SULPICIO VS CA

FACTS

APugad,
contract of carriage was entered into between petitioner and ALC for the transport of the latter's timber from
Lianga, Surigao del Sur.

March 17, 1976 Sulpicio sent its tugboat "MT Edmund" and barge "Solid VI" to Lianga to pick up ALC's timber.
However, no loading could be made because of the heavy downpour.
The next morning, several stevedores of CBL, who were hired by ALC, boarded the "Solid VI" and opened its
storeroom.
The stevedores were warned of the gas and heat generated by the copra stored in the holds of the ship.
Not heeding the warning, a stevedore entered the storeroom and fell unconscious. Two other stevedores
followed, one of whom was Leoncio L. Pamalaran. He also lost consciousness and eventually died of gas
poisoning.

Thus, Civil Case No. 2864 for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran by
Pamalaran's heirs against petitioner CBL, ALC and its manager, Ernie Santiago.

TC: ruled in favor of plaintiffs, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered:
Ordering defendants CBL Timber Corporation, AGO Lumber Company, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Ernie Santiago
to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally:
- 1. Actual and compensatory damages of P40,000.00;
- 2. Moral damages of P50,000.00;
- 3. Attorney's fees of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit (Rollo, p. 57).
CA: Affirmed LC decision.
HtP
PETITIONER ARGUMENTS
1. Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner. Therefore, it is not liable as a common carrier;
2. Petitioner and its employees were not negligent in the series of events which led to the death of
Pamalaran;
3. Petitioner is not liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code;
4. It is CBL and/or ALC which should be held liable for the death of the victim; and,
5. Petitioner should have been granted its just and valid counterclaims and cross claims.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that although Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner, still the
latter is liable as a common carrier for his death.
The Court of Appeals relied on Canas v. Dabatos (1965).
In said case, 13 persons were on board the vessel of defendant not as passengers but as 'cargadores' of the
shipper's goods. They were there with the consent and knowledge of the owner of the vessel. Despite the
absence of a passenger-carrier relationship between them, the appellate court, just the same, held the
patron thereof liable as a common carrier. The appellate court ruled:
- There is no debate as to the fact that not one of the thirteen passengers have paid an amount of money as
fare for their conveyance from Hingotanan to Cebu. The undisputed fact, however, is that all of them were in
the boat with the knowledge and consent of the patron. The eleven passengers, other than Encarnacion and
Diosdado were in the boat because they have helped in loading cargoes in the boat, and "to serve as
cargadores of the cargoes," presumably, in unloading them at the place of destination. For those services
they were permitted to be in the boat and to proceed to their destination in Cebu. The services rendered were
the valuable consideration in exchange for the transportation fare. "In onerous contracts the cause is

1
 understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the
other; . . ." (at p. 925; emphasis supplied).

ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner.

The presence of the stevedores sent by ALC on board the barge of petitioner was called for by the contract of
carriage.
For how else would its lumber be transported unless it is placed on board? And by whom?
Of course, the stevedores.
Definitely, petitioner could not expect the shipper itself to load the lumber without the aid of the stevedores.
Furthermore, petitioner knew of the presence and role of the stevedores in its barge and thus consented to their
presence. Hence, petitioner was responsible for their safety while on board the barge.

Petitioner next claims that its employees even warned the stevedores and tried to prevent their entry into
the storeroom. SC: NO

Such argument, again, is demolished by the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
. . . . However, appellant failed to prove that its employees were actually trained or given specific instructions to
see to it that the barge is fit and safe not only in transporting goods but also for people who would be loading the
cargo into the bodega of the barge.
It is not enough that appellant's employees have warned the laborers not to enter the barge after the hatch was
opened. Appellant's employees should have been sufficiently instructed to see to it that the hatch of the barge is
not opened by any unauthorized person and that the hatch is not easily opened by anyone.
At the very least, precautionary measures should have been observed by appellant's employees to see to it that
no one could enter the bodega of the barge until after they have made sure that it is safe for anyone to enter the
same.
Failing to exercise due diligence in the supervision of its employees, the lower court was correct in holding
appellant liable for damages.
Inasmuch as the findings of the Court of Appeals are merely an affirmance of the findings of the trial court, which
findings are supported by the evidence, we do not find any reason to reverse the same.

There is no quarrel that ALC and CBL are also liable as they were in fact held liable by both the trial and
appellate courts.
Both the counterclaims and cross claims of petitioner are without legal basis. The counterclaims and cross
claims were based on the assumption that the other defendants are the ones solely liable. However, inasmuch
as its solidary liability with the other defendants has clearly been established by both the trial and the appellate
courts, which we find to be in order, we cannot make a different conclusion contrary to that of the said courts.

