Republic of the Philippines A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132).
A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132). On March 28, 1983, petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was denied by the Presiding
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF TABAC REUNIES,
S.A.,petitioners
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco Law Office for petitioners.
Teresita Gandionco-Oledan for private respondent.
MELO, J.:
In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac
Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the
Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued
against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in
the local market.
Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK", also for cigarettes,
must be protected against unauthorized appropriation, petitioners twice solicited the ancillary writ in the course the main
suit for infringement but the court of origin was unpersuaded.
Before we proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it must be emphasized that resolution of the issue on the
propriety of lifting the writ of preliminary injunction should not be construed as a prejudgment of the suit below. Aware of
the fact that the discussion we are about to enter into involves a mere interlocutory order, a discourse on the aspect
infringement must thus be avoided. With these caveat, we shall now shift our attention to the events which spawned the
controversy.
As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of
America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are
similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered owners "MARK VII",
"MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration issued by the Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May
28, 1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention
of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case from
performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction (p. 75, Court of Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132).
For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with the Philippine Patent Office
subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it
has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark
"MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated (p.158, Court of Appeals Rollo in
Judge of Branch 166 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Pasig, premised
upon the following propositions:
Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are
not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction . . .". This simply
means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, expor[t]ation and
advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines. With this admission, defendant asks: ". . .
how could defendant's "MARK" cigarettes cause the former "irreparable damage" within the territorial
limits of the Philippines?" Plaintiffs maintain that since their trademarks are entitled to protection by
treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the Philippines is a member and
ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as such, have the force and effect
of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is an action for a violation or
infringement of a trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in
the absence of proof to support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue in the main
case to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such
trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of
the Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
There is no dispute that the First Plaintiff is the registered owner of trademar[k] "MARK VII" with
Certificate of Registration No. 18723, dated April 26,1973 while the Second Plaintiff is likewise the
registered owner of trademark "MARK TEN" under Certificate of Registration No. 11147, dated May
28, 1963 and the Third Plaintiff is a registrant of trademark "LARK" as shown by Certificate of
Registration No. 10953 dated March 23, 1964, in addition to a pending application for registration of
trademark "MARK VII" filed on November 21, 1980 under Application Serial No. 43243, all in the
Philippine Patent Office. In same the manner, defendant has a pending application for registration of
the trademark "LARK" cigarettes with the Philippine Patent Office under Application Serial No.
44008. Defendant contends that since plaintiffs are "not doing business in the Philippines" coupled
the fact that the Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for registration of its
trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is premature. Plaintiffs contend that
this act(s) of defendant is but a subterfuge to give semblance of good faith intended to deceive the
public and patronizers into buying the products and create the impression that defendant's goods
are identical with or come from the same source as plaintiffs' products or that the defendant is a
licensee of plaintiffs when in truth and in fact the former is not. But the fact remains that with its
pending application, defendant has embarked in the manufacturing, selling, distributing and
advertising of "MARK" cigarettes. The question of good faith or bad faith on the part of defendant are
matters which are evidentiary in character which have to be proven during the hearing on the merits;
hence, until and unless the Director of Patents has denied defendant's application, the Court is of
the opinion and so holds that issuance a writ of preliminary injunction would not lie.
There is no question that defendant has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
manufacture cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK" (Letter of Ruben B. Ancheta, Acting
Commissioner addressed to Fortune Tobacco Corporation dated April 3, 1981, marked as Annex
"A", defendant's "OPPOSITION, etc." dated September 24, 1982). However, this authority is
qualified . . . that the said brands have been accepted and registered by the Patent Office not later
than six (6) months after you have been manufacturing the cigarettes and placed the same in the
market." However, this grant ". . . does not give you protection against any person or entity whose
rights may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to your indicated
trademarks/brands". As aforestated, the registration of defendant's application is still pending in the
Philippine Patent Office.
It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction as well as in the United States that the right or title of
the applicant for injunction remedy must be clear and free from doubt. Because of the disastrous and
painful effects of an injunction, Courts should be extremely careful, cautious and conscionable in the
exercise of its discretion consistent with justice, equity and fair play.
