NOMINAL DAMAGES
franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing
EMERENCIANA M. VDA. DE MEDINA, ET AL., vs. GUILLERMO
CRESENCIA, ET AL. GUILLERMO CRESENCIA.
Appeal by Defendant Guillermo Cresencia from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its civil case No. 19890, sentencing Appellant, jointly and
severally with his co-Defendant Brigido Avorque, to pay Plaintiffs Emerencia M.
Vda. de Medina and her minor children damages in the total amount of P56,000,
P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs.
It appears that on May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-2232
(Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque, smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga
Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. A criminal case
for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Avorque (criminal case
No. 22775 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on
September 9, 1953. The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right to file a
separate action for damages, and on June 16, 1953, brought suit against the driver
Brigido Avorque and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner and
operator of the jeepney in question. Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
answer; while Defendant Cresencia answered, disclaiming liability on the ground that
he had sold the jeepney in question on October 14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat;
that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one buyer after another, until the vehicle
was purchased on January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner thereof
at the time of the accident. In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffs filed leave, and
was allowed, to amend their complaint making Rosario Avorque a co-Defendant; and
the latter, by way of answer, admitted having purchased the aforesaid jeepney on May
31, 1953, but alleged in defense that she was never the public utility operator thereof.
The case then proceeded to trial, during which, after the Plaintiffs had presented their
evidence, Defendants Guillermo Cresencia and Rosario Avorque made
manifestations admitting that the former was still the registered operator of the
jeepney in question in the records of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public Service
Commission, while the latter was the owner thereof at the time of the accident; and
submitted the case for the decision on the question of who, as between the two, should
be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages. The lower court, by Judge Jose Zulueta, held
that as far as the public is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the eyes of the law,
continued to be the legal owner of the jeepney in question; and rendered judgment
against him, jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for P6,000
compensatory damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary damages,
P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs, while Defendant
Rosario Avorque was absolved from liability. From this
judgment, Defendant Cresencia appealed.
We have already held in the case of Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182 (December
29, 1953), which the court below cited, that the law (section 20 [g], C. A. No. 146 as
amended) requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a
the certificate issued to the grantee; and that if property covered by the franchise is
transferred or leased without this requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against
the public or the Service Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee of
record continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission
and to the public. There we gave the reason for this rule to be as follows:
Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified
to the Public Service Commission so that the latter may take proper safeguards to
protect the interest of the public. In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is
granted, there should be a public hearing, with notice to all interested parties, in order
that the Commission may determine if there are good and reasonable grounds
justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered by the franchise, or if the sale
or lease is detrimental to public interest.
The above ruling was later reiterated in the cases of Timbol vs. Osias, L-7547, April
30, 1955 and Roque vs. Malibay Transit Inc., L- 8561, November 18, 1955.
As the sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without the approval of the
Public Service Commission, Appellant herein, Guillermo Cresencia, who is the
registered owner and operator thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and
the public for the consequences incident to its operation. Wherefore, the lower court
did not err in holding him, and not the buyer Rosario Avorque, responsible for the
damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente Medina resulting
from the reckless negligence of the jeepneys driver, Brigido Avorque.
Appellant also argues that the basis of Plaintiffs action being the employers
subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code for damages arising from his
employees criminal acts, it is Defendant Rosario Avorque who should answer
subsidiarily for the damages sustained by Plaintiffs, since she admits that she, and
not Appellant, is the employer of the negligent driver Brigido Avorque. The argument
is untenable, because Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal
case filed against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employers subsidiary
liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carriers contractual
obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And
it is also for this reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the
driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa
contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct
and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been questioned, Nevertheless, it is
patent upon the record that the award of P10,000 by way of nominal damages is
untenable as a matter of law, since nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize
a right that has been violated, in order to preclude further contest thereon; and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the Plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Articles 2221,
2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below has already awarded compensatory and
exemplary damages that are in themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiffs right
was violated, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper. Anyway,
ten thousand pesos cannot, in common sense, be deemed nominal.
With the modification that the award of P10,000 nominal damages be eliminated, the
decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against Appellant. SO ORDERED.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARIO PADLAN @ "MARCOS,"
ROMEO MAGLEO @ "MOTMOT," and ALFREDO MAGLEO @ "BOY,"
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated June 30, 1993, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 56 of San Carlos City Pangasinan, in Criminal Case No. SCC-
1960, finding accused-appellants Mario "Marcos" Padlan, Romeo "Motmot" Magleo,
and Alfredo "Boy" Magleo guilty of two counts of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer an imprisonment of:
1. Reclusion perpetua, for the death of Rodolfo Manzon.
2. Reclusion perpetua, for the death of Mateo Manzon.
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased as follows:
1) P60,000,00 for the death of Rodolfo Manzon.
2) P50,000.00 for the death of Mateo Manzon.
3) P100,000.00 far actual and temperate damages.
4) P200,000.00 as moral damages.
5) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The information filed against accused-appellants charged
That on or about the 15th day of November, 1992, at around 1:15
o'clock in the morning at Barangay Libas, San Carlos City in
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually
aiding each other, with evident premeditation, treachery, and intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of high-powered long firearm, attack and shoot Rodolfo
Manzon and Mateo Manzon, killing them instantaneously as a
consequence, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victims in the amount of P________.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.2
When arraigned on June 7, 1993, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty, whereupon
trial was held. The prosecution's main witnesses were Carlito Manzon and Jordan
Pagsolingan. Carlito Manzon is a nephew of the deceased Rodolfo Manzon. Carlito's
father being the brother of Rodolfo Manzon, Jordan Pagsolingan is the son of Carlito
Manzon's sister, Flora Pagsolingan, and therefore is a grandnephew of the deceased
Rodolfo Manzon.
Per their testimonies,3 at around 11 p.m. of November 14, 1992, at a pre-wedding
dance in Barangay Libas, San Carlos City, Rufo Manzon was beaten up by accused-
appellant Mario Padlan and a certain Lito Fernandez. He was saved from further
punishment by the timely intervention of Carlito Manzon and Jordan Pagsolingan who
took him away and led him to the house of Flora Pagsolingan in Barangay Anando.
Carlito Manzon and Jordan Pagsolingan then went to Barangay Payar to fetch Rufo's
father, Rodolfo Manzon, Mateo, a brother of Rufo, came along in response.
