Plato's Unwritten Doctrines

6/10/2017 Plato's unwritten doctrines - Wikipedia
Plato's unwritten doctrines

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Plato's so-called unwritten doctrines are metaphysical theories

ascribed to him by his students and other ancient philosophers but not
clearly formulated in his writings. In recent research, they are
sometimes known as Plato's 'principle theory' (German:
Prinzipienlehre) because they involve two fundamental principles from
which the rest of the system derives. Plato is thought to have orally
expounded these doctrines to Aristotle and the other students in the
Academy and they were afterwards transmitted to later generations.
The credibility of the sources that ascribe these doctrines to Plato is

Scholars at Tbingen University
controversial. They indicate that Plato believed certain parts of his
revolutionized the study of Plato's
teachings were not suitable for open publication. Since these doctrines
unwritten doctrines.
could not be explained in writing in a way that would be accessible to
general readers, their dissemination would lead to misunderstandings.
Plato therefore supposedly limited himself to teaching the unwritten
doctrines to his more advanced students in the Academy. The surviving evidence for the content of the
unwritten doctrines is thought to derive from this oral teaching.
In the middle of the twentieth century, historians of philosophy initiated a wide-ranging project aiming at
systematically reconstructing the foundations of the unwritten doctrines. The group of researchers who led this
investigation, which became well-known among classicists and historians, came to be called the 'Tbingen
School' (in German: Tbinger Platonschule), because some of its leading members were based at the
University of Tbingen in southern Germany. On the other hand, numerous scholars had serious reservations
about the project or even condemned it altogether. Many critics thought the evidence and sources used in the
Tbingen reconstruction were insufficient. Others even contested the existence of the unwritten doctrines or at
least doubted their systematic character and considered them mere tentative proposals. The intense and
sometimes polemical disputes between the advocates and critics of the Tbingen School were conducted on
both sides with great energy. Advocates suggested it amounted to a 'paradigm shift' in Plato studies.
Contents
1 Key terms
2 Evidence and sources
2.1 Arguments for the existence of the unwritten doctrines
2.2 The ancient sources for the reconstruction
3 The supposed content of the unwritten doctrines
3.1 The two fundamental principles and their interaction
3.2 Monism and dualism
3.3 The Good in the unwritten doctrines
3.4 Forms of numbers
3.5 Epistemological issues
4 The question of dating and historical development
5 Reception
5.1 Influence before the early modern period
5.2 Nineteenth century
5.3 Before the Tbingen School: Harold Cherniss
5.4 The anti-systematic interpretation of Plato's philosophy
5.5 The origin and dissemination of the Tbingen paradigm
5.6 Critics of the Tbingen School
6 See also
7 References
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato%27s_unwritten_doctrines 1/20
8 Sources
8.1 English language resources
8.2 Collections of the ancient evidence
9 Further reading
10 External links
Key terms
The expression 'unwritten doctrines' (in Greek, ,
grapha dgmata) refers to doctrines of Plato taught inside his school
and was first used by his student Aristotle. In his treatise on physics, he
wrote that Plato had used a concept in one dialogue differently than 'in
the so-called unwritten doctrines.'[1] Modern scholars who defend the
authenticity of the unwritten doctrines ascribed to Plato lay stress on
this ancient expression. They hold that Aristotle used the phrase 'so-
called' not in any ironic sense, but neutrally.
The scholarly literature sometimes also uses the term 'esoteric

doctrines.' This has nothing to do with the meanings of 'esoteric'
common today: it does not indicate a secret doctrine. For scholars,
'esoteric' indicates only that the unwritten doctrines were intended for a Aristotle referred to Plato's 'unwritten
circle of philosophy students inside Plato's school (in Greek, 'esoteric' doctrines' and discussed his principle
literally means 'inside the walls'). Presumably they had the necessary theory.
preparation and had already studied Plato's published doctrines,
especially his Theory of Forms, which is called his 'exoteric doctrine'
('exoteric' means 'outside the walls' or perhaps 'for public consumption').[2]
Modern advocates of the possibility of reconstructing the unwritten doctrines are often called in a short and
casual way 'esotericists' and their skeptical opponents are thus 'anti-esotercists.'[3]
The Tbingen School is sometimes called the Tbingen School of Plato studies to distinguish it from an earlier
'Tbingen School' of theologians based at the same university. Some also refer to the 'Tbingen paradigm.'
Since Plato's unwritten doctrines were also vigorously defended by the Italian scholar Giovanni Reale, who
taught in Milan, some also refer to the 'Tbingen and Milanese School' of Plato interpretation. Reale introduced
the term 'protology,' i.e., 'doctrine of the One,' for the unwritten doctrines, since the highest of the principles
ascribed to Plato is known as the 'One.'[4]
Evidence and sources

The case for the unwritten doctrines involves two steps.[5] The first step consists in the presentation of the
direct and circumstantial evidence for the existence of special philosophical doctrines taught orally by Plato.
This, it is claimed, shows that Plato's dialogues, which have all survived, do not contain all of his teaching, but
only those doctrines suitable for dissemination by written texts. In the second step, the range of sources for the
supposed content of the unwritten doctrines is evaluated and the attempt made to reconstruct a coherent
philosophical system.
Arguments for the existence of the unwritten doctrines
The chief evidence and arguments for the existence of Plato's unwritten doctrines are the following:
Passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics, especially the one in the Physics where Aristotle
explicitly refers to the 'so-called unwritten doctrines.'[6] Aristotle was for many years a student of Plato,
and it is assumed that he was well-acquainted with the teaching

activity in the Academy and thus a good informant.
The report of Aristoxenus, a student of Aristotle, about Plato's
public lecture 'On the Good.'[7] According to Aristoxenus,
Aristotle told him that the lecture contained mathematical and
astronomical illustrations and Plato's theme was the 'One,' his
highest principle. This together with the title of the lecture
implies it dealt with the two principles at the heart of the
unwritten doctrines. According to Aristotle's report, the
philosophically unprepared audience met the lecture with
incomprehension.
The criticism of writing in Plato's dialogues (German:

Schriftkritik).[8] Many dialogues accepted as authentic are
Papirus Oxyrhynchus, with fragment of
skeptical about the written word as a medium for transferring
Plato's Republic
knowledge and express a preference for oral transmission. Plato's
Phaedrus explains this position in detail. There the superiority of
oral over written teaching for transmitting philosophy is
grounded in the far greater flexibility of oral discourse, which is
held to be a decisive advantage. Authors of texts cannot adapt to
the level of knowledge and the needs of individual readers.
Moreover, they cannot answer readers' questions and criticisms.
These are only possible in conversation, which is alive and
psychologically responsive. Written texts are mere images of
speech. Writing and reading are thought not only to lead to a
weakening of our minds, but also to be unsuited for
communicating wisdom, which can only succeed in oral
instruction. Written words are useful only as reminders for those
who already know something but may have forgotten it. Literary
activity is therefore portrayed as mere play. Personal discussions
with students are essential and may permit words in various
individualized ways to be inscribed in the soul. Only those who
can teach in this way, the Phaedrus continues, can be considered
true philosophers. In contrast, those authors who have nothing
'more precious' (Gk., timitera) than a written text, which they
have long polished, are only authors or writers but not yet
philosophers. The meaning here of the Greek for 'more precious'
is debated but is thought to point toward the unwritten
doctrines.[9]
The beginning of the Seventh Letter in
The criticism of writing in Plato's Seventh Letter, whose
the oldest, surviving manuscript from
authenticity is contested, is nonetheless accepted by the Tbingen
the ninth century CE. (Paris,
School.[10] There Plato assertsif he is really the authorthat
Bibliothque Nationale, Gr. 1807)
his teaching can only be communicated orally (at least, he says,
that part of it he is 'serious' about). He emphatically says that
there is no text capable of expressing his philosophy and never
will be, since it cannot be communicated like other teachings. Real understanding in the soul, the letter
continues, arises only from intense, common effort and a shared path in life. Deep insights occur
suddenly, the way a spark flies up and lights a fire. Fixing thought in writing is damaging since it
produces illusions in the minds of readers, who either despise what they do not understand or become
arrogant about their superficial learning.[11]
The 'doctrine of reserve' in the dialogues. There are numerous passages in the dialogues in which an
especially important theme is introduced but then not further discussed. In many cases, the conversation
breaks off just where it approaches the crux of the issue. These often concern questions which are of
fundamental significance for philosophy. The defenders of the Tbingen School interpret these instances
of 'reserve' as pointers to the content of the unwritten doctrines, which cannot be directly handled in
written dialogues.[12]
The fact that it was common in antiquity to distinguish between 'exoteric' matters, suitable for open and
public discussion, and 'esoteric' matters, suitable only for instruction within a school. Even Aristotle
employed this distinction.[13]
The widespread view in antiquity that the content of Plato's doctrines that had been reserved for oral
transmission went significantly beyond the philosophy expressed in the dialogues.[14]
The unwritten doctrines are thought to be the logical consequence of Plato's supposed project of reducing
multiplicity to unity and particularity to generality. Plato's Theory of Forms reduces the multiplicity of
appearances to the relatively smaller multiplicity of the Forms that are their foundation. Within Plato's
hierarchy of Forms, the many lower-level Forms of the species derive from and depend on the higher and
more general Forms of each genus. This leads to the supposition that the introduction of Forms was only
a step on the way from the maximum multiplicity of appearances to the greatest possible unity. Plato's
thought naturally leads therefore to the consequence that the reduction of multiplicity to unity must be
brought to a conclusion, and this must occur in the unpublished theory of his highest principles.[15]
The ancient sources for the reconstruction
If the Seventh Letter is authentic, Plato sharply disapproved of