 There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater In connection with your letter dated January 25, 1984, reiterating your query as to whether your label
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a approval automatically expires or becomes null and void after six (6) months if the brand is not
doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that accepted and by the patent office, please be informed that no provision in the Tax Code or revenue
never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law regulation that requires an applicant to comply with the aforementioned condition order that his label
cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right approved will remain valid and existing.
must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by
the protecting preventive process of injunction. (Bonaparte v. Camden, etc. N.
Based on the document you presented, it shows that registration of this particular label still pending
Co., 3 F. Cas. No. 1, 617, Baldw. 205, 217.)
resolution by the Patent Office. These being so , you may therefore continue with the production said
brand of cigarette until this Office is officially notified that the question of ownership of "MARK" brand
Courts of equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which injunction shall be is finally resolved.
granted or withheld. There is wisdom in this course, for it is impossible to
foresee all exigencies of society which may require their aid to protect rights and
Very truly yours,
restrain wrongs. (Merced M. Go v. Freemont, 7 Gal. 317, 321; 68 Am. Dec.
262.)
TEODORO D. PAREÑO
Chief, Manufactured
It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its operation begin and useful, it
Tobacco
must be exercised with great discretion, and when necessary requires it.
Tax Division
(Attorney-General v. Utica Inc. Co., P. John Ch. (N.Y.) 371.)
TAN-P6531-D2830-A-6

Having taken a panoramic view of the position[s] of both parties as viewed from their pleadings, the
(p. 348, Rollo.)
picture reduced to its minimum size would be this: At the crossroads are the two (2) contending
parties, plaintiffs vigorously asserting the rights granted by law, treaty and jurisprudence to restrain
defendant in its activities of manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising its "MARK" cigarettes It appears from the testimony of Atty. Enrique Madarang, Chief of the Trademark Division of the then Philippine Patent
and now comes defendant who countered and refused to be restrained claiming that it has been Office that Fortune's application for its trademark is still pending before said office (p. 311, Rollo).
authorized temporarily by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under certain conditions to do so as
aforestated coupled by its pending application for registration of trademark "MARK" in the Philippine
Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events which supposedly transpired since March 28, 1983, when the trial court
Patent Office. This circumstance in itself has created a dispute between the parties which to the
first declined issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, that could alter the results of the case in that Fortune's application
mind of the Court does not warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
had been rejected, nay, barred by the Philippine Patent Office, and that the application had been forfeited by
abandonment, but the trial court nonetheless denied the second motion for issuance of the injunctive writ on April 22,
It is well-settled principle that courts of equity will refuse an application for the 1987, thus:
injunctive remedy where the principle of law on which the right to preliminary
injunction rests is disputed and will admit of doubt, without a decision of the
For all the prolixity of their pleadings and testimonial evidence, the plaintiffs-movants have fallen far
court of law establishing such principle although satisfied as to what is a correct
short of the legal requisites that would justify the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
conclusion of law upon the facts. The fact, however, that there is no such
For one, they did not even bother to establish by competent evidence that the products supposedly
dispute or conflict does not in itself constitute a justifiable ground for the court to
affected adversely by defendant's trademark now subject of an application for registration with the
refuse an application for the injunctive relief. (Hackensack Impr. Commn. v. New
Philippine Patents Office, are in actual use in the Philippines. For another, they concentrated their
Jersey Midland P. Co., 22 N.J. Eg. 94.)
fire on the alleged abandonment and forfeiture by defendant of said application for registration.

Hence, the status quo existing between the parties prior to the filing of this case should be
The Court cannot help but take note of the fact that in their complaint plaintiffs included a prayer for
maintained. For after all, an injunction, without reference to the parties, should be violent, vicious nor
issuance preliminary injunction. The petition was duly heard, and thereafter matter was assiduously
even vindictive. (pp. 338-341, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
discussed lengthily and resolved against plaintiffs in a 15-page Order issued by the undersigned's
predecessor on March 28, 1983. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied in another well-
In the process of denying petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order denying issuance of the argued 8 page Order issued on April 5, 1984,, and the matter was made to rest.
requested writ, the court of origin took cognizance of the certification executed on January 30, 1984 by the Philippine
Patent Office attesting to the fact that private respondent's application for registration is still pending appropriate action.