At Sitio Caniogon of Barangay Libas, the four saw accused-appellants Mario Padlan,
Romeo Magleo, and Alfredo Magleo. They tried to avoid them, but they were pursued
by the three, Romeo Magleo ordered them to stop, shouting "Hoy!" at them. Carlito
and Jordan saw that Mario Padlan was armed with a rifle. Jordan also saw that
accused-appellant Alfredo Magleo had a knife.
Carlito and Jordan were young boys aged 16 and 15, respectively. Mario Padlan "went
around" the two boys to get near Rodolfo Manzon and then shot the latter. Mario
Padlan fired three times at Rodolfo Manzon, 4 as the other accused-appellants
watched.5
Frightened, Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon ran away. As they were fleeing,
Jordan Pagsolingan said he heard two more shots fired.6 He and Carlito went home to
Barangay Anando to report the incident. Upon learning of the incident. Jordan's
mother, Flora Pagsolingan, and Eling Manzon lost no time and went to the city proper
to report the matter to the police.
Flora Pagsolingan corroborated the testimonies of her son Jordan and her brother
Carlito Manzon. 7 She testified that the incident was entered in the blotter of the
police.8
SPO4 Alberto Castro of the Philippine National Police in San Carlos City also
testified.9 He said that upon receipt of Flora Pagsolingan's report, at 3:20 a.m. of
November 15, 1991, a team of policemen went to the scene of the crime and
afterwards to the residence of Mario Padlan in Barangay Libas, but was told by the
latter's wife that he did not go home that night. The police finally found him at about
7 a.m.. in the house of his father-in-law. Alejandro Magleo. Magleo, a former
barangay captain, surrendered Mario Padlan to the police. SPO4 Castro said that the
report mentioning the participation of the two other accused-appellants. Romeo and
Alfredo Magleo, came only at about 5 in the morning. 10
SPO Virgilio G. Cardioza, who was a member of the team, testified that they
recovered from the scene of the crime four empty shells tired from an armalite
rifle.11 Rodolfo Manzon had a short bolo which the police found to be in its
scabbard, 12 while Mateo Manzon had a slingshot with darts. 13 Near the feet of
Rodolfo Manzon the police found a knife. 14 SPO Cardioza said he interviewed
Jordan Pagsolingan and was told that Mario Padlan fired at them and that with Padlan
were Romeo and Alfredo Magleo. 15 SPO Cardioza said that he and his companions
after sometime found Mario Padlan in the house of his father-in-law, but they were
unable to locate the other accused-appellants Romeo and Alfredo Magleo in their
residences. 16
Lolita Manzon, the wife and mother of the victims, testified 17 that prior to their death,
Rodolfo Manzon worked as a tenant farmer on land that produced eight cavans a year,
while her son Mateo, 15 years of age, was a high school sophomore who helped his
father farm the land. She bought coffins but could not remember how much she paid
for them because of her shock and grief. The deaths of her husband and son were for
her "very painful because there were two of them." 18
Dr. Pizarro testified that wound no. 1 could have been caused by a pointed instrument
and wound no. 2 by a sharp-bladed instrument. Wound no. 3 was the fatal wound,
which caused massive internal hemorrhage. 20
Dr. Pizarro found Mateo Manzon to have suffered a "[g]aping incised wound 2 1/2
inches long and 1 1/2 inches wide and 5 1/2 inches deep horizontally across the
anterior chest wall just below the medial end of the right clavicle lacerating the right
first rib and right portion of the sternum, directed posteriorily to the left lacerating the
lungs and the heart." 21 According to Dr. Pizarro, the wound, which was caused by a
sharp-pointed instrument, was fatal. 22
Accused-appellant Alfredo Magleo admitted 23 that he was at the pre-wedding party
in Barangay Libas in the evening of November 14, 1992. He claimed, however, that
he and accused-appellant Mario Padlan and others did not leave the place until 4 a.m.
of the following day, November 15, 1992. Alfredo said that from the party he went
home to Barangay Anando, and that in the morning, while the police officers went to
the house of his father and arrested his brother-in-law, accused-appellant Mario
Padlan, they did not arrest him (Alfredo Magleo) despite the fact that his house was
only 15 meters away.
Accused-appellants Mario Padlan and Romeo Magleo also interposed the defense of
alibi. Padlan claimed 24that they were in the house of Aniceto de la Cruz for the pre-
wedding party for the latter's daughter, Evangeline de la Cruz, and Roly Domingo
which lasted from 7 p.m. of November 14, 1992 up to 4 a.m. of November 15, 1992;
and that after the party, accused-appellant Romeo Magleo stayed behind, as he had
been asked by Aniceto de la Cruz to help prepare the food for the guests on the day of
the wedding.
Padlan claimed that from the party, he went to the house of his father-in-law Alejandro
Magleo because his wife was there. It was there that the police found him and
"invited" him to go with them to the police station for questioning. He said he denied
involvement in the killing and even asked to be given a paraffin test by the National
Bureau of Investigation, but that although he was taken to the NBI, he could not be
tested because of lack of equipment. Padlan also testified that he had no
misunderstanding with the Pagsolingan family.
For his part, Romeo Magleo testified 25 that before he left the house of Aniceto de la
Cruz (where the party was held) at 8:30 a.m. of November 15, 1992, Flora
Pagsolingan arrived with some policemen and asked if any untoward incident had
happened during the celebration, to which Romeo Magleo said he answered in the
negative; and that he (Romeo Magleo) was not apprehended by the police officers.
Aniceto de la Cruz, in whose house the party was held, testified that none of the
accused-appellants had left the party before it ended at 4 a.m. of November 15,
1992. 26
The defense also presented as witnesses three farmers, Rodolfo Lavarias, Tomas
Lavarias, and Ernesto Lavarias, all of whom were residents of Barangay Anando,
Ernesto Lavarias testified 27 that at around midnight of November 14, 1992, he heard
cries coming from the house of Flora Pagsolingan less than 30 meters away. For this
reason, he said, he fetched his brother Tomas and the two of them then went to Flora's
house. There they learned that Rufo Manzon had been beaten up. Rufo was brought
to the house of Flora. According to Ernesto Lavarias, Flora Pagsolingan sent her son
Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon to fetch Rufo's parents. In no time, Jordan
and Lito were back with news that Rufo's parents were coming.
