G.R. No.

L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE
LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre, respondents.

Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.

Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of
petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S.
Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving
any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre
and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo
Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order
dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the
sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot
No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze
Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of
said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by
the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-
indiviso of Lot No. 399.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue.
After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No.
399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then
on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua,
the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed
the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A)
on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying
that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed
to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason
that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code,
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4

1
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.

The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came.

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a
descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant
died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any
issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are
Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was
not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other
fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the
lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not
subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa
which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not
whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that
the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives
or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is
that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of
a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;

2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor

de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San
Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiadades:

2
 14483

La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo
No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas
gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed
upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias
Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816
dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is
gratuitous, it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias
Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent
heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and
testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of
Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of
the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the
Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to
deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for
the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be
made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito
Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a son of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the
latter's second marriage.

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his
death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art.
891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which
originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966.
We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees
did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were
very much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la
Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA
Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.: 1wph1. t

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following: 1w ph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

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 1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada

a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1w ph1.t

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

5
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six
children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the

6
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1wph1.t

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado
a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes
que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other

7
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel
of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in
1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-
half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Maalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.
When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

8
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by

affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return
such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

9
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1w ph1.t

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

10
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the
same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the

11
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-
existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

12
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE,

INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS,
ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.

Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.

Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-
9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:

Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of
this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw)
Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father
Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10)
parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother,
Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-
mentioned.

On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:

I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido varios
hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.

II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de
Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.

III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.

IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo
tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.

V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.

13
 VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la
Provincia de Laguna.

VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per
herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, p. 29)

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil
Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex
"C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in
the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in
turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain
any annotation of its reservable character.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers
in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo,
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos,
filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective
complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter
of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question
of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the
plaintiffs

14
 a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership, pro-
indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in paragraph three (3) sub-
paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;

b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership, pro-
indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described in paragraph three (3),
sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;

c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to be
conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all
surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the
other plaintiffs who are their uncles:

2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to
the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the
plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income being for the period from January 3, 1968
until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:

3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs

a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.

b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 46, Rollo)

This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in
toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no
cogent reason to reverse the decision.

This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in
good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of the
reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) has not yet prescribed.

IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by
virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.

Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court
affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they

15
agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista,
Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate
of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose,
Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled
that said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds
of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the
affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving
properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the
said affidavit.

It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were
free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby
showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this
is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering.

Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited
in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v.
CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380
and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein . . .

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .

In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a
document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration.
However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95
SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.

16
 That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as
the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In
cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of
deeds.

On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary
registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment
he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the
day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of
title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it.
(See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).

In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which
contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise
inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate
of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.

Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable
character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the
deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the
property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion
of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said
portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul
Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free
from any encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)

It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such
admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable
character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered
with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.

Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time
acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna
Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the
petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo
from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited
these properties from his son Raul.

The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891
of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:

17
 Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register
the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent
third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No.
42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether
the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for
the benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom
the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the
relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate,
natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter
dictum this Court stated therein:

The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant

reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant
reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New
Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to said
relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this
case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of succession. The
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the
reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have
nothing to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to
the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons
entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p.
292, Ibid)

Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this
Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value.
Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See
also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).

Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang
has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their
reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to
the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith,
free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised
not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?"
Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914,
that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had any knowledge of the
reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land
from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his
mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not
been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for
the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in
regard thereto.

18
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse)
had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property,
in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the
latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate
also.

The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real
property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition
of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis
supplied)

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration
of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor
Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the
right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property
during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the
latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree
(See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part
of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil
Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in
thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved
property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed
yet.

Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil
Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable
character of a property subject of reserva troncal.

SO ORDERED.

19
G.R. No. L-16579 June 29, 1964

SATURNINA HOLLERO and JOSE CAMENO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE HOLLERO, ANITA HARDER,
ISAGANI EVANGELISTA, ET AL., respondents.

Luis G. Hofilea and Efrain B. Treas for petitioners.

Eugenio G. Gemarino for respondents.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding ownership of a parcel of land in Jaro, Iloilo.

It formerly was the paraphernal property of Paz Hollero who died in June 1935, leaving her husband
Generoso Hollero and their only son Felix. The latter died in 1944 followed shortly by his father
Generoso.

The plaintiffs Jose Hollero, et al. brothers and nephews or nieces of Paz Hollero claim the
property by virtue of the reserva troncal provisions of the Civil Code. Upon the death of Paz, they
contend, the property passed to Felix; and upon the latter's death, it passed to Generoso.
Thereafter, the reserva troncal began to operate, to wit: when Generoso died, the property had to be
transmitted by operation of law to the relatives of Felix up to the third degree, i.e., the brothers and
sisters of Paz (Jose, Severo, Socorro, Estrella, Benjamin and Manuel) who survived him.

On the other hand, the defendants allege in short, that they inherited the land from Saturnina's
brother Generoso, upon the latter's death. They assert that Paz Hollero, in her lifetime, had sold the
property to Andrea Gustilo in 1934; and that in 1936, Generoso purchased it from Andrea.

It appears that on December 21, 1934, Paz Hollero executed a document transferring the property
by " pacto de retro" to Andrea Gustilo for P240.00. After her death, i.e. on February 28, 1936,
Andrea sold the same land to Generoso for P200.00. And the principal issue, debated both in the
court of first instance and the Court of Appeals, was whether the "pacto de retro" constituted a true
sale or was merely a mortgage. If a sale, Generoso got ownership of the land and his successors-in-
interest the defendants - have a right to judgment. 1wph1.t

Substantially, the Court of Appeals held: (a) it was a mere mortgage; (b) Generoso merely repaid the
debt; and Felix inherited it upon the death of Paz, his mother; and (c) when Felix in turn died, it
passed to Generoso subject to the provisions on reserva troncal.1

At this level, the character of the document whether a sale or a mere mortgage is foreclosed: it is a
question of fact on which the Appeals' Court pronouncement is final. This disposes of the last error
assigned by , the petitioners of this review.

