MARANTAN V DIOKNO

Facts:

Petitioner M was a defendant in criminal case where M and his co-accused was charge of
homicide while, Diokno was the counsel of the petitioner in the criminal case. However, LaO
and others prayed that the resolution of office of the ombudsman downgrading the charges from
murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide
be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.

Then another shooting incident occurred where Marantan was the ground commander in a
police-military team which resulted in the death of 13 men.

Marantan alleges that LaO and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, , organized and conducted a
televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously
made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No.
199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC,
branding Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for
indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous
statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.

Issue:

Is the respondent liable for contempt?

Ruling:

1ST: NO, the respondent is not liable for contempt.

2nd: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings
in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice[.]
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice.What is, thus, sought to be
protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case.The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be
punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the
power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat

3rd:

In this case, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their
opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their
position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from
homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere
restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence
the Court.

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.

(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON
AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO

Principle:

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held
liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the
judges and the Judiciary.

Facts:
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation
of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994.

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project. Due to the projects
location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. However, WWRAI (Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI)
allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALIs
construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an
easement of right of way and TRO which the RTC granted. Meanwhile the WWRAI filed TRO
to enjoin the RTC from further proceeding of the civil case which was later granted the petition
of WWRAI.

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the
decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to
favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: will the administrative complaint will prosper?

Held:

1st: No, The administrative complaint is bereft of merit

2nd:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for
its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary
must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the
service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character

3rd:
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices.

In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by the Court.
Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the
respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be premature.

Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative
liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not
sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before
he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice
cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than
AMALIs bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAIs
counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. OLAIREZ

Facts:

SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City offering various diploma courses in
different fields of study. Respondent Olairez and others were fourth-year graduating students of
SLUs College of Medicine Batch 2002. Olairez and others filed their Complaint for
Mandatory Injunction with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and TRO before the RTC,
against Dean Dacanay challenging the implementation of the revised version of the
Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for graduation from
SLUs medicine course.

Then, the RTC rendered decision declaring the Olairez group as graduates of the College of
Medicine, SLU. It explained that the Revised COWE became moot and academic for the
following reasons: 1] the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
issued a certification that the Olairez group had completed all the requirements for the Degree of
Medicine, notwithstanding the grant of autonomy to SLU by the CHED; and 2] SLU allowed the
Olairez group to participate in the graduation rites.

Then Olairez group trooped to SLU and insisted on immediate compliance with the RTC
ruling. Unable to get favorable reply from SLU, Olairez filed motion to cite the defendants in
contempt. The Court finds the defendants Dean Dacanay guilty of indirect contempt under 3 (b)
& 7 of Rule 71. However the CA reversed the decision of RTC.

CA opined that to comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt, there must be:

(1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order
issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and,

(2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.

The CA observed that the second element was lacking as there was haste in the conduct of the
proceedings and in issuing orders which deprived SLU of the opportunity to explain the reason
for not complying with the mandatory injunction. The CA then stated that "in order for a party to
be guilty of indirect contempt, the rules require that he be given enough and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side against the alluded contemptuous act. Deprive the party of such
opportunity would be to deprive him of due process of law.

Issue:

Was the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its officials were denied of due process as they were
not given the opportunity to comment and be heard on the contempt charges against them?

Ruling:

1st: NO, the CA is correct.

2nd;

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
 (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of
the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not
clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held
to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he
contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose,
however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights.54 To constitute contempt, the act must
be done wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.55

3rd:

The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school on
July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to
be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which
is clearly not the case here. On the contrary, SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision
and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez group.

Rivulet Agro-industrial corp. v Parungao

Facts:

Petitioner R was the registered owner of Hacienda Bacan despite the sale to third person A still
the title of the hacienda remained to Rs name. The DAR commenced administrative process to
acquire the subject property under RA No. 6657 and sent notices of coverage to A. R on the
other habd offer d for sale to the government the subject property. While the administrative case
was pending an ordinance was enacted reclassifying Hacienda Bacan from agricultural to agro-
industrial.

Thereafter, a TCT w/c under the name of R was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor in
the name of the republic. The court issue issued a TRO in G.R. No. 193585 enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and/or all persons acting
upon their orders or in their place and stead from canceling TCT No. T-105742 in Rs name;
issuing a new certificate of title in the name of the Republic; and issuing and distributing CLOAs
in favor of anyone during the pendency of the case.

Respondent Undersecretary Parugao sought advice from the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on the possibility of installing farmer beneficiaries in the subject property despite the
TRO, citing that the acts sought to be enjoined had already been performed prior to its issuance
and that the DAR was not among those enjoined.

The OSG advised Undersecretary Parugao that there appears no legal obstacle to the installation
of farmer-beneficiaries in Hacienda Bacan. It opined that the TRO was directed only against the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and that the installation of
farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law directs the
DAR to proceed with the distribution of the acquired land to the farmer-beneficiaries upon the
issuance of CLOAs in their favor. Accordingly, the farmer-beneficiaries were installed in the
subject landholding with the assistance of the members of the PNP

Issue:

Is the act of respondents in installing farmer-beneficiaries in the subject landholding constitutes

an open defiance and disobedience of the Courts December 15, 2010 TRO for which they should
be cited for indirect contempt of court?

Ruling:

1st: No, the petition lacks merit.

2nd: Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order, but
such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered
contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a
person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act
which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required

3rd:

In the present case, while the DAR was an intervenor, the December 15, 2010 TRO issued by the
Court was only expressly directed against the LRA Administrator, the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and/or all persons acting upon their order or in their place and stead, and
specifically for the following acts: "(a) from canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 105742
issued in favor of petitioner RIVULET Agro-Industrial Corporation; (b) from issuing a new
certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines; (c) from issuing Certificate of
Land Ownership Award in favor of anyone covering Hacienda Bacan, a 157.2992-hectare
property situated in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Negros Occidental; and (d)
distributing such Certificate of Land Ownership Award that it may have heretofore issued
pending trial on the merits."

Clearly, the DAR and its officials were not among those enjoined. Neither can they be
considered agents of the LRA Administrator and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
Moreover, the installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts specifically restrained,
negating the claim that the performance thereof was a contumacious act.