On rebuttal, Flora Pagsolingan testified 28 that actually Ernesto and Tomas Lavarias
went to her house only at about 1:15 in the morning of November 15, 1992, and that
was because of the news that Rodolfo Manzon had been shot.
The trial court found accused-appellants guilty as charged in its decision, the
dispositive portion of which was quoted earlier herein. Hence, this appeal. Accused-
appellants contend:
I Accused-appellants cite the testimony of SPO4 Alberto Castro which allegedly
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION SUBSTANTIALLY INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
GUILT OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
The contentions are without merit.
First. Accused-appellants were positively identified by prosecution witnesses Jordan
Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon as the ones who had stopped them on the way on the
day of the incident. While accused-appellants claimed they were in the house of
Aniceto de la Cruz attending a pre-wedding party, their alibi cannot prevail over the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying them as the assailants.
The place where accused-appellants were at the time of the killing is in Barangay
Libas where the crime also took place. It was not at all physically impossible for them
to have committed the crime. 29Each of the accused-appellants claimed he had no
quarrel with the deceased or the prosecution's main witnesses. Their identification,
however, makes it irrelevant that there is no proof of ill motive on their part to commit
the crime. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the
perpetrators of the crimes were. 30
It is contended that the testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Carlito
Manzon and Jordan Pagsolingan, are at odds with the entry in the police blotter.
Accused-appellants Romeo and Alfredo Magleo contend that entry in the police
blotter does not name them as among those involved in the killing of Rodolfo Manzon
and his son Mateo.
Flora Pagsolingan explained that at the time she made the report, she was "in [a] state
of shock . . . confused, and did not know what [she] was doing." 32 She must have
been in such a state of agitation that even the police investigator, who took down her
statement, identified accused-appellant Mario "Marcos" Padlan as "Marcos
Pagsolingan,"' although Flora maintains she never said the assailant was "Marcos"
Pagsolingan.
Accused-appellants contend that Flora's son, Jordan, and Carlito Manzon could have
corrected her or otherwise helped her since the two boys were with her when she gave
her statement to the police. But the two boys said they were themselves agitated if not
in shock as well as in fear 34 and so possibly could not have corrected Flora's mistakes.
corroborates the blotter entry naming accused-appellant Mario Padlan as the only
assailant. That is not so.
Thus what SPO4 Castro said was that while in the beginning only accused-appellant
Mario Padlan was named by Flora Pagsolingan and her son Jordan, the police later
received a report at 5 a.m. that accused-appellants Romeo Magleo and Alfredo (Boy)
Magleo were also involved in the killing of Rodolfo Manzon and his son Mateo. In
fact, according to the police blotter, Rodolfo Manzon, his son Mateo, Carlito Manzon,
and Jordan Pagsolingan were fired at by Mario "Marcos" Padlan (erroneously
identified therein as "Marcos Pagsolingan") and two unidentified men. Another
member of the police team, SPO Virgilio G. Cardioza, also testified that, during their
investigation at the scene of the crime, Jordan Pagsolingan named the two Magleos as
the companions of Mario Padlan. 36
It is not surprising that attention should focus on Mario Padlan because he was the
one seen by Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon shooting Rodolfo Manzon. In
the process, the participation of the other two as coconspirators was obscured. But
when it came to their turn to make their sworn statements and later to testify in court.
Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon categorically stated that the Magleo brothers
were present at the shooting.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that entries in police blotters, though regularly
done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the
truth stated in such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative
value because they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Sometimes they are based
on partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting and hearsay, untested in the crucible of
a trial on the merits. 37 But an indication of the guilt of the Magleos is the fact that
shortly after the killing they went into hiding. They could not be found in their
respective residences for which reason an alias warrant had to be issued by the trial
court for their arrest. Flight has been held to be evidence of guilt. 38
Second. Accused-appellants focus on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Accused-appellants point out a discrepancy between Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito
Manzon's testimonies to the effect that they were with Rufo Manzon when the latter
was attacked by Mario Padlan and Lito Fernandez and their affidavits 39 in which they
stated that they were on their way to the pre-wedding dance party when they came
upon Rufo Manzon being beaten up. There really appears to be a discrepancy
concerning this matter. However, it is not denied that Rufo Manzon had been beaten
up by Mario Padlan and Lito Fernandez, and this was the reason his father, the
deceased Rodolfo Manzon, was summoned. Whether Rufo Manzon was with Carlito
Manzon and Jordan Pagsolingan when he was set upon or whether he was then alone
is therefore of little moment.
Accused-appellants point out other "discrepancies" in the evidence of the prosecution.
Accused-appellants cite Jordan Pagsolingan's testimony that accused-appellant Mario
Padlan fired three times at Rodolfo Manzon and that, as he and Carlito Manzon were
fleeing, he heard two more gunshots, so that in all accused-appellant fired at the
victims five times. Accused-appellants say that this is contrary to the evidence that
Rodolfo Manzon sustained only one gunshot wound.
The number of wounds does not have to be equal to the number of shots, because
some of the shots may have missed their mark. It is also possible that in the excitement
of the moment, Jordan Pagsolingan may have made a mistake as to the number of
shots he heard. What is important is that although Rodolfo Manzon suffered only one
gunshot wound, the fact is that the police recovered four empty shells from the scene
of the crime. This confirms the statement of Jordan Pagsolingan that several gunshots
had been fired by accused-appellant Mario Padlan.
Accused-appellants claim that had it been their intention to kill the victims, they could
easily have ambushed the victims instead of openly confronting them, considering
that they are known to the witnesses and the victims. This assumes that accused-
appellants knew that the Manzons were going to pass the place where they were so as
to enable them to waylay their victims. The fact, however, is that it was the Manzons
who saw accused-appellants at a distance and who tried to run away from them, but
accused-appellants, using a shortcut, were able to overtake the Manzons.
Accused-appellants doubt whether the prosecution witnesses really recognized them.
