You are on page 1of 2

G.R. No.

110801 December 8, 1995

MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO

FACTS: Jose Reyes Sytangco alleged that he and his wife, Aurelia Liamzon-Sytangco had entrusted some
funds to Milagros Liamzon to purchase the Espaa Street property from its former owners. Wherein,
Milagros purchase said lot to herself and transferred the land to the petitioners in which owned by the
Liamzon family, a closed corporation. In their answer, petitioner denied the allegations of and claimed
that Milagros Liamzon had purchased the property by and for herself, with funds coming from petitioner
Marikina Valley. For her part, Milagros Liamzon insisted, among other things, that the Reyes Sytangco
spouses had waived in her favor their right to buy the property in question.

Jose Reyes Sytangco died during trial and was substituted by his heirs. After trial, the trial court ruled in
favor of private respondent heirs in a decision dated 11 October 1991. The trial court directed petitioner
Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of Conveyance covering the property involved in favor of private
respondents. On 28 October 1991, Marikina Valley and the other petitioners heirs of Milagros
Liamzon (Milagros having, in the meantime, passed away) received a copy of the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on 7 November 1991.

The Reyes Sytangco heirs opposed petitioners' motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it was a
pro forma one. The heirs contended that the allegations of insufficiency of evidence were couched in
very general terms, contrary to the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

On 21 November 1991, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
That, the there is no sufficient evidence to show that the down payment for the property came from the
plaintiff;

Petitioners received a copy of the above order on 22 November 1991. On 25 November 1991, they filed
a notice of appeal with the trial court. Denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period to
perfect an appeal. The trial judge reasoned that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was pro forma
and hence did not stop the running of the reglementary period. Thereupon, the trial judge granted
private respondents' motions for execution.

In the meantime, private respondent heirs moved for execution of the decision of 11 October 1991

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and injunction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, declaring that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
indeed pro forma and, "therefore, clearly without merit."

ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration was a pro forma? NO

HELD: The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by a decision of a trial court may move to set
aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be granted when

(a) the judgment had awarded "excessive damages;"


(b) there was "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision;" or

(c) "the decision was against the law."2

A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) or (c) above must point out specifically the findings
and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law,
making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions.

We note finally that because the doctrine relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration impacts
upon the reality and substance of the statutory right of appeal, that doctrine should be applied
reasonably, rather than literally. The right to appeal, where it exists, is an important and valuable right.
Public policy would be better served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity to review
the decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a literal
application of the procedural rule relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration.

You might also like