Finally, the indemnity for the death of Leoncio L. Pamalaran is increased from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994).

RULING

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
actual and compensatory damages is increased to P50,000.00.

2
JAPAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California bound
for Manila.
On the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los
Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061.
As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita,
Japan, at the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.

Upon
night.
arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the

The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila.
However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic.
Hence, private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight
No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay.

June 16, 1991 much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again
cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure.

Atexpense
this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation
during their stay in Narita.

accommodations
NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991 so private respondents were forced to pay for their
and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991.
Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
July 25, 1991 Private respondents commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
To support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and
comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from
June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan.
In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still
stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no
vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force majeure."

TC: rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. JAL liable for damages.
CA: lowered damages but affirmed TC finding.
HtP
ISSUE
Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its
stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused by "force
majeure.

No dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule.

Likewise, private respondents concede that such event can be considered as "force majeure" since their delayed
arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL.

3
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT

However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed arrival in Manila, it
was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the
obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers.

HOLDING

While we sympathize with the private respondents' plight, we are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind, and degree from any other contractual relation.
It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.
Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it
liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.
However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages
even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event.
To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an exception from any liability,
illusory and ineffective.

No question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is that
he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.
Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers
incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.
Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991.

Admittedly,
respondents.
to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the private

To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament
was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights.
Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded
passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel.
In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air
travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect.
After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.

Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of "force majeure," still ruled against JAL relying
in our decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals, thus:
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by
law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event.
Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers.
Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal
with situations as in the case at bar.
What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises.
Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination.

4
 On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim
rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.

SC: The reliance is misplaced.

The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant petition.
In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the diversion of the PAL flight.
However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened when "private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport
and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel," not to mention the apparent apathy
of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the stranded passengers.
In light of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and
malfeasance by the carrier's employees, an action for damages against the carrier is permissible.
Unfortunately, for private respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.

We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability.

Itdestination.
must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final

While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on
account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private
respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila.
Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it
declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private
respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.
Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24.
To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the
whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that
they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.

We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused
considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation.
In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flight operations would be
normal on the days affected.
Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to
transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport
private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.

Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order.

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by
him. 12 The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article
1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. 13

RULING

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1993 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to
pay each of the private respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorney' s fees of
P50,000.00 plus costs.

5
DEL PRADO VS MERALCO

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recover damages in the
amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, the
Manila Electric Company, in the operation of one of its street cars in the City of Manila.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of
suit, and the defendant appealed.

The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance of
passengers

On the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in charge of car
No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near the
intersection of said street and Mendoza Street.

After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of the
intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman.

The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street
to catch the car, his approach being made from the left.
The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of the plaintiff was so timed
that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the car was passing.

The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to show that the plaintiff, upon
approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in response to
which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping.
Upon this the plaintiff seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular handspot, at the same time placing his left
foot upon the platform.
However, before the plaintiff's position had become secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached
the platform, the motorman applied the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward.
This sudden impulse to the car caused the plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the
handpost,
He therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.
The next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital.
The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as the plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on
either side with both right and left hand.
The latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the plaintiff, but we are of
the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman slowed up slightly as the plaintiff was
boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at the moment
when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed by us.

The motorman stated at the trial that

he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car;
he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses;
he in fact knew nothing of the incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and some one called to him to stop.
SC: We are not convinced of the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see how a
motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding the car under the circumstances
revealed in this case.
It must be remembered that the front handpost which, as all witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in
attempting to board the car, was immediately on the left side of the motorman.

6
 With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of
a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for
stoppage.
In fact it would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if a company engage in this business were
required to stop any and everywhere to take on people who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be
in too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars.
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his
duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to
board the car.
The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.

The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in
failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa
contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code.

Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the
cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. *** IMPORTANT UNDER THE TOPIC
The case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of this duty with
respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train.
In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing down in a station, and at the time
when it was too dark for him to see clearly where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had
carelessly left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the result that his feet
slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm badly injured.
This court held that the railroad company was liable for breach positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff
was awarded damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction
is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising from breach of contractual duty and that arising articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).

RE: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TORT LIABILITY AND LIABILITY FOR CONTRACTUAL BREACH AND ITS
APPLICATION TO INSTANT CASE
The distinction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction

For the reason that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive
obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, by providing that he had exercised due negligence to prevent the damage

Whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa
contractual).

