POLITICAL LAW

(J. Bersamin)

RAUL SESBREO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 160689, 26 March 2014
Right against unreasonable search and seizure

Facts: Sesbreo accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by
the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an
unreasonable search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered judgment on 19 August 1994, dismissing the claim;
and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on 10 March 2003. Sesbreos
main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an
unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly
done with malice or bad faith.

Held: The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as
a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to
be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State
power. As the Supreme Court held in People v. Marti (193 SCRA 57), [i]f the search is
made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is
to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

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HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION VS. TOLL

REGULA TORY BOARD, ET AL.
G.R. No. 167290, 26 November 2014
Police Power; Eminent Domain; Immunity from suit

Facts: Petitioner sued the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and Engr. Jaime S. Dumlao, the
TRB's Executive Director, in the RTC, demanding specific performance, the grant of the
easement of right of way and damages (Civil Case No. 37-M-2002). The petitioner
amended its complaint to implead the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as indispensable
parties. Petitioner alleged in its amended complaint that the access fence had totally
deprived it of the use and enjoyment of its property by preventing ingress and egress to
its property; that the only access leading to its property was the road network situated
in front of its property; that it was thereby deprived of its property without due process
of law and just compensation; and that it was also denied equal protection of the law
because adjacent property owners had been given ingress and egress access to their
properties. TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
their favor.

Held: The limited access imposed on the petitioner's property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no
question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the
property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure the
general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and
valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just
compensation.

The TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially government or
public functions. As such, they were invested with the inherent power of sovereignty.
Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government, they could not
be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting as the agent of the TRB in respect of
the matter concerned.

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EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY (NOW PHILIPPINE EXPORT ZONE

AUTHORITY) VS. PULIDO
656 SCRA 315, 24 August 2011
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

Facts: Lot 1408; Lot 1409-B-2; and Lot 1406, registered in the name of Salud Jimenez
were subject in expropriation. During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406 was
subdivided into Lot 1406-A and 1406-B. The RTC sustained the right of the petitioner to
expropriate the three parcels of Riceland, but later partly reconsidered and released Lot
1406-A from expropriation. The petitioner and the Estate of Salud Jimenez entered into
a Compromise Agreement, stipulating that the petitioner agrees to withdraw its appeal
from the Order which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings, the
parties agree that the Estate of Salud Jimenez would transfer Lot 1406-B to the petitioner
in exchange for lot 434, the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B is
considered expropriated in favor of the government and the payment for which
being Lot 434, and the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing
agreement in good faith. Petitioner failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of
Salud Jimenez because the registered owner was Progressive Realty Estate, Inc., not the
petitioner. As a result, the Estate of Salud Jimenez filed a Motion to Partially Annul the
Order. RTC annulled the Compromise Agreement and directed the petitioner to
peacefully return Lot 1406-B to the Estate of Salud Jimenez. CA partially granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition; set aside the order of the RTC on the return of Lot
1406-B to the Estate of Salud Jimenez; and directed that the RTC determine the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B.
Held: The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the
State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose;
and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish
that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already
settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation. With the annulment of
the Compromise Agreement, the payment of just compensation for Lot 1406-B now has
to be made in cash. In that regard, the order of the Court to remand to the RTC for the
determination of just compensation was indubitably for the sole objective of
ascertaining the equivalent monetary value in 1993 of Lot 1406-B or Lot 434. In due
course, the RTC found that just compensation of Lot 1406-B was P6, 200.00/square
meter. Such finding, which the CA upheld, took into due consideration the clear and
convincing evidence proving the fair valuation of properties similar and adjacent to Lot
1406-B at or near 1993. The uniform findings of fact upon the question of just
compensation reached by the CA and the RTC are entitled to the greatest respect. They
are conclusive on the Court in the absence of a strong showing by the petitioner that the
CA and the RTC erred in appreciating the established facts and in drawing inferences
from such facts.

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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SUNTAY

G.R. No. 188376, 14 December 2011
Eminent domain, Just compensation

Facts: Respondent owned a land situated in Occidental Mindoro subject of

expropriation pursuant to PD No. 27. Rejecting the valuation, Respondent filed a
petition for determination of just compensation in the RARAD. After summary
administrative proceeding, RARAD rendered a decision fixing the total just
compensation. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration but RARAD denied its motion.

Held: The enactments of the legislature decreed that the money to be paid to the
landowner as just compensation for the taking of his land is to be taken only from the
ARF. As such, the liability is not the personal liability of Land bank, but its liability only
as the administrator of the ARF. In fact, Sec 10, Rule 19 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, reiterates that the satisfaction of a judgement for just compensation by writ
of execution should be from the ARF in the custody of Land Bank.

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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VERONICA NABLE

G.R. No. 176692, 27 June 2012
Eminent domain, Just compensation

Facts: Veronica Atega Nable (Nable) owns a landholding, a portion of which was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, or CARL). Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the affected landholding at only 5,125,036.05, but
Nable rejected the valuation. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) affirmed the valuation of LBP. Nable instituted against DAR and LBP a
petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC in Butuan City,
which took cognizance of the Affidavit of Nables caretaker, the Farming Experience
and Rule of Thumb Method of Conversion. LBP assailed the use by the RTC of the
farming experience and the thumb method of conversion as gauges of the justness of
LBP and DARABs valuation of the affected landholding.

Held: The Supreme Court finds nothing objectionable or irregular in the use by the RTC
of the assailed farming experience and the thumb method of conversion tests. Such tests
are not inconsistent or incompatible with the factors listed in Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657. Although Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 has not explicitly mentioned
the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion as methods in the
determination of just compensation, LBP cannot deny that such methods were directly
relevant to the factors listed in Section 17, particularly those on the nature, actual use
and income of the landholding. In appraising just compensation the courts must
consider all the facts regarding the condition of the landholding and its surroundings,
as well as the improvements and the capabilities of the landholding.

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SERENO VS. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF

THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
G.R. No. 175210, 1 February 2016
Right to Information

Facts: The CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161
from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July 2005. On 9 June 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then
the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines
(APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM
Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a copy
of the minutes of the meeting held on 23 May 2005.

After APMP sent several letters to CTRM, petitioner, Executive Director of APMP, filed
a petition for mandamus with the RTC. Petitioner sought to obtain official information
dealing with the policy recommendation of the CTRM with respect to the reduction of
tariffs on petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the
recommendation, which would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought
significant losses to the petrochemical industry that undermined the industry's long-
term viability and survival, but also conflicted with official government
pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments designed to support and develop an
integrated petrochemical industry. He has claimed that the implementation of E.O. No.
486 effectively deprived the industry of tariff support and market share, thereby
jeopardizing large investments without due process of law.
Respondents claim exemption from the right to information on the ground that the 23
May 2005 meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the
committee's composition and the nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign
affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the information withheld was within
the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly
related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State
in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a)
of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.

Held: It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex powers to fix
tariff rates vested in the President, that the recommendations submitted for the
President's consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated. Thus, executive
privilege was properly invoked in this case. The constitutional guarantee to information
does not open every door to any and all information, but is rather confined to matters of
public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The State's
policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and
is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

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ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015
Rights of the Accused; Right to Bail

Facts: Enrile assailed the Sandiganbayans Resolutions, denying his Motion to Fix Bail.
He claimed that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that he comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying
the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that he, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

Held: It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes, but is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. For
purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail. Enrile has averred in his Motion to
Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his
favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.

In granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
Enriles social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. At an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced
a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently
fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying Enrile bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. It is relevant to observe that
granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals
of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other hand, to
mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 188165, 11 December 2013
Rights of the Accused; Speedy Disposition of Cases

Facts: This case involves petitions for certiorari, assailing, among others, the
Sandiganbayans dismissal of SB-08-CRM- 0266 entitled People of the Philippine v.
Hernando Benito Perez, et al. for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of
the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan ruled that there was an inordinate delay in
the resolution against respondents. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on
13 February 2001. On 23 December 2002, Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his
complaint with the Ombudsman. On 23 December 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and
Intelligence Research Office) recommended that the case be referred to the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau. The
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 18 April 2008.

Held: The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that
there had been an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the charge
in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. The fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just
to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the
respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and
constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the
respondents right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. If, in
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70), the Court ruled that a delay of almost three years
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his
case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected
only after the accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that
political motivations had played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process; (b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established
procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the
simple factual and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater
reason to hold so in the respondents case.