However, on the strength of supposed changes in the material facts of this case, plaintiffs came up
Apart from this communication, what prompted the trial court judge to entertain the idea of prematurity and untimeliness
with the present motion citing therein the said changes which are: that defendant's application had
of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction was the letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue date
been rejected and barred by the Philippine Patents Office, and that said application has been
February 2, 1984 which reads:
deemed abandoned and forfeited. But defendant has refiled the same.

MRS. TERESITA GANDIONGCO OLEDAN

Plaintiffs' arguments in support of the present motion appear to be a mere rehash of their stand in
Legal Counsel
the first above-mentioned petition which has already been ruled upon adversely against them.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Granting that the alleged changes in the material facts are sufficient grounds for a motion seeking a
favorable grant of what has already been denied, this motion just the same cannot prosper.
Madam:
 In the first place there is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs' products which they seek to
protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and
available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. Secondly as shown by plaintiffs' own
evidence furnished by no less than the chief of Trademarks Division of the Philippine Patent Office,
Atty. Enrique Madarang, the abandonment of an application is of no moment, for the same can
always be refiled. He said there is no specific provision in the rules prohibiting such refiling (TSN,
November 21, 1986, pp. 60 & 64, Raviera). In fact, according to Madarang, the refiled application of
defendant is now pending before the Patents Office. Hence, it appears that the motion has no leg to
stand on. (pp. 350-351, Rollo in G. R. No. 91332.)
Confronted with this rebuff, petitioners filed a previous petition for certiorari before the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
78141, but the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside the court of origin's order dated April 22, 1987, and
granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Fortune, its agents, employees, and representatives,
from manufacturing, selling, and advertising "MARK" cigarettes. The late Justice Cacdac, speaking for the First Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13132, remarked:
There is no dispute that petitioners are the registered owners of the trademarks for cigarettes
"MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK".(Annexes B, C and D, petition). As found and reiterated by
the Philippine Patent Office in two (2) official communications dated April 6, 1983 and January 24,
1984, the trademark "MARK" is "confusingly similar" to the trademarks of petitioners, hence
registration was barred under Sec. 4 (d) of Rep. Act. No. 166, as amended (pp. 106, 139, SCA rollo).
In a third official communication dated April 8, 1986, the trademark application of private respondent
for the "MARK" under Serial No. 44008 filed on February 13, 1981 which was declared abandoned
After private respondent Fortune's motion for reconsideration was rejected, a motion to dissolve the disputed writ of
as of February 16, 1986, is now deemed forfeited, there being no revival made pursuant to Rule 98
preliminary injunction with offer to post a counterbond was submitted which was favorably acted upon by the Court of
of the Revised Rules of Practitioners in Trademark Cases." (p. 107, CA rollo). The foregoing
Appeals, premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a
documents or communications mentioned by petitioners as "the changes in material facts which
result thereof, to wit:
occurred after March 28, 1983", are not also questioned by respondents.
Pitted against the petitioners' documentary evidence, respondents pointed to (1) the letter dated
January 30, 1979 (p. 137, CA rollo) of Conrado P. Diaz, then Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, temporarily granting the request of private respondent for a permit to manufacture two (2)
new brands of cigarettes one of which is brand "MARK" filter-type blend, and (2) the certification
dated September 26, 1986 of Cesar G. Sandico, Director of Patents (p. 138, CA rollo) issued upon
the written request of private respondents' counsel dated September 17, 1986 attesting that the
records of his office would show that the "trademark MARK" for cigarettes is now the subject of a
pending application under Serial No. 59872 filed on September 16, 1986.
Private respondent's documentary evidence provides the reasons neutralizing or weakening their
probative values. The penultimate paragraph of Commissioner Diaz' letter of authority reads:
Please be informed further that the authority herein granted does not give you
protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by
infringement or unfair competition in relation to your above-named
brands/trademark.
while Director Sandico's certification contained similar conditions as follows:
This Certification, however, does not give protection as against any person or
entity whose right may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in
relation to the aforesaid trademark nor the right to register if contrary to the
provisions of the Trademark Law, Rep. Act No. 166 as amended and the
Revised Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases.
The temporary permit to manufacture under the trademark "MARK" for cigarettes and the
acceptance of the second application filed by private respondent in the height of their dispute in the
main case were evidently made subject to the outcome of the said main case or Civil Case No.
47374 of the respondent Court. Thus, the Court has not missed to note the absence of a mention in
the Sandico letter of September 26, 1986 of any reference to the pendency of the instant action filed
on August 18, 1982. We believe and hold that petitioners have shown a prima facie case for the
issuance of the writ of prohibitory injunction for the purposes stated in their complaint and
subsequent motions for the issuance of the prohibitory writ. (Buayan Cattle Co. vs. Quintillan, 125
SCRA 276)
The requisites for the granting of preliminary injunction are the existence of the right protected and
the facts against which the injunction is to be directed as violative of said right. (Buayan Cattle Co.
vs. Quintillan, supra; Ortigas & Co. vs. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326). It is a writ framed according to the
circumstances of the case commanding an act which the Court regards as essential to justice and
restraining an act it deems contrary to equity and good conscience (Rosauro vs. Cuneta, 151 SCRA
570). If it is not issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act
which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered
afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). Generally, its
grant or denial rests upon the sound discretion of the Court except on a clear case of abuse (Belish
Investment & Finance Co. vs. State House, 151 SCRA 636). Petitioners' right of exclusivity to their
registered trademarks being clear and beyond question, the respondent court's denial of the
prohibitive writ constituted excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse discretion. If the lower court does
not grant preliminary injunction, the appellate court may grant the same. (Service Specialists, Inc. vs.
Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139). (pp. 165-167, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
The private respondent seeks to dissolve the preliminary injunction previously granted by this Court
with an offer to file a counterbond. It was pointed out in its supplemental motion that lots of workers
employed will be laid off as a consequence of the injunction and that the government will stand to
lose the amount of specific taxes being paid by the
private respondent. The specific taxes being paid is the sum total of P120,120, 295.98 from January
to July 1989.
The petitioners argued in their comment that the damages caused by the infringement of their
trademark as well as the goodwill it generates are incapable of pecuniary estimation and monetary
evaluation and not even the counterbond could adequately compensate for the damages it will incur
as a result of the dissolution of the bond. In addition, the petitioner further argued that doing
business in the Philippines is not relevant as the injunction pertains to an infringement of a
trademark right.
After a thorough re-examination of the issues involved and the arguments advanced by both parties
in the offer to file a counterbond and the opposition thereto, WE believe that there are sound and
cogent reasons for US to grant the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the offer of the
private respondent to put up a counterbond to answer for whatever damages the petitioner may
suffer as a consequence of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction.
The petitioner will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting of
the preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the
cigarettes with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such
damages.
 While the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to dissolve an injunction previously
granted, nevertheless, it is equally true that an injunction could be dissolved only upon good and
valid grounds subject to the sound discretion of the court. As WE have maintained the view that
there are sound and good reasons to lift the preliminary injunction, the motion to file a counterbond
is granted. (pp. 53-54, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion for re-examination geared towards reimposition of the writ of preliminary
injunction but to no avail (p. 55, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332).
Hence, the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to
excess of jurisdiction when:
I. . . . it required, contrary to law and jurisprudence, that in order that petitioners may suffer
irreparable injury due to the lifting of the injunction, petitioners should be using actually their
registered trademarks in commerce in the Philippines;
II. . . . it lifted the injunction in violation of section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court; and
III. . . . after having found that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded
its jurisdiction for having refused to issue the writ of injunction to restrain private respondent's acts
that are contrary to equity and good conscience, it made a complete about face for legally
insufficient grounds and authorized the private respondent to continue performing the very same
acts that it had considered contrary to equity and good conscience, thereby ignoring not only the
mandates of the Trademark Law, the international commitments of the Philippines, the judicial
admission of private respondent that it will have no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after the
Director of Patents shall have rejected the application to register it, and the admonitions of the
Supreme Court. (pp. 24-25, Petition; pp. 25-26, Rollo.)
To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign corporations not engaged in local
commerce, rely on section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows:
Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been
registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair
competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed
to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country
of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by
treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines.
(As inserted by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 638.)
to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines
on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful
authority to do so. Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A, the conclusion reached
by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support thereof is embedded in the Philippine
legal jurisprudence.
Indeed, it was stressed in General Garments Corporation vs. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50 [1971]) by then Justice
(later Chief Justice) Makalintal that:
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum case was subsequently
derogated when Congress, purposely to "counteract the effects" of said case, enacted Republic Act
No. 638, inserting Section 21-A in the Trademark Law, which allows a foreign corporation or juristic
person to bring an action in Philippine courts for infringement of a mark or tradename, for unfair
competition, or false designation of origin and false description, "whether or not it has been licensed
to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint."
Petitioner argues that Section 21-A militates against respondent's capacity to maintain a suit for
cancellation, since it requires, before a foreign corporation may bring an action, that its trademark or
tradename has been registered under the Trademark Law. The argument misses the essential point
in the said provision, which is that the foreign corporation is allowed thereunder to sue "whether or
not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines" pursuant to the Corporation Law
(precisely to counteract the effects of the decision in the Mentholatum case). (at p. 57.)
However, on May, 21, 1984, Section 21-A, the provision under consideration, was qualified by this Court in La Chemise
Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez (129 SCRA 373 [1984]), to the effect that a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines may have the right to sue before Philippine Courts, but existing adjective axioms require that qualifying
circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani Commercial
Laws of the Philippines, 1991 Ed., p. 598; 4 Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws, Rev. Ed., 1986, p. 381). Indeed, it is
not sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin. Rather, it must
additionally allege its personality to sue. Relative to this condition precedent, it may be observed that petitioners were not
remiss in averring their personality to lodge a complaint for infringement (p. 75,Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132)
especially so when they asserted that the main action for infringement is anchored on an isolated transaction (p.
75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132; Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037 (1966), 1
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p. 103).
Another point which petitioners considered to be of significant interest, and which they desire to impress upon us is the
protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Yet, insofar as this
discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the
Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La
Chemise (supra at page 390).
Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the
guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a
cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue
is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners
are of the impression that actual use of their trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable
element under Article 2 of the Paris Convention in that:
(2) . . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in the country where
protection is claimed may be required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the
enjoyment of any industrial property of any industrial property rights. (p. 28, Petition; p. 29, Rollo in
G.R. No. 91332.)
Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law which
speak loudly, about necessity of actual commercial use of the trademark in the local forum:
Sec. 2. What are registrable. — Trademarks, tradenames and service marks owned by persons,
corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations,
partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with
the provisions of this Act; Provided, That said trademarks, tradenames, or service marks are actually
in use in commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the
applications for registration are filed; And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant
for registration is a citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines,
and such fact is officially certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the
English language, by the government of the foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. (As amended by R.A. No. 865).
 Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; how acquired. — Anyone who
lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or
who renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in
business,and in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a
tradename, or a service mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise,
business or service from the merchandise, business or service of others. The ownership or
possession of a trademark, tradename, service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this
section provided, shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent as
are other property rights known to the law. (As amended by R.A. No. 638). (Kabushi Kaisha Isetan
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 583 [1991], at pp. 589-590; emphasis supplied.)
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use
in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras,
International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p.
16).
The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law, according to Justice Gutierrez, Jr., in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 [1991]), have been construed in this manner:
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the
Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename.
xxx xxx xxx
These provisions have been interpreted in Sterling Products International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken
Bayer Actiengesellschaft (27 SCRA 1214 [1969]) in this way:
A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come down
through the years is that actual use in commerce or business is a prerequisite to
the acquisition of the right of ownership over a trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive right thereto. Such
right grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make
advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these
alone would not give exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of use.
The underlying reason for all these is that purchasers have come to understand
the mark as indicating the origin of the wares. Flowing from this is the trader's
right to protection in the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has
accumulated from use of the trademark. . . .
In fact, a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark unless it uses it in commerce.
We rule[d] in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 526 [1982]):
3. The Trademark law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of the mark prior to its
registration. There is no dispute that respondent corporation was the first registrant, yet it failed to
fully substantiate its claim that it used in trade or business in the Philippines the subject mark; it did
not present proof to invest it with exclusive, continuous adoption of the trademark which should
consist among others, of considerable sales since its first use. The invoices (Exhibits 7, 7-a, and 8-b)
submitted by respondent which were dated way back in 1957 show that the zippers sent to the
Philippines were to be used as "samples" and "of no commercial value". The evidence for
respondent must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies. (Sy Ching v. Gaw Lui, 44 SCRA
148-149) "Samples" are not for sale and therefore, the fact of exporting them to the Philippines
cannot be considered to be equivalent to the "use" contemplated by the law. Respondent did not
expect income from such "samples". There were no receipts to establish sale, and no proof were
presented to show that they were subsequently sold in the Philippines. (Pagasa Industrial Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 526 [1982]; Emphasis Supplied)
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines. It has
never promoted its tradename or trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipino except the
very few who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to
the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. (at pp. 589-591.)
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over
their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines
in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually
using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local
market.
Going back to the first assigned error, we can not help but notice the manner the ascription was framed which carries
with it the implied but unwarranted assumption of the existence of petitioners' right to relief. It must be emphasized that
this aspect of exclusive dominion to the trademarks, together with the corollary allegation of irreparable injury, has yet to
be established by petitioners by the requisite quantum of evidence in civil cases. It cannot be denied that our reluctance
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction is due to judicial deference to the lower courts, involved as there is mere
interlocutory order (Villarosa vs. Teodoro, Sr., 100 Phil. 25 [1956]). In point of adjective law, the petition has its roots on a
remedial measure which is but ancillary to the main action for infringement still pending factual determination before the
court of origin. It is virtually needless to stress the obvious reality that critical facts in an infringement case are not before
us more so when even Justice Feliciano's opinion observes that "the evidence is scanty" and that petitioners "have yet to
submit copies or photographs of their registered marks as used in cigarettes" while private respondent has not, for its
part, "submitted the actual labels or packaging materials used in selling its "Mark" cigarettes." Petitioners therefore, may
not be permitted to presume a given state of facts on their so called right to the trademarks which could be subjected to
irreparable injury and in the process, suggest the fact of infringement. Such a ploy would practically place the cart ahead
of the horse. To our mind, what appears to be the insurmountable barrier to petitioners' portrayal of whimsical exercise of
discretion by the Court of Appeals is the well-taken remark of said court that:
The petitioner[s] will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting
of the preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the
cigarettes with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such
damages. (p. 54. Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. 319, Rollo G.R. No. 91332) as well as in the very
petition filed with this Court (p. 2, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332) indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines,
for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 3, Rule 58, Revised Rules of Court). Indeed, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may
be added in this connection that albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the Philippines of their
symbols as admitted by private respondent, the fact of exclusive ownership cannot be made to rest solely on these
documents since dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact of registration alone and does not perfect a
trademark right (Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804 [1983]).
Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the absence of business activity here and rely on the
remaining statements of the complaint below, still, when these averments are juxtaposed with the denials and
propositions of the answer submitted by private respondent, the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have thereby
been controverted. This is not to say, however, that the manner the complaint was traversed by the answer is sufficient
to tilt the scales of justice in favor of private respondent. Far from it. What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet
in remedial law that before injunctive relief may properly issue, complainant's right or title must be undisputed and
demonstrated on the strength of one's own title to such a degree as to unquestionably exclude dark clouds of doubt,
rather than on the weakness of the adversary's evidence, inasmuch as the possibility of irreparable damage, without
prior proof of transgression of an actual existing right, is no ground for injunction being mere damnum absque
injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577 [1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court,
Second ed., 1985, p. 225; 3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 82).
On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing
into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent's "MARK" cigarettes who
might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of
a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the
diminution of tax revenues represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status
quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing
business in the Philippines.
With reference to the second and third issues raised by petitioners on the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, it
cannot be gainsaid that respondent court acted well within its prerogatives under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
Sec. 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of injunction. — The injunction may be
refused or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, upon the insufficiency of the complaint as shown
by the complaint itself, with or without notice to the adverse party. It may also be refused or
dissolved on other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendants which may be opposed by
the plaintiff also by affidavits. It may further be refused or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it appears
after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be
fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the defendant files a bond in an amount
fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction
granted is too great, it must be modified.
Under the foregoing rule, injunction may be refused, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on the following instances:
(1) If there is insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations therein. Refusal or
dissolution may be granted in this case with or without notice to the adverse party.
(2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or
continuance thereof would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer. The defendant, in this case, must file a bond in an
amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
(3) On the other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant which may be opposed by the
plaintiff also affidavits.
Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction granted is too great. (3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 99;
Francisco,supra, at p. 268.)
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected. At any rate, and assuming in gratia
argumenti that respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same may be cured by appeal and
not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co., 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and
mindful of the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the control of the
court before final judgment, petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak, more so when extinction of the
previously issued writ can even be made without previous notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs.
Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1974]; 3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14,
1989 and November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government.
His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him
in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the
government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful
guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on:
the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state
where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of
Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by
way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in
the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying
an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in
the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the
Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears
to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty — 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each
count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty — less
than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The
panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that
there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated
July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the
matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the
United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition
documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article
7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished
by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose
any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose
certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States
District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your
request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine
Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent
the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and
from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said
regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf,
moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are,
likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on
or before said date.
 SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED
OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUSIN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a
temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your
place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August
9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th
day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of
these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the
pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due
process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court,
moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to
fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the
event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any
conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed
only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called
as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree
relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of
the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal
force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity
of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time
and place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description
of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of
this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents
to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take
charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of
the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article,
as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest
and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in
the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of
Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority
of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D.
No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or
city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable,
issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in
the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the
prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor
upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the
aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of
the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-
US Extradition Treaty).1âwphi1.nêt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice
received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating
the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs
that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to
the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no
obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted
on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which
consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's
opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the
other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate
the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the
field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not
then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage,
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,Rollo). In essence,
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the
quasi-judicial power.
proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo
vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power,
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power
licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if
allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities
found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports,
revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable
forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the
to prosecution.
nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the
investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
discretion and judgment.
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The recompense.
body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result — the arrest and imprisonment of the
power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation,
which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain deprivation of his liberty.
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the
provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the
general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process
of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-
compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective
citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language
and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the
spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and
resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due
process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress
and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to
have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the
two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and
civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative
charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and
the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause
in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition,
the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and
the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return
as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-
755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form,
and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the
allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and
that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the
governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially
include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said
papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S.
408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of
conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to
the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory
on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324,
S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from
the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles,
which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty),
federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the
provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S.
Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice.
Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been
made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article
2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. §3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country.
The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the
hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and
(c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the
offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of
 the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is
noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the
character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or
innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations
in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting
government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information
he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity — the
Department of State — which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning,
and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In
the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and
having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of
Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in
the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited
be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern
is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest
worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right — that of liberty —
secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned,
the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the
means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is
no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective,
requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of
the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not
been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has
the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty,
he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance
with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation,
which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other,
it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the
request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree
No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general
right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right
of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government
(Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the
guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern.
On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters
which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters
requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby,
his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen
(Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any
citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life,
and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a
criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official
records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters
of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating
that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are
afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning
of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet
been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official
decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the
effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the
parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a
treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the
doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is
needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed
that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these
two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two
should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage
of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during
the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as
an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the
Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at
this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a
provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20,
Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this
imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available
during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since
Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which
provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is
aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano
vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997];
SO ORDERED.
Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC,
278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least
disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State
may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
Republic of the Philippines
insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential
Decree No. 1069?
EN BANC

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
[1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings
under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with
Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree
No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-
Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an
employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on
due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or DECISION
malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses
against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .
PANGANIBAN, J.:

(at p. 671)
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the
respondent. reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of
petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily
comprehensible. The Case

We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality,"
may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co.,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not
be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders
dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed
Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted
bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable
amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be
paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure
List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues

The Facts
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
I.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before
and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known
issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted
them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069,
also known as the Extradition Law. II.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in
the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on
provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides
for such power.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4,
an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
extradition.
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in ‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of
and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US the existence of special circumstances.
Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation
of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections
441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for ‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte ‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender
Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June ‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance
5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
 ‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the
the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their
Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
The Court’s Ruling
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
The Petition is meritorious. justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the
Preliminary Matters
instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1)
the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent,
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the
circumstances justify the same."
issues raised are purely of law." 16

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the
deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which
petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them,
there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a
binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the
issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts Five Postulates of Extradition
might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts
and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD
effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18
1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As
a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest
argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent.
are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated: Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major
judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system
et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
in Cuaresma: municipal and international law. 31
 An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence
the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the
of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person
the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate
itself." 32
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more,
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal
whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other
crimes." hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such
failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity. 41
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country. Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set
forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
each other’s legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon
extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein;
otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality. Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in
the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
to flee. Indeed,
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by
itself -- they are not.
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not
return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present,
court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

xxxxxxxxx
First Substantive Issue:

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and
final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those
final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition
cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting
forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court;
ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon
receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an
arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the
matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused
to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could
have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature.
Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours) inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be
preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest
and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
from the requested state.
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means 2. On the Basis of the Constitution
of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
the arrest and detention of the accused.
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing
Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I
to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
"Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in
two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed
Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49 hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment,
or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him
to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to
"best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before
a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of issuing a warrant of arrest:
fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned
Order, he stated:
 Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and
their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused
were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown
trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption
of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive
one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as
soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at
the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately
issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear
at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons,
including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail
to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of
x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to
a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity
to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty
prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in
court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements
of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the
court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His
invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when
instead of taking it, he ran away. it ruled thus:

In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating
The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’ This
our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty --
imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.1âwphi1.nêt
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the
class as all persons validly confined under law?
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their
detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70 particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain
peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71including, as a matter of reciprocity, those made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, interests are disregarded.
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class."73
"the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention
grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss
pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against
them.
his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
2. Anticipated Delay

While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents.
 Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are circuitous cop-out.
summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to
the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and
breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite extraditees.
another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
Summation

However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow. 1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition,
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings
3. Not a Flight Risk?
are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally
escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant
accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities for the
has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape
guidelines in this Decision.
again if given the opportunity.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out.
The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial
court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set
for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary
liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail,
both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally
observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties --
particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by
both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again
hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions,
private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear
factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions
written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant
questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very
delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall
make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If
convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a
history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the
community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the
highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to
the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to
be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy
and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for
respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
 8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent
or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every
little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request
to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral
justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to
conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from
this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by
the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown,
cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The
said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale
of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he
admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ
will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its
issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of
the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and
include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be
violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of
their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ
is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43
Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action
of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not
to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions
might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was
inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President
McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino
people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the
Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves
to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply
felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from
taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines
and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is
not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of
the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is
conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes
against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE
SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW
DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by
the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds
in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works
and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to
note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress
itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale
of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of
the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or
less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.
(Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the
Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our
political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is
taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No.
4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional
infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in
issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between
the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to
justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and
"as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in
question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1,
1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of
the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to
determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the
phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
 Republic of the Philippines of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
SUPREME COURT original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Manila Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
EN BANC
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
license agreements.
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by
his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed
is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished
KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA,
country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW
which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
vs.
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising
Oposa Law Office for petitioners. from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion
peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
The Solicitor General for respondents.
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
petitioners filed a reply thereto. to come.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
xxx xxx xxx
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
interest so requires.
against the herein defendant.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection
violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
Government.
They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
that would ban logging totally. the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
requirements of due process. conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as
a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless
to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for
the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace
or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
 The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist
if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.