Accused-appellants argue that if Mario Padlan trained his flashlight on the group of
the eyewitnesses and the Manzons, the prosecution witnesses would not have
recognized accused-appellants. As Jordan Pagsolingan explained, however, it was
quite bright that early morning because there was a moon and accused-appellants were
known to them because "we usually joke together." 40 Carlito Manzon also testified
that the moon was bright at that time. 41
Finally, accused-appellants brand the prosecution evidence as fabricated because of
the close relationship of the prosecution's main witnesses to the victims. In the absence
of proof of improper motive, the mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses to the
victims is not a ground for doubting their truthfulness. On the contrary, their natural
interest to secure the conviction of the real culprits could have deterred them from
implicating otherwise innocent persons, for then the real culprits would go scot
free. 42 In this case, there is additional reason for rejecting accused-appellants'
contention that because of their relationship to the deceased the prosecution witnesses
concocted stories to lay the blame for the killing on accused-appellants: accused-
appellants admitted that they had no quarrel or misunderstanding with the Pagsolingan
family which could make Jordan Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon testify falsely
against them.
The various criticisms made by accused-appellants against the testimonies of Jordan
Pagsolingan and Carlito Manzon boil down to a question of
their credibility. The trial court, which was in the unique position to hear the witnesses
and observe their deportment and manner of testifying. believed their
testimonies.43 We have considered the contrary view of accused-appellants which we
find to be without merit. Accused-appellants have not shown that, in the evaluation of
the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties, the trial court overlooked matters of
substance and weight justifying reversal of the findings of the trial
court. 44 Accordingly, we give its findings full faith and credit.
Third. Accused-appellants claim that even if all of them were present at the scene of
the crime, no inference of conspiracy can be drawn since the two prosecution
eyewitnesses did not see Romeo and Alfredo Magleo attack the victims. Several
circumstances indicate, however, that there was a conspiracy to kill Rodolfo Manzon
and his son, Mateo, in addition to the fact that all of accused-appellants were at the
scene of the crime, to wit:(1) accused-appellant Romeo Magleo shouted "Hoy!" at the
Manzons to make them stop as the latter were running away; (2) accused-appellants
pursued the Manzons when the latter tried to flee from them; and (3) accused-
appellant Alfredo Magleo was seen by Jordan Pagsolingan with a knife, which fits the
description of the weapon used in wounding Rodolfo Manzon and Mateo Manzon:
"pointed" and "sharp-bladed." 45
Nevertheless, we do not think that the crime committed was murder. The qualifying
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery have not been shown in this
case. Proof of conspiracy does not imply the existence of evident premeditation.
Evident premeditation can be presumed only where conspiracy is directly established,
not where, as in this case, conspiracy is only implied. 46 Nor was treachery established
with certainty. 47 The prosecution has not shown that there was that swift and
unexpected attack of an unarmed victim, which is the essence of treachery. 48 First,
the victims were not defenseless, since they too were armed. Rodolfo had a bolo, while
Mateo had a slingshot with darts. Second, the sight of accused-appellants at a distance
must have sufficiently warned the Manzons of accused-appellants and their intentions;
that was why they tried to evade them. Thus, an important condition for the existence
of treachery under Art. 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code has not been proven: that
the means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted so as to
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Accordingly,
the killing of Rodolfo Manzon and his son Mateo constitutes not murder but only
homicide.
The trial court found that the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstances
of (1) abuse of superior strength, (2) aid of armed men, and (3) nocturnity. Indeed,
there was abuse of superior strength in this case. Whatever superiority in number the
victims had over accused-appellants (four to three) was more than offset by the fact
that the latter group was composed of adult males in their physical prime. Accused-
appellant Mario Padlan was 28, 49 while accused-appellants Romeo and Alfredo
Magleo were 26 50 and 32, 51respectively. In contrast, the former group, with the sole
exception of Rodolfo Manzon, who was 43, 52 was composed of youths barely in their
early teens. Mateo Manzon and Jordan Pagsolingan were both 15 years old, 53 while
Carlito Manzon was 16 years of age. 54 More importantly, the group of accused-
appellants had a firearm and a knife which gave them a clear advantage over the bolo
and slingshot of the victims.
But we do not think the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity can be appreciated as
nocturnity was not shown to have been purposely sought by accused-appellants the
better to commit the crime. 55 Nor can the aggravating circumstance of "aid of armed
men" be appreciated, considering that accused-appellants, as coconspirators, acted
under the same plan and for the same purpose. 56
Under An. 249 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. As there was one aggravating circumstance (abuse of superior strength), the
penalty should be fixed in its maximum period, the duration of which is from 17 years,
4 months, and 1 day to 20 years. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the penalty is prision mayor, which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, as the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal.
In addition, we find errors committed by the trial court in awarding damages for the
death of Rodolfo Manzon and his son Mateo. The indemnity for death as currently
fixed 57 is P50,000.00 so the trial court's award of P60,000.00 for the death of Rodolfo
Manzon should be reduced accordingly.
The award of P100,000.00 for actual and temperate damages cannot be allowed.
Damages cannot be both actual and temperate. Temperate or moderate damages are
allowed because, while some pecuniary loss has been suffered, from the nature of the
case its amount cannot be proved with certain. 58 This is not the case here. The trial
court awarded the P100,000.00 as temperate damages apparently because the
prosecution failed to adduce proof of expenses in connection with the death, wake, or
burial of Rodolfo and Mateo Manzon but not because from the nature of the case it
was not possible to show with certainty the amount of the damage done. For the same
reason, no award of actual damages can be made. 59
The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages is excessive. As moral damages are not
intended to enrich the prevailing party, 60 an award of P50,000.00 would be in keeping
with this purpose of the law.
The award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 230 of the Civil Code in
view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under An. 2229 of the Civil Code
in order to set an example for the public good. For this purpose, we believe that the
amount of P20,000.00 can be appropriately awarded. 61
In reviewing the records of this case, we noticed a variance between the allegation in
the information and the evidence presented regarding the manner in which Mateo
Manzon was killed. The information alleged that he and his father Rodolfo Manzon
were killed "with the use of high-powered long firearm," but the medical certificate
indicates that while Rodolfo Manzon suffered both incised and lacerated wounds as
well as a gunshot wound, his son Mateo suffered only a "[g]aping incised wound 2
1/2 inches long and 1 1/2 inches wide and 5 1/2 inches deep horizontally across the
anterior chest wall just below the medial end of the right clavicle lacerating the right
first rib and right portion of the sternum, directed posteriorily to the left lacerating the
lungs and the heart." The variance, however, is not an obstacle to finding the accused-
appellants liable for double homicide. The variance does not affect or change the
nature of the crime charged, namely, murder, which in view of our finding is actually
homicide. The variance concerns merely the manner of execution of the crime. The
defense could have objected to the presentation of the evidence, in which event the
court could have ordered the amendment of the information so as to make the
allegation conform to the evidence presented and the accused-appellants would be
none the worse for it. Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellants are liable for two
counts of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are found guilty of two counts of
homicide and each one is sentenced to two prison terms of 12 years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay to the heirs
of the victims P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rodolfo Manzon, P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of Mateo Manzon, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORY LINER, INC., vs. ROSALITO GAMMAD, APRIL ROSSAN P.
GAMMAD, ROI ROZANO P. GAMMAD and DIANA FRANCES P.
GAMMAD.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the April 11, 2003 decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63290 which affirmed with modification the
November 6, 1998 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
Branch 5 finding petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. liable for breach of contract of carriage
in Civil Case No. 5023.
The facts as testified by respondent Rosalito Gammad show that on March 14, 1996,
his wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad,3 was on board an air-conditioned Victory
Liner bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. At about 3:00 a.m., the bus
while running at a high speed fell on a ravine somewhere in Barangay Baliling, Sta.
Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries
to other passengers.4
On May 14, 1996, respondent heirs of the deceased filed a complaint 5 for damages
arising from culpa contractual against petitioner. In its answer,6 the petitioner claimed
that the incident was purely accidental and that it has always exercised extraordinary
diligence in its 50 years of operation.
7 8
After several re-settings, pre-trial was set on April 10, 1997. For failure to appear on
the said date, petitioner was declared as in default.9 However, on petitioners
motion10 to lift the order of default, the same was granted by the trial court. 11
At the pre-trial on May 6, 1997, petitioner did not want to admit the proposed
stipulation that the deceased was a passenger of the Victory Liner Bus which fell on
the ravine and that she was issued Passenger Ticket No. 977785. Respondents, for
their part, did not accept petitioners proposal to pay P50,000.00. 12
After respondent Rosalito Gammad completed his direct testimony, cross-
examination was scheduled for November 17, 199713 but moved to December 8,
1997,14 because the parties and the counsel failed to appear. On December 8, 1997,
counsel of petitioner was absent despite due notice and was deemed to have waived
right to cross-examine respondent Rosalito.15
Petitioners motion to reset the presentation of its evidence to March 25, 1998 16 was
granted. However, on March 24, 1998, the counsel of petitioner sent the court a
telegram17 requesting postponement but the telegram was received by the trial court
on March 25, 1998, after it had issued an order considering the case submitted for
decision for failure of petitioner and counsel to appear. 18
On November 6, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and in the interest of justice, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Victory Liner,
Incorporated, ordering the latter to pay the following:
1. Actual Damages -------------------- P 122,000.00
2. Death Indemnity --------------------- 50,000.00
3. Exemplary and Moral Damages----- 400,000.00
4. Compensatory Damages ---------- 1,500,000.00
5. Attorneys Fees --------------------- 10% of the total amount granted
6. Cost of the Suit.
SO ORDERED.19
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
with modification as follows:
[T]he Decision dated 06 November 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect that the
following are hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiffs-appellees:
1. Actual Damages in the amount of P88,270.00;
2. Compensatory Damages in the amount of P1,135,536,10;
3. Moral and Exemplary Damages in the amount of P400,000.00; and
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the sum of the actual, compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages herein adjudged.
The court a quos judgment of the cost of the suit against defendant-appellant is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Represented by a new counsel, petitioner on May 21, 2003 filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the trial court for cross-
examination of respondents witness and for the presentation of its evidence; or in the
alternative, dismiss the respondents complaint.21 Invoking APEX Mining, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,22 petitioner argues, inter alia, that the decision of the trial court
should be set aside because the negligence of its former counsel, Atty. Antonio B.
Paguirigan, in failing to appear at the scheduled hearings and move for reconsideration
of the orders declaring petitioner to have waived the right to cross-examine
respondents witness and right to present evidence, deprived petitioner of its day in
court.
On August 21, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.23
Hence, this petition for review principally based on the fact that the mistake or gross
negligence of its counsel deprived petitioner of due process of law. Petitioner also
argues that the trial courts award of damages were without basis and should be
deleted.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether petitioners counsel was guilty of gross
negligence; (2) whether petitioner should be held liable for breach of contract of
carriage; and (3) whether the award of damages was proper.
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence
of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client.
However, the application of the general rule to a given case should be looked into and
adopted according to the surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus, exceptions to
the foregoing have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the
interests of justice so require, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of
the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.24
The exceptions, however, are not present in this case. The record shows that Atty.
Paguirigan filed an Answer and Pre-trial Brief for petitioner. Although initially
declared as in default, Atty. Paguirigan successfully moved for the setting aside of the
order of default. In fact, petitioner was represented by Atty. Paguirigan at the pre-trial
who proposed settlement for P50,000.00. Although Atty. Paguirigan failed to file
motions for reconsideration of the orders declaring petitioner to have waived the right
to cross-examine respondents witness and to present evidence, he nevertheless, filed
a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the trial court.
Hence, petitioners claim that it was denied due process lacks basis.
Petitioner too is not entirely blameless. Prior to the issuance of the order declaring it
as in default for not appearing at the pre-trial, three notices (dated October 23,
1996,25 January 30, 1997,26 and March 26, 1997,27 ) requiring attendance at the pre-
trial were sent and duly received by petitioner. However, it was only on April 27,
1997, after the issuance of the April 10, 1997 order of default for failure to appear at
the pre-trial when petitioner, through its finance and administrative manager, executed
a special power of attorney28 authorizing Atty. Paguirigan or any member of his law
firm to represent petitioner at the pre-trial. Petitioner is guilty, at the least, of
contributory negligence and fault cannot be imputed solely on previous counsel.
The case of APEX Mining, Inc., invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the case
at bar. In APEX, the negligent counsel not only allowed the adverse decision against
his client to become final and executory, but deliberately misrepresented in the
progress report that the case was still pending with the Court of Appeals when the
same was dismissed 16 months ago.29 These circumstances are absent in this case
because Atty. Paguirigan timely filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court
with the Court of Appeals.
In Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos,30 the Court was similarly confronted with the
issue of whether or not the client should bear the adverse consequences of its counsels
negligence. In that case, Gold Line Transit, Inc. (Gold Line) and its lawyer failed to
appear at the pre-trial despite notice and was declared as in default. After the
plaintiffs presentation of evidence ex parte, the trial court rendered decision ordering
Gold Line to pay damages to the heirs of its deceased passenger. The decision became
final and executory because counsel of Gold Line did not file any appeal. Finding that
Goldline was not denied due process of law and is thus bound by the negligence of its
lawyer, the Court held as follows
This leads us to the question of whether the negligence of counsel was so gross and
reckless that petitioner was deprived of its right to due process of law. We do not
believe so. It cannot be denied that the requirements of due process were observed in
the instant case. Petitioner was never deprived of its day in court, as in fact it was
afforded every opportunity to be heard. Thus, it is of record that notices were sent to
petitioner and that its counsel was able to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, an
answer to the complaint, and even a pre-trial brief. What was irretrievably lost by
petitioner was its opportunity to participate in the trial of the case and to adduce
evidence in its behalf because of negligence.
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded
against is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending its rights and interests,
but simply, whether it had the opportunity to present its side of the controversy.
Verily, as petitioner retained the services of counsel of its choice, it should, as far as
this suit is concerned, bear the consequences of its choice of a faulty option. Its plea
that it was deprived of due process echoes on hollow ground and certainly cannot
elicit approval nor sympathy.
To cater to petitioners arguments and reinstate its petition for relief from judgment
would put a premium on the negligence of its former counsel and encourage the non-
termination of this case by reason thereof. This is one case where petitioner has to
bear the adverse consequences of its counsels act, for a client is bound by the action
of his counsel in the conduct of a case and he cannot thereafter be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. The
rationale for the rule is easily discernible. If the negligence of counsel be admitted as
a reason for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new
counsel could be hired every time it is shown that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.31
Similarly, in Macalalag v. Ombudsman,32 a Philippine Postal Corporation employee
charged with dishonesty was not able to file an answer and position paper. He was
found guilty solely on the basis of complainants evidence and was dismissed with
forfeiture of all benefits and disqualification from government service. Challenging
the decision of the Ombudsman, the employee contended that the gross negligence of
his counsel deprived him of due process of law. In debunking his contention, the Court
said
Neither can he claim that he is not bound by his lawyers actions; it is only in case of
gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts can step in and accord relief
to a client who would have suffered thereby. If every perceived mistake, failure of
diligence, lack of experience or insufficient legal knowledge of the lawyer would be
admitted as a reason for the reopening of a case, there would be no end to controversy.
Fundamental to our judicial system is the principle that every litigation must come to
an end. It would be a clear mockery if it were otherwise. Access to the courts is
guaranteed, but there must be a limit to it.
Viewed vis--vis the foregoing jurisprudence, to sustain petitioners argument that it
was denied due process of law due to negligence of its counsel would set a dangerous
precedent. It would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision
through the simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of its counsel.
The Court will not countenance such a farce which contradicts long-settled doctrines
of trial and procedure.33
Anent the second issue, petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of
carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that
the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.
Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence.34
In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the
proximate cause of Marie Graces death was the negligence of petitioner. Hence, the
courts below correctly ruled that petitioner was guilty of breach of contract of
carriage.
Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified.
Article 176435 in relation to Article 220636 of the Civil Code, holds the common carrier
in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to
pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity,
and (3) moral damages.
In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemnity for the
death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00. 37
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceaseds earning capacity
should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way
of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or
(2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.38
In People v. Oco,39 the evidence presented by the prosecution to recover damages for
loss of earning capacity was the bare testimony of the deceaseds wife that her
husband was earning P8,000.00 monthly as a legal researcher of a private corporation.
Finding that the deceased was neither self-employed nor employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under the labor laws existing at the time
of his death, the Court held that testimonial evidence alone is insufficient to justify an
award for loss of earning capacity.
Likewise, in People v. Caraig,40 damages for loss of earning capacity was not awarded
because the circumstances of the 3 deceased did not fall within the recognized
exceptions, and except for the testimony of their wives, no documentary proof about
their income was presented by the prosecution. Thus
The testimonial evidence shows that Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and Melencio
Castro Jr. were not self-employed or employed as daily-wage workers earning less
than the minimum wage under the labor laws existing at the time of their death.
Placido Agustin was a Social Security System employee who received a monthly
salary of P5,000. Roberto Raagas was the President of Sinclair Security and Allied
Services, a family owned corporation, with a monthly compensation of P30,000.
Melencio Castro Jr. was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an average daily earning
of P500 or a monthly earning of P7,500. Clearly, these cases do not fall under the
exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite lack of
documentary evidence. Therefore, for lack of documentary proof, no indemnity for
loss of earning capacity can be given in these cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals computed the award of compensatory
damages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of respondent
Rosalito that the deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annum
when she died.41 No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneous
because the deceaseds earnings does not fall within the exceptions.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty.
In Pleno v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court sustained the trial courts award of
P200,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning
capacity because the income of the victim was not sufficiently proven, thus
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the
following circumstances:
...
"As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an
ent[re]preneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with
several projects in line, and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them
through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist
Longley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His
actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot
award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be
made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a permanent
deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his
left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex
and is no longer active in business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in
Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Coriage, et al. v. LTB Co., et
al., L-11037, Dec. 29, 1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al., L-11394, Sept.
9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given."
...
We rule that the lower courts awards of damages are more consonant with the factual
circumstances of the instant case. The trial courts findings of facts are clear and well-
developed. Each item of damages is adequately supported by evidence on record.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code was likewise applied in the recent cases of People v.
Singh43 and People v. Almedilla,44 to justify the award of temperate damages in lieu
of damages for loss of earning capacity which was not substantiated by the required
documentary proof.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary
damages because they are based on different jural foundations.45 These damages are
different in nature and require separate determination.46 In culpa contractual or breach
of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith
or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of
contractual obligations and, as in this case, when the act of breach of contract itself
constitutes the tort that results in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in
relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in
case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. 47 On the other hand,
exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction for the
public good may be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. 48
Respondents in the instant case should be awarded moral damages to compensate for
the grief caused by the death of the deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of
contract of carriage. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the
extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed to have acted
recklessly.49 Thus, the award of exemplary damages is proper. Under the
circumstances, we find it reasonable to award respondents the amount of P100,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. These amounts are not
excessive.50
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the Court of Appeals should
be further reduced. In People v. Duban,51 it was held that only substantiated and
proven expenses or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection
with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized. A list of expenses
(Exhibit "J"),52 and the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb (Exhibit
"F")53 in this case, cannot be considered competent proof and cannot replace the
official receipts necessary to justify the award. Hence, actual damages should be
further reduced to P78,160.00,54 which was the amount supported by official receipts.
Pursuant to Article 220855 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may also be recovered in
the case at bar where exemplary damages are awarded. The Court finds the award of
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged against petitioner
reasonable.
Finally, in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 56 it was held that when
an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in
the concept of actual and compensatory damages, subject to the following rules, to
wit
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
(Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, petitioner should be held liable for payment of interest as damages
for breach of contract of carriage. Considering that the amounts payable by petitioner
has been determined with certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall
be computed upon the finality of this decision at the rate of 12% per annum until
satisfaction, per paragraph 3 of the aforecited rule. 57
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is partially granted. The April
11, 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63290, which modified
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No.
5023, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Victory Liner,
Inc., is ordered to pay respondents the following: (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) P78,160.00 as actual damages; (5)
P500,000.00 as temperate damages; (6) 10% of the total amount as attorneys fees; and
the costs of suit.
Furthermore, the total amount adjudged against petitioner shall earn interest at the rate
of 12% per annum computed from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
CENON MEDELO, vs. THE HON. NATHANAEL M. GOROSPE, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, City of Iligan, PEDRO
ERMAC, and his children ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO, LUCIANO,
HILARIO, INADALECIO and FRANCISCA, all surnamed ERMAC.
This is a petition for mandamus with damages seeking the issuance of an order
directing the respondent judge to immediately order the execution of the lower court's
order dated June 25, 1970.
The deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit left as the only
property to be inherited by their heirs a parcel of land, Lot No. 1827, Iligan Cadastre
No. 292, covered by OCT No. RP-355 (262) of the Register of Deeds of Iligan, with
an assessed value of P590.00. Herein petitioner Cenon Medelo, one of the
grandchildren of the said spouses (being one of the children of their pre-deceased
daughter Digna Ermac filed on September 18, 1969 a petition for summary settlement
of the said estate. Since no opposition thereto was flied and all requirements were
complied with, the Honorable Judge Hernando Pineda, then the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, City of Iligan, issued on January
21, 1970 an order summarily settling the estate of the deceased spouses, enumerating
all the heirs entitled to participate in the inheritance and ordering petitioner to present
the project of partition of said lot.
Consequently, petitioner submitted on February 5, 1970 a project of partition. After
the filing of the said project of partition, private respondent Pedro Ermac one of the
children of the deceased spouses filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
settlement, asking that an order be issued eliminating Lot 1327 from the estate on the
ground that it belonged to him and his wife. The lower court denied the motion and
ruled that the proper remedy was a separate suit. Thus, Pedro Ermac together with his
children, filed Civil Case No. 1564 for Quieting of Title with the Court of First
instance (CFI) of Lanao del Norte involving the same Lot 1327, Cad. 292.
On June 25, 1970, the above-mentioned project of partition was approved. The private
respondents Ermac family members (the other private respondents), filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the project of partition. The said motion was,
however, denied on July 15, 1970.
On July 20, 1970, the private respondents filed before this Court a Petition for Review
alleging excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court in approving the project of partition notwithstanding the fact that it was being
claimed by the respondents in a separate civil action.
On June 19, 1975, this court rendered a decision which in part states:
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is specially true
with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a summary procedure
dispensing with the appointment of an administrator together with the other
involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of
the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inherit therefrom and
the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the probate court is not the beat
forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property
ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate. While there are settled
exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration proceedings, it is
not proper to delay the summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person
 just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not
belong to the estate but to him. Such claim must be ventilated in an
independent action, and the probate court should proceed to the distribution
of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such
distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the
protection of the claimant, the appropriate step is to have the proper
annotation of lis pendens entered.
Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed without prejudice to petitioner
having the proper annotation of lis pendens regarding Civil Case No. 1564
made on the title covering Lot 1327.
Costs against petitioner. 1
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Cenon Medelo filed a motion for execution of the
lower court's order approving the project of partition dated June 25, 1970 based upon
this Court's decision of June 19, 1975. The private respondents filed their opposition
to said motion on August 28, 1975.
On October 7, 1975, the respondent judge denied the said motion, stating in an order
the following:
Acting on the Motion for Execution filed by Atty. Irene Jurado, representing
the petitioner and the Opposition filed by Atty. Teddy Rodriguez on behalf
of the oppositors, and considering that the decision of the Supreme Court
itself referred to in the Motion for Execution states that the distribution of
the estate involved in this instant case is 'subject to the results of the suit'
(referring to Civil Case No. 1564 which is still pending trial before this
Court), in the meantime, therefore, that the said Civil Case has not been
terminated and decided, the Motion for Execution is hereby DENIED. 2
Petitioner Cenon Medelo filed a motion for reconsideration of said order to which the
private respondents also flied their opposition. Respondent-judge denied the said
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for mandamus with damages.
Petitioner Cenon Medelo argues in his memorandum that this Court's decision
dismissing the petition for review filed by respondents has long become final and
executory by operation of law and as such it is the lower court's ministerial duty to
issue a writ of execution.
The private respondents contend that this Court's previous decision was subject to a
condition as stated in the phrase... Such claim must be ventilated in an independent
action, and the probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there
are no legal obstacles to it... ." (Emphasis supplied.) Respondents further allege that
the filing of the separate civil case (Civil Case No. 1564) is the condition or legal
obstacle to the outcome of which the distribution of the estate is subject to.
