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Science and Culture. By Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 236
Diego Honorato*
From the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially during its second half, scholars
became increasingly aware of the difficulties entailed in the study of classical texts, or more
generally, in the study of the human sciences. This led to the development of a new
awareness of what scholars can legitimately say, for example, about the ancient Greeks.
Among those who took part in this endeavour, the classical scholar and historian Geoffrey E.
R. Lloyd stands out for his rigorous clarification of the implicit modern assumptions in
studying ancient texts. Like other classicists, Lloyd called attention to the difficulties or risks
*
Department of Philosophy, Universidad de los Andes, Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo
2.200 Las Condes, Santiago, Chile. Email: dhonoratoe@yahoo.com
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most important books? This will be answered by first considering a negative approach that
details the methodological practices scholars should avoid. Secondly, I will point out several
positive features that Lloyd believes classical scholars should seriously take into account in
carrying out their own research. Finally, I will discuss the epistemological principles that
Lloyd typically mentions three fallacies or recurrent problems classical scholars should be
(i) Confusing actors and observers categories. This is one of the most frequent
fallacies of all. It consists of assuming that the terms or concepts now in use, such as myth,
reason, science, magic, nature, and so forth were understood in basically the same way by
the ancient Greeks or the Chinese. This, of course, is a serious mistake of unthinkingly
projecting our own categories onto the near or remote past. In Lloyds words:
In each case I argue that it is essential to distinguish firmly between the categories
used by those who make the statements or hold the beliefs in question and those we
may use to describe them. The all-important distinction that has scrupulously to be
observed isto put it in the social anthropologists termsthat between actors and
Thus the question is what classical Greek scientists or philosophers themselves think
about their way of doing science. Moreover, we want to determine their conceptions of
their subject-matter, their aims and goals (Adversaries, 2). Yet, as Lloyd acknowledges,
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there is no possibility of getting into their shoes. There is no neutral description of facts, for
all observations are theory-laden.2 This is to say that all history, by its very nature, is
evaluative. We are told, however, that there is no need to despair. For even if we ultimately
cannot explain why Diogenes of Apollonia thought of and revived air as a monistic
element, or how Plato understood the relationship between mythos and logos, that does not
mean that no progress has been made in coming up with answers to such questions. In fact,
the awareness of our own prejudices and preconceptions constitutes a useful exercise and an
(ii) The anti-generalisation point. The anti-generalisation point states, in short, a very
simple idea, though it is often ignored by excessively systematic historians. It refers to the
risk of making overly lengthy assertions (generalisations), which very easily impose a
uniformity on materials that would normally show a much more complex structure than
initially outlined.3 We may easily become entrapped into making sketches of reality, which,
though they may simplify a given issue, would also conceal fundamental differences
between things. A common example of this are the grandiloquent judgments on entire
historical periods, as when it is asserted that Greek philosophy postulates or the more
Yet it is not only generalisations on whole periods that should be avoided. The same
is also true of different domains of knowledge. For what holds true generally in mathematics
does not necessarily apply to astronomy or medicine, regardless of whether one is referring
concerned, not even generalisations within one single domain can safely be made. If we look
at medicine, for example, a recurrent subject of Lloyds (see, Lloyd 1979 and 1983), we find
that, apart from the Hippocratic corpus, which is far from being a homogeneous body of
theories, there are at least four or five different traditions of healers to account for. There is,
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for example, temple medicine, and the medicine of the itinerant purifiers, and again that of
the root-cutters and the drug-sellers, and again that of female healers (midwives), the last
especially poorly represented in our extant evidence (Adversaries, 4). Greek medicine in
the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, as Lloyd shows, had diverse manifestations and included
different practices and forms of medicine (yet all of whose practitioners were considered
healers capable of alleviating disease).4 A similar point could be asserted about other
generalisations are therefore always a dangerous business if not carefully restrained by self-
criticism.5
(iii) The anti-piecemeal point. Here Lloyd calls attention to the frequent practice
that assumes that individual theories of different cultures and across different time periods
on particular problems (physical and cosmological) address the self-same issues and that
assume that because Greek scientists and philosophers tried to understand and define physis
or nature, their Chinese counterparts must have been doing the same. In fact, as he shows,
this was not the case. There is no equivalent in China to the concept(s) of physis that we find
in Greece. There are, of course, a number of terms that correspond to specific aspects of
what the Greeks referred to as physis, but not one overarching concept that fully corresponds
to the Greek term. As Lloyd enumerates the Chinese spoke of tian (heaven), wu (things),
xing (character), li (pattern), dao (the way), zi ran (spontaneity), whereas a classical Greek
The same point applies to equally nave assumptions that compare the Greek concept
of physis (which Aristotle or Archimedes might have entertained) with Newtons concept or
with what our contemporaries understand by a natural force or natural law. The ancient
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Greeks, the ancient Chinese, and contemporary Europeans clearly do not refer to the same
thing when they use the word nature or any of its counterparts:
So what we must at all costs avoid is the assumption that there is a single concept of
nature towards which both Greeks and Chinese were somehow struggling, let alone
that it was our concept of nature as in natural science. It would introduce massive
distortions in the interpretation of both Greek and Chinese science if we took it that
the work of ancient investigators was targeted at that goal: I stress once again that we
These negative approachesthe distinction between actors and observers categories, the
anti-generalisation point and the anti-piecemeal pointdo not in themselves clarify how we
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The anti-piecemeal point, however, sets us on the right track. Lloyd suggests that before we
ask for the proper answers to the problems themselves, that is, before assuming that only the
solutions to given problems might be different but not the problems themselves, which are
believed to be roughly the same, we should first question whether there are differences in
how the problems or the questions were perceived by their actors: We should ask first what
the questions were to which the answers were thought to be the right answers (Adversaries,
9). In other words, we must ask ourselves how the Greeks or the Chinese understood their
own inquiries about, say, the ultimate constituents of matter, or why the Greeks considered
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the problem of the elements, stoicheia, as a problem worth asking about in the first place,
However, by problematising the problems Lloyd claims that he is not trying to unveil
the psychological process by which a philosopher might have hit upon an idea or, for
example, to unveil Archimedes thought processes in his bath. Rather, he is concerned with
showing the conditions under which a given piece of knowledge was produced. What is
interesting here is that by applying this methodological reflection, Lloyd concludes that in
order to grasp the intellectual (internal) products of ancient Greece or China, and
So what may start out as internalist questions about the underlying problems as the
ancients saw them are indissociable from externalist issues to do with values,
Thus following the French cole of Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Marcel
we may furthermore deconstruct as addressing two main lines of inquiry. The first addresses
what Lloyd calls the contexts of communicative exchange and of interpersonal reaction,7
centring particularly on the conditions under which the discourses were performed. Lloyd
suggests that if we observe the communicative contexts within which Aristotle introduced
the distinction between literal and metaphorical8 (or between myth and rational account), it
would become clear that the ideal of univocity there expressed had its origin in the struggle
to supersede rival theories, that is, amid intellectual upheaval. Which is why, Lloyd argues,
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appears to have been artificially prompted by philosophers (or to use Detiennes word
regarding mythology, invented by them) in their zeal to put down theories which were
contrary to their own correct views. According to Lloyd, what scholars should do instead
of passively taking the categories inherited from western philosophy for granted, is to
deepen the communicative contexts and look for degrees of meaning, that is, for a plurality
also needs to be taken into consideration are cultural values. Indeed, we can never fully
escape our own cultural barriers. So the better our understanding of the cultural context in
which a problem is set, the better our insight into the problem will be. What is needed is
society or of any other culture are investigated: politics, legal issues, language, literacy,
religion, history, economy, technology, geography, climate, and so forth. All of these might
have some bearing on answering why certain authors (or a given school) postulated what
they did or why they or the whole society in which they lived did not follow a different path
of inquiry.
III
Lloyds theoretical solution to the epistemological difficulty that lies at the heart of these
meaningful discourse about the past if all observations, without exception, are theory-laden?
Can we, even if only very gradually, ever move outside our own categories of understanding
and penetrate alien (native) thinking or deconstruct their conceptions? Lloyd, as we have
noted,10 attempts to follow a middle course, by neglecting on the one hand nave realist
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conceptions that too easily invoke cross-cultural universals and, on the other, by denying the
extremely sceptical view that flatly asserts the impossibility of going beyond our own
cultural constructs. Lloyds strategy depends, if we have understood him correctly, on two
propositions: in Ancient Worlds (2004) Lloyd maintains (1) that all observations without
exception are theory-laden; and (2) that there are nevertheless different degrees of theory-
ladenness. This last contention is substantive, for it allows us to understand that he agrees
that it is possible to address the epistemological difficulty mentioned. What Lloyd is telling
us here is that not all of our observations and experiences are equally laden with concepts
and theories:
vary, not just in that the theories are different, but in that the theoretical charge, or
load, may be greater or less. Obviously at the lower end of the spectrum, where the
charge is less, the possibilities for comparing theoretical frameworks are greater.
This implies that some observations about the past hit the nail on the head (or reality)
more than others, that is, that they grasp reality more fully, or at least grasp a less
ideologised form of it. And yet as Lloyd explains, this epistemological assertion presupposes
a fundamental ontological claim.11 In short, what he affirms here is that because we all
happen to experience one and the same world, we are in fact capable of understanding
something about the way the Greeks or the Chinese experienced the world, even though this
claim that, despite the differences in their world-views, there is still a sense in
which Aristotle and the writers of the Huainanzi inhabit one and the same world,
This means that the different perspectives and cultural world-views, undeniably real as they
are, must be different perspectives on one and the same phenomenon, which precisely
because it exceeds the limited experience we can gain of it hic et nunc in richnessLloyds
perspectives.
Thus, on the one hand, Lloyd seems to argue that any real phenomenon, in virtue of
its multiple dimensions, admits of different perspectives upon one and the same
phenomenon. On the other hand, because these dimensions are dimensions of one and the
same thing, it seems reasonable to assume that the different experiences it gives rise to must
potentially be commensurable with each other, insofar as they are measured by the same
canon (or meter), that is, the one and the same thing upon which they are perspectives.
Consequently, according to Lloyd, the experience we can have of a Greek temple now, or of
Apollos statue, can be sufficiently symmetrical to the experience the Greeks might have had
in the fifth century BCE, so as to allow us to legitimately say something about their
religion. Yet, and here we come back to my main point, in order to do so and not simply
enunciate the epistemological and ontological grounds that enabled our experience, we must
which, according to Lloyd, constitutes the only way to shorten, if only partially, the
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linguistic and cultural distance that separates our experience of seeing the temple or
Conclusion
After briefly outlining Geoffrey E. R. Lloyds methodological approach and examining his
guidelines for doing classical research today, a double affirmation is in order. On the one
hand, as he affirms, it is obviously true that no field anthropologist has ever returned from
the study of a culture announcing that he or she could understand nothing (Ancient Worlds,
3), which means that a certain amount of knowledge of the phenomenal world can be
grasped, albeit gradually. On the other hand, it is also true that classical scholars are faced
with an awkward dilemma, for, as modern hermeneutics has taught us, there is no possibility
within a concrete, historical, and linguistic framework. We always perceive things from a
certain point of view, which we simply cannot ignore. Now, once Lloyd has clarified the
three most common fallacies in doing classical research (the negative approach), he offers
his reflections on how to positively address them. What we need to do is to foster the
valuesin the midst of which a particular question or problem arose. For, the better we
establish the external conditions under which a historical community worked, the better we
shall understand how and why they came up with the ideas they did. In keeping with the
notion of a sociology of knowledge, what Lloyd stresses is the importance of the cultural
values and institutions, as well as of all the different areas of knowledge which, as a
whole, helped forge that which we must now carefully and patiently try to reconstruct.
a middle course between nave forms of gnoseological realism, which rely on cross-cultural
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meaningful statements about the past. Lloyd, who allies himself with neither the strong
version of cross-cultural universals nor with the strong version of cultural constructivism,
tries to reflect on the unity and the diversity of the human mind, maintaining that even if all
of our observations are theory-laden, there would still be some room for different degrees of
realism that is nonetheless sufficiently robust for us to explain how it is that we can say
Notes
1
See especially Claude Calame, The Rhetoric of Muthos and Logos: Forms of Figurative
Discourse, in From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, ed. Richard
Calame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Marcel Etienne, The Creation of Mythology
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), where he criticizes the validity of the term
myth.
2
Lloyd has more recently insisted on this idea in Styles of Enquiry and the Question of a
Greek and Chinese Science and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). Lloyd claims that all
our observations or perceptions of the world are without exception laden or penetrated by theory
(concepts); in other words, that there are no perceptions of nude facts, only interpretations of them
(following Nietzsche). Yet Lloyd, and this is a fundamental contention, also admits that, although
all observations are theory-laden, there are different degrees of theory-ladenness (Ancient
Worlds, 84). This last assertion is essential, for it is the methodological key that enables him to
steer a middle course between dogmatism and relativism, between nave forms of realism and
cultural constructivism.
3
This precautionary note on generalizations, however, is not wholly new. The French cole led by
Jean-Pierre Vernant et al. also insist on the importance of contexts, that is, on the realization of
different contexts. For them, avoiding futile generalizations is the indispensable condition for
recognizing the different forms of rationality (and different logics) that formed the background of
Greek science, philosophy, and myth. Thus the more contextualized the research, the better.
4
In the Greek language, as Lloyd points out, there is no single term that embraces all these
functions. Moreover, not all of these functions were included under the category of iatroi
(doctors). The rizotomai (root-cutters), the pharmakpolai (drug-sellers) and the maiai (midwives)
all appear in different contexts. Besides, even though there were in antiquity some medical
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centres, there was no union that controlled the proliferation and the practice of their activities.
Cf. Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience (London: Bristol Classical
radical impossibility, which he, by the way, does not accomplish. Rather, what he is doing is
Press, 1986); Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (New York: Cornell University
Press, 1982), Myth and Thought among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983),
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1996); and Jean-Piere Vernant and
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1988).
7
Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Mythology from a Chinese Perspective, in From Myth to Reason?
Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, ed. Richard Buxton (New York: Oxford University
Wisdom (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); see also Aristotle, Mete., 357a24ff.,
Metaph., 991a20ff, 1079b24ff, Po. 1457b6ff, Apo., 97b3738, Top. 139b32ff., but compare other
passages where he praises the use of metaphor: Rh. 1405a8ff., 1410b13ff., Po. 1459a5ff., Apo.
that there are different degrees of theory-ladenness needs to be carefully qualified. On the one
hand, we certainly praise Lloyds determination not to give in to the different forms of cultural
constructivism and the gnoseological skepticism these positions entail. We also understand (and
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share) Lloyds precautions regarding a very difficult subject: the problem of cross-cultural
universals. On the other hand, to affirm without further justification that all our perceptions are
assuming such a theory, how do we know which observation is more or less loaded with a
theoretical charge? Furthermore, which criterion are we to apply in deciding such a question?
Perhaps appealing to another, a third, observation? But that, of course, would be an infinite
regress. All in all, I dont think this objection makes Lloyds position illegitimate or less worthy; it
simply reveals a critical point that has nowadays become the object of ongoing debateTheory
of perception has almost become a separate branch within philosophywhich demands further
clarification. This debate applies to both the physical and the human sciences, insofar as these are
required to ground their methods and their knowledge in observation to prove or falsify a given
theoretical constitution of multiple layers of meaning (i.e., configurations) in perception as, for
instance, Merleau-Pontys phenomenology of perception does, than to theoretically assume that all
Classification, in Ancient Worlds; and Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and
Diversity of the Human Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chaps. 14, where he
discusses this problem in some detail regarding color-perception, animal and plant classification
and emotions.
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Sufficiently robust: even if we do not fully endorse Lloyds notion of theory-ladenness, his
attempt to steer a middle course between nave forms of realism and relativism, is the right one.
That we would like to see him clarify certain issues does not rule out his approach nor does it
diminish the value of his methodology. Thus to introduce degrees of theory-ladenness allows him
to maneuver between gnoseological skepticism and affirmations which all too easily invoke
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common (universal) categories, as well as to render them in different cultures. That there is a
certain veil of opacity does not mean that we can see nothing through such a veil. Patience and
methodological discipline, through generations of scholarship, can help unveil the dust of
centuries of misconceptions that obscure the vision a particular Greek man in the fifth century BC
might have had of Apollo, and thus over time to catch a glimpse, perhaps even more than a