Barlin vs Ramirez

Facts: There are priests of the Roman Catholic Church in Lagonoy Province of Ambos
Camarines since 1839. When the church was burned the people in pueblo by virtue of the
enforced law built the church from 1870 to 1873. Defendant Ramirez having been
appointed by the parish priest took possession and administer the said church until
November 14, 1902. His successor demanded for the delivery of the church and other of its
property but defendant refused to do so. Defendant alleged that he was appointed by the
municipality and people to administer the church as they were the right owner of the
church.

Issue: Whether the Defendant has the right to the church and other properties thereto
considering that it was the people of the barrio who constructed the said church and
considering further that he had the possession of the property as he was given only
administration right to it.

Ruling: No the defendant has no right to the church and property thereto. Section 333
Paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that a tenant cannot deny his landlords
title. In the present case, it appears that Ramirez had the possession of the property as the
servant or agent of the plaintiff. He took possession under the agreement to return the
possession whenever it should be demanded of him.

LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA

FACTS:
Petitioner is an educational institution duly registered with the SEC since Sept 1950. Before the
case at bar, Petitioner commenced a proceeding against Lyceum of Baguio with the SEC to
require it to change its corporate name and adopt a new one not similar or identical to the
Petitioner. SEC granted noting that there was substantial because of the dominant word
Lyceum. CA and SC affirmed. Petitioner filed similar complaint against other schools and obtain
a favorable decision from the hearing officer. On appeal, SEC En banc reversed the decision and
held that the word Lyceum have not become so identified with the petitioner and that the use
thereof will cause confusion to the general public.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the corporate names of the private respondents are identical with or
deceptively similar to that of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the use by the petitioner of Lyceum in its corporate name has been for such
length of time and with such exclusivity as to have become associated or identified with the
petitioner institution in the mind of the general public (Doctrine of Secondary meaning).
Held: The corporate names of the parties carry the word Lyceum but confusion and
deception are precluded by the appending of geographic names. Lyceum generally
refers to a school or an institution of learning and it is natural to use this word to
designate an entity which is organized and operating as an educational institution.

Thus, we do not believe that the "Lyceum of Aparri" can be mistaken by the general
public for the Lyceum of the Philippines, or that the "Lyceum of Camalaniugan"
would be confused with the Lyceum of the Philippines.

Held : Doctrine of Secondary meaning is a word of phrase originally incapable of exclusive

appropriation, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer
with reference to his article that, in trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or
phrase has come to mean that the article was his product.

Lyceum of the Philippines has not gained exclusive use of Lyceum by long passage of time.
The number alone of the private respondents suggests strongly that the use of Lyceum has not
been attended with the exclusivity essential for the applicability of the doctrine. It may be noted
that one of the respondents Western Pangasinan Lyceum used such term 17 years before the
petitioner registered with the SEC. Moreover, there may be other schools using the name but not
registered with the SEC because they have not adopted the corporate form of organization.