The other two assignments while not necessarily assailing the second and third declarations of the
appellate court, tend only to modify the dispositive part of its judgment now under review, which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we hereby reverse the decision a quo, and render another declaring that the
transaction between Paz Hollero and Andrea Gustilo, executed on December 21, 1934, was
an equitable mortgage which was validly cancelled by payment of the loan on February 28,

20
 1936; declaring that the land, subject-matter of the mortgage, or lot 2376-D of the Jaro
cadastre, described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, was the paraphernal property of Paz
Hollero, ordering the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel transfer certificate of title T-5941
(Exh. 30) and in lieu thereof to issue another title in the names of Jose Hollero, Severo
Hollero, Manuel Hollero, and the other brothers and sisters of these persons who were alive
at the time of death of Generoso Hollero, in pro indiviso and equal shares, upon the
repayment to the defendants of the charges evidenced by the receipts, Exhs. 7, 8, 9 to 14,
and 17 to 22, which charges may however be offset against their share in the produce of the
land due from the defendants; and condemning the defendants to pay to the owners of the
property the sum of P5,000 per year beginning with the crop year 1956-1957, until
possession of the land shall have been restored to the latter. No pronouncement as to costs
in this instance.

The petitioners who were defendants below maintain that it was error to award "a part of the
land in question to Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder" whom the complaint had expressly
excluded, and who had previously acknowledged the right to the land of herein petitioners-
defendants below.

It appears that the complaint itself stated that although said two persons were also heirs of Paz and
Felix Hollero, they were not parties plaintiff because "they have relinquished their rights in favor of
the defendants"; it also appears in Civil Case No. 3239 of the Iloilo court of first instance, the herein
petitioners sued said two persons for ejectment from the land; and both having expressly
acknowledged the ownership of then plaintiffs (petitioners here now), were ejected therefrom (in
1951).

(By the way, this litigation commenced in 1956 by plaintiffs-respondents, seeks to recover the same
land.)

There is merit in this (first) assignment of error. Having won Civil Case 2239, the herein defendants
must be deemed to have the rights of Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder to the property. Now, what
are those rights?

It must be explained that the record makes reference to two Manuel Holleros. One is the plaintiff
Manuel Hollero who is the nephew of Paz (as the son of her brother Benjamin Hollero) and another
Manuel Hollero who is Paz' own brother excluded from the complaint. The latter is the one
enumerated erroneously in the dispositive part of the Court of Appeals' decision. Given the
result of the Iloilo Civil Case No. 2239, his portion should have been reserved or adjudicated to
herein petitioners-defendants below. What about Felix Harder? He is the son of Socorro, sister of
Paz. She is awarded one-sixth of the property by the above decision; and as she had left four
children (Anita, Meriam, Alatia and Felix) the latter's share is one-fourth of such one-sixth, i.e., 1/24,
which must be awarded to herein petitioners-defendants below.

The second assignment of error challenges the part of the decision awarding damages. No evidence
was adduced say petitioners about the annual crops harvested from the land. In reply, the
respondents point out the page of the stenographic notes and the evidence supporting the appellate
court's decision and findings. As this issue depends on the evidence, we must decline to interfere.

Now therefore, in upholding the rights of petitioners to the portion of Manuel Hollero and Felix
Harder, it should be stated that Manuel Hollero was entitled, upon the death of Generoso, to one-
sixth of the land (they were six brothers and sisters of Paz); but Felix Harder, as explained, is now
entitled to one-fourth of the one-sixth which his mother Socorro inherited, i.e., 1/24 of the land.

21
Wherefore, the dispositive part of the appellate court's decision should be modified to the effect that
the property belongs pro-indiviso to Jose Hollero 4/24; Severo Hollero 4/24; the heirs of Socorro
Hollero 3/24; the heirs of Estrella Hollero 4/24; the heirs of Benjamin Hollero 4/24: and the spouses
of Jose Camemo and Saturnina Hollero 5/24.

Needless to add, the amount to be repaid to defendants for the charges evidenced by the receipts,
etc., must correspondingly be decreased by 5/24, in the same way that the indemnity per year
(P5,000) payable to plaintiffs, must also be reduced by 5/24; such indemnity to be computed up to
the day this decision becomes final.

As surrender of the entire lot to plaintiffs may not now be ordered the case should be, and is hereby
remanded to the court of first instance, so that further proceedings may be had to separate the
portion belonging to defendants; and upon such separation, orders shall be made for the delivery to
plaintiffs of the pants corresponding to them with the fruits thereof; and the issuance of the
corresponding titles. Unless, of course, the parties come to an agreement to hold the property pro-
indiviso in which case, a new title may be issued in the corresponding names and proportions. With
these modifications, the appellate court's decision is affirmed.

22
G.R. No. L-23770 February 18, 1926

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE
CALLEJA, defendants-appellees.

Domingo Imperial for appellant

Mariano Locsin for appellees.

AVANCEA, C.J.:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only
marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina.
The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago
Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and
Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child
who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his
property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of
land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his
wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.

On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that
Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral
who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral,
on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided
between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.

On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas
for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds on
November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to
Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of
deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had
been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.

The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court
reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for
the probate of the will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at
the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of
extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the
court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary
proceedings.

From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were
acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of
Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of
the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that
parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and
11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha.

23
Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree
of the line from which this property came.

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against
Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as
purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the
reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the
plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the
registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be
declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa
and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the
deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the
reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the said
reservable property. The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:

For the foregoing reasons it is held:

1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the
character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to
make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the
defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these should survive her; 3.
That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral
should die before them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.

In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of
Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands
described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands
in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said parcels
of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either
of them survive her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000,
without express pronouncement as to costs.

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor
(reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost
importance to determine the time when the land acquired the character of reservable property.

It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into a
contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria
Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the
probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality
of the extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596
of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will
to make a partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the
deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of
course, excludes testate estates like the one now before us.

24
When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance
therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated.
And even after being probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed
by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary
provisions must be passed upon by the court.

For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicial
partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the
reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives,
the property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said
partition was approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la
Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the following language:

The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of
article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of the
inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of inventory and the
consequences thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only
after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of
the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by
law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or
administrator appointed by a competent court.

