characteristic o f being
. .
a law for conation not for cogni tion is common t o it

, ,
with all P ostulates ; a l l postulates are laws for cona

tion are laws of reasoning s o far only as reasonin g is
,
a voluntary that i s a conative process Thorough

, ,
.
going scepticism such as i s exhibited by Sextus E m

,
s
i r i c u s rests on the refusal Of a postulate Of reasoning

p ,
as a voluntary process namely of the postulate that

, ,
the result Of reasoni ng will be truer than its com

m e n c e m e nt that we shall be in a better position with
,
regard to truth by means O f reasoning than we were

w ithout it Scepticism does not deny the re a l ity o f
.
facts but the reality Of truth ; for the reality Of truth

,
is an assumption involved i n all reasoning ; and this

assumption the sceptic will not make It is Obvious .
that all volition involves the assumption Of the attain .
ab il i ty o f that whi ch it seeks to attai n ; otherwise it

would not seek to attain it that is the conation III , ,

volved in the volition would cease In reasoni ng .

,
truth is that whi ch conation seeks to attain ; therefore

the assumption Of the atta inability o f truth that i s , ,
o f greater truth than that from which we start is ,
involved m every instance o f reasoning All reason .
ing was rej ected by the Sceptics as involving this

assumption ; they neither reasoned t he m s elves nor
accepted the reasoni n g o f others except h y p o t h e t i ,
c a lly and as a concession to conveni ence All ki nds .
o f voluntary conation too as well a s reasoning they

VOL UN TAR Y R E D I NT E GRATI ON .
backwards only looks only at facts which have a l

,
ready been Objects Of presentation o r already inferred ,
from such Objects and remodels them in r e d i nt egr a

,
re a s o ni ng
.
tion in order to nd the general notion which will
,
e xpress them all in the briefest formula o r colligate ,
the facts in the simplest possible image A cquisitiv e .
generalisation on the other hand looks forwards into

, ,
the future as well as backwards into the past a n d ,
e ndeavours to deduce from Objects and their already
known e ffects new Obj ects and new effects w hether ,
these are to be introduced into the gro ups Of Objects

a lready known o r whether they are to take place in
,
the historical future whether it is a divination o f

,
Objects and events belonging to groups o f already

,
Observed Objects but not yet observed in those groups ,
o r a di vination Of Obj ects and events which are yet
to arise and constitute future experience C ritical .
generalisation explains past knowledge acquisitive ,
generalisation fo r e t e l s future knowledge ; critical ge

n e ra l i s a t i o n is representation only acquisitive gene ,
r a l i s a t i o n is imagination in addition .
The line of demarcation thus drawn between cri

tical and acquisitiv e reasoning besides the inherent
,
evidence it may be thought to possess Of being a

truly drawn line acquires some additiona l p r o b a b i
,
l i t y from its being coincident w ith two other lines o f

demarcation in cognate matters It coincides with .
the line Of demarcation between facts considered a s

contingent and facts considered as necessary It is .
admitted that all facts i ns o far as they are links in

,
the complex chain of causation are necessary ; that ,
their contingency arises from o u r not knowi n g in any ,
particular case either w hat the cause Of an event is

o r wheth e r that cause wil l itself take place All facts .

V OL UN T AR Y R E D I NT E GRA T I ON . 31 3
which have n o t only happened but are known to hav e ,
happened are necessary cannot be undone cannot fail

, ,
to have happened ; kno wledge and the fact known

coincide and the apparent contingence Of the fact
,
vanishes O f facts Objects and events all that is

.
, , ,
known and all that is unknown is necessary ; a l l that

is unknown is contingent besides The future and .
un known is in itself equally necessary with the known
and the past ; but particular things which are un

known whether in the past o r the future are as such
, ,
particular things contingent ; what is known whether ,
particular o r not and whether it is in the past or in

,
the fut ure is necessary The known o r necessary

,
.
facts are o n o ne S ide Of the line O f demarcation and ,
are Obj ects o f critical generalisation ; the u nknown o r

contingent facts are o n the other side o f the line and ,
are the Objects of acquisitive generalisation the a i m ,
Of which is t o bring them over from o n e side t o t h e

o ther .
And in the next place just as the cas e stands

, ,
with other Objects Of knowledge s o it stands a l so ,
with the Object of self con sciousness in its o w n a c

-
tions that is with the sense Of the freedom Of the

, ,
will O ur sense Of freedom arises from the fact Of our

.
knowing that o ur action will when it arises be a , ,
determination o f the Obj ect Of self consciousness but -

,
not knowing in what way it will b e determined ,
what line it will take in what way its self conscious

,
-
ness will b e coloured o r will feel That is its deter .

,
mination is unknown and being also a particular ,
thin g is contingent Those Of o u r actions which we

,
.
have already done are necessary and kn own and fa l l ,
011 the side o f critical gener a l isation ; thos e o f o ur
actions wh ich we have not done though e q ually n e ,

VOL UNTAR Y R E D IN TE GRA TI ON .
as actions yet as partic ul ar and unkn o w n

c e s sa r
y ,
actions are contingent besides and fal l o n the side o f ,
acqui sitive generali sation .
r ea s o ni ng .
Since critic a l generali sation has two aspects o r
functions that o f explicating conceptions and th a t o f
, ,
colligating facts but consciousness Operates in order

,
Of time it follows that there are two modes o f pro

,
c eedi n
g in critic a l generalisation o n e starting from a ,
general notion subsumes individual particular o r less , ,
general notions under it ; the other startin g from i n ,
dividual particular o r less general notions s up e ri n

, , ,
duces a general i ncluding notion upon them These .
modes O f proceeding may be regarded as the exercis e

o f what is called by Kant die bestimmende und die r e
e kt i r e n d e Ur t h e i l skra ft ( Kritik der Ur t h e i l skr a ft ,
Ri nl I V Werke vol 4 p
. .
,
and an al ogous modes Of
.
,
.
proceeding wi ll di sclose themselves i n the Operations

Of acquisitive generalisation These are the two modes .
in which the double faced operation o f critical g en e-
r a l i s a t i o n is carried into e ffect ; but in whichever o f
the two ways we approach the matter both aspects ,
and functions o f critical g eneralisation are i nvolved .
W h ether we go from less to more wide o r from mor e ,
to less wide notions the process as a whole will b e

, ,
both an explication Of a conception and a colligation

o f fa c ts . A s an instance Of the subs um in g process
may be taken the general notion of being c o m b u s s
tible starting from which we subsume un der it di a

,
mond and co a l the notion o f combustion having been

,
current before either diamond o r coal were found to

be combustible substances And as an instance of .
the superinducing process may be taken the c o n s t r u c

tion Of a type o f formation in the animal kingdom ,
from the grouping together Of i ndi vidual animals

31 6 VOL UN TARY R E D I NTE G R A T I O N .
lose its truth and soon ceas e altogether ; for it would

be equivalent to this that no empirical particular , ,
feeling would be presented again to consciousness .
The stability o f natur e therefore derived from pre ,
s e nt a t i o n continued as an universal fact in r e di nt e

,
g ra t i o n is assumed
,
in all voluntary r edintegration ,
and therefore in all critical reasoning I t is beside s .
a law relating to the matter and not the form of o b

e c t s to the feelings o f consciousness not to the times
j ,
and spaces which they occupy ; o r rather it relates to

empirical Objects and not t o their formal element
alone .
3 7 A cquisitive reasoning rests also on t h e as

.
_
sumption of thi s same law but not on this only ; it ,
rests besides on a further modication o r addition to ,
it namely on the law known as the U niformity o f

, ,

the course Of nature See M r J S M ill s System of . . . .
Logic Book 1 1 ch 1 2 The term uniform ity O f t h e

,
. .
-
.
cours e Of nature means the stability not O f Objects

but O f their sequences that the s a m e i m p r e s si o n s will
,
be followed by the same ; for instance that the visual ,
impression o f re to morrow will be followed by t h e -
impression Of burning if I touch it as it was followed ,
by it when I touched it to day ; while the term sta -
b i l i t y Of nature means that the visual impression o f re

t o day is the same as t h e visu a l impression o f r e to
m orrow and t h e burning Of to day as the burni ng of
,
-
to morrow A cquisitive reasoning in assuming as its

-
.
,
starting point the law o f t h e uniformity o f the cours e

Of nature assumes i m mi c i t l y the law O f the stability Of
,
nature ; but it does not explicitly assume it becaus e ,
it is busied with sequence s only for all passing from ,
a known to an u nknow n is a s equence , .
But t h e law Of the uniformity of the cours e Of

VOL UN T AR Y R E D I NT E GRA T I ON . 31 7
nature is not the whole o f what is assumed in acqui

s i t i v e reaso ni ng as the principle o r canon o n which it
,
rests It is only the material o r rather the empirical

.
, ,
portion Of the whole principle ; it is founded o n the

material in conj unction with the formal element in
cognition and not o n the formal element alone It
,
.
e xpresses a general fact concern ing sensations and
feelings not concerning the properties Of time and

,
S pace in which these feelings appear It supposes .
indeed everywhere that the feelin gs exist solely in

time and S pace ; how otherwise could it predicat e
uniformity o f them ? but it is not this fact which it
sets itself to express What it states is that among
.
,
the feelings lling time and space uniform sequence s

are everywhere observable ; that sim ilar feeli n gs o r ,
Objects s o far as they make themselves known by

feelings in similar circumstances will be followed by
, ,
s imilar feelings and similar objects Though it thus

.
abstracts from the formal element in cognition it does ,
not therefore S hake O ff its authority O n the con .
t ra ry it will b e found hereafter that it owes a great

,
part of its validity to the formal element It will b e .
hereafter S hown that the necessity o f having some

antecedent to every consequent and some consequent,
to every antecedent that the validity Of the canon o r

,
law o f C ausality o r R atio S uf c i e n s which is the for ,
mal S ide Of the law o f the uniformity o f the course o f

nature is nothin g else than the form o f time joined
,
to and existing in the form o f S pace ; the proof Of

which has been already given by Sir W Ham ilton . .

It woul d seem to be this canon Of causality which has

given to the canon Of t h e uniformity Of the course Of
nature its appearance o f necessity wherever such a ,
c haracter has been ascribed to it It is the necessary

.
31 8 VOLUNT ARY R E D I NT E GRA T I ON .
preliminary consideration which gives strength and

CH V I
importance to the canon Of uni f ormity ; it assures us
. .
that this latter stands o n rm ground and works i n ,
a legitimate di rection ; for it shows that we are com

e l l e d to look in the direction where the canon Of
p
uniformity looks and for something which that canon
,
professes to nd Here again comes out that same

.
distin ction between form and matter in cogni tion

, ,
between empirical Obj ects and their metaphysical ele

ments which has been Observed in all the phenomena
,
yet described ; in the pr esent case revealin g i t s e l f i n

the law o f acquisitive reasoning .
3 8 A cquisitive reasoning has two processes

.
,
Induction and D eduction analogous to t h e super ,
i n ducing and subsuming processes o f critical reason

m ,g and which may like them be treated either a s
two sides o f o n e and the same Operation o r as di s ,
tinct processes preceding and following each other .
F irst induction precedes deduction follows taking

, , ,
u
p the Operation where in duction relinquished it .
Induction i s the establishing a genera l law from par

t i c ul a r cases valid not o nl y fo r those particular cases
, ,
but for all cases yet unobserved which resemble

, ,
them ; as for instance from the Observed cases o f

, ,
the death Of creatures possessing e sh l y bo di es a law

1 s established that all creatures possessing e s hl b
y o
dies are mort al D eduction is the application Of such

.
laws to instanc e s yet unobserved thus bringing them ,
under the general law establi s hed by i n duction as

.
when it is concluded that an infant to be born to

morrow because he wi l l possess a e sh l y body will
, ,
be morta l No w Of thes e two processes it is to b e

.
remarked that they are fundamentally the same t w o ,
stages Of o ne and the same p rocess ; and that the e s

3 20 VOL UNTARY R E D I NT E GRATI ON .
consideration is That the course Of nature is uniform

, ,
that is that an Object which remains S imilar in its rela

,
tions to the senses will also remain similar in its e ffects ,
o r will be followed by Objects similar in their relations
to the senses That is in this instance that the Object

.
, ,
which we call a e sh l y body wil l always b e succeeded

by the same Object namely a decaying body This
,
.
general law is the ground o f all inductions ; that i s to

sa
y
,
all inductions are founded on o r deduced from
this assumption It is the ultimate major premiss to

.
whic h all partic ul ar inductions such as the above , ,
stand in the position o f conclusions The latter a r e .
appli cations Of the former subsumptions o f a cas e

,
under a given rule ; and in this sense all in ductions

are i n their nature deductions .
The tables are turned ; but they must be turned

again This primary principle o f all inductions from
.
,
which all inductions are deductions is itself an i n duc ,
tion It is a generalisation from many cases in which

.
,
S im i lar obj ects have been followed by similar to all ,
cases Of Objects followed by Objects yet unobserved .
Thou gh it may be tr ue that all subsequent induction

is deduction y e t it is deduction from a former induc
,
tion ; its ultimate ground the law Of t h e uniformity

,
o f the course o f nature appears to b e an induction

,
which rests o n no prior deduction .
But the tables must be again turned and for t h e ,
last time F or o n what rests this rst induction

.
,
prior to the partic ul ar inductions founded o n it this ,
rst induction Of the uniformity o f the course o f na

ture ? The uniformity of the course Of nature is a
generalisation from many cases in which S imilar ,
cases have been followed by sim i l ar to all cases o f ,
Objects followed by Objects yet unobserved We have .

VOLUNTARY R E D IN TE GRAT I ON . 321
no Observed the uniformity in all cases but e xtend

t ,
it from the Observed to t h e unobserved What justi .
es u s i n generalising at all in unknown cases in

.
going o ut beyond the actually Observed in assuming ,
that uniformity o f e ff ect from uni form i ty o f caus e

holds good in other cases besides those Observed ?
That which justies us in s o doing is a state o f c o n
s c i o usn e s s in redintegration We go o ut beyond
.
Observed facts that is beyond presentations becaus e

, , ,
i n spontaneous redintegration presentations are com

'
l e t e d are supplied with their e ffects before thos e

p , ,
e ffects are presented in consciousness Spontaneous .
redintegration anticipates t h e e ffects o f presentations ;

and thus the assertion Of t h e e ffect is a deduction from
o u r state o f mind in spontaneous redin tegration A .
chi l d who has burnt his ngers to day dreads t h e r e-
to morrow This is apparently an in duction ; he ge

-
.
n e r a li s e s t h e rst instance Of re followed by burni n g ,
and to morrow he assumes befor e the fact that r e

-
will burn h i m Why does he do this ? Because t h e

.
S ight o f the re the next day redi n tegrates t h e tot a l

i mpression left by the re the day before ; the visual
sensation to day is the sam e as that yesterday and
-
,
redintegrates the sensation Of heat In other words .

,
his induction that the re the next day will burn him
is a deduction from his association in re di ntegration , ,
Of the sight o f the re with the feeling Of burni ng
That association is the li nk between the two cases ,
the rst where the e ffect has been Observed and t h e

, ,
second where it has not been Observed It is tru e

,
.
that mere association is an untrustworthy guide but ,
previous to verication it i s the onl y o n e we have .
P revious to verication it is o ur onl y guide to tru th

,
in unknown instances ; and in passing from a number

322 VOL UNT ARY RE D INTE GRAT I ON .
o finstanc e s o f uniform i ty o f cause and e ffect t o oth er

instan c es i n generali sing the law o f uniform i ty in
, ,
making that induction which is the g r ound Of other

inductions thi s process Of spontaneous redintegrati on
, ,
conrmed i nto a h abit is the grou nd o r moving caus e ,
o f the generalisation Its validi ty depends o n t h e . -
fact proved a posteri ori o n the veri cation supplied ,
by a constant e xper ience ; but the a ss umption O f i t s
va l idity depends o n spontaneous redintegration and

is an a priori assumption U ltimately therefore all .
induction i s deduction from a prior s tat e o f con s cious

-

ness o r cogni tion

f
No t onl y in the i n ductions mad e previously t o .
the establishment Of the law o f uniformity is t h e

link between the k nown and the u nknown due t o
, ,
the anticipation of the event in redintegration but ,
a l so in i nductions mad e after the establishment Of
that law F or however certain we may be o f what is

.
past however much previous anti cipations have been

,
conrmed by later experience s o t h a t w e can assert ,
that i n all past experience the course of nature has

, ,
been un iform wh at is there in experi ence to justify

,
us i n extendi ng this certainty to future o r unknown

cases ? Why should n o t t h e course o f nature cease t o
be unif orm at the point a t which we have arrived ?
What certainty have we that the s un will rise to .
mor row ; O r why s houl d n o t e v e nt s henceforth follow

.
f
each o ther wi thout reference to their antecedents ?

Since w e d o not know the cause o f the uni formity o f
~
"
the course O f nature and S ince that uniformity i s n o ,
n ecess ary law o r for m O f t hough t it is clear that w e

f
.
,
.
can suppose it to cease a t any m oment ; fo r w e can

~
think it a way a nd we know o f no prior condition

,
.
from whi ch i t foll o ws T h e o nl y possible sa n sw e r .

3 24 VOLUNTARY R E D I NT E GRAT I ON .
proces s Of consciousness that is from t h e s ub je c

'

a , ,
tive S ide and as a chain Of cogni tions rather than a s

,
a chain Of Objects o f cognition when we look at how ,
we know rather than at what we know is that each , ,
s tep in it is dependent o n and subsumed under a pre
vions cognition that is to s a y is deductive ; and that

, ,
while objectively o r with reference to what we know

, ,
the whole process is properly called induction being ,
a superinducing Of particular facts which as particular

facts cann ot be known previous to o r independently
Of the process itself at the same time subj ectively o r
, ,
with reference to how we know the whole process i s ,
properly called deduction since it consists o f antici

,
p a t i o n s founded o n
p rev i ous knowledge V ericatio n .
t o o is either a deductive process o r a process o f pre ,
s e nt a t i v e perception and n o t Of reasoning at all Th e .
whole process Of acqui sitive reasoning o r ge n e r a l i s a

tion will then be divided a s follows ; i n its subj ectiv e
aspect it is de duction in its Obj ective induction ;
, ,
both Of these aspects bein g inse p arably connected ,
e very generalisation possessing both Then t w o .
s tages o f this double faced Operation wi ll be disti n

-
u i s h e d ; the rst moving from partic ul ars to gen e

g
rals and called specially Induction t h e second from
, ,
generals to partic ulars and called specially D e d uc

,
tion .
When t h e canon Of the uniformity Of t h e cours e

o f nature was established o n what depended its v a
,
l i d i t y ? O n the law of nature which it expressed .
This law o f nature is the ground o f the validi ty o f all

inductions both o f those made before and of thos e
,
made after the discovery Of the canon B ut upon .
what depended the feeling Of certainty with respect

to thos e inductions made befor e t h e d isc o very a nd
V O L UN T ARY R E D I N TE G RA T I ON . 3 25
without knowledge Of the canon ? That thes e induc

tions were valid is true ; but h o w were they known ,
o r assumed to be v a l id is the question ; how came

,
they t o be depended o n ? The ground o f certainty

with respect to those prior inductions is really als o
O
the ground o f certainty with respect to the later i n

d uc t i o n s and to the canon o f induction itself
,
This .
canon when discovered throws back light it is true , ,
o n the vali dity o f the former inductions the steps by ,
which it was itself reached ; but the felt certain ty o f

the former inductions was necessary to produce t h e
felt certainty Of the canon Of induction Ther e a r e .
here two questions subj ective and Obj ective r e s p e c

,
t i v e l y in their reference ; the rst r egardi n g the causa

c o gn o s c e n di o f induction the latter the causa exist
,
e ndi t h e possibil ity o r condition o f such certainty

,
e xistin g . The latter question is answered by t h e

canon Of in duction itself which gives the Obj ective ,
ground Of certainty that is which shows the vali di ty

, ,
Of the inductive process by s tating the general law ,
Of nature o n which it rests The former question .

,
which relates to the certainty o f the inductive process ,
is as yet unanswered except s o far as the preceding

,
remarks are an answer How came men to trust in .
r e s ul t s r e a c h e d by the inductive process before t h e
discovery o f the inductive canon ; how came men to

e mploy without hesitation the process Of induction ,
before they knew the general law that the course o f

nature is uniform ? This is the question .
The answer cannot be found in the canon o f

causality o r ratio s u f c i e n s deduced from the formal ,
e lement in cognition fo r the question relates only to

,
sequences in the material element o r in empirical

Object s And if th e re wer e no uniformity in t h e ma
.
t e ri a l element , if Objects followed each oth e r at ra n
dom and not Un iformly still they would b e subject

'
to the laws o r forms o f time and spac e N or can it .
be found in any constitution Of material Obj ects as ,
objects only for the question relate s to so mething

,
subj ective to the sense o f certainty attached to

,
Cert ain processes Of reaso ni ng

.
It must be sought .
i n the modes in which consciousness deals with O b

e c t s as Objects Of cons ciousness ; and this points o ut
j

to us the phenomena in which the answer is t o be

found It will be found in the phenomena o f spon
.
t a n e o u s redin tegration dependent on and repetitions

, ,
o f presentative perceptions
,
The sense o f certainty
.
in induction depends o n the law Of consciousness

which represents together phenomena o r parts o f
Objects which have been presented together in per
c e tio n ; and the m o re frequently and closely they
p
have b een presented together in perception t h e ,
greater is the tendency to represent them together

in redintegration It is the tendency which I hav e
.
called the second law of re di ntegration the law o f ,
Habit . This tendency causes us to expect that

.
when o ne o f such phenomena is presented to us t h e ,
others will be presented immediately Why ? It is .
commonly said because we have found it S O pre

,
s ented before But this is no t enough We want to

. .
know how this circumstanc e o f having found it s o ,
presented before operates ; why this circumstanc e is

,
the cause Of the expectation And the reason is that .

,
all co nsciousness is of a piece that o n e fragment r e il l u

,
m i n a t e s the wholes o f which it has been a part a n d r st

,
o f all those O f which it has most habitually been a part ;
that the spontaneous working o f consciousness going .
de eper and beginning earlier than i t s v oluntary

3 28 V OL UN T ARY R E D I NTE GRA T I ON .
a nd adoption is nothing e lse thanthe discovery and

,
.
a doption o f the canon Of induction if not in all its

, ,
ful ness Of certainty in a l l possible instances yet in a ,
mann e r able to serve as a basis for future i n ductions

in matter not very dissimilar t o that o f thos e induc
tions which we have already made though not per ,
haps at rst for inductions in very dissimilar matter .
Fo r t o s a y to ourselves that t h e method Offered by

Spontaneous redintegration ( though no t by that nam e )
is good and serviceable and to resolve t o adopt it is
, ,
in fact to draw a conclusion as to the uniform ity o f

t h e course o f nature in li m its wider than we hav e
yet had experienc e o f This brin gs the proces s
.
o f induction under t h e phenomena Of voluntary a s
Opposed to spontaneous re di ntegration though it ,
s hows at the sam e time that its roots are in t h e
latter .
T h e certain ty o f t h e canon o f induction depends ,
a ccording to what has been said o n the laws o f spon

,
t a n e o u s redintegration and these again o n the phe

,
n o m e n a o f presentation This certainty therefore

.
, ,
howe ver great it may be can never be s o great as

,
no t to b e liable t o b e overturned by a change in t h e
presented phenomena If the phenomena presented

.
to consciousness the immediate and remote e m p i r i e a l

,
Obj ects should cease t o fol lo w u nv a ry m g laws a nd

, ,
S hould be presented instead in u n x e d sequences a ,
stat e Of things which we can easily 1 m a gm e possible ,
this sense o f certainty would decrease and at last

vanish ; the validity o f the canon o f induction would
vani sh and there would be no more inductive reason
,
ing But the form a l element in cognition would r e

.
main unaltered both in existence and certainty both

, ,
in universality and n e cessity ; and t h e canon Of c a u

'
V OL UN T AR Y R E D I N TE GRA T I ON . 3 29
sa l i t founded upon it would be equally val id as b

"
e
y
fore every phenomenon would still necessarily have
,
s ome antecedent and some consequent o nl y not t h e ,
s ame always but always varying,

We should have .
no special sciences but formal logic and form a l ma

thematic ; these would lose thei r interest and t h e ,
whole intellectual world as well as the physical would

be a chaos These two laws then O f the stability
.
, ,
and the u ni formity o f nature are those which wer e

anticipated in 2 4 where it was said that some such
,
laws Of presentations as well as Of representations

, ,

must be discoverable whi ch are beyond man s con ,
trol and which , unchangeable themselves sho ul d

, ,
a dmit Of o r command chan ges within themselves .
It can n o walso be seen i n what the di ff erence con

sists and wher ethe line is t o be drawn between cogui
, ,
tions obj ects facts o r states o f consciousness which a r e

, ,
s trictly univers a l and necessary and those which a r e
S O only apparently partially o r conditionally Strictly

, ,
.
u niversal and necessary i s the implication o r c o njun c
tion o f the metaphysical elements o f obj ects o r states

Of consciousness form and matter time and spac e
, ,
with the feeli n gs which they contain becaus e no stat e ,
o f consciousness whatever exists which does not c o n
tain these two elements ; the very question itself o r ,
that state o f consciousness which attempts to disso

ciate them contains them in combination But appa
,
.
re nt l
y partially
,
o r condition a l ly univers a l and n e c e s
,
s ar are any habitu a l conjunctions in time and space

y ,
s uccessions o r coexistences Of two o r more complet e ,
o r empirical Ob ects ; such as for instance are

j t h e, ,
laws o f the stability and uni formity Of the course Of

nature and any more partic ul ar associations o f empi
,
ri c a l Obj ects ; for in a l l such cases t h e associated O b

330 VOL UNTARY R E D I NT E GRA TI ON .
jec ts can b e dissociated i n thought and represented ,
apart from each oth er without the representation ,
itself being an instance o f their combination Her e .
then is apparently the solution o f this long vexed

question i n philosophy .
A ccording to what has been said all acqui sitive

.
reasoning is i n i t s nature and from t h e subj ective

,
side a deductive operation a subsumin g a new case

,
under a previously known r ul e and this whether the ,
cases brought under t h e rule are whole classes o r

particular Objects whether the propositi on established
,
is general o r part icular All reasoning which goes .
beyond actual Observation a n d anticipates either facts ,
o r laws is ex p ra ec o gn i t i s e t p rae c o n c e s s i s n o t w i t h
, ,
standi n g that i t is also a rebus per r e s, ad r e s What ,

.
constitutes it acquisitive reasoning is the subsuming

o r sup erinducing o f unobserved facts C onsequently .
all acqui sitive reasoni ng including all induction rest s

, ,
o n a law which is also the law Of syllogism which is , ,

?
that a c o ncept contained in another concept is c o n

t a i n e d also i n a concept contain ing the latter ; for
'
syllogising is nothing else than the connecti on Of pre

sent with past states o f consciousness s o as to exhibit ,
the present state o f consciousness as a mo di cation or

a part o f a past state Hence all true deduction is
.
syllogism and can be exhibited in som e form o r other

,
Of syllogising o r in a partic ul ar syllogism ; and if all

,
induction is deduction it follows that all induction is

,
syllogism and capable Of being exh ibit e d if true , in

, ,
syllogistic form The inductive proposition All men

.
,
are mortal i s a case subsumed under the law of red

,
integration What has happened in the Observed cases

,
o f creatures possessing e s h l bodies w i ll happen also

y
in cases : where the issue h a s no t y e t b e e n Observed ;
.
.

3 32 VOL UN TARY R E D IN T E GRATI ON .
and other rule s o f sou nd reasoning ; and then futur e

presentations w ill b e t h e test Of the truth o f present
redintegrations
3 9 Such a r e t h e two great divi sions into which
.
reasoni ng o r voluntary redintegration develops itself ,
and such the prin ciples formal and material o n which

, ,
it rests C ritic a l generalisation precedes acqui sitiv e

.
in logical order as being the S impler Of the two But

,
.
if we look to t h e completion Of science in thes e t w o

methods it will appear probable that this very cha
,
ra c t e r Of superior simplicity i n critic a l generalisation

, ,
w il l be i t s title to rank last in order o f cog ni tion ,
acquisitive generalisation being a conn ecting link b e

tween t w o stages O f critical generalisation A s soon .
as new facts are proved by acquisitive generalisation ,
S O as to rank as facts o f experience they ipso fact o ,
become part o f t h e domain o f critical g eneralisation ,
and are included in the whole body o f known fact s

which criticism has to explain and nd t h e simplest
conception for They pass i nto the domain o f philo
.
S ophy from i that o f science into t h e patrimony Of

,
those who in whatever eld cultivate knowledg e for

, ,
its o w n sake and not as means to a further end ; for

s cienc e is the servant o f all t h e needs Of man not
,
only of his bodily and his moral but also o f his i n ,
t e l l e c t u a l needs
,
The fewer and S impler t h e ment a l
.
formulas are in whi ch the phenomena Of nature can

be arranged t h e richer thos e formulas will be t h e
, ,
greater command wil l man have over his knowledge ,
the more will each conception bring with it and t h e ,
more organic will be its whole system If we could .
suppose it possibl e that all possibl e e ffects could

be fores een with certainty acquisitive generalisati on

would b e entirely merged in critical and scienc e i n ,

VOL UN TAR Y R E D I NTE GRAT I ON . 33 3
philosophy But this is the ide a l goal Of science

.
,
always to be aimed at and never fully reached .
4 0 . A ll things may be classed in a threefold

o rder ,
in order e s s e n d i e x i s t e n di a nd c o gn o s c e n di ;
, ,
that is t o say in their logical historical and scientic

, , ,
o rder ,
5000? 2000?
7 1 5021 A rist
10 M etaph
. . .
VI 1. . The rst is the order Of philosophy the second ,
is the order discovered by science the third is t h e ,
o rder pursued by science Wh en any series o f facts

.
has been discovered the business o f philosophy is t o

,
arrange them in their logical order and this is a ,
function o f critical reasoning When the mind is .
discovering new facts gener a l o r particular it starts

, ,
from facts already known and these known facts a r e

,
rst in order o f knowledge The new facts di sco .
v ered are discovered in t h e order o f their existence ;
their order Of existence their dependence o n each

,
other through causation i s what is di scovered by

,
s cience ; to know the causes and e ffects o f Objects is
the aim proposed to itself by science There is n o .
thing contradictory to this division in the fact that

all Objects are obj ect s o f consciousness and that ex ,
i s t e n c e is equivalent to being present in conscious

ness Fo r o f this being present i n consciousness
.
there may well be mor e than o n e order the Objects ,
present in consciousness may b e arranged in mor e

ways than o n e . They may either be arranged a o
c ording to their order o f development in t h e con
s c i o u s n e s s which arranges them and then w e have

,
the history o f that particular consciousness and w e ,
hav e the facts in the order c o gn o s c e ndi y v a swg t h e , ,
Order pursued by science ; o r they may be arranged

.
in the order in which they hav e been di scovered to

e xist towards each other and then we have them in
,
33 4 VOLUNT ARY R ED I NT E OR A TI ON .
order ex i s t e n d i xgo vo v o r historical existence in

'
the , , ,
which o rder the facts whi ch are placed farthest from

the r easoni ng consciousness in past time are rst , , ,
a nd thos e placed farthest from it in future time are
l ast ; o r th ey may be arrange d in the order Of i n

cre asing complexity and decreasing generality as a ,
s ystem the truth Of which depends o n the Law o f

.Pa rc i mony and then we have them in order e s s e n d i

, ,
a s a
. system o f c onceptions o r den itions M W o r , ,
l ogic a l orde r This latter order is that followed and

.
e xhibited in this E ssay and in all merely h il o so

,
p
Th e se three orders must b e car efully kept ap a rt

i n thought and what is rst in o n e order not c o n
,
fused with what i s rs t i n an o ther order The greatest .
d ifculty i s to keep apart not the order Of knowledg e ,
from that o f existence but that Of existence from

,
that o f logic It does not follow that what is s i m

.
l e s t a n d therefore rst in order Of logic is therefor e

p
rs t i n order O f exist e n c e ; for instance that thos e ,

a ni m a l s which stand lowest in C uvier s Ani mal Ki ng
d o m and exhibi t the sm a l l est differentiations of t h e

,
charac t ers commo n to a l l anim als have been t h e r s t ,
produce d i n ord e r Of history A n d a gai n it may .

,
we ll happen and b e prove d by s c ience following M r ,

.

D arwin s meth o d that more co mplex ani mals a re
,
modi c ations by natur a l sele ction in order o f history

, ,
o f less complex o rganisations ; that vegetable s t r u c
tur es h ave developed i nto ani mal and inorganic s ub , :
s tan ces into v e g et ab l e structures But facts o f thi s .
ki n d d o not follow from t h e logical o rder o f priority

.

between si mpli city and complexit y No r would t hi s .
logi ca l o rd er b e affe cted by a revers a l o f the histo

ri c a l order o f ex ist ence if this sh oul d b e d o ne by
,
336 VOL UN TARY R E D I N TE GRA T I ON .
o the conv ersion Of metaphysic into ontology M eta

f .
physic is the a pplied logic o f the universe ont o logy

i
,
i s t h e attempt t o assign the absolute cause o f t h e

?
universe Such a confusion O f the logical order with

.
the historical order leadi ng to the transformation o f ,
metaphysic into ontology is found in Aristotle ; and ,
it is interesting to watc h the method in which this

transformation was effected in his mind and how h e , ,
was led to retai n an ontologic a l side by side with a

metaph ysical system A passag e which shows this is .
found in M etaph Lib x1 cap 7 I 07 5 00731 0; 021 at ?)

. . . . . . 0
3
:
6 7
5 7
0 7 0; o ga vd . fo r ; 70 62s 7 1 am ? 3 z weT . ar e} B? 7 5

a wo zi g
t evo v z o u

w o w 7 002a t o m
0
,
7 0 0s 507 :
7 TI 3 o z) z xvo ept evo v
E
d
( 3000 ? He argues thus 2000 ? v gy em 00 000.
,
Because an empirical Object which is moved is alway s

found as a member Of a series o f obj ects three at ,
least the rst Of which moves it and the last O f

'
, ,
which is moved by it this series may be regarded as ,
a complete series and as a representation o f every

series o f moving things The rst Obj ect in the serie s .
however is s o far as it belongs to this s eries onl y a

, ,
mover and not a moved ; there is therefore in t h e ,
phenomena Of motion generally such a thing as a ,
phenomenon which moves other things without mov ,
ing o r being moved itself Because in this s e ri e s t h e

'
rst Obj ect is the representative o f o n e o f the logical

elements o f motion namely movi ng others without , ,
movi n g oneself therefore the logical element has an

,
empirical existenc e The rst obj ect in the series is .

a wo zz euo v as we ll as 201 005 when regarded as an empi
a
r i c a l object and not o nl y as the representativ e Of t h e
,
logical element The logical elements o f 7 0m y o p evo v

'
.
,
n a m ely and if exhibited as logical

'
ought to be exh ibited as S imultaneous they a r e no t

V OLU NT ARY R E D I NT E G RA TI ON . 337
S O e xhibited by Aristotle ;and why not ? B ecaus e ,
t a k i ng these t w o logical elements he remove s them ,
into an empiric a l o r historical serie s ,

33 7 0 ,
z wo evo v x 00? x i x05 1 30000p a o v ( and the words 20000(A a o v

1
p /
S how that h e is thinki n g o f an empirical series ); b e

cause the thing moved i s mover a s well a s moved ,
and i s besides a mean between a mover and a moved ;

because it a s an empiric a l whole A i s moved by an
, ,
empiric a l whole B and moves another empirical whole

,
C ; therefore t h e empiric a l whole B whi ch moves A , ,
is not moved itself by a previous empirical whole o r ,

by any thin g else 7 0 vvv 307 1 7 : 3 o z) x t vo ft evo v m m
;
'
there is somethin g there which moves others withou t

moving itself H o w can such reasoni ng be brought
.
about ? It is becaus e t h e term B bears t w o charac

ters ; rst as an empiric a l whole it is rst in t h e
, ,
series Of three ; secondl y as the mover disting ui shed , ,
from the moved and from t h e moved and mover o f

, ,
the series it is a logic a l element and exists onl y q ua

, ,
mover The logic a l element q u a mover w a s 06

.
, ,

xwo zz t evo v is carried over o r erected into an empirical
f ,
whole containin g this element only Then becaus e .

,
.
the logical elements o f moving and being moved a r e

separable in thought notwithstanding that as such

, , ,
they are simultaneous and interdependent relatives ,
they are separable and in dependent empirical wholes ;

and because in a series o f three empiri cal Objects s a y ,
three billiard balls the motion o f the rst is the cause

,
o f the motion o f the thi rd transmitted through the

,
second therefore the logic a l element Of moving is

,
prior in order o f existence to the logical element o f

being moved N othin g n ya b 00 q o zz a evo v can be O b
.

v
t a i n e d without recourse t o the logical analysis Of 7 0

w o a evo v and nothing rst in order o f t ime can be
,
Z
338 VOLUNTARY R E D I NTE GRA TI ON
"
P A RT I .
Obtained without r e course t o the empirical series o f
which 7 0z wo a evo v form s a part But by the union .
,
o r co nf usion o f these two methods the logical and

, ,
the historic a l an empirical and i n dependent existence

,
o f a m yo evo v can be produced A n d as this

p .
is pl a ced in the 065 001 0; Which is 00731 00 it follows 7 05300 , ,

2
3 06 70411 0 6505 11 011 10111 37 0731 011

0 :0000 060100 1000 0 M p g/ 21 00
,
5
0 000 A ristotle separates the logical quality Of m o v
.
ing wi thout being moved and erects it into an actual ,
cause Of motion historically o r in order Of existence ,

.
His next step in 2 is to look about him for some

, ,
thing which answers t o this des cription ; and he nds

it in that which is at once 052707 01 and v0777 0u an Obj ect )
,
o f desire and an Object o f reason and this is with him ,
the rst cause and move r o f the universe its 555 7673 ,
00 o r e fcient cause
a rr000/ The latter part o f the .
,
M etaphysic o f A ristotle insists o n the necessity Of

mpirical Objects b in g rior to logic a l Objects A 07
e e p
.
2g si r/001
1 00
5a 7 01 0007 71 77 0001 00 eve
g y
f em . XI . 6 .
4 .
The 000100 o f the cause Of the universe the very ,
essence logical deni tion o r nature o f it must be

, , ,
000 01 00
57 complete
, o r empirical existence Y et the .
distinction between logical and empirical existence ,
b etween 000000 and 0005 7 0700 is not hereby destroyed ; ,
but an instance o f a thing imagined which is both at ,
once the essence Of which is t o be a complete Obj ect

,
.
When you have such an Object in your tho ughts you ,
cannot help asking the question What is it ? o r What , ,
does it exist as ? And if the answer is A S a com

,
p l e t e Object this nature o f it is shown by your asking

, ,
the question to be di ff erent from the me re fact o f its

,
being present in your thoughts SO that empirical .
existence and logical existence the latter including

,
all inseparable el e ments aspects and relations are

, , ,
3 40 VOLUNTARY R E D I NTEGRATIO N .
is the complex Of all feelings or cognitions in t h e

order in which they arose and connected themselves
with each other as such Its history as an Object for
.
,
the Subject i s a history o f feelings o r cognitions and

, ,
their historical order is the order Of their connection

as feeli ngs o r cognitions that is in many cases t h e
, , ,
reverse of the order Of facts o r qualities Of which they

are the subjective aspect Thus the empirical e go h a s
.
two sides o r aspects ; rst it is an obj ect for the Sub

,
je ct ,
and as such has a history o r exists in the order,
o f history ; and secondly it is the subjective aspect of
the world o f qualities in which character its historical

,
order becomes the order Of knowledge All partial .
sequences Of cognitions o r feelings are parts of t h e

whole sequence of the empirical ego and the e m p i ri ,
c a l ego contains and constitutes them in its o w n order
as sequences Of cognition .
The third meaning o f the term consciousness is

the conscious life Of the individual being that is the , ,
fe elings o r cognitions o f the empirical e go together

with those fee lings o r qualities which are called the
body and with which they are const a n tly conn ected
,
in experience This Object is heterogeneous consist

.
,
ing o f a part as it were o f the empirical e go enclosed

, ,
o r circumscribed by a part o f the world o f qu a l ities ,
o r as it is commonly expressed o f a soul dwelling in

, ,
a body Briey it may be said the third meaning of

.
,
consciousness is the soul The circumscription o f the

.
soul by the body gives it a place in the order Of h i s

tory properly s o c a l led that is in the hi story o f the
, ,
world Of qualities the correlate Of the empirical ego

,
.
The confusion noticed above is t h e conf usion Of the

Subject with the s Oul the c o nfusion o f that which as
, ,
being no object i s o ut Of all relation to t h e order O f

,
VOL UNTARY R E D I NT E GRA TI ON . 341
objects in time and something which is supposed t o

,
arise in time as an empirical Obj ect The Subject .
exists onl y in order o f logic and no t in either the ,
order o f history o r the order o f knowledge It is the .
li mit point o r line O f demarcation between t h e empi

, ,
r i c a l ego and the uni verse o f quali t ies existi ng poten ,
t i a l l y before reection and actually afterwards poten ,
t i a l l y in phenomena actually in their subj ective and

,
Objective aspects ; but whether potentia l o r actual

, ,
included alike in phenomena and in Obj ects and a l ike ,
necessary in order to the possession by these w o fd s Of

any meanin g whatever .
C onfusing the Subject with the soul o r c o nc e 1 v 1 ng ,
the Subject as an empirical Object I suppose an e n ,
q u i r e r to ask H o w can my consciousness be n e c e s

,

sary to all existence s o that without my conscious

,
ness there is no existence and yet I be able to poin t ,
t o the time when my consciousness beg a n t o exist ,
by being born in to a previously existing world ex ,
i s t i n g before and independently o f my consciousness ?

The world must have existed before my birth either ,
as it exists now o r in some way unknown to me and ,
my consciousness must have had then no existence in

any sense The answer has been a l ready given The
. .
soul may have had then no e xis tence true ; but the ,
Subj ect ? The same existence a s it has now that is , ,
neither an empirical nor an Objective but a logic a l

, ,
o n e in the world which o u assert existed before the

, y
birth o f the so ul Its existence depends o n the ex
.
i st e n c e and is inseparably involved in the existence

,
Of that world 1 rr e sp e c t i v e o f the soul and both world

, ,
and Subject exist o r vanish together Time and the

, ,
.
Subject being coeval and inseparable S inc e time is a ,
mode of cons ciousness no question can arise about

,
3 42 VOLUN TARY R E D I NTE GRATI ON .
PART I the origin o f the Subject any mor e than about

CH VI
.
o r1 gm o f tune ; and no quest 1 on can ar1 se about the

. .
40
Th t h
e o r1 1 n Of time because the notion Of origin is derived
re e
g
o r d nd from t h e n o t 1 o n o f t1 me and can be conceived t o
e r s, e s se 1
i t
ex s en di ,
n
co g d
n o sc e n l
e x 1 s t o nl y t1 me
.
.
C H A P T E R VI I .
M E T AL O G I CAL .
D I VI S I O N I . T H E P O ST ULAT E S A ND T H E C ONCEPT -
FO R M .
o f) Ira n }
. o vu
l e
q
f
b lc
s T O 37 6 .
Ari st o tl e .
41 . M E TAP H YS I C
is t h e scienc e which considers e x
i s t e nc e in i t s most genera l aspect s o that the few ,
most general laws which are t o be establi s hed in this

s cience must b e capable o f co nf ormi n g t o a ll t h e laws
Of the specia l sciences ; and conversely all t h e laws ,
Of the special sciences must agree in b e i ngc

harmonising with t h e gener a l laws Of m etaphysic ,
before they can be a d m i t t e d a s proved laws Of exist

e nce . The st arting point therefore Of metaphysic ,
,
i s the most abstract generalised notion Of existence

, , ,
which can be found in consciousness ; o r as it wo ul d ,
have been c ommonly expressed before the develop

ment Of philo sophy due t o the C ogito ergo s um o f
Descartes the starting point Of metaphysic is exist
,
ence itself in its most abstract S hape existence a s

, ,

such and nothing more ; o r in Aristotle s phrase 7 0 , ,
$1 l c a c
or
y ou
,
; 00
0; 7 0
0 7 007 0)
3
07 00
9 0 07 00 9000 3 0007 0 .
3 46 TH E P OS T ULAT ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
Of this abstract existence two things are certain ,
rst that it is always determinate never entirely

, ,
indeterminate existence ; s e condly that it has no

, ,
logic a l contrary that i s no contradictory The proof

, ,
.
o f both facts is experim ental A s to the rst it has .