Furthermore, since the decision sought to be executed is conditional, respondents
argue that mandamus will not prosper to enforce a right which is conditional or
incomplete. 3
Respondents also state that "justice and equality" can best be served by the stay of the
execution until Civil Case No. 1564 is terminated since the land in question had
already been titled in the name of respondents since 1956 and that they had introduced
improvements, paid taxes and exercised dominion thereto. The present petition is
impressed with merit. Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Execution upon final judgment or orders. Execution shall issue only upon
a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such
execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the judgment has been duly appealed, execution may issue as a matter of
right from the date of the service of the notice provided in Sec. 11 of Rule
This Court's decision of June 19, 1975 has long become final and executory due to the
fact that respondents did not seasonably question said decision. A judgment becomes
final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. 4 Furthermore,
the prevailing party is entitled to have the judgment executed as a matter of right when
the defeated party has not availed of his right to appeal. 5 The issuance of an order of
execution is, therefore, in order and is compellable by mandamus.
The private respondents also maintain that this Court's previous ruling is conditional
and will stay execution as embodied in the phrase 'if there are no legal obstacles to it.'
They allege that the pending civil suit is sufficient to stay execution.
The previous statement of this Court as appearing in the body of the decision is not
controlling since:
The only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part. Whatever may be found in the
body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or
conclusion of the court and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment
to determine the ratio decidendi what is controlling is what appears in the
dispositive part of the decision. 6
The dispositive portion of this Court's previous decision states:
Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed, without prejudice to petitioner
having the proper annotation of lis pendens regarding Civil Case No. 1564
made on the title covering Lot 1327. "Costs against petitioners."
It is, therefore, clear that it is the dispositive portion that is subject to execution and
not the body of the decision. Furthermore, said dispositive portion is unequivocal as
to what is to be performed leaving no further doubt as to the nature of its execution.
The doctrine that the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court
irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision is well-recognized in
this jurisdiction. 7
... At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion
is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing his to litigations, the
recognition of the truth that the trained intuition of the judge continually
leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal
reasons. ... 8
We previously held in this case that the appropriate remedy was to have the proper
annotation of lis pendensentered. The annotation of lis pendens is sufficient to protect
the rights of the private respondents for once a notice of lis pendens has been duly
entered, any cancellation or issuance of title of the land involved as well as any
subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject to the outcome of
the litigation. The rights of the private respondents are sufficiently protected since
upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of losing the property or any
part of it as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that may be
made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. 9
Petitioner requests for P1,000.00 as actual damages. Unfortunately, this Court cannot
award it in the absence of proof of the amount thereof. 10
Petitioner likewise requests the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to "set as
an example and warning that decisions of the Supreme Court, final and executory,
cannot be trifled with." The award cannot be granted. It has been held that exemplary
damages are not generally recoverable in a special civil action for mandamus unless
the defendant patently acted with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise
of honest judgment. 11 The preceding elements do not exist in the present case.
Furthermore, the following requisites for award of exemplary damages are not
satisfied.
First. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition to
compensatory damages and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant.
Second: The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Third: The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith,
and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 12
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the
respondent judge is directed to issue a writ of execution of the lower court's order of
June 25, 1970 approving the project of partition. The orders of the respondent judge
of October 4, 1975 and October 7, 1975 denying the motion for execution are reversed
and set aside. No pronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NORBERTO MANERO, JR.,
EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY
LINES, EFREN PLEAGO, ROGER BEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO
VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO and ROGER
BENDAO.
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless
foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and
pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around
their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song,
kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its
last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader
picked up pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before
horrified spectators. Some accounts swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although
they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the gang
leader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is
that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was
one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of
Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which
resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two
unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed
against those responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April
1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato. 6
After trial, the court a quo held
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander
Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines,
Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of
superior strength and treachery, hereby sentences each of them to a penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission
(PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, a civil
indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 for each of the eight
(8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for
every day the case was set for trial; moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00; and to
pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and
to indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of P19,000.00
representing the value of the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, and minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino Robles the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day of
trial and to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order
of their respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleago and Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and
Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal;
neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as
against them already became final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the
eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They
were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor
of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr.
scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter,
Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter"
is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist
movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining
witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the
others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to
Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another
Italian priest would be killed in his stead.8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified
companions nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The
placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except for
the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio
also posted a wooden placard bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close
to the eatery.9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4)
appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first
intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were
met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was included in the placards.
Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms
about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the
forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the
lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until
"Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he
was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however
managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr.,
ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that
"Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of
Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face and accused him of being a communist
coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a
burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with
both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and
ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He
entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago
towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the
gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle
was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter
simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point,
Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)?
Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your
head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali
dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted
Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark,
Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired
anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain
to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers,
his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-
in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines,
Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao contend that the trial court erred in disregarding
their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to
establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr.
Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto;
and, that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting
of the victim despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they
were harvesting palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from
the crime scene. Accused Roger Bedao alleges that he was on an errand for the
church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985,
taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza,
Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard
gunshots that they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of
La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-
accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to where the crime
took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at
some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of
being present at the crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity
between the places where accused-appellants were allegedly situated at the time of
the commission of the offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is
definitely feeble. 16After all, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that no
physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen
to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse
the distance between the place where he allegedly was at the time of commission of
the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there can be no
physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely two (2) hours
by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail
over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo,
testified that they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
11 April 1985 when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed
their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they
still saw the appellants in the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon,
appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers,
when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive
declarations that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the
morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they
were somewhere else, which is negative in nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of
appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all doubts that
they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are
therefore removed. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a
crime and decide to commit it. 22It is not essential that all the accused commit together
each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused
participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its
execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community
of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively
identified with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of
Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the
window near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor,
Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne from Cotabato were
grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish
their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto
Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino
Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told
them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to
Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr.
Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto
Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not
merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage
murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero
brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to
discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They
surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from
leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these
were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance
of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr.
Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may
not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a
common intent to commit the criminal acts.
damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily
proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be
awarded there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the
brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty
and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the
victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary damages may be
awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the
complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the
amount is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which
should be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the
evidence is AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the
deceased plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00; however, the award of moral
damages is deleted.

While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Costs against accused-appellants.
Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targeted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was SO ORDERED.
deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the
conspirators expressly agreed.

Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown,

the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30

The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the
Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is
nothing on record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil
relations with his family, or that he disinherited any member thereof, when he joined
his religious congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same
congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious
family belongs to the natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a
juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person,
it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has
a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages
may be awarded.

Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise
be lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the
reason that the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental
anguish; much less did they take the witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral