1

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC et. al. vs.

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful
Antaeus weakened and died.

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No.
6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified
farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation
of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.

One of the petitioners also contended that only public lands should be included in the CARP.

ISSUE: WON only public lands should be included in the CARP.

HELD:

No.

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution
itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural
lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes
specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional
injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution
of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they
till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES
BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, Respondents.

FACTS:

Borre filed a petition for the registration of the subject land.

 2

The Heirs of Amunategui opposed the same and prayed that said land be registered on their name.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition also praying that the title be registered on him
name.

The Director of Forestry consequently filed an opposition to the application for registration, claiming that
the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

During the trial, Borre sold his rights to the land to Alpasan, who also filed an opposition praying that the
land be titled on his name.

RTC adjudicated portions of the land to Bereber, Alpasan and Borre.

Heirs of Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals.

CA declared the land as forest land, not subject to titling.

Petitioner contended that the land had been in possession of private persons for over 30yrs and therefore
in accordance with RA No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title.

ISSUE: WON may be subject for registration and titling.

HELD:

No.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no are found in land does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less
as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have
been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
 3

strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was
only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning
from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest."
chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would
be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No.
885 had always been public land classified as forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."

G.R. No. 143307 April 26, 2006

LU DO AND LU YM CORPORATION, Complainant,

vs.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO., Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Aznar Brothers Realty Company, a partnership engaged in buying and selling real properties and in
livestock and agriculture business was awarded of Foreshore Lease over an 8,485sqm land located in
Sawang, San Nicolas, Cebu City. However, Lu Do and Lu YM Corporation, a manufacturer and exporter of
coconut oil products, took possession of the said land on July 21, 1965. Since then and up to the present,
 4

Lu Do introduced improvements on the land, such as, bodega for copra, cylindrical tank for coconut oil and
automotive shop. Said occupation of the land was by virtue of a purported provisional permit alleged to
have been issued by the Bureau of Lands. However, such permit was found to be inexistent in the records,
hence, the improvements introduced by petitioner were held to have been made in bad faith.

The Director of Lands rendered a decision revoking the award in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
While the Minister of Natural Resources reversed the decision of the Director of Lands upholding the
award of the land in favor of Aznar, and ordered the Lu Do to remove the improvements on the land,
otherwise, the same would be forfeited in favor of the government.

The Court of Appeals favored Aznar and the Supreme Court denied the further petition of Lu Do. Said
decision of the Court became final and executory.

Lu Do subsequently filed a Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Decision but was also denied.

Lu Dos arguments were: that the improvements it introduced in the land increased to not less than
P9,335,400.00, and it would be unfair for the government to forfeit said improvements in its favor; that the
land in question should be rebidded in view of dissolution of respondent partnership by reason of the
death of two of its partners; and that the questioned land ceased to be a foreshore land having been
transformed into an area suitable for industrial/ commercial purposes, hence said land is no longer a
proper subject of a foreshore application.

ISSUE: WON

1. It would be unfair for the government to forfeit the improvements introduced by the petitioner.
2. The land in question should be rebidded in view of dissolution of respondent partnership by reason
of the death of two of its partners.
3. The questioned land ceased to be a foreshore land having been transformed into an area suitable
for industrial/ commercial purposes, hence no longer a proper subject of a foreshore application.

HELD:

1. Whether the petitioner does not have nor has a provisional permit to use and occupy the land,
forfeiture of the permanent improvements introduced thereon is still proper.

Section 38 of the Public Land Act provides:

Section 8. Leases shall run for a period of not more than twenty-five years, but may be renewed once for
another period of not to exceed twenty-five years, in case the lessee shall have made important
improvements which, in the discretion of the Secretary of [the Department of Environment and Natural
resources], justify a renewal. Upon final expiration of the lease, all buildings and other permanent
improvements made by the lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns shall become
the property of the Government, and the land together with the said improvements shall be disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter five of this Act.

In the instant case, the purported temporary or provisional permit of petitioner enabled it to use the
subject land for more than 40 years. It was able to occupy the land for a period equivalent to a full term of
a lease, and for almost the entire duration of the maximum period allowed for a renewal thereof.
Petitioner cannot therefore pretend that the Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources ordering it to
remove the improvements on the land is greatly disadvantageous to it. Petitioner is in fact placed in a
better position because it was allowed to remove its improvements, unlike legitimate awardees of the
 5

right to lease a public land whose improvements become government property at the expiration of the
lease.

