LIST OF CASES UNDER PRESCRIPTION

1. FELICIANO VS. CANOZA, G.R. 161746, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010

2. CABACUNGAN VS. LAIGO, G.R. 175073, AUGUST 15, 2011
3. YARED V. TIONGCO, G.R. 161360, 19 OCTOBER 2011
4. SOLEDAD CALICDAN, ETC. VS. SILVERIO CENDANA, ETC.G.R.155080,
FEBRUARY 5, 2004
5. CRISOSTOMO VS. GARCIA, G.R. NO. 164787
6. HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. HON. RAMAS, G.R. NO. 157852: DECEMBER 15, 2010
7. AZNAR BROTHERS VS. HEIRS OF ANICETO AUGUSTO
8. INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORPORATION, VS. VIDAL
GREGORIO AND JULITA GREGORIO,
9. ROMEO D. MARIANO VS PETRON CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 169438 JANUARY
21, 2010
10. CONSUELO N. VDA. DE GUALBERTO VS. FRANCISCO H. GO, G.R. NO. 139843.
JULY 21, 2005
11. CABACUNGAN VS. LAIGO, G.R. NO. 175073, AUGUST 15, 2011
12. JEAN TAN ET., AL. VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 193443, APRIL 16, 2012
13. GALVEZ VS CA G.R. NO. 157954 MARCH 24, 2006
14. SPS. AGUIRRE V. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 169898,
OCTOBER 27, 2006
15. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY VS. FERNANDEZ, 358 SCRA 489
16. BENITO VS. SAQUITAN-RUIZ, G.R. NO. 149906. DECEMBER 26, 2002
17. CUTANDA V. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA, G.R. NO. 109215. JULY 11, 2000
18. SMPSM V. BCDA, G.R. NO. 142255, JANUARY 26, 2007
19. HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA V. DOMINADOR MAGDUA, G.R. NO. 176858;
SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
20. RAMON B. BRITO, SR VS.SEVERINO D. DIANALA, G.R. NO. 171717,
DECEMBER 15, 2010

Submitted by:
Christian T. Sombrano
HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. HON. RAMAS
G.R. NO. 157852: DECEMBER 15, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Valientes who, before his death, was the owner
of a parcel of land in Zamboanga delSur. In 1939, Valientes mortgaged the subject property to
secure his loan to the spouses Belen. In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly attempted,
but failed, to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen. Through an allegedly forged
document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject
property between Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained title over the land. On
February 28, 1970, the legitimate children of the late Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse
Claim. Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs executed an extra-judicial
settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondent Minor, the present possessor of
the subject property. On June 20, 1979, Minor filed with the then CFI a "PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN THE TITLE
IN HER POSSESSION" which the RTC granted. On the other hand, petitioners filed a complaint
for the cancellation of the title in Minors possession and its reconveyanceto them. On this
complaint, Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and
litispendentia, which the RTC dismissed. Undeterred, Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was granted. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on this decision which
was denied. They appealed it to the CA, which although found that there was no forum shopping
nor litispendentia, dismissed the case on the ground of prescription and laches.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of the case at
hand.

HELD: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED

CIVIL CODE; PRESCRIPTION
When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that
of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar, petitioners are not in
possession of the subject property. In this case, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an
implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT to
spouses Belen.But, the case was instituted beyond the prescriptive period.
As to the alternative defense of petitioners, applying Arts. 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the
Civil Code, thus entitling them to a 30 year period to assail the title, the Court ruled that the
applicable law in this instant case is Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree (since it is more specific that the general rules of the above
mentioned articles of the Civil Code). Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529,
the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an
action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.
It took petitioners 28 before filing this case. This period is unreasonably long for a party
seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners claim that they had not
slept on their rights is patently unconvincing.
The Decision of the CA and the Resolution are AFFIRMED.
CRISOSTOMO VS. GARCIA,
G.R. NO. 164787