,
been already said that the highest abstraction must

contain at the very least the cogni tion o f time and
, ,
some feeling occupying it that we cann ot be con ,
scious and not be conscious Of feeling and ti me The .
Object therefore o f consciousness is always a deter

minate object even if it contains no further deter
,
mination than the mere form o f time A s to the .
second existence has n o logical contrary o r contra

, ,
di c t o ry because nothing but existence c a n be present

,
in consciousness E xistenc e and consciousness a re

.
coextensive ; suppose consciousness and it is c o n ,
s c i o u s n e s s Of an Object that is o f existence ; supp ose

, ,
existence and it i s existence l n c o n s c 1 o u sne s s that is

, , ,
an Obj ect Logic however is a process o r mode o f

.
, ,

consciousness If Hegel s pure S e y n w a s pure N ichts
.
,
it would be t h e cessation Of consciousness altogether .
It will be admitted that both these proofs are e x p e ri ~
ment a l .
A s a c dn s e q u e n c e o f this reasoning I distingui sh ,
t w o se ns es o f t h e concept name No n e xistence ; o n e -

,
-
,
in which it has an Object o r concept signied by it ,
the other in which it has none but i s a concept name

, ,
-
only When non existence is Opposed t o the abstract

.
-
existence which is coextensive with consciousness it ,
is a name without an Object named by it ; fo r if there

were o n e it would b e o ut of con s ciousness In this
,
.
sense the words are true which Aristotle uses t o ex

press the Opinion Of Pa rmenides M etaph I 5 H a g ,
. . .
{b ew Bn
'
g 3 0 o0
gai 7
7z 0 3
'
1 7 0 30 01390
1 005 71 270001
1 as are 1 10 1
,
3 48 TH E P OS TULA TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
absent E ac h absenc e is the ground Of o r the thing

.
,
e xpressed by a particular negation ; is the n o n exist

,
.
-
enc e o f a particular Obj ect o r s e t Of Objects A s .
existenc e 1 S determinate s o also is no n existence ,

-
.
E xistence includes no n existence within it the latter-

,
is a mode o f t h e former Also existence precedes .
n o n existence in point Of time whether we take ex

-
,
i s t e nc e in i t s mor e abstract o r in its more particular

s ens e ; for until w e have been conscious generally
, ,
w e cannot b e conscious o f the absence o f any Object ,
and until w e have been conscious o f this o r that p a r

,
t i c ul a r Object w e cannot tell what it is which is a b

,
sent when we a r e not conscious o f it It follows from .
what h a s been last said that all negation has refer ,
e nc e t o t h e past o r to the futu re a n d not to the

, ,
present ; that it is no t the e xpression Of a present

fe eling Of t h e absenc e o f any object but Of that feel ,
ing as past it may be but a moment a go We recall

,
.
the feeli ng o r the Object in denying it ; in the mo

, ,
ment o f feeli n g its past absence it becomes present .
The past absence is the thing said o r predicated by

the negation ; the negation is t h e expression o f the
present feeli n g o f a past absence o f feeling ; the feel
ing b eing present whil e we deny it to have been
,
present form erly .
I t m a y be well perhaps to s um up what has been

, ,
said in a deni tion o f existence although I am aware ,
that high authority has said that it i s o n e o f those

matters which are obscured rather than explained by
dening them We r e nfe l s in D e Tempore O pus
.
, ,
cula V o l 2 says E x i st e nt i t e conceptus s i m p l i c i s si

,
.
, ,
m u s nomen c l a ri s s i m um
,
e s t ; plane u t e x i s t e r e quid
Sit S i d e ni re velis rem O b sc ura v e ri s potins qu am

, ,
e x l i c a v e ri s : actu in r erum natur a extr a mentem

"
p , , ,
TH E P OS TU L ATES A ND TH E C O NC E PT F O RM -
. 3 49
e xtra causas e sse omni a aut o b s c ri o ra sunt magis

,
que ambigua aut certe c l a ri o ra non sunt C ertainly

,
.
none o f these denitions wi l l agree w ith what has

been here maintained E xi stence in fact seems to be .
a striking instance of the difference between the fa m i

liar and the known in which it Offers a parallel to its ,
counterpart consciousness according t o what Shake ,
speare says o f man in M ea s ur e f o r M ea s ur e ,
M o st ign nt f wh t h
o ra o a

e s m o s t a ss u ed
r ,
Hi s gl y e e nc e
a ss ss .
Plato assumed 00
B ein g as the tra n scendent o r
0 01 0 o r
at least the transcendental cause Of the existence o f all

determinate Obj ects In the P armenides Steph 1 5 1 .
,
.
,
he says o f this determinate and actual existence 7 000 ,

2
7
0 1 71 0 3 021 0 01301000
3 {0 0 765 0
000 7 05 wa go w o g ;
SO long as the Obj ective point o f View is adhered to ,
no deni tion is possible ; fo r o n the o n e hand no

higher abstraction i s known to which to refer exist ,
ence di stinguishing it at the same time by its specic

,
difference and o n the other it would be impracticable

, ,
as in volving a progress in i n ni t um t o give all t h e ,
particular Obj ects which exactly occupy the sam e

eld as existence and to name all the particulars ,
contained under it But let the point o f View b e .
ch a nged and a denition of the latter class becomes

,
possible at once We no longer have to seek within

.
existence itself as such for its denition but a n o ther

, , ,
character di scloses itself pervading its entire sphere ,
as if a crystal globe should suddenly assume a rosy

tint without losing any of its crystalline clearness ; a
,
difference without a division which pervades and di s ,
t i ngui sh e s every particle Of the sphere ; each charac

ter therefore being coextensive and simultaneous
, ,
35 0 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F ORM -
.
with the other and with the whole Such was the .
change wrought by the magic spell C ogito ergo s um , .
My existence what is it ? Th o ught consciousness

, , ,
c o i t a t ur F o r this i s the mean i ng Of that phrase

g .
,
it means the phenomenon o f consciousness ; not that

a soul o r a n e go i s included in the cogito See D e s .
cartes O b je c t i o ne s S e p t i m ae in M e d i t a t i o n e s I L N otae
, ,
.
Sed mente c o nc i p i t ur ni hil hic aliud S i gni c a t qu a m

c o
gi t a t ur e t ideo mal e su
pp o ni t e ri m e nt i o n e m
mentis quatenus est pars ho m i ni s The question Of t h e

.
existence Of the mind is not prejudged by D escartes

in the starting point o f his philo sophy E xistence .
and consciousness are identic a l in poin t o f extension ,
they have exactly the same particulars contained

under them ; o n e denes the other .But of two c o
extensive Objects we always call that the de ni tion o f
the other which is the more familiar o f the t w o since ,
denitions are a l ways used c o gn o s c e n d i caus a We .
cal l therefore consciousness the denition o f exist

ence and existence the object dened by conscious
,
ness C onsciousnes s and not existence is the true

.
, ,
n e plus ultra .
4 2 If now standing at our present point o f View

.
, ,
Co n sc l o u s n e s s
a n d th gh t
o uwe were to substitute o n e of the functions o f conscious
.
nes s for the whole the logical function o f conceiving

,
for consciousness in a l l its branches and the formal ,
part Of that process o f conceiving for the process and

the Objects o f it together that is the formal concept
, , ,
considered as a concrete Object fo r the really concrete

,
concept which consists of a mat erial element feeling

, ,
o r sense as well as o f a form a l element

,
and if we
were to erect this formal process o f conceiving and ,
the results to which it leads as its deductions into ,
the subjective counterpart Of the world o f existence ,

35 2 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND T H E C ON C E PT F O RM -
.
a thought o r a concept Truth indeed depends upon .
the distin ct comparison o f perceptions that is upon , ,
thoughts and concepts and upon the forms o f their ,
comparison ; but this requires completing by the a d

ditional statement that tho ughts and concepts derive
,
thei r real ity from perceptions which becom e true rs t

in comparison that is in the shape Of thoughts and
, ,
concepts Without thought no truth without per

.
,
c e t i o n no reality
p By reali ty I understand . t h e
act ual existence o f any Obj ect its actu al presence in ,
consciousness ; this is not greater a fter thought than

before ; thought has transformed it into a different

Shape has given it new relations but has added
, ,
nothing to its re a l existence Truth o n the other .

,
hand is t h e product o f thought the form which an

, ,
Object assumes after investigation and thus is greater ,
after thought than before R eality depends o n t h e .
relation between Objects and consciousness truth o n ,
the relation between Objects in consciousness T h e .
true a nd the real have constantly been confounded ,
o r rather I d o n o t know that they have ever been dis
t i ngui s h e d A s reality has but o n e source s o als o

.
,
has truth but o ne ; as consciousness gives real ity s o ,
its form gives truth The formal process o f conscio us .
ness must be o n e consciousness must have uni ty o f

,
function D enkend ist der M ensch i mmer auch wenn

.
,
er nur anschaut says Hegel E nc y c l o p a d i e

,
24 ,
'
, ,

Z usatz I This is what is profound i n Hegel s sy s
.
tem he sees that there m u s t be uni ty o f function in

consciousness But where are we to nd this unity ;
.

what is its form ; and in what does it consist ? Hegel s
reply is In that process and in that form O f it which
, , ,
conceives and deals with c o ncepts that is in the form , ,
o f thought as opposed to that of intuition

'
; and if S O ,
TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM 35 3
'
-
.
then both the form and the matter of intuition must

be generated o ut o f the form the matter and the , ,
process o f thought belonging to it in its o w n right

,
underived from intuition .
This E ssay takes the opposite route and equall y , ,
re c o
g m sm
g t h e necessity of an u ni ty o f function in
consciousness makes the attempt to ded uce the forms
,
and the laws o f thought from the forms and the

matter O f int ui tion O n e mode of consciousness has
.
no greater re a l ity nor gives us Obj ects of greater

,
reality than another But the understandi ng and

,
.
,
reection so far as it is its development i s the fabri ,
cator and producer o f truth It was natural to sup

.
pose that the understanding and its forms were the

source Of reality ; and others besides Hegel might be
tempted o n other grounds than his to strike rst
, ,
into this way since it was universall y recogni sed

,
that the understanding and its forms were the organs

of truth In thought we are occupied with the rela
.
tions o f Objects to each other and the attention is

,
called o ff from their common relation to conscious

ness ; it was supposed also th at reality resided solely
in the Obj ects and not as must be imbibed from
, ,
D escartes in the relation between the objects and

,
consciousness R eality therefore it would be argued

.
, ,
must be the product the discovery O f that function

, ,
o f consciousness which deals with the objects as they
truly are whether in themselves or to each other

,
.
M oreover it had a l ways been remarked that the

changes in the conscious subject the object O f psych ,
ology were the most fertile source Of uncertainty ;

,
tha t d ifferent habits o f mi n d a n d O f body caused O h

je c t s to be seen in very different lights and that it ,
coul d never be known for certain whether two men

AA
35 4 TH E P OS T ULAT ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.

sa w o r felt exactly alike This caused the attention to

.
be withdrawn from the modes of intuition as sources

o f reality and xed upon reasoning and thought since
, ,
.
these were the methods o f producing agreement o ut

o f disagreement and exhibiting an Object in the same
,
light to all observers ; and when many Observers saw

but o n e object and agreed in their description o f it
, ,
must they not see it a s it really was independent o f ,
the subj ective peculiarities O f each observer ? If to

s e e Objects truly was to see them a s they really were ,
independently o f consciousness the process Of thought ,
must be the discoverer Of real existence But it .
must be replied t o such reections as these that in ,
fact we do not get rid o f s ubjectivity nor even of sub ,
j e c t i v e variations by adding to the modes O f intuition

,
those o f think ing and by consideri ng as is done in

, ,
thought the relations O f Objects to each other a b

, ,
s t ra c t i n from their relations to ourselves The

g .
objects which are proved to be true remain as

, ,
thoroughly subjective as before ; and error still exists

in the memory though recogni sed as error
,
.
P erhap s the account which woul d be usually

given of the relation o f truth to reality would be this ,
that truth is subjective re a l ity and reality objective ,
truth re a l ity being entirely independent Of the m i nd

,
o r consciousness and truth being the knowledge o f

,
that reality Those who s o conceive the matter are

.
entirely at o ne with Hegel o n this o n e point namely , ,
that true knowledge is a kn owledge o f an absolute ;

every piece o f true knowledge for instance o n e o f ,

Kepler s laws would be a knowledge o f the real and
,
independent that is Of an absolute The assumption

, ,
.
o f a gulf between the Objective and the subj ective ,
which I thi nk is no uncommon assumption is in this ,

35 6 TH E P OS TUL AT ES A ND TH E C ONC E PT F O R M -
.
voluntary proce s s NO o n e forms concepts without

.
effort nor w ithout a purpose i n View We are

,
.
consciou s o f an effort to x the a t tention and to hold

fast o n e peculiarity in an Object o r s e t o f Objects .
C onceiving then belongs to that stage or kind o f con

s c i o u s n e s s which is conscious o f purpose in addition
to its o ther Objects however much the original e ffort

,
may afterwards be forgotten when use has rendered

the concept name famil i ar It was shown in 3 1
-
.
,
th at volition is a particular form o f the sense o f

e ffort ; that it is the sense O f an effort combin ed
with the feeling o f an interest that is o f purpose in , ,
the effort O n e mode o f this volition is the function

.
o f logically conceiving But as volition di ff ered not

.
in its nature from the spontaneous activity of con

s c i o u sn e s s ,
but was itself that spontaneous activity
carried to a new development S O also the form of ,
volition called con ceiving is not essentially different

from the forms of the spontaneous activity of con
s c i o usne s s ,
called perception imagination and r e p r e
, ,
s e nt a t i o n
. It is a repetition voluntarily of the same
processes and w ith the same machi n ery that is in
'
, ,
the same forms or formal elements which were em ,
ployed in the spontaneous and in tuitive functions o f

consciousness This process of conceiving has already
.
been described in the concrete in the chapter on ,
voluntary redintegration It remains to examine the .
formal element as it appears in that process and to ,
s e e whether it contains any new characters not d e
rived from the formal element in perception namely , ,
time and space .
When volition is applied to modify the ob jects o f

perception the results are concepts and the postu
,
lates The means at the command of volition are the

.
T HE P OS T UL A T ES A ND T H E C ON C E PT F O RM -
. 35 7
power o f making an exh austive di V 1 s i o n and o f xing ,

PA RT 1 1 .
CH V II .
the a t t e n t 1 o n on o n e branch and Wi t h d ra w m g 1 t from

.
Div 1 . .
the other It has been shown in

. 1 6 that this , $ 43 .
the
fi f fi f
o n
power o f bein g exhaustively divided is an essential v
characteristic of time and space and that it arises ,
from the presence o f a material element in those

forms This property the will now takes possession
.
o f and enforces a point o r a line o f demarcation b e

,
tween the Objects which have excited its interest

. .
This distinguishing is conceivi ng It is a holdi ng .
fast any content 1 1 0 matter what and distinguishi n g

, ,
it from all others It i s determination and limitation

.
,
and depends as already said o n the power o f making

, ,
an exhaustive division ; for in order to distinguish an

object from a l l others we must be able t o emb race
both the o ne and the others in o u r view It matters .
not that the particular Object determined and distin ,
u i s h e d from all o t hers which we had in View when

g ,
we formed the concept is found to be the same with

,
other Objects which we were at that time expecting

to nd among the all others ; nor that among the all ,
others are found particula r Objects which are after

,
wards properly included i n the o n e F or instance it .

,
matters n o t to the concept white Objects as distin , ,
u i s h e d from Objects not white that some swans are

g
-
,
found to be included in the all others o r not white ,

-
Objects The concept white Obj ects is provisiona l

.
, , ,
anticipatory potential s o far as regards i t s extension

, ,
over the particular Objects o f perception included in

it but it is the most strict a n d xed mode o f thought
,
possible s o far as regards its o w n nature as a concept

,
.
White Obj ects and not white objects are xed a n d n u

-
changing i n their Signicance in spite o f this o r that ,
obje c t passin over from o n e t o the other category

g
.
35 8 T HE P OS T ULA T ES AND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
.
A ll concepts include their proper Object and ex

cl a de all others The formal nature o f concepts
.
,
apart from t h e proper Obj ects o f them is therefore ,
inclusion and exclusion ; when we conceive we i n ,
c l u d e a n d exclude and the obje c t included is the

,
proper o bj ect of the c o ncept The postulates arise in .
the same way F or the possibi li ty o f including and

.
excluding as a concept does i s founded o n the pos

, ,
s i b ili t o f makin g an exhaustive division and this is

y ,
expressed by the words E ither O r by the words

,
This N ot this and by the logic a l postulate of ex

-
,
cluded middle The other two postulates have the

.
same reference The rst o r the law Of Identity

.
, ,
A is A envisages the rst branch o f the exhaustive

,
division the inclusion o r object o f the concept and

, ,
af rms that all included by the concept is included in

the proper object Of the concept The second o r the .
,
law O f C ontradiction N O A is N o t A envisages the

,
-
,
Opposition between the t w o branches o f the concept ,
its inclusion a n d its exclusion a n d afrms that all ,
which is included in the o n e is ipso facto excluded

from the other The third is the law Of E xcluded
.
M iddle E very thing i s e i t h e r A o r N ot A and e n

,
-
,
visages the two branches ab extra and afrms that ,
this identity and contradi ction are exhaustive and ,
that nothing exists which is n o t included either e n

t i r e l y in the o n e o r entirely in the other The three .
postulates o r ultimate laws o f thinking logically that ,
is to s a y properly are expressions Of o ne and the

, ,
same ment a l fact o r fact o f consciousness which is at ,
once Obj ective and subjective m its reference namely , ,
the fact Of the existence in all things of an entirely

exhaustive division which is drawn o u t into distinct
,
ness s o soon as we begin to think a b o t them To

g
.
3 60 TH E P OS T ULA T ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
.
involuntarily Its ultimate laws are imposed by

.
,
though not produced o u t o f the will The postulates ,

.
express a resolution 1 s t when I s a y A I mean and , ,

-
wi ll mean A ; 2d and nothing else but A ; 3 d what

, ,

ever that else m a y be In controversy o r thin kin g .
,
in company with others the postulates impose this ,
resolution o n others ; they are the preliminaries o f all

argument ; if you argue you must do as I do and , ,
mean by A A and nothing else

, ,
.
4 4 The same act o f thinking the act of divid

.
,
ing exhaustively which nds o ne expression in the

,
three postulates of logic nds another expression ,
more brief a n d more concrete in the concept form -

.
The concept form is capable of analysis into the

-
postulates ; it contains them implicitly it expresses ,
t hem as a single fact E very concept form does two .

-
things include and exclude

,
Its inclusion is its .
proper Object which I call simply the concept ; its

,
exclusion is the contradictory o f its inclusion The .
concept form contains two contradictories C ontra

-
.
d i c t o ri e s are the creatures of logic ; they are ex

ressed by the word no t White and N o t white
p
-
.
are contradictories This res ul ts from the voluntary

.
nature o f conceiving ; I express in this way nam ely , ,
by the word not my assumption for the moment of,
an Object no matter what and my exclusion from it

, ,
o f all other Obj ects no matter what If I assume A

,
.
,
then to call it N o t A violates the hypothesis for this

-
,
was the very and only thing which I resolved to

a void by naming A If I assume White every thing .
,
is prima facie admissible as a predicate o f it except ,
o n e thing namely No t white C ontradictories are

, ,
-
.
Violations o f the hypothesis which we begin with ,
reversals of the resolution which we have taken .

TH E P OS TUL AT ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
. 361
O m ni s d e t e rm i n a t i o says Spinoza NO e st ne
g t iao ,
.
thing more true To determine dene limit is to

.
, , ,
afrm the inclusion but at the same time to deny

,
the excl usion E very concept form de ni es as cer

.
-
t a i nl y and as essentially as it afrms ; negation is

included in it as necessarily a s afrmation the nega ,
tion o f one the af rmation o f the other o f the two

, ,
contradictories Since it is a S ingle act the act of

.
,
exhaustively dividing which produces both the i n ,
c l u s i o n and the exclusion of the concept form both -

,
contradictories are equally necessary to the concept

form and equally necessary t o each other Since a
,
.
third point is taken to which the two contradi ctories

,
equally and al i ke refer namely t h e concept form i t , ,

-
self O r the act Of dividing which constitutes it the

, ,
two contradictories become contraries ; and we may

call them logical contraries since contraries are o b ,
e c t s contrasted with each other by reference to o n e

j
third Object o r o ne S ingle third point o f difference
, ,
right and left are contraries with reference t o the

person between them ; and as contraries a l so the con
t r a d i c t o ri e s Of the concept form are amenable to the -
rule Co nt ra ri o r um eadem est scientia The whole

,
.
which they constitute the concept form itself is the ,

-
point of View from which both are contemplated at a

glance The contradictories are also relatives n e c e s
.
,
sary to each other ; A involves No t A in its mere -
assumption They go together in thought for the

.
purpose Of mutual contradiction just as relatives go ,
tog ether i n existence for the purpose o f mutu a l a f r

mation F ather and s o n M aster and servant Sove
.
, ,
reign and subj ect are relatives which are necessary

,
both to the existence and to the intelligibility of each

other A and N o t A are relatives which are ne c e s
.
-
3 62 TH E P OS T ULA T ES AND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
sary t o the intelligibili ty but n o t t o the existence Of

each other The same necessity exists in destruction
.
as in support for in both cases it is a logical necessity

,
.
E ach o f the two contradictories in the concept

form involves the other ; and the concept form which -
,
may be called indifferently by the name of either i n ,
volves them both A if we take it as the name o f the

.
,
concept form includes N o t A ; and N o t A if we take it

-
,
- -
,
as the name o f the concept form includes A And e ach

"
-
,
.
Of them taken as a li m b Of the concept form involves

,
-
,
but excludes the other In other and more Hegeli an .
words the concept form 1 s the unity and the identity

,
-
Of contradictories a later negation denyin g an earlier

negation ; the negation Of the negation of A by N ot
A ; the perception that each contradictory 1 S m v o l v e d
in the other The act or phenomenon Of exhaustive
.
division giving rise to the contradictories and their

,
identity in the concept form in volun tary processes -
o f consciousness is what I understand P lato to mean

,
by the phrase 7 0 0200201070 near the conclusion of the

1
,
P armenides and what Hegel expressed by his nicht

,

i i b e rge h t sondern i i b e r ge ga nge n ist The division .
by itself occupies no time nor S pace fo r a division is ,
a distinction between two objects which occupy t ime

and space no portion o f time o r space intervening
,
.
The division does not exist cann ot be presented to ,
consciousness by itsel f ; it must be presented as two

,
Obj ects different from each other But the weight o f .
this View Of the matter this fact o f consciousness as ,
it truly is bears not against the necessity O f the cog

,
ni t i o n s of time and space but in favour o f it P lato

,
-
.
might be justied in taking his 7 0 020020 77; out of 1 0
time but no o n e writing afte r Kant is justied in

,
doing the same The two c o n a d i c t o ri e s o f the

g
.
3 64 TH E P OS T ULAT ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T -
F O RM Z
45 . The course Of enquiry has now brought us

to a position from which a brief criticism of Hegel s
,
Logical System may be attempted ; a task which it ,
will be remembered was postponed in Chapter I I I I

, .
cannot Offer the following as a complete examination

o f Hegel s Logic still less o f his whole system Of
,
philosophy o f which the Logic is the foundation ;

at the same time I think that it w ill e x hibit all the
essential and fundamental points o f it ; and as a pre
liminary I di stinguish in the Logic four thin gs ; its
starting point i t s goal its content and its method
, , , ,
o r principle O f movement ; which distinctio n s if kept ,
in View will serve as the framework o f the foll owing

,
remarks .

Hegel s Logic lays claim to a double character ;
it is proposed as at once a system o f metaphysic o r
ultimate logic o f the u ni verse and as a system of ,
ontology o r absolute existence It might be s up .
posed that a system bearing the latter character was

ipso facto disqualied from bearing also the former ,
S ince it has been shown that ontology o r a system o f ,
absolute existence is a chimera ; and accordingly that

, ,

if it coul d be shown that Hegel s Logic laid claim to
be an ontology it must abandon its claim to serve
,
also as a system o f metaphysic But this would not .
be examining the case on i t s merits ; for it might be

justly replied See rst whether the system is valid
,
as a metaphysical system and if it proves to be s o

, , ,
then the character of the system itself wi ll decide

whet her it is also an ontology and the existence ,
there exhibited an absolute existence ; you cannot

d ecide generall y that ontology is a chimera until y o u ,
have rst weighed the evidence Offered by this sy s

tem O f metaphysic The question then before us is
.
, , ,
TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
. 365

What is the val idity o f Hegel s Logic as a system Of
metaphysic o r applied logic Of the universe ?
,

Hegel s Logic is o ne great concept form Of which -
,
the inclusion the exclusion and the connection o f the

, ,
two are the A bsolute Idea D er Begriff is the term .
which I translate C oncept form ; and D ie absolute -
Idee is its completed content o r object including in , ,
that phrase both the Obj ect included the Object ex ,
cluded and their connection in the concept form

,
-
.
The absolute idea is involved in the concept form -
and Vice vers a ; form and matter in this sense are i n

separable In t h e concept form and the absolute idea
.
-
together lie the es sence the nature the explanation , , ,
o f all existence whatever ; they are the logic Of the
un iverse explain why things exist at all and why

, ,
they exist as we s e e and feel them Fo r the a b s o .
lute idea involving in itself the concep t form is not

,
-
,
inactive but proceeds to evolve from itself the world

,
Of Vorstellung o r phenomena in time and space

,
.
D ie reine Idee in welcher die Bestimmtheit Oder

,
R e a l i t a t des Begriffes selbst z um Begriffe erhoben

ist ist Vi elmehr absolute B efr ez ung fur welche keine
'
, ,
unmittelbare Bestimmung mehr i s t di e ni cht ebenso ,
sehr ges e tz t und der Begriff i s t ; i n dieser F r e i h e i t

n d e t d aher kein Ub e r ga ng statt das e m fa c h e S e y n , ,
z u dem sich die Idee bestimmt bleibt ihr vollkommen

,
durchsichtig und i s t also hier Vielmeh r s o z u fassen

, ,
dass die Idee sich selbst fr ez ent l a s s t ihrer absolut

' '
sicher und in sich ruhend U m dieser F reiheit willen .
ist di e F o r m i h r er B es t i m m t h ei t ebenso s c hl e c t h i n
frei die absolut fli r sich selbst ohne S ub je c t i vi t a t

,
A eus s er l z c hlc ei t d es R a
'
se e nd e um s und d er Z ei t
y
Insofern diese nur nach der a b s t ra c t e n Unm i t t e l
b a rke i t des S e yns ist und v o m B e w uss t se yn ge fasst
366 TH E P OS T ULA TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
wird ist S ie als blosse O b je c t i v i t a t und a u s s e rl i c h e s

,
Leben ; aber in der Idee bleibt s i e an und i r sich

die T o t a l i t a t des Begriffs und die Wissenschaft i m
,
V e rh a l t ni s s e des GOt t l i c h e n E rkennens zur N atur

'

.
The exte rnal world o f nature o r V orstellung or as , ,
I should s a y o f feelings i n time and space is thus ,
represented a s owing directly and necessarily from

the absolute idea and fro m that alo ne The exi stence
,
.
o f the formal element time and space is accounted ,

,
for by the freedom o f the absolute idea since time ,
and space have something free and unlimited about

them But the existence o f feelings the material
.
,
element as I call it is n o t accounted for at all The

,
.
germ o f them or the logical reason for them how

, ,
ever is given i n the Logic as also is that o f time

, ,
and space This E ntschluss o r development Of the

.
,
absolute idea into an external world is the Object ,
matter of the Na t urp h i l O S O p h i e which thus contains ,
the separation o f the idea from the external world

which is its product and exam i nes the product apart
,
from the parent But now farther S ince the idea

.
,
evolved thi s product because it contained the con

cept form the same reason compels it also to connect
-
again its product with itself ; for the external world ,
being the product of the idea contains also the con ,
cept form It proceeds therefore to evolve out o f

-
.
itself returni ng to the idea by the evolution the

, ,
absolute mind der absolute G eist who is to the

, ,
absolute idea just what the absolute idea is to the

concept form its absolutely existing content o r Object
-
, , ,
but from the subjective side There is one absolute .
mind with o n e absolute idea connected by one a b s o

, ,
lute form o f thought The passage already quoted .
proceeds as foll ows : D ieser na c h s t e E ntschluss der

368 THE P OS T ULA TES A ND T H E C ON C E PT F O RM ; -
absolute idea together and makes them the Object ,
I
matter o f the Logic The N a t urp h i l o s o p h i e and the
.
P hilosophie des G eistes together make up the con

tent objectivity existence o r reality of this object
, , ,
matter o f the Logic of the ab sol ute concept form ,

-
together with the ab solute idea The Logic con .
tains the principles o f the two other p arts o f the

system ; and therefore an i nsight into the Logic t hat ,
is into the form the content and the method or

, , ,
principle o f movement o f the absolute idea is an ,
insight into the whole system .
The Logic contains three moments D as S e y n , ,
D as Wesen D er Begriff In the last is completed

,
.
the concept form ; for Hegel does not start w ith the
-
assumption o f the concept form as such but with the -
assumption of a concept in which indeed the concept ,
form is included impli citly an sich but not yet proved , ,
explicitly an und i r sich this is part o f the logical

,
development itself The distinction between the con

.
cept and the concept form such as I have drawn it in

-
this chapter is nowhere found i n Hegel He di stin

,
.

ui s h e d indeed between der Begriff and die B e ri e
g g
but when he uses the S ingular der Begriff it is left , ,
uncertain whether the attention is meant to be drawn

to the Object or to the form of the object mentioned
, ,
.
S O that in assuming a concept das Seyu as the start , ,
ing point o f logic Hegel assumes both concept and

,
c oncept form but reasons only from t h e former

-
,
He . .
starts in the Logic from the assumption o f a concept ,
because it was proved in the P h a no m e no l o gi e that all

true knowledge is conceiving and that in concepts , ,
Begriffe and not i n V orstellungen in tuitions or per

, ,

c e t i o ns
p ,
i s truth In dem Wissen says Hegel , ,
P h al n o m e no l o gi e page 5 8 8 hat also der G eist die

, ,
TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 3 69
Bewegung seines G est a l tens beschlossen insofern das ,
selbe mit dem u n ub e rw un d e ne n U nterschiede des B e

w u s s t s e y n s behaftet ist E r hat das reine E lement
.
seines D a s e y n s den Begriff gewonnen

, ,
But how .

,
it may be asked does Hegel manage to reach der

,
B egriff as the conclusion o f the P h a no m e n o l o gi e

, ,
without derivi n g it from o r at least including in it as

,
e ssential constituents the cogni tions o f time and S pac e

,
in their proper shape ? D O not these c ognitions o p

pose him a t every step o f his progress to a pure con
cept a concept to which they are in that shape con
, , ,
s i d e r e d unessential ? They would do s o it must b e ,
replied if he had not put them aside at rst and

, ,
transformed them into a shap e suitable for further

transform a tion into the pur e concept Thes e cog .
ni t i o n s must if they are u ni versal a nd necessary

, ,
meet him at the very rst step Of the P h a no m e no

logie and accordin gly the very rst step of the P h a
n o m e n o l o i e is to abolish or transform them pages
g ,
7 97
-
1 . How is this done ? By striking at onc e
from the very beginning into the route Of second ,
as distinguished from rst intentions ; that is by n e

, ,
g l ec t in
g to analyse objects as Obj ects for conscious
ness alone and seeking instead for general notions
,
under which to group them and general terms by ,
which to characterise them ; and this characterising

Hegel calls perceiving the truth o r Wahrheit o f the , ,
Object He begins with the whole eld of immediate

.
i mpressions o f sense ; the knowledge which we hav e

o f them he says is the most abstract and poorest
, ,
truth ; it says o f its Obj ect only t his i t exists This

,
.
is to neglect the analysis o f the object and to ask ,
what can be said a b o ut the Object taken as a whole , .
The next step i s t o Observe the distinction i n this ,
B B
3 0 TH E P OS T UL ATES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O R M
-
.
whole Object into g eneral and particular general

, ,
consciousness and particular instances o f it and t o ,
notice the onl y circumstance common to all the parti

c u l a r instances namely that they are relations of a
, ,
Subj ect an Ich to an obj ect o r that they consist in

, , ,
an Obj ect a n d a Subject mutually conditioned o r con , ,
d i t i o ni n g e ach other Then the Objective Side o f this

.
relation is rst examine d the Obj e ct bein g taken as a ,
present Object in time das J e t z t and a present Object , ,
in space das Hier E very such Obj ect has the com
,
.
mon property common to it with all the rest of being

, ,
present ; in other words the Hier and the Je t z t are ,
allgemeines The same is then shown of the other

.
o r subjective side Of o u r consciousness of the object

, ,
as was shown of the Object itself A llgemeinheit o r .
d a s Allgemeine is the n ext Object investigated int o ,
which the previous obj ects o f sense are represe nted as

transformed o r what is the same thing which is
, , ,
represented as their truth This general object then .
c omes before us as das D ing v o n vielen E i e n s c h a f

g
ten the subj ective side Of which is Wahrnehmung
,
.
The mode o f coexistence o f these properties E igen ,
s c h a ft e n is then e x a m m e d and characterised and t h e

, ,
o bject transformed into the concept of forces acting
in polar Opposition to each other ; and the subjective

S ide Of this Object is V erstand In this way no .
,
sooner does an O bject arise for consciousness than it

is characterised o r described in terms borrowed from
some other Objects ; and the new Object thus pro
d u c e d i s treated in the same m anner The analysis .
o f the Objects as they exist fo r consciousness alone is
never seriously entered o n Thus it is that time and .
Space as the formal elements Of all Objects are put

, ,
aside from the rst and the pure concept as the ,

.
,
372 TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
passage i n the P h a no m e n o l o gi e E inl eitung p 6 5 a , ,

.
,
passage beginning D ieser Widerspruch und sei ne ,
We gra um ung He means to s a y in t h e passage her e

'
.
,
transcribed that thought which is t h e truth Of a l l

, ,
modes o f consciousness o r into which all mus t b e ,
resolved must be now examined for itself ; not in i t s

,
conditions as containing an Object and a subj ect but

, ,
as consisting of a n ature O f its o w n as I should s a y , ,
thought in its rst intention abstracting from all ,
particular thin gs thought Of and leaving only t h e ,
process o r thing itself Thought as an E xistence S O , , .
considered he asserts that it has t w o inseparable mo

,
ments o r aspects as I S hould call them namely S e y n

, , ,
a n d R einer B egriff pure thought and existence o r ,

being The fundamental distinction in Hegel s Logic
.
i s indeed a distinction into a material and a fo rm a l

e lement or aspect ; but not into t h e material and
f ormal elements of perception feeling and time and ,
s pace
,
nor yet into what I call the two aspects o f
phenomena O bj ect and Subject ; but into two ele
,
ments o r two aspects of thought namely existenc e , ,
and pure thought o r as I should call them the con

, , ,
cept and the concept form It is from this that h e -

.
starts ; and this must always be remembered namely , ,
that das S e y n is thought ; for when he mak e s his ,
rst beginning wi th das S e yn he abstracts from t h e ,
circumstance that it is thought and treats this aspect ,
o r moment for itself in its rst intention as a concept

, ,
and does not deduce any thing from the fact that it is
a thought o r a concept form O ut of the mere das
,
-
.
S e y n he deduces die absolute Idee not by comparing ,
it with thought o r bringing the two together at all

, ,
but solely by attending to what the thought das ,
S e y n is
, .
TH E P OS T UL A TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 3 73
N ow I shall try to Show that all the concepts

,
1 st ,
and all the steps taken by Hegel involve an element
which he does not acknowledge the form o f time , ,
2d that from a certain point onwards they involve

,
another element which he does not acknowledge the ,
form of S pace ; 3 d that the account given o f the

,
thought o f matter and o f the arising o f this thought

is insu fcient ; 4 t h that the forward movement de
,
pends o n the relation Of the rst and second intention

o f Obj ects and that the appearance Of contradictions
,
and their solution is removed by attending to this

distinction ; and 5 t h that so far from negation being
, ,
the moving prin ciple O f thinking o r o f the process o f ,
thought it is the mere expression of a limit imposed

,
by volition which is another element not acknow

,
ledged by Hegel .
The rst fourth and fth Of these points must

, ,
be treated together at least it is impossible to treat

,
any O f them s eparately without mixing up the others .
I will however take the fourth and show how the

, , ,
Hegelian movement depends o n the difference of rst

and second intentions which not being acknowledged
,
gives an appearance as if a contradiction and its solu

tion had taken place In the rst book of the Logic
.
,
D as S e y n all the triplets which compose it contain

,
each o f them , 1 s t an Object in its second intention ;

,
2d the same obj ect in its rst intention ; 3 d an O b

, ,
jec t composed o f these two intentions which thus ,
becomes a new Obj ect is called by a new name and , ,
is t h e r s t Object o r moment o f the succeeding triplet

'
The rst triplet o f all begins with Seyu reines S e y n ,

.
This is the bare thought o f existence presence in ,
consciousness ; it is undetermined only becaus e it is

a voluntary abstraction from all determination I t .
3 74 TH E P OS T UL A T ES AND TH E C ON C E P T F O R M I -
is the mer e thought a bout obj ects 37 ; 307 0 wit hout ,

1
,
any particular Obj ect thought o f the characterisation ,
o f all and any particular Obj ects as existing Turn .
now to this abstract existence the thought of exist ,
ence and ask what it is for consciousness o r what it

, ,
is in i t s rst intention and the answer must be that

, ,
it is N ichts ; a s an abstraction it has no rst i nt e n

tion but is a mere abstraction nothing But t h e
, ,
.
rst and the second intention are o n e and t h e sam e

thing ; to think Of abstract existence and to think o f
nothing is the same and yet not the same ; thought
,
passes from o n e to the other and each becomes the ,
other from whichever you s t art S e y n and Ni c h t s

,
.
together are Werden N ow here the elements o f .
time and feeling are present a t every step Ther e '
can be no becoming no change without time a nd , , ,
there can be no thought O f existence and no thought ,
o f nothing without occupy i ng time

,
The time in : .
volved in the Werden i s involv e d in each moment o f

it ; a n d to have a thought o f Seyu o r N ichts is to
'
have consciousness affected in a particular way that ,
is to have a feelin g See a criticism o n Hegel from

,
.
,
a somewhat similar point O f Vi ew to mine in Herr ,

Trendelenburg s Logische U ntersuchungen Vol 1 ,
.
,
p 3 6 2 d edit See also for an accoun t Of the na

.
,
.
,

ture and drift of Hegel s philosophy M r Stirling s ,
.
Secret o f Hegel 2 vols 1 8 6 5 ,

. .
Werden o r Becoming is the unity of existence

, ,
,
a n d nothing ; but what is it in its second i ntention ?
How is it to be characterised ? It is certainly a

determination ; namely o f S e yn by Ni c h t s and O f ,
N i c h t s by S e y n It i s det ermined existence D a s e y n ;

.
,
and thus there arises a starting point fOr the next

triplet which i s D a s e y n als solches Q ua li t a t E twas
, , ,
.
3 76 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
content . In the cas e o f d a s S e yn this content i s

"
Obviously N ichts ; and s o you have not only a rst

intention o f abstract existence but one which contra ,
dicts it . If it had been seen that das S e y n was

already a second intention it would have been r e ,
plied to Hegel D as S e yn is not N ichts b ut all things

, ,
whatever without attending to their qualities ; all

,
things whatever are the rst intention Of das S e y n ;

but if y o u propose to u s the abstraction das S e yn
'
, ,
the concept das S e y n and treat this which is a

, , ,
second intention as if it were a rst intention as if

, ,
it were an Object for consciousness by itself apart

from its content then 11 0 doubt its abstracting o r ,
conceptual nature must be taken into account and

such an abstraction is N othing The apparent con .
t ra d i c t i o n arises from treating a second intention as if

it was a rst intention .
The place where notions involving the cognition

o f S pace are rst introduced is in the third chapter
o f the Section o f Quality entitled D as F i i rs i c h s e y n

,
.
F t i r s i c h s e y n becomes U nity das E ins ; then the unit , ,
das E ins is in its rst intention das Leere das

, ,
L eere ist S O die Q ua l i t a t des E ins in seiner Unm i t t e l

b a r ke i t ,

p 1 7 6 N ow taking the quality Of unity
. .
,
together with a S ingle u ni t which excludes e very

thing else there arises the notion o f units excludi ng
,
u nits that i s Of P lurality o f units ; and this is R e

, ,
pulsion R epulsion involves attraction and this i s

.
,
the passing over o f quality into quantity N ow i t is .
impossible to have a notion o f repulsion or o f a t t ra c

tion without the notion o f space just as it is i m p o s ,
sible to have the notion Of becoming Werden with , ,
o u t that o f time The passing over to the notion o f

.
space is conceal ed by t h e simplicity o f the notion o f

TH E P OS T UL A TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 3 77
an unit which may be a mere uni t o r moment o f

,
time ; plurality o f units also may be conceived a s

existing in time alone b ut repulsion and attraction ,
a reciprocal action o f these units o n each other even ,
though it should be conceived as takin g place along

a single line involves the Visibility or the imagina
,
tion as visible o f that li n e and makes it a line o f ,
S pace a line o n which there is a movement both for

,
wards and backwards at once But here there is no .
real deduction o f the relations o f space from those O f -
time ; the passage from o n e to the other is merely

conce a l ed by the U nit s o that y o u do no t know how
, ,
you come to nd yourself in a world o f externality ,
outness o r space relations The three chief divisions

,
.
o f the section o n Quantity are rst Quantity as a , ,
s econd intention simple conti nuous unity ; second

, , , ,
the same as a rst intention Q uantum ; third the r e , ,
i
l a t o s Of Qu ta as quanta to each other
n a n ,
da s , ,
quantitative V e rh a l t ni s s This relation becomes p ro

.
portion das M aass which is the Obj ect matter o f t h e

, ,
-
third section o f the rst book D as S e y n ,

.
The Logic has to account for the existence that ,
is to give the concept o r thought of every thing that

, ,
comes forward in the external world o r in nature ,

.
The Logic is the genesis o f the thoughts the con ,
c e t s the true essences o r natures of the phenomena

p , , ,
Of sense The thought Of time in this sense would

.
, ,
be produced by the very rst negation the negation ,
Of S e y n by N ichts and would be contained i n the

,
thought of Werden ; s o that we S hould not be s ur

prised i n the N a t urp h i l o s o p h i e to nd phenomena o f
, ,
s ense existing in time seeing that the concepts in

, ,
the Logic have existed in the same way ; similarly

,
the thought Of spac e is quantity and the existence o f ,

3 78 TH E P O S T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O R M -
.
S pace in phenomena Of sense is provided for and ex

plained by o u r having had the thought of quantity i n
the Logic Hitherto in the two sections of Quality
.
,
and Quantity we have had nothing as content but

,
time relations and space relations and nothi ng as ,
form but the negative moveme nt o f tho ught o ut o f ,
which and the concept das S e yn the content has , ,
been represented as arising this content bei ng time ,
and S pace relations and the prop ortion Obtaining b e

tween them But now the phenomenal existence o f
.
matter has also to be a ccounted for the existence o f ,
solid tangible visible and otherwise sensible bodies ;

, , ,
the thought o r concept which makes them possible ,
and is their essence and truth has to be given This ,

.
is done at the e n d of the rst chapter of the th i rd

section D as M aass p 4 0 6 under the head D as F l i r
, ,
.
, ,
si c h s e n i m
y M a a sse The passage , begins E s. macht ,
aber die weitere Bestimmung aus and the thought

o r concept in question 1 s that o f S e l b s t a n d i gke i t .
Henceforth i n the two remain ing chapters o f the

,
rst book D a s S e y n Hegel must b e under s t ood as

, ,
having in his mind tangible and otherw ise sensible

Objects and their chemical composition He speaks
,
.
indeed Of the laws Of chemistry chemical afni ty , ,
a n d S O o n ; but he has really given no account or
reason why matter should arise why there should b e ,
colours sounds odours hardnesses , roughnesses and

, , , ,
S O o n He has included the m in his concept S e l b s t a n

.
,
'
d i gk e i t without n aming them

,
S e l b s t a n d i gke i t may .
be a good logical expression for tangible matter ,
when tangible matter has arisen but it is no cause o f ,
any thing bei ng tangible o r an Object for any of t h e ,
s ens es .C hemical relations may it is tr ue be r e , ,
so lved into time and space relations b ut the relations ,

38 0 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C O C E P T F O RM N -
.
The second book o f t h e Logic entitled D as Wesen , ,
exhibits this movement o f thought as thought In it .
four things may be remarked ; rst that it treats Of ,
the laws o f thought o r of logic t h e postulates ; second , ,
that it traverses the same ground as the rst book

traversed but in a different way ; third that the law
, ,
Of t h e movement is different from that in the rst

book ; and fourth that the notions o f time and spac e
,
relations or dynamic and static relations are ev ery

, ,
where involved T o begin with the law of the p r o

.
cess itself This process is that which was exhibited

.
in the rst book but there as involved in existences

,
o r concepts S e y n Werden Q ua l i t a t
, , Q u a n t i t a,
t V er ,
' '
h a l t ni s s M aass and s o o n Here that process is

'
.
, ,
exhibited in itself abstracted from these stages Of

,
its course o r Obj ects produced in its course But it

,
.
has stages Of its own and an evolution of its o w n

, ,
apart from those Objects I ts analysis is the d y n a m i

.
cal analysis O f the process which in the rst book , ,
was exhibited as a succession Of statical concepts .
There the concepts were compared and analysed her e ,
the movement between a n d connecting the concepts

is analysed ; and the concepts which are the stages ,
o r haltin g places o f the movement are named or cha

, ,
ra c t e r i s e d by their relation t o
,
the movement itself ;
s o that they seem to be different but are the same as
the concepts in the rst book The movement and .
the concept reached by it in this book are what I , ,
Should call the incomplete and the completed moment

o f consciousness Hence the law o f the process is not
.
,
as in the rst book a triplet consisting of a second

,
intention its rst intention and the union of the two

, , ,
but a tripl et consisting o f the incomplete moment or

movement its completio n in a concept and the u ni on
, ,
TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O R M -
. 38 1
o f both in a third concept It m ight be expected .
that the movement o f thought would be one and the

same in all instances o r in all moments o f S e y n ; that
,
it could therefore have no moments o f development

o f its own but when pointed o u t would be pointed
, , ,
o u t once for all as the single law Of movement and

,
development o f all possible concepts This might .
have been the case if Hegel had simply turned his

,
attention to the formal character the concept form ,

-
,
contained in every concept as it was shown to be ,
contained i n the concept das S e y n at the beginn in g

, ,

o f the rst book But such is not Hegel s procedure
. .
He develops every thing from das S e yn as a concept ,
and not as a concept form C onsequently das Wesen

-
.
,
the formal element o f das S e y n has itself a parti ,
c ul a r,
concrete shape ; it is not Wesen in the a b
,
stract but the Wesen O f the S e yn o f the series o f

, ,
concepts o f the rst book F rom this relation Of the

.
Wesen to the S e yn are d eveloped all the series o f

particular relations o r essences which are the cate ,
o r i e s o f thought This is consistent and logic al and

g .
,
the result is a ser1 es Of concepts which are relations

o f other concepts which are the relations o f the con
,
c e t s Of the rst book to each other

p .
The last step taken in the rst book was to ex

b ibit das S e y n as the substance o f all i t s attributes ,
their indifference and their s um That is to s a y das

.
,
S e y n is already a relation ; das Wesen is relation and ,
this relation is the rst and s i mplest moment or par ,
t i c ul a r relation in all the future series is the Wesen

, ,
with which the second book begins The rst triplet .
o f the book shows the relation O f We s e n to S e y n and ,
throws light on t h e second point remarked above ,
n amely that the ground traversed by both books is

,
38 2 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
the same F irst chapter p 8 v o l 4 Wesen . .

