Villavicencio vs. Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919
FACTS: In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute"
forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ
of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that
the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence.
This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the
city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of
October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter
were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed
as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved
to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that, it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional
courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present.
ISSUE: W/N the Judiciary shall permit a government of the men instead
of a government of laws.
HELD: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved
the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to
contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his
hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within
the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of
the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief
of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women
from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person
who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great
writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
FACTS: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that
created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial
of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering
Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law,
national and international.
ISSUE: Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
HELD:
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law
of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who
have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international
law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil. 113
FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the
Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After
the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge
Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the
Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued
in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs
proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and
proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws
of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless
suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected
even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it
would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the
phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he
intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of
courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even
after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have
been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would
be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided,
or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended
by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation
would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what
MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other
governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and
derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did
not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws
and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once
established continues until changed by some competent legislative
power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act
creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over
the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become
courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that
the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and
civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction
would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case
pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion
(govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the
majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted
as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs.
Duque
G.R. No. 173034, 9 October, 2007
FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed
impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned
RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not International Agreements entered into by the
Philippines are part of the law of the land, and may be implemented by
DOH through RIRR.
HELD: YES, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not
come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or
agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires
that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international
law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in
the Exercise of Police Power
FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country
to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then)
particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to
Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned
for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates
the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who
helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
Gonzales v. Hechanova
9 SCRA, 230
FACTS: Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of
rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from
the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to
be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing
the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals
or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice
and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private
parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542,
the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
ISSUE: 1) W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our
courts. 2) W/N RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements
entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: No.
1) The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming
that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements,
the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under
the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of
the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by
said laws.
2) Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise
of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also,
insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional setup.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of
a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,
when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
IN RE GARCIA
2 SCRA, 984
FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is
a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had
taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and
finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and
thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and
that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to
practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing
admission to the Philippine Bar?
HELD: The court resolved to deny the petition.
Ratio Decidendi: The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and
Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by
the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain
desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the
contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and
Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for there
as on that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of
the Philippines.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
G.R. No. 139465, 18 January, 2000
Summary: Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from
tax evasion to wiretapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez
was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-
US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as
the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him
copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is
not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such
copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of
Jimenez.
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation
of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel,
wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of
the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article
7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the
legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
Discussions: The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to
harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
HELD: No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties
of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration
when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
ALIH v. CASTRO
151 SCRA 279
FACTS: The respondents raided the compound occupied by the
petitioners in Zamboanga City in search of loose firearms, ammunitions
and other explosives. Petitioners pray to recover the articles seized from
them and respondents be enjoined from using the same against them
since they did not have a warrant to search the compound when they
seized said articles, thus constituting an illegal search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative
of the Bill of Rights and thus the evidence obtained therein inadmissible
in court.
HELD: The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time
in question did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of
the zona the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayors slaying
and had not been in fact investigated. Every person is entitled due
process. The respondents defied the precept that civilian authority is at
all times supreme over the military so clearly proclaimed in the
Constitution. The respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had
the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to
search the petitioners premises. It follows that as the search of the
petitioners premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and the ammunitions taken form the raided compound are inadmissible
as evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
People of the Philippines vs Tranquilino Lagman, 66 Phil. 13
FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being
compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense
Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he
has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to
kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army
to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military
or civil service.
Chavez v. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, 9 June 2004
FACTS: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief
Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines
banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco
Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request
was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
ISSUE: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to
property? Whether or not the banning of carrying firearms outside the
residence is a valid exercise of police power?
HELD: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated
fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute
right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of
this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive
the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of
firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside
of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of
their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed.
Aglipay v. Ruiz,
GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
FACTS: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed
a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post,
enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the
Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling,
as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates
religious purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative
stamps is constitutional?
HELD: YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or
church, but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist and the government just took advantage of an event
considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the
Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need
to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers'
request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating
the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent
Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this
petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject
EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion
was accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law
and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to
issue halal certificates.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State.