FACTS:
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that on 24 September 1986, Victoria Garcia Vda.
de Crisostomo, mother of petitioner Jose G. Crisostomo, sold to him, by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a parcel of land, including the improvements and rights thereon. In the Deed of
Sale, petitioner Jose Crisostomo and his sister Cristina Crisostomo signed as witnesses in the
execution of the instrument. Since they were distant relatives, respondent allowed Victoria and
her children, petitioner Jose and Cristina, to stay in the subject property as lessees under a
Contract of Lease. By virtue of the said deed of sale, respondent effected the transfer of the tax
declaration covering the property, under his name from the City Assessors Office
of Caloocan City. However, before the transfer of title to respondent could be completed,
petitioners-spouses Jose and Marlene Crisostomo were able to secure a loan from the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation using the subject property as security through bad faith
and machinations. Worse, petitioners were able to transfer the subject property under their names
without the knowledge and consent of the respondent.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Action, alleging that since respondents
cause of action is based on an alleged deed of sale executed on 24 September 1986, the cause of
action of the respondent to enforce and to implement the instrument arose on 24 September 1986
and pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the action must be brought within 10 years from
the time the right of action accrues. Thus, from 24 September 1986, respondent had only up to 24
September 1996 within which to file the action. Since the complaint was filed only on 20 June
2002, or after the lapse of more than 16 years, the cause of action is clearly barred by
prescription.
Respondent countered that Article 1144 of the Civil Code does not apply to the case
because the complaint is for cancellation of title registered in the names of the petitioners and
for reconveyance. Respondent further points out that he did not file an action for specific
performance based on the deed of sale. The complaint, he said, is for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust which expires in 10 years counted from the date the adverse title to
the property is asserted by the possessor.

ISSUE:
Has the cause of action for the respondent prescribed?

HELD:
Petitioners allegation that an action for the reconveyance of real property on the ground
of fraud must be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud is without basis. The
four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the petitioners apply only if the complaint seeks to
annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, respondents
action which is for Reconveyance and Cancellation of Title is based on an implied trust under
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code since he averred in his complaint that through fraud petitioners were
able to obtain a Certificate of Title over the property. He does not seek the annulment of
a voidable contract whereby Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code would find application
such that the cause of action would prescribe in four years.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a
constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Constructive trusts are created by
the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. When property is registered in anothers name, an implied or constructive
trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the
rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. An action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
SOLEDAD CALICDAN, ETC. VS. SILVERIO CENDANA, ETC.
G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004

FACTS:
On August 25, 1947, Fermina, widow of SixtoCalicdan, who died intestate, executed a deed of
donation intervivos whereby she conveyed a 750-square meter of unregistered land located in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan formerly owned by Sixto to respondent SilverioCendana who
immediately entered into possession of the land. Sometime in 1949, Cendana constructed a two-
storey residential house thereon where he resided until his death in 1998.
On June 19, 1992, petitioner Soledad, daughter of Fermina, through her legal guardian,
Guadalupe Castillo, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages
against the respondent alleging that; 1) the donation was void; 2) the respondent took advantage
of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and 3) she merely tolerated respondents possession
of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.
In his answer with Motion to dismiss, respondent contended that; 1)the land was donated to him
by Fermina in 1947; 2) he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously and adversely in
possession of the land for a period of 45 years; and 3) the complaint was barred by prior
judgment in the special proceedings.
In its decision dated November 12, 1996, the trial court ordered SilverioCendana to vacate the
land and surrender ownersip and possession of the same to petitioner. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and declared that the donation was valid and that the
petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed on August 25, 1947 was void.

HELD:
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownersip and other real right over immovable
property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and uner conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. The good failth of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
In this case at bar, as it demands that the possession be in good faith and with just title and there
is no evidence on record to prove respondents good faith, nevertheless, his adverse possession
of the land for more than 45 years aptly shows he has met the requirements for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in.
YARED v. TIONGCO
G.R. No. 161360, 19 October 2011

FACTS
The present dispute involves three parcels of land all located in Iloilo City. The lots were
registered in the names of Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, and in the name of Heirs of Maria
Luis de Tiongco.

While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their
children and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and Carmelo
Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco.

Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house on one lot and sustained herself by
collecting rentals from the tenants of the other lots. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of
Jose, filed an adverse claim affecting all the rights, interest and participation of her deceased
father on the disputed lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on the certificate of title
covering two lots.

In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants. In
December 1983, respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary
injunction against several tenants wherein he obtained a judgment in his favor. Respondent Jose
also filed a case for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner as she was staying on the
first lot. While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor, the CA
reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. As such, respondent Jose never took
possession of the properties. However, Jose averred that he has been paying real property taxes
on the said properties for more than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals only
because he allowed her.
In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she
discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of Adjudication dated April
17, 1974, declaring that he is the only surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating
unto himself all three lots. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued transfer
certificate of titles all in the name of respondent Jose.
Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on May 10, 1974,
the same day when the TCTs were issued, respondent Jose sold the said lots to Catalino Torre.
Certificates of title were also issued in the name of Catalino Torre. The former then sold the
properties to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to Jose.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the properties.

RULING
Yes.
The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed
be barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
 However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance when prescription
cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the
land to be reconveyed. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could
not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.
Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land
because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned
before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for
reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in
effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.

In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a
case for recovery of possession. The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor but
the CA on November 28, 1991, during the pendency of the present controversy with the court a
quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost possession of the said properties, and as
such, she is in a position to file the complaint with the court a quo to protect her rights and clear
whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Joses name.
CABACUNGAN VS. LAIGO
G.R. NO. 175073, AUGUST 15, 2011

FACTS:
Margarita Cabacungan owned three parcels of unregistered land in La Union which are
covered by tax declaration all in her name. Sometime in 1968, Margaritas son, Roberto Laigo,
Jr. applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United States, and to support his application, he
allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name. For said
purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to Roberto.
Roberto adopted respondents Pedro Laigo and MarilouLaigo. In July 1990, Roberto sold
the aforementioned three parcel of land. One parcel of land was sold to spouses Mario and Julia
Campos and the rest were sold to Pedro Laigo and MarilouLaigo. These sales were not known to
Margarita and her other children.
During Robertos wake, Margarita came to know of the sales as told by Pedro himself.
Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted a complaint for the annulment of said
sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties as well as for the
cancellation of Ricardos tax declarations.
Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith. Further, they noted that Margaritas claim was already barred by prescription and laches
owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties.
Marilou and Pedro contends to be buyers in good faith and for value. They also believed
that Margaritas cause of action had already been barred by laches, and that even assuming the
contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by prescription as the same had accrued
way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an implied
trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten
(10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an implied
trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.
Margarita and the Spouses Campos amicably entered into a settlement whereby they
waived their respective claims against each other. Margarita died two days later and was
substituted by her estate.
On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
compromise agreement and dismissing the complaint against the Spouses Campos. Trial on the
merits ensued with respect to Pedro and Marilou.
Trial court barred recovery from respondents who were found to have acquired the
properties supposedly in good faith and for value. It also pointed out that recovery could no
longer be pursued in this case because Margarita had likewise exhausted the ten-year prescriptive
period for reconveyance based on an implied trust which had commenced to run in 1968 upon
the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe.

HELD:
The Court disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that there was no evidence on
record showing that an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto. It finds that
petitioner had offered evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the
legal title to the properties in question, with expectation that Roberto would return the same to
her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into.
It explained that trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of
certain powers by the latter. Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an intention
to create a trust. Implied trusts arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the
parties or on equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the parties.
Constructive trusts, on the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not
by agreement or intention. They arise not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly,
evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands
of justice. Constructive trusts are illustrated in Articles 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456
Roberto is merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management,
control or disposition of the property except to make a conveyance when called upon by the
cestui que trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of
the trust property and a breach of the trust.
The Court finds that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the
instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds
the land and operates constructive notice to the world.
The Court granted the petition, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It also directed the cancellation of the tax
declarations covering the subject properties in the name of Roberto D. Laigo and his transferees,
nullified the deeds of sale executed by Roberto D. Laigo in favor of respondents Pedro Roy
Laigo and MarilouLaigo and directed said respondents to execute reconveyance in favor of
petitioner.
FELICIANO VS. CANOZA
G.R. NO. 161746, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010

FACTS:
The deceased Antonio Feliciano left behind a parcel of land as his only property. On
March 28, 1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina Feliciano declared themselves to be the only
surviving heirs of Antonio, with the exception of Salina. They executed an extrajudicial
settlement of Antonios estate and appropriated among themselves the said parcel of land, to the
exclusion of the heirs of Esteban and Doroteo, deceased children of Antonio. Said property was
then sold the property to Felisa Feliciano and Pedro Canoza, who each secured their respective
patents corresponding to the portion of the land they purchased. On October 18, 1993, the heirs
of the Esteban and Doroteo filed a complaint against Salina and Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza
and the heirs of the late Jacinto Feliciano for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title,
Recovery of Real Property and Damages. They alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale
were done without their participation and consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise,
they averred that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected on the subject property and that
they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza and Jacinto falsely declared that the property
was not occupied, so their titles to the property should be declared null and void on the ground
that they have made false statements in their respective applications for free patent. Before an
answer could be filed, they amended their complaint to include the allegation that they sought to
recover the shares of their fathers, Esteban and Doroteo, which they could have acquired as heirs
of Antonio. In their Answer, Canoza and his spouse alleged that they were buyers in good faith
and for value, and that assuming that there was preterition of legal heirs, they never took part in
it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was preterition of legal heirs

HELD:
YES. The heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition
executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. The said deed was
fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the
estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it
aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted which must be brought within 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud. However, in this case, said action has prescribed since the complaint was
filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost 16 years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued a free
patent and 14 years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued an original certificate of title. As
petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of
the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within the allowable
period. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for
reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners cause of action accrued.
Petition for review on certiorari was denied.
AZNAR BROTHERS VS. HEIRS OF ANICETO AUGUSTO
G.R. NO. 140417. MAY 28, 2004

Facts:
The subject matter of this controversy is Lot No. 4397 owned by Aniceto Augusto who
was married to PetronaCalipan. When Aniceto died on December3, 1934, he left behind ve
children: Geronimo, Zacarias, Teoderica, Arsenia and Irenea. Apparently, the property remained
undivided as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 026794 issued to PetronaCalipan in 1945. Tax
Declaration No. 02679 in the name of Calipan was cancelled pursuant to an
"ExtrajudicialPartition"5 executed before Notary Public Vicente Fanilag. In lieu thereof, tax
declaration certicates covering Lot No. 4397 were issued to the following: Filomeno Augusto,
CiriacoIcoy, Felipe Aying, Zacarias Augusto, Abdon Augusto, Teoderica Augusto, Pedro
Tampus and Anacleto Augusto. These persons sold the property to petitioner Aznar Brothers
Realty Company (Aznar Realty) through a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land. Respondent Heirs
led Civil Case No. 2666-L against petitioner Aznar Realty, and Carlos and Filomeno Augusto
in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27, for (1) recovery of Lot No. 4397; (2) the declaration
of the Deed of Sale dated February 13, 1962 as null and void; (3) the recognition of the Heirs; (4)
the cancellation of the TCT issued to petitioner Aznar Realty and (5) the issuance of a restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Aznar Realty led an answer interposing the defense
of lack of cause of action and prescription. It asked for a preliminary hearing on the armative
defenses as if a motion to dismiss had been led. This was granted by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the action was barred by prescription?

HELD:
Pet. is without merit, claim is imprescriptible. Respondents anchored their action for
reconveyance in the trial court on the nullity of the Deed of Sale between petitioner Aznar and
the supposed owners of the property. Respondents impugned the validity of the document
because the sellers were not the true owners of the land. Respondents sought the declaration of
nullity (inexistence) of the Deed of Sale because of the absence of their consent as the true and
lawful owners of the land. They argued that the sale to petitioner Aznar was void since the
purported "owners" who signed the Deed of Sale as vendors were not even heirs of Aniceto
Augusto and PetronaCalipan. They pointed out that the 1945 Tax Declaration in the name of
PetronaCalipan indicated that the property was undivided as of the time Aniceto Augusto died in
1932. The "owners" who sold the land to petitioner Aznar Realty could not have been the true
owners of the land since there was no showing how they acquired the land in the rst place.
Thus, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint without looking into the validity of
the sale of land to petitioner Aznar Realty. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on
the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of
action would be unavailing. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe. Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a
doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity,
which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," should be applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetasnunguamcontravenit legis.
The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions
for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity. Respondents were evicted from their land in November 1991
and they led their complaint with the trial court on July 28, 1992. Only eight months had passed
from the time they were ejected to the time they asserted their rights over their property. They
certainly could not be deemed to have slept on their rights. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err
in setting aside the decision of the trial court and ordering that the case be remanded for trial.
INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORPORATION, VS. GREGORIO,
G.R. No. 174104, February 14, 2011

FACTS:
The Spouses Gregorio, herein respondents, obtained three loans from the Insurance of the
Philippine Islands Corporation, petitioner (formerly known as Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc.), with
the interest at rate of 12% per annum each.
By way of security for said loan, respondents executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
petitioner over the parcels of land, each covered by a Tax Declaration.
Thereafter, respondents failed to pay their loans, as a result of which the [mortgaged]
properties were EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSED.
The extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted and the petitioner was the highest
bidder. Since respondent failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership
over the properties and the corresponding Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages because they discovered that the said lots were
already registered in the names of third persons and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were
issued to them.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing
thecomplaint of petitioner. It ruled that petitioners action for damages is barred by prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action for damages is barred by prescription.

HELD:
NO. The petitioners action for damages is not barred by prescription and laches.
Under the provisions of Article 1146 of the Civil Code, actions upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within FOUR YEARS from the time the cause
of action accrued.
As such, the Court agrees with petitioner that the reckoning period for prescription of
petitioners action should be from the time of actual discovery of the fraud in 1995.
Hence, petitioners suit for damages, filed on February 20, 1996, is well within the four-
year prescriptive period.
ROMEO D. MARIANO VS PETRON CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 169438, JANUARY 21, 2010

FACTS:
On 5 November 1968, Pacita V. Aure, NicomedesAureBundac, and ZenyAbundo (Aure
Group), owners of a 2,064 square meter parcel of land in Tagaytay City (Property), leased the
Property to ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (ESSO Eastern), a foreign corporation doing business
in the country through its subsidiary ESSO Standard Philippines, Inc. (ESSO Philippines). The
lease period is 90 years and the rent is payable monthly for the first 10 years, and annually for
the remaining period. The lease contract (Contract) contained an assignment veto clause barring
the parties from assigning the lease without prior consent of the other. Excluded from the
prohibition were certain corporations to whom ESSO Eastern may unilaterally assign its
leasehold right.
On 17 December 1998, petitioner sent to Petron a notice to vacate the Property. Petitioner
informed Petron that Presidential Decree No. 471 (PD 471), dated 24 May 1974, reduced the
Contracts duration from 90 to 25 years, ending on 13 November 1993.[12] Despite receiving the
notice to vacate on 21 December 1998, Petron remained on the Property.
On 18 March 1999, petitioner sued Petron in the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch 18, (trial court) to rescind the Contract and recover possession of the Property. Aside
from invoking PD 471, petitioner alternatively theorized that the Contract was terminated on 23
December 1977 when ESSO Eastern sold ESSO Philippines to PNOC, thus assigning to PNOC
its lease on the Property, without seeking the Aure Groups prior consent.
In its Answer, Petron countered that the Contract was not breached because PNOC
merely acquired ESSO Easterns shares in ESSO Philippines, a separate corporate entity.
Alternatively, Petron argued that petitioners suit, filed on 18 March 1999, was barred by
prescription under Article 1389 and Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code as petitioner should have
sought rescission within four years from PNOCs purchase of ESSO Philippines on 23 December
1977 or before 23 December 1981.
To dispense with the presentation of evidence, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for
Judgment (Joint Motion) containing the following stipulation:
5. On December 23, 1977, the Philippine National Oil Co. (PNOC), a corporation wholly owned
by the Philippine Government, acquired ownership of ESSO Standard Philippines, Inc.,
including its leasehold right over the land in question, through the acquisition of its shares of
stocks. (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE:
WON Petitioners Suit Barred by Prescription?

Held:
Petitioners waiver of Petrons contractual breach was compounded by his long inaction
to seek judicial redress. Petitioner filed his complaint nearly 22 years after PNOC acquired the
leasehold rights to the Property and almost six years after petitioner bought the Property from the
Aure Group. The more than two decades lapse puts this case well within the territory of the 10
year prescriptive bar to suits based upon a written contract under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil
Code.
CONSUELO N. VDA. DE GUALBERTO vs. FRANCISCO H. GO,
G.R. No. 139843. July 21, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late GenerosoGualberto, former registered owner of a
parcel of land situated at Redor Street, Barangay Redor, Siniloan, Laguna under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9203, containing an area of 169.59 square meters, more or less,
and declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4869.
Sometime in 1965, the subject parcel of land was sold by GenerosoGualberto and his wife,
herein petitioner Consuelo, to respondents father Go S. Kiang for P9,000.00, as evidenced by a
deed entitled Kasulatan dated January 15, 1965 which deed appears to have been duly notarized
by then Municipal Judge Pascual L. Serrano of the Municipal Court of Siniloan,
On April 1, 1973, petitioner Consuelo executed an Affidavit attesting to the fact that the
aforementioned parcel of land had truly been sold by her and her husband Generoso to the
spouses Go S. Kiang and Rosa Javier Go, as borne by the said Kasulatan. Evidently, the affidavit
was executed for purposes of securing a new tax declaration in the name of the spouses Go.
In December, 1973, in a case for Unlawful Detainer filed by a certain Demetria Garcia against
herein petitioners, the latter alleged that therein plaintiff Garcia is not a real party in interest and
therefore has no legal capacity and cause of action to sue the defendants; that the real parties in
interest of the parcel of commercial land and the residential apartment in question are
GenerosoGualberto and Go S. Kiang respectively as shown by TCT No. 9203 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Laguna.
In a Forcible Entry case filed by respondents against petitioners before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Siniloan-Famy, Siniloan, Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. 336, a decision was
rendered in favor of respondents, which decision was affirmed in totoby the RTC of Siniloan,
Laguna. When elevated to the Court of Appeals, that same decision was affirmed by the latter
court, saying that the Court finds that the judgment of the court a quo affirming the previous
judgment of the municipal court is supported by sufficient and satisfactory evidence and there is
no reason for the Court to hold otherwise.
In the meantime, on June 14, 1978, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1388 was issued in
the name of respondent Rosa Javier Go, wife of Go S. Kiang.
August 10, 1995, in the Regional Trial Court at Siniloan, Laguna petitioners filed against
respondents their complaint in this case for Conveyance, AccionPubliciana, and Quieting of Title
with Damages, the trial court, dismissed petitioners complaint and ordered them to pay attorneys
fees.

ISSUES:
Whether an action for reconveyance of property based on a nullity of title prescribes.
HELD:
No. An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust is
not barred by the aforementioned 10-year prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. In DBP vs. CA,[16] the Court
explained:

. . . [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when
the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants
are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Here, it was never established that petitioners remained in actual possession of the property after
their fathers sale thereof to Go S. Kiang in 1965 and up to the filing of their complaint in this
case on August 10, 1995. On the contrary, the trial courts factual conclusion is that respondents
had actual possession of the subject property ever since. The action for reconveyance in the
instant case is, therefore, not in the nature of an action for quieting of title, and is not
imprescriptible.
CABACUNGAN vs. LAIGO
G.R. No. 175073. August 15, 2011

FACTS:
Margarita Cabacungan owned three parcels of unregistered land in La Union which are
covered by tax declaration all in her name. Sometime in 1968, Margaritas son, Roberto Laigo,
Jr. applied for a non-immigrant visa to the United States, and to support his application, he
allegedly asked Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name. For said
purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to Roberto.
Roberto adopted respondents Pedro Laigo and MarilouLaigo. In July 1990, Roberto sold
the aforementioned three parcel of land. One parcel of land was sold to spouses Mario and Julia
Campos and the rest were sold to Pedro Laigo and MarilouLaigo. These sales were not known to
Margarita and her other children.
Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith. Further, they noted that Margaritas claim was already barred by prescription and laches
owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties.
Marilou and Pedro contends to be buyers in good faith and for value. They also believed
that Margaritas cause of action had already been barred by laches, and that even assuming the
contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by prescription as the same had accrued
way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an implied
trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten
(10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an implied
trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.
On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
compromise agreement and dismissing the complaint against the Spouses Campos. Trial on the
merits ensued with respect to Pedro and Marilou.
The trial court barred recovery from respondents who were found to have acquired the
properties supposedly in good faith and for value. It also pointed out that recovery could no
longer be pursued in this case because Margarita had likewise exhausted the ten-year prescriptive
period for reconveyance based on an implied trust which had commenced to run in 1968 upon
the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer.

ISSUES:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe.

HELD:
The Court disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that there was no evidence on
record showing that an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto. It finds that
petitioner had offered evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the
legal title to the properties in question, with expectation that Roberto would return the same to
her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into.
It explained that trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of
certain powers by the latter. Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an intention
to create a trust. Implied trusts arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the
parties or on equitable principles independent of the particular intention of the parties.
Constructive trusts, on the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not
by agreement or intention. They arise not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly,
evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one which arises in order to satisfy the demands
of justice. Constructive trusts are illustrated in Articles 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456
Roberto is merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management,
control or disposition of the property except to make a conveyance when called upon by the
cestui que trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of
the trust property and a breach of the trust.
The Court finds that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered or the
instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds
the land and operates constructive notice to the world.
In the present case, however, the lands involved are unregistered lands. There is no way
by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales
made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from Pedro himself in
August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to toll. The filing of the
complaint in February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period. Finally, such delay of only six
(6) months in instituting the present action hardly be sufficient to justify a finding of inexcusable
delay or to create an inference that Margarita has allowed her claim to stale by laches.
The Court granted the petition, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It also directed the cancellation of the tax
declarations covering the subject properties in the name of Roberto D. Laigo and his transferees,
nullified the deeds of sale executed by Roberto D. Laigo in favor of respondents Pedro Roy
Laigo and MarilouLaigo and directed said respondents to execute reconveyance in favor of
petitioner.
JEAN TAN ET., AL. VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 193443, APRIL 16, 2012

FACTS:
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic,
Cavite, an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-
459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of
6,920 square meters.[3] The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from
GregonioGatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years

ISSUE
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription

HELD:
Yes. From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the
latter havebeen in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31
years.Having possessed theproperty for the period and in the character required by law as
sufficient for extraordinary acquisitiveprescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership
over the subject property. Such right cannot bedefeated by respondents acts of declaring again
the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining aTorrens certificate of title in their name in
1998. The act of obtaining an original certificate of title does noteffectively interrupt possession
for purposes of prescription.
GALVEZ VS CA
G.R. NO. 157954 MARCH 24, 2006

FACTS:
Ulpiano and Paz Galvez are children of Timotea F. Galvez, who died
intestate.However, Ulpiano predeceased Timotea and was survived by his son, Porfirio
Galvez.Timotea left a parcel of land which passed by succession, both to Timoteasdaughter,Paz
Galvez, and to the formers grandson, Porfirio, the latter succeeding by right of representation as
the son of Ulpiano. Paz Galvez executed an affidavit of adjudicationstating that she is the true
and lawful owner of the said property, which said propertywas sold to Carlos Tam without the
knowledge and consent of Porfirio Galvez.Subsequently, Carlos Tam sold the same to Tycoon
Properties, Inc.

ISSUE:
Won respondent's claim over the subject property, which is based on an implied trust,has
already prescribed because the action was filed 24 years after petitioner repudiatedthe said trust.

HELD:
No, prescription will not lie.This case is governed by the rules on co-ownership since
both Paz Galvez and PorfirioGalvez are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having
inherited the same froma common ancestor. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "a
prescription shallnot run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as
long as heexpressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."It is a fundamental principle that
a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Santos v.Santos,citing the earlier case of Adille v. Court of Appeals,this Court
foundoccasion to rule that:Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subjectto certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon isclear and conclusive; and
(4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
In this case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-
ownership. The execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute suchsufficient
act of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to effectively excludePorfirio Galvez from
the property. This Court has repeatedly expressed its disapprovalover the obvious bad faith of a
co-heir feigning sole ownership of the property to theexclusion of the other heirs essentially
stating that one who acts in bad faith should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of
others. In the cases of Adilleand Panganwhere, as in this case, a co-heir was excluded from his
legal share by the other co-heir who represented himself as the only heir, this Court held that the
act of exclusiondoes not constitute repudiation.
SPS. AGUIRRE V. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 169898, OCTOBER 27, 2006

FACTS:
The petitioners have been in possession of a parcel of land for more than 26 years. They
declared it for taxation purposes, occupied it, built fences, planted trees and used the same as
ingress and egress towards their cottages. The respondent knew all these but they did not lift a
finger to bar them from doing so. They waited for 16 years to oust them.

ISSUE:
Will the action prosper? Why?

HELD:
No. Laches had already set it. Since they have been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the disputed land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997,
petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
The action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length or time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of
society.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY VS. FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. 138971. JUNE 6, 2001

FACTS:
The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into
by EPZA and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity
of the documents executed as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by
their predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred by
prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is barred from prescription?

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive
notice to all persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for
reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed.

Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would

have already prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied trust applies only when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they dont even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so
would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.

Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully

registered in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once the
property has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
BENITO VS. SAQUITAN-RUIZ
G.R. NO. 149906. DECEMBER 26, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the land from Francisco Morales
and instituted ejectment proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land. Respondent,
Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz bought a portion of the land from petitioner on a promise to contribute
Php 6000 for the ejectment proceedings which will serve as the consideration for the sale. On 17
April 1979, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in favor of respondent, however, he failed to pay
his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner never caused the issuance of the certificate of
title despite demands of the respondent for such issuance. Instead, petitioner subdivided the lot
where respondents land was located into five while the latter continued to possess such land.
Petitioners, then borrowed Php75,000 from a certain Basilia Dela Cruz, who later sued them for
collection. For failure to pay the borrowed money, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC
and the disputed petitioners land was sold to Dela Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter
was the highest bidder. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of Title was issued to Dela
Cruz but it was only on 27 May 1999 that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued. On 1
April 1999, respondent filed the case for specific performance with declaration of nullity of titles
and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed?

HELD:
No. The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a person claiming to be
the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek
reconveyance does not prescribe. A petition for the quieting of title, although essentially an
action for reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged
that the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
Furthermor
e, the action was seasonably filed since Dela Cruzs right to its conveyance and possession was
subject to the 12-month redemption perion provided under section 33 of rule 39 of the Rules of
court. In this case, only a month had passed.
CUTANDA V. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA
G.R. NO. 109215. JULY 11, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession, accounting and
damages against petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City. They alleged that in the 1900s, their
grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels of land in Bohol. Tax declarations were used
by them as evidence. Upon Robertos death, these lands were inherited by his children, namely:
Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia. Except for Doque who stayed in Bohol and
administered the lands, all of Robertos children established residence in Leyte. In 1987, they
returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands. Their plan, however, was frustrated as
petitioners, who were occupying the lands, refused to leave. Private respondent thus prayed that
each be declared owner of 1/5 of the subject real properties and that petitioners be ordered to
return to them said properties.
The petitioners, on the other hand averred that the lands were owned by their uncle
Anastacio who died without children. As such, petitioners, who were nieces and nephews of
Anastacio occupied and cultivated the land. The petitioners were claiming rightful ownership of
the land for having openly, contiguously, adversely, and continuously possessing the land for
about 55 years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents right over the land has prescribed?

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Civil Code provides that title to land by
prescription is acquired if the land has been in open, continuous, adverse possession and
occupancy of the land over 10 years. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten years of
actual adverse possession was required, regardless of how such occupancy may have
commenced or continued, before possession ripened into full and complete title over the land.
Applying this to the present case, by 1943, ten years after his possession of the subject parcel of
land had begun, Anastacio Cutanda became owner of the land in question through acquisitive
prescription.
Hence, the rightful owner of the land is the petitioners.
SMPSM v. BCDA
G.R. No. 142255, January 26, 2007

FACTS:
As a background, in 1992, RA 7227 created the BCDA to "accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations
and their extensions," and "to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military
camps." Pursuant to this Act, Pres. Ramos issued EO No. 40, series of 1992, specifying, among
others, the portions of Metro Manila military camps to be utilized to generate capital for the
BCDA. Among these Metro Manila military camps is Fort Bonifacio, located in the City of
Makati and the Municipality of Taguig. Under EO No. 40, 214 hectares in Fort Bonifacio were
earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects and to use such
funds to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the
Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions.
The members of SMPMI, allegedly comprising over 20,000 families, are residents of Fort
Bonifacio occupying a portion of it specifically Lot 4, Lot 3, and Lot 1 with an aggregate area of
97.58 hectares allegedly covered by SWO-00-001265 in the name of BCDA. Petitioner
maintains that its members have been occupying peacefully and continuously these lots in Fort
Bonifacio. It alleges that Fort Bonifacio is covered by the TCT in the name of the United States
of America, hence the Philippine Government.It further alleges that BCDA, pursuant to RA
7227, the Municipality of Taguig, through its Mayor, sent 30-day notices of eviction to its
members. It asserts the illegality of the imminent eviction, for which the present action was filed,
as the land which petitioners members are occupying is still owned by the USA and not by the
Philippine Government.
It further asserts that Section 8of RA 7227, which stipulates the area of Fort Bonifacio
specifically covering 2,276 hectares, did not provide any technical description on what is indeed
covered. Besides, it strongly argues that because of the lack of "tie line" locating the exact
position claimed by BCDA, the latter cannot illegally stake its claim on the whole of Fort
Bonifacio to the prejudice not only of its members but also of all persons or entities occupying
said area. Petitioner also contends that what complicates the controversy is the approval of the
BCDA plan by the Bureau of Land without due certification from the Land Registration
Authority.

ISSUE:
Does prescription apply if the subject land is covered by a Torrens Title and run against the
State.

HELD:
It is basic that ownership or dominion includes the right of possession. In traditional Roman
law, jus possidendi or the right to possess is fundamentally not only an attribute of ownership but
also a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDAs ownership of the subject lots
originates the rights of possession, use, and disposition
Prescription does not apply if the subject land is covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at
bar.
Neither prescription nor laches runs against the State. Thus, even granting arguendo that the
subject lands had been erroneously issued titles in favor of third parties, which is definitely not
the case; neither prescription nor estoppel by laches applies against the State. In a catena of
cases, we have consistently reiterated this hornbook doctrine. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that:
In so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic
that prescription does not run against the State. x x x The case law has also been:
When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to
assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on
the ground of laches or limitation. x x x

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be

recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such cases for the
Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA V. DOMINADOR MAGDUA,
G.R. NO. 176858; SEPTEMBER 15, 2010

FACTS:
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch
34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare
void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua . The sale (through misrepresentation by Ricardo) was made
during the lifetime of Ricardo.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan,
Leyte. In an Order (2006) the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the amount
cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not
merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment
of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the
case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUES:
Is the present action barred by prescription?

HELD:
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged
seller of the property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a
review of the case is necessary.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit
alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that
the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia
Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not
presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any authority from
Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his
consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8
September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality
to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-
Abas had no legal personality or right to sell the subject property is of no moment in this case. It
should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against his daughters and not the herein
plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or ratified the alleged deed
of sale.
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that
Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years
in order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Dominador merely assumed that
Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the
RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC for recovery of
ownership, possession, partition and damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he
separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not
mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the land or whether
Ricardos family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for
taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed.
Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the
land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-
owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code
which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
RAMON B. BRITO, SR VS.SEVERINO D. DIANALA,
G.R. NO. 171717, DECEMBER 15, 2010

FACTS:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B, formerly known as Lot
No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and his wife, EufemiaDianala, both
of whom are already deceased. On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez.
Petitioners wife, alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while
Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one
EusebioDichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that
Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory
heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses,
also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance
of the complainants.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior
to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban
and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are
the heirs of Esteban and Franciscas children; that they are in open, actual, public and
uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their legal
interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. Herein respondents,
on the other hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance
and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. RTC dismissed both cases.

ISSUE:
WON respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for
reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly
committed by petitioner.

HELD:
No. There is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as
evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against respondents
for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents possession of the disputed
property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such,
with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is
one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and
his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the Civil Code
provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
 An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by
petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for
reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not
yet expired. Respondents are not guilty of laches simply because they are no longer parties to the
case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment. Respondents act of filing
their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting their right. Laches is recourse in equity. Equity, however, is
applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not
in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription
does not commence to run against him.