D as
,
. .
,
i s t das a ufgeh o b ene S ey n] ; All that is not Wesen is

unwesentliches ; e x c e p t t h e pure relation or pur e
'
movement o f thought every thing is Schein mere , ,
appearance D er Schein ist der ganze R est der

.
,

noch v o n der S p h a r e des S ey n s b ri g geblieben ist .
p 9 But all the S e yn was taken up into the Wesen ;

. .
what then c an the Schein be ? It is a mode o f the

Wesen der Schein ist das an sich N ichtige ; es
i s t nur z u zeigen dass die Bestimmungen die ihn , ,
v o m Wesen unterscheiden Bestimmungen des Wesens ,

selbst sind p 1 1 And again D er Schein ist also . .
, ,
das Wesen selbst aber d a s Wesen in ein er Bestimmt ,
heit aber s o dass S ie nur sein M om ent i s t und das

, ,
Wesen ist das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst D as .
Wesen i n dieser seiner Selbstbewegung ist die R e

e xi o n p I 3 1 4
.

A s I S hould express it the Schein
.
-
.
,
is the completion Of the incomplete moment of time ,
Wesen .
The next triplet analyses R eexion The move .
ment itself exists o r is setzende R eexion the i n , ,
complete moment ; secondly i t thinks or posits some ,
thing a ussere R eexion the completed moment ;

, ,
thirdly this something is itself bestimmend e R e

, ,
ex i o n .
The s econd chapter treats o f the essentia lities ,
Wesenheiten o r R e e x i o n s Besti mmungen

,
They -
.
are in fact the postulates Of logic or rather corre ,
s o n d to what are call ed the postulates ; for Hegel

p
takes the movement itself and not its stages as t h e
essential t hing imposin g the postulates o n itself o r
, ,
creating them in its course The three moments .
are I d e nt i t a t U nterschied and Widerspruch p 2 6

,
'
, , ,
. .
D as Wesen i st zuerst einfache Beziehung auf sich '

38 4 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
.
tion arises Hegel w h o admits only o n e pure move

.
,
ment o f thought without any double element can

, ,
only attribute t h e phenomenon to this pure nature o f

thought itself and s a y that it is i t s nature to b e con
,
t ra d i c t i o n .
The remaining chapter Of t h e rst section treats

o f der G rund and die Bedingung which may be con ,
s i d e r e d as corresponding to what is commonly call ed
the R atio S u f c i e n s And in these the time and

.
space relations appear t o me t o be every where s up

posed and tacitly employed D er absolute Grund .
bears a statical character der bestimmte Grund a ,
dynamic character and die Bedingung combines ,
the two methods The two remaining sections o f

.
this second book D ie E rscheinung and D ie Wirk

,
l i c h k e i t require also as it seems to me notions o f

, , ,
time and spac e relations to b e present in order t o ,
their being understood The law o f development is .
the same in these three sections of the second book ,
as in all their subordinate triplets D as Wesen t h e .

,
Object O f the rst section is in its completion die ,
E rschein ung the world o f phenomena the obj ect o f

, ,
the second section ; and this together with the move

ment which produced it is d i e Wirkli chkeit the O b
'
e c t Of the third section The Wirklichkeit o f the

j .
s econd book corresponds to t h e M aass o f the rs t
book and is the essence o f the M aass The last

,
.
stage Of Wirklichkeit is die Wechselwirku ng the ,
action and reaction o f the universal Substanz taken

,
a s a s i n gle moment ; and this grasp o f the whole as a
single moment is der Begri ff the C oncept form which ,

-
,
has no further distinctions within itself but onl y , ,
as I should express it di sti n ction o f aspects as a ,
wh ole .
TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 38 5
The third book o f the Logic treats o f o r rather ,
exhibits the C oncept form the Begriff as the evo

,
-
, ,
l ut i o n o f its three aspects in their relation to each

other ; it unites in itself the S e y n and the Wesen o f
the two former books traverses the same ground as ,
they do but in its evolution constr ucts a world o ut

,
o f them which is the world o f reason and o f truth

, ,
the world as it really is This is done in the thir d .
section Of this book D ie Idee ; and die Idee is what ,
Hegel calls the R eason V ernunft as disting uished , ,
from the U nderstanding V erstand D ie Idee kann ,

.
als die Ver nunf t ( diess ist die eigentliche p h i l o s o

s c h e Bedeutung f1 1 r Ver nun t
h i f) gefasst wer
p ,

den E n c y c l O p a d i e
. 214
'
,
.
In this book we have no longer before us the suc

c e s s i v e stages reached by pure thought the concepts ,
o f the rst book nor those o f the movement o f pure

,
thought itself as in the second book ; but we have

,
the concrete action o f thought the movement and i t s ,
concepts together the concepts as produced by the ,
movement and not as produced by each other That .
is we have rst the logical forms O f thought them

,
selves as di stinguished from the laws Of the move

,
ment the postulates ; these forms being the concept

,
form itself the judgment Ur t h e i l a n d the syllogism

, , , ,.
Schluss These are the three chapters o f the rst

.
.

section of the book entitled D er Begriff The second: .
s ection contains the object or content produced o ut
o f and corresponding to these forms Of thought ; i t

, ,
contains 1 s t the world Of mechanism as conceived

, ,
by thought o r the mechanical laws o f the universe ;

,
2d the world of chemistry as conceived by thought

, , ,
o r the chemical laws Of the universe ; and 3 d the ,
totality o f thes e two spheres their 7 07 0; o r compl e ,

1
CC
38 6 TH E P OS TUL A TE S A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
tion or adequateness to the concept form which they

,
-
express ; and this is called Teleologie der Z weck ist ,
seiner F orm nach eine in sich unendliche T o t a l i t a t '
vo l 5 p
. 2,
06 The
. third. section con t ains the union
o f the two former namely the subjective process o f , ,
thought and the Obj ective content o r aspect of it a , , ,
content or aspect which has come in the Teleologie , ,
fully up to the form o r subj ective aspect or process .
The two things subjectivi ty and Objectivity are, ,
h enceforward united ; they were originally what I

s hould call aspects O f the whole that is each of them , ,

was the whole Co n c e p t fo rm from its own point o f ~
V i e w ; or as Hegel expresses it the O bjectivity is the

, ,
Besonderheit des Begriffes the Subjectivity is t h e ,
All gemeinheit des Begri ffes The remaining section .

,
called D ie Idee is the E i n z e l nh e i t des Begriffes o r

, ,

the C oncept form as an actual existence subjective

-
a n d Objective at once all of whose actual forms o f ,
e xistence are forms o r modes o f consciousness the ,
l iving personality thinking and feeling The chap .
t ers o f this section are 1 s t Life ; 2d C ognition ; and , ,
3 d the unity o f both

,
In o r as the Absolute Idea
.
,
which is the unity o f both says Hegel v o l 5 p , ,

.
,
;
3 1 7 der,
Begri ff ist nicht nur S eel e sondern freier ,
s ub e c t i v e r Begriff der r S ich ist und dah er di e

j
i ,
P er s b nl z e/z lc ei t hat der praktische an 1 1 n d fii r sich

'

, ,
bestimmte Objective Begriff der als P erson u n d ur c h

, ,
dringliche atome S ub je c t i v i t a t ist der aber ebenso

,

,
sehr nicht ausschliessende E i n z e l nh e i t sondern i r ,
Sich A llgem ei nhei t und E r kennen ist u n d in sein em ,
Andern s ei ne ei gene O b je c t i v i t a t zum G egenstand e

hat .
A s to the law o f the process followed in this book ,
it still moves by negation and negation of that nega

,
, ,
38 8 TH E P OS T UL A TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
.
used as such an organon there is no test o f the tr uth

,
Of any thing left except of logic itself and no man

,
can be sure O f having mastered any fact securely o r ,
as true unless he has mastered the whole Of logic that

, ,
is o f metaphysic and seen the relation which that

, ,
fact bears and the niche which it occupies in t h e

, ,
logical o r metaphysical system All empir ical and

;
.
,
particular phenomena o f sense or V orstellungen can , ,
only be known by being referred to their proper

head in o n e o f the Books Sections and C hapters o f , ,
a Logic ; and what is the science o r the principle

which teaches us to refer these to the right head in
the Logic ? Since the empirical and particular facts
in all the special sciences are changing in relation and
increasing in number every day we shall want some ,
general science with general rules to guide us in

, ,
referring them to their proper head in the Logic ,
without which they cannot be understood ; that is ,
we Shall still b e in want o f a logic as an organon .

Hegel s Na t urp h il O S O p h i e and P hilosophie des G eistes
might indeed serve as useful g uiding examples but ,
we should still want some general rules applicable to ,

all cases Hegel s Logic in becoming a metaphysic
.
,
o r applied logic o f the universe has ceased to be an ,
organ on o r a test o f the correctness o f particular

,
processes Of thought It has virtually in this point

.
, ,
gone back to the station o f the P latoni c D ialectic ,
before Aristotle produced the system o f formal logic ;

for in that system o f P lato s there was o n e thing and ,
o n e only to s e e namely the 07377 If you could

, , ,
.
understand these you had truth ; if not you were

, ,
involved in hopeless error R eason as I reason said .

,
P lato admit the 07077 and distin guish them in pheno

, ,
mena o r you d o no t reason at all ; reasoning is to

,
'
TH E P OS T UL ATES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 38 9
a pply my system A ristotle however showed that to

.

apply Plato s system o r any other was but a parti
, ,
cnlar kind o f reasoni ng and not the whole ; tr ue o r

false it was a metaphysical and a complete system
, ,
a n d as such no t a Logic ; conta i ni ng more than the
mere laws o f reasoning it was not adapted to serve ,

a s an organon The same Obj ection applies to Hegel s
.
Logic ; true o r false it contains s o much that a s a

, , ,
whole it offers no standard for j udging of extra logi

,
-
cal matters It is a complete system ready made to

.
,
the hand Of the reasoner ; who before he has a c ,
c e t e d it requires some organon by which to examine

p
it and after accepting it some r ul es o f applying it
, , ,
to future circumstances .

But Hegel s Logic is not only a metaphysical but
a n ontological theory a theory o f the A bsolute ,
It .
does not profess to s a y what the subjective o r any ,
o ther aspect o f existence is but to s a what exist

, y ,
e nce as a whole is to transmute existence into the

,
concept form as the truth o f existence Of which truth

-
, ,

existence is a moment How comes it that Hegel s .
metaphysical theory which has just been examin ed

, ,
a ppears in this other character o f a theory of t h e
A bsolute ? This is n o t a necessary consequence o f

being a metaphysical theory ; a l l metaphysical theo
ries are not ontologies but it is a consequence Of t h e
particular phenomenon xed o n by Hegel as the key
o f his system It is because the concept form is the -
.
round and substance o f his metaphysic a l analysis

g
that his metaphysical analysis is also an ontology .
E very concept is a logical whole If the entire phe .
n o m e n a of the world can be reduced to the concept
form they constitute a whole from which nothing

,
c a n be excluded but in which every thing is provided

,
3 90 TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND T HE C ON C E PT F O R M ; -
for I f n o w the concept form i s a prod uct of other

w
-
.
modes of consciousness and a product which arises ,
only to be transcended a limit which is itself over ,
leapt as soon as set then whatever may be i n cluded ,
i n a concept form is but a part o f t h e world of phe

-
nomena and not the whole and the concept form itself ,
-
is a part and not the whole of conscio u sness ; it is a

particular way of representing phenomena the effect ,
o f voli tion looking to a further purpose and capabl e

, ,
o f use as an organon ; which is the view taken of it

in this E ssay But if the concept form itself the e s

.
-
s ence of which is to be a limited whole is the ground , ,
s ubstance and t r uth Of all things from which nothin g

, ,
is excluded then the u n iverse must be regarded as

,
Absolute as something which has nothing beyond

,
it and yet is limited N ow although Hegel includes .
Innity itself in a concept ; and the concept o f innity ,
o r innity as a concept is wh at I u nderstand him to

f
m ean by his expression true innity as opposed t o ,
f alse o r the schlecht unendliches ; and though this is

,
-
t h e same thing a s that which I mean by the idea O f

innity there is this difference between the two cases
, ,
namely that the idea of innity as will be seen in t h e

, ,
chapter on Ideas is a m ode O f expressing or trying t o

,

grasp the phenomenon Of in nity Hegel s schlecht ,
u nendliches an attempt which confessedly fails and

, ,
names its failure i n naming the Object it attempts t o

grasp ; while Hegel s concept of i nnity o n the other ,
h and professes to have grasped the innite becaus e

, ,
i t h a s included it in a concept form The c i rcum -

.
s tance that there is som ething which exceeds our
p ower to grasp this circumstance is the

,
innity of
t hat something be it time o r Space o r feeling ; i n
, , ,
ni t y 1 s t h e conc ept name o f that c i c m s t a n c e a nd

-
,
3 92 T HE P OS T UL A TES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O R M -
.
enclose it witho ut leaving a period before it uncha

ra c t e ri s e d .
I S hare with Hegel his grand and profound c On

V i c t i o n that What we know that w e are
,
See thi s,
.
e xpressed in the E n c c l o p adi e 23 In der Tha t

y 9 ,
.
a ber ist die N atur das durch den G eist geset z te und

d e r G eist selbst ist es der S ich die N atur z u seiner

V oraussetz ung macht We make the world by
.
knowin g it ; for the time which is past which w e ,
imagine as independent o f us is a representation o r , ,
representative perception o f som e present moment ,

.
We call it into existence according to the laws which

govern consciousness ; that is the world is produced ,
and developed according to the laws which govern

consciousness ; the principle or principles o f the pro , ,
cess o f knowing are the principle o r principles of the , ,
process of existence in t h e world But what are thos e .
principles ? This is the question o n which I diverg e

from the Plato o f o ur days 0 H Aov 0 607 779 000 0 31 02 ,
1 1
,

30360; A 1 0030xo v Hegel ,
His theory is stated in
.
o n e word N egation o r rather C ontradiction O n e

, , ,
.
S ingle prin ciple explains every thin g and moulds all ,
i n to one grand and comprehensive system The fewer .
a r e the principles employed in explaining any thing ,
the more d i i c ul t and complete is the explanation ;

b ut the richer the mor e complex those principles
, ,
are and the more they require and admit anal ysis
, ,
that is the more elements they contain s o much

, ,
the more does t h e explanation which they off er b e , ,
come easy and incomplete N Ow contradiction is .
certainly o n e single principle but it contains many ,
elements What are these elements ? T i rne simpl e

.
,
feeling feelin g of will C ontradiction containing thes e

, .
elements will carry us wherever we can make a b

TH E P OS T ULA T ES A ND TH E C ON C E P T F O RM -
. 393
s t ra c tio from an exte rnal world ; but it wil l not ex

n
plain the existenc e o f such an external world T o .
explain this another element must be added the form

, ,
o f S pace There are then deeper and S impler principles

.
than contradiction ; a nd the simplicity and complete

ness Of Hegel s system are apparent only and not true .
M ake time space and feeling the principles o f t h e

, ,
world and a syste m is Obtained less apparently com

, ,
l e t e and promising less but in my opinion at least

p , , ,
more able to perform what it promises .
It will be well perhaps before leavin g this subject

to give a fe w instances m which Hegel attempts t o ,
explain phenomena o f t h e world o f qualities and o f

the world of feelings by referring them to their logical
truth o r to explain them in their rst intention by

,

giv ing their truth o r second intention in which it
,
will be seen how unsatisfactory such explan ations are .
N ature itself the external world considered in

,
the abstract what is it ? I t has been already said

,
that this is the rst production o f the last stage o f

the Logic o f the Absolute Idea Hegel answers
,
.
t his question in th e E n c y c l o p a d i e 24 7 Werke , , ,

D S
vo l .
7 ( )
I p 2 3 ie
,
N atur hat . ich
. als die Idee
i n der F orm de s A n d er s s ey ns ergeben D a die I d ee .
s o als das N egative ihrer selbst Oder s i c h a us s er l z c /z

'
ist s o ist die N atur nicht a u s s e rli c h nur relativ

,
gegen diese Idee ( und gegen die subjective E xistenz

derselben den G eist ) sondern die A eus s er l z c h kei t
, ,
macht die B estimmung aus in welcher S ie als N atur ,
ist .
N egative o r external to itself but whenc e
the notion Of externality o r outness and whence t h e ,
equi valence of this outness to negation ? Why should

the negation o f the idea be outness ? Is it not clear
th a t there must already b e outness be fore it can b e ,
394 TH E P OS T UL AT ES A ND T HE C ON C E P T F O R M -
.
perceived as different from the i d ea ? A n external

world is already there before it can be explained as
being the negation Of a world conceived as only
itself the idea M ere negation O f the idea does n o t
,
.
explain the fact that outness 1 s the Obj ect which n e

a t i v e s the idea Why does the idea determine itself
g .
to evolve from itself d i es es Andere this and no other ,
negation o f itself ? N 0 answer is p o s s i b l e e x c e p t that '
t h e external world already exists .
The explanation o f S pace labours under the sam e

difculty E ncyc 253 D as A e u s s e r s i c h s e y n als
,
.
,
positiv . This is a description o f S pace and supposes ,
S pace already there It is the same with time .

,
D as A e u s s e r s i c h s e y n als negativ It is evolved from .

S pace as the negation which Space contains in itself ,
2 7
5 . It is das A ngeschaute Werden 2
5 8 It ,

.
has been shown however above that time is i nvolved ,
in the concept S e yn itself previous to Werden s o , ,
that it is in sufcie nt to s a y that the concept Werd en

is the truth ground or explanation Of time
, ,
.
M atter in 2 6 1 is the union o f space and time

, , ,
the existence in which their ideality becomes reality ,
o r as Hegel expresses it farther on 44 8 at the end, ,
R aum und Z eit durch die ihnen immanente D ialektik

des Begriffs S ich selbe r zur M a t er z e als ihrer Wahr
'
heit aufheben and this their passi n g over into con i - .
crete D a s e y n says Hegel is inconceivable for t h e

, ,
mere understandin g a nd consequently is a l ways r e

,
p resented by i t as an ultimate fact a g egebenes ,

H e .
adds that the current notion is to represent Space and

ti me as empty and then to let them be lled with
,

matter ; which remark shows that he had no notio n

o f t hem as met a physical el ements o f Obj ects a con ,
c eption t o w hic h his remarks do not apply But can .

396 TH E P OS T UL A T ES A ND TH E C O NC E P T F O RM -
.
Havi n g in 3 9 5 v o l 7 ,
page 8 1 gathered
.
,
up into a focus the general characteristics o f t h e

min d into the focus Of an 1 nd i v i d u a l Subj ect o r
,
mind Hegel proceeds to the development o f thi s

,
individ ual mind The rst instance I will notice i s

.
his explanation o f E m p nd ung sens e i n its most ,
g eneral S hape .What is sense o r s e ns a t i v e ne s s ? I

have already quoted part Of his answer to this ques
tion i n 2 1 from E ncyc 3 9 9 p 1 1 5 .
D urch d a s
. .
, ,
E m p n d e n ist somit die Seele dahin gekommen dass ,
das ihre N atur ausmachende Al lgemeine in einer un

mittelbaren Bestimmtheit fii r s i e wird N u r durch .
dies s Fi i r si c h w e r d e n ist die Seele e m p nd e nd Thi s .

is a description no t an analysis or an explanation

,
.
The phenomenon Of sense must be present befor e

it can be described and the description cann ot b e
,
regarded as its cause .
Begierde desire ; what is the explanation given o f

,
this ? Answer in 4 2 6 pag e 2 7 0 When any thing

, , .
which is identical with itself feels a contradiction with

itself there arises a Trieb o r impulse to remove the
, , ,
contradiction and this impulse is desire This may

,
.
serve as a description o f d esire when once the feelin g

is there ; but t h e question o f why there should b e
s uch a feeling at all o r why a felt contra di ctio n
,
S hould be such a particular feeling is no t answered ; ,
the feeling has no explanation but itself ; it is no ex

planation to s a y that it may b e described as a felt
contradiction with oneself .
Similarly it is attempted to explain t h e p h e no m e

non O f feeli ng Ge fuh l in 4 7 1 page 3 6 3 by saying
, , , ,
that it is nichts Anderes als die F orm der unm i t t e l

baren e i ge nt h i i m l i c h e n E i nz e l nh e i t des S ubjects i n ,
der jener Inhalt w i e jeder an d er e o bj ective Inhalt,

,
TH E P OS T UL A TES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O RM -
. 397
dem das B e w us s t s e y n auch Ge ge n s t a n dl i c h ke i t z u

schreibt gesetzt werden kann
,
.
Again in 47 2,
page 6
3 4 the phenomenon ,
o f
pain is explained by saying that it is die Un a nge
m e s s e n h e i t des S e y n s z u dem Sollen

.
These instances are enough for the present pur

pose ; and if it should be replied that all these objects
(1 feelings are included as content in the con c epts
, ,
as exhibited in the Logic the answer must be that , ,
in that case these concepts themselves are capable o f

analysis and analytical explanation and that their ,
e xplaining power is due to the elements Of which
they severally consist for that every concept is a

,
compound complete o r empirical Object

, , .
It remains nally to notice the way in which

Hegel resolves again the indi vidual mind which h e ,
is examining i n to the general o r absolute mind with

, ,
which the treatise ends This is done virtually that

.
,
is the rst steps are taken in 4 2 6 4 9 D ie B e

2 -
, ,
gierde and the two following

,
D as anerkennende
S e l b st b e w u s s t e yn
. I n the phenomenon of desire the ,
Objects in reference to which the desires arise are

recognised as o f the same nature an sich identisch , ,
with the Subj ect They are therefore if not capable

.
,
o f being immediately taken up into the Subject con ,
s i d e r e d necessarily as s o many independent subjects ,
s o many instances Of an alter ego Thus the Subject .
creates o ut of its objects in the phenomena o f desire

, ,
a world of other individual minds all Of the same ,
nature with itself and separated from it only by the

,
bodies which they inhabit Instead o f considering .
e very obj ect as unconscious till reasons have arisen
for considering it conscious the mind o n this theory , , ,
considers every Object as conscious till reasons have

3 98 THE P OS T ULA T ES A ND T H E C ON C E P T F O RM
-
.
arisen for considering it unconscious ; and this fol

lows from the assumption that originally all con
s c i o u s n e s s depends on sel f consciousness This View -
.
appears to be supported by many facts in t h e early

history o f science and religion so far as it is known ,
t o us namely by fetichism in the earliest states o f

, ,
civilisation by polytheism and by the explanation

, ,
o f physi cal events by reference to the inner feelings

o f men such as o u u and veTa o g These facts how
,
.
ever do not render necessary the explanation of them

by supposin g self consciousness to be prior to con
-
s c i o u s n e s s ; for it is su fcient to suppose that self
consciousness was developed prior to the development

o f these early modes o f thought and there is nothing ,
to Show that these early modes of thought were

contemporary with consciousness itself If then a l l .
consciousness is self consciousness and all Obj ects o f

-
,
-
consciousness are O f the same nature as conscious

ness which latter is no doubt the case then not onl y
, ,
a l l Objects are Obj ects of self consciousness which i s -

,
true in a certain sense but also there is but one self ,
consciousness in the world the absolute mind ; for ,
the Obj ects of c o nsciousness are themselves instances

o f self consciousness
-
each mind recognise s itself in
,
all its Objects and the o n e common Obj ect or com

, ,
plex o f Obj ects which all the minds recognise as

,
themselves i s itself self consciousness and the sepa

,
-
rate minds are in their turn its objects This o n e .
common Subject O bject is the absolute min d and

-
,
:
other nite m i nds are t h e modes o f its self conscious -
ness A ssume self consciousness as the starti ng poi nt

.
-
,
and it will also appear as t h e g o al ; there as absolut e

logic a l form here as absolute existing mind This i s
,
.
Hegelianism But o n the other hand assume c o n

.
, ,
400 THE P OS T UL ATES A ND TH E C ON C E PT F O R M -
.
Vrai Grand E tre or Humani ty ; each Of which is

,
the
concomitant result if I may s o speak Of the e v o l u
, ,
tion o f the world history ; each Of which is personied

-
as a S ingle in di vidual ; and each o f which is t h e

Obj ect o f divine honours ; and these three points Of
S i milarity suppose several minor ones Then again .
there is the progression by triplets in Hegel in which ,
the rst m ember is the an sich the last the an und ,
i r sich and the middle the transition between them

, ,
while the last s t age when reached throws back ligh t

, ,
upon the nature o f both the previous stages not ,
understood before they had produced their results .

To this answers C omte s doctrine Of a triple stage in
the actual history o f all development the middle of
which is but a transitional state which cann ot b e ,
judged o f till the las t stage has been reached fo r ,
which it was a preparation ; for instance in the elds ,
o f the intellectual the active and the affective func

, ,
tions o f man three stages may be Observed ; in t h e

,
rst the ctive the abstract and the positive stage ;

, , ,
in the second the conquering the defensive and t h e

, , ,
industrial ; and in the third the domestic the civil , , ,
and the universal P olitique P ositive v o l 4 chap

.
,
.
,
.
3,
page 1 77
. P rogression by triplets in all reasoning
has been shown to depend o n the will rst setting ,
and then overleaping a bound whereby a second o b

, ,
e c t is di stinguished from a rst and then seen to

j ,
have something in common with it the result being ,
the concept form the form o f all reasoning This

-
,
.

law is Hegel s discovery But it is very remarkable .
,
though perhaps n o t surprising when a positive philo ,
Sopher discovers o n quite independent grounds a

, ,
law o f progress in actual history s o closely corr

s o n di n
p g to the l a w o f progress which
. a metaphysical
TH E P O S T UL A TE S A ND TH E C O N C E PT F O RM -
. 4 01
philosopher deduced from the discovery o f this logical

and abstract law o f reasonin g in genera l .
I will nally no t ice a similarity o r rather same

ness o f principle which i s the most comprehensive o f
all a principle which is common to both p h i l o s o
,
p h e r s and which belongs

,
in my judgment at least
, ,
t o what is true and not erroneous in their two s s

y
tems Both writers each from his o w n point o f view
.
, ,
and in his o w n half of the world move round t h e ,
same centre ; for the principle which they share is

the central truth o f their two systems This truth .
in Hegel is that the universe can only be described

, ,
analysed and known within itself In the P h il o

, .
s ophie P ositive the ruli ng thought

,
as e x hibited in ,
the Law o f the Three States and elsewhere is that , ,
the search after causes is vain and is superseded by ,
the search after laws In other words analys e the .

,
order o f coexistenc e and the order o f sequence o f

phenomena within the world o f phenomena but seek ,
no cause fo r any o f them that is not itself a pheno

menon Both conceptions are the same namely t o
.
, ,
keep within pheno m ena to analyse their order and ,
interdependence and to abstain from going beyond

,
o r seeking the Why o f the universe instead o f this ,
to seek only fo r the necessary o r universal antecedent s

o f particular objects as parts o f the whole
,
A di ffer .
ence between them there is and a wide o n e namely , , ,
that this mode o f philosophising is i n C omte a renun

c i a t i o n of an attempt as useless while in Hegel it is a ,
clai m to have succeeded in that attempt the attempt

,
to sei z e the Absolute Look only for laws and not

.
for causes s a y they b oth ; philosophy is the discovery

,
o f laws and not of causes ; the absolute is not to b e
seized remain within your xed limits But why i s

,
.
DD
4 02 TH E P O S T UL A TE S A ND TH E C ON C E PT FO RM
-
.
the absolute not to be seiz ed ? With Hegel because ,
it has been seized already is dened and contains all

, ,
causes within it ; with C omte b ecause it cann ot be

,
seiz ed at a l l and we must content ourselves without

,
causes E qually however in both cases is the search

.
for causes given up The way in which I should be

.
inclined to express the same truth would be by the

ancient formula O p e r a ri sequitur esse or by sayi n g
, ,
That the question of history is subordinate to the

question of nature .
4 04 TH E C O NC E PT .
and this makes it a concept O r volition may proceed .
beyond the original abstract notion and form a ge ,
neral notion by redintegration o f other obj ects in

consciousness which contain as a common factor t h e
original abstract notion The abstract notion appears
.
thus in two shapes both alike due to volition but o n e

, ,
more elaborate than the other the simpler of which ,
is a particular abstract notion and the more complex ,
a general abstract notion To both o f these I give .
the name C oncept which has thus two kinds under

,
it the particular and the general concept The latter

,
.
alone has been usually treated as a concept ; it h a s

been considered that concep t s must be general terms ,
that they contain and include a comparison and ex ,
press the result o f a comparison c o n c i p i o capio hoc

,
cum illo said C oleridge but the d istinction between

,

the general and particular nature o f the inclusion o f

the concept form appears t o me comparatively
-
portant by the side of the essential nature o f the con

,
cept which is the implied reference it contains to t h e

,
objects which it excludes This implied referen c e is

.
due to the will and is common to both kinds of con

,
c e t s the particular and the general The general

p ,
.
conc ept is the result of a comparison for it is a ge ,
neral notion ; but as a concept as used for the pur ,
poses o f logic it is an unity ; and as such it matters

,
li ttle whether as an intuition it is a s i mple o r com

, ,
pound object the result o f one act o f perception o r of

,
a series An u ni ty in consciousness need not be a

.
minimum o f consciousness ; the will may adopt an

object o f greater o r less extent complexity o r dura , ,
tion and make it an unity for the purposes of logic ;

,
we must not understand by the term uni ties unities , ,
o f equal magnitude Again no object o f perception

.
,
TH E C O NC E PT . 4 05
is so simple as to be incapable of analysis ; the parti

c u l a r abstract notion contains parts which would come
into prominence by dwelling o n it ; although it is the

product o f perception o r o f spontaneous r e d i nt e gra
tion before it is xed o n by the will it is not simple
, ,
and uncompounded in itself but receives its unity ,
from the w ill j ust as the general notion does for the
, ,
purposes o f reasoning It I s not therefore the s i m

.
p l i c i t y o r the complexity o f the inclusion that makes

a concept but the nature o f the relation o f the i nc l u
,
sion to the exclusion The concept is an abstract

.
notion either general o r particular adapted for com

, ,
parison with other objects .
The concept includes general a n d particular con

c e ts
p . It includes also rst and second i ntentions ;
that is to s a y both objects i n their rst intention and
,
obj ects in their second intention may be concepts .
In 1 0 it was shown that an obj ect in its rst i nt e n

tion is an obj ect for consciousness alone and that an ,
object in its second intention is an obj ect in its rela

tion to other objects in consciousness F or instance .
,
s team is an object for consciousness alone an obj ect

,
o f the senses o f touch sight and s o o n But it is .

, ,
dif cult to think o f steam without including in it

i t s motive power o r power o f reaction on a surface
,
c ompressing it .If this is included in the notion of

s team we have a new obj ect before t h e min d steam ,
,
in its relation to other obj ects ; this is steam in its

second intention O r take the object called a straight
.
l ine ; here is an object o f presentation o r representa

tion familiar to every o n e in its rst intention ; but
, ,
i f I include in the obj ect the notion o f its being t h e

shortest way between t w o points I have compared it ,
with other lines connecting those po ints and no w ,

406 TH E C ON C E PT .
have before me an object in its second intention .
E ither of these two objects may be xed o n by voli

tion for the purpose o f bein g compared with othe r
objects ; that is either of them may become a con
,
cept But when this has been done and the con
.
,
cept formed then that concept is used as an obj ect i n

,
its rst intention for the purpose o f being compared

,
with other obj ects ; o r concepts as such have a rs t , ,
and second intention and the distinction between

,
rst and second intentions is applicable to concept s

as well as to percepts O bjects in their second a s
.
well as objects in their rst intention may be taken

by the will and made into concepts ; but whatever i s
taken and made into a concept is taken and treated
as an object in its rst intention with a reference t o ,
obj ects excluded from it but not yet thought i n refer

ence to it Steam for instance whether in its rs t
.
, ,
o r second intention when adopted by the will as a

,
concept is taken as a n object in its rst intention

, ,
present to consciousness and all other obj ects are ex

,
cluded from it as being not steam This referenc e

,
-
.
to other obj ects excluded from them is impressed

upon the objects taken as concepts by the will a n d ,
not by the actual knowledge of the excluded objects .
When used in this way these obj ects are concepts .
A s abstract notions the obj ects in question have a

,
single and direct reference to consciousness which ,
may be called their rst intention and an i n d e p e n d ,
ent existence ; as concepts they have a second exist

ence a second reference to a ll other obj ects beside s
, ,
the m selves white to not white pleasure to not plea

,
-
,
-
sure pain to not pain and so on which is impressed

,
-
, ,
upon them by the will for a particular purpose and ,
this may be called their second intention F rom thi s .

4 08 TH E C O N C E PT .
concept which includes them both under it Thus

,
.
white would be thought when it was contrasted with

red because both fall under t h e common class o f
,
colour ; but white would not be thought if it was

,
contrasted with any obj ect which did not fall under a
common class with it for instance with hard ; he
, ,
t e r o ge n e a non c o m p a ra r i ergo nec distingu i p o s s u n t

.
,
But this obj ection vanishes o n closer inspection T h e .
rule h e t e r o ge n e a non c o m p a r a ri ergo nec distingui

, ,
p o s s u nt is admirable
,
as a maxim o f practical argu
ment it means that to come to an useful conclusion , ,
you must come to close quarters with t h e notions

e mployed ; that you must narrow the class o f no
t ions common to both subject and predicate of your

,
propositions narrow your middle terms till you com e

, ,
to o n e single point o f difference between them It .
d oes not mean that there are notions which have no

common notions with others under which they both ,
stand It is useless to distinguish white from hard

.
,
not because there is no common notion under which

they stand but because this common notion under
,
which they stand that o f sensation is too remote for

, ,
most practical purposes When it is said therefore .

, ,
that it is a notion o f a particular kind which must b e

supplied to a concept in order that it may be thought ,
it must be replied that it is s o only for the purpose

,
o f think i ng it usefully or protably but that it is

;
really thought whatever may be the notion supplie d
,
t o contrast it with Fo r all notions whatever stand

.
under some common notions o r at least under o n e ,
common notion that is have two o r more points in

, ,
common I mean o f course that they all without

.
exception stand un der the common notions of time ,
space and feeling ; and that they should b e though t

,
TH E C ON C E PT . 4 09
under these notions is in fact what is essenti a l to , ,
thinking ; not however because time space and feel , ,
ing are concepts o r names o f a class not because

, ,
they are categories but because class names com , ,
mon notions and categories are derived from and

, ,
a re modications o f feelings i n the forms of t h e and
S pace ; a point which the present division o f this chap

ter is designed to elucidate .
Although the concept involves a relatio n yet the ,
relation itself is not the object o f the concept R ela .
tions may be themselves objects as existing between ,
oth er objects o r as being modes o f objects and as

, ,
s uch may be the obj ects o f abstract terms and there ,
fore as such the obj ects o f concept names

, ,
F or -
.
instance the relation o f duplicity is in relation to

, ,
consciousness alone expressed by the abstract term,
duplicity as a rst intention ; it means an obj ect

,
doubled ; and also the relation o f this very obj ect to

o thers to simplicity triplicity and s o on in which it
, , , ,
is a second intention is expressed by the same word , ,
and is a concept The relation which is expressed by

.
the concept name is itself an object in relation to a n

-
other o r to others excluded from it not now any ,
longer to obj ects o r relations included in it C oncepts .
are not relations except incidentally A relation may .
be like other obj ects a concept the obj ect of a concept

, , ,
name in its rst intention but as a concept it has a ,
relation beyond its inclusion implied by it as its ex

, ,
e lusion E very concept is a rst intention a n d i m

.
plies a second i ntention .
C oncepts are o f the same nature with abstract and

general notions ; what these are concepts a r e also ,
.
But these are objects o r part s o f objects o r objects , ,
composed of the parts o f other obj ects o f percep t ion ,

41 0 TH E C ON C E PT .
either presented or represented either in immediate ,
intuition o r in redintegration That is to s a y they .

,
are images V orstellungen E very image is a feelin g

,
.
o r a complex of feelin gs o f a certain kind and o f a
certain degree o f intensity bound together for a cer ,
tain time i n a certain gure o r in a certain place A .
particular abstract notion is an actual image a general ,
notion is a provisional image It is not the result o f .
a single ac t of abstraction but o f several compared ,
together and therefore it is an image which w a s

,
never given actually in presentation as it appears in

representation when the genera l term is applied to it
,
.
This circumstance together with the fact that we u s e

,
general terms apagogically more often than osten

si v e l
, y has made writers fancy that the general term ,
which they called a concept was something different ,
i n its nature from an image instead of bein g and not , ,
merely being capable o f translation into o r proof by ,
means of an image or obj ect of perception It i s a

,
.
provision al image which is presented again to thought

,
as a n i m a ge o f which there are m any parts waitin g t o

be lled up and which therefore is still liable to m o
,
d i c a t i o n by the results o f investigation F ries in .

