Arroyo v.

de Venecia (1997)

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise
a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House
of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated
House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery.
It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the
repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary,
the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith
belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. Theymay be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to
a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of
the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon
the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of
popular government.

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just.
 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947
Ponente: Justice Tuason

Facts:
Instant petition is for prohibition of a congressional resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. 3 of petitioner senators were proclaimed elected in
the April 1946 elections, but were then suspended on alleged irregularities. The 8
petitioner representatives had not been allowed to sit. Thus, the mentioned did not
take part in the passage of the resolution. If their votes had been counted, the
affirmative votes would have been short of the necessary.

Issue:
Whether or not the issue is justiciable.

Held:

No. Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial review,
except when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts by
constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the separation of powers.
According to a US case, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of proposed
amendment to Federal Constitution is a political question. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. 1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification.

Proposal to amend is highly political performed by Congress in its sovereign

legislative capacity, and there is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposals
validity rather than ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President to use
his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the legislature to pass a
certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial review if the one charged fails to
perform them. Motives are beyond the courts. The sensible solution is not to patch
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to circumvent the Constitution, but to represent
ourselves with competent legislators.

The Code of Civil Procedure provides proving legislative proceedings 1) journals,

clerk/secretary certified; 2) copy signed by presiding officers and secretaries,
conclusive proof. But this Court chooses to pass over the question. The journals
have no signs of irregularity.
 ASTORGA (Vice-Mayor of Manila) vs. VILLEGAS (Mayor of Manila)
G.R. No. L-23475 | April 30, 1974 | Makalintal, C.J.

Nature: The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No.
9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose
Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
Doctrine: Journal and Congressional Records Art. VI, Sec 16 (4)

Facts:
o March 30, 1964- House Bill No. 9266 was filed in the House of
Representatives.
o April 21, 1964- The bill was passed on third reading without amendments and
was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. Senator Roxas
suggested a minor amendment to the bill wherein instead of the City
Engineer, the President Protempore of the Municipal Board should succeed
the Vice-Mayor in case of his incapacity to act as Mayor but this amendment
did not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted
upon.
o May 20,1964- while the bill was on second reading in the Senate, Sen.
Tolentino introduced substantial amendments to Section 1 (not mentioned in
the case) Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate.
o May 21, 1964- the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HOR that
House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the
one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments
(which were actually approved by the Senate). The HOR confirmed approval
of House Bill No. 9266. The Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Senate President certified and attested the bill.
o June 18, 1964- through the president's approval, House Bill 9266 became
Republic Act No. 4065.
o July 5,1965- In a press statement, Sen. Tolentino stated that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was
a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him which were approved on the
Senate floor.
o The Senate President clarified that he is invalidating his signature on House
Bill 9266 because it was not the approved version by the Senate.
o July 31, 1964- President of the Philippines officially withdrew his signature as
well because "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into
law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
o Due to the bill invalidation, Manila Mayor Villegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to
the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila
to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order
to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to the Vice-Mayor due to said House bill.
 o Vice-Mayor Astorga filed a petition for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
o April 28, 1965- Respondent who was scheduled for an official trip abroad filed
for a restraining order, without bond, enjoining the petitioner from exercising
any of the powers of an Acting Mayor conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of
Manila under Republic Act 4065.
o Respondents claim that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law
since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in
the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in
the resolution of the issue while petitioner argues that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is a conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.

Issue:

1. W/N RA 4065 is a valid law-no

The certification made by the presiding officers of Congress is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved
by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
Republic Act 4065 is invalid because it was not duly approved by Congress due to
the signatures being withdrawn.

2. W/N the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in validating the said
bill-yes
Since the certification of Congress is invalid the Supreme Court have resorted to the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor,
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President and signed by him.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called
Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby
made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Notes:
1935 constitution: Sec. 10 (4)"Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its
judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2) "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar
days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the
necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment
thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
 MORFE V MUTUC
January 31, 1968 | Fernando, J.

Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)

Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive Secretary) et al.

Declaratory relief (Appeal)

Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption
of office and within the month of January of every year thereafter, as well as
upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office
to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of
his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year.

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission within the
month of January of every other year thereafter of their sworn statement of assets
and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police
power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the
ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination.

Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:

Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation

Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of

general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate
exercise of police power.

CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the
police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

Issue/s: Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive
exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right
to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together
with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and
official dignity of public officials.

Ruling: Decision reversed.

Ratio:

Presumption of validity
 o Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement
for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to
rebut the presumption of validity.
o If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. (Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila)

Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause
o inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society (Justice Malcolm)
o The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the
limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
o Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to
regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.
o It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to
protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
o Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due
process is observed.
o The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official
action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression.
o It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh
and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to
heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming officeThere was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.

Right to privacy & Right to be let alone

o It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for

disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person
to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a
public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of
the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.
 Unreasonable Search and Seizure
o The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does
not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.

Right against self-incrimination

o We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a mans

conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.

Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

o Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action

taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
 Alba v. Evangelista
Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the
vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio
Alajar was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to
Alajar telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was
then declared as the acting mayor. Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a
quo warranto case before Judge Jose Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
Appointment of City Officials The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines,
the mayor, the vice-mayor and he may remove at pleasure any of the said officers
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the
constitutional inhibition that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law, because the two
provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the
president upon displeasure.
HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or
during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of
which Congress could not deprive him.
The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and
fixing the term or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right and the tenure or the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise
of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing,
among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which
the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the
logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of
certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar was
appointed by the pleasure of the president and can also be removed when that
pleasure ceases.