As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by Maria Corral
to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the
reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on
their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she
transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868 tending to
assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation
known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the reservation now under
consideration.

In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the
registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of
ninety days for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law).
According to article 203 of the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time
must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code,
regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been indicated,
must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the
decision of this court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may
demand compliance with this obligation.

If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt that she
could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted in the registry of
deeds. This land having been sold to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the
question arises whether the latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This

25
acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the notation of
the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria
Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period
of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the
right of the reservees to commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land
first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law
imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that held by Maria
Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the obligation to note it in the registry
of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.

In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition
for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the
property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas
and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were
made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the
reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.

Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when
they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa
by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the
legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with
Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose
Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land
by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the
relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a
daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of
them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her
son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11
has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to
comply with this obligation.

The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the return of
these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or a bond in the
amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this
security, the recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil
Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property
will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the property is required
by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse
when the property has been sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil
Code), but is not applicable to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In
the case of Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:

* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation
by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva
troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects,
these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a
reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the reservor
as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is extinguished.
In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property
goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a
second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free
of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the

26
 transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before
becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered.
But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen,
the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides that should the
property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another
marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon
contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the
rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not
required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without
prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent
purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the
efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of the property sold by
the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the
property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva
troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second
marriage in the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is
unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the
other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are
decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of
deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

27
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas,
absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to
costs.

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.

Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her,
ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land
above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter
Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born
Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased
father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the
said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants
the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint,
invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged
natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in
its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article
811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural
daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while
unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother
until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and

28
exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio
de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente
vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion
and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate
of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)

The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not
an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article
811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his
son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana
Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and
she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo
obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the
third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the
defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.
1awph!l.net

There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva.
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms
"ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be
legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel
for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or
tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives
to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of
that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that
the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of such
commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better
than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the
persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father
or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural
ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching
the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family.
Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that
it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

29
 Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not
recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established
by acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges and the
acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in
said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the
exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks
only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course
made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in
the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for
example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained
that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the
legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
article 811, and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime.
The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly
included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class
being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811
occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were
any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the
provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of
the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their
testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.

Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to
succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire
that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which
they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and
whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the
patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate
ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from
the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws
of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal
properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the
duty to reserve.

The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised
just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised;
but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the
interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with
respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)

The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:

Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate
points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is
established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which the properties came.

30
 It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to
articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established
between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to
favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which
is just what this article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate

ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which
the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the
patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not
be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to
inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the
two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the
natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The
reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil,
Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives
so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.

31
G.R. No. 70722 July 3, 1991

CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN, FLORA VELASQUEZ, BENJAMIN VELASQUEZ, RODOLFO

VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO VELASQUEZ, NAPOLEON VELASQUEZ, MANUEL VELASQUEZ,
JULIO VELASQUEZ, VICTORIA VELASQUEZ, CARLOS VELASQUEZ, LEONOR VELASQUEZ,
ELENA VELASQUEZ, PATROCINIO VELASQUEZ, PATRICIA VELASQUEZ, SANTIAGO
ZAPANTA, HERMINIGILDO SISON, ALFREDO AGAPITO, MOISES SANTOS, MAGDALENA
PAGKATIPUNAN, AGAPITO MANALO, MIGUEL ANGELES, MATIAS ALVAREZ, PATRICIO
LAYSA, TEOFILO DE LUNA, ISIDRO ANINAO, APOLINAR CASAL, MOISES GALLARDO,
BONIFACIO PEREZ, DELFIN LAYBA, AND HERMOGENES FLORES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE R. VELASQUEZ, JR., LOURDES
VELASQUEZ, EDGARDO VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ, MINERVA VELASQUEZ,
CYNTHIA VELASQUEZ, CESAR GONZALES, ADOLFO GONZALES, EVELYN GONZALES,
AMELITA GONZALES, RUBEN GONZALES, AND CARMENCITA GONZALES, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Ascuna & Bengson for petitioners.
Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) in AC-G.R. CV No. 68431 dated February 7, 1986, affirming the decision of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, Branch II, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Civil Case
No. SC-894, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is affirmed, with the following
modification:

The entire house and lot on West Avenue, Quezon City, shall be divided as follows:

One-half value of said house and lot to defendant-appellant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her
13 co-defendants-appellants children (now petitioners) to the extent of their respective
proportional contributions as stated above; and

The other one-half value of the said house and lot goes to the second conjugal partnership of
the deceased husband and his second spouse Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-
fourth to Canuta Pagkatipunan and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose
Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his 18 heirs as follows:

1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiff-appellee Lourdes Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia, and
Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;

32
 1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellee Teresa Magtibay and her children, Ricardo,
Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/1 8 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben,
and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;

1/18 undivided portion to each of the 13 defendants-appellants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio,

Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria, and Carlos, all
surnamed Velasquez.

SO ORDERED. (p. 55, Rollo)

The facts from the records are as follows:

The principal litigants in this case are the successors- in-interest of Jose Velasquez, Sr. who died
intestate on February 24, 1961. Petitioner Canuta Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13 petitioners are their children namely: Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio,
Julio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos. On the
other hand, the private respondents are the descendants of Jose Velasquez, Sr. with his first wife
Victorina Real who died in 1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna. Private respondents Jose Velasquez, Jr.
(substituted after his death during the pendency of this suit by his surviving spouse Teresa Magtibay
and their children Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and Lourdes Velasquez are two of the five
children of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. The other three, Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda,
all surnamed Velasquez, all died before the commencement of this case. Amelia Velasquez died
without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was survived by private respondents Edgardo, Lolita,
Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez, his children, forced heirs and lawful
successors-in-interest. Lutgarda Velasquez was survived by private respondents Cesar, Adolfo,
Evelyn, Amelita, Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales, likewise her children, forced heirs
and successors-in-interest.