,
hi s System der Logik 24 says D as D enken der

, , ,
Begriffe i s t immer v o m Schematismus der E i nb i l d

un gs kr a ft a b h an i denn j edes abgesonderte B
gg ,
e
w us s t s e y n allgemeiner T h e i l v o rs t e l l un e n erhalten
g
u r s r n l i c h durch die A bstraction der S c h e m a t e
p g
in der E in bildungskraft To his expression Theil .
vorstellung corresponds mine o f provisional image I .
think it will be admitted readily that the particular

abstract notion as described here is an image but
, , ,
n o t s o readily that the general notion is s o At t h e .
same time if my remarks establish the poin t w ith

,
ment o r its modes which they t hen also possessed

,
.
The elements remain t h e same though combined

again o r though reduced to a minimum o f power o f
,
being perceived This I call a provisional image If

. .
not this then the concept name o r general term has

,
-
no obj ect of consciousness signied by it But it is .
clear that it has an obj ect signied by it o r it would ,
be o f no u s e in reasoning And when we voluntari l y .
perform the process o f abstraction at what do w e ,
stop what is the state o f o ur mind when we hav e

,
completed the process and are looking about for a ,
name to x the result by ? We have before us an

abstract o r a provisional i mage in which the parts o f ,
the object abstracted from are represented by a blank

s pace and the parts attended to remain in their o w n
,
colours This is the object o f the abstract and this

.
,
in more complicated cases is the obj ect o f the general

term universal o r concept name The case is ex
, ,
-
.
a c tl the same as that f the division which separates

y o
two spaces o r two times It has no existence by .
itself but only as involved in the two spaces o r times

, , ,
which it limits When w e think o f a division in t h e

.
'
abstract o r by itself w e r e p r e s e nt the spaces o r t h e

,
times which it separates as existing provisionally and

not denitely .
Wh at has usually been understood by the word

C oncept is a compound o f t h e properties o f th is pro
visional i mage and t h e term which designates it t h e ,
concept name A s the former the concept was not

-
.
,
an image that is a complete o n e and as the latter it

, , ,
was capable of being employed in reasoning R ea .
s onin g appeared c onsequently to be a process inde
pendent o f the forms of tim e and space which a r e t h e ,
forms o f all images ; though at the same time it was

TH E C O N C E PT . 41 3
admitted that it was only va l id when it could be

appli ed to images ; in other words that the concept ,
must always admit o f being tested by objects of a

possible intuition But if it can be shown that all
.
reasoning is employed with images actual o r provi ,
s i o n a l the only valid distinction in this matter wil l

,
be that between the concept and the concept name -
the ge neral notion and the general term and between ,
the two kinds o f reasoning employing them r e s p e c

t i v e l y ostensive and apagogic the latter being t h e
, ,
representative o f the former Abstract and general .
notions therefore are images though provisional ; and ,
concepts differ from images solely in being held fast

by a conscious e ffort in consciousness and this canno t ,
change their nature as i mages .
4 7 There are however some instances o f c o n

.
c e t s which seem at rst sight not to be capable o f

p
analysis into images modied b y volition I will .
e xamine those given by We r e n fe l s in the D ialogue
D e FImbus M undi which has been already quoted

,
.
In that di alogue this p oint is argued at length .
We re nfe l s says in e ffect I n ni t a p eene sunt qu ae

,
non i m a gi n a m ur c o n c i p i m u s t a m e n
,
U niversal ia , ,
nu m e r um m i l l e n a r i um mille a ngul um c i r c ul um per

,
-
,
fe c t um i c o s a h e d r um l o b um e ni t u s rotundum
g p
-
, , ,
m o t um aut v e l o c e m nimis aut lentum m a t e ri aa in ,
i n n i t um s e c t i o n e m N ow these all bear o n e cha

.
ra c t e r. In them the concept is an assumption that

the task of imagination has been completed ; they
are abbreviations compendia o f imagination ; no t b e
, ,
cause imagi nation is unt but becau se i t is too weak

,
to perform the whole task o f representation T h e .
failing o f the imagination is in deg ree not in kind ,
o f e f ciency . The number 1 000 fo r insta nce i s a , ,

41 4 TH E C ONC E PT .
whole consisting o units ; the

f 1 000 angled 1 000 -
gure i s a gure containing 1 000 angles We begin .
by imagining the synthesis o f a few units and a few

angles but being wearied have recourse to an and
,
so forth u p to Without the beginning in

imagination we could not conclude by a concept
,
.
But how is the stoppin g point reached the number -
1 000 itself ? This conc ept 1 000 which is assumed, ,

as the goal o f the and so forth must be rst a t ,
t a i ne d .This concept is the gathering up into u ni ty

o f several syntheses o f imagination F irst uni ts are .
added together up to 1 0 then the s um 1 0 is added

, ,
to itself 1 0 times then to the s um 1 00 is added

,
another s um o f 1 00 which has been reached inde

,
pendently by another similar process til l it has been ,
added to 9 other sums o f 1 00 At each step there .
is a gathering up i nto a single unit 1 0 1 00 200 , , , ,
& c a synthesis of the u ni ts e ffected by the imagina

.
,
tion E ach of t hese gatherin gs up mto unity is a

.
concept a brief expression o f the result o f imagin a

,
tion in order to keep hold of the ground which has

,
been won The number 1 000 is originally reached

.
in this way ; and when the meaning o f the concept

,
name 1 000 has been explained to any o n e he appro ,
r i a t e s the result o f the orig i nal imagination without

p
himself going through t h e whole process and deals ,
thenceforth analytically with the amount 1 000 which ,
was attained originally by a synthetical process .
The perfect circle and the perfect globe are also

concept names expressing the anticipated fullment
-
o f the task of imagination in analysis in abstract ,
i n g the material element from empirical circles and

globes s o that what remains is a pure i n tuition o f
,
a gure in space The s o called concept is a pure

.
-
the point wher e consciousness becomes incapable ,
from whatever cause o f penetrating they manifestly , ,
contradict themselves by expressing an impossibility

performed a ni t e i n ni t e a divisible indivisible I n
,
-
,
-
.
the rst case the fact o f weakness exhibited in cer

,
tain modes o f i magination is seiz ed o n and expressed

a s a concept ; m the second case there is a c oncept ,
name without a concept The contents o f these con .
c e t s are images and their in ni ty is another nam e

p ,
for the weakness o f the imagination .
There is another concept mention e d by Weren

fels and quoted with approval from D escartes that o f ,
ipsum nihil pure nothin g We can conceive he says

,
.
, ,
b ut not imagine pure nothing This must b e con ,

.
n e c t e d with other concepts which he mentions o ne ,
o f which is the limit o r end o f any thing ; manet

hoc x um e t immobile nos nes nullius rei i m a gi n a ri
posse . A nd again he says Ita licet i m a gi n a ri non

,
o s si m nihil ess e extra mundum concipere t a m en

p ,
possum These three instances show the true natur e

.
o f a concept its derivative nature and its limited

, ,
nature The concept is a li mitation o f the process

.
o f imag i n ation the M a gm a t i o n stopped at a cer

,
tain point by volition Imagination gives no last .
lim i t because its form tim e and space h a s no limit

, , ,
.
Imagination is never w i thout an obj ect since it con ,
tains always time and space The concept is an as .
s umed limi t assumed fo r practical purposes by t h e

,
will,
Signif er statu e signum hic m a n e b i m u s o p
, ,
time The relation between imagination and t h e

.
concept is similar to that between a whole o f exten

sion a general notion and a whol e of intension any
, , ,
particular object contained under it The general .
notion o r Class animal ; h a s fe we r qualities than any

,
T HE C O N C E PT . 41 7
individual anim al has ; and in this sens e the i nd i vi
dual ani mal contains more than the class ; but o n ,
the other hand the class animal contains more than

,
the indi vidu a l for it contains all the individuals If

,
.
the class o r genera l notion ani m al were a concret e , ,
phenomenon any in di vidual animal would be a mo di

,
c a t i o n of it adding some modication o r other and

, ,
in this respect surpassin g the thin g mo di ed ; but

the modication would itself belong to and be a part ,
o f the phenomenon modied

,
So it is with imagina .
tion which is a partic ul ar concrete process o f con

,
s c i o u s n e s s and the concept

,
The concept is a mo di .
c a t i o n o f imagination but it never exceeds the lim i ts

,
o f imagination ; all modications o f imagin ation a r e
imagination No w as to these three inst a nces o f

.
concepts ; if the concept is a form o f consciousness ,
simply o f consciousness not o f imagination it canno t , ,
be without an object it cannot have pure nothing for

,
its object If we suppose ourselves to conceive pur e

.
nothing we are mistaken and mistake the concept

, ,
name N othing for an object To suppose that w e .
can conceive N othing is to suppose that conscious

ness can exist without being consciousness Because .
we can conceive lim its within the eld o f objects w e ,
suppose that we can conceive the limits o f that eld

itself A s to the nes nullius rei i m a gi na ri posse
.
,
i t is not the case if by res is meant an obj ect with

,
a material as well as a form a l element ; such e m p i ri

cal objects are lim ited in perception itself If o n t h e .
,

other hand by nes are meant lim i ts which have
,
pure nothing beyond them then conceiving them is ,
nothing more than abstracting the attention from

what is beyond o r excluded from those limits ; and
the limi t s in this sens e are as l ittle conceivable as
RE
41 8 T HE C ONC E PT .
they are imaginable The limits in their true sense

.
, ,
exist both in i magination and conception A s to t h e .
nihil esse extra mundum it will be clear from,
what has been already said that it is a mistake t o

, .
apply the limitation o f particular objects by others t o

the whole o f the world where the expression whol e
,

o f the world assumes that no particular object is to b e
imagined outside it ; whereas it is a law o f imagination ,
wholly independent of o u r will that no limit can b e ,
perceived without there being perceived at the sam e

,
time the existence of something beyond th at limit ,
an existence involved in the fact o f limitation itself .
If this criticism is correct it follows that the fun

,
d a m e n t a l doctrine of We r e n fe l s m ust be rejected ,

I m a gi n a t i o longe a ngu s t i o r est c o n c e p t u puro In .
fact reality is whatever can be given in imagination ;

,
the eld o f the concept is limited by that of the i m

a
g i na t i o n
,
while the l i mits o f particular objects in
that eld are given by the imagination and adopted

by the conception The statement o f a limitation is
.
a concept But the limits o f the whole can be neither

.
imagined nor conceived ; it is not true to apply to

the whole as if it could be perceived what is true o f
, ,
the parts which are perceived But the very fun c

,
.
tion o f limitin g in which co nception consists pro

, ,
vides concept names which have no objects ; and it

-
is here onl y that imagi nation is really outstripped ,
namely by the concept names which are mere words

,
-
.
N othing exists to which it is not e a s s o far as I

,
words go to prex a not Again the fact that

, ,
.
all division increases the number o f objects since it ,
m akes two where onl y o n e existed before shows in ,
what sense only it can be said that many things can ,
be conceived which can n Ct be imagined If you .

4 20 TH E C O NC E PT .
P AR T c o nsc iousness ; these t w o objects s o given are con

II .
, ,
C H V II.
t ra ri e s ; they are as yet only compared with each

.
Div 2 . .
48 other as different states o f the same empirical e go

Th l g l
.
e o i c a
o bj tec d thanWhen they are held fast each by itself and com
e
l gic l nit
o
,
a u
, ,
pared with referenc e to the same tim e and space

.
that is to the same moment o f the empirical ego

, ,
then the sam e two contraries appear as c o nt r a di c

tories The assumption o f the o n e is then contra
.
d i c t o ry to the assumption o f the other because w e ,
c annot at the same time and place cognise both o n e
a n d the other ; and this involves their comparison
a lso secundum idem for to adopt two points o f view , ,
o r two respects is to place the objects in two m o ,
ments o f time If o ne is held fast as it is in a .

,
concept the other must b e let go o r assigned to a n

,
o ther time and place Approaching from the sid e .
o f the concept contradictories precede contraries and ,
a r e their condition ; we distinguish rst an A and a
N ot A and secondly refer these to their common p a

-
,
rent a third thing the concept form which is at o n e

, ,
-
,
time o n e o f them at another time the o ther A p ,

.
p ro a c h i n
g from the side of perception contraries ,
precede contradictories ; consciousness is differently a f

fe c t e d at diff erent times and these affections or object s ,
o f perception are contraries inasmuch as they are dif ,
fe r e nt and yet united i n a third thing ; their common

parent consciousness the common element in all its
, ,
moments They become contradictories when o ne

.
object o f perception simple o r complex as it may ,
happen is xed on by volition and assigned to o ne

,
moment o f time in consciousness long o r short as it ,
may happen then this object in this moment is t h e

contradictory of all other objects referred to that
moment A ssign those other objects to other mo.
ments o f the same consciousness o r to that sam e ,
moment considered from another point o f view ,
which is the same thin g and the c o ntrad ictories

,
become contraries again and a new quality is added

,
to the object perceived C ontradi ctories belong o nly

.
to logic ; and since logic can only be applied t o o b

j e c t s in time and space contra di ctories are valid only
,
within and not without time and space and can onl y ,
be applied to particular objects o f cognition and n o t ,
to a supposed whole o r universe o f those objects for ,
s uch a whole is n o t possible in time and space .
The word N ot is a word of logic and not a word ,
o f intuition . It is the turn ing point o f all c o n c e p

tion ; it expresses distinction being borrowed from
,
the greatest distinction known to reection from cases

o f intuition alone the distinction between being con
,
scious o f particular objects and not being conscious o f

them We are conscious o f obj ects onl y in empirical
.
moments o f time and volition excludes from thos e

,
'
moments the obj ects from which it abstracts I n v o .
l i t i o n we are conscious onl y o f one object however ,
complex o r however simple that object may be .
L ogical contradiction depends upon the nature o f o ur

consciousness which can cogni se obj ects only in em
,
i ri c a l moments o f time that is o n the i n c o m re s

p , , p
s i b i li t
y of t i i n e in consciousness in conjunction
,
with
the incompressibility of time and space in objects o f
consciousness . Thus the law o f contradiction t o ,
gether with the two other forms o f it the laws o f ,
identity and o f excluded m i ddle known as the pos ,
t ul a t e s o f logic is no law o f i ntuition as such but is

, ,
a law and indeed the rst and fundamental law o f

, ,
logic ; at the same time it is founded o n the laws o f

,
intui tion the forms o f time and space in conscious

,
ness and is the expression o f these forms as soon as

, ,
they are adopted and appli ed by volition If an .
Hegelian should reply that contradi ction creates ti me

,
and space by constantly denying itself ; contradiction

,
being nothing else than the necessity of a constant

division and castin g o ff o f a logical opposite ; and
that in this way since the logic a l opposites cann ot
,
remain together they are thrown apart O i i t o f o n e

, ,
another and this outness is time and space ; the a n

,
swer is that contradiction cannot throw objects o ut

,
in time and space unless the objects already exist in

,
those forms ; and a l l objects do this ; the forms o f

time and space are in the contradictory objects no t in ,
the contradiction and are in the objects as such and

, ,
before the contradiction is perceived There is no .
thin g in contradiction wh ich can make time a nd space

intelligible to us ; but given time a n d space then t h e
, ,
a ddition o f the feeli n g o f volition is the expl a nation o f
contradiction .
It may appear perhaps at rst sight that onl y , ,
the form o f time and not that o f space is employed

, ,
in logical thinking ; this however is not s o but both

, , ,
forms are involved The perception even o f intern a l

.
feelings as was shown in 1 3 i s always conn ected

, ,
with perceptions occupy ing space ; those internal feel

ings are always felt in connection with a body and ,
that body a s a part o f an external world It is pos .
sible to x the attention on the internal feelings only ,
and to abstract from the body and the external world ;

but the moment we place those feelings in relation to
others which must be done i n logic they must have
, ,
a position assigned them the position they occupy in

,
the body and the external world E ven if we con .
sider the in ternal feelin gs as an isolated series s o that ,

424 TH E C O NC E PT .
ings in time is xed o n as a concept that portion i s

, ,
taken to be examined as a whole simultaneously ; i t ,
is indeed a representation but we move backward s ,
and forwards in it and treat it statically as a simul

, ,
t a n e o u s or statical object as if it were a part o f a ,
series o f feelin gs in space E very representation .

,
whether o f simple o r complex content when treated ,
as a concept is treated statically that i s as occupying , ,

.
a portion o f a line o n which we move backwards and

forwards ; is treated as if it were an obj ect of pre
s e nt a t i o n in space ; and since all feelings are part of
,
a n empirical ego which occupies space every r e p r e ,
s e nt a t i o n when treated as a concept is treated as

, ,
o ccupying a portion o f space as we l l as a portion o f
time The concept expressed by the A o f the pos

.
t ul a t e s occupies a certain portion o f space existing

for a certain portion o f tim &
E very concept is the logical 7 8 31 and the logi c a l
7 6 ev It is assumed to exist at the moment o f thought

.
,
and every thing else to be non existent at that moment -

.
C oncepts as such have only an assumed existence ;

o bj ects which do not exist may be assumed to exist
fo r the purpose o f being disproved By giving a .
name the existence o f something named is assumed ;

,
hence we can s a y without absurdity Iron gold is not ; ,

-
for as a concept we choose to assume it for the pur

poses o f argument and then we deny that it exists
,
for perception To s a y Iron gold is not is exactly

.
,
-
,
equivalent to sayi n g Iron gold is a concept name and

,
- -
n o t a concept C oncepts as such o r concepts in their

.
,
form a l one have no reality and differ not in poin t o f

, ,
existence from concept names ; both have an as

-
s u m ed existe nce only The concept is thus the logical

.
existence It is also the logical u nit It is the ex

. .
T HE C O N C E PT . 425
pression o f a sin gle empirical moment o f time N o .
matter how long a time may be occupied by the ex

i s t e n c e o r the consciousness o f the particular objects
comprehended under it as a general term the under ,
s tanding them all as comprehended i n the concept
makes them into a single empirical moment o f time

in consciousness ; they are gathered up into a pro
visional i mage and assumed t o be a l l o n e thing for
,
the purposes of argument .
4 9 The concept as an object is a provisional

.
image and as such contains no other elements than

,
those found in images and objects o f perception ; and

it owes its character o f uni ty t o the exercise of volition
i n the forms o f time and space V olitionis a mode
.
o f consciousness and subject as such to its forms ; in

,
xing o n any obj ect o f consciousness by a volun tary

e ff ort we x o n it as occupying a certain portion o f
,
time and a certain portion of space ; and all t h e

shapes which an object o f consciousness can take a r e
modes of these two ultimate forms o f time and space .
N o other modes o f unity but thes e would seem to b e

possible and certainl y no others are required It is
,
.
super uous to look fo r any pure o r a priori forms o f

thought as thought different from these two well
,
known forms of perception Fo r the will is n o t

.
limited in its choice o f objects o r parts o r shapes o r

, , ,
durations o f objects no r in its power o f combining

,
them farther than in point o f degree o f energy If

,
.
,
however such other pure a n d a priori form s of thought

,
as thought are assumed as existing independently

, ,
and not as elements of the objects to be thought by

means of them then it may be shown by a mode o f
, ,

argument known as the oc
n m ro g that thes e ,
forms are similar to the objects which are thought by

means o f them and that some third concept o r form

,
is required to which they in their turn may be r e

ferred and by reference to which their relation to the
,
objects thought by means o f them may be explained ;

for without such a reference no explanation has been
given but the form of thought is a mere dupl icate
,
o f the object thought ; for instance plurality as a ,
form o f thought is but a general expression for many

objects of the same sort taken together and the fact ,
is as much an explanation o f the form as the form o f

the fact If then there are forms o f i ntuition and
.
, ,
forms of thought side by side with distinct origin , ,
then some third form o f consciousness must be assumed

in order t o r e gul a t e the application o f one s e t to t h e
'
other ; and this journey in i n ni t um Kant found him

self compelled to enter o n for having estab l ished
.
, ,
time and space as forms o f intuition and the cate ,
o ri e s as forms of thought he introduced as mediators

g ,
between them rst the Schemata by which spac e

, , ,
relations o f obj ects were transformed into time rela

tions and s o brought closer to the subj ective process
,
o f thought supposed to exist in ti m e alone and

, , ,
secondly the system o f P ri nciples o f Synthetic Judg

,
ments a priori by which schematised obj ects o r o b

, ,
e c t s reduced to the form o f time were subsumed

j ,
under their proper category O n the other hand if .

,
these forms of thought are taken as elements already

existi ng in the objects o f perception which formal ,
elements it is the office o f logical conception to bring

o ut distinctly and apply to the obj ects in which they
are involved then it may be shown that such form a l

,
elements are a l l capable of analysis into the forms o f

time and space in uni on with the material element
,
which is their content And this may be shown o f .


accor di n g as we know o r do not know Of the exist

ence Of the conditions of any given Obj ect This latter .
notion with that Of caus e and e ffect depends on t h e

, ,
canon o f R atio S uf c i e n s which will be examined in ,
the following division Of this chapter N ow if w e .
grant that the will can x o n any Object which has

been presented to consciousness and can abstract from ,
the Objects which accompany it then it will appear ,
u nnecessary to look farther for the origin o f the no
tions Of unity o r plurality o r total ity or any other

, , ,
Of these categories .
5 0 We next have to deal with the concept in

'
reference to its exclusion in its combination with ,
other concepts that is with concepts as employ ed in

, ,
propositions and in syllogisms It is admitted that .
the formation o f a concept when it is a general no ,
tion itself involves a judgment and that the judg

, ,
ment expressed by a proposition is Of the same natur e

as the judgment employed in forming the general
notions which are its subject and its predicate ; that
to combine two objects in a concept is a process t h e
same in kind as that which combines two concepts in
a proposition When we form the concept man w e
.
,
judge that certain properties in particular individual s

are to be abstracted from the other qualities o f t h e
individuals and combined into o n e Object the con
, ,
cept man When we predicate o f this concept man

.
that it is included under the concept animal we again ,
combine into a whole only in this cas e two sets Of ,
qualities instead O f o ne the qualities abstracted from ,
indi vidual men and those abstracted from individual

animals besides men The theory o f predication
.
,
therefore o r of forming propositions cannot be sepa

, ,
rated from the theory o f the formation o f concepts ;

TH E C O N C E PT . 429
it is a further development o f the same process and

function that of j udgment The process O f judgment
, .
,
an operation o f consciousness is what is expressed ,
in the proposition C oncepts are always formed by

.
judgments but not always by judgments expressed

,
in propositions When the terms o f a judgment and

.
the d ealing o f consciousness with the terms are su ffi

c i e nt l marked to be distinguished one from the other
y ,
when we can distinguish the process o f judgment from

t h e notions which it compares then that process is ,
capable Of being expressed in a proposition A judg .
ment is a silent proposition a proposition is an ex ,
pressed judgment When the concepts have arisen

.
,
when images have been xed and limited by volition ,
all further dealin g with them must be distinct and ,
capable of expression in propositions The limitation .
Of an image as a concept involves the distinct exist

e nce o f the dealing o f consciousness with it compels ,
us to attend to the operation Of consciousness in deal

ing with its concepts as distinct from the concepts
,
dealt with Judgments and propositions come next

.
after concepts in order o f complexity that is in order , ,
Of logic .
C oncepts it has been shown are provision a l images

, ,
considered as unities and there are only two modes

,
in which they can be connected o r combined together

in consciousness o r i n thought namely time and , ,
s pace. We should expect therefore s i nce logic in ,
its verbal forms expresses the connections and com

b i n a t i o n s o f thought that the forms Of logical predi
,
cation should be founded on and express the relations

Of Objects to each other in these two modes o f t i me
and space And this is the case ; for there are two
.
main kinds o f logical propositions and t w o onl y , ,

founded o n the modes in which the subject and

predicate are connected in thought and these a r e !
categoric al and hypothetical propositions O f which ,
categorical propositions express space relations and ,
hypothetic a l propositions time relations Subordinat e .
to these two classes O f propositions stand two other

classes which are modications Of each o f them r e
,
s e c t i v el
p y disjunctive
,
propositions which are a mo ,
di c a t i o n Of categorical and hypothetico di sjunctive

,
-
which are a modication o f hypothetical propositions .
C ategorical and disjunctive propositions express spac e

relations between their concepts hypothetical and ,
hypothetico disjunctive propositions express time r e

-
l a t i o n s between them This is an exhaustive division

.
Of propositions from the point of view Of the mode in

which their subjects and predicates are combined Of ,
the course which consciousness takes in passing from

o n e concept to the other P ropositions may be divided
.
also from other points o f view ; from that Of their

quantit y into universal and particular propositions ;
,
from that O f their logical quality into affirmative and

,
negative propositions ; from that Of their certainty ,
into necessary and problematical propositions But .
propositions of all these kinds must fall also unde r

o n e or other O f the four kinds Of categorical hypo ,
thetical disjunctive and hypothetico disjunctive p ro

, ,
-
positions ; and this latter division appears a mor e

elementary and fundamental division than the others ,
from being founded on nothing else than the mode s

in which consciousness passes from o n e of its Objects
to another modes which are the possibility O f propo
,
s i t i o n s existing at all which constitute proposition s

,
not Of this o r that particular character but ak so ,

a
far a s t h e y are s i i np l y ex p ressions Of judgment

.
4 32 T HE C O NCE PT .
member o f the series Of antecedents o r consequents , ,
to the exclusion o f the other members C ategorical .
and disjunctive propositions both express coalescenc e

o f images o r concepts in consciousness but the dis ,
j un c t i v e propositions more denitely than the c a t e go

ri c a l
. Hypothetical and hypothetico disjunctive p r o -
positions both alike express the sequence Of concepts

in consciousness and again the latter kind O f proposi
,
tions more denitely than the former .
5 1 Before examini n g however the classes Of

.
propositions it may be well to s a y something O f their

,
import generall y It has been a l ready said that judg

.
ments are silent propositions and propositions ex ,
pressed judgments Judgments may be 1 s t percep .

, ,
tions o f the connection of presentations as for instanc e ,
when standi ng o n Westminster Bridge I s a y London

, , ,
is o n the Thames ; and in this case the proposition

expressi ng the judgment expresses my consciousness
o f the connection o f the two presentations The t w o .
o bjects o f consciousness are connected in conscious
ness ; as the objects are objects Of consciousness s o ,
their connection takes place i n consciousness and t h e ,
Objects and their connection are subjective as well as

Obj ective If 2d l y when I hav e gone down into t h e
.
, ,
coun try I relate t o my friends London is o n t h e

, ,
Thames the proposition expresses a connection b e

,
tween representations the consciousness which makes ,
me speak is a redintegration o f London and t h e

Thames and o f their connection ; the Obj ects are r e
presentations no more and no less subj ective than
,
before but in redintegration not in presentation The

, ,
.
truth o f the second judgment i s d e ri v a t i v e derived ,
from presentation The test Of the truth o f the

.
second judgment is to refer to the rst to repeat t h e ,

TH E C ON C E PT . 433
presentation But by repeating the presentation I

.
do not go from subject to Object ; Objective truths are

n o t the test o f subjective truths but subj ective truths ,
Of presentation are the test o f subjective tr uths o f r e

presentati on Thirdly judgments may be perceptions
.
,
o f the connection between objects Of presentation and
Objects o f representation ; as fo r instance if I stand

, , ,
i n g o n Westminster Bri d ge s a y That London i s o n

, ,
the Thames is what I remembered in the country o r , ,
That London is o n the Thames i s true Here again .
the propositions express a subjective process o r c o n

n e c t i o n between the two images presentative and r e ,
presentative Since presentation a nd r e p r e s e nt a t i o n

.
,
are all t h e states O f consciousness these three move ,
ments o f consciousness in judgment are a l l that are

possible ; all judgments must fa l l under o ne o r other
Of these three kinds .
N ow in the two rst cases the proposition em

, ,
ployed to express both judgments is the same ; o n e

proposition expresses in di scriminately either judg
ment And this circumstance perhaps may have
.
concurred to lead M r Mill to s a y in his System o f

.
,
. .

Logic Book I ch 5 that propositions ( except
, ,
where the mi n d itself is the subject treated o f) are

not assertions respecting our idea of things but asser ,
tions resp ecting the thi ngs themselves The sharp .

distinction which M r M il l appears t o take between

.
things Objective and things subjective leads him since ,
propositions clearly express Objective things to d i s r e ,
gard the fact that they a l so at the s a m e time and in

,
the same respect express subjective thin gs E a r :

,
.
"
2 Ev
05 V 7 0 o
g nw ? 7 5 V iv 7
5
7 05 3 775002e a p o xa ,
says Aristotle , D e I nt e rp capA ssume now that . . 1 .
every thing is Objective and subjective at once and ,
FF
4 34 TH E C ONC E P T .

the difc ul ty as to whether the import Of propositions

,
is subjective o r objective disappears entirely for the

, ,
import is both at once ; and this distinction is replaced

by another namely by that between presentative and
, ,
representative judgments Applied to this distinction .

,
the words quoted from M r M ill would restrict proposi .
tions to express only judgments of presentation But .
the fact that the form of the proposition does not indi
,
cate the ki n d o f judgment which it expresses does n o t ,
warrant u s in restricting it to On e kind of judgment

to the exclusion Of another It shows only that the .
precision o f language falls short as yet o f expressing

the distinctions of thought N or yet does it destroy .
the subjective character Of propositions and their

connection with judgments ; for judgments O f presen
t a t i o n s are subjective and their presented Objects are
,
objects of consciousness and only as such can they be

,
expressed in propositions The same is the case with.
n ames . N ames also as well as propositions show no

, ,
inections o r forms indicating whether they are u sed

as names of Objects i n presentation o r Objects in r e
presentation The name white expresses white O h
.
c t s in presentation and in representation i n d i s c r i m i

je
na t el
y; yet it is not in the o n e case a name Of an

idea ( s o called ) and not Of an Object nor in t h e o t h e r
-
,
case a name Of an Object and not Of an idea What .
is really shown by this in di scriminate application of

names and propositions to express presentations and
representations is that we are as yet in no position
,
to found a true classication o f names and proposi

tions o n the classication o f judgments as judgments ,
Of presentation and judgments of representation since ,
the names and propositions have n o t yet been divided

at all ; but must use them without such a c l a s si c a
436 T HE C ONC E PT .
52 A ll categorical including disjunctive p r o

.
, ,
positions express the coalescence o f images in con

s c i o usne ss Their copul a the word is means
.

, ,
coalescence ; A is B means A co a l esces with B The .
copula does not express the existence o r presence

o f the Objects in consciousness ; this is a condi tion
o f their being co nn ected i n a judgment but is not ,
expressed by the proposition expressing the judg

ment N or does the copula express the identity o f
.
the Objects ; this woul d be to make them convertible

with each other But partial identity identity in
.
,
some respect is what is expressed by the copula and

, ,
this partial identity I call coalescence All c a t e go ri .
cal propositions connect a concept with its exclusion

in space affirm o r deny some part o f its exclusion of
,
its incl usion But what is it that is said in an a f r

.
,
m a t i ve
p roposition o f that concept which is the s ub
,
jec t ? A nd again what is said of the pre di cate which ,
by being considered as belonging t o the exclusion o f

the subject is thereby considered as different from
,
it ? It is and this is what the proposition asserts

, ,
that the subject i s the predicate a part o f its own ,
exclusion and again that the pred icate a part O f that

, ,
exclusion i s the subject o r the inclusion P redicate

,
.
and subject o f the proposition are the same T h e .
subject the inclusion of the concept is asserted to be

, ,
its exclusion o r a part Of it to be that which by its ,
very nature as the inclusion o f the concept it dis

, ,
t i ngui s h e d from itself In oth e r words the limits

.
,
imposed by volition in creating the concept are over

leapt and the concept is carried out beyond them and
, ,
m ade to coalesce with its contradictory or its exclu
sion Are those limits destroyed by being overleapt ?

.
By no means ; they are essential to the overleaping ,

to t he proposition They are vali d for volition but

.
,
not for intuition The proposition the c ontinuation

.
,
Of consciousness leaves them behind and asserts that

, ,
them notwithstan di ng the Objects within them and ,
the objects beyond them are o ne object In regard .
to volition subj ect and predicate are t w o Objects con

n e c t e d together ; in regard to intuition they are o n e
Object They are two Objects connected together s o

.
long as we u s e the concept names by whi ch volition -
separates the i nclusion from the exclusion o f the con

cept In order t o s a y that A is the same a s B we
.
,
must begin by assuming them to be different We .
could not s a y that they were the same unl ess we ,
regarded them rst as no t the same It follows that .
they are different in o n e respect the same in another ,
respect ; different in respect Of volition the same in ,
respect Of intuition The im age xed by volition .
coalesces while I keep it before the mind with some

, ,
thing which was not in cluded in it but excluded from ,
it as s o xed by volition P ropositions express this

,
.
coalescence Of concepts Of the inclusion and exclu ,
s ion O f a concept in intuiti on Hence there is no

,
.
contradi ction involved in the proposition ; the propo

s i t i o n is not self contradictory for it is a movement
-
,
Of intuition and the limits whi ch intuition overleaps

,
are not i mposed by itsel f but by volition are li mits ,
voluntarily adopted by consciousness t o mark its o w n

progress C onsciousness with o ne h a nd a s it were
.
, ,
intuition draws an advancing lin e with the other

, , ,
volition it marks progress The two functions are

,
.
not contradictory but they are equally essential If

,
.
the mar ks were obliterated as soon as overleapt there ,
would be no progress for the progress is one o f con ,

.
s c i o u s n e s s o f knowledge and consists in the a c c um u

, ,
lation o f the marks as well as in overleaping them

, .
Where volition makes a mark there is t h e p ri nc i p l e , u
Of contradiction ; all o n o n e side Of the mark i s the

contradi ctory Of all o n the other side Of the mark o n e ,
side is A the other side is not A Intui tion moves

,
-
.
along t h e line Of consciousness and passes from t h e ,
inclusion o f the concept which i s the subject over

, ,
the li m it Of contradiction t o the exclusion Of the ,
concept the predicate If the Obj ect which it meets

,
.
there i s o ne which experience or association has shown

t o be connected in a certain way with the i n clusion
Of the concept the proposition expresses this connec
,
tion and is affirmative ; if n o t it expresses the want ,
o f this connection and is negative The t w o c o n .
c e t s coalesce o r do not coalesce in intuition presen

p ,
t a t i v e o r representative

The copula is o r is
.

,

no t
,
takes the place Of the limit Of contradiction .
C ategorical predication accordingly proceeds by adop

tion o f the form o f contradi ction o f the postulates , ,
and o f the concept form as the means Of distinguish

-
,
ing the movement o f consciousness into di stin ct steps ;

which adoption takes place in t h e establishment o f
concepts t h e concept being a portion o f intuition
,
thrown into the concept form And as conscious -

.
ness in predication does not adopt the form Of contra

diction as a n Object in itself but as a fo rm appli cable ,
to all Objects a s it does n o t identi fy the concepts a s

, ,
content with their form Of contradiction s o it does

, ,
not contradict itself in ta king the concepts o u t Of that

form again and a sserting the coalescence Of their i n
,
e lusion and exclusion in the proposition o r nullify ,
the form of contradiction itself by changing its c o n

tent and substituting fo r its limit the copula Of the
,
proposition .
t he intension ; all those Objects in which the qua

i
o n -
l i t i e s Of the intension a r e found united no more and ,
no fewer are included in the extension F arther it

,
.
is plain from comparing several concepts of the same

,
series together that the proportion between their i n

,
tension and extension as quanta varies inversely ; , ,
concepts whose extension is large have a small i nt e n

s ion ,
and those which h ave a large intension have a
small extension Ani mal for instance compared with
.
,
V ertebrate has a sma ll er intension and a larger ex

,
tension ; as each new quantum Of qualities is added

to the intension a new quantum O f in di vidu a l s is
,
taken O ff from the extension and the new name ,
expresses the new dressing o f the balance The .

.
individual animals such as this man this horse & c

, , ,
.
have the largest intension and the smallest extension ,
namely unity Of all the concepts in the series T h e

,
.
enlargement O f the intension the addi tion Of specic ,
qu a l ities and peculiarities lessens the number o f i n ,
s tances i n which all are found t o coexist ; s o that ,
while extension and intension are always in inverse

proportion they always correspond to and balance o r
,
measure each other The widest possible concept .

,
E xistence has the smallest possible intension but t h e

, ,
greatest possible extension This thought applied to .
the universe as the Object matter O f the different

,
-

special sciences is the ground Of C omte s doctrine Of
,
the logical order o f those sciences Of their arrange ,
ment in a scale or hierarchy according to the decrease

in generality and increase in complexity o f the laws
Of each of them that is to s a y their decrease in ex
, ,
tension and increase in intension Thus the laws O f .
E thic as the most complex Of all the sciences come

last and highest and the units to whom those laws
,
a pply are the ultimate in di viduals o f the uni verse ,
Opposed to the laws Of the genera l concept existence , ,
at the other e nd o f the logical scale .
Al l concepts whether gener a l particular o r indi

, , ,
v idual that is images xed on and limited as unities

, ,
by volition are a l ike included in th i s view Of exten

,
sion and intension And it is an useful suggestion

.
made in the E ssay Languag e and Science ( Thre e

,
E ssays London 1 8 6 3 p
, ,
that the conn otation
,
.

a n d denotation Of words in M r J S M ill s employ ,
. . .
ment Of those terms are t o words what intension and

,
extension are to concepts o r notions expressed by ,
words ; s o that by the connotation Of a concept nam e -
i s understood the intension o f the concept and by i t s ,
denotation the extension Of the concept E very c o n .
cept is a quantum in two ways a quantum Of qualities ,
and a quantum o f individu a l s each Of whi ch indi ,
v i d u a l s contains all the qualities o f the other o r i n
tensive quantum ; but the extreme members Of a

s e r ies the individu a l concept at the o n e end and the
, ,
general concept at the other contain respective ly onl y ,
o n e i ndividual and only o n e quality But the con .
c e t i o n Of a quantum whether o f qualities o r Of O h

p ,
j e c t s possessing qu a l i ties whether o ne o r many is t h e

, ,
conception Of a space ll ed with what it contains ; s o

that when o ne quality o r o n e Object is asserted to
,
coalesce with another it is either included in o r coin

,
cides with the space occupied by that other and we ,
have before us the intuition Of spaces including o r

coinciding with each other If experience in pre .
,
s e n t a t i o n or representation compels the t w o concepts ,
to coalesce it must be in o ne Of these two ways

, .
When the extension o f a concept is predicated O f i t s

intension o r i t s intension o f i t s extension the t w o
, ,
442 TH E C ONC E PT .
concepts coalesce as coinciding Fo r instance Ani .

,
mals meaning whatever possesses sentience nerve

, , ,
and cellular organisation are vertebrate moll usc ra , , ,
diate and articulate Here the intension and the

,
.
extension o f the same concept animal are balance d , ,
against each other and ani mal as a class coincides

,
with ani mal as a collection Of qualities ; o ne is the

deni tion Of the other its analysis and counterpart
,
.
But when the coalescence is not by way of coincidence

but o f inclusion then subject and predicate must in
, ,
coalesc i ng become either whole o r part o n e Of the

,
other When I pre di cate in order Of extension the

.
,
subj ect is included as a part in the predicate a s a

whole ; for instance M an is vertebrate E ngland is
, ,
insul ar ; Where the subject is contained in a larger

class Of indi viduals man in that o f thi ngs vertebrate
, ,
E ngland in that Of th i ngs insular But these same .
propositions may be understood in order Of intension ,
and in that case the subject is a whole Of which the

pre di cate is a part ; for in stance M an as a quantum , ,
o f qualities contains among them the qu a li ty Of being

,
vertebrate ; E ngland contains the quality o f bein g

insular The same proposition if its terms are un
.
,
d e r s t o o d a s u ni ts Of intension moves from subject a s ,
whole t o pre di cate a s part .
It w a s said above that logic recogni ses that i s at , ,
least woul d do well t o rec ognise ( for I speak lik e a

,
barrister who predicts that the C ourt will do what he

kn ows to be the law ) in propo sitions where the c o
,
a l e s c e n c e i s Of whole and part onl y those propositions

,
as logical where the predicate is the whole and t h e

subject the part excludi ng those where the subject
,
is the whol e and the predicate the part If this is .
ad m i tted it follows that propo sitions where the pre

, ,
being vertebrate But if I take the t w o in order o f

.
extension then man as a whole o r uni ty is included

, , ,
i n the whole concept o r unity vertebrate ; E ngland ,
is included in the whole class insular Objects In ,

.
fact concepts are logical uni ts only s o far as they are

,
wholes in order Of extension ; t h e qualities included

in Objects are concepts onl y s o far as they are uni ed
by volition ; it must be specied what quality is meant ,
whether by vertebration for instance is meant that

, ,
common to all vertebrate ani mals o r that common to ,
man o r that t o shes and s o o n But this changes

, ,
.
the quality into a whole o r uni t o f extension at t h e ,
same time that it changes it i nto a concept Suppose .
I have a provisional image o f vertebration common to

all vertebrate anima ls ; then keeping this before me ,
as a concept an uni t I bring it into connection w ith

, ,
the concept man and s a y in order o f intension M an

,
is vertebrate o r conta i ns in him vertebration the

,

,
proposition i s not true he does not contain it in thi s

,
sense ; or suppose I s a y still in order o f intension but

, ,
changing the position Of subject and predicate V erte ,
brate i s man o r the vertebration com mon to all ani

,
mals contains in it the qualities o f man then the p rO ,
position is absurd as well as untrue I f therefore .

, ,
concepts are logic a l uni ties predication in order Of ,
intension is illogical The onl y logical way o f treating

.
concepts i s to use them in propositions in which they

can be treated as unities that i s in propositions in
, ,
order Of extension .
P ropositions in whi ch subject and predicate coin

cide are always legitimate ; for i n these though we ,
pass from the i ntension to the extension o f one and

the same concept and vice vers a yet the qualities
, ,
which constitute the intension are unied a n d made

concepts by volition ; by the qualities are meant all

the i n stances Of the presence o f the quali ties ; they
are i n fact transformed into quanta o f extension The .
term ani mal fo r instance means a l l Obj ects possessing

, ,
sentience nerve and cellul ar organisation ; the pro

, ,
visional image is an animal shape with these qualities ,
standing for all such shapes The intension o f the .
concept is a class o f individuals as much a s the ex

tension is ; o n e class o f individu a l s is asserted in the
proposition to coincide with another .
Secondly with regard t o the rule which makes the

predicate wh ole and the subject part i n propositions ,
in order Of extension where the terms do not coin,
cide It is true that co a l escence in intuition may

.
t a ke place whether we begin with the whole o r with

the part and s o far as this only is concerned t h e
, , ,
expression o f that coalescence in propositions might

move from whole to part a s well a s from part to
whole But an almost uni versal custom has decided
.
that the image which contains shall be placed last ,
and that which is contained rst in order Of speech ; ,
that the predicate shall expres s that t o which the

subject belongs the subject be explained by as signing
,
that to which it belongs and not that which belongs ,
to it To this rule propositions in order o f intension

.
appeared to form an e xception ; but they di d s o onl y

apparently since they reversed the position o f subject
,
and predicate as part and whole only by using ge

, ,
neral terms as equiva l ent not to all the instances con ,
t a i n e d under them but to single modes o f qualities

,
.
It is only in categorical propositions that the order

o f in tension comes forward ; no oth er kind o f prop o
sitiou lends itself to express the i nh erence Of qu alities

in Objects ; and in categorical propositions this kind
44 6 T HE C O NCE PT .
o f coalescence is not a logical o ne since general term s ,
should include and recall all the instances o f Objects

o r qualities to which the term applies not o n e singl e
,
instance onl y o f its applicability .
A reference to the mental operations which give

rise to the t w o orders o f intension and exten sion will
serve to verify the Vi ew now taken o f them as to
!
,
their respective tness for logical purposes E very .
Object has intension which exists as what h a s been

called in 2 6 a remote Object that is as an empirical , ,
Object composed o f immediate empirical objects O h .
e c t s have intension as objects o f perception ; their

j
attributes o r qualities are their intension But O b .
e c t s have extension only when xed o n by volition

j ,
and transformed from percepts into concepts The

. .
term extension is derived originally no doubt from , ,
the case Of those concepts onl y which are general a s

Op p osed to abstract notions that is which are general
, ,
and not particular concepts ; the extension o f a ge

neral notion is c o mposed o f the several instances in
which the abstract q uality expressed by its name , ,
occurs ; for in stance the extension o f the general

,
notion pillared comprises the quality o f being pil

l a r e d in portico es G reek temples G ot hic cathedrals
, , ,
and s o o n But when only a single instance has

.
been Observed and the quality is onl y an abstract

,
notion o r a particular concept still the term exten ,
sion is applicabl e to the single Object but it is an ,
uni t Of extension In no case can there be extension

.
without a concept formed by volition ; the intension

Of these concepts consists i n the qualities which they
have as Objects Of perception the uni on of which ,
qualities into complex parcels constituted th em r e

mote objects T o bring the intension of concepts
.
44 8 T HE C O NC E PT .
predicate a combination O f o ne wi th t h e other in t h e

,
forward movement o f consciousness .
If we hold that concepts enter into the proposi

tion as uni ties w e are enabled to dism i ss the con
,
sideration o f u ni versal and particular propositions .
Whether we s a y All animals some ani mals o r this , ,
animal are sentient in any case the subject and the

, ,
pre di cate are each a single concept These like .

,
modals are forms o f speech prov ided by grammar

, ,
which can but need not be adopted by logic for

, ,
its o w n purposes We need not think under these.
forms but we may if we choose

,
But however we .
modify the concepts whi ch are subject o r predicat e

o f our propositions they still remain concepts each
, ,
a sin gle concept and must coalesce in consciousnes s

,
in order to being combined in a proposition .
5 3 The second great class o f propositions con

.
tains those which express the conn ection Of concepts

in order o f time hypothetical propositions But it
,
.
is not enough that the concepts should be predicated

o f one another as succe e di n g they must be connected ,
together by some bond ratied o r vali d i n conscious ,
ness expressin g a fact Of consciousness in order of

,
time the bond o f causation ; just as in categorical

,
propositions it is experience that makes the concepts

coalesc e into o ne object in o n e and the same por
tion o f space In categorical propositions subject and
.
predicate coalesce into o ne Object ; in hypothetical

propositions where the relations Of the concepts in
,
order o f time alone are considered they cannot c o ,
a l e sc e into o n e object and a bond of connection b e ,
tween them as separate Objects m ust be sought This .
bond is the causal relation The subject O f c a t e go ri .
cal propositions becomes the antecedent and the pre ,

TH E C ONC E PT . 449
dic a t e becomes the consequent o f hypothetical pro

,
positions The hypothetical proposition asserts that

.
given one object another will follow or be capable o f ,
being asserted ; If A is B then C is D The cop ul a

,
.
in hypothetical propositions is not as in categorical , ,
a word signifyin g coalescence but two words sigui

,
fy i ng the dependence of o n e object o n another I f , ,
then Since the word if is a conjunction and gram

.
,
m a t i c a ll
y requires and in troduces a sentence and n o t
a single name it follows that the terms o f h y p o t h e

,
tic a l propositions are themselves propositions B ut .
propositions which are the expression Of judgments

do no t essentially differ from concept names which -
are the expression o f concepts and it makes no e s

,
s e n t i a l difference between categorical and h o the

yp
tical propositions that the terms o f the latter a r e
propositions expressing analysed concepts and no t ,
concepts simply Hypothe t ical propositions do not

.
assert that the complex o f objects existing in o n e

moment o f time is o r contains the cause o f the com
plex O f objects existing in the moment of time next
succeeding though it is true that it does so ; nor do
,
they directly assert that o n e Object or event is a su ffi

cient cause o f the existence Of ano t her though such ,
direct propositions might h ave been selected from

grammatic a l speech by l o gi c i a i i s a s wel l a s the form
which they have actu a l ly selected for the same pur
pose namely the purpose o f expressing their reason
, ,
ings in the form o f ti me ; but hypothetical proposi

tions pick o ut some isolated object or event i n o ne
moment Of time and assert that it is such that a n
,
other Object o r event in some succeeding moment of

time wil l arise in consequence o f it ; not however that
the former Object o r event is the sole cause o r condi
GG
45 0 T HE C ON C E PT .
tion o f t h e latter but only that it is a sufficient cause

,
.
This corresponds to the rule in categorical proposi

,
tions that the subj ect is included as a part i n the

,
predicate ; fo r t h e consequent is larger than the ante

cedent inasmuch as it may arise in consequence o f
,
s o m e other antecedent if the o n e named does not

,
arise o r exist D ifferent as hypothetical and cate

.
o ri c a l propositions are in form yet o n e is no more

g ,
problematical than t h e other Both alike express .

,
not the existenc e o f their terms o r either Of them

not the presenc e o f their terms i n consciousness
though they both imply it ; but they express the
conn ection between their terms concepts expressed ,
by names in the o n e concepts o r events expressed by

,
propositions in the other ; o n e in the order Of space ,
the other in that Of time The If o f the hypothetical

.
copula does no t render the proposition problematical ;

but the hypothetical proposition If A i s B then C is , ,
D is exactly equivalent to this The concept o r event

, ,
A B is a cause o f the concept o r event C D .
Hypothetical propositions have a prerogative over

categorical propositions derived from their u s e o f the
,
form o f time abstracted from Space and that is that , ,
they c a n move either in order o f history o r in order

o f cognition ; the antecedent can be either the causa
e x i s t e n d i o r the causa c o gn o s c e n d i of the consequent .
C ategorical propositions can make no distinction b e

tween these two orders they are bound to the third
,
order the order o f logic alone ; they m ake a b s t ra c

,
tion o f the form o f time and o f history and cognition

,
in time B ut the employer o f hypothetical proposi

.
tions is bound to distinguish in which o f these two

,
orders he places the conn ection of their terms for the ,
confusion O f the two is o n e o f the most fertile sources

them at once The second kind in which the whole

, ,

,
class is only given as divided into parts and is pre ,
d i c a t e d as s o divided must contain any smal ler portion

,
pro po sitio n s . o f itself onl y in o n e Of thes e di visions and not in ano
ther and therefore is exclusive ; if t h e subject belongs

,
to o ne part o f the p r e d i c a t e i t is e O ipso excluded , ,
from the others The disjunctive propositions o f this

.
latter kind are those which a re properly disjunctive ;

the former kind are not distinguishable essentially
from simple cat egorical propositions Of coincidence .
In disjunctive propositions as i n simple c a t e go r i ,
cal the copula expresses coalescence Of the subj ect

,
with the predicat e in consciousness ; the di fference

between disjunctive and categorical propositions lies
in the greater complexity o f the predicates o f the
former Less is asserted by the disjunctive than by
.
the categoric a l in o n e sense because the predicate is

,
Opened thereby to a further determination an a l ter ,
native and the subj ect n o t expressed in its comple

,
tion M ore is asserted by them in another sense

.
,
because no t only is a predicate asserted but some o f ,
the relations Of this predicate are included in the as

sertion The categorical proposition A whale is a
.
,
mammal is an assertion complete in itself whatever

, ,
further may have to be said on the subject T h e .
d isjunctive proposition A whale is either a mammal

, ,
a reptile a bird or a sh includes indeed the asser

, , ,
tion A whale is a mammal but does not x it as the

, ,
thing asserted by the proposition ; it gives the alter

natives O f this assertion and therefore the means o f
,
decidi ng o n its truth which were not contained in

,
.
the categorical proposition This character o f i n .

,
cluding the means of deciding or conditions of the

truth o f a proposition seems to be the reason why
,
TH E C ONC E PT . 45 3
disjunctive propositions are O ften treated in connec

.
tion with hypothetic a l .
A negative disjunctive proposition expresses that

the subject does not coalesce with any of the a l ter na
t i v e s o f the pre di cate and therefore it is useless t o
,
enquire in the case o f negatives w hether they are

, ,
o f the inclusive o r exclusive order Fo r instance .

,
Whales are neither moll usc articulate nor radi ate , , ,
is a negative disjunctive proposition which expresses ,
alike the non coalescence o f the concept whales with

-
the whole in di fferently a n d with the parts separately .
5 5 The fourth and last class is that o f hypo

.
t h e t i c O disjunctive propositions
-
These ow from .
and a r e a mo di cation Of hypothetical as disjunctive ,
are o f categorical propositions Their form is time ; .
they express in similar manner a s the disjunctive

, ,
the completion o f the series Of e ffects o f a given

cause o r o f causes o f a given e ffect The h y p o t h e t i
,
.
cal proposition ass erts for instance If he is s a d he , , ,
wants money ( causa c o gno s c e ndi ) The hypothetico .
disj unctive asserts If he is s a d he wants either , ,
money o r health o r employment ; that is it com

, , ,
pletes the series o f consequents proved o n e if no t all ,
Of which must be proved by the antecedent o r ground

o f inference He is s a d ,
O r again the hypothetic a l .
,
proposition asserts If he wants money he will b e sad

, ,
( causa e x i st e nd i ) The hypothetico.di sjunctive as -
serts If he wants either health o r money o r em

, , ,
ployment he wi l l be s a d ; completing the series Of

,
causes as before o f e ffects .
It is to be Observed that the hypothetico di sjunc -
tive like the disjunctive expresses its alternatives

, ,
both exclusively and inclusively Logical language .
provides no clear a nd s i mple formula by which the

t wo modes are distinguished from each other ; it is

still left to the reasoner to state each time i n which ,
sense exclusively o r inclusively he is using the pro

, ,
positions o r to his Opponent to analyse his assertions

,
and reduce them to o ne o r other o f these forms .
This end might perhaps be attained by distin guishing

the inclusive use o f the disjunctiv e and hypothetico
disjunctive proposition by the addition Of the word

indifferently leaving them in their present form
,
when they are intended exclusively We might s a y .

,
for in stance V erse i s either rhymed o r unrhymed i n

, ,
differently ; but The F aery Queen is either rhym ed

,
o r unrhymed ; and in the hypothetico di sjunctive If -

,
we are prudent we shall either command o r deserve

,
success indifferently ; but If a religi ous creed is per

, ,
s e c ut e d it will be either uprooted o r strengthened

,
.
N either hypothetical nor hypothetico disjunctiv e -
propositions can be negative s o long as they remain

in that form ; for whether the terms are both o f them
negative o r o n e negative and the other afrmative
, ,
the connection between them which is what i s as ,
s e r t e d by t h e proposition must always be af rmed

,
.
There is no hypothetic a l form fo r a negative proposi
tion ; grammatical language does not admit i t In .
order to deny both hypothetical and hypothetico

.
disjunctive propositions they must be reduced t o,
their categorical equivalents Fo r instance t h e n e .

,
a t i v e s o f the propositions If a man is merry he is

g , ,
happy ; and If a man is s a d he wants either money

, , ,

o r health o r employment are A man s bein g merry
, ; ,

is n o proof of his bein g happy ; and A ma n s being ,
sa d i s no proof o f h i s wanting either money o r ,
health o r employment The connection o f the terms

, .
must be denied .
also and a l l its forms are expressi ons o f consc i ousness ,
belonging by nature t o conscious beings ; but the

selection o f some o f these forms o f language and ,
their systemati sation s o as to serve a s expressions o f

,
judgments and generalisations in accordance with t h e

laws o f thought this i s an invention o f reecting
,
man an adaptation o f natural circumstances to his

,
o w n pu r p o ses M an was led to the conscious selec

.
tion o f the forms by nding them o r many Of them

in use before selection he used them spontaneously
,
befor e he selected them voluntarily Then logical .
systems arose each systematising language in different

,
ways The last step is t o nd the principle o f selec

.
tion to nd the laws o f thought which the selection

,
o f forms o f language is designed to express o r which ,
they were unconsciously adapted to express ; that is ,
to show the connection o f logical propositions and

syllogisms with their source the laws o f conscious ,
ness and to harmonise them as a system from that

,
point o f view The forms o f time a n d space with

.
,
their material element into which volition introduces

,
the postulates and the concept form are the key o f -

,
logic and of its verbal forms Of propositions and sy l

l o gi s m s .
Syllogisms are o f four kinds depending o n the ,
four kinds o f propositions and called by the same

names The ki n d o f the syllogism is determined by
.
the kind o f the proposition which it has for its major

premiss See again S i r W Hamilton Logic Lect xv
. .
, ,
. .
C ategorical syllogisms are those in which the three

propositions are categorical ; and in which the c o a l e s
cence of the concepts in the qu aestio or conclusion , ,
is made possibl e by the discovery of a middle term

o r third concept with which they both coalesce In .
disjunctive syll ogisms no new m i ddle term i s in tro

d uc e d but the exhaustive an a l ysis o f the concept
,
given in the major premiss is made the ground of the

conclusion ; for it was shown above that the d i sjunc
tive proposition does not assert a fact simply but as ,
involved in alternatives which contain the mean s o f

deciding on its truth In hypothetical syll ogi sms also
.
no new middle term is introduced but a s in d i sjunc , ,
tive the ground o f the conclusion is already contai ned

,
in the major premiss And the same may be s a i d o f

.
the hypothetico disju n ctive syll ogisms whi ch combin e

-
the peculiarities o f the t w o preceding kinds But the .
conclusion in three o f the four kinds o f syllogism in ,
all except the hypothetico disjunctive is a categoric a l

-
proposition ; that is it is a proposition expressing the

,
coalescence o f t w o concepts in to o ne The result i s .
the same in all these three kinds and that result is ,
an image whether we reach it by reasoning in the

,
form o f space o r in that o f time whether b y the ,

-
introduction o f a new intermediate concept as in ,
categorical syllogisms o r by an exhaustive analysis

, ,
as in disjunctive syllogisms o r by the consideration

,
o f its consequents o r o f its antecedents a s in hypo ,
thetic a l syllogisms The result in hypothetico d i s

.
-
junctive syllogisms is an hypothetic a l prop osition .
The middle term o r concept o f an afrmative

categoric a l syllogism must either contain o n e o f the
extreme concepts and be contained in the other o r it ,
mus t contain o ne and coi ncide with the other o r it ,
must coincide with one and be contained in the other ,
o r it must coincide with them both ; otherwise it does
not compel their coalescence This gives rise t o four

.
cases o r gures O f categoric a l afrmative proposi

, ,
tions o f each o f which I will give an ins t a n ce wi th

,
a diagram ann exed t o render t h e movement clearer .
A n instance o f the rst gure is

M n i ( nt in d in ) ni
a s lco a e a m a ,
A ni l i ( nt in d in) g ni b ing
m a s co a e o r a c e ,
M n i ( nt in d in ) g n b ing ;
a s co a e o r a ic e
o f the second gure ,
M n i ( nt in d in ) ni
a s co l a e a m a ,
A ni l i ( in id nt wit h ) nti nt b ing

m a s co c e se e e ,
M n i ( nt in d in ) nt i nt b ing ;
a s co a e se e e
of the third gure ,
A ni a l i ( in id nt wi t h ) nt i nt b ing
m s co c e se e e ,
A ni l i ( nt in d in) g ni b ing
m a s co a e o r a c e ,
S nt i nt b ing i ( nt in d in ) g ni
e e e s co a e o r a c
b ing ; e
o f the fourth gure ,
A ni l i ( in id nt wit h) nt i nt b ing
m a s co c e se e e ,
S nt i nt b ing i ( in id nt wi t h ) p
e e e s co c e o sses
i n fn S o o e rv e ,
A ni l i ( in id nt wit h ) p
m a s in fco c e o sses s o O
n rv e e .
These four gures are a ll that are possible if c o n ,
c e t s a re treated as u ni ts
p N egative syllogisms also .
fall under these same forms since onl y o n e o f the ,
premises in a negative syllogism c a n be a negative

proposition and the other premiss must express either
,
coincidence o r comprehension Besides which a m e .

,
a t i v e proposition is the counterpart o f an a i rm a

g
tive proposition o f coincidence ; t h e exclusion in the
o n e case and the coalescence in t h e other is total and
, ,
without exception When two concepts are c o m c 1 .
dent all predicates o f the o ne are pre di cates o f t h e

,
other t o assert any thing o f the o n e is to assert it also

,
o f the other and when t w concepts are excluded

; o ,
not outside both Whe n this i s the case a step for

.
:
,
ward is taken by the syllogism which step forward is ,
the purpose o f syll ogising If we consider those con .
c e t s which coincide with others and those which

p ,
contain others as the predicates o f those which they

,
coincide with o r contain the syllogism will be in c o n ,
formity to the D ictum o f Aristotle Ca t e g III I 5 ,

. . .
"
a 5 a m ro c 7 05 z oo m
y o
g p
ov vo v a A y z
'
m t,
f
2
7 0 11 7 04 m a ) 3
75 05 7 0
7 05 wo z et t
f vo v
gnS A predicate Of a predicate
f
y O ez

'
f -
w .
is a predicate o f its subject .
N egative syllogisms are those in which the con

c l us i o n i s a negative p r oposition o n e asserting that ,
subject and predicate do not coalesce This case .
arises when o ne of the premi ses is a negative and the ,
other an af rmative proposition and when besides , , , ,
the middle term excludes o n e o f the extreme terms

and either includes o r coincides with the other N e .
a t i v e propositions assert exclusion that the subject

g ,
is excluded from the predicate and the predicate ,
from the subject ; they make no distinction between

modes o f coalescence by inclusion o r coincidence but , ,
they deny co a l escence S imply There is in logic no .
such thing as a particular negative proposition ; con

c e t s are unities and if o n e excludes a n other it ex
p , ,
c l ud e s it entirely A proposition such as this Some

.
,
men are not negroes excludes entirely the concept ,
some men from the concept negroes ; and the same

knowledge which warranted the assertion o f this pro
,
position warrants also the af rmative proposition

, ,
N egroes are ( contained in ) men Logic takes up o r .
adopts no classes genera o r species ready made from

, , ,
other sciences but forms its own concepts by volition ;

,
and every concept every fact stands on its own basis

, ,
o f knowledge Logic cannot treat M an for instance

.
, ,
TH E C ONC E PT . 46 1
as a genus or S pecies or class o r a s a collection of i n ,
dividual men but as a S ingle concept with a de ni te

,
meaning ; the logical concept man is not a multitude

o f individuals some o f which are o n e thing some a n ,
,
other b ut it is o ne thing with a deni te connotation

,
and indivisible T o treat M an as a collection of indi

.
v i d u a l s some o f which are o n e thin g and some a n

,
other is to treat it as a percept and no t a concept ;

,

and whatever is predicated o f some men is predi
c a t e d o f them as objects which happen also to be
men not Of them qu a tenus men o r as belonging t o

, ,
the concept man The essence o f a concept is to be

.
a qu a tenus ; its rights t o u s e a legal metaphor are

, ,
creatures of contract and not o f status If two con .
c e t s coalesce at all it must be either as coincident

p ,
o r as containing and contained If they are not coin .
eident they must either coal esce as containing and

,
contained o r not co a l esce at a l l If y o u d o not kno w

,
.
that they coincide then either you know that one

,
contains the other o r you kno w nothing at all abou t

,
them ; in the former case you c a n assert an affi rma ,
tive proposition about them in the latter case y o u ,
cannot assert that o ne excludes the other In order .
to assert a negative proposition you must have know ,
ledge o f the two concepts ; and if your knowledge of ,
them falls Short of enabling you to assert their mutual

exclusion you have enough to warrant some a f rm a
,
tive proposition respecting them Wherever there is .
ground for a particular negative proposition there is ,
also ground for the afrmation o f some fact or other

respecting its terms P articular negative propositions
.
therefore such as Some men are negroes and M en

, , , ,
a r e not contain ed in negroes are o f no use in logic ,
and ought t o be rejected from its forms ; whi ch in ,

462 T HE C ONC E PT .
volitional matter is the same thing as saying that

,
they a re rej ected .
Whenever there is a negative premiss the c o n ,
c l u s i o n is simply negative irrespective o f the mode o f

,
coalescence expressed by the afrmative proposition .
In the rst and third gures o f syllogisms gi ven above ,
in order t o exclude the subj ect o f the conclusion from

the pr edi cate the middle term must be excluded from
,
the pre di cate ; that is the premiss in which the middle

,
term is compared with the predicate of the conclu

sion must be negative ; otherwise that i s if the other
, ,
premi ss is negative the subject o f the conclusion is

,
not excluded from the predicate for it is only ex ,
cluded from a concept which is included i n that pre

d i c a t e that is from a part o f it only and n o t from
, ,
the whole But in the second and fourth gures o f

.
syllogisms it is indifferent which o f the premises is

,
negative and which afrmative Fo r the middl e .
term is in the second and fourth gures coincident

with the pre di cate o f the conclusion s o that it is the ,
same thing to exclude the subject o f the conclu

sion from the middle term and to exclude it from
the predicate o f the m i ddle term that is o f the con, ,
c l u s i o n ; no room is left between the limit o f the
middle term and the predicate o f the conclusion in ,
which the subject o f the conclusion might be found

though e xcluded fr om the m i ddle term When there .
fore we meet with a syllogism apparently informal ,
from having that premiss negative in which the m i ddle

term is deni ed o f the subject o f the conclusion o r vice ,
vers a fo r in either case the exclusion is mutual we

, ,
Should consider whether it is not a syll ogism of the

second o r fourth class in which the middle term and
,
t h e predicate o f the conclusion are coincident o r c o

4 64 T HE CONC E PT .
over i n to popular language If however the plain a nd .
easy distinction between coinciding with and contain

ing is always ex p ressed in logical language there is no ,
reason why the language o f popular discussion should

not become exact and logical ; fo r the distinction is
o n e which has n o t

like that o f all and some an
, ,
abstruse technical appearance as if more was meant ,
than met the ear There would then at least be no

.
obstacle presented by t h e phraseology Of logic to i t s

pop ular adoption ; the great dif culty would however
remain the same and must perhaps be rst removed
, ,
the dif c ulty which is felt in using terms as concepts

and not as percepts as wholes o f extension which can
,
be dened and not as wholes o f intension which may

have an innite number Of qualities not yet perceived ,
and in substituting the denition and the qu a tenus

in place o f the loose and undened name .
The adoption o f concepts as logical units removes

the appearance of what has sometimes been called the
petitio principii involved in categorical syllogisms .
If I say for instance

, ,
All m en p n ibl b ing

a re r e s o s e e s,
C iu i
a s n s a m a ,
C iu i
a p n ibl b ing
s s a re s o s e e ,
it appears that C a ius himself being a man is involved , ,

in the universal term all men and that I must
,
have exam i n ed the case o f C aius and admitted the ,
conclusion before I can assert the major premiss

, .

The term all men includes all men past present , ,
and to come ; it is not prim a facie restricted to my

present knowledge of men which it o ught to be since , ,
that is the sole ground o f my proceeding to a further

reasoning about them But if I s a y .
M n is
a p o n ibl b eing
a re s s e ,
T HE C O N C E PT . 4 65
t hen M an is a concept which has o r ought t o have a , ,
denite a n alysis o r content ; suppose for instance , ,
that it means any being having emotions volition

, ,

and powers o f r e e c t i o n ; and by the term respo nsi
ble s uppose is meant having the feel i ng o f being

bound to act according to some law Then the major .
prem i ss expresses no more than my present know

ledge independent o f the case of C aius warrants ;
, ,
and when I compare the concept C aius with my con

cept man and nd that it is contained in it I then
, ,
infer from the uniformity o f the course of nature

that it is contained also in the concept a responsible ,
being The degree o f certainty in the conclusion is

.
no greater than the degree o f certainty in the major

premiss b ut there is a greater quantity o f knowledge ;
,
the amount is increased by the combination o f the

minor premiss with the major ; a step forward has
'
been taken and taken in conformity with the laws o f

,
.

thought But the term all men includes s o much
that there is no room for more for it lays claim to ,
have exhausted the concept by anticipation o f its ,
future modications We are just i ed in speaking

.
o f o ur present conception o f man but n o t justied in ,
asserting that it will not be modied by future i n

stances ; and to adopt a logical formul a which i s onl y ,
suitable fo r cases where knowledge i s perfectly certain

and perfectly exhaustive is to adopt what i s uns uit
,
able to express the vast majority o f judgments .
Hypothetic a l syllogisms ow from hypothetic a l

L
H yp o h e m
propositions ; that is the quaestio is established by
,
be i ng connected with its cause in order of time n o t ,
with a concept which contains it in order o f space .
The major premiss asserts that the quaestio wi ll exist

if some other event precedes it and the minor pre ,
HH
miss asserts that this other event takes p l a c e i f the

'
syllogism i s an afrmative o n e or in what is called ,
the modus ponens If it rains the sh will rise But .

,
.

it does rain Therefore the sh wil l rise Since it
. .
is not asserted that rain is the only cause o f the sh

rising we cannot conclude conversely that if the sh
, ,
rise it will rain ; for they may rise from other causes
a s well as rain S O that a i rm a t i v e conclusions are
.
only possible from an afrmation o f the anteced e nt ,
n o t o f the consequent O n the other hand since this .

,
o n e cause if it existed would draw the consequent

, ,
with it if the consequent does not exist we may con

, ,
c l u d e that the antecedent does not exist ; and this is
the ground o f the negative conclusion o r modus tol ,
lens in hypothetical syllogisms If there is game

,
.
,
the dog points But he does not point Therefore

. .
there is no game .
D isjunctive syllogisms have a major premiss wh ich

'
asser t s the coalescence o f a concept with one o f a com

l e t e series of other concepts exclusively The series
p .
must be exhaustive o r complete and the predication ,
exclusive If the series is not exhaustive the propo

.
,
s i t i o n w il l be false as admitting another alternative

,
which may be the true o n e If the predication is .
inclusive as for i n stance Animals are e ither verte

, ,
brate mollusc radiate o r articulate indifferently

, , , , ,
. then the conclusion must be inclusive and no step ,
forward w ill be taken ; fo r instance ,
A ni l it h m a s a re e er v . m . r . o r a .
,
S nt i nt b i ng e ni l
e f e s a re a m a s,
S nt i nt b ing eit h e e s a re e er v . m . r . o r a .
,
where w e derive no benet from the disjunctive form

o f the major premiss but treat it as a mere c a t e o

, g
ri c a l
. But if we predicate exclusively we can in the ,
P A RT II . true o ne but it is not requisite indeed it is i m p o s ,

CH V I I
sible that the predication shoul d be exclusive The
. .
D iv 2. .
,
.
56 mi n or prem i ss takes car e o f t h e exclusion The fo l

Syll gi
. .
o sm s
lowing is an instance
.
If h e nts m n y h e will it h w
wa o e e er o rk o r ght ,
B ut h will n t w k
e o o r ,
I f h w nt m n y h will ght
e a s o e e .
It is not possible to prove the negative o f o n e alter

native by afrming the other as i n the m odus ponendo ,
tollens o f disjunctive syllogi sms for the conclusion ,
would in that case contradict the major premiss .
Again since the proof moves by negation of alter

,
n atives and by denying the antecedent nothing is

,
proved the alternatives cannot be in the antecedent

, ,
in a hypothetico di sjunctive syllogism N othing is

-
.
proved for instance by saying

, ,
If h e is it h
e er o ut o f m o ny e ,
o r h ea l t h ,
o r em pl ym nto e ,
he w ill b e sa d,
B ut h e i s no t o ut o f h lt h o m pl ym nt
ea r e o e ,
If h e is o ut o f m o n y h will b s d
e e e a .
We Obtain less than we had in the major premiss .
C onsequently hypothetico disjunctive syllogi sms u s e

,
-
o nly the modus t o l l e n d o ponens prove o n e of a series ,
o f consequents not o f antecedents have an h y p o t h e

, ,
tical proposition as their conclusion and their c o n ,
elusion is always af rmative .
The syllogism commonly kno wn as the D ilemma

is not properly a hypothetico disjunctive but a hypo ,
thetical syllogism It wears an appearance of dis

.
junction because the consequent is double but it ,
lacks the essen c e of disjunction becau se it does not

proceed by afrming one alternative from the nega
tion of the other o r by denying o n e from the a f r
,
TH E C O N C E PT .
46 9
m ation of the other ; it denies both a l tern atives It .
is in fact nothing but a hypothetical syllogism in the

mod us tollens The whole cons equent is deni ed i n
.
the minor premiss and therefore the antecedent is ,
deni ed in the concl usion An instance is .
I f A i B th n it h C i D
s ,
e X i Z
e er s ,
o r s ,
B ut n ith
e C i D n
er X is Z s ,
o r ,
A i n t B
s o .
B ut here I should remark that I attempt o nl y t o give

simple instances o f the four forms o f syllogisms in ,
order t o Show the principles o n which they rest ,
Without professing to repeat o r to formulate anew

the more complicated forms into which they may ,
perhaps with advantage be thrown o r which may , ,
arise from their combination .
5 7 The hypothetico disjunctive syllogism closes

.
-
the series o f syllogisms o r separate forms o f reasoni ng ,
by means o f words and sentences If o t her forms of .
syllogism should be adopted it is dif cult t o imagine ,
that they Should n o t be developments modications , ,
o r combinations o f these It will be observed that .
nothing has been s a id o f the s o called inductive sy l -
l o gi s m. This is because in the view here taken , ,
inductions may be thrown into the form o f any kin d

o f syllogism and because a l l in duction is in its na
,
t ure deductive a deduction either from an anticipa

,
tion o f redi n tegration o r from an a ssumption o f the ,
law t hat the course of nature i s uniform All cases .
o f acquisitive g e neralisation it h a s been shown in ,
3 8
,
as we l l those which move from particu l ar fa cts
as those which move from general facts o r laws are , ,
deductions from such anticipation o r such a s s um p

tion It is impossible to reason no t ex p rte c o gni t i s
.
et rte c o nc e s s i s ; induction itself i s an ins tan ce o f

p
4 70 T HE C ON C E PT .
such reasoning And since induction i s a mode of de

.
,
duction the four forms o f syllogisms which suf ce for

, ,
.
ll cases o f deduction su f ce also for this case o f it

d a
.
,
d
I n d u c t i o n s o far as it is reaso ning that i s s o far as
, , ,
it is a voluntary puttin g together o f two o r any num

ber o f facts o r phenomena is a deductive process ,
.
Induction s o far as it is a process o r conn ected pro

, ,
c e d ure at all is a deductive procedure The line

, ,
.
o f demarcation fa l ls not between induction and de ,
duction but between perception of phenomena o r o f

,
facts whether procured by observation o r by ex

,
p e ri m e nt and reasoni
,
ng analysing or combining , ,
those phenomena o r t heir elements P erception o f .
facts whether by observation o r e x p e ri m m t is not

, ,
induction ; reasoni ng acquisition o f new and as yet

unobserved facts is not perception but deduction ,
from former perceptions ; and induction answers to

this description It was because induction was con
.
s i d e re d to be different i n nature from deduction ,
while syllogism was suited onl y fo r deductive pro

cesses that a special form of syllogi sm was provided
,
o r at least employed to embody the results o f induc

,
tion as a pre syll ogistic and extra logi cal process The
- -
.
process o f induction it was thought was non sy l l o , ,

-
g i s t i c but its results might be expressed by the s l l o

, y
gism An inst a n ce o f the syllogism o f induction is
.
A B C D m tl , , ,
a re o r a ,
A B C D ll nkind
, , ,
a re a m a ,
Al l nk ind t l m a a re m o r a .

The premi ss A B C D are all mankind ex , , , ,
presses the result o f a complete induction o r one ,
a dopted by the logician as such The task o f show .
ing that the in duction was complete or correct that ,
is the process of induction was considered by t h e

, ,
472

TH E C ONC E PT S
incorporate into syllogistic logic N o w it was shown .
in 3 8 that the inductive process is a process of

,
deduction and that Observation and experiment a s

, ,
modes o f perception are common to both The con ,

.
fusion o f the notion o f induction with the notion o f

processes in which experiment and observation bear
a large proportion to the reasoning founded o n them ,
this is probably the chief source o f the divorce
between induction and deduction Wherever was .
seen a large accumulation o f facts experiments and , ,
observations there people s a i d Induction ; without

,

stopping to ask whether induction was a s i rnp l y per

c e t i v e o r a redin tegrative process Wherever they
p .
s a w lo n g arguments from comparatively few facts o r
phenomena there they exclaimed D eduction But

,
.
the truth is that wherever there is a voluntary red

, ,
integrativ e process there is deduction ; the interest

,
supplies the matt er and directs the movement logic ,
supplies the form and moulds the movement in Co n

formity with the a priori requirements Of truth .
If we treat concepts as units then there is nothin g , ,
short o f innity too large and nothing short of i n

, , ,
ni t y too small for the grasp of logic

,
E very new .
fact as it is Observed o r brought to observation by ,
experiment is treated as a concept compared with

, ,
others and made the subj ect or the predicate o f a

,
proposition Black tawny copper coloured are said

.
, ,
-
o n e by o n e as the fact is Observed

,
to be contain e d ,
in the concept the human form And again the .

, .
concept the hum a n form is said t o be either black ,
white tawny o r copper coloured indi fferently A c

, ,
-
,
.
u i s i t i v e generalisations to which the term in duc

q ,
tion is usually applied employ when expressed sy l , ,
logistically categorical syllogisms o f w h i p h the major

,
TH E C O N C E PT . 473

premiss is The course o f nature is uniform When .
the hypothetical form is employed the same premiss ,
may be added as a pendant to the antecedent ; If

A is B and the course o f nature is uniform then
, ,
C is D The forms o f syllogism above given are

.
thus adequate measures o r forms o f thought for b oth ,
kinds o f reasoning critic a l and acquisitive and no t

, ,
only fo r the results o f reasoni ng but for the processes

themselves But of the four forms o f syllogism cate
.
,
o r i c a l hypothetical disjunctive and hypothetico di s

g
-
, , ,
junctive the two former are most tted for acquisitive

,
'
reasoning and t h e t w o latter for critical ; o r rather for
,
that kind o f critical reasoning which follows acquisi

tive and reduces its results to a critic a l form ; for
,
these two latter forms o f syllogism take up as their

major pre m iss an elaborate result o f reasoning a ,
whole class with its divisions ready formed a concept ,
already analysed exhaustively either in to its statical ,
and mutually exclusive members o f analysis o r in to ,
its complete series o f e ffects Logic offers us in its

.
,
four kinds of propositions and in its four kinds of syl

l o gi s m s founded o n them forms corresp onding and
,
adequate to the t w o methods o f empirical reasoning ,
critical and acquisitive which were found t o exhaust

,
the whole domain o f voluntary redintegration .
Hypothetical propositions and hypothetic a l sy l l o

gisms depend o n the pos t ulates and the concept form -
equally with categorical and di sjunctive propositions

and syllogisms O nl y since they connect concepts in
.
the order o f time keepi ng them apart without coa

,
l e s c e n c e with each other they avoid the appearance

,
o f contra di cting the post ul ates and t h e concep t form -
which is the pecul iarity o f categorical propositions .
They assert that o ne concept causes another no t that ,

conc ept is another Time is involve d i n b o t h

o ne .
kinds o f propositions and syllogisms alike that is to ,
sa
y
,
the movem e nt of consciousness in judgment re
quires time to exist In another sense a l so they both

.
require time and they both require space ; the images

, ,
o r concepts which are their objects exist both in

,
.
time and in space C oncepts whether separate o r in

.
,
coalescence must exist in time But this historical

,
.
e m s t e n c e in time is abstracted from in categorical
and disjunctive propositions and syllogisms and their ,
extension in space is abstracted from in hypothetical

and hypothetico disjunctive propo sitions and sy l l o
-
gisms ; no use is made o f it in these forms o f rea

sonin g The form o f tim a abstracted from that Of
.
space o n which hypothetical and hypothetico di sjun c

,
-
tive propositions and syllogisms rest is as will be , ,
shown in the following D ivis ion the formal element ,
in the Law of C ausal ity and known by the name Of

, .
R atio S uf c i e n s Hyp othetical and hypothetico dis

.
-
junctive syllogisms rest avowe dl y o n the prin ciple o f

R atio S uf c i e n s ; categorical and disjunctive s y l l o
gisms rest also o n the same principle but do not ,
make it their principle o f movement just as the other ,
t w o kinds o f syllogisms rest o n the form Of space

without movi n g by means o f it The forms o f time .
and space respectively determ i ne the forms o f these

two main kinds o f propositions and syllogi sms in
logic the hypothetical and the categorical
, .
The same distinction between the forms o f ti m e ,
and space is the ground o f another diffe rence also in

methods of reasoni ng o f the difference between the
,
critical and acquisitive methods A cquisitive reason .
i ng differs from critical in assumin g as its principle

that objects yet unknown wi ll be subject to the law
part o f the enti re knowledge reached without which ,
those conclusions would be unintelligibl e ; and this

cannot be abstracted from but is a valuable part o f ,
the history of the mind .
This doubly vol untary logic a l treatment may in

, , ,
any kind of question and in eithe r method o f reason

ing critical o r acquisitive proceed by the application
, ,
o f the forms either O f time o r o f space A period o f .
history for i nstance may be treated as a statical con

, ,
cept in which cause and e ffect are qualities o r modes

,
o f existence The reign o f C harles I for example

. .
, ,
may be treated as o n e concept in which the event o f ,
the attempted Arrest o f the F ive M embers and that

o f the beheading o f the King are constituent parts ,
notwithstandi ng that the former event was o n e o f t h e

causes o f the latter If n o w we reason acquisitively
.
,
we may s a y that similar exercises of arbitrary power ,
in similar circumstances will produce similar r e t ri b u

,
tion ; A is productive o f B ; o r A is ( contained in ) ,
events productive o f B The word productive con

.
n e c t s events in order o f time and makes cause and ,
e ffect coalesce into o n e statical concept Similarly .

,
the same period o f time may be treated as a network

o f causes and e ffects and we may s a If there is an
, y
exercise o f arbitrary power there will be retribution , .
And again in wholes o f simultaneous existence where

, ,
the parts exist simultaneously for instance the risin g , ,
and fa l ling o f the Opposite ends o f a lever the action ,
and reaction o f bodies i n collision the angles and ,
sides o f a triangle each part may be considered as a

,
cause o f the rest and as the e ffect o f the rest ; a

,
single bone o f a fossil ani m al not onl y as proof o f

what the rest o f the skeleton was but also as havi ng ,
been with t h e other bones a condition of the whole ,

and as itself conditioned by the rest In other words .

,
logic can treat wholes o f succession statically and ,
wholes of S imultaneous existence dynamically for the ,
purposes of investigation ; it can a l so treat new i n

fe r e n c e s in acquisitive general isation as qualities o r
, ,
constituent parts o f a l ready acquired concepts b e ,
sides treating them in the character o f fut ure events ,
or events consequent o n prior conditions .
5 8 Logic has a l ways been consider ed to be a

.
purely f orm al science making abstraction from all

,
content o r matter o f knowledge and giving only the ,
laws which are afterwards applicable to all kinds o f

content or matter but which do not contain any in
,
themsel v es o r of their own If this were strictly

.
true it would follow that there was no community of

,
nature between M etaphysic and Logic for m e t a p h y ,
s i c always has in its objects both form and matter the ,
latter being as essential as the former ; and couse

quently that metaphysical truths could n o t be de
d uc e d from logical n o r logical from metaphysical
,
.
Two faculties o r functions would then exist S ide by

S ide in consciousness which might be capable of b a r
,
m o n i o u s action but which would no t be necessitated

,
to act harmoni ously ; and thus a thi rd principle o r set

o f principles wo uld be required t o estab l ish the p r a c
,
tical rules which regulate o r ought to regulate the

, ,
concert o f the two functions But now if any o ne

.
, ,
startled at the apparent incongruousness o f such a

system should enquire whether after all it were the
, , ,
true o ne and Should experience the wish to reduce

,
it to greater simplicity the mode o f doin g this which

,
would be likely rst to suggest itself wo ul d be t o a s k

w hether o n e of the two kinds of principles m e t a p h y ,
s i c a l and logical could no t be derived from the other

,
.
47 T HE C ON C E PT .
P A RT II An
having put the question i n this shap e it would
d
VII ,
.
CH
probably next occur to h i m that the most concrete of
. .
Di 2
v
,
. .
58 the two kinds of prin ciple s must be deducible from

R i 6f t h
e v e>w e
the most abstract Th i s attr ibute o f be ing the most
gii
t e .
,
abstract he would at rst be led to think was pos

,
sessed by the principles o f logic since it has always ,
been proclaimed that logic makes abstraction o f all

content and c o nsequently is entirely and completely
,
.
a bstract But when it had been prove d that there is

.
no object o f thought or of consciousness whi ch does

not contain in itself both matter and form ; and that
consequently even the postulates o f logic can make
no claim to be entirely and strictly formal any more ,
than the principles of metaphysic o r o f intuition of ,
existences as objects namely ti me and space ; but

.
, ,
that both kinds o f principles alike contain both matter

and form that is are felt as well as known in consci
, ,
o u s n e s s ; he would then nd the question of the r e
duction o f o n e kind to the other Opened afresh since ,
in this respect they stand o n the same level ; and it

would remain onl y to ask not which w a s abstract and ,
which was concrete but which was the most abstract

, ,
the most simple and elementary The d i i c ul t y ari s .
ing from the apparent difference in kind o f the two

sets o f principles would be thus removed ; it woul d
remain to compare them together a n d s e e whether
either contained the elements of the other whether ,
either contained more than was contained implicitly

in the other .
N ow the postulates contain expli citly more than

time and space contain explicitly but not more than ,
time and space contain implicitly In other words .

,
they are a development of time and space and not an ,

addi t ional o r new principle Time and space contain . ,

No t -
A,is the assertion of difference o f feeling E very .
thing is either A o r N ot A i s the assertion that same -
ness and difference as above dened, are the onl y ,
way in which we can conceive o f two objects The .
incompressibili t y o f time and space and the couse ,
quent security o f the feelings o r matter which they

contain is the ground o f the certain assertion of the
,
postulates The postulates again are the assertion of

.
genera l facts facts as necessary and certain as any

,
others ; onl y less general and less certain than the

forms o f time and space which they express but ex , ,
press with the addition o f a matter o r content con

t a i n e d in them and distinguished from them They .
are the rst and most general and most necessary

laws of empirical phenomena as such .
This unity o f feeling in difference o f position in

historical time and space is the rst and sim plest fact
which the postulates can be employed t o express o r ,
wh ich they express in the rst instance Afterwards .

,
any feature in an object can be xed o n and made a

conce p t for instance a particular gure a particular
, , ,
duration a particular position with reference t o other

,
objects as well as a particular feel ing such as hard

, ,
ness o r colour O bjects in which occurs this parti

.
c ul a r gure duration position o r particular feature

, , ,
-
be it what it will are then said to be the same in that

,
particular respect o r qu a tenus such That is to s a y

,
.
,
the postulates are applicable to a ll and every feature

in objects without exception Still this refers only .
to objects existing in t i i n e and space historically .
When we go farther and reect o n objects as o b , ,
j e c t s existing both historically and in consciousness ,
a further appli cation o f the postulates is made The .
same feature is then perceived as twice present to

T HE C ON C E PT . 48 1
consciousness when regard ed as a single feature o r

feeling I reect that I have said o f it A is A The
. .
only difference O f the two A s is the difference in

their times o f recurrence in consciousness not as , ,
before the difference in their environment ; cotton in

,
my mind now and cotton in my mind ve minutes

ago the R oman E mpire in my m i nd now and the
,
R om an E mpire in my mind ve mi n utes ago occupy ,
historically the same space and time at each moment ,
o f representation The subj ective space they occupy

.
is also the same they are environed by the same body

,
and the same external world each time The onl y .
d ifference between them is that one is before and the

,
other after an intervening series o f feelin gs The .
j udgment A is A is now the outward expression of

, ,
this reective act o f consciousness ; the reective

moving from one feeling to the other requires time ,
and this time from A to A is represented by the two

A s o f the judgment R eection raties the postu
.
lates b y adopting them ; and the postulates are ex

pressions o f the ultimate judgments of reection as ,
well as o f the original judgments o f perception a n d

understanding .
The simplest expression o r formula o f the postu

lates contains a material element in it besides that ,
contained in time and space as pure objects It has .
been a l ready s a id that even the pure cognitions o f

time and space are material as well a s form a l that ,
they are felt as well as known and i nvolve a being ,
conscious as well as a form o f that consciousness .
But the particular o r determinate mode of this mate

rial element is in the pure object only provisionally
, ,
present In the postulates o n t h e contrary the ma

.
, ,
t e ri a l element is present determinately ; it is some

II
P A RT II . distinct limitation o f time and space impressed upon

Di
v. 2 . them by volition Three things were distinguished
.
in 1 6 l st Tini e and Space themselves ; 2d h e ma

R g
e v
i i
ggf t h , ,
t
t e ri a l element ; 3 d the li m itat i ons and d i vi s i ons O f
e .
,
.
?Qi gif log

i
g
s o
i
,
time and space impressed upon them by the material

.
element The postulates express those divisions which

.
can exist onl y when form and matter are present with
them Volition xes o n the divisions and retains
.
form and matter provisionally ; the divisions s o xed

are the concept form and the expression of them is
-
,
by the postulates The simplest formula o f the pos

.
t ul a t e s is representative o f any determinate material

element whatever ; it is not an expression o f o n e
object or o n e element existin g alike in all Objects o r ,
o f all objects or all matter indifferently but it is o n e ,
Object chosen for its i n si gni c a n c e by itself i n order

, ,
to represent any determinate object whatever as de

terminate A letter o f the alphabet serves this pur
.
pose well There is no simpler O r better formula for

.
the postulates than this concrete determin ate yet , ,
representative o n e A is A ; NO A is N o t A ; E very

,
-
thing is either A o r N ot A A and No t A are not -

.
-
properly speaking abstractions they are not a h ,
s t ra c t e d as uni versal properties or qualities o f objects ,
and considered logically as inde pendent o f the con

crete objects t o which they belong ; but they are
signs denotin g any concrete empirical determinate , ,
object whatever A means this object N o t A means

.
- -
not this object ; and the three postulates express

- -
truths concerning obj ects but no other truths than ,
are contained in the facts o f perception in the s ub ,
je c t i o n o f feelings to the forms of time and space In .
other w ords the cognitions o f time and space are the

,
condition and ground o f the postulates The A o f .

48 4 TH E C ON C E PT ;
capab le of being resolved into n o n empi rical element s -

.
This latter analysis here attempted is no attempt to

, ,
prove the postulates to add a certainty to them which

,
they had not before ; but it is an attempt to show

how they came to be invested with that character o f
certainty In other words it is an attempt t o assign
.
,
their conditio e s s e n d i e t e x i s t e n d i as distingui shed ,
from their conditio c o gn o s c e n d i an attempt corre , ,
s o nd i n
p g to that made in C hap II I with respect
. to .
time and space ; the onl y difference bein g that in the ,
last mentioned case the causa e x i st e n d i was sought

-
in objects in their objective in the r s t mentioned

,
-
case in objects in thei r subjective character ; in the

,
last case in objects as empirical existences in the

, ,
rst in the metaphysical analysis of such objects

,
.
A S imilar phenomenon has been observed in the

relation o f the cognitions o f time and space to each
other Just as the postulates being empirical are
.
, ,
more familiar than the forms o f time and space and ,

have consequently usurped their place in men s minds ,
so space being more complex is also more familiar

, ,
than time and has become the mode i n which we

,
represent every thing to ourselves time itself i n ,
cluded Space is more complex because o f its three

.
dimensions which can be compared together ; it con

,
tains in itself the conditions of its intelligibility ; but

we render time intelligible to ourselves by an image
drawn from space by a line the image of the rst
, ,
dimension of space Y et no statical image is really

.
contained in the cognition o f time ; but t m i e i s e u

t i r e l y irreducible to any form of space :
The cogn itions o f time and space as lying deeper ,
th a n the postulates are discovered later ; they have

,
however been familiar from the rst a n d certainly ,

before the postulates if the present account o f them

,
is true There should be no confusion o n t h is point

. .
The knowledge o f time and space is coeva l with con

s c i o u s n e s s ; the knowledge that they are coeval with
consciousness is o f late growth The knowledge o f .
the postulates is later than the knowledge o f time and

space a n d depends upon it ; but the knowledge that
,
the postulates are necessary tr uths is prior t o the

knowledge o f the corresponding fa ct in the case of
time and space But the knowledge that the postu
.
lates are necessary truths does not depend upon the

knowledge that time and space are necessary truths ;
in fact it is known long before it in point o f time .
The earli est recognition o f a necessary truth as such ,
that is o f such and such a truth as necessary is the

, ,
recogni tion that the postul ates are such This was .
done satisfactorily rst by A ristotle ; while the cor

respondi n g recognition in the case o f time and space
i s due t o Kant . The knowledge therefore that time
, ,
and sp a ce are necessary truths is no causa c o gno,
scendi no reason for o ur recogn ising the postulates

,
as such ; that i s it affords no proof of the postulates

,
.
B ut o n the other hand the knowledge o f time and

space is the causa e s s e n d i e t e xi s t e n d i o f the know
ledge O f the postulates The existence o f t h e o n e
.
cognition is the cause o f the existence o f the other .
Unl ess we had the cognitions o f time and space we ,
could never have arrived at the cogni tion o f the pos

t ul a t e s . The existence o f consciousness in o n e mode
i s the cause o f the existence o f consciousness in the
other mode N either the knowledge that the postu
.
lates are true nor the knowledge that they are n e c e s

,
s a ri l
y and universally true depends ,
upon the kn ow
ledge that the cognitions of time a nd space a r e

necessarily true ; this would be t o make the former

depend o n the latter as their conditio c o gn o s c e ndi .
But they depend both o f them upon the knowledge

, ,
that the cogni tions o f time and space are true ; this
is to make them depend o n these cognitio ns as their
conditio e s s e n d i e t e x i s t e n di They depend upon a
.
knowledg e o f tim e and space but n o t upon a r e e c

,
tion o n that kn owledge T o make them depend upon

.
a reection o n that knowledge fo r instance upon the

, ,
reection that time and space are always true o r ,
necessarily true would be t o prove them by o r

, ,
deduce them from the knowledge o f tim e and space

, ,
as their causa c o gno s c e nd i instead o f an a l ysing them

,
into those cogni tions .

48 8 R A TI O S UF F I C I E NS .
formal element has been shown t o be res olvable into

the cognitions o f time and space It remains to Show .
the parallel circumstance with regard to the formal

element o f the R atio S uf c i e n s the principle of a o ,
u i s i t i v e reasoning and hypothetical and hypothetico

q
disjunctive syllogisms a task which as I have ,
said h a s already been virtually performed by Sir W

,
.
Hamilton Appendix I A D iscussions 2 d e di t pp

,
. .
, ,
. .
61 8 -
21 .
Like the postulates the law of ratio s uf c i e ns ,
cannot be expressed except in a shape includin g a .
mate ri al element that is empirically It must always

, ,
.
be expressed generally and representatively whether ,
it be as the ratio e x i s t e n d i o r the ratio c o gn o s c e n d i ,

.
The rst o f these for instance may be thus expressed

, ,
Whatever exists must have a cause nothing exists -
without a cause ; the second thus : Inf er not h i n g with

o ut a reason The words Whatever N othing and
.
, , ,
C ause mean any Object no obj ect and some object as

, , ,
cause N ow both the cause or ratio e x i s t e n d i and

.
, ,
the reason o r ratio c o gno sc e n d i in every particular

, ,
case must be given by actual experience subject to ,
the canon o f in duction The course Of nature is uni ,
form I t would be i mpossible to obey the law O f

.
ratio s uf c i e n s in either o f its bra n ches e x i s t e n d i o r

, ,
c o n o sc e nd i u nl ess the sequences and coexistences

g ,
among material objects were uni form ; we could never
sa
y that one particular object A was the cause o r , ,
the reason o f another particular object B unless they , ,
uniformly preceded a n d followed each other We .
should indeed be still compelled to look for an ante

cedent but w e should be condem n ed never to be
,
satised by nding the same consequent attached to

the same antecedent H e nce the law of ratio s uf .
RA TI O S UFF I C I E NS . 48 9
c i e ns has been sometimes expressed : E very thing

must have a cause o r a reason wh y it is a s it is and
, ,
not otherwise ; a formula which expresses the fact

that the law o f ratio s u i c i e n s is boun d up with and

,
refers t o the empirical law o f the uniformity o f the

,
course o f nature It expresses not only that every

.
object is bound t o some antecedent in fact or in ,
knowledge but a l so that it is bound t o some o n e o r

,
more particular and unvarying antecedents With .
this form o f the law o f ratio s u f c i e n s there fore i n , ,
a sm uc h a s it is the expression of the union of the two
elements formal and material we have nothing t o do

, ,
the present purpose being to analyse the formal ele

ment in as abstract a shape as possible .
E ven the simplest formula expressing the law of

ratio s uf c i e ns taken by itself and apart from the
,
law o f uniformity includes as has been seen a ma

, , ,
t e ri a l par t o r element just as the postulates do

,
We .
have then to analyse it farther just a s in the case of ,
the postulates and to s e e what the purely formal

,
e lement in it is apart from the matter o r Objects

,
which are involved in every expression o f it It h a s .
two branches ; it is both the ratio s uf c i e n s e x i s t e n di ,
and the ratio s uf c i e n s c o gno s c e ndi The principle .
o f both wi l l be found t o be the same ; but it will be
requisite rst to s e e what a r e the relations of these

two branches to each other o n e o f whi ch may be ,
called the C ause and the other the R eas on

,
.
The cause must always precede its e ff ect e m p i r i

cally in the order of history of objects a s objects of
,
consciousness i n time ; the reason must a l ways pre

'
cede its consequent empiric a l ly in the order o f cog ,
ni t i o n o r o f the history o f states o f consciousness in

, ,
time I will distinguish these t w o orders by calling

.
490 RA T I O S UF F I C I E NS .
the former historic a l the latter psychologic a l ; both

,
are equally objective to reection Any o n e of its .
causes o r e ffects historically Speaking may be the

, ,
reason for o ur inferring the existence o f an obj ect ; it

is psychologically o nl y that the knowledge o f the
reason must precede the knowledge of the cons o
quent Fo r instance when we s e e blackened ruins
.
, ,
we in fer that a building has been b urnt The burn .
ing of the building is historically earlier than the

existence o f the blackened ruins but p sy c h o l o gi ,
cally it is later If we are told that A is a great

.
man we infer that he will be honoured by pos

,
t e r i t y ; the cause historic a l ly being a l so the reason

psychologically and prior in both respects to the fact
,
inferred .
The cause o r causa e x i s t e ndi is entirely historical

, , ,
a n d must always precede its e ffect historically ; when
we s a y Whatever exists must have a cause we mean

, ,
to say that whatever exists must have some object

,
existing previously to it and that unless some obj ect , ,
had previously existed it co ul d not have come into ,
e xistence When empiric a l Observation has shown that

.
t w o Objects are i n variably link ed together in time o f ,
which o n e invariably precedes and the other invariably

follows ; and that the taking away o f the precedi ng
object without takin g away any other o f the a c c o m
,
panyin g phenomena involves the disappearance o f ,
the following object ; then we call the former the

cause a n d the latter the effect o ne o f the other The ,
.
cause however as exhibited in the ratio s ui c i e n s

,
alone is not a special and invariable antecedent o b

,
j ec t
,
but some antecedent Object no matter what ,
.
That some Object must precede objectively every

Object which can exist this i s the necessary truth ,
492 R AT I O S UF FI C I E NS .
sary o r the embodiment o f a necessary truth The

, .
second formula in each case is merely another ex

pression o f the l a w o f the uniformity Of t h e course
o f nature see n rst from the objective S ide then from
, ,
the subjective The two formulas the rst i n each

.
,
case differ from each other in noth ing but in the

,
point o f View being in the former historical in the ,
latter psychological ; the former declares how objects

must exist the latter how they must be known to
,
e xist ; the former declares how they are conn ected

with each other the latter how the consciousness o f
,
o n e is conn ected with the consciousness o f the other .
N ow in both cases in both modes o f connection we

, ,
have before us a provisional obj ect ; in the o ne the ,
objective aspect in the other the subjective aspect

, ,
o f phenomena . The connection in the rst case is

objective with abstraction o f the subjective side for
, ,
which reason it has been called historical ; the con

n e c t i o n in the second case is subjective with a b s t ra c ,
tion o f the objective side for which reason it has

,
been called psychological and not subj ective Both .
cases however are connections o f states o f conscious

, ,
ness both are subjective and objective at once This

,
.
connection common to the two cases which is at

, ,
once Objective and subjective and at once universal ,
and necessary is the cognition of time ; fo r besides

, ,
being universal and necessary it is nothing more ,
than the relation o f succession abstracted from any ,
content o r series o f succeeding objects It is t h e .
formal cognition o f ti me which forces us back in

every instance upon a previous condition o f existence
to that with which we begin whether it i s priority in
,
order o f thought o r in ord er o f nature whether the ,
previous condition is considered as adapted to cause

RA T I O S UF F I C IE NS . 4 93
a thought in us o r as adapted to cause an object

,
independent of us The same cognition o f time i n

.
volves also the necessity o f an e ffect for every cause ,
a s well as o f a cause for every e ff ect ; it extends for
wards into the future as well as backwards into the

past historically ; and psychologically every thought
, , ,
has consequences which must lead t o theories and

systems capable of inni te development This is the .
ground o f prediction o f the future from the past .
Whatever object whether Of objective o r subj ective

,
reference we take as o ur starting point we must go

, ,
backwards a parte ante in conceiving its causes or ,
its reasons and forwards a parte post in conceiving

, ,
its effects o r its consequences ; and in both cases i n

i n n i t u m . The result therefore o f the forego i ng
ana l ysis is that the cogni tion of time is the purely
,
formal and necessary principle involved in all the

shapes o f the ratio s uf c i e ns .
. 6 0 What has been called the causa e s s e n di or ,
formal cause is nothing else than the ana l ysis of an

,
obj ect in its rst intention When any Obj ect is so .
analysed then either o f its two aspects the thin g

, ,
dened a n d its denition may be call ed m e t a p h o ,
ri c a l l
y the form or causa e s s e nd i
,
o f the other or , ,
pari ratione the effect of the other ; or i t s parts o r

elements o f anal ysis may be metaphorically called
causes or e ffects of the whole o r reciproc a l ly causes ,
and e ffects o f each other within the whole M eta .
h o ri c a l l because both the aspects a n d all the parts

p y , ,
and elements are simultaneous and coexistent and

, ,
can only be called causes and e ff ects by an nuwar

ranted extension o f the relations subsisti ng be t ween
objects in their second intention o r between o ne O h ,
e c t and another in consciousness to cases where the

j ,
494 RATI O S UF FI C I E NS .
object is already assumed to be o n e single though ,
perhaps complex object in which neither aspect no

, , ,
part no el ement precedes another The term causa

, , .
tion is best restricted to express relations between

objects in time as precedi n g and succeeding M ake
, .
any o n e o f these aspects or parts o r elements an , , ,
object b y itself in a pro vi sional image and then y o u ,
can consider what causes or e ffects it has ; but what

ever is coextensive with i t in respect of time is not
its cause o r its effect but a co element or c o partner

- -
,
in the provisional object from which it is abstracted .
The causa e s s e n d i o r formal cause must be contain e d

, ,
in the obj ect o f which it is considered as the cause ;

but for this relation terms have been already pro
vi d ed ,
those o f denition aspect element a nd part
, , ,
in analysis Kant made reciprocity o f cause and

.
e ffect o n e of his categories which is the conception ,
o f two objects being reciprocally conditions o f each
other ; o f which the equality of mechanic al force i m

parted and lost o f action and reaction the diagonal
, ,
movement in the para l lelogram o f forces positive and ,
negative electricity would perhaps be among the

instances N ow if either of the two forces acting in
.
any o f these cases i s pri or in existence to the other ,
it may be considered as among the c a u s es e x i s t e n d i

o f the other ; but if they both begin to exist ex
a c tl
y at the same moment then I contend that it ,
is more reasonable to regard them as elements o r

component parts o f one phenomenon and not as ,
causes of that phenomenon or of each other O nl y ,

.
if an actu a l p riority Of existence is assumed o r d i s

covered can o n e of them be properly called cause ,
and the other e ffect .
6 1 Here is completed the analysis of the logical

.
49 6 R ATI O S UFF I C I E NS .
the coordinate of logic a l truth but at once its sourc e

,
and i t s eld By imagining it to be its coordinate we

.
imagine the possibility that one may transcend the

other If logical laws a re objects o f cognition at all
.
,
and yet not derived from time and space o n what ,
principle are we to justify their limitation in use to

objects within time and space ? We shall be i n e v i t
ably carried o n to the assertion o f an Absolute a ,
logical truth independent in some incomprehensible

,
way of a ll obj ects known o r knowable by us in time

,
and space and yet objectively existing The View

,
.
here taken o n the other hand introduces unity into all

the operations o f the mind and reduces o ur risk of
,
error by o n e important item the conict o f coordinate

,
tribun a l s.
The incongruousness o f such a system with its ,
double source o f truth intuition a l and logical and

, ,
its critical machinery for avoiding the consequences ,
seems to have struck the ontological successors o f

Kant F or just as in the case o f Aristotle m e t a p h y
.
, ,
s i c a l and ontological principles existed side by side
and contained the germs o f future systems of meta

physic and ontology and just as in his case the onto
, , ,
logic a l principles were rst seized o n and carried out

into systems by the philosophers o f Alexandria s o in ,
the Kritik der R ei nen V ernunft there lay thoughts ,
which might develop into ontologies side by side with ,
thoughts which were purely metaphysical ; and in

this case again the ontological side was rst seized and

developed Looking now at Kant s system o f philo
.
sophy as a whole it will be seen that the central

,
point of the whole is the transcendental unity o f a p

perception the Ich denke which accompani es and
, , ,
may be perceived t o accompany every moment of c o n ,

R A TI O S UF F I C IE NS . 497
s c i o us n e s s and makes it a S ingle moment C onfused .
impressions o f sense in time and space are the raw

matter into which this unity o f apperception is intro
d uc e d o r o n which it operates
,
Time and S pace are .
the forms o f all sensible impressions whether in con ,
fusion o r in or d er But h o w is or d er introduced into

.
them o r how are they cast into order ? The unit y o f

,
apperception combines them true ; but it may c o m ,
bine them without the leas t trace o f regularity o r

u ni formity The transcendental unity o f a p p e rc e p
.
tion would in this case be an unity o f apperception

, ,
o f the sensible impressions in time and space ; but
there would be no knowledge o f any thing for there ,
would be no uniformity The transcendental unity .
o f apperception works necessarily in the forms o f i n
tuition time and space ; they are properly its o w n

,
forms forms Of bringing sensible impressions int o

,
unity ; but they are not a s yet knowledge To p r o .
duce knowledge to form a regular world o r C osmos

,
o f sensible impressions in time and space the tran ,
s c e n d e n t a l unity of apperception according to Kant , ,
possesses and applies or rather operates in a n d by;

,
certain forms o f thought the C ategories which a r e , ,
modes o f unity modes o f the transcendental u ni ty o f

,
apperception itself ; and therefore in every step o f t h e

Operation there is an unity o f apperception but o ne ,
employed upon the sensible impressions and u pon ,
them in the other forms o f the transcendental unity

o f apperception the forms o f intuition combin ed with
,
the categories o r category used The transcendenta l .
u nity o f apperception has thus indeed two ki n ds Of
forms in which it operates those of intuition tim e , ,
and space and those of thought the categories ; but

, ,
neither the sensible impressions nor their forms Of i n

xx
498 RATI O S UF F I C I E NS .
tuition time and space a r e objects by themselve s

, , ,
until comb i ned by the unity o f apperception working

through some category or mode and as it were t in eke , , ,
-
x ;s fo of unity ; then rst arises objectivity or reality

o f obj ects This same unity of apperception also a c
.
companies the Idea o r R eason concept o f an absolut e

,
-
,
totality o f conditions No w the transcendental unity

. .
o f apperception is the principle o f reality and O b je c
t i v a t i o n of Objects as well as the pri nciple o f their

,
truth o r their ultimate test ; and in both characters

, , ,
is a principle o f reasoni ng and not a principle o f intui

tion Alle V erbindung ist eine V e r s t a n d e sh a n d l ung
.
,
says Kant in the 2 d e di tion o f his Kritik .

If now it was argued by Kan t s ontological s uc
,
c e s s o rs,
any forms and modes o f procedure can b e
found in this transcendental unity o f apperception ,
any forms o f thought any concepts these must con

, ,
tai n reality and truth itself for they are the source o f ,
it in experience ; and cannot be limited to matters

contained within the intuitional forms of that a p p e r
c e t i o n which are at best only its parti a l and preli
p ,
m i na r
y modes and rather
,
o ff er resistance to the un i
fy i ng principle the apperception than express it fully
, , .
The apperception is essentially u ni ty and unity is not ,
a principle o f i n tuition but of thought ; thought there ,
fore cannot be conned within time and space o r

, ,
limited to work onl y o n objects within those forms ,
o n pain o f losing its reality Whatever can com e .
forward in the unity o f apperception is real c o n s e ,
quently the K a n tian Idea o f an absolute totality is

real ; and this Idea it is which seems to have become ,
with Hegel the ab solute Begriff

, .
Some such reasoni ng as this I apprehend mus t , ,
have convinced those who were dissatised with t h e

5 00 R AT I O S UF F I C I E NS .
under the operations o f t h e pu re ego a method which ,
has issued in the logical ontology o f Hegel as its ,
most complete and satisfactory outcome This E ssay .
h a s taken the opposite mode o f lling up the gul f ,
and has attempted to reduce the forms o f thought to

those o f intuition ; thus restoring the unity o f c o n
s c i o u s n e s s as completely as the ontologists though ,
reversing their method ; and getting rid equally ,
with them o f a Thin g i n itself transcendent i n its

,
- -
nature and o f concepts which though they ought t o

, ,
be merely regulative o f the practical exercise o f

reason are constantly mistaken for Obj ects o f a p o s
,
s ible experience .
Whatever can be presented o r represented in t h e

forms o f time and space has a certain objectiv e ex
i st e nc e . To be able to present o r represent any
object to ourselves is to assert its existence n o t i t s ,
S O c a l led subjective existence only but its objectiv e

-
,
e x i s tence also ; for it is now suf ciently clear that ,
t h e popular u s e o f the words subjective and O b ,
j e c t i ve
,
as if they signied respectively unreal and
real ,
S ubjective existence meaning apparent and
possibly mistaken existence is unsound and must

,
be given up Hence its true meaning is given to t h e

.
doctrine o f D escartes that whatever he clearly and

,
distinctly c onceived existed ; that existence is not a

u a l ity o r attribute to be proved in addition to a con
q
c ept o r perceptio n but is involved in all clear con
,
c e t i o n s a l i ke
p What
. D escartes however applied , ,
especially to clear conceptions is true o f all ; their ,
conception includes existence and the only question ,
remaining i s whether that existence is permanent o r

,
transitory .
Both elds o f knowledge intuition and thought , ,

R A TI O S UFFI C I E NS . 5 01 ,
being thus reduced to o n e the remaining question is

,
CE VII
to distinguish apparent not from real but from true
. .
, ,
existence Whatever danger there is Of applying the

.
laws of logic to pretended Objects the same danger ,
exists o f applying the laws o f intuition to them This .
danger is real in both cases Its character is to i m .
agine in portions o f time and space a material con

, ,
tent which does not stand the test o f experience ;

which believed in once is found to vanish o n fur
, ,
ther investigation Truth has been dened to be

.
the agreement o f o ur imaginations perceptions o r , ,
thoughts with actual objects ; but according to the

,
distinction already drawn 4 2 it is properly

,
de ,
ned as the agreement O f o ur present with o ur future

perceptions when t h e most accurate and complete
,
investigation Shall have tested them E rroneous and .
true perceptions are equally obj ects o f consciousness ;

former and latter perceptions are so too ; the percep
tions which are t o agree with obj ects and those O h
je c t s with which they are to agree are equally s ub
je c t i ve The .former perceptions and the erroneo us

perceptions may be equally clear and equally distinct
with the true and the latter perceptions but they a re ,
not the less erroneous o n that acco unt C learness .
and distinctness in perceptions are not a test o f their

tru t h ; the most distinct and clear perceptions may
be changed by future enquiry and by newly Observed
facts The gures in a dream have often the greatest
.
Clearness and distinctness and are accompanied by

,
the strongest sense o f re a l ity But why do we call .
them unreal and untrue ? Solely because they will

n o t bear repeated investigation because though we , ,
can remember them o n waking with a s great clear

nes s a n d distinctness as other things yet we cannot ,
5 02 R A TI O S UFF I C I E NS .
mould them into a consistent whole along with the

other part icular circumstances which we know c c
existed with them the room we slept in and the ,
time o f o ur being asleep nor w ith the general tenor ,
o f experience which is a consistent whole of whi ch

,
they are an incongr uous portion .
It will be said perhaps h ere that whatever is ,
clearly and distinctly perceived is true s o far as it

goes and while it lasts ; and that the error lies in
drawin g inference s from our clear and distinct per
c e p t i o n s not in the perceptions themselves ; that we
,
infer from the Clearness and distinctness of the dream

perceptions that they will last and are independent
,
o f o ur will in fact that they are real ; and thus that

,
the error is o n e of inference not o f perception The ,

.
rst assertion I admit namely that the perceptions , ,
are true so far as they go and while they last ; not s o

the second namely that the sense o f independence
, ,
and reality in the dream gur e s is not a perception -
but an inference P roperly S peaking we do not infer

.
at all in dreaming ; we exercise no vol untary but ,
spo ntaneous redintegration ; we do not s a y to o ur

,
selves These gures are real and independent o f o ur

selves but we never doubt it and therefore c a i m o t
, , ,
reas on about it But we s e e them move without

.
o u r suggestion hear them S peak without our s ug

,
gestion feel them touch ( not Violently for that

, ,
wou ld probably imply wa k ing ) without o ur s ugge s

tion ; and this is to perceive the independent and
real The dream gur e s then are objects o f per
.
-
, ,
c e t i o n; clear di stinct and true far as they

p ,
s o , ,
go and while they last But is this what we mean .
by Truth ? However certain we may feel of any

thing for the present there is no ground in this ,
5 04 R A TI O S UFF I C I E NS .
o n their probation E very one seeks f o r a test Of

.
truth whether in a principle o r in a system It can

, ,
.
be found however nowhere but in continued investi

a t i o n ; that is to s a it is n o t found in any com
g y ,
p l e t e d investigation .Y et here the rule o f practice
is to adopt a principle o r a system as a limit o f

e nquiry a terminu s a quo and ad quem and t o
, ,
work from it and live by it as if it were true It i s .
the same process as that which formed the remote

o u t o f the immediate Object and the concept out o f
,
the remote obj ect . The will says Here we tak e

o ur stand The result o f metaphysical enquiry
.
,
j ust as that o f practical experience shows us that ,
there is no absol ute o r ultimate empirical truth ,
but every where relative and approximate truth It .
is an inexible law o f c o nsciousness N ihil a b s o

luti .
Hence too arises the justication o f the right ,
which every generation o f men exercises to pass ,
judgment o n the conceptions o f all preceding gene

rations and to reverse o r conrm their decisions ;
,
while future generations in their turn will we igh

, ,
with truer insight this verdict itself Fo r a s indi .
v i d u a l s increase in knowledge s o also does the race ;

,
a n d though some generations may be more ignorant
than some that have preceded them yet some ther e ,
must arise which will be wiser It is n o t the mer e .
fact o f being later in time that makes o n e judgment

truer than a nother but the fact o f its bei ng t h e
,
re sult o f a more complete investigation of which ,
posteriority in time is o n e condition It has been .
said that man never possesses but always anticipat e s

happiness ; and s o it may be said o f truth that a s ,
truth it i s never present It i s the thought Of y e s

.
RA TI O S UFF I C I E NS . 5 05
t e rd a which we address as truth the thought o f

y ;
to day which warrants that o f yesterday needs itself
-
, ,
the warranty o f to morrow -

.
I t must not be concealed but freely confessed

that in giving up all notion o f an Absolute and o f
,
ontology and in falling back on a metaphysic

,
which is a mere analysis o f the ultimate elements in

empirical experience all hope is renounced o f solvin g ,
that problem which has been the aim conceived more ,
o r less distinctly and more o r less excl usively o f

, ,
all philosophers from the earliest times to Hegel ; a

problem which may be thus expressed t o nd the ,
ground rst o f there being an existence at all and

, , ,
s econdly o f this existence being such as we perceive

,

it Hegel s solution o f these problems is probably
.
the most complete that has ever been proposed .
But not only are all complete ontologies here aban

doued Hegel s among the rest but also all o nt o l o gi
, ,
cal portions in systems which otherwise are purely

metaphysical Kant does not see m clearly to hav e
.
drawn the distinction between metaphysic and onto

logy and the Kritik contains both elements He
,
.
does not indeed like Hegel profess t o account for

, ,
the existence o f impressions of sense generally ; but

he does profess to account for the order o f those
impressions that is for there being stability o f na
, ,
ture and uniformity in the course o f nature ; and t o

that extent the K ritik is an ontology The tran .
s c e n d e n t a l deduction of the categories is an account of
the origin o f what I c a ll the stability and uniformity

o f nature o f the synthetic unity o f all phenomena
, .
E s ist also der V erstand nicht blos ein V e r m Oge n ,
durch V ergleichung der E rscheinungen S ich R egel n

z u machen : er ist selbst di e G esetzgebung fur d i e
5 06 R ATI O S UFF I CI E NS .
N atur d i ohne V erstand wurde es u b e ra l l nicht

,
. .
N atur d i synthetische E inheit des M ann igfaltigen

,
. .
der E rscheinungen nach R egeln geben Werke .

,
ed R os u Sch v o l 2 p I I 3 And agai n he says

. . . . .
,
. .
,
page 1 1 4 der V erstand ist selbst der Q uell der

,
G esetze der N atur und mithin der formalen E inheit

,
der N atur .

N ow the expressions stability and uniformity of

nature have two senses o n e in which they have , ,
been employed in C hapter V I and elsewhere in this .
E ssay namely the sameness Obtaini ng between i m

, ,
mediate o r remote objects of consciousness and the ,
sameness obtaini ng between the s equences o f such

immediate or remote obj ects ; and the other in which ,
they express the conn ection of feeli ngs as elements

o f obj ects with certai n portions o f time and g ures o f
space as their formal element it being an universal ,
and necessary c i rcumstance that feelings can exist

only in some such portions of time and space Ther e .
is no state o f consciousness in which stability and

uniformi ty in this second sense do not pervade the
, ,
obj ect o f consciousness ; but such stabili ty and

formity must be conceived as coexistent and coev al
with consciousness itself In the complex empirical .
fact of fee l ings being given to us in consciousness we

h ave the fact of their orderly arrangement each feel ,
ing as an unity in time and space by contrast with

different feelings given also ; and it is impossible to
,
conceive o r imagine feelings existing otherwise The .
stability and uniformity of n ature in this sense is part

o f the ultimate phenomenon o f experience to be ana
lysed ; and in this sense too it is the ground o f the ;
stability and uniformity in the rst sense namely , ,
that between complete objects i n nature ; o f which no

5 08 RA TI O S UFF I C I E NS .
in time and spac e certainly but all in confusion and ,
without any particular duration o r gure whatever ,
in V erw irrung with a total absence o f form In the

,
.
s econd e di tion o f t h e Kritik where he gave a new ,
s hape to t h e transcendental deduction o f the C ate
g o r i e s ( Supplement x 1 v Werke v o l 2 R. o s e nk u ,
. . . .
Schub . he begins by stating this somewhat

e xplicitly D as M annigfaltige der V orstellungen
.
kann in einer Anschauung gegeben werden di e ,
blos sinnl ich d i nichts als E m p fa ngl i c h ke i t i s t

,
. .
,
Sep arating t h e elements o f phenomena from each

o ther by reference to the supposed sources from
which they owed o r were produced in conscious
ness the senses and understanding he imagined them
, ,
a s capable o f existin g separately from each other ,
inasmuch as their supposed sources o r faculties o f

t h e mind were imagined separate N ow if a tota l .
a bsence o f form could be imagined o r conceived then ,
the arising o f form would demand an explanation an ,
o rigin o r cause o f it t o be pointed o u t But if this .
can not be done as it cannot then all that remains

, ,
fo r us is to analyse the phenomenon into its material

and formal elements This analy sis has been shown
.
to be the ultimate step which human knowledge can

take and consequently it has been shown that all
,
o ntology o r knowledge o f an absolute is beyon d o u r
reach A t the same time since this also shows that

.
,
e xistence and consciousness are coextensive it is plain ,
that an absolute does n o t exist O ur knowledge is .
e xtended in the very fact o f its being limited ; and
this reection must b e o ur r e compense for the limi

tatio n .
C H A P T E R V III .
RE AS O N .
Q Q g 0 0
Ov v a
A
Ka t 6 6 a v ro v 7 07 6
'
a v ro s

va t
'
V O Gt V .
Ari sto tl e .
63 . THE
foregoing account o f the functions o f t h e
mind so far as it is a cognitive power is a complete
o ne ; there is no function which is not capable o f
being brought under its description and there is no ,
part of knowledge which can be reached by any track

o r means exclusive o f those already described The .
essential unity o f the functions known as perception

and u nderstanding h a s been shown But a further .
distinction is Often made between understanding and

R eason o n which it may be desirable to say a few
,
words especially as the distinction as a difference in

, ,
kind comes recommended to E nglishmen by the

,
honoured name o f C oleridge The real difference .
between them appears t o me to be o n e o f degree ,
expressed by o r consistin g in the fact that the object ,
o n which they are employed assumes a new aspect ,
when the higher degree has been reached Pheno .
mena assume the character o f objects in presence o f

a Subject or what is the same thing the character
, , ,
o f being objective and subjective ; the former if we ,
regard the development of the phenomena themselves ,
the latter if we regard them as the Object o f o ur o wn

,
510 R E AS O N .
reection ; the former from the point of View o f ex

,
i s t e n c e the latter from that o f consciousness

, ,
The .
presence o f a new class of cognitions not any differ

re e cti n
o .
,
ence in the cognitive function itself is the ground of ,
making the distinction certai n ly a very important and

,
fundamental one between the two functions o f con

,
s c i o u s n e s s understanding and reason

,
.
R eection on itself i s the distinguishing charac

t e ri s t i c o f a stage o r mode o f consciousness nex t
above understandi ng in complexity and this is t h e ,
last stage o f development O f which consciousness has

hitherto been capable C onsciousness rst under
.
stands Objects that is phenomena are rst a colle e

, ,
tion o f feelin gs o r matt er indifferently in time and

space ; then it reects on itself or wha t is the sam e , ,
thing o n the phenomena and distinguish es feeling

, ,
generally from particular feelings and these from ,
qualities ; and since the disti nction between Objects

and Subj ect thus drawn is exhaustive so far as w e ,
can s e e the decision of reection o n any question is

,
nal and irreversible except by a further exercise o f

,
reection ; s o that reection is the nal arbiter o f

truth In this way consciousness shows us its own
.
poverty and weakness as well as its own strength and

,
dignity ; it destroys illusions by creating them for it ,
gives u s truths secured from doubt in exchange for

notions which had not before been doubted It de .
stroys the appearance of certainty which before a t

t a c h e d to o u r cognitions it exhibits the inevitabl e
nature o f error in exhibiting the necessity o f progress
,
towards truth A new light dawns with reection

.
,
in which we see ourselves as we are ; from the natur e

there exhibited there is no escape fr om the decision ,
o f reection there is n o appeal R eason is our being ;

.
5 12 R E A S ON .
standing that this involves comparison in a greater

degree may when compared with its second stage
, , ,
be called intuition o r self consciousness It is only

-
.
by what they are predominantly not by what they ,
are solely that actions o r states o f consciousness a r e

,
called perc eption intuition understanding reection

, , , ,
and reason .
Self consciousness which is the rst o r intuitiv e

-
,
stage o f reection distinguishes the pure ego o r Sub

,
c t from its objects distinguishes the binding thread

j e ,
o f feeling common to all the changing feelings which

,
it binds together into the empirical ego It is this .
pure thread o f feeling which is the object o f self consci -
o us n e s s
. Its peculiarity is that it cann ot be made
,
an object by itself ; it is always involved in Objects as

their unity it is that which feels and perceives them
, ,
o r that in which they are subjective The act o r m o .
me nt o f perceiving that there is such a binding thread

o f feeling is called apperception the Ich denk e o f ,
Kan t ; and this must be combined with other percep

tions o r thoughts The Subject is abstract feeling ;
.
and like other abst ractions cannot be exhibited except

in a provisional form That this abstraction is abstract
.
consciousness itself is what makes it appear more m y s

t e ri o u s than other abstract notions Thus it is that .
the Subj ect cannot be an object by itself but onl y as ,

the subjective aspect o f o t h e r objects To have the .
Subj ect fo r an object is the same thing as to have t h e

distinction between the subjective and Obj ective as
pe e ts o f phenomena for an Object o r to have as an ,
obj ect obj ects as the correlate o f consciousness o r ,
consciousness as the correlate o f objects Th is act .
o r moment whether separate o r in combination with

, ,
others as apperception i s called s elf consciousness

, .
RE A S O N . 5 13
Those acts o r moments with which it is combin ed o r ,
which contain it are called R eason when they are

,
predominantly acts of comparison o r understanding .
6 4 A s the Subj ect o r p u re ego but a l ways as

.
,
involved in the empirical ego is the object o f self ,
consciousness s o the empirical e go is the obj ect o f

,
reason o r reection in its discursive stage It is the

,
.
object which reection creates ; for reection is t h e

perception that all Obj ects are subjective in other ,
words that the empirical ego is the complex o f all

,
the states o r actions or modes o f consciousness bound

together by the Subj ect Ha m . : 0v 07 2 7 02 7
Wgo fw oc r
h ocsays P roclus Inst Theol I 9 5 In reality
, ,
. . .
this is only a completion o f the process which self con -
s c i o u s n e s s began ; self consciousness took the rst

step towards making the phenomenal world objective
and subjective reason makes the whole o f it in detail
,
so,
and calls it the empirical ego ; ( historically indee d
the process has been gradual S ince the empirical e go ,
has been long regarded as an Obj ect among objects

and it calls by the name o f the empirical ego what
ever phenomena o r classes o f phenomena it has from
time to ti me made subjective and ultimately embrace s
,
under that name the whole objective world ; for t h e

world o f any individual consciousness is the complex
o f the states o f consciousness which it includes in
present past and future time

, ,
.
The Subject is the object o f self consciousness -
the empirical ego is the obj ect of reason ; the former

expresses the distinction between the objective and
subj ective aspects o f phenomena in its abstraction the ,
latter expresses the same distinction in its complete ,
empirical complex development In examining and

,
.
dealing with the empirical ego reason is dealing with ,
LL
5 14 R E A S ON .
phenomena in both aspects at once obj ective and sub , ,
e c t i v e and has the two correlates present in a single

j ,
o bject R eason distinguishes the two aspects of things

.
,
makes abstraction of the objective aspect and consti ,
t u t e s the subjective as p ect alone its o w n Object ; where

as t h e understanding in dealing with the same pheno
mena the moments o f the empirical ego treats them
, ,
a s objects external to itself either from not having ,
d rawn the distinction o r if it has been draw n by the

, ,
r eason ,
by abstracting from the subjective aspect .
The understanding for instance does not reect that

, , ,
i n voluntary redintegration its own volition deter ,
mines what Objects or parts of objects shall be ex

a m i n e d but seems to be guided by the objects them
,
selves alone I t i s reasonwhich makes this discovery

.
,
in e x a m m m g the connection between its states o f con

s c i o us n e s s as such .In voluntary redintegration as ,
performed by the understanding the shapes which ,
t h e objects assume appear to be forms o f the Objects

a lone to b e discovered in the obj ects by the under
,
s tanding ; r e ason traces the subjective conditions o f
t h e arising o f those forms and sees t hat they are e u

,
t i r e l y products o f previous states o f co ns ciousness .
Both the voluntary and spontaneous processes of con

s c i o u s n e s s are the Objects o f the reason and reason ,
herself works by means o f th at is is a mode of v o l un

, ,
tary redintegration
The operations o f reason are n o t lim i ted to this
s ingle reection ,
that all things are subjective o r ,
modes of consciousness though th is reection aecom

,
a ni e s all its O perations and distinguishes them from

p ,
the Operations of the understanding All the opera .
tions o f the reason deal wi t h the empirical ego as their

object ; they reason about it and i ntroduce further
516 R E A S ON .
but in both cases reason is dealing with the empirical

ego and remodelling it making so far as possible a
,
new man in place of the O l d It is the will that is .
a ctive here ,
rejecting the false and bad and remo '
delling the empirical ego ; reason is a mode o f v o l un

tary and not o f spontaneous redintegration .
Besides rej ecting some states o f the empirical ego ,
reason also brings other states into new prominence

thos e namely which are true and those which a r e
good a n d these reason seeks to impress upon con
,
s c i o u sn e s s
,
and to bind up with it by remembrance
and repetition In s o doing it prod uces ideas that
.
,
is images which contain an assumed or anticipated

,
innity o r perfection for an object is perfect when

,
considered as developed in its n a ture in innite time .
The ideas which will be chiey considered in the fol

lowin g chapter are products o f reason ; though it is
clear that there may be ideas of concepts of the u n
d e rs t a n d i ng as for instance the perfect circle and
, ,
the perfect globe and time and space considered a s

, ,
innite are ideas

,
.
The new self which is thus distinguished from

and educed o ut of the empirical e go by reason has
not as yet received any name ; but it may properly
be called the True E go in distinction from the em,
i r i c a l and the pure It is by this true ego that we

p . .
pass moral judgments on the man as distinguished ,
from his conduct A ccording as this true ego a p

.
r o a c h e s o u r standard of truth and goodness and

p ,
also according to the degree Of stedfastness and clear

ness with which a man cleaves to it and imprints it
o n his consciousness that is according to his e n
, ,
l i gh t e nm e nt and to his will to act u p to his light w e ,
judge the man to be good o r bad R eason i s t h e .

REA S ON . 5 17
mode of consciousness to which ethic belongs there

is no ethical science apart from reason Technic .
there may be but n o t ethic o r practical science in

, ,
its highest branch All ultimate ends must be given

.
by reason and not by understanding If we could

, .
discover what were the tru t hs and what the objects

which the reason o f all men when most developed
would include in the tr ue ego we should know what ,
the perfect life consisted in ; and if we could appeal

to any o n e o r more objects o r states o f consciousness
as irreversibly and ineradicably best and truest for
every individual consciousness as the same objects ,
a r e for o u r o w n we should know what w a s the s u

,
preme happiness and the supreme d uty o f all men ,
as we now know what is the supreme happiness and

s upreme d uty for ourselves individually And this .
would be the principle o r system o f principles o f ethi

cal science holding the same place in ethic with r e
, ,
gard to universal applicabili ty and certainty that tim e ,
and space hold in speculative philosophy There is .
however this difference namely that the cognitions

, ,
o f reason both principles and details both general

, ,
and particular cognitions are the fruit o f the exercis e

,
o f consciousness while the cognitions of time and

,
space are the elements o f every exercise o f it ; t h e

former are produced as a tree produces its frui ts a s ,
a consequence and result of its development .
The true ego thus contains less than the e m p i ri

cal but what it contains is o f greater value and
,
dignity What once was truth is no w rejected as

.
error 7000? 7 02g

,
0 0
5 21 Em oa 25 677 7 011 3
5 1
}
'
and wha t
o nce was good is now rej ected as bad R eason trans .
forms what once was true and good into untrue and
bad and the will rej ects them from the true into t h e
,
518 RE A SO N .
empirical ego R eason is the ultimate judge o f tr uth

.
and goodness and what it declares t o be such is such

, ,
just as what the eye declares to be red is red In .
both cases presence in consciousness is existence and ,
existence is presence in consciousness ; There is no

thin g absolute in this o r in any mode o f conscious
ness when the reason i s employed in j udgin g of t h e
good and bad it is called conscience ; conscience i s
,
its name in this part o f its function ; but there is n o

distinct name for its function o f j udging between
truth and error ; for this the common name R eason
i s employed .
The View o f reason here taken is opposed to a l l

such Views as would make it consist in the logical
principle of unity a principle compelling us to unify
,
all o ur conceptions leading with Kant up to t h e

.
, , ,
three Ideas o f the P ure R eason G od the World and , , ,
the Soul This unication is suf ciently provided

.
for by the principle o f P arcimony and the facts o n ,
which it rests It is opposed also to such Views a s

.
those which deduce it from the power of making

abstract conceptions o r o f drawing conc lusions from
,
them ; these are functions o f the understanding and ,
as Such are possessed in a low degree by many a ni

mals besides man N or again is it the moral or
.
emotional importance o f certain reections nor t h e ,
perception O f a moral value in certain tr uths nor a ,
reference o f knowledge to action or o f action t o ,
moral ends which constitutes reason ; although it is

,
true as has been shown above that reason is t h e

, ,
source o f morality and ethical science and that there ,
fore there is a close connection between them ; fo r

reason is speculative as well as practical and both of ,
these at once ; and this character it shares with other

5 20 R E A S ON .
In the exercise and no t t h e bare possessi on o f

reason lies the dignity o f man in the expansion o f
his faculties in the operations performed by his

,
reason and not in the single reection which a o

,
companies them and conditions them The percep .
tion that representations are as such obj ective and

, , ,
that they can be recalled and banished by volition is ,
perhaps the rst step in the exercise of the discursive

stage of reection O ther animals certainly have trains
.
o f redintegration both voluntary and spontaneous ;

,
but there is no evidence to show that they have dis

t i ngu i s h e d representations from presentations and ,
found o n e subj ective the other objective ; o r that they

,
have found representations objective o r lastly have

found presentations subj ective ; in other words that ,
they have reected o n their relation to the world

about them ; though they may have drawn the primary
distinction between extended matter and feeling and ,
represented the latter by a rudimentary language .
.6 5 Since metaphysic itself is an operation o r ,
a particular application o f the Reason it may perhaps

, ,
not b e considered o u t o f place here to take a brief

retrospect o f the course which the human mind has
followed in reectin g o n o r applying reason to t h e
, ,
phenomena o f experien c e in their most general aspect ,
that is Of the course of metaphysical philosophy from

, ,
an early epoch to the present d a y ; sometimes ex

h i b i t i ng and always bearing in mind the distinction
o f metaphysical from ontological spec ul ative from
,
practical and direct from reective theories Thos e

,
.
which are at once purely reective S peculative and , ,
metaphysical will be found to make but a very small

portion o f what is commonly included in the history
o f philosophy O ur present point o f View the position
.
,
RE AS O N . 5 21
occupied in this E ssay will o f course be the clue

,
adopted to guide us in this retrosp ect ; and I shal l

not attempt to do more than indicate the most salient
a n d cardinal points without attempting any thing like
,
an outline o f the whole history o f philosophy .
The philosophical system o f P lato was the care Pl t

a o .
fully and critically elaborated result o f a study o f t h e

theories o f previous philosophers among whom per ,
haps P armenides h a d and deservedly the greatest

, ,
in uence He included in his survey all branches o f

.
human kno wledge as they then existed and conceived ,
more perfectly than any o f his predecessors a system

more universal than any o f theirs and turning o n ,
disti nctions more subtil and more central This s y s .
tem was the D ialectic t h e Theory o f the E B77 I t

,
.
has been often described by historians o f philosophy ,
and its chief features and their concatenation e x h i

bited I shall conne myself to S howing what it was
.
from the point o f Vie w o f this E ssay It was a system .
at once o f logic and o f existence both logical and ,
o ntological in which both elements existed mutuall y

,
involved and undistinguished from each other Logic .
and metaphysic were both o n e with P lato his forms ,
Of thought the 5 2077 were forms o f obj ects ; they wer e

, ,
the former o r logical because they were the latter

, , ,
o r forms Of things o r existences 005 7 02 7 02 677 00 He .

,
di d not take general notions as logical forms ; and

then attribu t e to them a real and separate existence ;
but he had not gone s o far as to distinguish logical
notions from real . G eneral notions were n o t with
him the means o f investigation or rather they were
,
s o only because and s o far as they were the objects

, ,
Of investigation G eneral notions as w e c a l l them

.
, ,
were the only real existences and there was a har

,
5 22 REA S O N .
ni o n i s e d or organic world o f g eneral notions in and

behind the particular notions o r 001073 777 02 Instances .
o f these are the following three pairs as they a r e
exhibited in the Sophistes

0p } B 7 B ing nd N t b ing
m y e a o -
e .
Oi / r S
n l na v nd D iff n am e ess a e re ce .
i 7 R t nd M t i n
x i / 1 0 09 es a o o .
E a ch o f these s i x 0287; had a double sense according ,
as it was used in what may now be properly called i t s

rst or its second intention ; 7 31 607 1 7 00(0 21 005 7 0090003 0 1 !
0 1
00157 00 7 0
,
0BE 7 5 0g 0070077 00 5032A y eo S o u Sophistes Steph
1
'
.
,
.
In the rst intention they were 7 000 73 0 3 9

2
55 .
{ 007 00

00M 777xo z g
Mgf 1 003 00
/ 1 In the
0. second intention they wer e
7 0 0 S Ao w a 50701 737 01 ; Mfg1 003 001 id 2 5 6

1 It would
/ 2 . . .
appear that all general terms o r 22877 were to be con

s i d e r e d in the same way and were o f the same natur e ,
as these s i x And the se would constitute togethe r

.

70 6 37 ; 31 when used in their rst intention o r a s
0 01 2
,
categories O bj ects o f sense which fell under a general

.
term in its rst intention would be that general term

in its second intention and would be said to share in ,
it,
as their i B a F or instance in the case o f
.
,
objects diff erent from each other P lato says 210 300007 00 ,
7 5
0 0 3 7 5 01)
5 i
a m : 31 O
7 0 Z AAGUV, f 81 007 731)
o ) 5
00 7 05 0
5 5 0 711
,
01 00 7 6 7 i h a
7 7; g 7 77; 3 007 0
5 00 . N o particular
Obj ect o f perception 0013 8 777 61 but only these general
,
1
,
notions themsel ves would have a rst intention that

, ,
is would be real existenc e s ; particular objects of

,
perception would be as it were receptacles of t h e

second intent ions of various general notions o r 27077 , ,
like con verging rays from various luminaries meeting

i n many different foci Thus rst intentions which .
,
belonged only to general notions o r 07007 were t h e , ,
R eal E xistence Of P lato O bjects which were t h e .

'
5 24 R E AS ON .
intention it has no predicates and is pure nothing It

,
.
is impossible however here to enter farther o n the

vexed question o f the interpretation o f this dialogue .

All that I wish farther to Show is that P lato s supreme ,
07200 the 7 0 2
,
7 like the 02271 which have their being

from it is a notion drawn from intuition and not from

,
logic P lato had a visual image before him in naming

.

7 0 2 7 as we should naturally suppose of ourselves and ,
,
as is evident from what Aristotle says in his account

o f P lato s theory in M etaph Book I chap 6 namely . . .
, ,
that P lato made 7 0 2 the or 7 0 7 0 7 7 0 7 007 of a

7 7 0
5 7 77 and that this 37 77 was a 25 000 consisting o f 7 0

1 1
, ,
and 7 6 a m p fly words which plainly have a Visual s i g

,
ni c atio n .

P lato s D ialectic therefore was a logic but it was ,
an intuitional logic ; it s a w the general notion as ex

i s t i n g in and behind the particulars It never occurred .
to P lato that the truths which he reached by reason

ing were less real than the Obj ects which he started
from to reach them that by reasoning he could p o s
,
si b l have objects presented in a less real o r tru e

y
shape than before he began to reason ; the new world
discovered by reasoning was the real and the tru e
world which he had attained s o and s o far to see
,
.
P lato left philosophy as a system o f absolute n e c e s

sary truth ; all error attached to the individual merely ,
and to him only s o far as he did not reason ; the true

essences were existing it only nee d ed to s e e them ,
.
If others did not s e e them as he did it was becaus e ,
they did not reason at all not because they reasoned ,
wrongly ; because they remained i n the 00203 777 02 and

did not s e e the 21277 ; for to s e e the 0720 was to reason ,
and nothing else but seeing the 07277 was reasoning .
IVh a t e v e r was merely subjective wa s eeting and

RE A S O N . 5 25
false ; whatever was true was obj ectively existing and

eternal ; it was found to be true only because it existed .
There was no doubt a great and fundamental dif

ference O f character between A ristotle and P lato a ,
difference which is seen reappearing in numerous

cases o f ph ilosophers s o that it has been said that
,
every man is born either P latonist o r A ristotelian .
But this at least is certain to me o n the other hand ,
that had P lato lived when A ristotle did instead o f in

,
his own day and had he then found philosophy ex

,
i s t i ng as he left it himself had he instead o f A ris , ,
t o t l e been the pupil o f a man who held his o w n phi

,
l O S O p h y in that stage which it had reached when

A ristotle was his pupil he would have taken the ,
very step which A ristotle took and introduced the ,
very same development That step consisted in .

transforming the 7 0 51 7 ; 31 into the 7 8 31 75 31 In
1 0
0 1 7.
that little phrase lies hid the separation o f ontology

and metaphysic taken together from logic Logic
, ,
.
becomes volitional and as a consequence knowledge , ,
becomes relative to different individu a l s M any men .
may reason though they do n o t reason alike o r to the

,
same result E very object says A ristotle has many

.
, ,
aspects some o r all o f the ten categories ; seize on

,
any o ne o r mo re o f these and hold it fast ; if y o u

take the rst category that o f 05 0700 you then con , ,

sider the obj ect f 31 if the second that o f 77 0007 y o u

1
, , ,
then consider the obj ect 7? 7 0067 7 1 N ow it is true 7 .
that all these aspects are really existent in the Object

but then each o f them is not like P lato s truth the
o n e thin g to be seen but o n e thing a mong many to
,
be seen A guide to truth is therefore needed some

.
,
criterion to tell us which of these aspects we are to

see
. A man seizing o n o ne o f them reasons just as
5 26 R E A S ON .
much as a man seiz ing o n another of them ; the ques

tion is whether he reasons equally to the purpose
, ,
that is to his own purpose the object which he has

, ,
chosen to exami ne Hence arose a separation of the

.
laws and method of reasoning which were common to

all enquirers whatever aspect o f things or whatever
,
purpose they had in view from the laws and forms of ,
each separate class of phenomena Ther e arose thus .
two classes o f general notions o n e abstracted from ,
objects the categories which was a cl a ssication o f

, ,
objects o n the principle of the elements or qualities

found by analysis in all obj ects ; the other which
,
was the result of a comparison of these categories

with each other and especially o f the contrast b e
,
tween the rst of them with the other ni ne

, ,
the logical categories as they may be called ggo g , , ,
78001 7 0 1 00 and 00 0 8 5 07060 o r as P orphyry gives them

1
,
1
, 51 5 , , ,
1 20302
2 300 51 004,
and 014048 5 5 77706; O n the r e
,
lation between these two classes the categories o f ,
existence and of logic the categories and the predi ,
cables see Topica Book I cap 7 The predicables

, ,
. . .
together with the postulates which latter P lato also ,
states and appeals to make a kind o f machinery o ut,
side of Obj ects to be employed in sift ing them a bat

, ,
t e ry to be worked ab extra The importance o f this .
step taken by Aristotle was that a clas s o f objects , ,
these general logic a l notions was found which clearly , ,
owed its orig i n to voli tion w a s an arti cial creation ,
o f the mind and yet was o f equal certainty with the

,
Objects o n which it was employed .
The separation wrought by Ar istotle was essen

t i a l l y a further separation o f the subjective point o f
View from the obj ective ; for it sep a rated what was
volitional in the search after truth from what was
5 28 R E AS ON .
another which investigated 7 6 61 77 01 which we have

,
1
7 31
1
,
in the treatise now known as the M 07 02 7 02 0001 7 02; a 0
treatise which t hough it bears every mark o f Aris

,

t o t l e s intellect yet cannot be supposed to have r e
,
c e i v e d its nal shape from him ; the result of which

was an 060 00 in all respects like 7 02 7 03 6700 07 00 com
1 0 0
,
l e t e o r empirical objects really existing except that

p ,
it was eternal innite and immaterial, ,

.
Here the progress o f speculative metaphysic w a s

checked for many centuries U ntil D escartes no o n e .
,
arose capable of carrying o n the development of me

t a p h y s i c from the point where A ristotle left it o f ,
proceeding to the separation o f ontology from meta

physic and educing reection o ut of direct under
,
standing NO o n e again occupied the same central

.
and commanding position occupied by the masters

o f those who know The remaining schools of phi
.
l O S O p h y in G reece were all schools of practical philo

sophy Stoic E picurean Cyni c Cyrenaic the A c a d e
, , , , ,
mies and the Sceptics ; they were not exclusively

,
indeed but pri marily and pred o minantly practical ;

speculative knowledge was n o t their chief purpose ,
but onl y S O far as it was requisite to give a p h i l o s o

h i c a l and consist ent basis to their pr a ctical theories
p .
A t Alexandria arose a school which was indeed ,
purely speculative the N eo P latonists of whom t h e

,
-
,
greatest known to us are P lotinus and P roclus But .
these were not distinctively metaphysicians but onto

l o gi s t s ; the O n e Supreme E xistence 7 069 008 01 was ,
1 1
,
their object ; to be reached either by int ui tion o r

dialectic They abandoned the position occupied by
.
Aristotle from which an advance was still possibl e

,
by further distinction o f the processes Of thought and ,
str uck into o n e o f the paths the ontological to which , ,

RE AS ON . 5 29
they mad e metaphysic Subordinate instead o f re ,
n o un c i ng the path o f ontology o r advanc i n g in both
with equal steps They stood to Aristotle in a very

.
s imilar relation t o that in which F i c h t e Schelling and , ,
Hegel stand to Kant Plato had no t separated meta .
physic from ontology ; Aristotle in separating logic , ,
had begun but had not completed that separation .
P lotinus and P roclus took their stand o n P latonism ,
which they developed with the aid o f the additional

light derived from Aristotle and thus bound up me ,
t a p h y s i c with ontology mor e closely than before In .
many shapes they kept repeating indee d the c o n c ep

tion o f P armenides ,

3 611 6 60 7 2 11 0 6 711
7 10 1 7 7 6 x0 2 0 1711 6 106 11 60 7 0
but it remained with them a paradox equally a s w i t h .
him for they did n o t make it clear in what way this

,
unity o f thought and fact was to be understood T h e )

.
li ght which was ultimately t o b e thrown upon t h e

paradox and exhibit it as a truth came from another
source and from facts of a di fferent order from thos e
,
with which philosophers were at that time engaged .
These new facts the importance o f which to phi

,
l o s o p h y was in the end s o great were t h e religious ,
emotions facts o r phenomena in the nature and h i s

,
tory o f consciousness the delight felt in worshipping

, ,
o beying and loving G od as a F ather who knew and

,
loved his children Such feelings had long been fa

.
m i liar to the Hebrew race which may be regarded ,
a s the home o f emotional as G reece o f intellectual , ,
philosophy The great writers o f the Hebrew Scrip

.
tures al o ne had adequately expressed the deep r e l i gi

o u s emotions o f the heart of man ; and these summed ,
up as they were into o ne pure religion by C hrist ,
wer e n o w communicated and took root in nations till

5 30 RE A S O N .
then familiar only with Grecian culture The effect

VIII
.
CE
o f the introduction of these new f acts into philosophy
. .
t h e e ffect Of the religious emotions becoming the com

mon property o f all men either as proved and felt,
re a l ities o r as facts admitted by common consent w a s ,
t o raise in the estimation o f philosophers the personal

, ,
importanc e of the huma n soul to turn their attention ,
to what it w a s i n its capacities its history and i t s , ,
destiny to make it appear the great phenomenon t h e

, ,
great existence in the world no longer an accident ,
but the nal cause o f the whole c reated universe .
G od and the soul o f man as t h e seat of the religiou s

,
e motions became thus the two chief obj ects of philo

,
sophy ; and the world which in purely Greci a n phi

,
l O S O p h y had played the chief part became a scene i n ,
wh ich the destiny of man was to run its course I t .
was religion the pure religion preached by C hrist

,
.
which when made known to the Grecian world ( and

,
it was tted to be made known by its purity ) wrough t ,
this change But the fruits were not yet to be reaped

. .
Two processes had before that time o f harvest to be

gone through a nd gone through simultaneously ; rst
, ,
the two trains o f thought Hebrew and Greek h a d to

, ,
be incorporated into one complete philosophical sy s

t e m and secondly the nations of modern E urope had
, ,
to work o ut this philosophy and b rin g it to a poin t

corresp onding to that at which Aristotle had stoo d in
Grecian ph i losophy ; that is to s a y the insight into ,
the d istinction o f ontology from metaphysic had t o

b e attained by the schools o f modern E urope .
These processes occupy the tim e from the esta

b l i sh m e nt of C hristian ity as a religion to the days
of D escartes T w o periods may be distinguished as
.
occupying thi s time the rst o f which may be cha

,
5 32 RE A S ON .
controversy between R ealism and N ominalism that ,
is between metaphysic mixed with ontology and

,
metaphysic pure is a painful working back to t h e

,
point o f View which A ristotle occupied and a redis ,
o f his meaning But at the same time it w as

c o v er
y .
a reproduction o f his meaning in a new and origi nal

mould s o that the form was simpler and cle a rer and
, ,

the contradictions which Aristotle s system contained ,
i n i t s combination o f ontology with metaphysic wer e ,
b rought to View This w a s a great step in advance

.
,
a l though no o n e as
y et arose capable o f introducing
.a principle o f solution for those contradictions Jean .

C harlier de G erson s work D e modis s i gni c a n d i a n d ,
D e concordia M e t a p h y s i c ae cum Logic a a work dated ,
C hristmas E ve 1 4 2 6 may be taken as an exponent

, ,
o f the results obtained by Scholasticism ; and it i s
s urprising to s e e the clos e agreement between it and
modern Kantian and therefore also o f much post

,
Kantian philosophy It is t h e result o f previou s

,
.
philosophisin g and the seed o f modern philosophies

, .
I t is the bud which contains all the ower com

pressed and undeveloped needin g only t h e life ,
givi ng breath o f genius to quicken it into ower

and fruit It still speaks o f existence o f objects of
.
, ,
m ind ,
as if they were things well known in them

s elves and needing no explanation D escartes ques .
tion Am I ? and h i s answer I thin k produces o ut o f

, , ,
this philosophy the philosophies of Locke o f Leibnitz , ,
o f Berkeley Of Hume o f Kant and his successors

, ,
.
When thes e appear each in their turn they are o c

, ,
c u i e d with the same phrases the sam e distinction s

p ,

which meet us in G erson s work What was new .

and important in D escartes question was that i t ,
e xpressed a resolution to approach philosophy from

REA S ON . 55 3 3
the subjective side t o examine no t what things

, ,
were but how we could know what they were

,
.
Henceforth this resolution bein g followed up by

, .
o ther philosophers metaphysic became subj ective in a

,
partial sense that is it b e came psychology an enquiry

, , ,
into the conditions of knowledge This however wo uld .
n o t have been possible had not the human mind ,
been long famil iarised with states o f consciousness

as Obj ects and accustomed t o regard its thoughts
,
and feelings and the systems into which these wer e

,
moulded as obj ective and existing realities And

,
.
t his w a s owing chiey to the introspective character

o f the religious philosophy o f C hristianity .
Between G erson and D escartes came a period o f

preparation and transition in which two other sourc e s ,
o f instruction for metaphysic were disclosed and a

p
plied j ust as had been done previously by C hristi
,
a ni t.
y O n e o f these sources was the great d i sc o v e
ries in physical science the other was the more c o m ,
p l e t e acquaintance with the literary and scientic

writin gs o f the G reeks known as the R enaissance ; ,
i n o t h e r words a development o f the human mind in

,
t w o directions rst in the S pecial sciences secondly

, ,
in the Litera H um a ni o r e s O f religion o f the literae .

,
h u m a ni o r e s in all their branches and o f the empiri cal ,
s ciences in all their branches physic physiology and , , ,
psychology metaphysic is the constant a nd i n s e p a r

,
able companion whether we judge as i n t h e present

,
case from its history o r as before from the analysi s

,
o f its nature O f the great names o f this transition

.
period I will mention o nl y o n e Giordano Bruno I I , ,
N olano memorable here fo r his opposition to t h e

,
doctrine o f A ristotle about space H e proved that .
S pace was innit e 70007 02 7 5 608 5 01 1 that the unive rs e ,

5 34 R E A S ON .
P A RT II . wa s unlimited This wa s the m etaphysic a l

o n e a nd .
appli cation o f t h e astronom i cal do c trines of Co p e rni

c us and i s an instance o f metaphysic owing its deve .
l o p m e nt from ti me to t i me to following in the track

, ,
o f the empirical science s a n d adoptin g t heir d i s c o v e
ries His doctrines a bout space Giordano Bruno had

.
der ived from C operni cus ; but he als o drew attention

to time On this subject he held a P latonic doctrin e
.
,
namely t hat time w a s non ess e ntial to existence that

,
-
et e rn ity was t h e n egation o f time and t hat potenti a l ,
and actual e xi st e nc e w er e the same thing Both doc

tr ines that a s to space and that as to time were d e s

, ,
tined to prod uc e th eir effects in future ph ilosophies .
35536622665
8
8
When D escartes explained existence by conscious
ness c o gi t a t ur he gave the real and the tr ue mean

, ,
i ng to the term existence Th is relative existence .
was what p hil osophers and a l l men had a l w ays meant

and understood by existence without knowing i t ;
they had never had any other exis t ence in th ei r
thoughts than this nor was it possible that they,
should have had any other But now the point O f . .
View o f philosophy was ch a n ged ; ever since that

time philosophers enquired n o t what Objects were , ,
but what they were kno w n as ; not wh at the con di

tions o f objects w e re but wh at wer e the conditions ,
o f our k n owledge o f t hem Hence the mind and its .
n ature was the object o f research ; hence forth ph ilo
sop hy a pproached from the s ubj ective side o f t h e

shield a n d psychology became closely almost i n
, ,
di stinguishably united with metaphysic

,
M en began .
a t the beginn ing w ith the inve stigation o f percep

,
tion Locke led t h e brawls with N ih il in i nt e l l e c t u

.
,
quod non prius in sensu L eib ni tz f ollowed wit h t h e .
a i n l i c a t i o n N isi ipse i n t e ll e c t u s He a dded i ndee d

'
p , .
5 36
.
R E AS ON .
Go d as the caus e o f the mind H ume reecting o n .

,
this view o f things s howed that the notion o f cause

, ,
assumed by Berkeley was drawn from the succes ,
s ions o f material objects as known to the mi nd and ,
that therefore the objects assumed by B erkeley a s

causes were themselves part o f that consciousness o f
which they were assumed as pre existing causes -
.

K a n t dwelling o n this View o f Hume s took up t h e
, ,
View o f Le i b ni t z N i s i ipse i nt e l l e c t u s and showed that

, ,
the forms o f consciousness in intuition and thought

accompanied a l l its objects and gave them consist
e ncy . Sense gave impressions but the mind formed ,
these rst into objects by its o w n unity o f a p p e r

c ep t i o n But though the unity o f apperception was
.
e very thin g was the source o f the reality o f objects

, ,
it had no use except in application to impressions o f

s ense . It was wider than the eld Of sense to which
it was applied This was the point sei z ed o n by
.
F i c h t e Schelli ng and Hegel They argued C an t h e

, , .
,
Transcendental O bject formed immediately by t h e

u ni ty o f apperception which is the source o f all,
reality itself have no real ity merely because no i m

, ,
pressions o f sense correspond to it ? R ather this tran

s c e n d e n t a l object is the true reality Their e ffort . .
a ccordin gly was to deduce o r construct the world o f , ,
i mpressions o f sense o ut o f the transcendental Objec t

o r the Operation o f thought in its unity o f a erc e
pp p
tion They s a w uni ty in consciousness unity in t h e
.
,
world and unity in both connected ; their error as i t

, ,
appears to me was that they pitched upon a function

,
o f consciousness as fundamental and ultimate which

, ,
was not s o but was o n the contrary a mode o f a n

,
other Simpler function namely intuition The uni ty , ,

.
o f apperception cannot account fo r intuition in t h e

RE A S O N . 5 37
forms time and space n o r for t h e e xistence o f i m

o f
pressions o f sense ; but these can account fo r t h e
uni ty o f apperception which resul ts from them and , ,
contains them all .
The choice o f a derivative function o f conscious

ness and the erection o f it into the whole causes ,
F ichte Schelling and Hegel to become ontologists

, , , ,
a n d the particular function o f consciousness which
they choose being the intellectu a l function o f reason

,
ing makes them ontologists o f t h e same school as

,
P lotinus and P roclus T 0067 01 7 6 671 001 700027 6 1 0071 says

. 1 1 1 1
,
P lotinus and 677 2 1 017 77677 61 0610 5001

,
E nn III Book 8
1 1 . . . .
7. If an unit o f thought a concept o f any kind i s

, ,
the universe the universe must be an absolute But

,
.
in reality all concepts are limits imposed by volition ,
and imply an existence beyond that limit .
Whatever may be embra c ed in any concept i n ,
an
y whole o f thought there remains always a beyond , ,
both in time and S pace Take existence as the a b .
s olute and there is consciousness outside it perceivin g

,
it ; take consciousness perceiving existence as the a b

s olute ,
and y o u are yourself outside it perceiving it .
N evertheless though the t w o correlates existenc e

, ,
a n d consciousness form no absolute either in correla

,
tion o r by inclusion yet the doctrine o f their corre

,
lation is the completion o f the science o f metaphysic ,
a n d is the key stone to a s tructure o f coherent doc

-
trines which has to fear no reversal from the progress

o f knowledge in other directions The subj ective and .
o bj ective sides o f philosophy and o f existenc e a r e
again u nited as in the philosophy o f P lato but with ,
this difference that there they were undistin guished

, ,
but here distinguished from each other ; equall y i n

s eparable in both cases but in the latter involving ,
5 38 R E A SO N .
the eliminat ion o f the a bsolute and of its science o u ,
t o l o gy . C ould P lato have live d in the days o f Kant ,
he would have philosophised as Kant did ; just as he

would have philosophised as Aristotle did h a d h e ,
lived in the days of A ristotle .
The ground for this assertion o f the identity b e

tween t hese great m e n is that they all agree i n t h e
,
kind of reasoning which they predominantly employ .
Their systems are all of them instances o f e x t ra o r di

n a ri l
y Vigorous exertions o f the reason as distinguished
from the u nderstanding R eason is always asking

.
,
not what results can be deduced but what is the ,
meaning signicance or value o f such and such a

, ,
fact whether premiss or result to myself R eason

, ,
.
and understanding are two modes o f reasoning which

are carried 011 Side by S ide or in conjunction two ,
strands of o n e rope each o f which modies the results

,
o f the other Whatever the results o f the understand

.
ing are at any period in the history o f philosophy

, ,
the shape into which they are thrown by a Vigorous

reason will be very Similar The differences o f two
.
systems o f philosophy will dep e nd o n two things

rst on the difference O f the results of the under
,
.
standing the advances made in the S pecial sciences

,
and secondly on the different degree of vigour in the

reason of the several philosophers But supposing .
these philosophers to have equal degrees o f vigour in

their reason then each will represent the same results
,
o f science i n the same way ; and when any o f them
sees what were the results o f p ositive science know n

to any of his predecessors he can then enter fully i n to
,
the philosophy which that predecessor founded upon

them and comprehend his meanin g for i n the same
, ,
position he would have done the same thing .

5 40 R EA S O N .
o f the mind and that the methods which have s u c

,
c e e d e d in explaining s o much in the former eld must
b e also employed in the latter This View is war .
ranted by Our increased experience and grounded o n ,
a more accurate acquaintance with moral as well a s

with physical subjects O ur point o f View havin g
.
become s ubj ective w e s e e the complex character o f

,
moral enquiries .
The same is the cas e within the eld o f ethic

itself Both P lato and A ristotle treated the question
.

7 6 7 67 201 7 6 o0157 00 x eg 66001 011 1 00
'
o bjectively ; 7 067 003 01

.
1
, g 1
p 1
, ,
7
,
all included i n the phrase the Summum Bonum o r , ,
as in o u r days it appears U tility in the broad sens e , ,
attached to it by Bentham and his followers was t h e ,
turning point o f the whole discussion R eligion t h e .

,
religion o f C hristianity was the means o f introducing

,
into E uropean ethic another conception ; o r rather i t

was in religion in that part o f the ethical eld that
, ,
another conception arose the conception o f C onscienc e

,
a n d its phenomena the sense o f right and wrong o f

, ,
righteousness and wickedness as the turning point Of ,
e thic . This is the subj ective aspect o f 06600150 01 00 1 .
E ach is the other viewed from the opposite side O n e .
imposes duties the other proposes ends ; o n e look s

,
only to what the agent thinks right o r his duty a t

the moment as St P aul says Whatsoever is not o f
,
.
,
faith i s s i n ; the other enquires into the probabl e

results o f such and such an action ; o n e regards only
o n e s i n gle state o f consciousness the feeling existin
g ,
in the moment o f action ; the other compares t w o

states o f consciousness together as end and as means .
Both aspects are equally e s s e nt i a l i t o ethic and each ,
i s inseparably involved in t he other ; but there is still

wantin g a scientic View o f ethic treating o f both .
RE AS ON . 5 41
a spects as coessential and thus doing fo r subjectiv e

,
e thic what Ar istotle did for objective .

Y et Aristotle s objective treatment throws great
light on the subj ective side o f ethic He required a .
denition at least provisional o f happiness and con

, , ,

0 7? 61 6 60 27 31 7 27 610
c luded that it was 4 96 4
57 01 02 7 1 ; 70007
7 1
3 01 7 1 1 1
,
and conseq u ently that 60ge7 7) was to b e examined in

o rder to determine what happiness o r 0660 01 001 10
1 0 was ;
, ,
i n other words he suspended the nature o f happines s

,
o n that o f Virtue E th N i c I I 3 Again he dene s

. . . . .
Virtue as the property quality o r state o f doing per

, ,
-
fe c t l y the particular work which o n e is tted to d o

by nature o f performing perfectly the functions p r o
,
per to the being o r creatur e who performs them .
This is nothing but Obedience to the ultimate laws o f

nature ; in other words it is the conception o f D ut y
, ,
o nly o f duty conceived n o t as immediately and i n fa l
li b l y made known t o us by a moral sens e o f right

and wrong but by a careful exami n ation o f what t h e
,
laws o f o ur nature are Happiness is a state o f feel

.
ing ; the sense o f right and wrong the i mmediate ,
dictate o f conscience is a state o f feeling also ; neither

,
is in truth more subjective o r mor e objective than , ,
the other A s A ristotle required a denition o f t h e

.
s t ate o f feeling called happiness s o the moderns r e ,
quir e a deni tion o f the state o f feeling called t h e

s ense o f right and wrong The de n ition o f both i s
.
the same ; it is that they consist in 60p m } in a perfect ,
performing o f functions The perfect performanc e

.
o f natural functions by a conscious being acting

voluntarily i s a stat e o f consciousness containi ng t w o
things rst the sens e o f happiness secondly t h e
s ense known
, , , ,
as a good conscience N ow t h e order .
o f thes e things canno t b e r e versed ; havin g begun by

5 42 RE A S O N .

nquirin g What is happiness ? and What is a good
e
CH V III , ,
conscience ? and having received t h e answer Th e

. .
perfect performance o f natural functions and then

o f the n
r ea s o
,
proceeding to enquir e What is this perfect perform

.
ance o r wherein does it consist ? i t is not possibl e

,
to reply In the s e nse o f happiness o r In the sens e

, , ,
o f a good conscience This is a circle a n d not fur

.
,
the r knowledge ; and we want som e further d e t e rm i

nation O f Vi rtue No r yet is it possible to reply In
.
,
making others happy o r In e nabling them to hav e , ,
a good conscience F or the question recurs again

.
,
with greater obscurity What i s the happiness and , ,
what is the good conscience of others ? It is clear

that if we do not know what they are in ourselve s
, ,
we do not know what they are in others There is .
then only o n e way in which the answe r to t h e ques

tion What is Virtue ? is to be found It is in an
,
.
examination by reasoning reection o f the entire

, ,
eld of consciousness in the empirical ego And .
this is what all ethical enquiry must be namely an , ,
exercise of reason on the conative function o f t h e

empirical ego .
No w here there are four things t o be observed

rst that the enquiry is no long er conceived as o b
,
j e c t i v e a lone o r as,
an enquiry into happin e ss as if i t
was a possession like wealth externa l to the mi nd
, , ,
nor yet as subjective al one o r as an enquiry merely ,
into what action conscience dictates at any particular

m oment for the di ctat e o f o n e day may contra di c t
,
the dictate o f another day and to o cc upy oneself only ,
with the dictate o f the present moment i s t o rejec t

ethical enquiry altogether ; b ut that the enquiry i s
objectiv e and subjective at on ce an enquiry int o ,
what happin ess a goo d conscienc e and virtu e a re

, , ,
5 44 R E A S ON .
moment is also a feelin g which cannot be farther

analysed and to which the time and space element s
,
are indifferent These are the motives o f conduct

.
,
nal causes as e fcient ; states o f consciousness which

are ulti mate feelings incapabl e of further analysis
,
.
But happiness 6 66004001 100 the summum bonum o n

,
1
, ,
t h e one hand and o n the other hand a good con

,
science as a permanent state o f consciousness thes e ,
are not ultimate i ndecomposable states o f conscious

ness but the s um and c ompletion o r rather the per
, ,
fe c t i o n o f the corresponding simple feelings

,
The .
question is wh at these are in their nature N o w as

,
.
thes e are the 60p m ) o r virtue o f t h e empirical ego a s

, ,
a whole so t h e sense o f doi ng right o r hav ing don e

,
right at any particular moment is the Virtue of that

particular action o r moment ; and this sense of doing
right is always p l e a s ur e a b l e that is always contains , ,
a sense o f pleasure or interest which is the motive

power in it T h e Virtuous character o f any action
.
known this alone makes it p l e a s ur e a b l e and gives it

,
ef cienc y as a nal cause ; the pleasure or interest

it involves leads us to do it and this pleasur e o r ,
interest is derived from nothing else but from t h e

knowledge that it is a part o f the virtue o f t h e
whole empirical ego There are pleasures and i n
.
t e r e s t s many a n d keen which are independent Of

, ,
s uch knowledge o r contradictory to such knowledge

, ,
that is which a r e n o t Virtuous and which are Vicious

, ,
.
The practical problem therefore is to make the plea ,
s ures and interests which are derived from the sens e
o f do m right o r which can be combined with it pre

g ,
dominate over and n all y exclud e thos e which can

not be combined with it ; to make the sense of doing
r ight
, deduced from t h e knowledg e Of the Virtu e o f
R E A S ON . 54 5
the empirical ego the criterion o f what actions a r e

,
chosen to be adopted into the line of conduct .
It has been shown in 2 that pleasure o r in

9
t e r e s t o f some kind o r other is the motive o f the
empirical ego ; and therefore it is s o in ethic which ,
is part of the empirical ego P leasure interest hap .

, ,
p i n e s s these are the motives the nal causes becom e

, ,
e fcient o f all actions without exception They a r e

,
.
the caus ae e x i s t e n d i o f actions and they are the p ro ,
ducts o r e ffects o f a ll successful actions also They .
are rst in order of history as e f cient causes and , ,
last in order o f history as produced results o f a c

, ,
tions They are rst in order o f cognition as nal

.
,
causes and last in order o f cognition as produced

, ,
results in future time for in future time the order

,
Of history and that o f cognition coincide But they .
are not the actions themselves o r the essence o f t h e ,
actions in order o f logic The essence o f an action

,
.
consists in its relation to the whole empirical ego in ,
its being conformable or not conformable important ,
o r uni m port a n t to the harmony o f function in that

,
complex consciousness Vir tue is not the means t o

.
the end happiness ; nor are interest pleasure o r hap

, , ,
i n e s s the means to the end Virtue But pleasure

p , ,
.
interest and happiness are both means and ends the

, ,
o n e because the other and virtue o r vice is their

, , ,
essence at every stage from rst to last o f every ,
part and o f the completed whole P erfect harmony

,
.
o f function is the nature and essence o f action o r
conation as the object o f ethic Just as in a piece o f .
music every note has a distinct quality and a di stinct

pitch and a distinct degree o f loudness in itself sepa ,
ra t el
y from the other notes but d eri ves its music a l
,
character that is its power and manner Of impressing

, ,
NN
5 46 RE A S ON .
o ur m u S i c sen s ibility S olely fr om its r elation to the

al ,
notes which p recede follow o r accompany it s o a c

, , ,
tio n s which are particular states o f c onsciousness

,
.
,
have each a form and quality of their own for t h e

.
spe cul ativ e reason but derive their ethi cal chara cter
, ,
place they occupy in t h e e n tire series o f actions from .

,
their r elation t o the actions w hich p recede and fel l o w

them M usic is t h e ethic o f so unds and e thic the
.
,
musi c o f a ction s .
I n this way questions as to the n atur e of e thical

a c tion s are separated from q u estions as to t heir his
t o ry a nd p roduction the logical order from the histo

,
ri c a l B u t there r emains t h e third order that o f

.
,
cognition or knowledge which is equally essential to ,
the treatment of a ny sub ject with t h e other t w o .
The producti ve or m otive power in actions i s the

pleasure or inter est which they contain ; the essence
or nature of actions c onsists in their harmoni sing o r
not with the total s eri es o f actions o f whi ch they form
a p art ; but how is the nature of any action known to
us how do we k now before the fact that is befor e
, , , ,
the action has taken place and whil e we a r e d e l i b e

r ating about doing it whether it wi l l s o harmoni se
_
,
.
with the wh o le o r n o t ? Two actions suppose offer

.
, ,
th emselves for our c hoice ; each o f them therefore is .

.
i n s ome measure pleasurabl e o r interesting t o us ,
otherwi se it would not offer itself to be chosen How .
'
do w e know which o f t h e two will harmonise with

the whol e series o f o ur a c t i On s that is which o f the , ,
two is good c ompared with the o ther ? The a nswer

.
to this is t o be found in o n e partic ular ki nd o f feeli ng

whi ch some a ctions possess in a greater degree than "
others a n d which some do not poss ess a t all ; thi s

,
5 48 R E A S ON .
another man has a right t o demand but from that o f ,
what the agent owes to others from his position and

c ircumstances a course requiring no more investiga
,
tion o f motives than the course now followed by

courts o f law The change would be simply a change
.
from the point o f view of the plaintiff to that o f the

defendant the same point o f view in fact from which
,
he must judge himself morally that is a subjective , ,
o ne
. It is a change from a theory founded o n the
notion o f men being naturally independent o f and at ,
w a r with each other to a theory founded on t h e

, ,
notion that men are naturally at peace with and ,
members o f each other and therefore is as thoroughly

, ,
C hristian as it is philosophic .
The same progress in developing from an objectiv e

to a subjective stage is observable i n the history o f
poetry The poetry o f modern E urope is busied
.
much more with the phenomena o f consciousness by

themselves and for their own sake than was the ,
poetry o f either the G reeks o r R omans But it is .
necessary to be somewhat more precise The distin o .
tion here intended as the distinction between ancient

,
and modern poetry is not the distinction between

,
poets who do and those who do not introduce r e e c

tions o f their o w n into their descriptions of natur e
and events for then all dramatic poets ancient and
, ,
modern must be classed together and all epic and

, ,
lyric poets o f whatever age must fall into the s ame

class N or again is it the distinction between poets
.
who express their o w n feelings and emot ions and

those who aim at representing objects and events and
the feelings and actions o f others for this would b e ,
to place many ancient lyric poets in t h e same class

with a great majority o f modern poets and some
RE A S O N . 5 49
modern poets such as M oliere and Scott woul d b e P RT II A

VIII
.
, ,
C H . .
included among the majority of the ancients But it .
66
i s the distinction between poets who make it their O th d in
.
er o m a s '
f th n o e re a s o
primary obj ect to e x hibit man in his connection
with the world o f external objects and circumstances ,
whether these are house and family seas and storms , ,
wars and governments laws human and laws di vine

, ,
such as A m and M noc o r as subj ect to a conict o f

such laws as in the cases o f O restes and Antigone

, ,
and poets o n the other hand who in addition to a ll ,
such circumstances ( o r sometimes abstracting from

them in poetry more o r less my stic ) make the pri
, ,
mary interest o f their poems to consist in an e xh i

bitiou of the internal nature o f man his character and ,
t h e workings o f his mind and heart as in the cases o f ,
Hamlet and Faust w h o study the same laws o f des

,
tiny and circumstance but as operating in a subtiler

,
f ield
,
in the thoughts and emotions o f men not in ,
their fate and history Hence the scope o f t h e Greek

.
d rama and G reek poetry was human actions ; that o f

modern poetry is human character and emotions ,
which are actions also b ut o f a subtiler kind

,
.
P oetical imagination is a mode o f reason ; it is t h e

faculty o f comprehending a n d describing an object o r
an event in its e ffect on the emotions o f comprehend ,
ing and describin g the object and its e ffect both at

once in other words the power o f the object T h e
, ,
.
degree in which this particular faculty is possessed

by poets determines their rank ; and the parallel i s
e xact in this point between poets with their poetical ,
imagination and philosophers wit h their pure reason

, , .
The di fference between the subjective and objectiv e .
s tages o f poetry and philosophy does n o t depend o n
t h e greatness o f the poets o r philosophers but is e x ,

550 RE A S ON .
ternal to them and depends on the general progres s

o f thought and the kn owledge and character attained
,
by mankind o r by a nation at any particular time ,
Fo r instance E s c h y l u s and Shakespeare are equally

,
great in the vigour of their poetical imagination ; b ut

o n e belongs to the objective the ot her to the s ub
,
c t i v e stage of poetry E s c h l u s lived in an age

j e
y .
,
and shar ed the characteristics of it when the atten ,
tion of mankind was concentrated on the external .
conditions o f life whether these were divine human

'
, , ,
o r physic a l Single actions single moments are i n

.
, ,
hi s dramas and in Greek tragedy generally prepared

, ,
and followed by long trains o f events and are t h e ,

.
centres o f interest for a whole society o f G ods and

m en . I n Shakespeare s dramas this moment thi s , ,
centre has expanded into the whole play the play

, , ,
occupies months and even years and the stage is ,

,
lled by twenty o r thirty actors who have no other

audience but themselves D ifferences o f this natur e
the object and in t h e manner of treating it wer e
not determined by the poet ; but the imagination
with which he treats it is the same There w ere .
,
besides, other conditions which determined the form

o f the drama at these two periods The drama both .
at A thens and in E ngland sprang from meetings of

the people for a religious purpose and from the reli ,
~
g i o u s creed of the people at A thens from the solem n
worship of D ionysus i n E ngland from the Mysterie s

,
o r sacred plays At A thens the play was part of t h e

.
worship and included music and the action r e p r e ,
sented was some sublime event o r action which w a s .
re p resented in all i t s sublime and religious s i gni

canc e by being dwelt on revolved and enfo rced by

, ,
mea ns o f the music or chant o f the chorus It was a .

5 52 R E A S ON

.
lysed function is correct would lead me too far i n to

,
the regions o f poetical criticism to be attempted here .
I think however that a l l i n s t a n c e s o f poetical imagina

tion in its true sense a r e capable of explanation b y
, ,
regarding it as the union o f understanding and emo

tion in a reective action o f consciousn e ss This .
satises the demands o f some o f o u r best poets and

c ritics that poetry is the expression of the whole
,

'
m a n a n d that
,
a poet is a man s peaking to men as
such and not to particular kinds o r classes o f men
,
.
I argue therefore from the above instances that ,
the same course of development o f movement from ,
objective to subj ective has been followed by t h e

,
human mind in other departments of its activity ,
where reection is the kind o f activity in operation

'
,
as well as in metaphysic M etaphysic is an inst anc e

.
o f a law which is com m on to most if not all o f the , ,
elds of reective energy and activity P oetry is .
reection ; E thic is reection ; the connection between

ethic and physic and that between law and ethic is
, ,
given by reection Lastly metaphysic is reection

.
,
and this is its common bond and ground o f c l a s s i c a

tion with the other two sciences ethic and poetry ; ,
from whi ch again it is distinguished by its want o f a

practical side or corresponding Art
,
.
6 7 There is a prevalent notion that the cours e

.
o f science has been the very reverse o f that which i t
has here been maintained to be that it has not been ,
from an obj ective to a subjective and metaphysic a l

s t ate but from a metaphysical and subjective to an
,
entirely objective state It is thought that men

.
began by imposing their o w n s o called subjective -
notions o n phenomena as explanations of them and .
, ,
have ended by modelling their o w n subj ective notions :

R E AS O N . 553 .
o n external independent observed obj ective pheno

, , ,
mena This doctrine is thought besides to receive s up

.
port from the famous Law o f the Three States enun

c i a t e d by C omte ; from which law however rightly ,
understood it receives no support at all That law

,
.
,
as stated in the C ours de P hilosophie P ositive Le c on ,
I v o l I p 8 edit 1 8 6 4 and again in Le c on L I v o l

. .
,
.
,
.
,
. .
4 ,
p 4 6
. 2 is that the human
,
mind ,
has to pass and ,
has actually passed in every kind o f speculation , ,
through three states the primitive theological state , ,
the transient metaphysical and the nal positive state ,

.
The law is a law n o t o f the development o f scienc e

within itself but o f the history of the human mind as
,
a whole the mind becoming in every branch of s p e c u

, ,
lation in its turn scientic and positive these being , ,
equivalent terms excluding o n e class o f conceptions ,
as not positive and n o t scientic and having recours e ,
to others o f the opposite character ; a law o f the deve

IO p m e n t o f science n o t within itself but in its relation , ,
to the conceptions which were rst thought to be seien

t i c and positive but which were aft erwards proved to ,
be not s o ; a law o f the development of the human mind

and of scienc e taken together that is o f the gradual , ,
e x t e n s m n o f the germ o r leaven o f scientic and posi
tiv e conceptions s o as to include and give a scientic ,
and positive character to a l l the conceptions of t h e ,
human mind A proprement parler says C omte

.

, ,

vol 4 p 4 9 0
.
,
la philosophie thologique m em e
.
, ,
dans notre prem iere enfance individuelle ou sociale , ,

n a jamais p u etre rigoureusement uni verselle c est a ,
-
dire que pour tous les ordres quelconques de ph eno

,
m enes les faits les plus simples e t les plus commun s

, .
o nt to ujours t regards comme essentiellement a s

s uje t t i s a des lois naturell es a u lieu d etre attribus a ,
554 R E A S ON .

l ar volont des agents surnaturels L i l l us t r e
b i t ra i re -
.
A dam Smith a p a r exemple tres heureusement r e

, ,
-

marqu dans se s essais ph i losophiques qu on n e trou
, ,
va i t en aucun temps ni en aucun p a ys un di eu

, ,
pour la pesanteur And again page 4 9 1 .

On .
,

doit meme remarquer a c e sujet que c est a u con , , ,

traire l b a u c h e spontane des premieres lois natu
,
relles propre s aux actes indivi duels o u sociaux qui ,
c t i v e m e n t transporte a tous les p h en o m en e s d u

monde extrieur a d a b o r d fourni d apres nos e x p l i
, ,
cations prcdentes l e v rai principe fondamental d e ,

la philosophie thologique Ainsi l e germe elemen .

,
t ai re de la philosophie p o sitive est certainement tout

aussi primitif a u fond que celui de la philosophi e
, ,

thologique elle meme q u o i q u i l n ait p u s e dvelopper
-
que beaucoup plus tard U ne telle notion import e .

i
e x t r m e m e n t a la parfaite ra t i o nn a l i t de notre thori e
sociologique puisque la v i e humaine n e pouvant

, ,
j amais offrir aucune v eri t a b l e c r ea t i o n quelconque ,

mais toujours une simple ev o l u t i o n graduelle l es ,
'
sor nal de l e sp ri t positif deviendrait s c i e nt i q u e

ment i n c o m p r eh e n s i b l e s i d es l o ri gi ne o n n e n con , , ,
c eva i t a tous gar d s les premiers rudiments m eces ,
saires .
The theological state consisted in explaining phe

"
n o m e n a by the action o f a person dwelling in the m
and making them act ; the sun was the body o f a sun
god the tree w a s the living body o f a dryad and s o

, ,
o n . The metaphysical state consisted in e xplaining

phenomena by t h e action of abstract entities or e s
s e n c e s such as an abstract will fortune necessity o r
, , , ,
chance which caused the phenomena to be what they

,
were and to act and react as they were observed to

,
do . T h e positive state consists in observin g the phe

556 . R E A S ON .
in pointing o u t their material and formal elements ,
completes them as special sciences .
The caus e of the rejection by P ositivists o f meta

physic the transient state of metaphysic will hav e
, ,
already become apparent from what has been now

'
said T h e m e t a p h y s i c o f their metaphysical state is

.
.
not metaphysic proper b ut ontology The di stino

,
.
tion between the two was not drawn and the n e c e s ,
si t of metaphysic a s t h e subj ective theory o f t h e

y ,
universe was not seen by C omte when he wrote

,

his P hilosophie P ositive F rom M Littr s book
. .
,
Auguste C omte e t Le P ositivisme it would seem that ,
C omte was not directly acquainted with any o f t h e .
writings o f Kant except the Idee z u einer a l l ge

meinen G eschichte in We l t b i i rge rl i c h e r Absicht It .
cannot then surprise a metaphysician that a mind s o

great as C omte s working independently and starting
,
with the empirical sciences should end with c o n c e p ,
tions o f the same that is a metaphysical order as

, , , ,
those with which Kant an avowed metaphysician , ,
from the rst began ; that he should in his second

great work the P olitique P ositive work avowe dl y
, ,
from a subj ective point of view o n e which embraced ,
the two aspects objective and subj ective at once ; and

that in his last and unfortunately uncompleted work ,
the Synth ese Subj ective he sho uld attempt a s ub

,
c t i v e logic
j e ,
and o n e in which the phenomena o f
pure space play the chief part It was as a meta .
,
physician must believe not his weakness but his i n

,
t e l l e c t u a l greatness that led him to take this course .
M Littr himself too recognises in the C onclusion o f

.
,
the above mentioned work that t h e P ositive P hilo ,
sophy requires completing in three respects o n e o f ,
w hich is t he establishment of a thorie subjectiv e d e

RE A S ON . 55
l h um a ni t But such a complement o f positive philo

.
sophy does n o t need to be taken in hand and supplied

now for the rst time ; its construction has been in
progress side by side wit h the other sciences from
, ,
the time when reection rst accompanied thought .
I ts constr uctors are such men as P lato A ristotle D es , ,
cartes and Kant M etaphysic also is a positive science

,
.
,
as well as the special and empirical sciences which it

connects and whose component parts it analyses
,
.
The position which the P hilosophie P ositive o f

Au guste C omte holds and the service which it has ,
rendered to metaphysic seem to me to be parallel to

,
the position held and the service rendered to meta

, ,
physic by the astronomical theory o f C opernicus ; the

C opernican theory laid hold o f the vigorous meta
physical mind o f G iordano Bruno and produced in ,
him the thought o f the innity o f space ; and the

cases o f C opernicus and C omte are both instances o f
what I have already observed namely of the em , ,
p i ri c a l sciences supplying food and fuel to meta

physic and o f metaphysic progressing by reecting
,

o n the results of the empirical sciences C omte s .
P hilosophie P ositive established a result in empirical

science whether physical or sociological o f the very
, ,
highest order nothing less than a law o f succession

,
o f the states and o f the development o f the human
mind in all branches o f empirical enquiry a law com ,
m o n to and valid in them all E xpr essed in general .
terms this law the law o f the three states is that in

, , ,
historical o r empirical enquiry the How and not the ,
Why o f objects and events is the result and the only

, ,
possible result o f investigation ; in other words that

, ,
L aws and not C auses can be discovered and that ,
Laws can not be employed a s C auses G reat as was .

558 RE A S ON .
Kant the writer o f the Kritik der R einen V ernunf t he

, ,
did not draw t his distinction nor distinctly reject the ,
search after causes a s di stinguished from laws The .
rst paragraph of the Introduction to the Kritik der

R einen V ernun ft 1 st e di t shows t his E xperience
,
.
, ,
he says that is e mpirical experience tells us i n

, , ,
deed wh at exists b ut i t does not tell us that it must

,
necessarily be as it is and not otherwise . It tells
us facts but not why th ey exist The answer to this

,
.
Why ? was the purpose of his work He still sought .
the conditions o f experience n o t the mere analysis o f ,
it,
the conditions o f synthetic judgments a priori ,
the c onditions o f existence o f there being order and

systematical arrangement in t h e world at all He .
was too great to employ these conditions the tran ,
s c e n d e n t a l uni ty of apperception and its categories ,
o f the understandin g and the forms of i ntuition time , ,
and space as e ntities with an absolute or independent

,
existence ; but still they were with him not mere , ,
metaphysical elements o f experience but also pre .
cedin g conditions o f experience N ecessity w a s not

. .
merely anothe r name the s u bj ective aspect of univer , ,
sa l i t
y,
but something o f another order from empirical
universality He had not drawn clearly out that d i s

.
tinction between analysis a n d construction history ,
and nature elements o f analysis and conditions o f

,
existence which metaphysic is now able to appro

,
r i a t e and employ yet wi t hout becoming an onto

p ,
logy as with Hegel chiey ifnot solely in consequence

, ,
of the C o m t i a n distinction between laws and causes

t
in the empiric a l sci e nces and the impulse given to ,

thought gener a lly by the appearance of C omte s
Philosophie P ositive .
5 60 R E A S ON .
relations o f positive science to the facts to be ex

plained by contrasting them not with previous states
,
o f positive science itself but with relations held by

;
systems which are not positive science to the facts

which they profess to explain that is w ith c o nc e p , ,
tions not o f positive scien ce at an earlier or a later

period but with conceptions which do not belong to
,
positive science at all The law o f the three states

.
is a true law in the sense in which C omte meant it ;

but it is a law o f t h e historical development o f the
human mind in its speculation that is of the history
, , ,
o f philosophy and not a law o f the development o f

,
positive science ; for it does not give the law of s u c

cession of states o f science states o f mind comprised
,
within positive science compared together as mem

,
bers of a series It explains how the human mind

.
came to explain to itself phenomena by theological

entities how it then used this conception as a stepping
,
stone to that o f ontological entities and nally how ,
it rose from this to the conception o f positive laws .
B u t it does not explain how the positive science which

existed in the theological state passed into the s uc
c e e d i n g states o f positive science existing in the ,
ontological state and nally into the nal states o f

,
positive science in which we are at the present day .
It is not a law o f the development o f the positive

element alone and as distinguished from the non
,
positive elements combined w ith it in the theological

and ontological states .
I have no further suggestion t o offer i n solution

o f the question o f the law o f succession of the states
comprised in positive science itself The logical order .
o f the special empiri c al sciences has been consider ed
by C omte as being also the historical order in which

RE AS ON . 5 61
they successively became component parts o f positiv e

s cience generall y and this conception he exhibits a s
,
the hierarchy o f the sciences in t h e Philosophi e P osi

tive But whether the historical order o f existenc e
.
o f the speci a l sciences is o r is n o t the same with their
logical order a question recently debated by M r H

,
. .
Spencer both thes e orders o f arrangement o f t h e

,
s pecial sciences are arrangements o f t h e sciences as
complete systems and are neither o f them an account

,
o f the way in which positiv e scienc e itself advances
in all and each o f its domains that is in all and each , ,
o f the special sciences P ositive scienc e must hav e

.
som e method o f advancing peculiar to itsel f and ,
common to all the branches that i s a ll the special , ,
s ciences o r in its application t o any particular c o ll e c

,
tion o f phenomena And some stages in this method

.
o r this appli cation must be discerni ble in the earlier ,
o f which the science is less and in the later more , ,
complete and self dependent Such a law o f progres s

-
.
in positive science generally and consequently in all ,
t h e special sciences metaphysic included is o ffered

, ,

by M r J S M ill s distinction between the inductive
. . .
o r tentative and the deductive stag e o f any science .
The deductive stage may b e considered to arise in

any science when a sufcient body o f truths peculi ar
,
to the obj ects o f that science has been discovered ,
truths suf ciently certain and suf ciently coherent t o

s erve not onl y as starting points for future ge n e ra l i s a
tions but a l so as at least negative tests o f their cor

,
r e c t n e s s that is truths which a r e s o general and s o

, ,
certain as not to be liable to be overthrown by any

,
thing short o f a reversal o f the laws o f the stability .
and uniformity o f the course o f nature While this .
may be regarded as a genera l a n d direct law fo r all

00
5 62 R E AS ON .
s ciences whatever there is another law t o which some

,
s ciences are subject di r ectly and others indir ectly

,
through the medi ation o f the former This law is .

,
that there are two stages o f the development o f con

s c i o u sn e s s
,
the di rect and the reective the latter ,
being the completion and furnishing the ultimat e

,
analysis o f the former In the rst stage conscious

,
.
,
ness deals with obj ects alone in the second with s ub

,
j e c t and objects at once A nd.a ll sciences become
s ubjective in this complete sense a s soon as they a r e

, ,
conn ected with metaph ysic which is the speculative

,
employment o f reection M etaphysic itself become s

.
deductive when a su fcient body o f truths is estab

li s h e d to reason from ; it might be said perhaps that
it became deductive when Aristotle consciously estab
li sh e d logic o n the basis o f the P ostulates There .
a re thus two laws o f the development o f the sciences ;
rst that they advance from the i nductive to t h e

,
deductive stage ; secondly that they advance from

,
the objective o r solely empirical stage to the meta

, , ,
physical o r that whic h i s at once and equally sub

,
j e c t i v e and object.i ve
5 64 I DE A S .
No t that ther e is any transcendental existenc e

lurking either behind t h e Subject o r behind t h e
object behind the empirical ego o r behind the o h
,
e c t s of consciousness which is unknown to us from

j ,
its very nature S uch transcendental existenc e h a s

.
been shown to melt into the phenomena by the ana ,
lysis already applied But t h e unknown existenc e

.
which remains unknown to all men even after t h e ,
most accurate and complete investigation is an ex ,
i s t e n c e transcending o ur knowledge in degree not in

kind transcending o ur conative not o ur intellectual
,
powers an existenc e o f unknown and undiscovered

,
f eelings in innite expansions o f time and space ; o f

which possible and unknown existence we can pre
di c a t e this only that it must b e feeling and tim e and
,
s pace in conjunction .
It may have appeared to som e that in making ,
tim e and spac e the formal lim i ts o f existence w e ,
S hall b e taking away the possibility o f thoughts whic h

give i t s tr ue dignity and value to human nature and
human life ; that we shall b e curtaili ng and even
denying the S p i ritual nature o f man But such s u s .
i c i o n s arise from not considering t h e import of t h e

p
doctrine o f the inni ty o f time and space To com .
l e t e the view already taken o f existence and c o n

p
s c i o usn e s s it remains to s a y a few words o f that
,
unknown possible existence transcendent in degre e,
not in kind towards which we cast longing glances

, ,
but which we can onl y anticipate and not know t h e ,
kingdom o f Ideas and Ideals I t was the great s e r

.
vice o f C oleridge t o dwell upon t h e nature t h e ,
reality the supreme value o f ideas

,
That is t h e .
doctrine fo r which we his countrymen at leas t o we

, ,
h i m lasting honour and gratitude H i s error was if

.
,
ID E A S .
; 5 65
I may presume to s a y s o an error common t o many

,
o thers equally great with himself that o f supposing ,
it essential to ideas to have a faculty o f the mind

appropriated to them which was their organ o f per
,
c e tio n as the eye f colours a faculty named t h

p ,
o e ,
reason The existence o f the reason as a separat e

.
faculty was an inference from the phenomena o f

ideas ; and it was supposed that if the faculty o r ,
S pecial function was denied t h e real existence of t h e

,
o bj ects o f it the ideas must be deni ed also

, ,
But in .
this E ssay it is always the phenomenon itself which

is the point o f departure and the obj ect o f analysis .
I t is the phenomenon which is rst in analysis and

cannot be denied o r deemed unreal whatever may b e ,
thought o f its origin So it was with the perceptions

.
,
s o it was with the concepts and s o it is also with t h e

,
ideas What are they then in themselves ? They

.
belong t o the kingdom o f possible existence ; but n o t

a l l possible existences are ideas Those only a r e .
ideas which a r e possible as in ni te ; into the d e ni

tion o f which it enters that they cannot be fully con
c e i v e d ; which are assumed as existing in innite tim e
a n d space and not in those portions o f time and spac e

,
which are within o ur ken Truth for instance is i t

.
, ,
s elf a n idea according to what has been said in

,
62 .
Ideas are a particular kind o f concepts that kind ,
which advances o n the line o f imagination and then ,
nding the road lead o n to the innite takes a spring ,
and reaches the goal per saltum assuming that t h e ,
innite road has been traversed See 4 7 E very . .
o n e o f such anticipatory concepts is an idea Tim e .
a n d Space themselves as innite are ideas , O bjects ,

.
in t M e and space feelings o f all kinds may be ideas

, ,
a lso when considered as carried o ut to innity

,
In .
5 66 IDE A S .
nite motion inni te power inni te knowledge i n

, , ,
nite happiness innite pain inni te virtue the per

, , ,
fe c t globe the perfect circle and s o o n are ideas

, ,
.
These all depend o n the two modes of the innit e ,
t m e and space There are therefore ideas o f t h e

.
understanding as well as ideas of the reason Those .
ideas which are names o f modes o r states of con

s c i o u s n e s s as disting uished from objects of conscious
,
ness are ideas o f the reason ; for we must have r e

,
e c t e d o n objects and distinguished their subjective

from their objective aspect before we can consider
them as modes of consciousness and therefore before ,
we can consider them as modes o f consciousness car

ried o ut to innity The subjective S ide of objects i s
.
What arises rst in reection and therefore all modes ,
o f consciousness as distinguished from obj ects o f con

,
s c i o u s n e s s are the objects o f reection

,
F ear as di s .
t i ngu i s h e d from the object of fear o r the terrible ; ,
love as disting ui shed from the object o f love o r good ,
ness ; knowledge as distinguished from the obj ect of

knowledge o r truth are modes o f reason o r reecting
, ,
consciousness and when considered as in nite are

,
ideas o f reason .
But let us farther classify ideas o r inni te obj ects .
They natural ly fall in to three great classes accor di ng ,
to the three great branches of h uman knowledge which ,
again depend o n the three great functions o f conscious

ness which it has been said in 3 2 are logical and not
, , ,
empirical divisions o f consciousness The three func .
tions are conation cognition and feeli n g The three

, ,
.
branches o f knowl edge founded on these are Techni c ,
Theoretic and Teleologic Techni c and Teleologic

, .
are the two branches of practical knowledge founded ,
respectively on conation and feeling and are both to ,

5 68 I DE A S .
dwell o n them a s they have dwelt o n their opposit es .
They h ave however been embodied in an idea t h e ,
e vil pr inc iple and that ag a in in an ideal which has

o f id ea s.
,
played a great part in human creeds I understand .

,
by an ideal the embodiment and in cases where t h e , ,
ideas are modes o f reecting consciousness o r reason ,
t h e personi cation o f ideas o n e o r more ; the ideal

being to the ideas which it embodies as the concret e
to the abstract t h e example to the rule ; o r to com
, ,
pare a later with an earlier stage o f consciousness it ,
may be said that ideals are to ideas what the remot e

o bject is to the imme di ate objects in perception We .
must not expect to nd names in common o r even in ,
philosophic a l language for all the ideas either simpl e

, ,
o r mixed The history o f ideas and ide a l s their p s y

.
,
c ho lo is a part o f the history o f philosophy a n d

g
y
,
Opinion which has yet to be written It is enough .
here to contribute something to their analysis .
6 9 But n o w leavin g the other ideas whether

.
,
n amed o r unnamed let us consider as representativ e

, ,
instances the ideas belonging to the three great func

,

tions o f consciousness as obj ects innite x wro a 7 3603 66 1 1
,
7
and in a good sense o r o n the side o f pleasurable and

,
n o t painful emotion and these in their most general

,
s hape namely the good power and truth

, , ,
There i s ,
.
n o obj ect whether simple o r complex which has n o t

, ,
o r may n o t have its idea C oleri d ge examines in his

.
C hurch and State the idea o f the E nglish constitution ;

Plato in his R epublic the idea o f a State Two kinds .
o f ideas must be distinguished o r rather the idea mus t ,
be di stinguished from something which is an a p p ro x i

mation to it but n o t strictly t h e same This latte r
, .
may be called t h e approximate o r mediate idea In .
practic a l knowledge it is a concept o f what i s desir

IDE A S . 5 69
a ble and at the same time probably attainable o r not

, ,
too high o r distant o r perfect to be hoped for within

s ome n o t very long space o f time The true idea on .
,
the other hand is assumed to be unattainable ; this

,
e nters in to its very essence ; it is t h e conclusion o f an
innite progress ; all the mediate ideas are stages o n

the road towards it but it is assumed a s never to be
,
reached ; i t is a compound o f the highest mediate ide a

and the add ed notion o f innity o r in practical mat , ,
ters perfection Let then the ideas o f the good power

, .
, ,
a n d truth be assumed as ideas proper and n o t as me

,
diate ideas .
In the case o f ideas we must hold fast the prin

c i le and mode f analysis which has guided us
p o
throu ghout in the case o f perceptions and in that o f

,
concepts I mean the principle that the obj ect as it is

, ,
present to consciousness is the object a s it exists in

itself We must not now in the case o f ideas turn
.
round upon o ur principle and assume that the objec t

,
o f an idea is something in itself apart from the idea
which we have o f it The idea is real because w e

.
have it in consciousness ; what its nature is must b e

learnt from analysing it as s o present I t exists her e .
and n o w while we are consciou s o f it ; its nature is to

,
be imperfect because assumed to be transcendingly

perfect O bjects o r thoughts o f this nature are pre
.
c i sel those which civilised and cultured man will

y
least readily give up They are himself The mor e
. .
he advances in culture the mo re closely he cli n gs t o

them and the more necessary they are to him I n
,
.
their imperfection which is the other aspect o f their

,
transcending perfection is n o disadvantage but this

, ,
is rather the source o f their value I f they could b e .
grasped ful l y they would lose that transcending per

5 70 I DE A S .
fe c t i o n which is their charm and some other obj ects ,
would be sought after to supply their place F or a s .

,
ti m e and space are innite s o there will be always i n ,
nite obj ects imaginable ; that is there will always be ,
ideas This is their reality and their truth

. .
B ut what is the S pecial truth o f the three ideas

selected for examination ? C an these ideas vani sh
under investigation ? O n e o f them is truth itself ; it
supposes i nvestigation as its condition It is not .
needful to a sk w hether this will vani sh under i n

v e st i a t i o n
g But as
. to the other two the good and ,
power since we have chosen these as representative

,
instances let us s e e whether they will vanish under

,
investigation and then we Shall s e e what quality in

,
them guarantees their truth and consequently what ,
kinds o f ideas from lacking this quality have no

, ,
such guarantee and may be supposed t o vanish from

,
existence a s these attain to it in more and more per

fe e t degrees The truth o f these two ideas the good
.
,
and power is assured to them by their being in har

,
mony with the emotions and desires o f man U nder .
the idea of the good we sum up all the feelings which

we delight in ; under the idea of power we s um up
a ll the forc es mental and material which are capable
, ,
o r productive o f harmonious action N ow reasoning .

,
which is the instrument and condition of truth is a ,
voluntary process We reason because we are inter .
e s t e d in obj ects F eelin gs in which we delight i n

.
t e r e s t us ; their causes are modes o f the power which

produces them So long therefore as we shall be
.
capable o f reasoning s o long as we shall be capable ,
o f seeki n g truth s o long S hall we make these ideas

,
( whether more o r less perfect m akes no d ifference )

the grand and ultimat e object o f o ur search N ot .
5 752 IDE A S .
If this is optimi sm it i s not that Optimism which ,
V oltaire ridiculed which denies the truth o f evil and

,
o f evil ideas s o long as they are felt and whi l st they
e xa m in d
e . last ; but it is an optim i sm which admitting t h e ,
e xistence and t h e truth o f physical and moral evil in
t h e world and in consciousness as actual obj ects y e t , ,
refuses to admit that they will always prove true o r

have ideal truth These t w o sets o f ideas the good
.
, ,
power truth o n the o n e hand and their contraries o n

, , ,
the side o f evil o n the other hand are as concepts m u ,
t u a ll y contra di ctory ; as ideas they are mutually anni

h i l a t o ry o r destructive o f the existence o f each other
,
.
A s ideas they cannot be both o f them real and true , , ,
bein g as they are inni te as well as contradictory

, ,
.
I f we assume the o n e s e t we must deny the other ; ,
th at i s deny that the other wi ll always prove true

,
.
No w is it possible to reason and to suppose that error

i s the result o f reasoning ; should we reason if w e
thought that this was even possible ? It is clear that
w e S hould not for error is what we reason in orde r
,
t o avoid Sim i larly what interests us that i s t h e

.
, , ,
good is what we reason in order to attain ; that is t o

,
sa
y
,
the good and truth a r e two aspects o f the sam e
result o f t h e same process the process o f reasoning ,

.
P ower is all forces all causes which concur to thi s , ,
e n d ; power working in antagonism to this end de
S troys itself and tends to weakness P ower t h e .

,
good and truth a s ideas are inseparable ; there for e

, ,
they are true for truth is sO Therefore their con

,
.
t r a d i c t o ri e s are untrue when considered as ideas o r , ,
in point o f their necessity o f always being true If .
t h e world is a progress towards the o n e it must be a ,
regress from t h e other And this it is by the mere .

action o f the laws o f natur e in t h e world o f obj ect s

ID E A S .
5 7 3
an d by the action o f the laws o f consciousnes s in C H 1X .
reasoning U nattainable as is the goal ex hypothesi

.
.
,
yet it involves equally the elim ination o f evi l and

the establishment o f good the truth o f o n e kind o f
,
e xa m in d
e .
ideas and the untr uth o f t h e other considered in ,
t heir ideal character And we are justied in ex

.
pressing this fact by the p hrase that t h e essenc e , ,
e nd ,
and summum bonum o f t h e univers e a r e c o n
vertible terms .
7 0 These ideas o f the good power and truth

.
, ,
are obj ects o f consciousness in its S piritual life ; and

it has been Often said and I think is generally a d
,
m i t t e d that man grows mor e S piritual that is mor e

, , ,
religious transmuting superstition into religion in

, ,
proportion to his progress in civi l isation and culture .
I do not wish to enter at length upon t h e sacred

ground o f religion o r upon the wider eld o f ethic ;
,
a n d I make the following remark solely fo r the pur
pose o f indicating t h e connection between those s ub

e c t s and the purely cogni tive branch o f consciousness
j ,
which is the main subject o f examination here A S .
all objects o f sensibl e perception are given to u s in

consciousness and are the objects o f belief ; as con
s c i o u s n e s s is belief and existence only another nam e
,
fo r consciousne ss s o also are ideas objects o f c o n

, .
s c i o u s n e s s which arise necessarily in consciousness at
a certain stage o f its development and are in exactly ,
the same way obj ects o f belief In what consists t h e .
difference of the two cases o f belief which are thus ,
s een to b e essenti a l ly the same ? The differenc e i s

solely in that imperfection which is another nam e ,
for the transcending perfection o f the ideas T h e , .
two kinds o f objects differ no t at a l l in point o f

reality nor in point o f truth They differ in nature
,
.
,
5 74 ID E A S .
in point of their different valu e and i n terest to c o n

s c i o u sn e s s. O f a true idea it may b e said as A ristotle ,

s aid o f metaphysic z o u re m 3
2 i f
ig
-
oo m
y g 7 6 06 1 a x
f
,
72 s
,

o o t ez vwv BE o B m Ideas are o ur very life o u r very
p a .
,
s oul ; and their transcending perfection i s the i r value .
O n account o f this distinguishing characteristic of

them we di sti ng uish a particular kind o f belief whi ch
,
we appropriate t o them as ordinary belief is appro ,
r i a t e d to perceptions and concepts We that

p s a
y .
true and ultimate ideas are apprehended by o r a r e ,
present to consciousness i n F aith ,

.
The ideas o f t h e good po w er and truth are I deas , ,
o f the understandi ng the subjective aspect of them

,
shows them as ideas o f the reason o r modes o f r e ,
e c t i ng consciousness A s objects of the reason their

.
names are love power and knowledge ; and as idea s

, ,
o f the reason they are perfect love perfect power , ,
and perfect knowledge When these are considered .
as united in o n e Subject as modes o f its conscious ,
ness they form an ideal person and thi s ideal person

, ,
is G od In this however is contained a very i m

.
portant ass umption the proof o f whi ch can only b e

,
given by ethic and which must therefore remain a s

,
an assumption here namely that the C hristian doc

, ,
trine that love is convertible with happiness as t h e

,
subjective aspect o f t h e ethi c a l summum bonum is ,
a true do ctrine I shall assume the truth o f it her e

.
,
fo r this reason that since the term love expresses

, ,
the feeling o f a person towards others and not hi s ,
feelin g solely toward s o r in himself it conveys a ,
more determ i nate notion to the mind than is c o n

v e e d by the term subjectiv e feeling o f happiness
y .
T h e assumption is that there is o n e particular deter

, ,
minate emotion that of love which includes per

, , , ,
5 76 I DE A S .
mighty Go d and F ather He r eveals himself to u s .

,
and just as light reveals itself in visual perception

,
so does G od reveal himself in reason as t h e s u ,
preme ideal t h e person i n whom are embodied t h e

,
ideas o f love power and knowledge I cannot think

, ,
.
,
supposi n g verbo tenus such a conceptio n to be pos

s ible that it would be an honour to him o r a bene t
, ,
to mankind to suppose him entirely withdrawn from

,
a ll communication with human reason behind t h e ,
impenetrabl e veil o f absolute unin telligible and no n , ,
objective existence It is in these ideas o f love

.
,
power and knowledge o r rather in their union in an

, ,
ideal embraced by the imperfect act o f faith that a l l

, ,
men learned and unlearned alike may rejoice to res t

, ,
from their disputings and e nq ui r i ngs for they are t h e ,
deepest and the truest thoughts in all the range o f

consciousness .
7 1 I return now to the point departed from at

"
the end o f 6 9 and in what is now said the thre e

,
ideas o f the good power and truth will be regarded

, ,
from t h e subjective S ide as they exist in a Subject , ,
o r as ideas o f the reason and bear the names o f love , ,
power and knowledge The objection to which t h e

,
.
logical idea o f Go d is exposed a n d the contradi ction ,
which it appears to involve is this : The idea o f Go d ,
is an idea compounded o f the three ideas innite love , ,
i nnite power and innite knowledge,

Y et there is .
such a thing as evil E ither therefore the love i s .

, ,
not innite o r the power is not innite o r the know

, ,
ledge is not inni te E ither therefore o n e two .

, , , ,
o r all o f the three compounded ideas are not innite ,
o r if they are all in ni te they a r e not compounded
into o n e idea or o n e ideal o r o n e person

, ,
.
F rom this reasoning it i s sometimes attempted t o

ID E A S . 5 77
e scape by two argumenta ad hominem ; rst by a p ,
pealing to the impotence o f man as showing that ,
man has no right to question the idea o f G od for , ,
Since in nite power is incl uded in it man is but clay ,
to the potter and cannot reply t o G od Why hast

, ,
thou made me thus ? and secondly by appealing t o ,
the ignorance o f man as taking away his right to s a y

,
that apparent evil is real evil for it is argued What

, , ,
o u call evil may be good in the innite wisdom o f

y
G od .
The answer t o the latte r argument is this : The

e xistence o f evil rests o n the same grounds o f evi
dence as the existenc e o f good If therefore what is .
apparently evil may be really not evil but good then ,
what is apparently good may be really not good but

e vil a nd if s o
, ,
then the very idea of goodness o r love
,
may be taken away So that this argument is as

.
dangerous to that which it defends as to that which

it attacks ; and we are forced to admit that we must
consider evil to be as real as good .
The answer to the rst argument is similar : If

man has no right to question he has none to assert ,
if he cannot examine the truth o f his ideas he cannot ,
know that they are true E qually therefore does t h e

.
rst argument injure the cause which it advocates .
The true answer to the objection may be found

i n what follows
. It must be remembered that the
.
obj ects which have to be reconciled are ideas that i s , ,
are supposed to be existing in innite perfection ;

that it is not an historical proof that is sought n o t a ,
proof that the world as we see it is the effect of these

previously existing attributes as its caus ae e x i s t e n d i ;
but th at it is required to Show that love power and , , ,
knowledge when considered a s innitely perfect are

, ,
PP
5 78 . ID E A S .
compatible with each other and n o t mutually contra

di c t o ry the dif c ul ty being thi s tha t power appears ,
to be no t innite if li mited to the production only of

the good that when we s a y all power o r in n ite
, ,
po wer we must include those operations which are

,
bad as well as those which a r e good

,
The task .
before us the meta physical task o f reconciling the

, ,
thre e ideas o f love power and knowledge is much , , ,
e as ier than would be the t a sk o f showing that the
union o f these three attributes was historicall y the

c ausa e x i s t e n d i 55 5 7673m w wewg o r e f cient cause of the
, , ,
universe ; such a cause would be an obj ect o f onto

l ogy and quite beyond the reach o f metaphysic
,
.
F irst o f a l l why sho ul d these three ideas love

, , ,
ower and knowledge be u ni ted together at a ll ?

p , ,
What makes us choose these t o personi fy in an ideal ?
It is because they are ideas of the reason and express

the perfection o f all the three functions o f conscious
ness feeling conation and cognition ; and because
, , , ,
being s o we nd them always uni ted in o urselves as

,
objects Of reason and therefore cannot di su ni te them

,
when represented a s inni te There is no c o nt ra di c .
tion in their union as obj ects o f reason ; the contra

di ction ap p e ars i n them rst when they are r e p r e
sented as inni te fo r in nite power appears t o mean,
all p ower power directed to all purposes good and

, ,
bad indi fferently I will att empt to Show that the.
name power is applicable only to power directed to

good purposes that power includes in its signication
,
the desirabili ty o f the result to which it tends ; in

accordance with the dictum o f P lato that Go d is not ,
the author o f a l l things but only o f the good Ti maeus , .

,
7 0
,
R ep B 379
. . .
Two thi ngs must be obs erved about power The .

5 80 ID E A S .
St Augustine In Johann E vang Tract 1 I 3 that

.
,
. . . .
,
S in and idols have no existence at all and that man ,
is ipso facto and pro tanto annihilated when he sins ;

but I s a y that evil o f all kinds moral and physical
, , ,
has no ideal truth .
By inni te power then is meant power dir ected

, ,
to a certain purpose namely love and knowledge , , ,
and overcoming power improperly s o called directed , ,
to all antagonistic ends ; for power conicting with

power is not power but weakness And in this I .
do but repeat St Anselm P r o sl o gi um cap 7 And

.
, ,
. .
because power conictin g with power is weakness ,
therefore innite power which is not weakness but ,
its opposite must be power o f a certain kind distin

, ,
'
u i sh e d by its result o r purpose ; must be not power

g
gen erally as commonly understood but power di
, ,
r e c t e d to some single o r harmoni ous purpose ; it must
be power to produce the good and eliminate the bad .
I would therefore employ always the word activity

to signify power taken generally and restrict t h e ,
word power to mean activity of a certain kind activity ,
directed to purposes which are considered as good .
A ssuming then that love and knowledge are the brief

summary of all good a point which it is the provinc e
,
o f ethic to investigate the power of loving and know

,
ing is the only power which is innite for it is t h e ,
only power which can destroy a l l antagonists T h e .
contradiction then l ies only with those who maintain

th at innite power is equivalent to power generally ,
o r to the power o f producing good and bad i n di f
fe r e n t l y .
The insight that innite power must be power

,
o f a articu l ar ki nd characterised by its purpose or

p
result may be obtai ned by reecting o n t h e exercis e
,
ID E A S . 5 81
o f volition a l emotional and c ognitive functions o f

, ,
consciousness When we exercise volition and reect

.
o n that conscious n ess we s e e that o u r volition has

,

a lways a purpose 27 043 05 w vo ; Eg
0 o /em f If the pur .
,
pose is attained the volition is complete and ceases

,
.
Suppose the purpose to be perfect good the volition ,
by which it is attained will be perfect also If w e .
have contrary purposes in view the volition will b e ,
di s t racted and c on icting with itself In such a case .

,
although ther e would be greater intensity o f volition ,
greater consciousness o f e ffort the result would b e ,
less the s um tot a l o f the power would be reduced

,
.
T h e same thing may be shown also in another

and more direct way The function o f conation a n d .
its completion in volition was shown i n 3 2 to be not ,
a function o f equal rank with those o f feeling and

c ognition but a part o f the general function o f feel
,
i ng . All activity o r action is divisible into t w o ele

ments only feeling and cognition All ac t ion is
,
.
cogni tion and all action is feeling If the whole o f

,
.
the cognition is characterised by o n e term know ,
ledge and the whole o f the feeling is ch a racterised

,
by o ne term good the whole action is characterised

, ,
by the t w o terms in u ni on ; and there is no room for

the action itself o r a ny par t o f it such as conation o r
, ,
volition to be charac t erised as bad T o characteris e

,
.
an action a conation a volition as bad is to charac

, , ,
t e r i s e the feeling which it contains a s such ; for, ,
there is no such thing as action conation o r volition , ,
apart from feeling .
B ut n o w arises a further question Why S hould .
o u r idea o f Go d be an idea o f goo d ness ; why should
it no t be an idea o f innite activity directed to i n

nit e evil and innite error a n activity for wh ich , .
5 82 I DE A S
there I s no sp e cial name ? It might seem superuou s

t o answer such a question P ractical interest indeed
.
it has n o t but it has some S pec ul ative i nt e I est T h e

,
.
answer is found in reecting o n o ur o w n conscious

ness its objects a n d its method What is goodness ?
, ,
.
That which we desire What is the summum bonum ?

.
That which we permanently and increasingly desire ,
when more and more enlightened by knowledge ; i n

other words that state o f consciousness which is t h e
,
end at once o f o u r volition cognition and emotion , , .
We reason in order to attain the good we desire t o ,
attain the good we act to attain the good T h e

,
.
exercise o f any o n e o f these function s and sti ll mor e ,
the exercise of them a l l in conj unction as it is t h e ,
nature of o ur consciousness to exercise them involve s ,
logically the assumption that the exercise will issu e

in good since we exercise them consciously I t
,
.
would be a s t ul t i c a t i o n o f ourselves to assume that i '
they could issue in what was un d e si ra b l e a n d untrue .
This consideration therefore is a bar to our pleadin g

that evil will be ultimately p r e d o m i n a nt w i l l not b e ,
.
ultimately annihilated in the universe It is decisiv e

,
.
as an argumentum ad hom i nem Such pleading would .
be parallel to the contradiction into which a sceptic

would fall who Should think that it was possible t o
,
prove that no proof was possible .
But secondly and without arguing ad hominem ,

,
but looking to the historical or psychological side o f

the question the course o f this world has been and
,
is being actually though gradually improved ; con

, ,
s c i o u s n e s s does actually exhibit a progress toward s
good and towards the elim i n ation o f evil ; and t h e

grounds of this gradual progress may be pointed o ut
in t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l analysis of successive states o f
.
5 84 I DE AS .
laid in o n e o f the deepest and most elementary facts

o f consciousness a fact which appears at rst sight to
,
have no conn ection with that idea ; and thus this fact
throws light at once o n the idea assumed and o n t h e
necessity of its assumption .
It will be evident that here also as in t h e cas e o f

,
the postulates o f logic ; it is no proof that is intended ,
but an analysis ; an analysis o f the idea o f G od and ,
o f the mode o f its arisin g or r a t h e r a n indication o f

its sources i n human consciousness But in both .
cases alike the proof of the truth o f the object ana

lysed is contained implicitly in the analysis ; no o n e
can admit the analysis and doubt the truth o f the
,
object analysed ; at least on the admission o f the doc

trine that presence in consciousness is existence and
,
v ice vers a M any have been the modes in whi ch

.
philosophers have analysed the idea o f G od To reli .
gion it matters little how the analysis is performed ;

in religion the truth o f the objec t is the important
point and this is founded in the nature o f conscious
,
ness itself and is secure beyond the reach o f question

,
.
B u t the analysis o f it is the important point for phi

l o s o p h y and every system o f philosophy wil l in turn
,
propose i t s o w n analysis as t h e most satisfactory .
P lato analysed the idea o f Go d into life and reason;

A ristotle into the supreme good conscious o f itself ;
St Anselm into the union o f all reality and p e rfe c
.
tion e x 1 s t e n c e being o n e o f the perfections ; Spinoza

,
into the hidden substance o f two inni te attributes ,
thought and extension ; Leibni tz into t h e monad o f

monads and all thes e conceived the idea as an objec t
fo r the S pec ul ative reason Kant renouncin g t h e
.
,
attempt to conceive t h e idea o f G od as an object for

t h e theoretic which with him was the constitutive

, ,
I DE A S . 5 85
reason maintained that it was true but true only

, ,
fo r the practical reason o r as an idea regulative o f

,
thought and o f life In these cases and I believe in

.
,
all others that could be mentioned the truth of the ,
idea is felt to be necessary ; t h e attempt is to give

some account o f what the idea is that is to analyse , ,
it Analysis is not irreligious because religious writers

.
usu a l ly make no attempt to analyse ; such an attempt

is not within their provi nce a s re l i gi o u s writers : But
the repeated attempts o n the part of philosophy to

analyse the idea of G od are an evidence o f the tr uth ,
a recognition o f the necessity and therefore a homage ,
to the power o f the object of their contemplations .
A s it is impossible to be conscious and not conscious

o f some object so it is impossible to be religious
,
and not religious towards G od G od is the obj ect .
o f the religious consciousness and man is by his na ,
ture religious A nd this is true however imperfect

.
,
o r inadequate may be the anal ysis proposed ; the

truth o f the idea o f G od is felt to be necessary even ,
though the analysis proposed o f it Should divide its

constituent elements o r even characterise it by a
,
differe nt name .
The union o f the members o f analysis into a single

obj ect transforms the idea into an ideal a whole whose ,
parts are ideas ; and when the ideas s o united are

subjective modes o f consciousness as for instance ,
when they are love power and knowledge instead o f

, , ,
the good power and truth then the ideal in which

, , ,
they are un ited is a person N ow the phenomena .
from which we start in this case are the reli gious

e motions ; the nature o f the object o f the emotions
can only be learnt by an exami n ation o f the emotions
themselves And there is o ne truth to which all
.
5 86 ID E A S .
religious writers testify unanimously whether they ,
have written as expressing th eir o w n emotions o r a s ,
describing them ; and this truth is that religion is a ,
personal matter an emotion o f a person towards a

,
person $ 07 7} 70612o 7 5 6; a vo v and not towards an

,
.
,

obj ect which is not conceived as contai ning a Subject .
It follows therefore that the ideal o f G od consists in

the union o f the personal subjective attributes o f
love power and knowledge and not of the obj ective
, , ,
attributes o f the good power and truth ; in other

, ,
words that the ideal of G od is an ideal o f the reason

,
and not of the understandi ng Hence also the va l idity .
o f the title F ather

,
the onl y name which expresse s
,
by itsel f alone the nature of G od a name in which ,
the whole o f religion nds its utterance a name rst ,
uttered i n its full signicance by C hrist C hristianity .
as C hrist conceived it is the true religion It is not .
within the province o f this E ssay to show that no

other religion but the religion of C hristianity not
,
indeed the system o r systems o f philosophy o r y v m g

which pass too commonly under that name but the ,
religion o f C hristianity as it was conceived by C hrist ,
corresponds fully to the needs and is as expansive

,
as the nature o f man N evertheless the analysis o f

,
.
the ideal o f Go d here proposed is propos e d as

analysis o f the C hristian ide a l o f G od that i s as an , ,
an a l ysis o f that ideal o f Go d which is implicitly

adopted by true C hristians And if the C hristian .
ideal is capable o f being s o analysed it follows that it ,
shares the truth o f that analysis But it is not requi .
site for its capabili ty o f being s o analysed that it

, ,
should have been expli citly recogni sed by any C hris

tian as s o capable F igurative expressions best con
.
v e y and have been always found the best to convey

, ,
E P IL o e uE .
T ur p e e st d i f c i l e s hb a e re nug a s,
Et s t ul t us lba o r e st i nep t i a rum .

IT is so And I remark only that if the endeavou r

.
,
to a n alyse the world is a tri e it is because the world ,
is such The Sum o f things can have no second

.
intention nor can it be characterised by any trait

,
that is not included i n itself Some things are sweet .

,
but what is o ur sense which perceives them ; som e

thin gs are good but what is o u r conscience which
,
judges them ; some things are true but what is o ur ,
intellect which argues them ; some things are deep ,
but what is o ur reason which fathoms them ? E very

o n e who thin ks deeply must have reected that if t h e ,

purposes and results o f man s practice are vanity s o ,
also must be those o f his speculation G oethe said .

,
that there was n o refuge from virtues that were n o t

o u r o w n but in loving them ; and E cclesiastes that ,
there was none from the vanity o f life but in fearing

and obeyin g Go d So a l so from the vanity o f Spe e n
.
lation there is no refuge but in acquiescing in i t s

relative nature and acceptin g truth for what it is
,
.
R O B S ON A N
D S O N, G R E A T NO RT HE R N P R I NTI NG WO R K S ,
P ANCR A s R OAD , N
. w
.

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E

M t phy i i phil phy

PR E S ENTAT I ON AND R E P R E S ENT AT I ON .

S P ONT ANE O US R E D INT E GR A T I ON

V O L UNT AR Y R E D INT E GRAT I ON .

Hyp th t i o di jun t i p p iti n

63 Int uit ive

65 . R t p t f m t phy i l phil phy

1 . writer o f the followin g pages submits them

not without a sense o f their i m perfection to the judg ,

ment o f his contemporaries The questions t reated .

o f labour under o n e kind Of dif culty pec uli arly

pared to admit that in o n e part o f metaphysical

enquiries the proof to be required di ffers in its nature

from the proof to be required in the purely obj ective

o f the matter at once subj ective and objective In .

the purely Objective sciences a writer need have no

clear what the precise object is about whic h he rea ,

sons For instance in P olitical E conomy he can

obviate ambiguities in his Object matter by dening -

tion he can dene P roductive Labour to mean labour

which produces such commodities ; for every one is

still in process o f doing there every man must be ,

judge for hi mself whether his o w n internal e x p e ri

ence bears o u t the assertions Of the writer Fo r the .

facts o f metaphysic like those o f e very purely o b je c

tive science are facts of consciousness and their o b

sc u t i and the dif culty o f observing them make

very questions at issue are What are the facts ? What,

is their analysis and Is there any phenomenon

no judge but consciousness itself Such qu estions .

for instance are the a nalysis of the cogni tions of

time and space t h e analysis of consciousness in its

simplest concrete shape the q uestion whether we are

immediately conscious of the Will and s o on If the ,

meanin g of the term red was no t su fciently agre ed

o f indivi duals to decide what colour should be dis

t i ngui s h e d by this name ; and those who were colour

A great part of metaphysic not by any means ,

the whole of it and a continually though slowly de

creasing part is in this un x e d and undetermined

state ; and it is natural that this sh ould be the case

the universal and obvious presence o f some O f its

u n x e d part of metaphysic the appeal to c o n s c l o u s

ness must still be per mitted ; there the proofs must

sufcient consensus of judgments and the aim o f the

not to give convin cing inferential proofs of his posi

to lead and as sist the reader in nding the proofs

for himself o r in other words t o aid h i m in going

through the trains of reasoning in such an original

By the term consciousness in this E ssay is a l

ways meant consciousness as existing i n an in di vidual

individuals unless they themselves recognise their

truth as descrip tions applicable to the p rocedur e and

if true will ultimately be recogni sed as such by all

individuals whose consciousness is formed o n the same

2. THE true opposite o f the term metaphysic is

states o f consciousness o r with external phenomena .

States of consciousness and external phenomena whe ,

ther abstract o r concrete whether considered as parti

o nlar and unclassied o r as general and classied are ,

known to us by experience either direct o r indirect ,

by perception o r by inference ; that is to s a y they ,