2. In case of Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin.it was held that the death of the partners did
not automatically forfeit the rights they acquired over the land and that their heirs and the new
association established by them should be considered subrogated in the place of the original
partners.

Further, under section 105 of the Public Land Act, the heirs-at- law of a natural person, who dies before
the final grant, are subrogated to his rights and obligations, and entitled to have issued to them the
patent or final concession upon proof of compliance with the requirements of the law.

3. In the same vein, there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the questioned foreshore
lease should be revoked because the land is no longer a foreshore land having been converted
by it (petitioner) to a commercial/industrial land. Indeed, the Court of Appeals correctly held
that since the said land was a foreshore land at the time the application was filed, the right to
lease the same should still be awarded to respondent. To forfeit the right of respondent would
be the height of injustice as it would reward petitioner for successfully stalling the enforcement
of a final and executory decision.

G.R. No. L-3714 January 26, 1909

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL., respondents.

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant.

FACTS: Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece
of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery.

Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and an entity known as Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra
opposed the same contending that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States,
and that the latter was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said
fishery.

The Court of Land favored of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.

ISSUE: WON a land used as fishery is a public lands?

HELD:

In the Santiago case2 there was a fishery about two thousand yards from the sea, with which it
communicated by a river, and a portion of the inclosure was dedicated to growing the aquatic tree called
bacawan. The fishery had been constructed by man, upon land heretofore sown with this tree.
 6

In the Gutierrez case3 it was shown that the land was partly highland, growing fruit trees, and partly
lowland , converted by the occupant of the upland into a fishery by this labor.

In the Baello case,4 the river running to the sea was a hundred meters away, the salt water therefrom
reaching the lowland by means of an artificial canal cut by the owner of the land when he gave up
cultivating bacawan thereon, an made it into a fishery.

In the Montano case, although there was a considerable depth of water over the soil, yet before the
fishery was made, some thirty years before the trial, bacawan had been sown and propagated in the mud
by the owner who finally sold the entire cut when he built the dikes.

The custom had grown up of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became common
feature of settlements along the coast and at the time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the
most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and
prove a public disaster. In our opinion it was the object of Congress and in furtherance of the purposes of
the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land
Registration is affirmed, without costs.

In the case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government whereby under the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States the phrase "public lands" is held to be equivalent to "public domain," and does not by
any means include all lands of Government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open
to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws. Accordingly,
"government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items; the first includes not only the second,
but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private
right.

In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate
which is not part thereof.

G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 23, Trece Martires City, REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.

FACTS:

The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, purchased on installment from the government by
Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio,
and Julio Cenizal. Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. Said three
assignees purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands and consequently
were issued a certificate of title over the said land. Following several transfers, the the registered owners
of the land become Remedios Miclat and Juan C. Pulido, the respondents therein.
 7

The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the original sale thereof from the
government was tainted with fraud because based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. It claimed that
Gregorio Cenizal and Maria Cenizal cannot sign the joint affidavit on August 9,1971, since they were
already dead on February 25, 1943 and on January 8, 1959 respectively.

In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the joint affidavit and said they had all
acquired the property in good faith and for value.

The trial court granted the motion.

ISSUE: WON the title to the land can be reversed back to the Government?

HELD:

The Court observed that the joint affidavit is indeed a forgery, that the two affiants were already dead on
the date indicated, and that the three signatures affixed thereto were written by one and the same hand.

However, the Court provides that respondents are innocent transferees for value in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, and have the protection of the Torrens System and renders the titles obtained
by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No.
55044.

Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold
the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.

xxx xxx xxx

The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility

The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the juridical personality of her father
and so cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value because she is charged with knowledge of her
father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in fact or law. Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did
not merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without knowledge of
its original defect. The agreement to subdivide, 18 which she presented to show that she had acquired the
land for valuable confederation, is more acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also
consonant with the presumption of good faith.

The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the
government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the
Solicitor General contends as if it made any difference of the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased
to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the
date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered land,
it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration
Decree, which applies even to the government.
 8

Petition is denied.