HELD: No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that
freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the
fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products
as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has
in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an
and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to
issue halal certificates.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society
with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the
case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious
right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health
of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for
in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do
not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
Bayan v Zamora
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT
v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS: The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense
and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond
to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect,
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under the provision cited, the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must
be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
ISSUE: 1. Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? 2.
Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of
the Constitution? 3. Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make
the VFA effective?
HELD: 1. NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party
bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not
only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury
as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are
involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners
that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners,
as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess
the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of
any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong,
they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also
stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to
bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of
Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present
action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA
involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of
the Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and
binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular
designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special
provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision,
the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render
compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the
agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for
that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the
other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US
and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and
supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals
with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should
apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to
mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent
placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The
Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. maneuvers or exercised of Filipino and Americal which was pursuant to
We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops
or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish.
We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and
facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is
not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases
being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects, such that three different situations are
contemplated a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a)
foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities any of the
three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article
XVIII.
3. YES, Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were
at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the
US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words
used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador
Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA,
and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and
unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said
treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to
be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide
in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent
on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda),
to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section
2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations.
Lim v Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 138570, 10 October, 2000
FACTS: In the beginning of 2002, the personnel of Armed Forces of the
United States started to arrive in the Philippines which will participate in
the Balikatan 02-1 pursuant to the VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement)
signed in 1999. The Balikatan 02-1 is a simulation of joint military
MDT (Mutual Defense Treaty) a bilateral agreement entered into by the
Philippine Government and US Government in 1951. The entry of the
American troops in the Philippines is partly rooted from the campaign of
US President George W. Bush against international terrorism as a result
of terrorist attacks in US which was the cause of numerous loss of lives.
The petitioners, Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando, as citizens,
lawyers, and taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and
attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan 02-1 or the joint exercise.
Subsequently, they were joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng
Manggagawa by filing a petition-in-intervention, they claimed that some
of their members were situated in the places were the exercise are being
conducted.
However, the Solicitor Genral claimed that they do not have locus standi,
does not involve tax spending, and there is no proof of direct or personal
injury.
ISSUE: W/N the Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA. W/N the VFA is
constitutional.
HELD: The VFA permits the US personnel too engage, on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was
undefined. The permit under VFA grants US personnel a wide scope of
undertaking subject only to approval of the Philippine Government. In
general, US personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent with
the agreement, and in particular, from any political activities. All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.
In aid of the case at bar, the Vienna Convention of the law of treaties
Article 31 and 32 which contains the provisions governing the
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the intentions of the parties.
The word activities in the view of the ocurt it was deliberately made that
way to give both parties a leeway for negotiations. In this manner, the
US forces may sojourn in the territory of the Philippines for purposes
other than military. Under the auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the
current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that Balikatan
02-1, a mutual anti-terrorism, advising, assisting and training exercise
falls under the context of the agreement.
From the facts obtaining, the court find that the balikatan 02-1 joint
military exercises has notintruded into that penumbra of error that would
otherwise call for correction on the part of the court. The respondents
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition and petition-in-intervention are
hereby dismiised without prejudice to the filing of new petition sufficient
in form and substance in the proper regional trial court.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in
the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548
constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2)
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people?
HELD: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aim of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good
to the greatest number.
Ratio:
(1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy.
(2) The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness of all.
Estrella Ondoy vs Virgilio Ignacio
97 SCRA 611
Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines: The State shall
promote social justice in all phases of national development.
FACTS: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the
employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to thechief engineer and oiler, Jose
Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited
byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found
dead. Therefore, Estrella wasasking for compensation from the death of
her son while in the respondent s employ. However, thestatement
given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer
and thereforedismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion
for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretary of
Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy
is constitutional; is social justice applicable in this case?
HELD: Yes. Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the
Department of Labor. It merely disregarded the statements made by the
chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied
in this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized
the right of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while in the actual performance of his work.
