Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SYLLABUS
12. ID.; ID.; NO PROPOSITION BEFORE THE COURT LIFTING ANY TERM LIMIT OF
OUR ELECTED OFFICIALS. Petitioners and other intervenors also assail the
proposition lifting the term limits of our elected o cials as an un t subject of a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. They contend that the proposition will
involve a revision of the constitution and not merely its amendment. There is no
necessity to resolve this particular issue. The Court has unanimously ordered the
COMELEC to dismiss the Del n petition. Thus, there is no proposition before the Court
lifting any term limit of our elected o cials. Any ruling on the issue will be no more than
an advisory opinion which cannot be rendered by this Court.
RESOLUTION
The Court En Banc considered the motions for reconsideration of its Decision of
19 March 1997, separately led by the O ce of the Solicitor General for public
respondent Commission on Elections, private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa and private respondent Jesus Del n, et al., in relation to the oppositions
thereto led by the petitioners and intervenors Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol Ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), Raul Roco, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN), and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Two Members of the Court did not take part in
the deliberations: Padilla, J., who is on sick leave and who, in any case, had from the
outset inhibited himself from taking part in the cases at bar on account of his personal
relationship with the attorney of one of the parties; and Torres, J., who inhibited himself
from participation in the deliberations for the reasons set forth in his separate Opinion
hereto attached.
The remaining Justices actually present thereafter voted on the issue of whether
the motions for reconsideration should be granted or not, with the following results:
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., voted to DENY
said motions for lack of merit; and Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and
Panganiban, JJ, voted to GRANT the same. Vitug, J., maintained his opinion that the
matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. DcTSHa
Thirteen (13) Members having taken part in the deliberations, and only six (6)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
having voted to grant the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be as they
are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, the arguments therein set forth not being su cient
cogency to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decision of 19 March 1997.
The separate opinions of Davide, Puno, Francisco and Hermosisima, JJ., are also
hereto attached.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
This treats of the motions for the reconsideration of our decision of 19 March
1997 led separately by the private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, the
O ce of the Solicitor General for the public respondent COMELEC and by private
respondent Jesus Delfin.
The Pedrosas raised the following "jurisdictional and constitutional grounds" in
support of their motion:
1. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 6735 NOT HAVING BEEN DRAWN
INTO ISSUE IN THIS CASE. THE HONORABLE COURT OVERSTEPPED
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO EXERCISE
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS WHEN IT CONDEMNED R.A. NO. 6735 AS FATALLY FLAWED
ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY.
3. THE ADEQUACY OR SUFFICIENCY OF R.A. NO. 6735 AS A LEGISLATIVE
MEASURE TO IMPLEMENT SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF THE
CONSTITUTION IS A POLITICAL QUESTION NOT REVIEWABLE BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
4. HAVING OPENLY RECOGNIZED THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF R.A. NO.
6735 AS EMBRACING THE PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION, THE HONORABLE COURT HAS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO EFFECTUATE, AND NOT TO DEFEAT,
SUCH LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
5. SECTION 20 OF R.A. 6735 EMPOWERING THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS
MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT"
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.
6. MOREOVER, THE PROVISIONS OF COMELEC RESOLUTION 2300 MERELY
REPRODUCE THE PROCEDURES OF INITIATIVE ON THE
CONSTITUTION ALREADY DEFINED UNDER R.A. 6735. THE
PROCEDURES WERE NOT LEGISLATED BY COMELEC RESOLUTION
2300. R.A. 6735 INSTALLED THE PROVISIONS.
7. THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALBERTO AND CARMEN
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
PEDROSA TO CONDUCT A SIGNATURE DRIVE FOR PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE IS A RIGHT GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND
CANNOT THEREFORE BE ENJOINED.
The OSG, on its part, argued in this wise:
I. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 CAN NOT BE DECLARED INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
OF THE COURT'S PERCEPTION THAT IT IS INCOMPLETE,
INADEQUATE OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.
II. ASSUMING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 CAN BE DECLARED INEFFECTIVE
ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR IT
LACKS ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, IT IS THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS THAT SHOULD DO SO UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
III. THE DECISION UNDULY RESTRICTED THE SCOPE OF SECTION 2,
ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
IMPLEMENTING LAW MUST CONTAIN "DETAILS FOR CARRYING OUT
INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION."
IV. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS SUFFICIENT AND ADEQUATE TO
IMPLEMENT SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V CONGRESS IS NOT GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER.
Respondent Jesus Del n, who thought it imperative to le his motion to open
"the door to where the weight of the Dissenting Opinions may yet move the Honorable
Justices in the Majority, to reconsider their stand against the adequacy of R.A. No.
6735, especially," limited the grounds of his motion to the following:
I. THAT, COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 CANNOT BE VOIDED UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
II. THAT, R.A. NO. 6735, AS INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
ADEQUATELY COVERS THE SYSTEM.
III. THAT, COMELEC DID NOT ACT WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
AUTHORITY. DHcSIT
II
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S RULING THAT RA 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT
AND DEFECTIVE AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE THE VALID SOURCE OF SUBORDINATE
LEGISLATION NOR A VALID BASIS FOR A PETITION FOR A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION IS INADEQUATELY JUSTIFIED BY THE RIGOROUS
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AS MANDATED BY THE
1987 CONSTITUTION ITSELF.
III
THE PETITION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT DELFIN IS DEVOID OF ANY
CAUSE OF ACTION NOT HAVING COMPLIED WITH THE SPECIFIC 12% SIGNATORY
REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, THUS THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WAS CORRECT IN
PROHIBITING COMELEC FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF HIS PETITION.
Finally, in its consolidated comment, intervenor Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) moved for the denial of the motions for reconsideration, contending that the
arguments in support thereof were but a mere rehash of those already raised and no
compelling argument had been presented to justify a reversal of the 19 March 1997
decision; that the Court's judicial power, encompassing as it does the power to declare
laws unconstitutional, likewise includes the power to declare a statute incomplete; and
that Section 8 of R.A. No. 6735, in setting the initiative or referendum at not earlier than
45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the COMELEC of the
su ciency of the petition, contradicts the mandatory period of not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days as set forth in Section 4 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Before coming to grips with the arguments raised in the motions for
reconsideration, certain observations must initially be made on petitioners' insistence in
their consolidated comment that the Del n proposals cannot be the subject of initiative
since they would involve revision, of not mere amendments to the Constitution; and on
intervenor Roco's plea that we re-examine our ruling that insofar as initiative on
Constitutional amendments is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate and, therefore,
ineffective. Our 19 March 1997 decision considered premature any discussion on and
resolution of the issue of whether or not lifting term limits constituted a revision of or
mere amendment to the Constitution considering our holding that R.A. No. 6735 was
inadequate or insu cient and therefore, ineffective; and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 was void insofar as its provisions on initiative on Constitutional amendments
were concerned. The latter ruling simply meant that the Del n Petition led with the
COMELEC was devoid of legal basis. A resolution then on whether the proposals for
initiative contained therein, i.e., the lifting of term limits for certain elective o cials,
would involve revision of or merely amendments to the Constitution would be for the
nonce an exercise in futility or a rendition of a declaratory judgment. We rule on that
issue at an appropriate time.
In any event, these grievances of petitioners and intervenor Roco could have been
the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, since none of them sought
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the decision of 19 March 1997 had
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
long become nal as to them. They cannot be heard on said grievances nor permitted
to obtain a partial reconsideration of the decision by way of the motions for
reconsideration filed by the adverse parties.
We now take up the grounds in the motions for reconsideration.
I
The arguments in support of grounds III and IV of the OSG's motion; grounds 5
and 6 of the Pedrosa's motion; and grounds I, II and III of Del n's motion, are not new.
Except for the apparent attempt to recast their arguments in a different light and
language, said arguments are mere reiterations of those previously raised.
II
Grounds I and II of the OSG's motion; and grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Pedrosa's
motion, admittedly, present novel theories. However, movants conveniently overlooked
that during the 23 January 1997 hearing of this case, they acceded, unquali edly, to a
discussion on the first two issues in this case, viz.:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for the System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution,
and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of speci c provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
Thereafter, they vigorously argued their case within the parameters of these issues,
expounding thereon with all the spirit and vigor that their knowledge of constitutional
law and mastery of language could summon. cTADCH
Without a doubt, these two issues call for the exercise of judicial power, which,
unfortunately, the OSG seeks to unduly restrict by its miscomprehension of the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Said paragraph does not purport
to encompass the totality of judicial power; it merely states what the concept includes.
The paragraph reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Contrary to the claim of the Pedrosas, these two issues do, in fact, raise the issue
of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735. At its core lays the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power and the exceptions thereto, both of which are xed and invariable
subjects of constitutional law (Enrique M. Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines,
second ed. [1977], 161-166; Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines. A Commentary, 1996 ed., 610-618; Thomas M. Cooley. A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, Eight Ed. [1927], 224-247). It has been aptly said
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
that "[t]he problem of delegation of legislative powers like that of separation of powers
involves constitutional law rather than statutory construction" ( Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, Vol. 1 Third Ed. [1943], Sec. 301, p. 54).
Since a law may be declared unconstitutional where it delegates non-delegable
legislative authority, or that any attempt to do so would be tainted by
unconstitutionality (Fernando, op. cit., 161), then a law which purports to delegate a
delegable legislative power may also be declared unconstitutional or invalid if it fails to
comply with the completeness and "su cient standard" tests. Only courts, in the
exercise of its judicial authority, can determine if a statute has met these tests. ( Pelaez
v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 [1965]; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 [1970]). By arguing
that "the delegation of power to the COMELEC hurdles both the completeness and
su cient standard tests prescribed in Pelaez vs. Auditor General . . . ," the Pedrosas
admit that a constitutional issue is, indeed, involved. Thus, their assertion to the
contrary in their motion for reconsideration is incomprehensible. We do not then
hesitate to state that the stand of the Pedrosas on this point and, we may add, the
overbearing conclusion of intervenor Roco that our ruling on the insu ciency of R.A.
No. 6735 "created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but
inadequate and, therefore invalid laws," only betray an inability to fully grasp the
workings of the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers and exceptions
thereto. Only this inability, coupled with the incapacity to fully understand the
significance and import of our statement in the Decision that:
R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. .
..
could sire what intervenor Roco baptizes as "third specie of invalid laws" or "mongrel."
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the theory of the OSG that
COMELEC is vested with the primary jurisdiction to declare the incompleteness or
inadequacy of R.A. No. 6735, and the Pedrosas' belated resort to the "political question"
theory, are outlandish.
III
Ground V of the OSG's motion and grounds 5 and 6 of the Pedrosas' motion are
likewise unfounded. We never held that Congress was guilty of unlawful delegation of
legislative power; in fact we even conceded that "[e]mpowering the COMELEC, an
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a [permissible] form of delegation of legislative authority under No. 5
above." What we said, in plain and simple language, was that R.A. No. 6735 failed to
comply with the "completeness" and "su cient standard" tests, hence Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6735 authorizing the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules could not
cure the in rmity. It is settled that the validity and enforceability of a delegation of rule-
making power hinges upon compliance with the aforementioned tests.
IV
Neither may we succumb to the arguments raised in ground 4 of the Pedrosas'
motion. Although we recognized that "R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution," we cannot otherwise
read into the statute non-existent provisions in order to make it complete and set forth
therein a su cient standard, and thus validate the delegation of the power to
promulgate implementing rules to the COMELEC. To do so would constitute unabashed
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
judicial legislation, an act offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers.
We stated earlier that the issue of delegation of legislative powers is properly a
subject of constitutional law, and not statutory construction. In short, our primary task
was merely to determine if R.A. No. 6735 "hurdled," to use a word used by the Pedrosas,
the "completeness and su cient standard tests" in the investiture of rule-making
powers to the COMELEC relative to initiative on constitutional amendments. When we
then declared it to be inadequate or insu cient in that respect, we simply meant that it
failed to "hurdle" the tests. Put differently, the terms incomplete, inadequate and
wanting in essential details in our challenged Decision have reference to the
"completeness and su cient standard tests," and to none other. The intent then of the
law, which is the concern of statutory construction, is not a su cient guidepost. This
puts to naught for being clearly misplaced, if not irrelevant, the plea that we should give
full life to the intent of the law to include initiative on constitutional amendments, as
well as the warning that to suppress the intent of the law would be tantamount to
determining the wisdom, reasonableness, adequacy or su ciency of the law, a role
exclusively pertaining to the legislature. Accordingly, Nebbia v. New York (291 U.S. 507,
537, 78 L. Ed. 940, 957 [1934]) and Government v. Springer, (50 Phil. 259 [1927]), cited
by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion, are inapplicable. Nebbia
involved a New York law establishing a Milk Control Board with the power, among other
things, to " x minimum and maximum retail prices to be charged by stores to
consumers for consumption off the premises where sold," and was challenged under
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. While as regards
Springer, simply, it did not involve non-delegation of legislative powers and the tests for
permissible exceptions thereto.
The plea then that we hearken to the intent of R.A. No. 6735 in dealing with
initiative on constitutional amendments, or that we apply a liberal construction to give
life to an intent not so expressed in the statute as passed, is but a ploy to tempt us to
engage in judicial legislation.
The vociferous claim of the sponsor of the bicameral conference committee
report that the consolidated bill covers the initiative on constitutional amendments
would likewise prove unavailing. Such only proved that the intent was present at the
outset, however, it did not answer the question of whether the bill, as passed, was
complete and contained a su cient standard for a valid exercise of subordinate
legislation by the COMELEC. Whether it did could best be resolved by the provisions of
the bill which became R.A. No. 6735. Res ipsa loquitur. If by its provisions the bill or law
is inadequate or insu cient with regard to initiative on constitutional amendments
because it failed to comply with the "completeness and su cient standard tests" one
thousand or more seraphs and cherubs heralding otherwise would be for naught. cIDHSC
V
As to ground no. 7 of the Pedrosas' motion, we need only stress that the system
of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory. The exercise of the right thereunder is dependent upon a valid
implementing law. It follows then that any gathering of signatures for initiative on
Constitutional amendments would, at this time, be an idle ceremony, an exercise in
futility. However, the Pedrosas are not prevented from engaging in that endeavor if they
so wish; precisely, we lifted the temporary restraining order as against them.
Finally, to refute the charge of the OSG in the prefatory statement of its motion,
and that of the Pedrosas in their discussion on ground no. 4, that we committed a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
"terrible volte-face" or "complete turnabout," respectively, from our unanimous decision
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 125416, 26 September
1996), it must be pointed out that said case did not involve initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and, logically, did not rule as it could not, for obvious reasons on
the su ciency of R.A. No. 6735 insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. The charge then is palpably groundless.
I vote then to DENY for utter want of merit, the motions for reconsideration led
by the O ce of the Solicitor General, private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
and private respondent Jesus Delfin. This denial is FINAL.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
For resolution are the motions for reconsideration of our Decision dated March
19, 1997 led by the respondents COMELEC, the spouses Pedrosa and Jesus Del n.
The dispositive portion of our Decision states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
c. Declaring void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
2. Assuming Republic Act No. 6735 can be declared ineffective on the ground that
it is incomplete, inadequate or it lacks essential terms and conditions, it is the
COMELEC that should do so under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
3. The Decision unduly restricted the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution when it held that the implementing law must contain details for
carrying out initiative on the Constitution.
4. Republic Act No. 6735 is su cient and adequate to implement Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
4. Having openly recognized the legislative intent of R.A. No. 6735 as embracing
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the Honorable Court has the
constitutional duty to effectuate, and not defeat such legislative intent.
On April 22, 1997, the Court required the petitioners and the petitioners-
intervenors to file their consolidated comments on the motions for reconsideration.
Petitioners Santiago, Padilla and Ongpin prayed for the denial of the motions for
reconsideration on the following grounds:
"1. Respondents' motions for reconsideration do not raise new issues and should
be dismissed for being pro-forma.
2. A people's initiative to lift term limits is not an amendment, but a revision of the
entire Constitution.
3. The Honorable Court's ruling on the inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 to
cover a constitutional initiative is a valid exercise of the power of judicial review
and is not a political question.
4. Republic Act No. 6735 is not the enabling law referred to by the Constitution to
implement the constitutional initiative since it contradicts major provisions of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Constitution on a constitutional initiative.
2. The Honorable Supreme Court's ruling that R.A. 6735 is insu cient and
defective and therefore cannot be the valid source of subordinate legislation nor a
valid basis for a petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution is
adequately justi ed by the rigorous requirements for amendments to the
Constitution, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution itself.
3. The petition led by private respondent Del n is devoid of any cause of action
not having complied with the speci c 12% signatory requirements laid down in
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Honorable Supreme
Court was correct in prohibiting COMELEC from taking cognizance of his
petition."
Petitioner-intervenor Roco partly joined the petitioners and the other intervenors.
Roco opined that the Court correctly ordered the dismissal of the Del n petition for
failure to comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6735. Roco, however, urged the
majority to reexamine its ". . . restrictive and all too sweeping judgment that R.A. No.
6735, which was intended to cover initiative or the Constitution, is `inadequate' and,
therefore, ineffective."
Petitioner-intervenor Integrated Bar of the Philippines moved for the denial of the
motions for reconsideration. It claimed that the motions raised no new facts and no
new issues.
The case at bar bristles with constitutional signi cance. At its core is the proper
interpretation of R.A. No. 6735, enacted by the rst Congress after the EDSA revolution,
to implement the provisions of our Constitution empowering the people with the new
right to directly amend the Constitution thru people's initiative. The sharply divided vote
of the Court mirrors its difficulty when it first resolved the case at bar.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
The motions for reconsideration have rekindled the embers of debate on charter
change within and without the Court. The motions are not pro forma for the movants
have raised new and vital issues. For one, the movants have challenged the jurisdiction
of this Court to resolve what they perceive as a political question. For another, the
movants joined by intervenor Roco, contend that the Court cannot refuse to effectuate
laws if they do not violate the Constitution. In effect, they contend that the majority has
expanded the limits of the Court's power of judicial review. It has also allegedly altered
the traditional line separating legislative and judicial powers and has tilted our delicate
system of check and balance too much in favor of the judiciary. They call the Court's
attention to the danger of "judicial dictatorship." In ne, the correct interpretation of the
meaning and nuances of R.A. No. 6735 carries high impact effects on the sovereign
right of our people, the fundamental principle of separation of powers and the capacity
of our Constitution to be a living law. The seriousness and signi cance of these
contentions induced the Court to give the motions for reconsideration what a jurist has
dubbed as the "sobering second thought."
Consistent with my prior stand, I vote to partially grant the motions for
reconsideration that seek a modi cation of our decision holding that "R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution in concerned" and "declaring void those parts of
Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct
of the initiative or amendment to the Constitution." IAcDET
Senator Gonzales. Mrs. President, under Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution, it
is provided that the Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum and the exceptions therefrom whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition
therefor signed by, at least, ten per centum of the total number of registered voters
of which every legislative district must be represented by, at least, three per
centum of the registered voters thereof. EcTaSC
To implement this constitutional provision, one of the early bills led before the
Senate was Senate Bill No. 17, entitled
The initiatives and referendum are new tools of democracy; therefore, we have
decided to be cautious in our approach. Hence, 1) we limited initiative and
referendum to the local government units; 2) that initiative can only be exercised
if the local legislative assemblies refuse or fail to act on a proposed ordinance or
resolution; and 3) that initiative cannot be exercised more frequently than once
every year.
Now, this was approved by the Senate. And it is one of the earliest bills approved
by the Senate during the rst regular session. However, it took the House of
Representatives two regular sessions before they could come up with their own
bill implementing the system of initiatives and referendum as called for in the
Constitution. The result is House Bill No. 21505, entitled
The result, Madam President, is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505. Understandably, the title of House Bill No. 21505 has been
adopted as the title for the consolidated bill. It is An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Now, under this consolidated bill, Madam President, there are three kinds or
systems of initiative: (1) initiative on the Constitution itself which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. This is expressly provided for
in the system of amendment and revision of the Constitution; (2) initiative on
statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
(3) initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance, as
the case may be.
There are two kinds of referendum under this consolidated bill: (1) referendum on
statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and (2) referendum on local laws.
The provisions of the consolidated bill referring to the initiative on the
Constitution and initiative on statutes, which are national in character, as well as
the provisions on referendum regarding a national legislation, are largely provided
for in House Bill No. 21505. On the other hand, beginning from Section 13 on
page 6 up to Section 23 on page 10 of this Report, this is basically the Senate Bill
No. 17, with the exception of the provision on appropriation. Because, we have to
adopt the provision of the House bill on appropriation.
And so, this has been signed by all the conferees on the part of the Senate and a
majority of the conferees on the part of the House of Representatives. This
morning, Madam President, I was informed that this Conference Committee
Report had already been approved by the House of Representatives.
Therefore, we most respectfully submit this Conference Committee Report and
strongly recommend its approval.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Rasul]. Are there any questions?
The Majority Floor Leader is recognized.
APPROVAL OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON SENATE BILL NO.
17/HOUSE BILL NO. 21505
Senator Mercado. Madam President, I reiterate my motion for the approval of the
Conference Committee Report.
The Presiding O cer [Senator Rasul]. Are there any objections? [Silence] Hearing
none, the Conference Committee Report is approved.
The following is the full text of the Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill
No. 17/House Bill No. 21505:
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17
entitled
having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend as they do
hereby recommend to their respective Houses the approval of the attached bill in
consolidation of Senate Bill 17 and House Bill 21505 entitled
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
CONFEREES ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Sgd.) RAUL S. ROCO
SECTION 1. TITLE. This act shall be known as `The Initiative and Referendum
Act.'
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy . The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirement of this Act is hereby a rmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
SEC. 3. De nition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
(a) `Initiative' is the power of the people to propose and enact legislations through
an election called for the purpose. SacTAC
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12 percent) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3
percent) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be
exercised only after ve (5) years from the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
SEC. 7 Veri cation of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' a davit and voters'
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
I. NATIONAL INITIATIVE REFERENDUM
SEC. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall
call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission
shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino
and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set
the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty- ve
(45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
SEC. 9 Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.
SEC. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provision of Sec. 4 hereof, any
local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty- ve (45) days in case
of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body of enact the said measure.
IV. FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purpose of this Act.
SEC. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
SEC. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.
SEC. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved."
The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 17/House Bill No. 21505 was
unanimously approved by the Senate then led by Senator Jovito Salonga as its
President. It cannot be doubted that the intent of the Senate in approving R.A. No. 6735
is to implement the provisions of the Constitution giving the people the power to
initiate and approve amendments to the Constitution. Nor can it be doubted that the
Senate installed in R.A. No. 6735 the procedure to implement this legislative intent. The
Senate that approved R.A. No. 6735 carried the names of some of our more brilliant
legal minds, and some of our most experienced hands in bill drafting. It is di cult to
believe that these distinguished senators allowed R.A. No. 6735 to be approved when it
is so littered with ambiguities as to become incomprehensible, nay, unenforceable.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
II
The second overriding concern is the need to comply with our traditional duty to
interpret R.A. No. 6735 to effectuate its intent. R.A. No. 6735 represents the wisdom
and the will of two co-equal branches of government the Legislative and the
Executive. Due respect to these two branches of government demands that we utilize
all rules of statutory construction to effectuate R.A. No. 6735. It has been the teaching
of this Court for ages that when a law admits of two interpretations, one that will
sustain it and another that will invalidate it, the interpretation that will save the law
should be adopted. cdtai
The simple yet decisive question is whether there is a way to interpret R.A. No.
6735 to save it. Stated otherwise, is the law so badly written that the Court has no
choice but to strike it down as inadequate? Even the gurus of grammar will not suggest
the indefensible idea that our distinguished senators and congressmen who cobbled
R.A. No. 6735 into law were so lacking in draftmanship skills that they wrote a
completely incomprehensible piece of legislation. The running argument between the
majority and minority members of this Court may not have clearly settled the issue of
whether the language of R.A. No. 6735 has adequately expressed the intent of our
lawmakers. At the very least, however, the sparks of the spirited debate show that there
is a way to interpret R.A. No. 6735 in order to save it. The minority view that R.A. No.
6735 is comprehensible enough to be enforceable cannot be dismissed as totally
unfounded, unreasonable, and unrealistic. In truth, the minority view is shared by others
whose honesty of motive cannot be assailed. It is shared by the lawmakers who
enacted R.A. No. 6735 in compliance with their constitutional duty to the people. It is
shared by former President Corazon C. Aquino who signed R.A. No. 6735 into law. And
most important, the COMELEC has never wavered in its position that R.A. No. 6735 is
not incomprehensible, insu cient or inadequate. The COMELEC, under the stewardship
of then Acting Chairperson Haydee Yorac, understood R.A. No. 6735 without any
difficulty. Indeed, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2300 prescribing the rules
and regulations on the conduct of people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It was
ready then and it is ready now to implement R.A. No. 6735. More than any department,
instrumentality or agency of government, the COMELEC is the most authoritative to
determine whether R.A. No. 6735 is clear and enforceable. Article IX (c) (2) of the
Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall." Its long experience and expertise in enforcing our election laws cannot be
doubted and its interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 carries a considerable weight.
To stress once more, there is no question that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to
implement the right of the people through initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Its validity is questioned, however, on the ground that its key provisions
relating to what a petition should contain fails to mention constitutional amendments
and appears to be limited to ordinary legislation proposed for enactment; approval or
rejection. (E.g., Sec. 5(c) and subtitle II).
No reason has been advanced why these provisions cannot be construed to
apply to proposed constitutional amendments. No reason has been shown for
restrictively and literally construing these provisions as applicable to ordinary
legislation only. On the other hand, the established rule in the interpretation of statutes
is for courts to seek the legislative intention and give it effect. The inadequacy of a
statute is not a ground for invalidating it. Given the lawfulness of the legislative purpose
to implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution, it is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
not for this Court to say how well the statute succeeds in attaining that purpose. "With
the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicality of the law enacted
to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal." 3
III
The third overriding concern is the need to avoid the danger of over-checking the
power of Congress to make laws which will put in peril the fundamental principle of
separation of powers. The Constitution vested in Congress the power to make laws. 4
The power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature. The legislature is accorded
the widest latitude in lawmaking to meet the uctuating problems of our people. It
cannot be gainsaid that our legislators are more keenly aware of these problems for
they are in closer contact with our people. They have better access to facts to solve
these problems. They are also expected to respond adequately to our people's
problems for they have to account to the people come election day. A more chastened
recognition of the policy-making role of Congress should compel this Court to exercise
extreme care and caution before imposing any new limitation on its power to make
laws.
From time immemorial, courts have only invalidated laws that offend the
Constitution. The limits of the judicial power to invalidate laws are no longer open to
doubt and debate. In this jurisdiction, as early as 1927 in the seminal case of
Government v. Springer, 5 Mr. Justice Johnson's concurring opinion authoritatively laid
down its metes and bounds, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
"It is conceded by all of the eminent authorities upon constitutional law that the
courts have authority to nally determine what are the respective powers of the
different departments of government.
"The question of the validity of every statute is rst determined by the legislative
department of the Government, and the courts will resolve every presumption in
favor of its validity. Courts are not justi ed in adjudging a statute invalid in the
face of the conclusions of the legislature, when the question of its validity is at all
doubtful. The courts will assume that the validity of a statute was fully
considered by the legislature when adopted. Court will not presume a statute
invalid unless it clearly appears that it falls within some of the inhibitions of the
fundamental laws of the state. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute
is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the
courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers subjects
not authorized by the fundamental laws of the land, or by the constitution, then
the courts are not only authorized but are justi ed in pronouncing the same illegal
and void, no matter how wise or bene cent such legislation may seem to be.
Courts are not justi ed in measuring their opinions with the opinion of the
legislative department of the government, as expressed in statutes, upon
questions of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. In exercising
the high authority conferred upon the courts to pronounce valid or invalid a
particular statute, they are only the administrators of the public will, as expressed
in the fundamental law of the land. If an act of the legislature is to be held illegal,
it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but
because the act is forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and because the
will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is paramount and must
be obeyed, even by the legislature. In pronouncing a statute illegal, the courts are
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
simply interpreting the meaning, force, and application of the fundamental law of
the state." (Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil. 250, 251.)
DIESHT
The judicial department of the Government may examine every law enacted by
the legislative branch of the Government when the question is properly presented
for the purpose of ascertaining:
(a) Whether or not such law came within the subject matter upon which the
legislative branch of the Government might legislate; and
(b) Whether the provisions of such law were in harmony with the authority given
the legislature.
If the judicial branch of the Government nds (a) that the legislative or executive
branches of the Government had authority to act upon the particular subject, and
(b) that the particular law contained no provisions in excess of the power of such
department and the acts of the executive were within his powers, then that
investigation, or that conclusion, conclusively terminates the investigation by the
judicial department of the Government."
Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando similarly posits the view that a law can be
invalidated o nly if Congress exceeds the substantive or formal limitations of its
legislative power as spelled out in the Constitution, viz: 6
"The legislative power, while comprehensive, is not unlimited. It cannot be where
constitutionalism prevails. Such limitations may be substantive or formal. They
belong to the former category when they refer to the subject matter of legislation.
They may be either implied or express. Implied substantive limitations are
embodied in such doctrines as the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable
laws, and the prohibition of the delegation of legislative power. The Bill of Rights
embodies such express limitation. Then too there may be other provisions that
limit speci c powers of the National Assembly. An example is the requirement of
uniformity for taxing statutes. Formal limitations refer to the procedural
requirements in the enactment of legislation. Thus, no bill shall become a law
unless it passed three readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its
nal form have been distributed to the members of the National Assembly three
days before its passage except when the Prime Minister certi es to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency."
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 6735 is not assailed by the majority as
unconstitutional for failure of Congress to follow the substantive requirements of
lawmaking. It even concedes that Congress enacted the law in compliance with its duty
to implement the provision of the Constitution granting the people the right to amend
our fundamental law thru people's initiative. It goes without saying that the subject
matter of R.A. No. 6735 is within the compass of the power of Congress to legislate.
Nor does the majority strike down R.A. No. 6735 on the ground that Congress breached
any of the formal procedural steps in enacting a law. Since it is uncontested that
Congress did not violate any of the substantive or formal requirements of lawmaking in
enacting R.A. No. 6735, this Court has no option but to effectuate the same. This is our
consistent stance in the past. There is no reason to be inconsistent now.
The majority has broken all precedents when it did not nd R.A. No. 6735 as
unconstitutional yet refused to validate it. It relies on a reason unrecognized by existing
jurisprudence, i.e., that Congress inadequately expressed its intent in drafting R.A. No.
6735. In so doing, intervenor Roco observed that this Court "has created a third specie
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
of invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but inadequate and, therefore, invalid
law." 7
The Roco observation should raise our antennas. In letting loose this "mongrel"
type of invalid law, the Court has overextended its checking power against Congress.
This mongrel endangers the principle of separation of powers, a touchstone of our
Constitution. The power of Congress to make laws includes the power how to write
laws. The court has the power to review the constitutionality of laws but it has no
authority to act as if it is the committee on style of Congress. The Court has the power
to interpret laws but the principal purpose in exercising this power is to discover and
enforce legislative intent. We should heed the warning of Crawford that if courts ignore
the intent of the legislative, they would invade the legislative sphere and violate the
tripartite theory of government. 8 The balance of power among the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of our government was xed with pinpoint precision by the
framers of our fundamental law. The Constitution did not give the Court the power to
alter this balance especially to alter it in its favor. Unless allowed by the Constitution, a
non-elected court cannot assume powers which will make it more than the equal of an
elected legislature or an elected executive.
IV
The fourth overriding concern is the need to enforce the new provision of the
provision of the Constitution giving our people a direct, participatory role in its
amendment. It is almost trite to state that a good written Constitution has three
essential part. The rst provides the framework of government; the second de nes and
protects the rights of the people against government intrusion; and the third prescribes
the procedure of its amendment. 9
The importance of our constitutional provision on amendment cannot be
overemphasized. Apropos is the reminder of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that a constitution
is an enduring framework of government for a dynamic society and not a code of
lifeless forms. 1 0 For a constitution to be a living law, it ought to be exible in order to
meet the variegated needs of the people as time and circumstance dictate. A
constitution cannot be beyond the touch of change for the vision of its framers cannot
always pierce the veil of the future. To be unremittingly relevant, every constitution
provides a procedure on how it can be amended. The amendatory provision of our
Constitution is thus its safety valve for change without confrontation, for progress
without violence. It is our duty to be liberal in interpreting this amendatory provision, for
if our Constitution fails to take care of the troubles of tomorrow it will become the
sarcophagus of our people's aspirations. The same liberal spirit should guide us in
interpreting R.A. No. 6735 for its purpose is to allow our people to initiate amendments
to our Constitution to meet their changing needs.
V
Petitioners and other intervenors also assail the proposition lifting the term
limits of our elected o cials as an un t subject of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. They contend that the proposition will involve a revision of the
constitution and not merely its amendment. There is no necessity to resolve this
particular issue. 1 1 The Court has unanimously ordered the COMELEC to dismiss the
Del n petition. Thus, there is no proposition before the Court lifting any term limit of our
elected officials. Any ruling on the issue will be no more than an advisory opinion which
cannot be rendered by this Court. CIAHDT
"SEN. FERNAN: One of the reasons behind this amendment, is for you to
see President Ramos run for reelection?
"MR. PEDROSA: Yes, sir. I will admit that that is in fact the . . .
"SEN. FERNAN: You are interested in seeing him continue as President?
"MR. PEDROSA: Yes, in the affirmative." 2
The foregoing is unequivocal. The guiding intention and plan of the prime movers of the
initiative on the constitution is not the re-examination of the entire constitution so as to
fall within the ambit of revision, but an alteration on the term of o ce of elective
officials. Hence, the same pertains to a mere amendment. ISCTcH
"It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cloister; another to think
under re to think for action upon which great interests depend." So said Justice
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so am I guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the
holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide su cient
standard for subordinate legislation" 1 and now interpose my dissent thereto.