APPLICATION: In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
dIligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this
contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and
instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art.

But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under
article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710.)

Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902 of the Civil Code and liability
arising from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of the
Civil Code,

Isthethat, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is given a discretion to mitigate liability according to
circumstances of the case (art 1103).

No such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising under article 1902
Although possibly the same end is reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability because of the
latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.

7
RE: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
We are of the opinion that it should be treated, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as
a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil Code.

Itinjury.
is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate cause of the

The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power
prematurely.
A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the
conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the
situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the
platform.
Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent
act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The
rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of "the last clear chance."
In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa,
872; 171 N. W., 167).
The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.

With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we note that, although he lost his foot,
he is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning capacity has probably not been
reduced by more than 30 per centum.

Inof limb,
view of the precedents found in our decisions with respect to the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss
and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
(38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the
circumstances connected with the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff will be adequately compensated by
an award of P2,500.

RULING: It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by reducing the recovery to the sum
of P2,500, the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

This appeal presents a hard case, whichever way it is decided.
I read the entire record in this case before it was submitted to the second division for decision. I was then theponente.
I was then convinced, as I am now, after a re-examination of the record, that the judgment of the lower court should
be revoked for the following reasons:
(a) That the motorman managed the car carefully and with ordinary prudence at the moment the alleged accident
occured;
(b) That the appellee acted with imprudence and lack of due care in attempting to board a street car while the same
was in motion; and
(c) That he contributed to his own injury, without any negligence or malice or imprudence on the part of the defendant.
There is nothing in the record which even remotely justifies a contribution of damages between the appellee and the
appellant. The appellee should be required to suffer the damages which he himself, through his own negligence,
occasioned, without any negligence, imprudence or malice on the part of the appellant.
Therefore, the judgment of the court a quo should be revoked, and the appellant absolved from all liability under the
complaint.

8
LA MALLORCA VS COURT OF APPEALS

La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for
quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor
daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.

FACTS

On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus
No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga.
At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging.
The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets
(Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on
Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's
rules and regulations.

After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor, among
whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off.
With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to
get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children.
Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters
away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but
in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father.

While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him
his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while
unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the
conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to
the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran.
Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the
point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without
getting his bayong from the conductor.
He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children.
At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life.
The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode
earlier together with her parents.

For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant seeking to recover
from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained as a result
thereof and attorney's fees.

TC: Found defendant liable.

On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage and
sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing
burial expenses and costs.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract in the case, for
the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident
and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated.

9
 Although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty
of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the
plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.

In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of
contract
(2) in raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from
the decision of the lower court.

Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding petitioner liable
for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran.
It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children
(including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of
passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get
one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus.
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for
his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the
petitioner remained subsisting.
For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting
from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.

The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about
5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also
persisted.

Itthehaspassenger
been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination,
but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises.

And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances.
Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger.
So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the
company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has
been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is
deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the
protection of the railroad and company and its agents.

APPLICATION: In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father.

However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the
bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle.

It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed.
Ina "very
the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of
cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in
the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers.
In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he
started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still
unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family.

10
 The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered
still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable
for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph
7 of the complaint, which reads

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by
the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants
and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide in the operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict.

The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of
carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege
causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter
in controversy may be resolved and determined.

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged
in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent."

This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the
proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it,
started to run off the vehicle.

The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant
employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner
must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however, cannot
be sustained.

Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in
appellant's brief.

Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages
for the death of their daughter.

Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the
inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the
matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court
of Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious.

RULING

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the
amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.

11
BATACLAN VS MEDINA

Facts:
After midnight on September 13, 1952, Bus 30 of Medina Transportation, owned and operated by R
Medina, left Amadeo, Cavite and was bound for Pasay City. It was driven by its regular driver Conrado
Saylon, and together with his conductor, was with 16 passengers. Among the passengers was Juan
Bataclan who was seated to the right of the driver.

(Baka tanungin ni Sir bilang dami niyang obiter questions)

VISAYAN PERSON DRIVER JUAN FELIPE
BATACLAN LARA
NATALIA VILLANUEVA (somewhere behind them)

At about 2 AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the bus began to zigzag until it
fell into a canal on the right side of the road and turned turtle. The 4 passengers above (except the driver,
who was able to get out dont know how) couldnt get out of the overturned bus and about 30 mins later,
10 men living in the area came to help, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo, evidently
fueled with petroleum. As they approached the bus though, a fierce fire started, consuming the bus and
the 4 passengers trapped inside. Apparently, when the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the tank, permeating the body of the bus and the ground around it, and the torch brought by
one of the men helped set it on fire.

By reason of Juan Bataclans death, his widow and his 5 minor children filed an action to recover from
Medina damages amounting to P87,150.

CFI Cavite: P1,000 + P600 attorneys fee + P100 for value of merchandise for sale carried by Bataclan
then

Issue: WON Medina could be held liable Yes

Held: The Civil Code provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods.
(note Torts class discussion)

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

In instant case, there was a breach of contract of transportation for hire, Medina Transportation
having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination. There was also negligence on the part of
Medina, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blowout, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned, there was a
distance of about 150 meters, indicating that Saylon must have applied the brakes in order to stop the
bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

Defendant carrier is responsible, but to what extent? What is the proximate cause?

According to the trial court, the proximate cause was the fire that burned the bus, for when the bus
overturned, Bataclan was still alive. SC disagrees and holds that the proximate cause was the overturning
of the bus, for it was because of this that the leaking of the gasoline happened. The arrival of the men

12
with a lighted torch was expected as the accident happened at 2:30 in the morning and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus (for help and assistance).

Furthermore, the driver and conductor were just on the side of the road; they could have warned or taken
steps not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, as it was evident gasoline already leaked and soaked
the area in and around the bus. Said negligence come under the CC provisions Articles 1733, 1759, and
1763.

It further makes use of this definition of proximate cause, as provided for in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence:

'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.

Hence, damages awarded by the trial court are increased from P1,000 to P6,000, and for attorneys fees,
from P600 to P800.

Obiter:
One of the injured passengers who was hospitalized was visited by Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have
the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of
fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not
taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed
the tires, especially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably,
despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred.
The criminal case against Saylon was provisionally dismissed due to witnesses being reluctant to
testify. As a matter of public interest, the prosecution of Saylon should be pursued. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

13
ABOITIZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

On 11 May 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by herein petitioner at the port of San Jose Mindoro, bound for
Manila. On 12 May 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having
been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third
deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp. took over the exclusive control of
the cargoes loaded on said vessel.

One hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, the Stevedoring Corp. started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering
that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said
vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He
was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired 3 days thereafter. On 15 May 1975, the cause of his death according to the
death certiOicate being hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder.

Private respondents Oiled a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. In its answer, Aboitiz denied
responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of respondent Stevedoring Corp. as
the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz; it is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter
cannot be held liable under the follow-servant rule. Thereafter, Aboitiz Oiled a third party complaint against Pioneer Stevedoring Corp
imputing liability thereto for Anacletos death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was an
employee of the Stevedoring Corp. under its exclusive control and supervision. Stevedoring Corp on the other hand raised its defense
that Aboitiz had no cause of action against them considering that the latter is being sued for breach of contract of carriage to which the
former is not a party and that it was Anacletos gross negligence as the proximate cause of his death; and that the Oiling of the third party
complaint was premature by reason of the pendency of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence Oiled against the
crane operator.

The RTC ordered Aboitiz to pay the Vianas for damages incurred and Pioneer was ordered to reimbursed Aboitiz for whatever amount
the latter paid to Vianas. Both company appealed but it only granted the Stevedoring Company and absolved the same for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator. CA further afOirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the victim is guilty of contributory negligence that caused his death.

Ratio: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the vessel owners dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until
the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carriers conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carriers premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to
be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carriers premises to claim his baggage.

It is apparent that what prompted the Court to rule as it did is the fact of the passengers reasonable presence within the carriers
premises. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on
or near the petitioners vessel. When the incident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right
to do, form petitioners vessel. A carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage.

It is not deOinitely shown that one hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to
prove this. What is clear is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minijm time of one hour allowed for the passengers to disembarked, it may be
presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an
hour earlier, his presence in petitioners premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only
one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioners vessels that the unloading

14
operations shall start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim is still deemed a passenger of said
carrier at the time of his tragic death.

Under the law, common carriers are, form the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all
the circumstances of each case. More particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Thus, were a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives
rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which,
in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passengers with extraordinary diligence which such relation subsists.

There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinary diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly
and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. While the victim was admittedly
contributorily negligent, still the petitioners aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate cause and direct
cause of, because it could deOinitely have prevented the victims death.

Dispositive Portion: Petition is denied and the judgment appealed from is afOirmed. Stevedoring Corp is not within the ambit of the rule
on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on common carriers like Aboitiz.

15