disclosing the contents of the supposed unwritten doctrines in writing.
However, no obligation to remain silent was imposed upon the
'initiated.' The 'esoteric' character of the teachings should not be
understood as a requirement to keep them secret or as a ban on writing
about them. Indeed, students in the Academy did later publish writings
about the unwritten doctrines or reuse them in their own works.[16] This
'indirect tradition,' the evidence drawn from other ancient authors,
supplies a basis for the reconstruction of doctrines that Plato
communicated only orally.
The following sources are most frequently used for reconstructing

Plato's unwritten doctrines:
Aristote, his student Theophrastus, and
Aristotle's Metaphysics (books , and N) and Physics (book Strato of Lampsacus (National and
) Kapodistrian University of Athens).
Fragments of Aristotle's lost treatises 'On the Good' and 'On
Philosophy'
The Metaphysics of Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle
Two fragments of the lost treatise On Plato by Plato's student Hermodorus of Syracuse[17]
A fragment from a lost work of Plato's student Speusippus[18]
The treatise Against Mathematicians of Sextus Empiricus (10 books). Sextus does not there explicitly
ascribe the doctrines to Plato but describes them as Pythagorean. Modern scholars have assembled
evidence, however, that Plato was in fact their author.[19]
Plato's Republic and Parmenides. The principles ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition make many of
the statements and trains of thought in these two dialogues appear in a different light. Interpreted
accordingly, they contribute to sharpening the contours of our image of the unwritten doctrines. The
debates in other dialogues, for example, the Timaeus and the Philebus, can then be understood in new
ways and incorporated into the Tbingen reconstruction. Allusions to the unwritten doctrines can even be
found, it is argued, in Plato's early dialogues.[20]
The supposed content of the unwritten doctrines

The advocates of the Tbingen School have intensively examined the scattered evidence and testimony in the
sources in order to reconstruct the principles of Plato's unwritten doctrines. They see in these teachings the core
of Plato's philosophy and have reached a fairly settled picture of their fundamentals, though many important
details remain unknown or controversial.[21] A notable feature of the Tbingen paradigm is the contention that
the unwritten doctrines are not unrelated to the written doctrines, rather there is a close and logical connection
between them.
Insofar as the Tbingen interpretation corresponds to the authentic teaching of Plato, it shows that his principles
opened up a new path in metaphysics. His Theory of Forms opposes many views of the Eleatics, a school of
Pre-Socratic philosophy. The principles at the foundation of Plato's unwritten doctrines indeed break with the
convictions of the Eleatics, who held that only perfect, unchanging Being exists. Plato's principles replace this
Being with a new concept of Absolute Transcendence, that is somehow higher than Being. They posit a sphere
of absolutely perfect, 'Transcendental Being' beyond the being of ordinary things. 'Transcendental Being' thus
somehow exists at a higher level than ordinary things. According to this model, all familiar kinds of being are
in a certain way imperfect, since the descent from Transcendental Being to ordinary being involves a restriction
of the original, absolute perfection.[22]
The two fundamental principles and their interaction
Plato's Theory of Forms asserts that the world which appears to our
senses derives from the perfect, unchanging Forms. For him the realm
of the Forms is an objective, metaphysical reality, which is independent
of the lower sort of Being in the ordinary objects we perceive with our
senses. For Plato, the Forms, not the objects of sense, are real Being:
strictly, they and not the objects we experience are reality. Thus the
Forms are the really existing things. As models for the individual
objects we sense, the Forms cause ordinary objects to appear the way
they do and lend them some secondary kind of existence.[23]
In Plato's Allegory of the Cave, we are
Just as the Theory of Forms in Plato's published dialogues is supposed like prisoners chained in a cave who see
to explain the existence and features of the world of appearances, the only the shadows cast by the Forms and
two principles of the unwritten doctrines are supposed to explain the think they and not the hidden Forms are
existence and features of the realm of the Forms. The Theory of Forms real (Michiel Coxie, 14991592).
and the principles of the unwritten doctrines fit together in a way that
provides a unified theory of all existence. The existence of the Forms as
well as therefore of the objects we sense are derived from two fundamental principles.[24]
The two fundamental 'ur-principles' that are thought to constitute the basis of Plato's unwritten doctrines are :
The One: the principle of unity that makes things definite and determinate
The Indefinite Dyad: the principle of 'indeterminacy' and 'unlimitedness' (Gk., ahristos dys)
Plato is said to have described the Indefinite Dyad as 'the Great and the Small' (Gk., to mga kai to mikrn).[25]
This is the principle or source of more and less, of excess and deficiency, of ambiguity and indefiniteness, and
of multiplicity. It does not imply unlimitedness in the sense of a spatial or quantitative infinity; instead, the
indefiniteness consists in a lack of determinateness and therefore of fixed form. The Dyad is called 'indefinite'
to distinguish it from definite two-ness, i.e., the number two, and to indicate that the Dyad stands above
mathematics.[26]
The One and the Indefinite Dyad are the ultimate ground of everything because the realm of Plato's Forms and
the totality of reality derive from their interaction. The whole manifold of sensory phenomena rests in the end
on only two factors. Form issues from the One, which is the productive factor; the formless Indefinite Dyad
serves as the substrate for the activity of the One. Without such a substrate, the One could produce nothing. All
Being rests upon the action of the One upon the Indefinite Dyad. This action sets limits to the formless, gives it
Form and particularity, and is therefore also the principle of individuation that brings separate entities into
existence. A mixture of both principles underlies all Being.[27]
Depending upon which principle dominates in a thing, either order or disorder reigns. The more chaotic
something is, the more strongly the presence of the Indefinite Dyad is at work.[28]
According to the Tbingen interpretation, the two opposing principles determine not only the ontology of
Plato's system, but also its logic, ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, cosmology, and psychology.[29] In
ontology the opposition of the two principles corresponds to the opposition between Being and Not-Being. The
more the Indefinite Dyad influences a thing, the less it has of Being and the lower its ontological rank. In logic,
the One supplies identity and equality, while the Indefinite Dyad supplies difference and inequality. In ethics,
the One signifies Goodness (or virtue, aret), while the Indefinite Dyad signifies Badness. In politics, the One
gives to a populace that which makes it into a unified political entity and enables it to survive, while the
Indefinite Dyad leads to faction, chaos, and dissolution. In cosmology, the One is evidenced by rest,
persistence, and the eternality of the world, as well as the presence of life in the cosmos and the pre-determined
activity of the Demiurge Plato mentions in his Timaeus. The Indefinite Dyad is in cosmology the principle of
movement and change, and especially of impermanence and death. In epistemology, the One stands for
philosophical knowledge that rests upon acquaintance with Plato's unchanging Forms, while the Indefinite
Dyad stands for mere opinion that is dependent upon sensory impressions. In psychology or the theory of the
soul, the One corresponds to Reason, and the Indefinite Dyad to the sphere of instinct and bodily affects.[30]
Monism and dualism
Positing two fundamental principles raises the question of whether the

unwritten doctrines and thereforein the case they are authenticof
whether the whole of Plato's philosophy is monistic or dualistic.[31] A
philosophical system is monistic in the case when the opposition
between the One and the Indefinite Dyad is founded upon a single,
more fundamental principle. This occurs if the principle of multiplicity
somehow reduces to the principle of unity and is subordinated to it. An
alternative, monistic interpretation of the unwritten doctrines posits a
higher 'meta-One' that serves as the foundation of both principles and
unites them. If the Indefinite Dyad is, however, understood as an
independent principle distinct from any sort of unity, then Plato's
unwritten doctrines are in the end dualistic.
The evidence in the ancient sources does not make clear how the
relation between the two principles should be understood. They do,
however, consistently accord the One a higher status than the Indefinite
Dyad[32] and consider only the One as absolutely transcendent. This
implies a monistic interpretation of the two principles and fits with
assertions in the dialogues that suggest a monistic philosophy. Plato's The Clarke Plato, 895 CE (Oxford, 1
Meno says that everything in nature is related,[33] and the Republic recto).
states that there is an origin (arch) for all things, which can be grasped
by reason.[34]
The opinions of advocates of the Tbingen interpretation are divided on this question.[35] Most favor resolving
the dispute by concluding that, although Plato indeed considered the Indefinite Dyad as the indispensable and
fundamental element of our ordered world, he nonetheless posited the One as some higher, overarching
principle of unity. This would make Plato a monist. This position has been defended at length by Jens
Halfwassen, Detlef Thiel, and Vittorio Hsle.[36] Halfwassen asserts it is impossible to derive the Indefinite
Dyad from the One since it would thereby lose its status as a fundamental principle. Moreover, an absolute and
transcendental One could not contain any sort of latent multiplicity in itself. The Indefinite Dyad, however,
would therefore not have an equal origin and equal power as the One, but is nonetheless dependent upon the
One. According to Halfwassen's interpretation, therefore, Plato's philosophy is in the end monistic. John
Niemeyer Findlay likewise makes the case for an emphatically monistic understanding of the two principles.[37]
Cornelia de Vogel also finds the monistic aspect of the system dominant.[38] Two leading figures of the
Tbingen School, Hans Joachim Krmer[39] und Konrad Gaiser[40] conclude that Plato has a single system with
both monistic and dualistic aspects. Christina Schefer proposes that the opposition between the principles is
logically irresolvable and points to something beyond them both. According to her, the opposition stems from
some fundamental, 'ineffable' intuition that Plato experienced: namely, that the god Apollo is the common
ground of both the One and the Indefinite Dyad.[41] This theory also leads therefore to a monistic conception.
According to the prevailing view of researchers today, although the two principles are considered elements of a
finally monistic system, they also have a dualistic aspect. This is not contested by defenders of the monistic
interpretation but they assert the dualistic aspect is subordinated to a totality that is monistic. Its dualistic nature
remains because not only the One but also the Indefinite Dyad is treated as a fundamental principle. Giovanni
Reale emphasized the role of the Dyad as a fundamental origin. He thought, however, that the concept of
dualism was inappropriate and spoke of a 'bipolar structure of reality.' For him, however, these two 'poles' were
not equally significant: the One 'remains hierarchically superior to the Dyad.'[42] Heinz Happ,[43] Marie-
Dominique Richard,[44] and Paul Wilpert[45] argued against every derivation of the Dyad from a superior
principle of unity, and consequently contended that Plato's system was dualistic. They believe that Plato's
originally dualistic system was later reinterpreted as a kind of monism.
If the two principles are authentically Plato's and the monistic

interpretation is correct, then Plato's metaphysics strongly resembles the
Neo-Platonic systems of the Roman Imperial period. In this case, the
Neo-Platonic reading of Plato is, at least in this central area, historically
justified. This implies that Neo-Platonism is less of an innovation than
it appears without the recognition of Plato's unwritten doctrines.
Advocates of the Tbingen School emphasize this advantage of their
interpretation. They see Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism, as
advancing a tradition of thought begun by Plato himself. Plotinus's
metaphysics, at least in broad outline, was therefore already familiar to
the first generation of Plato's students. This confirms Plotinus' own
view, for he considered himself not the inventor of a system but the
faithful interpreter of Plato's doctrines.[46]
This bust is often identified as Plotinus

The Good in the unwritten doctrines
(c. 205 270 CE), the leading Neo-
Platonist. An important research problem is the controversial question of the
status of the Form of the Good within the metaphysical system derived
from a combination of the Theory of Forms and the two principles of
the reconstruction. The resolution of this issue depends upon how one interprets the status Plato gives to the
Good in his Theory of Forms. Some believe that Plato's Republic sharply contrasts the Good and the usual
Forms, and gives the Good a uniquely high rank. This accords with his conviction that all the other Forms owe
their Being to the Form of the Good, and are thus ontologically subordinated to it.[47]
The starting point of the scholarly controversy is the disputed meaning of the Greek concept of ousia. This is an
ordinary Greek word and literally means 'being.' In philosophical contexts, it is usually translated by 'Being' or
'Essence.' Plato's Republic says that the Good is 'not ousia' but is rather 'beyond ousia' and surpasses it as an
origin[48] and in power.[49] If this passage implies only that the essence or nature of the Good is beyond Being
(but not the Good itself), or if the passage is just interpreted loosely, then the Form of the Good can retain its
place inside the realm of the Forms, i.e., the realm of things with real Being. In this case the Good is not
absolutely transcendent: it does not transcend Being and somehow exist above it. The Good would therefore
have a place in the hierarchy of real Beings.[50] According to this interpretation, the Good is not an issue for the
two principles of the unwritten doctrines but only for the Theory of Forms. On the other hand, if the passage in
the Republic is read literally and 'ousia' means 'Being,' then the phrase 'beyond Being' implies the Good actually
transcends Being.[51] According to this interpretation, Plato considered the Good to be absolutely transcendent
and it must be integrated into the realm of the two principles.
If Plato considered the Good as transcendent, there is a problem about its relation to the One. Most proponents
of the authenticity of the unwritten doctrines hold that the Good and the One were for Plato identical.
According to their arguments, the identity follows from the nature of Absolute Transcendence, since it brooks
no determinations of any kind and therefore also no distinction between the Good and the One as two separate
principles. In addition, defenders of such an identity draw on evidence in Aristotle.[52] A contrary view,
however, is held by Rafael Ferber, who accepts that the unwritten doctrines are authentic and that they are
concerned with the Good but denies that the Good and the One are identical.[53]
Forms of numbers
It can be inferred from the report of Aristoxenus about Plato's lecture

'On the Good,' that a discussion of the nature of numbers occupied an
important part of Plato's argument.[54] This theme accordingly played
an important role in the unwritten doctrines. This involved, however,
not mathematics but a philosophy of numbers. Plato distinguished
between the numbers used in mathematics and the metaphysical Forms
of numbers. In contrast to the numbers used in mathematics, the Forms
of numbers do not consist of groups of units and so cannot be added
together or subjected to the ordinary operations of arithmetic. The Form
of Twoness, for example, does not consist of two units designated by Excavations in Athens near the site of
the number 2 but rather the real essence of twoness.[55] Plato's Academy, where the unwritten
doctrines were debated.
According to defenders of the unwritten doctrines, Plato gave the Forms
of Numbers a middle position between the two fundamental principles
and the other, ordinary Forms. Indeed, these Forms of Numbers are the first entities to emerge from the One
and the Indefinite Dyad. This emergence isas with all metaphysical productionnot to be understood as the
result of a temporal process but rather as an ontological dependence. For example, the interaction of the One
(the determining factor) and the Dyad (the source of multiplicity) leads to the Form of Twoness in the realm of
the Forms of Numbers. As the product of both principles, the Form of Twoness reflects the nature of both: it is
determinate twoness. Its fixed and determinate nature is shown by its expression of the relation between the
Form of Doubleness (a determinate excess) and the Form of Halfness (a determinate deficiency). The Form of
Twoness is not a group of units like the numbers used in mathematics but rather a connection between two
magnitudes, one of which is double the other.[56]
The One acts as the determining factor on the Indefinite Dyad, which is called 'the Great and the Small,' and
eliminates its indeterminacy, which encompasses every possible relation between largeness and smallness or
between excess and deficiency. Thus the One produces determinate relations between magnitudes by making
the indeterminacy of the Indefinite Dyad determinate, and just these relations are understood by advocates of
the unwritten doctrines to be the Forms of Numbers. This is the origin of determinate Twoness, which can from
various perspectives be seen as the Form of Doubleness or the Form of Halfness. The other Forms of Numbers
are derived in the same way out of the two fundamental principles. The structure of space is implicit in the
Forms of Numbers: the dimensions of space somehow emerge from their relations. Key details of this extra-
temporal emergence of space are missing from the surviving ancient testimonies, and its nature is debated in the
scholarly literature.[57]
Epistemological issues
Plato believed that only experts in 'dialectics,' i.e., philosophers who follow his logical methods, are competent
to make statements about the highest principle. Thus he would have developed the theory of the two principles
if indeed it is hisdiscursively in discussions and grounded it in argument. From these discussions, it
emerged that a highest principle is necessary for his system, and that the One must be inferred indirectly from
its effects. Whether and to what degree Plato in addition held it possible to have direct access to the sphere of
the absolute and transcendental One or indeed ever claimed such a thing is debated in the literature. This poses
the question of whether the assertion of transcendental Being also entails the possibility of knowledge of that
higher Being, or whether the highest principle is known theoretically but not in any more direct way.[58]
If human understanding were restricted to discursive or verbal

arguments, then Plato's dialectical discussions could at most have
reached the conclusion that the highest principle was demanded by his
metaphysics but also that human understanding could never arrive at
that transcendental Being. If so, the only remaining way that the One
might be reached (and the Good, if that is the same as the One) is
through the possibility of some nonverbal, 'intuitive' access.[59] It is
debated whether or not Plato in fact took this route. If he did, he thereby
renounced the possibility of justifying every step made by our
knowledge with philosophical arguments that can be expressed
discursively in words.
At least in regards to the One, Michael Erler concludes from a

statement in the Republic that Plato held it was only intuitively
knowable.[60] In contrast, Peter Stemmer,[61] Kurt von Fritz,[62] Jrgen
Villers,[63] and others oppose any independent role for non-verbal
intuition. Jens Halfwassen believes that knowledge of the realm of the
Forms rests centrally upon direct intuition, which he understands as
unmediated comprehension by some non-sensory, 'inner perception'
(Ger., Anschauung). He also, however, holds that Plato's highest Herm of Plato. The Greek inscription
principle transcended knowledge and was thus inaccessible to such reads 'Plato [son] of Ariston, Athenian'
intuition. For Plato, the One would therefore make knowledge possible (Rome, Capitoline Museum, 288).
and give it the power of knowing things, but would itself remain
unknowable and ineffable.[64]
Christina Schefer argues that both Plato's written and unwritten doctrines deny any and every kind of
philosophical access to transcendental Being. Plato nonetheless found such access along a different path: in an
ineffable, religious experience of the appearance or theophany of the god Apollo.[65] In the center of Plato's
worldview, she argues, stood neither the Theory of Forms nor the principles of the unwritten doctrines but
rather the experience of Apollo, which since it was non-verbal could not have grounded any verbal doctrines.
The Tbingen interpretation of Plato's principles, she continues, correctly makes them an important component
of Plato's philosophy, but they lead to insoluble puzzles and paradoxes (Gk., aporiai) and therefore are
ultimately a dead end.[66] It should be inferred from Plato's statements that he nonetheless found a way out, a
way that leads beyond the Theory of Forms. In this interpretation, even the principles of the unwritten doctrines
are to a degree merely provisional means to an end.[67]
The scholarly literature is broadly divided on the question of whether or not Plato regarded the principles of the
unwritten doctrines as certainly true. The Tbingen School attributes an epistemological optimism to Plato.
This is especially emphasized by Hans Krmer. His view is that Plato himself asserted the highest possible
claim to certainty for knowledge of the truth of his unwritten doctrines. He calls Plato, at least in regard to his
two principles, a 'dogmatist.' Other scholars and especially Rafael Ferber uphold the opposing view that for
Plato the unwritten doctrines were advanced only as a hypothesis that could be wrong.[68] Konrad Gaiser
argues that Plato formulated the unwritten doctrines as a coherent and complete philosophical system but not as
a 'Summa of fixed dogmas preached in a doctrinaire way and announced as authoritative.' Instead, he continues,
they were something for critical examination that could be improved: a model proposed for continuous, further
development.[69]
For Plato it is essential to bind epistemology together with ethics. He emphasizes that a student's access to
insights communicated orally is possible only to those souls whose character fulfills the necessary
prerequisites. The philosopher who engages in oral instruction must always ascertain whether the student has
the needed character and disposition. According to Plato, knowledge is not won simply by grasping things with
the intellect; instead, it is achieved as the fruit of prolonged efforts made by the entire soul. There must be an
inner affinity between what is communicated and the soul receiving the communication.[70]
The question of dating and historical development

It is debated when Plato held his public lecture 'On the Good.'[71] For
the advocates of the Tbingen interpretation this is connected with the
question of whether the unwritten doctrines belong to Plato's later
philosophy or were worked out relatively early in his career. Resolving
this question depends in turn upon the long-standing debate in Plato
studies between 'unitarians' and 'developmentalists.' The unitarians
maintain that Plato always defended a single, coherent metaphysical
system throughout his career; developmentalists distinguish several
different phases in Plato's thought and hold that he was forced by
problems he encountered while writing the dialogues to revise his
system in significant ways.
In the older literature, the prevailing view was that Plato's lecture took
place at the end of Plato's life. The origin of his unwritten doctrines was
therefore assigned to the final phase of his philosophical activity. In
more recent literature, an increasing number of researchers favor dating
the unwritten doctrines to an earlier period. This clashes with the
suppositions of the unitarians. Whether or not Plato's early dialogues
Professor Paul Shorey, here at the
allude to the unwritten dialogues is contested.[72]
University of Chicago circa 1909, was a
prominent advocate for unitarianism in
The older view that Plato's public lecture occurred late in Plato's career
Plato studies and Harold Cherniss's
has been energetically denied by Hans Krmer. He argues that the
teacher.
lecture was held in the early period of Plato's activity as a teacher.
Moreover, he says, the lecture was not given in public only once. It is
more probable, he says, that there was a series of lectures and only the first introductory lecture was, as an
experiment, open to a broad and unprepared audience. After the failure of this public debut, Plato drew the
conclusion that his doctrines should only be shared with philosophy students. The lecture on the Good and the
ensuing discussions formed part of an ongoing series of talks, in which Plato regularly over the period of
several decades made his students familiar with the unwritten doctrines. He was holding these sessions already
by the time of this first trip to Sicily (c. 389/388) and thus before he founded the Academy.[73]
Those historians of philosophy who date the lecture to a later time have proposed several different possible
periods: between 359/355 (Karl-Heinz Ilting),[74] between 360/358 (Hermann Schmitz),[75] around 352 (Detlef
Thiel),[76] and the time between the death of Dion(354) and Plato's own death (348/347: Konrad Gaiser).
Gaiser emphasizes that the late date of the lecture does not entail that the unwritten doctrines were a late
development. He rather finds that these doctrines were from early on a part of the Academy's curriculum,
probably as early as the founding of the school.[77]
It is unclear why Plato presented such demanding material as the unwritten doctrines to a public not yet
educated in philosophy and was thereby metas could not be otherwisewith incomprehension. Gaiser
supposes that he opened the lectures to the public in order to confront distorted reports of the unwritten
doctrines and thereby to deflate the circulating rumors that the Academy was a hive of subversive activity.[78]
Reception
Influence before the early modern period
Among the first generations of Plato's students, there was a living memory of Plato's oral teaching, which was
written up by many of them and influenced the literature of the period (much of which no longer survives
today). The unwritten doctrines were vigorously criticized by Aristotle, who examined them in two treatises
named 'On the Good' and 'On Philosophy' (of which we have only a few fragments) and in other works such as
his Metaphysics and Physics. Aristotle's student Theophrastus also discussed them in his Metaphysics.[79]
In the following Hellenistic Period (32331 BCE) when a thorough-

going skepticism came to dominate the Academy, the inheritance of
Plato's unwritten doctrines could attract little interest (if they were
known at all). This skepticism faded by the time of Middle Platonism
and Neo-Platonism, but the philosophers of this period seem no better
informed about the unwritten doctrines than modern scholars.[80]
After the rediscovery in the Renaissance of the original text of Plato's

dialogues (which had been lost in the Middle Ages), the early modern
period was dominated by an image of Plato's metaphysics influenced by
a combination of Neo-Platonism and Aristotle's reports of the basics of
the unwritten doctrines. The Humanist Marsilio Ficino (14331499)
and his Neo-Platonic interpretation decisively contributed to the
prevailing view with his translations and commentaries. Later, the
influential popularizer, writer, and Plato translator Thomas Taylor
Bust of Marsilio Ficino in the cathedral
(17581835) reinforced this Neo-Platonic tradition of Plato
in Florence (by A. Ferrucci, 1521). He
interpretation. The Eighteenth century increasingly saw the Neo- seems to play his translation of Plato
Platonic paradigm as problematic but was unable to replace it with a like a lyre.
consistent alternative.[81] The unwritten doctrines were still accepted in
this period. The German philosopher Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann
proposed in his 179295 System of Plato's Philosophy that Plato had never intended that his philosophy should
be entirely represented in written form.
Nineteenth century
In the nineteenth century a scholarly debate began that continues to this day over the question of whether
unwritten doctrines must be considered and over whether they constitute a philosophical inheritance that adds
something new to the dialogues.
The Neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato prevailed until the beginning

the nineteenth century when in 1804 Friedrich Schleiermacher
published an introduction to his 1804 translation of Plato's dialogues[82]
and initiated a radical turn whose consequences are still felt today.
Schleiermacher was convinced that the entire content of Plato's
philosophy was contained in his dialogues. There never was, he
insisted, any oral teaching that went beyond them. According to his
conception, the genre of the dialogue is no literary replacement for
Plato's philosophy, rather the literary form of the dialogue and the
content of Plato's philosophy are inseparably bound together: Plato's
way of philosophizing can by its nature only be represented as a literary
dialogue. Therefore, unwritten doctrines with any philosophically
relevant, special content that are not bound together into a literary
dialogue must be excluded.[83]
Schleiermacher's conception was rapidly and widely accepted and

became the standard view.[84] Its many advocates include Eduard
Friedrich Schleiermacher
Zeller, a leading historian of philosophy in the nineteenth century,
whose influential handbook The Philosophy of the Greeks and its
Historical Development militated against 'supposed secret doctrines'
and had lasting effects on the reception of Plato's works.
Schleiermacher's stark denial of any oral teaching was disputed from the beginning but his critics remained
isolated. In 1808, August Boeckh, who later became a well-known Greek scholar, stated in an edition of
Schleiermacher's Plato translations that he did not find the arguments against the unwritten doctrines
persuasive. There was a great probability, he said, that Plato had an esoteric teaching never overtly expressed
but only darkly hinted at: 'what he here [in the dialogues] did not carry out to the final point, he there in oral
instruction placed the topmost capstone on.'[85] Christian August Brandis collected and commented upon the
ancient sources for the unwritten doctrines.[86] Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Christian Hermann Weisse
stressed the significance of the unwritten doctrines in their investigations.[87] Even Karl Friedrich Hermann, in
an 1849 inquiry into Plato's literary motivations, turned against Schleiermacher's theses and proposed that Plato
had only insinuated the deeper core of his philosophy in his writings and directly communicated it only
orally.[88]
Before the Tbingen School: Harold Cherniss

See also Harold Cherniss, American defender of Platonic unitarianism and critic of the unwritten
doctrines
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the 'antiesoteric' approach in Plato studies was clearly dominant.
However, some researchers before the midpoint of the century did assert Plato had an oral teaching. These
included John Burnet, Julius Stenzel, Alfred Edward Taylor, Lon Robin, Paul Wilpert, and Heinrich Gomperz.
Since 1959, the fully worked out interpretation of the Tbingen School has carried on an intense rivalry with
the anti-esoteric approach.[89]
In the twentieth century, the most prolific defender of the anti-esoteric

approach was Harold Cherniss. He expounded his views already in
1942, that is, before the investigations and publications of the Tbingen
School.[90] His main concern was to undermine the credibility of
Aristotle's evidence for the unwritten doctrines, which he attributed to
Aristotle's dismissive hostility towards Plato's theories as well as certain
misunderstandings. Cherniss believed that Aristotle, in the course of his
polemics, had falsified Plato's views and that Aristotle had even
contradicted himself. Cherniss flatly denied that any oral teaching of
Plato had extra content over and above the dialogues. Modern
hypotheses about philosophical instruction in the Academy were, he
said, groundless speculation. There was, moreover, a fundamental
Harold Cherniss, critic of the unwritten contradiction between the Theory of Forms found in the dialogues and
doctrines, in 1941-2. Aristotle's reports. Cherniss insisted that Plato had consistently
championed the Theory of Forms and that there was no plausible
argument for the assumption that he modified it according to the
supposed principles of the unwritten doctrines. The Seventh Letter was irrelevant since it was, Cherniss held,
inauthentic.[91]
The anti-systematic interpretation of Plato's philosophy
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a radicalization of Schleiermacher's dialogical approach
arose. Numerous scholars urged an 'anti-systematic' interpretation of Plato that is also known as 'dialogue
theory.'[92] This approach condemns every kind of 'dogmatic' Plato interpretation and especially the possibility
of esoteric, unwritten doctrines. It is fundamentally opposed to the proposition that Plato possessed a definite,
systematic teaching and asserted its truth. The proponents of this anti-systematic approach at least agree that the
essence of Plato's way of doing philosophy is not the establishment of individual doctrines but rather shared,
'dialogical' reflection and in particular the testing of various methods of inquiry. This style of philosophyas
Schleiermacher already stressed is characterized by a process of investigation (rather than its results) that
aims to stimulate further and deeper thoughts in his readers. It does not seek to fix the truth of final dogmas, but
encourages a never-ending series of questions and answers. This far-reaching development of Schleiermacher's
theory of the dialogue at last even turned against him: he was roundly criticized for wrongly seeking a
systematic philosophy in the dialogues.[93]
The advocates of this anti-systematic interpretation do not see a contradiction between Plato's criticism of
writing and the notion that he communicated his entire philosophy to the public in writing. They believe his
criticism was aimed only at the kind of writing that expresses dogmas and doctrines. Since the dialogues are not
like this but instead present their material in the guise of fictional conversations, Plato's criticism does not
apply.[94]
The origin and dissemination of the Tbingen paradigm
Until the 1950s, the question of whether one could in fact infer the
existence of unwritten doctrines from the ancient sources stood at the
center of the discussion. After the Tbingen School introduced its new
paradigm, a vigorous controversy arose and debate shifted to the new
question of whether the Tbingen Hypothesis was correct: that the
unwritten doctrines could actually be reconstructed and contained the
core of Plato's philosophy.[95]
The Tbingen paradigm was formulated and thoroughly defended for

the first time by Hans Joachim Krmer. He published the results of his
research in a 1959 monograph that was a revised version of a 1957
dissertation written under the supervision of Wolfgang Schadewaldt.[96]
In 1963, Konrad Gaiser, who was also a student of Schadewaldt,
qualified as a professor with his comprehensive monograph on the
unwritten doctrines.[97] In the following decades both these scholars
expanded on and defended the new paradigm in a series of publications
while teaching at Tbingen University.[98]
Further well-known proponents of the Tbingen paradigm include Thomas A. Szlezk, a prominent
Thomas Alexander Szlezk, who also taught at Tbingen from 1990 to advocate of the Tbingen approach
2006 and worked especially on Plato's criticism of writing,[99] the
historian of philosophy Jens Halfwassen, who taught at Heidelberg and
especially investigated the history of Plato's two principles from the fourth century BCE through Neo-
Platonism, and Vittorio Hsle, who teaches at the University of Notre Dame (USA).[100]
Supporters of the Tbinger approach to Plato include, for example, Michael Erler,[101] Jrgen Wippern,[102]
Karl Albert,[103] Heinz Happ,[104] Willy Theiler,[105] Klaus Oehler,[106] Hermann Steinthal,[107] John
Niemeyer Findlay,[108] Marie-Dominique Richard,[109] Herwig Grgemanns,[110] Walter Eder,[111] Josef
Seifert,[112] Joachim Sder,[113] Carl Friedrich von Weizscker,[114] Detlef Thiel,[115] andwith a new and far-
reaching theoryChristina Schefer.[116]
Those who partially agree with the Tbingen approach but have
reservations include Cornelia J. de Vogel,[117] Rafael Ferber,[118] John
M. Dillon,[119] Jrgen Villers,[120] Christopher Gill,[121] Enrico
Berti,[122] and Hans-Georg Gadamer.[123]
Since the important research of Giovanni Reale, an Italian historian of

philosophy who extended the Tbingen paradigm in new directions, it
is today also called the 'Tbingen and Milanese School.'[124] In Italy,
Maurizio Migliori[125] and Giancarlo Movia[126] have also spoken out Giovanni Reale was the leading
for the authenticity of the unwritten doctrines. Recently, Patrizia advocate for the unwritten doctrines in
Bonagura, a student of Reale, has strongly defended the Tbingen Italy.
approach.[127]
Critics of the Tbingen School
Various, skeptical positions have found support, especially in Anglo-American scholarship but also among
German-speaking scholars.[128] These critics include: in the USA, Gregory Vlastos and Reginald E. Allen;[129]
in Italy, Franco Trabattoni[130] and Francesco Fronterotta;[131] in France, Luc Brisson;[132] and in Sweden, E.
N. Tigerstedt.[133] German-speaking critics include: Theodor Ebert,[134] Ernst Heitsch,[135] Fritz-Peter
Hager[136] and Gnther Patzig.[137]
The radical, skeptical position holds that Plato did not teach anything orally that was not already in the
dialogues.[138]
Moderate skeptics accept there were some kind of unwritten doctrines

but criticize the Tbingen reconstruction as speculative, insufficiently
grounded in evidence, and too far-reaching.[139] Many critics of the
Tbingen School do not dispute the authenticity of the principles
ascribed to Plato, but see them as a late notion of Plato's that was never
worked out systematically and so was not integrated with the
philosophy he developed beforehand. They maintain that the two
principles theory was not the core of Plato's philosophy but rather a
tentative concept discussed in the last phase of his philosophical
activity. He introduced these concepts as a hypothesis but did not
integrate them with the metaphysics that underlies the dialogues.
Proponents of this moderate view include Dorothea Frede,[140] Karl-

Heinz Ilting,[141] and Holger Thesleff.[142] Similarly, Andreas Graeser
judges the unwritten principles to be a 'contribution to a discussion with
student interns'[143] and Jrgen Mittelstra takes them to be 'a cautious
question to which a hypothetical response is suggested.'[144] Rafael
Ferber believes that Plato never committed the principles to a fixed,
written form because, among other things, he did not regard them as
knowledge but as mere opinion.[145] Margherita Isnardi Parente does
not dispute the possibility of unwritten doctrines but judges the tradition E. N. Tigerstedt, a historian of the fall
of reports about them to be unreliable and holds it impossible to unite of Neo-Platonism in the Early Modern
Period, criticized the Tbingen
the Tbingen reconstruction with the philosophy of the dialogues, in
interpretation.
which the authentic views of Plato are to be found. The reports of
Aristotle do not derive from Plato himself but rather from efforts aimed
at systematizing his thought by members of the early Academy.[146]
Franco Ferrari also denies that this systematization should be ascribed to Plato.[147] Wolfgang Kullmann
accepts the authenticity of the two principles but sees a fundamental contradiction between them and the
philosophy of the dialogues.[148] Wolfgang Wieland accepts the reconstruction of the unwritten dialogues but
rates its philosophical relevance very low and thinks it cannot be the core of Plato's philosophy.[149] Franz von
Kutschera maintains that the existence of the unwritten doctrines cannot be seriously questioned but finds that
the tradition of reports about them are of such low quality that any attempts at reconstruction must rely on the
dialogues.[150] Domenico Pesce affirms the existence of unwritten doctrines and that they concerned the Good
but condemns the Tbingen reconstruction and in particular the claim that Plato's metaphysics was bipolar.[151]
There is a striking secondary aspect apparent in the sometimes sharp and vigorous controversies over the
Tbingen School: the antagonists on both sides have tended to argue from within a presupposed worldview.
Konrad Gaiser remarked about this aspect of the debate: 'In this controversy, and probably on both sides,
certain modern conceptions of what philosophy should be play an unconscious role and for this reason there is
little hope of a resolution.'[152]
See also
Allegorical interpretations of Plato, a survey of various claims to find doctrines represented by allegories
within Plato's dialogues
Harold Cherniss, American champion of Platonic unitarianism and critic of esotericism