To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection
to labor, The Court quoted another case as between a laborer, usually
poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure
able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the
stricter compliance.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected
by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing
an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children
to public school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty
interest in a parents or guardians right to decide the mode in which their
children are educated. States may not usurp this right when the
questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state
interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to
establish and maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military
Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary
restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians
to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The
appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with
protected liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any
purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act
would be destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power
to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and
duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to ensure that children receive
a proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and
guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their
children are educated.
SALONGA VS FARRALES
105 SCRA 359, 369 (1981)
FACTS: The defendant Julia B. Farrales is the titled owner of a
residential lot in Sta. Rita Olongapo City. Within the owned parcel of land
by the defendant, the plaintiff, spouses Salonga are the lessees of the
156 sq. meters of land where the latter erected a house and is paying
rentals to the defendant.
Sometimes before 1968, the plaintiff failed to pay rental and that as a
result, the defendant filed an ejectment case for non-payment of rentals
against the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant forced the plaintiff. The plaintiff
then offered that they will just buy their occupied parcel of land instead
of vacating the land and the house of strong materials, however, despite
of the insistence of the plaintiff, the titled owner defendant refused to
accept the offer, thus there is no contract of sale or sell in the aforesaid
land was realized.
The plaintiff then, after a strict refusal from the defendant-owner to sell
her land, filed for petition for relief. The case was heard and elevated
until the CA, praying for ordering to the defendant to sell her parcel of
land where the house of the plaintiff was erected and that the plaintiff
invokes their right to be subjected under Section 6, (9) Article II of the
new constitution, referring to the application of social justice which they
contended that it delimits and regulated property rights and private
gains.
ISSUE: Was the contention of the plaintiff correct such that by invoking
for the promotion of social justice, provided in article 6 (9) Article II of the
constitution, they could gain their contention for relief and force the
defendant to sell her land?
HELD: No, the contention of social justice cannot be invoked by the
plaintiff just gain relief and force the defendant to sell her land where the
plaintiff's house was erected.
Social Justice is said to be for promotion of economic development and
proper equilibrium between the relationship of all units of the society.
However Social Justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners who under the constitution and
laws are also entitled for protection. Social justice is not intended to take
away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled
thereto.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff cannot force the defendant to sell her title
by invoking equity and
justice rather, the plaintiff 's may remove the improvements should the
lessor refuse to reimburse, by the lessee do not have the right to buy the
land. The right of property of the defendant over her owned land cannot
be simply override by invoking social justice, since the right of property
is also protected by the state. Thus, judgment affirmed in favor of the
defendant.
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the
vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning
CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on
September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case
were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners'
motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining
order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the
authority and power of the CRH?
HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent
of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides
the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil
and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an
adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional
provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction, for
it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not
being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge
in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or
of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited
from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
Meyer v. Nebraska
263 U.S. 393
Brief Fact Summary: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child
German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign
languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the
legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.
FACTS: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a
Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to
students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
ISSUE: Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably
infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on
the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any
end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the
freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the
statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of
all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the
Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is
a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere
knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as
harmful.
DISCUSSION: Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states
when the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a
purpose which the state may permissively regulate.
Cabanas v Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843, 25 July 1974
FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his
insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated
that if upon his death, the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his
benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child
was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then
took charge of Florentinos insurance proceeds for the benefit of the
child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and
for her to be declared as the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and
obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens
patriae to the terms of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family
as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as
in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then
the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case
according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not
be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative
of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more
care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens
patriae here is in consonance with this countrys tradition of favoring
conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is
observed.
People v Ritter
2194 SCRA 690
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez
and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated
Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to
the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and
Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her
vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has
already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara
saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City General Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to
remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it
was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having
peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with
homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12
years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario
prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received
300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified
that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was
different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to
Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She
also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago.
Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages
he must award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that
the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
Department of Education vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth The
issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has
thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to
take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- A
student shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for
the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional
grounds.
FACTS: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the
NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it
again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid
rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to
the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled
on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended
petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and
equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on
academic freedom, due process and equal protection.
HELD: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those
who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
Ratio:
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have
a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in
which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness
its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no
less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the
NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation.
