Kong, Marchini Sandro C.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Adherence to international Law
Title: Kuroda vs Jalandoni
Reference: 83 Phil. 171

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charged before a military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians
and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of
war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S.
Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before
the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with
the case of petitioners.

Issue:
1. Whether or not E.O No. 68 is unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not the non signatory of Philippines in the Hague Convention
affects the jurisdiction of the Philippines to implement its provisions?

Rulings:
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing
rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the
President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this
order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,
that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the
present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those
person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental
thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
 The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his
power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court.

Title: Philip Morris vs Court of Appeals

Reference: GR: 91332

Facts:
Petitioner, Philip-Morris, Incorporated filed a case against Court of Appels when it
lifted its initially issued resolution which set aside the court of origins order and granted
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to the herein cases other respondent,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, due to the counterbond offered by the latter. The Court of
Appels believed that there are sound and cogent reasons for them to grant the
dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction due it because it will not make the
Petitioner suffer from any irreparable damage since they are not actually engaged in the
manufacture of the cigarettes with the trademark in question. Even if they will suffer, the
counterbond will amply answer for such damages.
However, this was not appreciated by the petitioner and in turn, they filed their
own motion for re-examination geared towards reimposition of the writ of preliminary
injunction but to no avail. They claim that the respondent court abused its discretion
tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. They also claimed that the court made a complete
about face for legally insufficient grounds and authorized the private respondent to
continue performing the very same acts that it had considered contrary to equity and
good conscience, thereby ignoring not only the mandates of the Trademark Law, the
international commitments of the Philippines, the judicial admission of private
respondent that it will have no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after the
Director of Patents shall have rejected the application to register it, and the admonitions
of the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated the Trademark Law which resulted
to failure perform the states international commitment?

Ruling:
Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving
trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law
that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a
cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners have done in the
case at hand.
In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the
writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners are of the impression that actual use of their
trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable element under
Article 2 of the Paris Convention in that:
. . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in
the country where protection is claimed may be required of persons
 entitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial
property of any industrial property rights.
Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2
and 2-A of the Trademark Law which speak loudly, about necessity of actual
commercial use of the trademark in the local forum:
Sec. 2. What are registrable. Trademarks, tradenames and service
marks owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations
domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations, partnerships or
associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in
accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided, That said
trademarks, tradenames, or service marks are actually in use in
commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before
the time the applications for registration are filed; And provided, further,
That the country of which the applicant for registration is a citizen grants
by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, and
such fact is officially certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law
translated into the English language, by the government of the foreign
country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. (As
amended by R.A. No. 865).
Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; how
acquired. Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of
any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who renders any
lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade,
in business, and in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive
use a trademark, a tradename, or a service mark not so appropriated by
another, to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the
merchandise, business or service of others. The ownership or possession
of a trademark, tradename, service mark, heretofore or hereafter
appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be recognized and
protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are other
property rights known to the law. (As amended by R.A. No. 638).
So as the result, the Petition was dismissed and the ruling of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed.
i. Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated the Trademark Law
which resulted to failure perform the states international
commitment.
The Court of Appeals did not violate the Trademark Law since according to Article 2 of
the said Law ..Trademarks, tradenames and service marks owned by persons,
corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons,
corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be
registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided, That said trademarks,
tradenames, or service marks are actually in use in commerce and services not less
than two months in the Philippines and with the facts given, it was stated by the
petitioners and two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc. that they are similarly not doing business in the
Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction.
Title: Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
Reference: GR: 139465

Facts:
On June 18, 199 , the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S. Note No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez. Secretary of Justice then ordered a technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition request.
Pending evaluation, private respondent (Mark Jimenez) through counsel wrote a
letter addressed to herein petitioner requesting copies of official extradition request from
the US Government. He requested ample time to comment and for the matter to be held
in abeyance in the meantime.
Secretary of Justice denied the said request specifically invoking our countrys
responsibility to the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties that every treaty in force
is binding upon parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Extradition is
a toll of criminal law enforcement and to be effective must be processed expeditiously.
Particularly in this case is the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Extradition is the process by
which persons charged with or convicted of crimes against the law of a State and found
in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment.
Pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our countrys legal duties under a treaty is also compelled
by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution.
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere.
After the denial of the request letter, Mark Jimenez filed a petition against herein
Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Thus, this petition
is now at bar.

Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge Lantion acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order to herein petitioner in
performing his legal duties as Secretary of Justice?

Ruling:
The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply, thus extradite has the
basic right of notice and hearing. The RP-US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation
Clause in case of conflict is not superior over a national law. International law is given
equal standing but not superior to national legislative enactment. The principle lex
posterior degorat oriori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In States where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as
the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.
 Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within
which to file his comment and supporting evidence
There was only a void on some provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty as
regards to the basic due process right of a prospective extradite at the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceeding.

Topic: Principle of Transformation

Title: Gov. of U.S vs Puruganan
Reference: GR: 148571

Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 --
dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its
October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed
their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges:(1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of
Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section
7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal
campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g
and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition
prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of
PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motio, which prayed that petitioners application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one
million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July
4, 2001.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069?
2. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
the prayer for bail?
3. Whether or not there is a violation of due process?

Rulings:
1. Yes
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not
as important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a
prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause
for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already
evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in
the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
 would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither
the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

2. Yes
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption
of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

3. No
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

Topic: Conflict between Municipal Law and International Law

Title: Inchong vs Hernandez
Reference: 101 Phil. 1155

Facts:
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for
a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. Republic
Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business."
 In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act
are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an
exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business
on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses
are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case
of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and
juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the
heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles?

Ruling:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA1180.
The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced;
and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can
no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Title: Gonzales vs Hechanova

Reference: 9 SCRA 230

Facts:
President Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma
for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing
a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in
cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from
abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred
that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency.

Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into
by the president?

Ruling:
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the
same through an bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts
adverted are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may
be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has
clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Topic: Separation of Church and State Principle
Title: Ymbong vs Ochoa
Reference: GR: 204819

Facts:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely
circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention. A perusal
of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn,
the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to
religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test"
and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the church can affect the decision of the State?

Ruling:
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is
made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together.
It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally
believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs
and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred
over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in
its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.