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DENNIS FUNA VS. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO AGRA

G.R. No. 191644, 19 February 2013
Executive Department; Appointment

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on 1 March 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on 5 March 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on 7 April 2010, the petitioner, in his
capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations,
claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor
General and commenced his duties as such on 5 August 2010.

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on 12 January

2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera
who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on 5 March 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact
that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is
settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.

Held: The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation
of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It
was of no moment that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The
text of Section 13, supra., plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of
his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession
and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of
the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra.,
the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation.
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra., is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants. To construe differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention
of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-
in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or
controlled corporations."

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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G. R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010
Executive Department; Judicial Department; Appointments to the judiciary

Facts: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on 17 May
2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 2009, Congressman
Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately. In its 18 January 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of 8 February 2010,
the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than 22 February 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules,
the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which
led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the
JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of
appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

Held: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time
to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution
were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect
their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists
the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

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ARAULLO, ET AL. VS. AQUINO III

G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014
Judicial Function; Operative Fact Doctrine

Facts: In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because
the Courts interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that
savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a
statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court
should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption
of good faith, in resolving their motion.

On their part, petitioners pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of
appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that
augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President
for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to
Congress should be declared unconstitutional.

Held: The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a judicial function.
The consolidated petitions distinctly raised the question of the constitutionality of the
acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection. Hence, the matter is still entirely within the Courts competence, and its
determination does not pertain to Congress to the exclusion of the Court.

The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being
an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount
fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to
augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and
other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget
execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the
purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless
of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy,
the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and
unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are
sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as
the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within
the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes
must be carried out through legal methods. In this regard, the withdrawal and transfer
of unobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But then, whether the withdrawn
allotments have actually been reissued to their original programs or projects is a factual
matter determinable by the proper tribunal. Also, withdrawals of unobligated
allotments pursuant to NBC No. 541 which shortened the availability of appropriations
for MOOE and capital outlays, and those which were transferred to PAPs that were not
determined to be deficient, are still constitutionally infirm and invalid.

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the
object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House,
the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. An item, as defined
in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. On this premise, it may be concluded
that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power
of item veto, must contain specific appropriations of money and not only general
provisions which provide for parameters of appropriation. An item of appropriation
must be an item characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a line-
item. This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a
specific appropriation of money but also ensures that the President may discernibly
veto the same. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is
the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct
from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in
the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the
expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his
veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense
category belongs to. Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the
caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of
augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded
projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual
determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under
Rule 65.

The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine. As a
general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the
illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in
inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has
essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its
ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of
infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the DAP. Thus, the
Court upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact
doctrine.

Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers,
further enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This
presumption is necessary because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of
the State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law. However,
the presumption may be disputed. At any rate, the Supreme Court agreed during its
deliberations to extend to the proponents and implementors of the DAP the benefit of
the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with the
adoption of the invalid acts and practices.

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TRADE INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

(TIDCORP) vs. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO
681 SCRA 27, 18 September 2012
Admin, Preventive Suspension

Facts: Petitioner TIDCORP is a wholly owned government corporation whose primary

purpose is to guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to any domestic
entity, enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in business in the
Philippines. Respondent Demigillo is then a Senior Vice President in TIDCORP.
Petitioner TIDCORP charged the respondent with grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in
the course of official duties. Petitioner company referred the charged to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel for formal investigation and suspended the
respondent. Respondent assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service
Commission and declaring her preventive suspension to be not in order.

Held: Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the imposition of
preventive suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of
charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

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RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE SECOND

SEMESTER OF 2009
645 SCRA 309, 15 March 2011
Administrative Law; Public Officers, Habitual Tardiness

Facts: This administrative matter emanated from the reports by the Leave Division
under the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) to the Complaints and Investigation
Division, also under the OAS, to the effect that the some employees had been habitually
tardy in the second semester of 2009. On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned
employees to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against them for their habitual tardiness during the covered period, which
habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 1991. The OAS concluded that the concerned employees had
incurred habitual tardiness and that their justifications were unacceptable. Thus, it
recommended the penalties to be imposed on the concerned employees.

Held: It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This
canon includes the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and the
efficient use of every moment of such hours for the public service, because only thereby
may the public servants recompense the Government and the people for shouldering
the costs of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees must
at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire the publics respect for the justice
system. The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court officials and
employees reflect the premium placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image
is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work in the Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative duty of everyone involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts good
name and standing as true temples of justice.

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MARSADA VS. MONTEROSO

785 SCRA 599, 8 March 2016
Administrative Law
Facts: A complaint for misconduct and dishonesty was lodged by petitioner Marsada
against respondent Monteroso in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC. Judge Doyon
issued the writ of execution only as far as the amount of P35,000.00 is concerned. After
the failure of defendants appeal, Marsada sought the implementation of the writ of
execution by Monteroso. However, Monteroso delivered only P25,000.00 to Marsada,
but he requested the latter to sign a prepared typewritten acknowledgment receipt
indicating that he received the amount of P25,000.00 as "FULL AND ENTIRE
SATISFACTION" of the defendant's obligation. Marsada later asked Monteroso for the
balance, but the latter informed him that the defendant no longer had any property or
money with which to fully satisfy the judgment.

Investigating RTC Judge Edgar G. Manilag found Monteroso guilty of misconduct and
the Office of Court Administrator noted that the act of Monteroso constitutes
misconduct. As a sheriff and officer of the court charged with the dispensation of
justice, respondent Sheriff Monteroso's conduct and behavior is circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility.

Held: The Court affirmed the findings of the OCA which was noted to be in accord with
the evidence on record. The writ of execution shall: (1) issue in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines from the court which granted the motion; (2) state the name of the
court, the case number and title, the dispositive part of the subject judgment or order;
and (3) require the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the
writ according to its terms. In this case, Monteroso could enforce the writ of execution
only "according to its terms, in the manner herein after provided." However, he was
remiss in his duty to enforce the writ by collecting only P25,000.00. Even assuming that
he had only been successful in collecting P25,000.00 from the defendant, he still
exceeded his authority in requesting Marsada to sign the typewritten acknowledgment
receipt reflecting the P25,000.00 as the full and complete satisfaction of the writ of
execution.

Marsada did not establish that the act complained of was tainted with corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules. Consequently,
Monteroso's liability only amounted to simple misconduct.

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SUSTENTO V. LILAGAN
785 SCRA 612, 8 March 2016
Administrative Law

Facts: The petitioners have charged the respondent with undue delay in the resolution
of the petition for certiorari they had filed to assail the adverse order issued by Judge
Pocpoc-Lamoste. Subsequently, the respondent sought the termination of the case based
on the withdrawal of the complainant against him. The OCA denied the motion of the
parties.

Held: Respondent is guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a
decision within the 90 day period from the submission of a case for decision is
detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation
of the speedy administration of justice.

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LAI V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 175999, 1 July 2015
Administrative Law; Impartiality of a judge [who was the public prosecutor in the
same case]; Right to be afforded a just and fair trial

Facts: Petitioner Lai was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt by Judge Elumba for
the crime of homicide. On appeal, petitioner raised, among others the following error:
The lower court erred as accused was deprived of due process when this case was
decided by the honorable presiding judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before
he was appointed to the bench.

Held: Any violation of the right to due process cannot be condoned, for the impartiality
of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of
procedural due process. To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the
public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public
prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not
really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no
relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming
the judge. The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that
would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be
conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. No judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot
objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and
strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all
parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the
courts of justice.

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DUCO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 183366, 19 August 2009
Administrative Law; Grave abuse of discretion

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay. The Respondent,
initiated an election protest in the MCTC seeking a recount of the ballots. The MCTC
ruled in favor of respondent. The COMELEC dismissed Ducos appeal.

Held: The COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must have
issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner. The
petitioner did not discharge his burden.

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ESTRELLADO VS DAVID
G.R. No. 184288; 16 February 2016
Civil Service

Facts: Petitioners filed with the CSC-NCR a petition to declare the LTO-CO-SPB
selection procedure null and void. The LTO Grievance Committee dismissed the
petition. Petitioners filed an appeal before the CSC but the latter dismissed the same.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondent.

Held: The appointments in question followed the mandate of the law. The screening
process is that which each department or agency formulates and administers in
accordance with the law, rules, regulations, and standards set by the CSC. If neither the
law nor the implementing rules and regulations define in specific terms or criteria the
particulars of the screening process, then each agency or department is empowered to
formulate its own screening processes subject to the standards and guidelines set by the
CSC. The CA thus correctly concluded that the appointing authority exercised the right
of choice, freely exercising its best judgment, in determining the best-qualified
applicants from those who had the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

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ROSQUETA V. ASUNCION
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823, 19 March 2014
Public Officers

Facts: Petitioner Sr. Insp. Rosqueta apprehended Refuerzo, the body guard of
respondent Judge Asuncion, for illegal possession of firearms. After investigation,
petitioner found out that subject firearm is an evidence in a criminal case for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs assigned to and dismissed by respondent Judge.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Judge should have turned over subject firearm to the
PNP in accord with a Supreme Court circular stating firearms used as evidence in
courts should be turned over to FEO upon the termination of the cases or when it is no
longer needed as evidence. In his defense, respondent Judge that two years after the
dismissal of the criminal case, he contemplated transferring the subject firearm to the
PNP, and put the gun in his trunk. He brought his car to a car mechanic, and upon
remembering about the subject firearm which he forgot to surrender to the PNP, he
instructed Refuerzo to retrieve from his gun from the car trunk.
Held: The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to lower court judges. The conduct
required of court personnel, from the Presiding Judge to the lowliest clerk, must always
be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let
them be free from any suspicion that could taint the judiciary. The objective of
disciplining an officer or employee is not the punishment of the officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the Government. The Constitution stresses that a public office is a public
trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated
in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should
be taken as working standards by all in the public service.

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ARSENIO AGUSTIN VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 207105, 10 November 2015
Public Officers; Citizenship

Facts: Petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). On
October 5, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of
the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the 13 May 2013 local
elections. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that
he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural born
Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte for 25 years. Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in
the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin alleging that the petitioner had made a material
misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality
of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on 31 May 2012.

Held: A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a public office in the
Philippines. Thus, petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on 6 October 2012, after
having renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled
abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He
continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been
already issued his Philippine passport on 23 August 2012. He thereby effectively
repudiated his oath of renunciation on 6 October 2012, the first time he used his USA
passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on 2 October 2012. Consequently, he
could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from 2
October 2012 until 6 October 2012. The petitioners continued exercise of his rights as a
citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA
citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
 ----------------

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET

AL.
G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014
Constitutional Commissions; Prohibition from holding any other office or
employment during tenure; Independence of CSC; De Jure Officer vs. De Facto
Officer

Facts: In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque

III (Duque) as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was thereafter
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo
issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following
government-owned or government-controlled corporations: (a) Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH),
(c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF). Funa filed the instant petition questioning the designation of
Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and
HDMF for being violative of Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure.

Held: Section 14, Chapter 3, Title IA, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees.

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and
functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards
of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the
governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and
functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such
being the case, the designation of Duque was unconstitutional.

Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not
part of the Executive Branch.

In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman.
Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as
Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all
respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. That
notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. A de facto officer is one who
derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is
an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de
facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

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CAGAS VS. COMELEC

663 SCRA 645, 24 January 2012
Election Law; COMELECs Decision

Facts: The petitioner Cagas and respondent Bautista contested the position of Governor
of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local
elections, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Alleging fraud, anomalies,
irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions,
Bautista filed an electoral protest. The petitioner averred as his special affirmative
defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista
did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The
petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether
the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, requiring all decisions to clearly and
distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based; and requiring a
detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

Held: Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides that each Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision,
although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

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LLOREN VS. COMELEC

681 SCRA 167, 18 September 2012
Election Law; Dismissal of Actions

Facts: The petitioner and respondent were the candidates for Vice Mayor in Leyte. For
the alleged mass vote-buying, intimidation and defective machines, the petitioner
commenced an Election Protest Case in the RTC. In the answer of the defendant, he
alleged that the election protest stated no cause of action, insufficient cause of action
and for failure to pay required cash deposit. The COMELEC ruled against the petitioner
for his failure to pay the appeal fee within the period. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal and sent a letter that he paid the motion fee of P300.00
by postal money order. However, the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners
motion for failure to pay required motion fee prescribed under their rules.

Held: The non-payment of the motion fee of P 300.00 at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration did not warrant the outright denial of the motion for
reconsideration, but might only justify the COMELEC to refuse to take action on the
motion for reconsideration until the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action or
proceeding when no full payment of the fees is ultimately made. The authority to
dismiss is discretionary and permissive, not mandatory and exclusive, as expressly
provided in Section 18, Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure itself, to wit:

Section 18. Non-payment of Prescribed Fees. - If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss
the action or the proceeding.

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TALAGA VS COMELEC
G.R No. 196804, 9 October 2012
Election Law; Second-placer

Facts: Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition alleging therein that the petitioner,
despite knowing that he had been elected and served three consecutive terms , still filed
his CoC. The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution declaring the Petitioner
disqualified to run. On election day, the votes casted in Talagas favor were counted in
favour of Ruby as his substitute candidate. Castillo filed a petition for annulment of
Rubys application.

Held: The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified
winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully
aware in fact and in law of that candidates disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the
second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the exception did not
apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent.

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GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 182380, 28 August 2009
Election Law; Release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds

Facts: The petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them
with a violation of Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code,
for having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released,
disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election.
After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the
dismissal of the complaint. The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing
recommendation in its own resolution.

Held: The prohibition of the release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for
any and all kinds of public works depends on the following elements: (a) a public
official or employee releases, disburses or spends public funds; (b) the release,
disbursement and expenditure is made within 45 days before a regular election or 30
days before a special election; and (c) the public funds are intended for any and all
kinds of public works except the four situations enumerated in paragraph (v) of Section
261. It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence that
the acquisition of Lots for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the
public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election
Code was unfounded and unwarranted.

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ELSIE S. CAUSING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 199139, 9 September 2014
COMELEC; Personnel Movement

Facts: During the election period, respondent Municipal Mayor relocated petitioner
from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor, just a few steps
away. Causing filed the instant complaint claiming that Mayors order to detail her to
the Office of the Municipal Mayor during the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC was illegal, and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No.
1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
Held: Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code. The movement
involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor only physically transferred her office area from its
old location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing is not stripped of her functions as
Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely required to physically report to the Mayors
Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is
still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her usual work station. She is
also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she continues to review
their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in
performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by
itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Moreover,
Causings too literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the
provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor was sought to be charged with
an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the
accused.

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CALUZOR V. LLANILO
G.R. No. 155580, 1 July 2015
Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship

Facts: Respondent Llanillo owned the parcel of land to which the petitioner averred that
former took him into as a tenant and giving to him a sketch that indicated the
boundaries of the portion he would be cultivating. Even after the death of the
respondent, the petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to the family of
respondent. Respondents son offered to pay the petitioner in exchange for turning his
tillage over to him. In the end, respondents son did not pay the petitioner forcibly
ejected the petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the
use of a bulldozer.

Meanwhile, the DAR Secretary granted respondents sons application for conversion of
the land to residential and commercial uses. The PARAD dismissed the complaint of
the petitioner stating that there was no consent given to him and that there was no
payment in money or produces given which are the essential elements in establishing a
tenancy relationship. The DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD which ruled that
complainant-appellant is a de jure tenant. CA affirmed the decision of PARAD.

Held: The Court ruled that in order for tenancy relationship to exist, the following
elements must be shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; (4) the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence which
means that the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
In this case, the third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not shown. To
prove the element of consent between the parties, the petitioner testified that Lorenzo
had allowed him to cultivate the land by giving to him the sketch of the lot in order to
delineate the portion for his tillage. This element demanded that the landowner and the
tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely and voluntarily, with neither of
them unduly imposing his will on the other. The petitioner did not make such a
showing of consent. The sixth element was not also established. Even assuming that
Lorenzo had verbally permitted the petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy
relationship between them thereby set in because they had not admittedly discussed
any fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo simply telling him simply that he would just
ask his share from him. The absence of the clear-cut sharing agreement between him
and Lorenzo could only signify that the latter had merely tolerated his having tilled the
land sans tenancy.

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VINUYA V. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, 12 August 2014
Public International Law; Reparations

Facts: In its 28 April 2010 decision, the Supreme Court held that respondent Exec. Sec.
Romulo, et al, cannot be compelled by the petitioners, all members of the MALAYA
LOLAS, an organization established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War, to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals. Petitioners
are now praying that the Court reverse said decision, arguing, among others, that the
Philippines constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Courts ruling
that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited, that under
the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party, and that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the
prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read the foreign
policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the
constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights.

Ruling: Petitioners are not entitled to the injunction. It is basic that the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should
be protected. Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners'
claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the
wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly,
we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
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