This case was judicially instituted by the private respondents against the petitioners in 1969 in a
complaint entitled "accion reivindicatoria, annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages."
However, both the trial and the appellate courts considered that the real controversy in this case is
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties acquired by the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr.
in his two marriages, one with Victorina Real, who predeceased him, and the other with Canuta
Pagkatipunan, as well as the partition of the estate of said Jose Velasquez, Sr. among his heirs.

It appears that after the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no dissolution of the first conjugal property
has been made. Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr. enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and
administration of the whole conjugal property of the first marriage.

In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second wife although they cohabited
as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon after his first wife's death. From this marriage, the other 13
co-petitioners were born. Neither had there been any liquidation of the second conjugal partnership
after the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the controversies in the
instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two marriages.

The trial court appointed two sets of commissions one on January 31, 1975, for the purpose of
making an inventory of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other on November 15, 1976, to
determine which of the parcels of land listed in such inventory submitted by the first set of
commissioners belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal partnership
of the second marriage.

33
Based on the Report and Inventory submitted on May 29, 1975, the commissioners listed the
following properties as acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his marriage with Victorina
Real:

1. Tax Declaration No. 2718. A riceland, located in Luya and with an area of 93,662 square
meters;

2. Tax Declaration No. 3125. A Secano land located in Luya and with an area of 12,540
square meters;

3. Tax Declaration No. 2623. A Cocal and Forestal, situated in Salang-Bato (Macasipac) and
with an area of 500,000 square meters;

4. Tax Declaration No. 2096. A riceland, situated in Islang Munti and with an area of 40,328
square meters;

5. A Cocal and Forestal land situated in Bankang Bato containing an area of 240,000 square
meters;

6. Tax Declaration No. 4251. A Cocal, Secano and Cogonal land situated in Cambuja and
containing an area of 163,121 square meters;

7. Tax Declaration No. 1342. A parcel of land situated in Bagumbayan and containing an
area of 80,258 square meters;

8. Tax Declaration No. 3541. A Cocal and Secano land, situated in Bagumbayan and
containing an area of 20 hectares;

(Total area as surveyed is 392,503 square meters. This includes the area of the land stated
in Item 7 of the Inventory).

9. Tax Declaration No. 82. A Cogonal land situated in Tungkod (Ikalong Tumid), containing
an area of 385,324 square meters;

10. Tax Declaration No. 1500. A riceland, situated in Pague, containing an area of 9,228
square meters;

11. Tax Declaration No. 5688

a) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 24,725

square meters;

b) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 25,000

square meters;

12. Tax Declaration No. 543. A parcel of land situated in Gomez Street, containing an area of
755 square meters;

13. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
367.2 square meters;

34
 14. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
367.2 square meters.

15. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
367.2 square meters.

16. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
367.2 square meters.

17. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
1,275 square meters.

18. Tax Declaration No. 804-A. Three parcels of land situated in Salang Bato, containing an
area of 450,000 square meters;

19. Tax Declaration No. 2560. A parcel of land situated in Salang Bato which area is
included in item no. 18.

20. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known
to both parties).

21. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St., containing an area of 5,000 square meters.
(Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

22. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 300 square meters. (Papers
cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

23. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 1,050 square meters.
(Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).

24. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known
to both parties).

25. A parcel of land situated in Zamora St., containing an area of 3,605. (Papers cannot be
located but subject lot is known to both parties).

26. Tax Declaration No. 2412: A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an area of
12,867 square meters;

27. A parcel of land situated in Dra. Amelia St.

On the other hand, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by Jose Velasquez,
Sr. on February 11, 1921 or after the death of Victorina Real:

28. Tax Declaration No. 2547. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of
21,566 square meters;

29. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 93.191 square meters.
(Commissioner's Inventory, Rollo, pp. 355-360)

35
Worth noting are the following findings of the commissioners:

3) That among the properties acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime,
only the one mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (Annex "A") is still intact. It is situated in
Bagumbayan, Sta. Maria, Laguna, and is containing an area of 80,258 square meters, more
or less;

4) That Item 8 of the Inventory is only 200,000 square meters, more or less in Tax
Declaration No. 3541, but as per Survey caused by the defendants (which is not yet
approved) it contains an area of 330,345 square meters. That the Tax Declaration of said
parcel of land is under the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, but plaintiff Jose Velasquez, Jr. is
the one in possession of said property. That the area as contained in the Survey includes the
area of the land mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (80,258 sq. m.);

5) That the other properties of the late Jose Velasquez Sr. were disposed of by the said
decedent during his lifetime and some were sold and/or disposed of by the parties and heirs
of the late Jose Velasquez, Sr.;

6) That the Barandilla properties, as evidenced by the Venta Absoluta dated February 11,
1921 executed by Pedro Villanueva in favor of Jose Velasquez Sr., were disposed of portion
by portion. It was sold by the late Jose Velasquez who disposed of some portions and the
rest by either the plaintiffs or defendants. An area of 11,200 square meters more or less was
DONATED (donacion propter Nupcias) in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan by the decedent
Jose Velasquez, Sr. as evidenced by Kasulatan ng Panibagong Documento Donacion
Propter Nupcias notarized under Inst. 135; Page 47; Book 1; Series of 1947 of Notary Public
Bonifacio de Ramos;

7) That the parcels of land appearing in Items 5 and 6 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were
DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez Sr. to Guillermo Velasquez;

8) That parcels of land mentioned in Items 18 and 19 of the Inventory (Annex "A") were
DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to Jose Velasquez, Jr. Said properties were sold
by the Donee to Sps. Santiago Recio and Filomena Dimaculangan;

9) The property mentioned in Item 27, page 3 of the Inventory was given by the late Jose
Velasquez, Sr. to one of his daughters, Dra. Amelia Velasquez while she was still living and
now owned by her heirs;

10) A residential lot at 7 West Avenue, Quezon City, titled in the name of Canuta
Pagkatipunan, was acquired from the PHHC (People's Homesite and Housing Corporation,
now National Housing Authority) and presently occupied by the defendants. (Rollo, pp. 351-
353)

There is divergence of findings and opinion among the three members of the second set of
commissioners with respect to the properties covered by Items 7 and 8 and the property in the
unnumbered item relating to Lot 2-A West Avenue, Quezon City and the house thereon of the
Inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners. They refuse to make findings as to the nature
of the properties because the petitioners had caused the issuance of titles covering said properties.
However, all the commissioners were in agreement that all the other properties listed in the
Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

36
The records before Us will show that the properties covered by items 7 and 8 were originally
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the spouses Real and Velasquez. This has been
admitted by Canuta Pagkatipunan during the hearing before the Commissioner and is duly
supported by documentary evidence.

After the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the full possession of said property was acquired by Canuta
Pagkatipunan. On March 4, 1967, she sold the same property to the spouses Moises Santos and
Magdalena Pagkatipunan, her brother-in-law and sister, respectively (they were previously
impleaded in the trial court as party-defendants). Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 was
issued in the names of the said spouses who later resold the same property to Canuta
Pagkatipunan. Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in her name, During the
pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of
her thirteen children. The latter caused the issuance of separate free patent titles in their favor
covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them by their mother. Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-
2000 to P-2012 were accordingly issued in their names.

With regard to the West Avenue property it is not disputed that said residential lot was purchased on
installments from People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (now National Housing Authority) by
the spouses Jose Velasquez Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. The installments were paid by the said
spouses until Jose Velasquez, Sr. died on February 24, 1961. Canuta Pagkatipunan, with the help of
some of her children, shouldered the payment of the remaining installments until said property was
fully paid in 1965. On February 23, 1968, the PHHC executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the
said house and lot to Canuta Pagkatipunan.

On August 11, 1980, a judgment was rendered by the trial court:

1) Declaring the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the Commissioners on May 9,
1975, as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real;

2) Confirming all the conveyances, either by way of sale or donation, executed by Jose
Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime;

3) Declaring null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or
conveyances: (a) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister
Magdalena Pagkatipunan in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan (sic); (b) the deeds of
assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, covering the
properties listed in Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory; and ordering defendants (petitioners) to
reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents) the parcels of land covered by Patent
Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012;

4) Declaring as null, fictitious and fraudulent the sales by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of
her children and her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan and brother-in-law Moises Santos,
listed in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint; declaring the plaintiffs owners of the said
properties; and ordering the defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan and her children-defendants to
deliver possession of said properties to the plaintiffs;

5) Ordering the partition of the house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City in the following
manner:

(a) One-half undivided portion to defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan; and the other half
appertaining to Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided among his heirs, to wit:

37
 1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;

1/18 undivided portion to Lourdes Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer,
all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Teresa Magtibay and her children Ricardo,
Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;

1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben and
Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;

1/18 undivided portion to each of the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Benjamin,
Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos, all
surnamed Velasquez;

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 7, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Civil Cases Division promulgated a
decision, affirming the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the entire house and lot in
West Avenue, Quezon City be divided into two; one-half value to the petitioners Canuta
Pagkatipunan and her 13 children to the extent of their respective proportional contributions and the
other half value, to the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta
Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth appertaining to the
deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his heirs.

Hence, this instant petition for review pointing out the following four (4) assignments of error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE ESTATE LISTED IN THE
INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 9, 1975 AS BELONGING
TO THE DECEASED SPOUSES JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. AND VICTORINA REAL.

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING ALL THE CONVENYANCES

EITHER BY WAY OF SALE OR DONATION EXECUTED BY JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR.
DURING HIS LIFETIME.

III

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID, SHAM AND
FICTITIOUS THE FOLLOWING SALES: a) THE SALE EXECUTED BY CANUTA
PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER SISTER MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN AND
BROTHER-IN-LAW MOISES SANTOS; b) THE RESALE EXECUTED BY MOISES SANTOS
AND MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN; c) THE
DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER
CHILDREN: COVERING THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN ITEMS 7 AND 8 OF THE
INVENTORY; AND ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN

38
 AND HER CHILDREN DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS TO RECONVEY IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY PATENT TITLES NOS.
P2-000 TO P-2012.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE HOUSE AND
LOT IN WEST AVENUE, QUEZON CITY, ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND THE OTHER HALF TO JOSE
VELASQUEZ, SR. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

After a careful review of the records and the arguments presented by both parties, the Court finds
that both the trial court and the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court failed to consider some
basic principles observed in the law on succession Such an oversight renders the appealed decision
defective and hard to sustain.

It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it
is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed
the trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of and exhausted his
corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs
have nothing more to inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the
conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private respondents as heirs of the
deceased Victorina Real. Clearly, the trial court failed to consider among others, the following
provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed
in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of
some of his compulsory heirs. They include among others, the donation made in favor of Guillermo
Velasquez on February 26,1953, consisting of 403,000 square meters (Items 5 and 6); the donation
made in 1926 in favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr., consisting of 450,000 square meters (Item No. 18); the
donation in favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item No. 27); and the donation in favor of Canuta
Pagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square meters (part of Item No. 29) (Commissioner's
Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360).

It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal share
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he
executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the same may be
considered subject to reduction for being inofficious.

39
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.

Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator
could have disposed by his last will. 1wphi1

Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be
reduced according to the rules established by this Code.

With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting collation, which are ruled
controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the lower court's ruling adjudicating the
remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely speculative and
conjectural.

Relative to the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan to the spouses Magdalena Pagkatipunan and
Moises Santos; the resale of the same property to her; and the subsequent deeds of assignment she
executed in favor of her children, the trial court had clearly established that Canuta Pagkatipunan
employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over the said properties. Hence, the trial court, as well as
the respondent court are correct in ruling that the said sales and assignments are null and void,
sham and fictitious.

The pertinent portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:

From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before this Court and before
the Commissioners, these properties were acquired on November 19, 1918 by the spouses
Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real from Estanislao Balasoto (Exh. H-5 Commissioner).
Said property was originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of said spouses.
(Exh. H Commissioner) On March 4, 1967, defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan sold the same
property to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1-
Commissioner). The vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the sister of the defendant Canuta
Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 (Exh. H-2 Commissioner) was
issued in the names of the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan resold
(sic) the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-3 Commissioner). Thereafter, tax
declaration covering said property was issued in the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit
H-4 Commissioner). During the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and
assigned by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, the defendants Flora, Leonor,
Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and
Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez. Said defendants-children of Canuta Pagkatipunan caused
the issuance of free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to them
respectively by their mother (Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L)

It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Canuta
Pagkatipunan had no right to alienate the same. Her conveyance of the same property to her
brother-in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10) days after she executed her sale,
the same property was resold to her by the vendees. She utilized said conveyance and
reconveyance only for the purpose of securing a tax declaration in her name over said
property. Her subsequent subdivision of said lot and transfer of the subdivided lots to each of
their children further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their rightful shares
in the disputed property. (Rollo, pp. 606-607)

40
Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they did not rebut the foregoing
findings of the trial court but merely held on to their argument that since Free Patent Titles Nos. P-
2000 to P-2012 were already issued in their names, their title thereto is indefeasible and
incontrovertible. This is a misplaced argument.

The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land does not warrant the
reversal of the trial court's ruling that the above mentioned sales and assignments were sham and
fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is
that if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land is registered
thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property within a period of ten years (Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908,
August 11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340).

Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of land but acted in
fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as trustees for the benefit of the
latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.

But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the questioned titles, We
cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor of the private respondents. The reason
is that it is still unproven whether or not the private respondents are the only ones entitled to the
conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs
of Jose Velasquez Sr. the herein petitioners are also entitled to participate in his conjugal share. To
reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone would not only be improper but will
also make the situation more complicated. There are still things to be done before the legal share of
all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.

Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the respondent appellate court
proper and in accord with law insofar as it adjudicated the one-half (1/2) portion of the house and lot
situated at West Avenue, Quezon City, as belonging to the petitioners to the extent of their
respective proportional contributions, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan. We must modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the
conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. (1/2 of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the entire house and lot)
to his 18 heirs.

As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs can be reached in
this case without (1) determining first the net value of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating
all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the
compulsory heirs. 1w phi 1

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court as modified by the respondent appellate court is
hereby SET ASIDE except insofar as it:

(a) declared the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the commissioners on May 9,
1975 as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez,
Sr. and Victorina Real;

41
 (b) declared null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers, assignments or
conveyances:

1) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena

Pagkatipunan; 2) the resale of the same property executed in favor of Canuta
Pagkatipunan; and 3) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan
in favor of her 13 children; covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8;

(c) declared as null and void all the other conveyances made by Canuta Pagkatipunan with
respect to Item No. 13 of the inventory; and

d) dismissed the case against the other defendants except Canuta Pagkatipunan and her
children and the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan.

Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, for further
proceedings and the same Court is directed to:

a) follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed;

b) expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal dispositions of the first conjugal
partnership properties not only by Canuta Pagkatipunan but also by the other heirs as can be
shown in the records;

c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the residential house in
Quezon City with his conjugal share under his first marriage, if any, to determine his net
estate at the time of his death.

The trial court's pronouncement as to cost and damages is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.

42
G.R. No. L-2920 January 23, 1951

IN THE TESTATE ESTATE OF DON ISIDRO ARAGON, deceased. JOSEFA A. VDA. DE

CLAUDIO, RAMON DIOKNO and MENANDRO QUIOGUE, claimants-appellants,
vs.
CRISANTO ARAGON, administrator-appellee.

Jose W. Diokno for appellants.

Pedro Valdes Liongson for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Isidro Aragon died on November 26, 1944, in the city of Manila, leaving a will. In paragraph 7 of the
will, the deceased made certain legacies in favor of the following persons: Josefa Aragon Vda. de
Claudio, P10,000; Ramon Diokno, P8,000; Menandro Quioque, P4,000.

Instead of taking steps to have the will probated in accordance with law, the heirs made and
executed a document wherein they agreed to distribute among them the properties of the deceased
in accordance with terms and conditions ordained by him in his will, including money and shares of
stock not mentioned thereon. And the reference to the factory of soap which was burdened with the
payment of legacies, the following was agreed upon:

2. Asimismo se adjudica a Clara Aragon de Villanueva, Crisanto Aragon, Concepcion

Aragon de Santiago, Guillermo Aragon, Francisco Aragon, Asuncion y Lilia Garcia,
Noiminada Aragon y Valentina Tibayan viuda de Aragon en comun y proindiviso, y en
laproporcion de una octava parte cada una (considerandose a Asunciony Lilia Garcia como
una parte), la fabrica de jabon en Pasay, Rizal, con toda su existencia, equipo y mobiliario,
incluyendo losedificios y el terreno en que se halla levantada, . . . .

Conforme se dispone en el testamento, mientras la fabrica nose haya vendido, la misma

estara en comunidad entre la viuda, hijos y nietas del difunto Don Ysidro Aragon aqui
otorgantes, conla carga de los legados referidos y los incidentales de laadministracion, que
la tendra el referido Crisanto Aragon y que podraoperarla con la misma libertad que si fuera
el mismo difunto. Despues de pagados los gastos corrientes de administracion, seiran
pagando con los productos las cargas, y una vez pagadasestas, se dividiran los productos
en ocho partes y se pagara a loscomuneros como arriba queda dispuesto, hasta que se
divida la propiedad. (Pags. 13-14, Particion). (pp. 4-6, Rec. on Appeal).

After the death of Isidro Aragon, some pieces of equipment that were attached to the soap factory,
such as a Buick jeetney, a Chevrolet truck and a Ford truck, were sold by the heirs on June 28,
1945. The value of this equipment amounts to P6,000.00. The building in which the factory of soap
was leased by the administrator with a monthly rental of P400.00, so that he received a total of
P10,400 as a rental for twenty-six months, and when he later decided to reside in the building he
never paid any rental therefor as it was his duty to do.

The heirs apparently had taken some steps to sell the property, perhaps with the purpose of paying
off the legacies, but their efforts proved futile and so far they have not paid any of the legacies, while
the building is fast deteriorating and is continuously menaced by destruction by fire without hope of
recovery because it has never been insured.

For the foregoing reasons, invoking the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the
legatees, through counsel, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on August 29, 1947, a

43
motion praying that the rentals so far earned by the property be ordered deposited with the court to
pay the legacies made in favor of the movants with legal interest thereon, and that a writ of
execution be issued to pay the balance of the legacies, if any, against the factory of soap, and the
land, buildings, furniture and equipment belonging thereto, charging the costs and other incidental
expenses of the proceedings against the heirs of the deceased.

On October 22, 1947, the court, instead of granting the motion, ordered the movants to submit a
petition for the probate of the will on the ground that, unless the will is probated, the legacies which
movants claim to have been made in their favor cannot be entertained; and this step having been
taken, the will was admitted to probate, and Crisanto Aragon was appointed administrator of the
estate.

On January 20, 1948, the legatees moved that the administrator be ordered to sell the property at
public auction in order that with its proceeds the legacies maybe paid as soon as possible. To this
the administrator countered stating that, whereas it is the desire of the heirs to comply with the
provisions of the will as early as possible, they cannot however agree to the sale of the property at
public auction for such would be detrimental to their interests, and in lieu thereof he requested that
he be authorized to sell it at the best obtainable price inasmuch as the heirs had agreed to exert
their best efforts to sell the property even at a reduced amount of P70,000. This request was granted
and the administrator was given four months within which to sell the property with the understanding
that if at the expiration of said period the property is still unsold, it would be sold at public auction to
the highest bidder.

Two days before the expiration of the period given by the Court, the administrator again asked for six
(6) months additional period within which to sell the property, which was strongly opposed by the
legatees. The Court, however, granted the administrator an additional period of three (3) months
provided that he deliver to the legatees the amount of P6,000 rentals he then had in his possession.
The administrator having failed to obey this order, the legatees insisted in their desire that the
property be sold at public auction. This pretense was again denied, and on August 18, 1948, the
administrator moved that the amounts of the legacies fixed by the testator be reduced in proportion
to the price at which the property may be sold for the reason that due to the depreciation of land
values the price originally fixed by the testator as basis for the payment of the legacies of
P16,500.00 could no longer be realized with the possible result that it may be sold with a reduction
of 50 per cent in value. To this motion the legatees filed a vigorous objection contending that the
reduction prayed for is unjust and unwarranted under the circumstances. And on September 10,
1948, the court granted the motion stating in its dispositive part as follows:

En su virtud, el Juzgado encuentra bien fundada la mocion del administrasor, y ordena que
se reduzcan los legados mandados en el testamento, en proporcion al producto que se
obtenga de la venta de la fabrica de la jabon, y esta reduccion sera en un por ciento
equivalente al por ciento que representan las cantidades asignadas por el testador a los
lgeatarios sobre la base de P116,500 que el ha fijado. (p. 57, Rec. on Appeal).

On October 12, 1948, the legatees moved for reconsideration of said order invoking the same
reasons and praying at the same time that the property in question be immediately sold at public
auction, and this motion having been denied, (although the court ordered the administrator to sell the
property at public auction and to deposit its proceeds with the clerk of court until further orders), the
legatees gave notice of their intention to appeal both from the order of the lower court of September
10, 1948, in toto, and from the order of November 18, 1948, in so far as it maintains its order of
September 10, 1948.

The case is now before this Court purely on questions of law.

44
 xxx xxx xxx

The only question raised in this appeal refers to the order of the lower court dated September 10,
1948, which directs the reduction of the legacies in favor of appellants in proportion to the proceeds
that may be realized from the sale of the property in question taking into account as basis the
original value of P116,500 fixed by the testator in his will. It is claimed that this order is erroneous
because the lower court does not have power and authority to grant such reduction under the law.

The question herein involves a study of the scope and extent of the power of a testator to dispose of
his property in a way that may not impair the rights given to their heirs by law. The issue is
fundamental because it strikes at the very power of a person to dispose of his property mortis causa.
This calls for a delimitation of this power to determine if in the disposition of his property the testator
has transgressed the law.

All authorities are unanimous that the only portion of the estate that cannot be impaired by the
testator is the legitime. This is the part of the property which the testator cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs, called forced heirs. (Art. 806, Civil Code). Among these
heirs are the legitimate children and descendants with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants (Art. 807, idem). The legitimate of these heirs consists of two thirds (2/3) of the
estate, one-half of which the testator may dispose of as a betterment to a
legitimate child or descendant. (Art. 808, idem). The testator cannot deprived
his forced heirs of this legitime, except in cases specifically determined by
law. (Art. 813, idem). And while a person may make donations, no one can
give more than that which he can give by will otherwise, the excess shall be
inofficious, and shall be reduced accordingly. (Art. 636, 654, idem) and as a
rule, testamentary dispositions which impair the legitimate shall be reduced on
petition of the heirs insofar as they are inofficious or excessive. (Art.
817, idem).
The foregoing provisions give a clear idea of the scope and extent of the power of a testator as
regards the disposition of his property mortis causa. They demonstrate conclusively that the power
of a testator to dispose of his property is untrammelled provided it does not impair the legitime of the
heirs. In other words, it can be safely said that all testamentary dispositions are deemed valid if they
do not exceed the one-third (/3) free disposal reserved by law to the testator. Any
excess shall be reduced as inofficious.
Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, the question now to be determined is: do the legacies
given by the testator to claimant-appellants in this case impair the legitime of his forced heirs? In
other words, do they exceed the portion of free disposal which the law reserves to the testator? The
answer cannot but be in the negative in the light of the facts obtaining in this case. It appears
undisputed from the evidence of record that all the heirs of the deceased of their own will and accord
had distributed among them the estate in accordance with the terms and conditions of the will so
much so that the only thing remaining to be done is the settlement of the legacies in question. In
other words, the parties do not seem to dispute the fact that the heirs have already received and
taken possession of their respective shares in the inheritance within the limits guaranteed to them by
law, with the expectation that, whatever balance may remain after the legacies in question had been
paid, it would still be distributed to them, not to complete their legitime, but as an increase or addition
to the hereditary portion already received by them. This is clearly apparent in the deed of partition
executed by the heirs, and no one now claims that the testator in making the legacies has

45
transgressed the bounds of the law. We can therefore safely affirm that the legitime of the heirs is
not in any way impaired by the legacies given to the appellants, and as such they are not inofficious
and cannot be validly reduced under the law. To do so would be capricious and arbitrary.

If the legacies are not inofficious, as we have stated before, can they be reduced on some other
ground? Of course this would depend upon the desire of the testator clearly expressed in his will.
There is nothing that would prevent the testator from doing so if such is his true desire. This is his
undisputable prerogative. But this intent must appear clearly in his will in order to prevent that an
injustice be done to the legatees. This cannot be left to a mere conjecture. This is necessary in order
that the will of the testator may not be thwarted or defeated, more so if the legacies have been made
for some onerous consideration. And this intent can only be ascertained by making a careful scrutiny
of the provisions of the will on the matter. Letus now quote these provisions of the will:

8. La Fabrica de Jabon en Pasay (C. T. T. No. 4218, Rizalantes, hoy Manila), con toda su
existencia, equipo y mobiliario, sera vendida a un precio no menor de P116,500, y de esta
ventase sacaran los legados mandados en el parrafo 7 de esto testamento, asi como los
gastos de la testamentaria, y el resto se dividira enocho partes iguales, una octava parte
para mi esposa, una octavaparte para cada uno de mis seis hijos de primeras y segundas
nupcias, y una octava parte para mis dos nietas por mi difuntahija Adela en partes iguales.
Mientras la fabrica no se hayavendido, la misma estara en comunidad entre mis citados
esposa, hijosy nietos, con la carga de los legados y gastos referidos y los gastospropios de
su administracion, que la tendra Crisanto Aragon, quienpodra operarla con la misma libertad
que si fuera yo mismo, y loscitados comuneros no podran enagenar o gravar su
participacionen la comunidad sino a favor de todos o alguno de los otros comuneros. De los
productos de la operacion de la fabrican, despuesde pagados los gastos corrientes de
administracion, se iran pagandolas cargas, y el resto que hubiere se dividira entre
loscomuneros como arriba queda dispuesto. (pp. 2-3, Rec. on Appeal).

From the foregoing it should be noted that the testator burdens the factory of soap, with the land,
equipment and furniture belonging thereto, with the payment of the legacies and directs that it be
sold, to pay the legacies, at a price of not less than P116.500. This is the only pertinent provision on
this matter. The testator does not say that if the property is not sold at that price, the legacies will be
reduced accordingly. He merely directs that the legacies be paid from the proceeds of the sale,
including all the expenses incident to the probate of the will, and that the balance be divided among
the heirs. The mere fact that the testator has fixed the price at which the property will be sold, is not
indicative of an intention to reduce the legacies if the property is sold at a lesser price. It is merely a
statement of his desire to have the property sold at such price in the hope of obtaining greater profit
for the benefit of the heirs. It cannot be presumed that the testator wanted to have that price serve
as the basis for the payment of the legacies considering the fact that he must be presumed to know
that material values are fluctuating in nature. This is a contingency which he is presumed to have in
mind when he decided to make the legacies. If notwithstanding his knowledge of this contingency,
that is, his knowledge that the price may go down, he did not impose any condition nor limitation on
the amount of the legacies to be paid, it must be because of his desire that they be paid in full even if
the property charged with their payment be sold at a lesser price. A different interpretation would be
capricious and arbitrary. No other interpretation is warranted in the absence of a clear proof to the
contrary. This interpretation is fair and is in line with the rule laid down in Art. 675 of the Civil Code.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 28, 1881, cited by appellants, 1 is of
persuasive effect in this case, and supports the view we have here expressed.
We are persuaded to conclude that the lower court erred in ordering the
reduction of the legacies in the light of the facts obtaining in this case.

46
Wherefore, the order of the lower court dated September 10, 1948, as well as its order of November
19, 1948, insofar as it maintains said order are hereby set aside. The administrator is hereby
ordered to pay the legacies as ordained in the will without any reduction. No pronouncement as to
costs.

47
G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,

CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO,
and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.

Ramon C. Zamora, Lorenzo E. Coloso, Jose L. Castigador, Arthur Defensor & Sixto Demaisip and
Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.

Nacianceno G. Rico & Felipe G. Espinosa for oppositors-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November
4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio
Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana
Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion
of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge
Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on March approve extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. 3

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of
Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina
Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto
Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and more
valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made
dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No.
1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of
the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of
Adriana Maloto. 6

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated
November 16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said
motion had been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners
appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court
dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of

48
dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the
appeal is improper was issued.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as
G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:

L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) THE
COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without
passing on the issue of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of
November 16, 1968 of respondent Judge was made on time, it appearing that the
more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in
question. 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution dated July 15,
1969 which reads:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R.

No. L-30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated
June 11, 1969, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the
clarification that the matter of whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of
respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16, 1968 constitute res
adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in
question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such
matter will be more appropriately determined. 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN

DESTROYED AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.

II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR
JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).

III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY
PASSED OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY ARRESTED
IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.

IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO

MALOTO ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY TENDER THIS
PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES. 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on the
basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be
Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors'
contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate
estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:

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 I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT
OF PETITION FOR PROBATE SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO)
HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR

PROBATE OF THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE
ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE
MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES ADJUDICATA

III

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID

PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE
ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-
CITED DUE COURSE.12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of
Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied
because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate
estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have
filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14,
1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a
bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged
will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing
of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-66574

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

PARAS, J.:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite
in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in
her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at
the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children
to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero;

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of Pascual Santero;

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent
Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to
intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated
August 24, 1977.

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Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14,
1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further
taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1,
1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R.
A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the
decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads

WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law
applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of
December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the
declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Costs against the oppositors-appellees.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the
same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review
with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of

petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art.
1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren
Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of
their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero (Art. 982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son
and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and
therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand
children;

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 V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable
provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976
which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children
of Pablo Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the
issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art.
990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the
New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941,
Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by
Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

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In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is
changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the
Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that
while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the
intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in
all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would
be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on
the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the
Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory.
Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976
held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to
intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9,
1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal.
Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of
jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a
judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err
therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti
Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of
an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void. "

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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