Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science

Author(s): Gabriel A. Almond

Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 828-842
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 r

Separate Tables

Schools and Sects

in Political Science*
GabrielA. Almond
StanfordUniversity

"'Miss Cooper:Loneliness
is a terriblething

MissCooper:Isanytype an 'alone'type,
MissMeacham.. ?"
(FromTerenceRattigan's
SeparateTables,
(1955,78, 92) GABRIEL
A. ALMOND
InSeparateTables,the hit of the 1955 New Yorktheatricalseason, the Irishplaywright,
Terence Rattigan,used the metaphorof solitarydinersin a second-rateresidentialhotel in
Cornwallto convey the lonelinessof the humancondition.It may be a bit far fetched to
use this metaphorto describe the conditionof politicalscience in the 1980s. But in some
sense the variousschoolsand sects of politicalscience now sit at separatetables, each with
its own conception of proper politicalscience, but each protectingsome secret islandof
vulnerability.
Itwas not alwaysso. Ifwe recallthe state of the professiona quarterof a centuryago,
let us say inthe early 1960s,DavidEaston's(1953) and DavidTruman's(1955)scoldingsof
the professionfor its backwardnessamongthe socialscience disciplines,had been takento
heart by a substantialand productivecadre of young politicalscientists. In 1961 Robert
Dahlwrote hisEpitaphfora Monumentto a SuccessfulProtestreflectingthe sure confidence
of a successfulmovement, whose leaderswere rapidlybecomingthe most visiblefiguresin
the profession. Neither Dahl nor Heinz Eulau,whose BehavioralPersuasionappeared in
1963made exaggeratedor exclusiveclaimsfor the new politicalscience. They expressed
the view that the scientificapproachto the study of politicalphenomenahad proven itself,
and that it could take its place alongsidepoliticalphilosophy,publiclaw, and institutional
historyand description,as an importantapproachto the study of politics.As the part of
the discipline"on the move," so to speak, it created some worry among the older sub-
disciplines.An appropriatemetaphor for the state of politicalscience at that time, per-
hapswould be the "youngTurk-old Turk"model, with the youngTurksalreadybegin-
ningto gray at the temples. But we were all Turks.
Now there is this uneasyseparateness.The publicchoice people seek an anchoragein
reality, a "new institutionalism,"to house their powerful deductive apparatus;the
politicaleconometricianswant to relate to historicaland institutionalprocesses; the
humanistscringeat the avoidanceof politicalvalues by "scientism,"and sufferfrom feel-

828 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

Figure I.
IdeologicalDimension
Left Right
Hard HL HR
Methodological
Dimension
Soft SL SR

ingsof inadequacyin a world dominated by statisticsand technology;and the radicaland

"critical"politicaltheorists, like the ancient prophets, lay about them with anathemas
againstthe behavioristsand positivists,and the very notion of a politicalscience profes-
sionalismthat would separate knowledgefrom action. Buttheir anti-professionalism must
leave them in doubt as to whether they are scholarsor politicians.
The uneasinessin the politicalscience professionis not of the body but of the soul. Inthe
last several decades the profession has more than doubled in numbers. Americantype
politicalscience has spread to Europe, LatinAmerica, Japan,and more interestinglyto
Chinaand the USSR.Politicalscience has taken on the organizationaland methodological
attributes of science-research institutes, large-scalebudgets, the use of statisticaland
mathematicalmethods, and the like. Politicalscience has prospered materially,but it is not
a happy profession.
We are separated alongtwo dimensions;an ideologicalone, and a methodologicalone
(see FigureI). On the methodologicaldimensionthere are the extremes of soft and hard.
At the soft extreme are CliffordGeertz (1973) types of "thicklydescriptive," clinical
studies. As an example of this kindof scholarshipAlbert Hirschman(1970) celebratedthe
JohnWomack (1969) biographyof the Mexicanguerrillahero, EmilianoZapata, with its
almost complete lack of conceptualization,hypothesizing,efforts to prove propositions
and the like. Despite this lack of self-conscioussocial science, Hirschmanargues, the
Zapata study was fullof theoretical implicationsof the greatest importance.Leo Strauss
(1959) and hisfollowers in politicalphilosophywith their exegeticalapproachto the evoca-
tion of the ideas of politicalphilosopherscome pretty close to this soft extreme as well,
but while Womack's kind of work leaves everythingbut narrativeand descriptionto
implication,Straussianexegesis involvesthe disciplineof the explicationof the great texts,
ascertainingtheir "true" meaningthroughthe analysisof their language.
Somewhat away from the soft extreme, but still on the soft side of the continuum,
would be political philosophicalstudies more open to empiricalevidence and logical
analysis.Recent work such as that of MichaelWalzer on justice (1983) and obligation
(1970), Carole Patemanon participation(1970) and obligation(1979) would be illustrative.
Here there is more than a simple, rich evocation of an event or personality,or precise
exegesis of the ideasof politicalphilosophers.A logicalargumentis advanced,often tested
throughthe examinationof evidence, and developed more or less rigorously.
At the other extreme of the methodologicalcontinuumare the quantitative,econo-
metric, and mathematicalmodellingstudies; and the most extreme would be the com-
binationof mathematicalmodelling,statisticalanalysis,experiment, and computer simula-
tion in the publicchoice literature.Theoriesof voting, coalitionmaking,decision-makingin
committees, and in bureaucracies,involvingthe testing of hypotheses generated by for-
mal, mathematicalmodels would exemplifythis hard extreme.
On the ideologicalcontinuumon the left we have four groups in the Marxisttradition-
the Marxistsproperlyspeaking,the "criticalpoliticaltheorists," the dependencistas,and
the world system theorists, allof whom deny the possibilityof separatingknowledgefrom
action, and who subordinatepoliticalscience to the strugglefor socialism.At the con-
servativeend of the continuumare the neo-conservativeswho favor amongother thingsa

Fall 1988 829

Separate Tables

free market economy, and limitson the power of the state, as well as an aggressiveanti-
communistforeign policy.
If we combine these two dimensionswe end up with four schools of politicalscience,
four separate tables-the soft-left, the hard-left,the soft-right,and the hard-righttables.
Reality,of course, is not quite this neat. The ideologicaland methodologicalshadingsare
more complex, more subtle. To elaborate our metaphor a bit but stillwithinthe refec-
toral realm, since the overwhelmingmajorityof politicalscientistsare somewhere in the
center-"liberal" and moderate in ideology, and eclectic and open to conviction in
methodology-we mightspeak of the great cafeteriaof the center, from whichmost of us
select our intellectualfood, and where we are seated at large tables with mixed and
changingtable companions.

The outlyingtables inthis disciplinaryrefectoryare stronglylitand visible,whilethe large

center lies in shade. It is unfortunatethat the mood and reputationof the politicalscience
disciplineis so heavily infuenced by these extreme views. This is in part because the
extremes make themselves highlyaudibleand visible-the soft left providinga pervasive
flagellantbackgroundnoise, and the hardrightprovidingvirtuoso mathematicaland statis-
tical displaysappearingin the pages of our learnedjournals.

The Soft Left

Suppose we begin with the soft left. All of the sub-groupsof the soft left share in the
meta-methodologicalassumptionthat the empiricalworld cannot be understood in terms
of separate spheres and dimensions,but has to be understood as a time-space totality.
"Criticaltheory," as developed by Horkheimer,Adorno, Marcuse,and others of the
"FrankfurtSchool" reject the alleged detachment and disaggregatingstrategy of
mainstreamsocial science. The various parts of the social process must be seen " . . as
aspects of a total situationcaughtup inthe process of historicalchange"(Lukacsquoted in
David Held [1980], 164).The student as well as that which he studies is involvedin strug-
gle. Hence objectivityis inappropriate."Positivistsfailto comprehendthat the process of
knowingcannot be severed from the historicalstrugglebetween humansand the world.
Theory and theoretical labor are intertwinedin social life processes. The theorist cannot
remaindetached, passivelycontemplating,reflectingand describing'society' or 'nature'"
(Held, 165). To understandand explain one must have a commitment to an outcome.
There is no politicalscienceinthe positivistsense, that is, a politicalscience separablefrom
ideologicalcommitment.To seek to separate it is a commitmentto support the existing,
historicallyobsolescent order.
The more orthodox Marxistssuch as PerryAnderson (1976), Goran Therborn(1977),
PhilipSlater (1977), and others, while sharingthe meta-methodology of the "Critical
school," go furtherand argue that unless one accepts historicalmaterialismin the fullest
reductionistsense of explainingthe politicalrealmin classstruggleterms, one ends up fail-
ing to appreciate the relationshipbetween theory and "praxis."
As we consider the composition of the soft left our four-fold metaphor of separate
tables begins to break down. The Marxisttheorists of several persuasions-the "critical
theorists," the "dependency"writers,and "worldsystem" theorists-make quarrelsome
table companions. What they all share is a common belief in the unity of theory and
praxis, in the impossibilityof separatingscience and politics. As a logicalconsequence
positivistpoliticalscience, which believes in the necessity of separatingscientificactivity
from politicalactivity,loses contact with the overridingunityof the historicalprocess and

830 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

is mindlesslylinkedto the status quo. Positivistpoliticalscience failsto take into account