Hans Krmer, a founder of the Tbingen School (in German)
Konrad Gaiser, a founder of the Tbingen School (in German)
References
1. See below and Aristotle, Physics, 209b1315.
2. For a general discussion of esotericism in ancient philosophy, see W. Burkert, Lore and Science in
Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 19, 179 ff., etc.
3. For example, in Konrad Gaiser: Platons esoterische Lehre.
4. For Reale's research, see Further Readings below.
5. See Dmitri Nikulin, ed., The Other Plato: The Tbingen Interpretation of Plato's Inner-Academic
Teachings (Albany: SUNY, 2012), and Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the
Foundations of Metaphysics: A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato
with a Collection of the Fundamental Documents (SUNY Press, 1990).
6. Aristotle, Physics, 209b1315.
7. Aristoxenos, Elementa harmonica 2,3031.
8. See ch. 1 of Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics: A
Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection of the
Fundamental Documents (SUNY Press, 1990).
9. Platon, Phaedrus 274b278e.
11. Plato, Seventh Letter, 341b342a.
13. Hans Joachim Krmer: Die platonische Akademie und das Problem einer systematischen Interpretation
der Philosophie Platons.
14. See Appendix 3 of Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics:
A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection of the
15. Michael Erler: Platon, Mnchen 2006, pp. 162164; Detlef Thiel: Die Philosophie des Xenokrates im
Kontext der Alten Akademie, Mnchen 2006, pp. 143148.
16. SeeMichael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.)
17. Text and German translation in Heinrich Drrie, Matthias Baltes: Der Platonismus in der Antike, Band 1,
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, pp. 8286, commentary pp. 296302.
18. Text and German translation in Heinrich Drrie, Matthias Baltes: Der Platonismus in der Antike, Band 1,
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, pp. 8689, commentary pp. 303305.
19. See Heinz Happ: Hyle, Berlin 1971, pp. 140142; Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de
Platon, 2.
20. Jens Halfwassen: Der Aufstieg zum Einen.
21. There is an overview in Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.)
23. For an overview of the Theory of Forms, see P. Friedlander, Plato: an Introduction (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2015).
24. Giovanni Reale: Zu einer neuen Interpretation Platons, 2.
25. Aristotle, Metaphysics 987b.
27. Heinrich Drrie, Matthias Baltes: Der Platonismus in der Antike, Band 4, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996,
pp. 154162 (texts and translation), 448458 (commentary); Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar,
ed.)
28. Hans Joachim Krmer: Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1959, p. 144 ff.; Konrad Gaiser:
Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 3.
29. For an overview, see Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of
Metaphysics: A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection
of the Fundamental Documents (SUNY Press, 1990).
30. Konrad Gaiser: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 3.
31. For an overview, see Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of
Metaphysics: A Work on the Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection
of the Fundamental Documents (SUNY Press, 1990).
32. Christina Schefer: Platons unsagbare Erfahrung, Basel 2001, p. 186 ff.
33. Plato, Meno 81cd.
34. Plato, Republic 511b.
35. There is a literature review in Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.).
36. Jens Halfwassen: Monismus und Dualismus in Platons Prinzipienlehre.
37. John N. Findlay: Plato.
38. Cornelia J. de Vogel: Rethinking Plato and Platonism, Leiden 1986, p. 83 ff., 190206.
39. Hans Joachim Krmer: Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, 2.
41. Christina Schefer: Platons unsagbare Erfahrung, Basel 2001, pp. 5760.
43. Heinz Happ: Hyle, Berlin 1971, pp. 141143.
44. Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon, 2.
45. Paul Wilpert: Zwei aristotelische Frhschriften ber die Ideenlehre, Regensburg 1949, pp. 173174.
46. Detlef Thiel: Die Philosophie des Xenokrates im Kontext der Alten Akademie, Mnchen 2006, p. 197f .
and note 64; Jens Halfwassen: Der Aufstieg zum Einen.
47. A collection of relevant passages from the Republic in Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Die Idee des Guten in
Platons Politeia, Sankt Augustin 2003, p. 111 ff. For an overview of the positions in the research
controversy see Rafael Ferber: Ist die Idee des Guten nicht transzendent oder ist sie es doch?
48. The Greek presbea, 'rank accorded to age,' is also translated 'worth.'
49. Platon, Republic, 509b.
50. The transcendental being of the Form of the Good is denied by, among others, Theodor Ebert: Meinung
und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons, Berlin 1974, pp. 169173, Matthias Baltes: Is the Idea of the
Good in Platos Republic Beyond Being?
51. A collection of presentations of this position is in Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Die Idee des Guten in
Platons Politeia, Sankt Augustin 2003, p. 67 ff.
53. Rafael Ferber: Platos Idee des Guten, 2., erweiterte Auflage, Sankt Augustin 1989, pp. 7678.
54. Aristoxenos, Elementa harmonica 30.
58. An overview of the relevant scholarly debate in Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.)
60. Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.)
61. Peter Stemmer: Platons Dialektik.
62. Kurt von Fritz: Beitrge zu Aristoteles, Berlin 1984, p. 56f.
63. Jrgen Villers: Das Paradigma des Alphabets.
65. Christina Schefer: Platons unsagbare Erfahrung, Basel 2001, p. 60 ff.
67. For a different view see Hans Joachim Krmer: Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1959, p. 464
ff.
68. Rafael Ferber: Hat Plato in der "ungeschriebenen Lehre" eine "dogmatische Metaphysik und Systematik"
vertreten?
69. Konrad Gaiser: Prinzipientheorie bei Platon.
71. An overview of the opposed positions is in Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon, 2.
72. For a history of the scholarship, see Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar, ed.)
73. Hans Joachim Krmer: Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1959, pp. 2024, 404411, 444.
74. Karl-Heinz Ilting: Platons Ungeschriebene Lehren: der Vortrag ber das Gute.
75. Hermann Schmitz: Die Ideenlehre des Aristoteles, Band 2: Platon und Aristoteles, Bonn 1985, pp. 312
314, 339f.
76. Detlef Thiel: Die Philosophie des Xenokrates im Kontext der Alten Akademie, Mnchen 2006, pp. 180f.
77. Konrad Gaiser: Gesammelte Schriften, Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 280282, 290, 304, 311.
78. Konrad Gaiser: Platos enigmatic lecture On the Good.
79. See however, difficulties with Theophrastus' interpretation in Margherita Isnardi Parente: Thophraste,
Metaphysica 6 a 23 ss.
82. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: ber die Philosophie Platons, ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg
1996, pp. 21119.
83. See Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Schleiermachers "Einleitung" zur Platon-bersetzung von 1804.
84. Gyburg Radke: Das Lcheln des Parmenides, Berlin 2006, pp. 15.
85. August Boeckh: Kritik der Uebersetzung des Platon von Schleiermacher.
86. Christian August Brandis: Diatribe academica de perditis Aristotelis libris de ideis et de bono sive
philosophia, Bonn 1823.
87. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, Leipzig
1826; Christian Hermann Weisse: De Platonis et Aristotelis in constituendis summis philosophiae
principiis differentia, Leipzig 1828.
88. Karl-Friedrich Hermann: ber Platos schriftstellerische Motive.
89. The rivalry began with Harold Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1945), and Gregory Vlastos, review of H. J. Kraemer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles,
in Gnomon, v. 35, 1963, pp. 641-655. Reprinted with a further appendix in: Platonic Studies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981, 2nd ed.), pp. 379-403.
90. For a short summary of his views, see Harold Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1945).
91. Cherniss published his views in Die ltere Akademie.
92. There is a collection of some papers indicative of this phase of Plato research in C. Griswold, Jr.,
'Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings' (London: Routledge, 1988).
93. For the influence of Schleiermacher's viewpoint see Gyburg Radke: Das Lcheln des Parmenides, Berlin
2006, pp. 162.
94. Franco Ferrari: Les doctrines non crites.
95. For a comprehensive discussion, see Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the
96. Hans Joachim Krmer: Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1959, pp. 380486.
97. Konrad Gaiser: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, Stuttgart 1963, 2.
98. Krmer's most important works are listed in Jens Halfwassen: Monismus und Dualismus in Platons
Prinzipienlehre.
99. Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie, Berlin 1985, pp. 327410;
Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Zur blichen Abneigung gegen die agrapha dogmata.
100. Vittorio Hsle: Wahrheit und Geschichte, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1984, pp. 374392.
101. Michael Erler: Platon, Mnchen 2006, pp. 162171.
102. Jrgen Wippern: Einleitung.
103. Karl Albert: Platon und die Philosophie des Altertums, Teil 1, Dettelbach 1998, pp. 380398.
104. Heinz Happ: Hyle, Berlin 1971, pp. 8594, 136143.
105. Willy Theiler: Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur, Berlin 1970, pp. 460483, esp. 462f.
106. Klaus Oehler: Die neue Situation der Platonforschung.
107. Hermann Steinthal: Ungeschriebene Lehre.
108. John N. Findlay: Plato.
109. Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon, 2.
110. Herwig Grgemanns: Platon, Heidelberg 1994, pp. 113119.
111. Walter Eder: Die ungeschriebene Lehre Platons: Zur Datierung des platonischen Vortrags "ber das
Gute".
112. Siehe Seiferts Nachwort in Giovanni Reale: Zu einer neuen Interpretation Platons, 2.
113. Joachim Sder: Zu Platons Werken.
114. Carl Friedrich von Weizscker: Der Garten des Menschlichen, 2.
115. Detlef Thiel: Die Philosophie des Xenokrates im Kontext der Alten Akademie, Mnchen 2006, pp. 137
225.
116. Christina Schefer: Platons unsagbare Erfahrung, Basel 2001, pp. 24, 1014, 225.
117. Cornelia J. de Vogel: Rethinking Plato and Platonism, Leiden 1986, pp. 190206.
118. Rafael Ferber: Warum hat Platon die "ungeschriebene Lehre" nicht geschrieben?, 2.
119. John M. Dillon: The Heirs of Plato, Oxford 2003, pp. VII, 1, 1622.
120. Jrgen Villers: Das Paradigma des Alphabets.
121. Christopher Gill: Platonic Dialectic and the Truth-Status of the Unwritten Doctrines.
122. Enrico Berti: ber das Verhltnis von literarischem Werk und ungeschriebener Lehre bei Platon in der
Sicht der neueren Forschung.
123. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Dialektik und Sophistik im siebenten platonischen Brief.
125. Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verit, Milano 1990, pp. 6990.
126. Giancarlo Movia: Apparenze, essere e verit, Milano 1991, pp. 43, 60 ff.
127. Patrizia Bonagura: Exterioridad e interioridad.
128. Some of these positions are reviewed in Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon, 2.
129. Gregory Vlastos: Platonic Studies, 2.
130. Franco Trabattoni: Scrivere nellanima, Firenze 1994.
131. Francesco Fronterotta: Une nigme platonicienne: La question des doctrines non-crites.
132. Luc Brisson: Premises, Consequences, and Legacy of an Esotericist Interpretation of Plato.
133. Eugne Napolon Tigerstedt: Interpreting Plato, Stockholm 1977, pp. 6391.
134. Theodor Ebert: Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons, Berlin 1974, pp. 24.
135. Ernst Heitsch: .
136. Fritz-Peter Hager: Zur philosophischen Problematik der sogenannten ungeschriebenen Lehre Platos.
137. Gnther Patzig: Platons politische Ethik.
138. For a discussion of 'extremist' views, see Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the
139. This is, for example, the view of Michael Bordt; see Michael Bordt: Platon, Freiburg 1999, pp. 5153.
140. Dorothea Frede: Platon: Philebos. bersetzung und Kommentar, Gttingen 1997, S. 403417. She
especially disputes that Plato asserted the whole of reality could be derived from the two principles.
141. Karl-Heinz Ilting: Platons Ungeschriebene Lehren: der Vortrag ber das Gute.
142. Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns, Las Vegas 2009, pp. 486488.
143. Andreas Graeser: Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik, Plato und Aristoteles, 2.
144. Jrgen Mittelstra: Ontologia more geometrico demonstrata.
146. Margherita Isnardi Parente: Il problema della "dottrina non scritta" di Platone.
147. Franco Ferrari: Les doctrines non crites.
148. Wolfgang Kullmann: Platons Schriftkritik.
149. Wolfgang Wieland: Platon und die Formen des Wissens, 2.
150. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie, Band 3, Paderborn 2002, pp. 149171, 202206.
151. Domenico Pesce: Il Platone di Tubinga, Brescia 1990, pp. 20, 4649.
Sources
English language resources
Dmitri Nikulin, ed., The Other Plato: The Tbingen Interpretation of Plato's Inner-Academic Teachings
(Albany: SUNY, 2012). A recent anthology with an introduction and overview.
Hans Joachim Krmer and John R. Catan, Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics: A Work on the
Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection of the Fundamental
Documents (SUNY Press, 1990). Translation of work by a founder of the Tbingen School.
John Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy, 347 -- 274 BCE (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2003), esp. pp. 16 29. A moderate view of the unwritten doctrines by a leading scholar.
Harold Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).
Prominent American critic of the unwritten doctrines.
Gregory Vlastos, review of H. J. Kraemer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, in Gnomon, v. 35, 1963,
pp. 641655. Reprinted with a further appendix in: Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1981, 2nd ed.), pp. 379403. Famous critical review that, along with Chernisss Riddle, turned
many Anglo-American scholars against the Tbingen School.
John Niemeyer Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (London: Routledge, 2013). An
older work, first published in 1974, advocating for the importance of the unwritten doctrines
independently of the Tbingen School.
K. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and
Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Sayre
seeks a middle position by arguing that allusions to the unwritten doctrines can be found in the dialogues.
Collections of the ancient evidence

Margherita Isnardi Parente (ed.): Testimonia Platonica (= Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei,
Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, Memorie, Reihe 9, Band 8 Heft 4 und Band 10 Heft 1).
Rom 19971998 (a critical edition with Italian translation and commentary)
Heft 1: Le testimonianze di Aristotele, 1997
Heft 2: Testimonianze di et ellenistica e di et imperiale, 1998
Giovanni Reale (ed.): Autotestimonianze e rimandi dei dialoghi di Platone alle "dottrine non scritte".
Bompiani, Milano 2008, ISBN 978-88-452-6027-8 (A collection of relevant texts with Italian translation
and a substantial introduction, in which Reale responds to critics of his position.)
Further reading
Overviews
Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die
Philosophie der Antike, Band 2/2), Basel 2007, pp. 406429, 703707
Franco Ferrari: Les doctrines non crites. In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes
antiques, Band 5, Teil 1 (= V a), CNRS ditions, Paris 2012, ISBN 978-2-271-07335-8, pp. 648661
Konrad Gaiser: Platons esoterische Lehre. In: Konrad Gaiser: Gesammelte Schriften. Academia Verlag,
Sankt Augustin 2004, ISBN 3-89665-188-9, pp. 317340
Jens Halfwassen: Platons Metaphysik des Einen. In: Marcel van Ackeren (ed.): Platon verstehen.
Themen und Perspektiven. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17442-9,
pp. 263278
Investigations
Rafael Ferber: Warum hat Platon die "ungeschriebene Lehre" nicht geschrieben? 2. Auflage, Beck,
Mnchen 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-55824-5
Konrad Gaiser: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen
Begrndung der Wissenschaften in der Platonischen Schule. 3. Auflage, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1998,
ISBN 3-608-91911-2 (pp. 441557 collect the ancient texts)
Jens Halfwassen: Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin. 2., erweiterte Auflage,
Saur, Mnchen und Leipzig 2006, ISBN 3-598-73055-1
Hans Joachim Krmer: Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen
Ontologie. Winter, Heidelberg 1959 (a fundamental investigation, but some positions were superseded by
later research)
Hans Joachim Krmer: Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica. Saggio sulla teoria dei principi e sulle
dottrine non scritte di Platone. 6. Auflage, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2001, ISBN 88-343-0731-3 (this is
better than the faulty English translation: Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics. A Work on the
Theory of the Principles and Unwritten Doctrines of Plato with a Collection of the Fundamental
Documents. State University of New York Press, Albany 1990, ISBN 0-7914-0434-X)
Giovanni Reale: Zu einer neuen Interpretation Platons. Eine Auslegung der Metaphysik der groen
Dialoge im Lichte der "ungeschriebenen Lehren". 2., erweiterte Auflage, Schningh, Paderborn 2000,
ISBN 3-506-77052-7 (a general overview suitable as an introduction to the topic)
Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon. Une nouvelle interprtation du platonisme.

2., berarbeitete Auflage, Les ditions du Cerf, Paris 2005, ISBN 2-204-07999-5 (pp. 243381 are a
collection of the source texts with a French translation but without critical apparatus)
External links
Lecture (http://www.nd.edu/~plato/plato2issue/Szlezak.htm) von Thomas Alexander Szlezk: Friedrich
Schleiermacher und das Platonbild des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?

title=Plato%27s_unwritten_doctrines&oldid=793005799"
This page was last edited on 30 July 2017, at 01:51.

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may
apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia is a registered
trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.

Plato&#39;s Unwritten Doctrines - Wikipedia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Plato&#39;s Unwritten Doctrines - Wikipedia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

6/10/2017 Plato's unwritten doctrines - Wikipedia

Plato's so-called unwritten doctrines are metaphysical theories

The credibility of the sources that ascribe these doctrines to Plato is

The scholarly literature sometimes also uses the term 'esoteric

Evidence and sources

Arguments for the existence of the unwritten doctrines

and it is assumed that he was well-acquainted with the teaching

The criticism of writing in Plato's dialogues (German:

The ancient sources for the reconstruction

If the Seventh Letter is authentic, Plato sharply disapproved of

The following sources are most frequently used for reconstructing

The supposed content of the unwritten doctrines

The two fundamental principles and their interaction

Monism and dualism

Positing two fundamental principles raises the question of whether the

If the two principles are authentically Plato's and the monistic

This bust is often identified as Plotinus

It can be inferred from the report of Aristoxenus about Plato's lecture

If human understanding were restricted to discursive or verbal

At least in regards to the One, Michael Erler concludes from a

The question of dating and historical development

In the following Hellenistic Period (32331 BCE) when a thorough-

After the rediscovery in the Renaissance of the original text of Plato's

The Neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato prevailed until the beginning

Schleiermacher's conception was rapidly and widely accepted and

Before the Tbingen School: Harold Cherniss

In the twentieth century, the most prolific defender of the anti-esoteric

The anti-systematic interpretation of Plato's philosophy

The origin and dissemination of the Tbingen paradigm

The Tbingen paradigm was formulated and thoroughly defended for

Since the important research of Giovanni Reale, an Italian historian of

Critics of the Tbingen School

Moderate skeptics accept there were some kind of unwritten doctrines

Proponents of this moderate view include Dorothea Frede,[140] Karl-

Harold Cherniss, American champion of Platonic unitarianism and critic of esotericism

Collections of the ancient evidence

Marie-Dominique Richard: Lenseignement oral de Platon. Une nouvelle interprtation du platonisme.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?

This page was last edited on 30 July 2017, at 01:51.

You might also like

Plato's Unwritten Doctrines - Wikipedia

Plato's Unwritten Doctrines - Wikipedia