At the outset, however, I reiterate my adherence to the position of the majority
that the Del n petition should be dismissed on the ground that, failing to contain names
and/or signatures of "at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein," 2 the Del n petition is fatally defective, being in
violation of Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
In the Motion for Reconsideration led by private respondent Jesus S. Del n,
there was an attempt to befuddle this blatant non-compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the petition to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative
bear the names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters in the
country. Private respondent Del n distortedly postulated that the COMELEC, as an
administrative agency, has no judicial authority to cognize any petition to amend the
Constitution through a people's initiative, and that thus, the Del n petition need not
contain the names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, the
same being merely a "request for administrative assistance" which was never intended
to "trigger the inception of jurisdiction to act on a Petition for Initiative to Amend the
Constitution, which certainly it should not . . . because COMELEC does not have such
kind of judicial jurisdiction in matters relating to initiative [and] . . . because the matters
sought for in the pleading . . . are only petty preliminaries which can be done by
COMELEC even before the filing of a Petition for Initiative requiring signatures." 3
Private respondent's contentions, however, border on childish quibbling. There is
no mincing words when it comes to a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of a
right; the Constitution is plain and unequivocal as to what triggers the proceedings for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution only "a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Whether
the Del n petition is "a mere request for administrative assistance" or itself already the
"Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution," it is undisputedly, by praying for the
setting of time and dates for the signing of the petition by the required percentage of
the registered voters all over the country and for the publication of the "Petition for
Initiative on the Constitution," the petition that sets off the mechanism of a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. As the petition that triggers the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution, the Del n petition must be signed by the required
percentage of registered voters, or at the least, must contain the names of at least 12%
of all the registered voters in the country and then signed by at least one registered
voter in behalf of all the signatories, as mandated by the Constitution. We cannot and
will never sanction any avoidance of this categorical mandate of the fundamental law of
the land.
There is simply no going around this requirement that the initiatory petition for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution should contain the names and/or
signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters in the country. The attempt to do
so, however, is not new to us, it being only recently that we had stricken down a similar
attempt by a losing candidate in a mayoralty election to initiate recall proceedings on
the strength of a petition for recall containing only the name and signature of said
losing candidate, which petition as such is utterly violative of the statutory requirement
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
that recall proceedings be initiated by a petition of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned. This was the case of Mayor
Ricardo M. Angobung v. Commission on Elections En Banc and Atty. Aurora S. de Alban.
4 There we ruled:
"Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that
`recall of any elective . . . municipal . . . o cial may also be validly initiated upon
petition of at least twenty- ve percent (25%) of the total number of registered
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the
local o cial sought to be recalled was elected.' The law is plain and unequivocal
as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters, may validly initiate recall proceedings. We take
careful note of the phrase, `petition of at least twenty- ve percent (25%)' and
point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least
25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be 'of' or by, at least 25% the
registered voters, i.e., the petition must be led, not by one person only; but by at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters. . . . Hence, while the initiatory
recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total
number of registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25%
of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign
the petition in the meantime.
We cannot sanction the procedure of the ling of the recall petition by a number
of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the ling
thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative
of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly
repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law.
Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local
Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of
25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness,
private respondent proceeded to le the petition for recall with only herself as the
ler and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many
others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost con dence in the leadership of petitioner. But the
petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have
reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. . . .
While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected o cials, the
same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all
the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above
anonymity, confronting the o cial sought to be recalled . . . and seeing the recall
election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to le the
initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the rst
place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the o cial sought
to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an
attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all
circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter
requirement in the initiation of the recall process." 5
The Del n petition was led and signed by private respondent Del n only. The
Del n petition having prayed for the setting of the time and dates for the signing of the
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution and for the publication thereof for public
consumption, it is the initiatory pleading for purposes of starting the proceedings for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution, which initiatory pleading as such should
have contained the names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters
in the country. As the Del n petition utterly failed to comply with the constitutional
requirement of voter percentage, it is nothing more than a mere scrap of paper that the
Commission on Elections should have, at rst glance, in whatever capacity, ignored as
surplusage.
Having rejected private respondents' asseverations on the validity of the Del n
petition, I, nonetheless, with as much conviction, realize now that the majority ruling on
the inadequacy of R.A. No. 6735 should be reconsidered.
While I hold in esteem my brother Justice Hilario Davide whose ponencia
established a detailed foundation in support of the interpretation that R.A. No. 6735
does not adequately cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
hence my earlier concurrence thereto, I see now that there is an equally compelling and
valid rationale which builds and sustains the interpretation that R.A. No. 6735 is a
substantial compliance on the part of Congress with its constitutional duty and power
to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right." 6
The underlying policy of R.A. No. 6735 is the realization of the "power of the
people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, [and] laws, ordinances, or resolution
passed by any legislative body," 7 The subject matter of R.A. No. 6735 clearly includes a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Illustrative of this are (1) the de nition of
"initiative" in the said Act as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose," 8 (2) the enumeration in the same Act of the three (3) systems of initiative
which includes the "initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution," 9 and (3) the de nition of "plebiscite" as "the electoral
process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people." 1 0
Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution,
one of the duties and powers of the legislature is to enact a statute that "shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of [the] right [to amend the Constitution through
a people's initiative]." In pursuance of this constitutional mandate, Congress provided in
R.A. No. 6735 that "a petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein." 1 1 Directed by the Constitution to spell out the
limits and parameters, if need there be, as to the exercise of the people's right to
amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings, Congress further provided that
"initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after ve (5) years from the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter." 1 2
Having already laid out the required voter percentage and the limitation as to the
time for the proper exercise of the right to amend the Constitution through a people's
initiative, and having categorically provided that the initiatory petition for a people's
initiative should contain "the proposition and the required number of signatories," 1 3 R.A.
No. 6735 proceeds thus to delegate to the Commission on Elections the power to
determine the form of this initiatory petition. 1 4
R.A. No. 6735 also provides for procedures for the process of verifying the
signatures in the initiatory petition 1 5 and for the conduct of a special registration 1 6
before the scheduled initiative, all apparently in compliance by Congress with its
constitutional duty to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the people's
right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings. DEaCSA
The thrust of the majority opinion is that in providing the above policies,
concepts and procedures, Congress nonetheless failed to lay down the su cient
standards by which the Commission on Elections may be validly and effectively guided
in "promulgat[ing] such rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of
[R.A. No. 6735]" 1 7 in the sense that R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate or wanting in the
essential terms and conditions pertinent to the implementation of the people's right to
amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings. Said Act, thus, cannot be
deemed complete and containing su cient standards to serve as valid basis for
subordinate legislation in the form of Comelec Resolution No. 2300.
It is signi cant to note, however, that while the majority declared R.A. No. 6735 to
be so inadequate as to bar the exercise by the people of their right to amend the
Constitution through initiative proceedings, the majority decries the omission by
Congress of only one provision an enumeration of the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. It bears repeating, however, that Sections 3 (f) and 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 6735, read together, provide that a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must contain the proposition and the required number of signatories, which is at least
12% of the total number of registered voters in the country, of which every legislative
district should be represented by at least 3% of the voters thereof. Undoubtedly, such
constitutes, by any measure, a su cient standard on the basis of which the
Commission on Elections may proceed to formulate the more detailed requirements, if
any, of a petition to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings.
The majority also pointed out that R.A. No. 6735 does not contain a subtitle
treating solely of the matter of an initiative on the Constitution, but certainly the mere
literal absence of such a subtitle without an explicit mention of what particular
provision should be contained under that subtitle, i.e., what "essential terms and
conditions" are referred to by the majority as indispensable to make R.A. No. 6735
adequate for purposes of a people's initiative on the Constitution, does not make a
good case in support of the majority's postulation that R.A. No. 6735 is insu cient for
said purposes.
More importantly, I humbly submit that R.A. No. 6735 does not have to contain
every detail conceivable in the matter of initiative proceedings for the amendment of
the Constitution and that as it provides for the minimum voter percentage requirement,
the essential requisites in the initiatory petition, the ve-year time limit on the exercise
of the right of initiative on the Constitution, the special registration day prior to the
plebiscite, and the conduct of signature veri cation as to the initiatory petition, R.A. No.
6735 su ciently laid down the necessary minimum standards for a valid and complete
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
statute treating of the matter of, among others, the initiative proceedings to amend the
Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 having provided for the basic and indispensable who's,
what's, where's, when's and why's in the matter of the initiative proceedings to amend
the Constitution, the details as to how such proceedings are to be step-by-step
undertaken, are properly left to the Commission on Elections to promulgate in the form
of subordinate legislation. Said commission, after all, is empowered by the Constitution
to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of . . .
initiative . . ." 1 8 and by R.A. No. 6735 to "promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [said] Act." 1 9
Finally, having established that there exists no legal impediment to the reliance
on R.A. No. 6735 to validate an exercise by the people of their right to amend the
Constitution through initiative proceedings, I may as well add, with extreme hesitation,
that while the passionate call for the championing of the people's rights to control their
political destiny, demands a favorable response from this Court, it being the ultimate
defender of the sovereignty of the people, this Court cannot be ultrapopulist as to
indiscriminately stamp its imprimatur to each and every form of "people power"
activism albeit wanting in legal underpinnings. Neither may this court, however,
straitjacket a people's momentum to charter their own political destiny by imposing its
personal additional ingredients as to what makes a perfect statutory mixture, albeit the
finished formulation of a simple, basic concoction that is R.A. No. 6735.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis
for the exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative
proceedings and to uphold the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it
does not sanction the ling of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to amend
the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3%
of their registered voters therein.
Torres, J., inhibition:
As the parties pay fealty and homage to the Constitution as the nal expression
of the will of the sovereign people, I nd myself not wholly free to participate in the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
resolution of the issues in clear conscience. Probitas verus honor honesty is true
honor. On the jurisprudential level, it was Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez in Pimentel vs.
Salanga who penned the ethical idiom that "to disqualify or not to disqualify one's self,
is a matter of conscience. (No. L-27934, September 18, 1967). In the same breath, the
Christ-like Indian sage Mohandas Gandhi cautioned that "in matters of conscience, the
law of the majority has no place."
Considering the foregoing, I bet to ABSTAIN from participating in the case at bar.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ. , voted to
DENY.
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., voted to
GRANT.
Vitug, J., maintained that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication.
Padilla, J., on leave.
Footnotes
* Arrived after the roll.
** On official mission.
3. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 78 L. Ed. 940, 957 (1934).
4. Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.
5. 50 Phil. 259.
10. Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 US 502 (1942).
11. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
12. G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994, 237 SCRA 279.
2. Petition, p. 4.
3. Art. VII, Secs. 4-5, 1935 Constitution; Mendoza, V., From Mckinley's Instructions to the New
Constitution, Documents on the Philippine Constitutional System, Central Lawbook
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Publishing Co., Inc., 1978, pp. 155-156.
4. 115 SCRA 418, 433. See also: The 1973 Constitution by Bernas, 1983 ed., p. 4.
3. Motion for Reconsideration dated April 4, 1997 filed by private respondent Delfin, p. 17.
4. G.R. No. 126576, promulgated on March 5, 1997.
5. Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung v. Commission on Elections En Banc and Atty. Aurora S. de
Alban, G.R. No. 126576, March 5, 1997.
6. Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.
14. Ibid.
15. Section 6, R.A. No. 6735.
16. Section 7, R.A. No. 6735.