the historicaldialecticwhich makes the shift from capitalismto socialisminevitable.
Fernando Cardoso, the leading theorist of the dependency school, contrasts the
methodology of dependency theory with the North Americansocial science traditionin
the followinglanguage:
We attemptto reestablish the intellectual
traditionbasedon a comprehensive socialscience.We
seek a globaland dynamicunderstanding of socialstructuresinsteadof lookingonlyat specific
dimensions of the socialprocess.We opposethe academictraditionwhichconceivedof domina-
tion and social-cultural
relationsas "dimensions" independentof one anotherand
analytically
togetherindependentof the economy,as if each one of these dimensionscorrespondedto
separatefeaturesof reality... . We usea dialecticalapproachto studysociety,itsstructures and
processesof change.... Inthe end whathasto be discussedas an alternativeis not the con-
solidationof the state and the fulfillment
of "autonomous capitalism," but how to supercede
them.The importantquestion,then,is howto constructpathstowardsocialism. (Cardosoand
Faletto,1979,ix andxxiv)
Politicalscience can only be science then, if it is fully committed to the attainment of
socialism.
One of the leadingAmericanexpositors of the "'dependency"approach,RichardFagen,
draws the implicationsof Cardoso's views for the academic communityconcerned with
development issues. Realprogressin development scholarshiphas to be associatedwith a
restructuringof asymmetricinternationalpower relationsand ". . a much more difficult
and historicallysignificantassaulton capitalistforms of development themselves .... Only
when this crucialunderstandinginfusesthe nascentacademiccritiqueof the globalcapital-
ist system willwe be able to say that the paradigmshiftin mainstreamU.S. socialscience is
gatheringsteam and movingscholarshipcloser to what reallymatters" (1978, 80).
Two recent interpretationsof the history of Americanpoliticalscience show that this
"soft-left" critiqueof mainstreamwork in the disciplinehas taken on some momentum.
David Ricciin TheTragedyof PoliticalScience(1984) traces the emergence of a liberalscien-
tific school of politicalscience in post-World War IIAmerica, a movement dedicated,
accordingto Ricci,to provingthe superiorvirtue of liberalpluralisticvalues and assump-
tions by the most precise methods. The validityof this complacent "empiricalpolitical
theory" constructedby such politicalscientistsas DavidTruman,Robert Dahl, C. E. Lind-
blom, the Universityof Michigangroup of voting specialists,and others, was undermined
in the disorders of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in the associated discreditingof
American politics and public policy. Riccidraws the implicationof this behavioral-post-
behavioralepisode, as demonstratingthat politicalscienceas empiricalscience without the
systematic inclusionof moral and ethical values and alternatives,and a commitment to
politicalaction, is doomed to disillusion.Politicalscience has to choose sides; failingto do
so results in its withdrawalinto specializedpreciosity,and futility.

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Ricci'ssoft leftismis of the humanistmoderate left variety.That of RaymondSeidelman

(1985) is a more sharplyradicaltreatment of the historyof Americanpoliticalscience. Ina
book entitled DisenchantedRealists:PoliticalScienceand the AmericanCrisis,1884-1984,
Seidelmandevelops the thesis in detail that there have been three trends in American
politicaltheory-an institutionalisttrend, a democratic populist trend, and a relatively

Fall 1988 831

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short-lived"liberalpoliticalscience" trend, initiatedin the 1920sand 1930sby the Univer-

sity of Chicagoschool, and floweringin the United States in the post-WorldWar 11years
roughlyuntilthe 1970s.The institutionalisttrend is the Hamiltonian-Madisonian tradition
embodied in the constitutionalsystem, so constructedthat it would frustratethe will of
majorities.Separationof powers theory is based on a distrustof popular propensities.
Contrasted with this tradition of American politicaltheory, is the democratic populist
trend manifestedin earlyagrarianegalitarianism, abolitionism,populism,and the like.This
second Thomas Painetraditionis anti-statist,anti-governmentand was discreditedby the
rise of industrial-urban
society and the necessity for strong centralgovernment.
The thirdtraditionwas based on a belief in the possibilityof a science of politicswhich
would help produce a powerfulnationalstate, manned by trained experts pursuingcon-
structiveand coherent publicpolicies,and supported by virtuouspopularmajorities.This
third traditiondream of a great constructivepoliticalscience has been dispelledon both
the politicaland the science sides. Politicalrealityhas turned into a disarticulatedset of

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elite-dominated"issue networks" and "iron triangles,"incapableof pursuingconsistent

and effective publicpolicies;and the science has turned into a set of disembodiedspecial-
ties lackingin linkageto politicsand publicpolicy. Seidelmanconcludes:
scienceprofessionalism
political
Historically, hasonlyobscuredfundamental conflictsandchoices
inAmerican publiclife,for it hastreatedcitizensas objectsof studyor clientsof a benignpolitical
paternalism .... Untilpolitical scientistsrealizethattheirdemocraticpoliticscannotbe realized
througha barrenprofessionalism, intellectuallifewillremaincleavedfromthe genuineif hereto-
fore subterranean dreamsof Americancitizens.Politicalsciencehistoryhas confirmedthis
separation,even as it hastriedto bridgeit. Modernpoliticalsciencemustbridgeit, ifdelusions
are to be transformed intonew democraticrealities.(241)
The burdenof the soft left, thus, is an attack on politicalscience professionalism.It is a
callto the academyto jointhe politicalfray,to orient its teachingand researcharoundleft
ideologicalcommitments-in particular,moderate or revolutionarysocialism.

The Hard Right

The hard right, on the other hand, is ultra-professionalat the methodologicallevel,

deploying a formidable array of scientific methodologies-deductive, statistical, and
experimental.There is a tendency to view softer historical,descriptive, and unsophis-
ticated quantitativeanalysisas pre-professional,as inferiorbreeds of politicalscience,
althoughin recent years there has been a notable rediscoveryof politicalinstitutions,and
an effort to relate formaldeductivework to the empiricaltraditionpioneered by Gosnell,
Herring,V. 0. Key.
WilliamMitchell(1988), in a recent review of the publicchoice movement in political
science, distinguishesbetween the two principalcenters, which he calls the Virginiaand
RochesterSchools.The Virginiaschool, influentialmainlyamong economists, was founded
by JamesBuchananand Gordon Tullock.The founderof the Rochesterschool, more influ-
ential among politicalscientists,was WilliamRiker.Both schools tend to be skepticalof
politicsand bureaucracyand are fiscallyconservative. But the Virginiaschool views the
marketunambiguously as the benchmarkof efficientallocation.The Virginians
accordingto
Mitchelldisplaya ". . . firm conviction that the private economy is far more robust,

832 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

efficient, and perhaps equitable than other economies, and much more successfulthan
politicalprocesses in efficientlyallocatingresources .... Muchof what has been produced
by the [Virginian] Center for Study of PublicChoice, can best be described as contribu-
tions to a theory of the failureof politicalprocesses .. inequity,inefficiency,and coercion
are the most general resultsof democratic policyformation"(pp. 106-7).Buchananpro-
posed an automatic deficit reduction plan years before the adoption of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings proposal; and he was the author of an early version of the proposed
constitutional budget-balancingamendment. Buchanan,in two books-Democracy in
Deficit, The PoliticalLegacyof LordKeynes(1977), and TheEconomicsof Politics(1978)-
presents a view of democratic politics in which voters act in terms of their short-run
interests,that is to say oppose taxes and favor materialbenefitsfor themselves;politicians
naturallyplay into these propensities by favoring spending and opposing taxing; and
bureaucratsseek to extend their power and resources without regard to the public
interest.
These theorists differin the extent to whichthey believe that the short-runutilitymaxi-
mizer model captures humanreality.Some scholarsemploy the model only as a way of
generatinghypotheses.ThusRobertAxelrod, usingdeductivemodelling,experimentation
and computer simulation,has made importantcontributionsto our understandingof how
cooperative norms emerge, and in particularhow norms of internationalcooperation
might develop from an originalshort-runutilitymaximizingperspective (1984). Douglass
North (1981), Samuel Popkin(1979), Robert Bates (1988), and others combine rational
choice modellingwith sociologicalanalysisin their studies of thirdworld development and
historicalprocess.
That this view is on the defensive is reflected in recent comments of scholars with
unquestionablescientificcredentials.Thus Herbert Simon challengesthe rationalchoice
assumptionof this literature:
It makes a differenceto research, a very largedifference,to our researchstrategywhether we
are studying
the nearlyomniscient
homoeconomicus
of rationalchoicetheoryor the boundedly
rationalhomopsychologicus of cognitivepsychology.It makesa differencefor research,but it also
makes a differencefor the proper designof politicalinstitutions.JamesMadisonwas well aware
of that, and in the pages of the FederalistPapers,he opted for this view of the humancondition;
"As there is a degree of depravityin mankindwhichrequiresa certaindegree of circumspection
and distrust, so there are other qualitiesin human nature which justifya certain portion of
esteem and confidence:"-a balancedand realisticview, we may concede, of bounded human
rationalityand its accompanyingfrailtiesof motive and reason. (303)

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JamesMarchand JohanOlsen attackthe formalismof the publicchoice literature."The

new institutionalismis an empiricallybased prejudice,an assertionthat what we observe in
the world is inconsistentwith the ways in whichcontemporarytheories ask us to talk. . .
The bureaucraticagency,the legislativecommittee, and the appellatecourt are arenasfor

Fall 1988 833

Separate Tables

contendingsocial forces, but they are also collections of standardoperating procedures

and structuresthat detine and defend interests" (1984, 738). They similarlyquestion the
rationalself-interestassumptionof the publicchoice literature,arguing,
Although self-interest
undoubtedly permeatespolitics,actionisoftenbasedmoreon discovering
the normatively appropriate the returnexpectedfromalternative
behaviorthanon calculating
choices.As a result,politicalbehavior,likeotherbehavior,canbe describedintermsof duties,
roles,andrules.(744)
obligations,

The Soft Right

Inthe soft-rightcell there are miscellaneousconservativesof an old and a "neo" variety,

who tend to be traditionalin their methodologiesand on the rightside of the ideological
spectrum. But the followers of Leo Strauss in politicaltheory are a distinctivebreed
indeed. Their methodologicalconservatismis unambiguous.The enlightenmentand the
scientificrevolutionare the arch-enemy.Highon their list of targets is the value free and
ethicallyneutralpoliticalscience of MaxWeber. As Leo Straussput it, "Moralobtuseness
is the necessaryconditionfor scientificanalysis.The more seriouswe are as socialscientists
the more completelywe develop withinourselvesa state of indifferenceto any goal, or to
aimlessnessand drifting,a state of what may be called nihilism"(1959, 19). But political
science is not only amoral, it is not really productive of knowledge. Again Leo Strauss,
"Generallyspeaking,one may wonder whether the new politicalscience has broughtto
lightanythingof politicalimportancewhich intelligentpoliticalpractitionerswith a deep
knowledge of history, nay intelligentand educated journalists,to say nothingof the old
politicalscientists, did not know at least as well beforehand"(in Storing, 1962, 312).

The Straussiansreject all "historicist"and "sociologyof knowledge" interpretationsof

politicaltheory. The true meaningof philosophicaltexts is contained in what has been
written. The politicalphilosophermust have the skilland insightnecessaryto explicatethis
originalmeaning.The ultimatetruth can be located in the writingsof the originalclassic
philosophers,and particularlyin the writingsof Plato-in his Socraticrationalismshorn of
all contingency.Truths transcend time, place, and context. Post-Machiavellian political
philosophyhas led to moralrelativismand the decay of civicvirtue; "behavioral"political
science is the debased product of this moral decline.
Inthe recent celebrationsof the 200th anniversaryof the Constitution,the Straussians,
as one mightexpect, were in the vanguardof the "originalintent"school of constitutional
interpretation.Gordon Wood, in a recent review of the Straussianliteratureon the Con-
stitution,(1988) points out that for such Straussiansas Gary McDowelland Walter Berns
the whole truthabout the Constitutionis containedinthe constitutionaltext, and perhaps
the record of the debates, and the FederalistPapers.Wood pointsout that the Straussian
commitment to "naturalright," leads them to distrust of all historicallyderived rights
". . . particularly those recently discovered by the Supreme Court" (1988, 39). For some
Straussiansthe naturalrightto property postulated by the Foundersmay be groundsfor
rollingbackthe modernwelfarestate. The moralmodel regimefor manyStraussiansis the
Platonicaristocracy,or as second-best, Aristotelian"mixedgovernment."Theirprogram
of action is a call for an intellectualelite which will bringus back to first principles.

The Hard Left

There is finallya hardleft school, whichemploys scientificmethodologyin testing propo-

sitionsderivedfrom socialistand dependencytheories. However, the moment one makes

834 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

explicitand testable the assumptionsand beliefsof left ideologies,one hasgone part of the
way toward rejectingthe anti-professionalism of the left. And this is reflected in the ner-
vousness of leadingsocialistand dependency theorists over quantificationand the testing
of hypotheses. Thus ChristopherChase-Dunn,one of the leadingworld system quan-
tifiers, pleads with his colleagues,"My concern is that we not become bogged down in a
sterile debate between 'historicists'and 'social scientists,' or between quantitativeand
qualitativeresearchers.The 'ethnic' boundariesmay provide us with much materialfor
spiriteddialogue,but a real understandingof the world system will requirethat we tran-
scend methodologicalsectarianism"(1982, 181).The leadingdependencytheoristssuchas
Cardoso and Fagenraise serious questions regardingthe validityof "scientifictype, quan-
titative" studies of dependency propositions. For reasons not clearly specified such
research is "premature,"or misses the point. Thus, they probablywould not accept as
valid the findingsof the Sylvan,Snidal,Russett, Jackson,and Duvall(1982) group which
tested a formal model of "dependencia"on a world-wide set of dependent countriesin
the 1970-75period, and came up with mixed and inconclusiveresults. Nevertheless the
dependency and world system quantifiersand econometricians,includingpoliticalscien-
tists and sociologists such as Chase-Dunn(1977) and Rubinson(1979), Albert Bergesen
(1980), Volker Bornschier(1981) and others, are carryingon quantitativestudies oriented
toward the demonstrationof the validityof world system and dependency propositions.

Getting Our Professional

History Straight

Most politicalscientistswould find themselves uncomfortableseated at these outlying

tables. Havingbecome a majoracademicprofessiononly in the last two or three genera-
tions, we are not about to cast off our badges of professionalintegrityby turningour
researchand teachinginto politicaladvocacy.Thisis reflected in the partialdefectionfrom
anti-professionalism by the hard left, who insistthat assertionsabout society and politics
can be tested by formulatingthem explicitlyand precisely,and usingstatisticalmethods
where appropriate.
Similarlymost of us are troubled at the preemption by the publicchoice and statistical
politicalscientistsof the badge of professionalism,and their demotion of the rest of us to a
prescientificstatus. And this concern is shared by some of the most reputable and
sophisticatedof our more rigorouspoliticalscientists,who are currentlyengaged in relat-
ing to and rehabilitatingthe older politicalscience methodologies, such as philosophical,
legal and historicalanalysis,and institutionaldescription.
And there are few politicalscientistsindeed who would share the view that all political
science since the sixteenth century is a deviation from the true path, and that the sole
route to professionalismis throughthe exegesis of the classicaltexts of politicaltheory.

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It is noteworthy that each of these schools or sects presents us with a particularversion
of the historyof the politicalscience discipline.Whoever controlsthe interpretationof the
past in our professionalhistorywritinghas gone a longway toward controllingthe future.
The soft left has almost pre-empted the writingof professionalpoliticalscience historyin
recent years. I believe they may have succeeded in convincingsome of us that we have
deviated from the true path. Both Ricciand Seidelmanwould have us believe that modern
politicalscience with its stress on methodology and objectivitycould only develop in the
United States where for a brief intervalit appeared that liberaldemocracyand an objec-
tive professionalismwere possible. As this Americanoptimism abates, and as party and
class antagonismsharpens inevitably,they argue, a politicallyneutral political science
becomes untenable.Accordingto this view politicalscience must againbecome an active
part of a political,and for some, a revolutionarymovement.

Fall 1988 835

Separate Tables

The view of professionalhistory presented by the hard right is a very foreshortened

one. Accordingto this view, prior to the introductionof mathematical,statistical,and
experimental methodologies there was no politicalscience and theory in the proper
sense.
Butthe largemethodologicallyeclectic majorityof politicalscientists,and those who are
committed to the control of ideologicalbias in the conduct of professionalwork-what I
callthe 'Cafeteria of the center"'-ought not to concede the writingof disciplinaryhistory
to any one of these schools. The historyof politicalscience does not lead to any one of
these separate tables, but rather to the methodologicallymixed and objectivity-aspiring
scholarshipof the center.

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It is not correct to arguethat politicalscience deviated from classicalpoliticalphilosophy
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,and that it has been on the wrong path ever
since. Nor is it correct to attribute to American politicalscience the effort to separate
politicaltheory from politicalaction. The Straussianscannot legitimatelyclaim exclusive
originin classicalGreek philosophy.The scientificimpulsein politicalstudies had its begin-
nings among the classicalGreek philosophers.Robert Dahl, for my money, is a more
legitimatefollower of Aristotle than is Leo Strauss.
There is a politicalsociologicaltraditiongoing all the way back to Plato and Aristotle,
continuingthrough Polybius,Cicero, Machiavelli,Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu,Hume,
Rousseau,Tocqueville, Comte, Marx, Pareto, Durkheim,Weber and continuingup to
Dahl, Lipset, Rokkan,Sartori, Moore, and Lijphart,which sought, and seeks, to relate
socioeconomic conditionsto politicalconstitutionsand institutionalarrangements,and to
relate these structuralcharacteristicsto policy propensitiesin war and peace.
Our founding fathers belonged to this tradition. Alexander Hamilton observed in
Federalist9, "The science of politics . . . like most other sciences, has received great
improvement. The efficacy of various principlesis now well understood, which were
either not knownat all, or imperfectlyknownto the ancients"(1937). And in Federalist31
Hamiltondeals with the perennialquestionof just how scientificmoraland politicalstudies
could be. He concludes,
Thoughit cannotbe pretendedthat the principles of moraland politicalknowledgehave,in
general,the samedegreeof certaintywiththoseof the mathematics, yet theyhavemuchbetter
claimsinthisrespectthan. we shouldbe disposedto allowthem.(ibid.,189)
It is worth notingthat the hard science-soft science polarity,which we have been led to
assume is a recent phenomenon attributableto the heresy of the Americanbehavioral
movement, has in fact been endemic to the disciplinesince its origins.
Inthe 19thand early20th centuriesAugusteComte, Marxand Engelsand their follow-
ers, Max Weber, EmileDurkheim,VilfredoPareto, and others treated politicsin larger
social science perspectives, with law-likeregularitiesand necessary relationships.At the
turn of the 20th centuryJohnRobert Seeley and Otto Hintze, MoissayeOstrogorski,and
Roberto Michelsall produced what they considered to be "scientificlaws" of politics-
Seeley and Hintzeon the relationshipbetween external pressureand internalfreedom in
the development of the nation states of Western Europe; Ostrogorski, on the incom-
patibilityof the mass-bureaucratic politicalpartyand democracywhichhe derivedfrom a

836 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

comparativestudy of the rise of the Britishand Americanparty systems; and Michels,on

the "iron law of oligarchy,"the propensityin large bureaucraticorganizationsfor power
to gravitateto the top leadership,which he derived from his "critical"case study of the
SocialDemocraticPartyof Germany.More recently,Duverger's"law"of the relationship
between the electoral and party systems also came from Europe.
Among the early pioneersof modern professionalpoliticalscience it was common prac-
tice to speak of this branchof scholarshipas a "science"from the very beginning.ThusSir
FrederickPollockand JohnRobert Seeley, the first lecturingfrom Oxford and the Royal
Institution,the second from Cambridge,entitled their books TheHistoryof the Scienceof
Politics(1890) and An Introductionto PoliticalScience(1896), respectively.What these early
writers meant by "science" varied from case to case. Pollockdistinguishesbetween the
naturaland moral sciences.
.. . [T]hecomparative of the moralsciencesis not the faultof the menwho have
inexactness
devotedtheirabilitiesto them,butdepends,as Aristotlealreadysaw,on the natureof theirsub-
ject matter.(1890,5)
For JohnRobert Seeley politicalscience was to be a body of propositionsdrawnfrom
historicalknowledge. He expected a takeoff in the development of political science
because of the development of historiographyin the 19thcentury.Ifthe modernswere to
do so much better than Locke, Hobbes, and Montesquieu,it was because their historical
data base was much richer.
For Seeley, who introducedpoliticalscience into the CambridgeTripos, it meant learn-
ingto ". . . reason, generalize,define, and distinguish... as well as collecting,authenticat-
ing, and investigatingfacts ..." These two processes constitutedpoliticalscience. "Ifwe
neglectthe first process, we shallaccumulatefacts to littlepurpose, because we shallhave
no test by which to distinguishfacts which are important from those which are un-
important;and of course, if we neglect the second process, our reasoningswill be base-
less, and we shallbut weave scholasticcobwebs" (1896, 27-8).

.e. tugf
weetw
in
sols A te a tca e t

There were two schools of thought in the 19th and early 20th century social sciences
regardingthe degree or kindof science whichwas possible.The work of AugusteComte,
KarlMarx,and VilfredoPareto makes no distinctionbetween the socialand the "natural"
sciences. Bothgroupsof sciencessoughtuniformities,regularities,laws. On the other hand
the notion of a socialscience whichwould consist of ". .. a closed system of concepts, in
which realityis synthesizedin some sort of permanentlyand universallyvalidclassification,
and from which it can againbe deduced. . ." was viewed as entirelymeaninglessby Max
Weber.
The streamof immeasurable towardseternity.The culturalproblems
eventsflowsunendingly
which move men form themselvesever anew and in differentcolors, and the boundariesof that
streamof concreteeventswhichacquiresmeaningandsignificance
areainthe infinite for us, i.e.
whichbecomesan "historical subjectto change.The intellectual
are constantly
individual" con-
analyzedshift.(1949,80)
texts fromwhichit is viewedandscientifically
The "lawfulness"of humaninteractionis of a differentorder for MaxWeber. The subject
matter of the social sciences-human action-involves value orientation, memory and
learning,which can only yield "soft" regularities,"objective possibilities"and probabili-

Fall 1988 837

Separate Tables

ties. Culturalchange may attenuate or even dissolve these relationships.SimilarlyDurk-

heim viewed culturalphenomena as too complex and open to humancreativityto lend
themselves to the same degree of causalcertaintyas the naturalsciences.
Duringthe firstdecades of professionalpoliticalscience in the United States-from 1900
to the 1930s-two scholars, Merriamand Catlin,the first as Americanas apple pie, the
second a temporarilytransplantedEnglishman-tookthe lead in advocatingthe introduc-
tion of scientificmethods and standardsin the study of politics. Merriam'scontribution
was primarilyprogrammatic,and promotional.He advocated, recruited personnel, and
funded a particularresearchprogramat the Universityof Chicago.He also was a founder
of the Social Science ResearchCouncil. Catlinwrote on methodologicalquestions, dif-
ferentiatingbetween historyand politicalscience, and locatingpoliticalscience among the
social sciences.

In his 1921 manifesto, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," Merriam(1925)
advocated the introductionof psychologicaland sociologicalinsightsinto the study of
politicalinstitutionsand processes, and of the introductionof statisticalmethods in an
effort to enhance the rigorof politicalanalysis.Nowhere in this early call to professional
growth and improvement is there anything approximatinga discussion of scientific
methodology. He proposed to do politicalscience ratherthan talkabout it. And indeed, in
the decades followingat the Universityof Chicago,a research programunfoldedexem-
plifyingMerriam'sstress on empiricalresearch, quantification,and social-psychological
interpretation.The scholarsproduced by this programconstituted a substantialpart of
the nucleusof the post-World War "behavioralmovement."
George Catlinmay have been the firstto speak of a "behavioristtreatment of politics"
(1927, xi), and in his argumentabout a science of politicsseems to dispose of all of those
objections which would differentiatesocial and human subject matters from those of
naturalscience. But he is hardlysanguineabout the prospects of science.

Politicsmustfor the presentconfineitselfto the humbletask of collecting,where possible

measuring,andsortingthe historical
material,pastandcontemporary;andfollowing upprobable
clues to the discoveryof permanentforms and generalprinciplesof action. ... It is reasonableto
expect that politicalscience will prove to be more than this, that it willgive us some insightinto
the possibilityof controllingthe socialsituation,and willshow us, if not what it is wise to do, at
least what, humannature beingwhat it is, it is unwiseto do, because such action willcut across
the grainof the socialstructureand athwartthe linesof activityof the deeper forces whichhave
builtup thisstructure.(1927, 142-43).
Thus BernardCrick's(1959) argumentthat it was the behavioralmovement in Ameri-
can politicalscience, and particularlythe Chicagoschool that was responsiblefor leading

838 PS: Political Science and Politics

 Separate Tables

politicalscience down the gardenpath of scientismcannot bear carefulexaminationof the

sources. In both Europeand America meta-methodologicalopinion has been divided on
this question. It would be hard to find more hard science oriented scholarsthan Comte,
Marx, Pareto, and Freud. Durkheimand Weber, while fullycommitted to the pursuitof
science, clearlyrecognizedthat the socialscientistdealt with a subjectmatter less tracta-
ble to covering-lawhardscience forms of explanation.Thispolemicdiffusedto the United
States in the course of the twentieth century.

4. 44 0...
?4^4t^
!u^4e efasp4to t V ?4c 44t
la?t a4?i.
Crick'sattributionof this scientificorientationto Chicago populistsdoes not hold up
when we examine the evidence. One has to read the Tocquevillecorrespondence(1962)
to appreciate how close that brilliantinterpreter of American democracy, a century
before the Chicagoschool saw the lightof day, came to doing an opinion survey in his
travels around the country. As he talked to a steamboat captain on the Mississippi,to
farmers in the interior,to bourgeois dinnercompanionson the eastern seabord, and to
officeholdersin Washington,D.C., samplingthe Americanpopulationwas clearlyon his
mind. KarlMarxdrew up a six-page questionnairefor the study of the livingconditions,
workingconditions,attitudes, and beliefsof the Frenchworkingclass in the early 1880s.A
largenumberof copies were distributedto socialistsand workingclassorganizations.The
data gatheredwere to be used in the forthcominggeneralelection (I 880). InMaxWeber's
working papers for his study of the peasantry in East Prussiathere is evidence that he
plannedand partiallyexecuted a survey of Polishand German peasant attitudes. And in
his study of comparative religion he used a formal two-by-two table-worldliness-
unworldliness,asceticism-mysticism-asa way of generatinghypotheses about the rela-
tionship between religiousethics and economic attitudes.
Most of the important discoveries in the development of statistics were made by
Europeans.La Place and Condorcet were Frenchmen;the Bernoullifamilywere Swiss;
Bayes, Galton, Pearson, and Fisherwere Englishmen;Pareto was an Italian;Markova
Russian.The first "publicchoice" theorist was the Welshman, DuncanBlack(1958). The
view that the quantitativeapproach to social science analysiswas peculiarlyAmerican
doesn't stand up to the historicalrecord. What was peculiarlyAmericanwas the improve-
ment in, and the applicationof, quantitativemethods as in survey research, content
analysis,aggregatestatisticalanalysis,mathematicalmodellingand the like, and the pursuit
in empiricaldepth of psychologicaland sociologicalhypotheses largelygenerated in the
Europeansocial science literature.

74 v4w
tV44t^t ^U^4M/e f te 44%e+
0 44 I

At the darkest moment in Europeanhistory-in the 1930s-there was a strong infusion

of Europeansocialscience into the United States throughrefugeessuchas PaulLazarsfeld,
KurtLewin,MarieJahoda,WolfgangKohler,HansSpeier, ErichFromm,FranzNeumann,
Otto Kircheimer,Leo Lowenthal,FranzAlexander, HannahArendt, Hans Morgenthau,
Leo Strauss,and many others. It should be quite clear from this litanyof names that this
emigrationcarriedthe varioussocial science polemicswithinit, and that the counterposi-
tion of a Europeanand an Americanapproachto socialscience aroundthe issueof human-
ist vs. scientificscholarshipwill simplynot bear the lightof day. There is clear continuity

Fall 1988 839

Separate Tables

from the Europeanbackgroundto the growth of the socialsciencesand politicalscience in

the United States.
This broad traditionof politicalscience beginningwith the Greeks and continuingup to
the creative scholarsof our own generation,is the historicallycorrect versionof our disci-
plinaryhistory. The criticaland Marxistschools throw in the professionalsponge. Con-
frontingthis simplistictemptation we need to have a deep-rooted and unshakablefirm-
ness in our commitmentto the searchfor objectivity.The callfor 'relevance" associated
with "post-behavioralism"impliesa greater concernfor policyimplicationsin our scholar-
ly work, but it cannot implya commitment to a particularcourse of politicalaction. A
politicalscientistis not necessarilya socialist,and surelynot a socialistof a particularkind.

Thu4 dtle st4e hw4 tE Be* 44Ws

4 t^4 U4eE 5t4e4.

The version of disciplinaryhistorypresented to us in Straussianpoliticalphilosophycan-
not be taken seriously.The hard-nosedpublicchoice version of our historymistakestech-
niquefor substance.Mainstreampoliticalscience is open to all methods that illuminatethe
world of politicsand publicpolicy. It will not turn its back on the illumination
we get from
our older methodologiesjust because it now can employ the powerfultools of statistics
and mathematics.
We have good groundsfor professionalpride in the development of politicalscience in
the last decades. And as Americanswe have made importantcontributionsto an age-old,
world-wideeffort to bringthe power of knowledgeto bear on the tragicdilemmasof the
world of politics.

About the Author

GabrielA. Almond is professor of politicalscience emeritusat StanfordUniversity.He was presi-

dent of the APSAin 1965-66.Since 1977 APSAhas given a dissertationaward at its annualmeeting
in honor of ProfessorAlmond.

Note

*An earlierversion of this paper was delivered as the DistinguishedSocialScience Lectureat the
Northern IllinoisUniversityat DeKaib,Illinois,on November 13, 1987.

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Fall 1988 841

 Statistics in Society
American Statistical Association Winter Conferenc
San Diego, California * January 4-6, 1989
Sheraton Harbor Island East
Featured Speakers Q Leo A. Goodman, University of California, Be
Q Clive Granger, University of California, San D
[ Donald B. Rubin, Harvard University
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courses. Some of the topics for invitedsessions include
Q MultilevelAnalysis
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2. Allscientistsinterestedin the statisticalaspects of business,economics, the social sciences, and
sciences are welcome.
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= n Nonmembersmay call the ASA officeat (703) 684-1221 to requestthis materialor write to th
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