The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the
former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full
harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents
toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of
square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took
decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because
we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
Oposa vs Factoran
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS: A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa,
et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary
of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in
the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises. They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the
act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class
suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319
August 5, 1996
FACTS: The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the
Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995
assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various
procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a
new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said
orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing
contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their
licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal
and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property.
FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary
International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the
civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying
petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision
but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequence, ARB
requirement was issued. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid
exercise of Police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police
Power.
HELD: Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant
to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state
particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of a
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so
as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range
of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one
may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much
wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of
the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid
written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their
trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted
deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So, long as
professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards
no such deprivation exists.
PASE V. DRILLON
163 SCRA 386
FACTS: DOLE enacted Department Order No 1, outlining guidelines of
temporary suspension deployment of female domestic workers.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, engaged in the recruitment
of overseas workers assailed the validity of the said order. They contend
that this is discriminatory against female domestic workers and does not
apply to all Filipino workers but to domestic helpers only.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO No 1 violates equal protection on the ground
of sexual discrimination?
HELD: Petition dismissed. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight
that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic
servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few
cases, physical and personal abuse. The same cannot be said of our
male workers. It is the avowed objective of DO No 1 to enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers this Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers
have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare. The Court finds the impugned guidelines to be applicable
to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to all
Filipina workers is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban
been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable
and arbitrary. Not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the
Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of
persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or
group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons.
Bernardo vs NLRC
GR 122917 07/03/99
FACTS: Petitioners numbering 43 are deafmutes who were hired on
various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers.
Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees,
because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that
their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280
and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were
hired only as special workers and should not in any way be considered
as part of the regular complement of the Bank.[12] Rather, they were
special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
HELD: The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated
that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the
employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish
the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may
terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause.
Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall
automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact,
two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the
contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank.
More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not
render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a
qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and
conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5
of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled person
shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable employment. A
qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and
conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able
bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily
removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since
the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied
persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, x x x
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by
the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.
Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year,
even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity
to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only
with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56
handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact,
two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the
contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank.
More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not
render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the exception of
sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six
months.
Petition granted
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
FACTS: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with
other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGOs to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our
National Economy and against to the Filipino First policy. The WTO
opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service
sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected
in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free
market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our
constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare
if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal
Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy
in the international community. The WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise
the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states
have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the
WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
members vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor
countries can protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful
blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the
Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying
the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With
regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation
and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
HELD: While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases
of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
was concurring in.
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs Philippine
Coconut Authority
286 SCRA 109 Political Law Free Enterprise
FACTS: The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by
Presidential Decree No. 232 as an independent public corporation to
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut
and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut
farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such
development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut
plant operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution
No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut
processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise
unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic
red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators
specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline
of coconut-based commodities. The Association of Philippine Coconut
Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA
to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have
repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary
to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call
for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general
public. This is so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear
that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest
so requires.
LIMBONAS vs. MANGELIN
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of
the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the
case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because
its resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category
[CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the
organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits
of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And
if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion
is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess,"
it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be
called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold
the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
LINA V. PAO
G.R. No. 129093, 30 August, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by
PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayors
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna. It was denied on
the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the
province, including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his
application, private respondent filedan action for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoining
petitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid
HELD: No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part
of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a
valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province
of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local governments
objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local
governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of
the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary
views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal
governments are merely agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been
conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being
the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The question
of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine,
taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has
allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in
Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority
by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 3 December, 2002
Corona, J.
FACTS: Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the
Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC
Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said
circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be
reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going
beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
HELD: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the
power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely
alter-egos of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of
control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended
or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
PAMATONG V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, 13 April, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others
as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e.,
he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he
has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced
law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of
an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult
to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however,
the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long
as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations
or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and
the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide
intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources
in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute
a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice
on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is
both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not
before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the
reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an
international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of
Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1)
natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to
read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election;
and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
MAQUERA V. BORRA
G.R. No. L-24761, 7 September, 1965
Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS: The main subject of this case is Republic Act 4421, effective
June 19, 1965, incorporated to the Revised Election Code, which states
that:
SEC. 36-A. Posting of bond by candidates; exception; forfeiture. All
candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices shall post
a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the
position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor
of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least ten per
cent of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of
candidacy there being not more than four candidates for the same office.
Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial,
city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-
year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate,
which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or
municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when
declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the
office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not
more than four (4) candidates for the same office;"
In compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the Commission on
Elections had decided to require all candidates for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives to file
a surety bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable to
the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and P40,000.00, for
President and Vice-President, respectively, and P32,000.00 for Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives;
In consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the aforementioned
action of the Commission on Elections, every candidate has to pay the
premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either his
own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond, or
properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons willing to
accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said bonding
companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act no. 4421 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, to prevent or
disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although
having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, cannot file the
surety bond, owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding
company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-bond;
Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of disqualifying for
provincial, city or municipal elective offices, persons who, although
possessing the qualifications prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said
premium and/or do not have the property essential for the
aforementioned counter-bond.
It has the effect of imposing property qualifications in order that a person
could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for
him.
Said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence
of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle
of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and
that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office
Lastly, the Court said that bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and
the confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of
defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in
connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an extended
decision, to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional
and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as
well as their representatives and agents, from enforcing and/or
implementing said constitutional enactment.
Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters
of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus
instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed
as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed
the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to
validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD: The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such
as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern
or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of
access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional
right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right,
every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject
to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is
the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even
as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case
while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent
has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit
the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of
public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Mandamus, therefore lies
VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
FACTS: Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of
the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to
allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying
that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE: WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to
inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First
Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD: Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of
policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may
not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering
the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest
they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited
right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being
subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose
is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court,
are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-
owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit
of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy
of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded
the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.
GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
G.R. No. 92024 November 9 1990
FACTS: The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese
private corporation, applied for registration with the Board of
Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of
Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the
change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District
of Bataan requested a copy of BPCs original and amended application
documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors
in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments
Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to
disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended application
without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended
application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in
yielding to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
HELD: The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcias Constitutional right
to have access to information on matters of public concern under Article
III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of
Bataan had an interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant
in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only
their economic life, but even the air they breathe The Court also ruled
that BPCs amended application was in fact a second application that
required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all
applications and their supporting documents filed under this code shall
be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant, the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides
for disclosure on the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. The
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application,
amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI
under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information,
the Constitution does not open every door to any and all information
because the law may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny. Thus, it excluded the trade secrets and confidential,
commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security from its order. The Court did not provide a
test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to
access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that
BPC could withhold under its ruling.
AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO
G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991
FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote
its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's
records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual
board members after a review of the movies and television productions.
It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a
film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the
nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the
individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned
and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the
member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting
of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner.
In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare
their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered
the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine
the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989,
that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing
committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE: WON the respondent has violated the citizen's right of access to
official records as guaranteed by the self-executory provision under the
constitution?
HELD: Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by
respondents, we now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner.
In this regard, we find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the
review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members,
as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records.
More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
"The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law." (emphasis supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530
[1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley,
A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right there in recognized may be asserted by
the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an
individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means
"pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community
at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of
respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in
an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be
gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in
character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There
can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to
be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing
official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public
official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny
for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to
their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in
nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records
access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.
lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public.
The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. Court can resolve this case without determining
any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court.
Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the
public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is purely legal or constitutional question. The right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations before
a final agreement as required by the constitution. The Supreme Court
granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended
JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89

and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null
and void.

Chavez v Public Estate Authority

GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

FACTS: On November 20, 1973, the government through the

Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On April 25,
1995, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into
through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate
Committees. On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant
petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands
to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to
AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art
XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin
the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.

Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the
petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
These duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands
of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court
considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance
of the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate
and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of
paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well-being of the people. The amended JVA does
not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to
insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content
of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed