DUERO vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS (Jurisdiction) The fundamental rule is that, the lack of

jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction
of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court
did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action.
Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction
upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeals found
support for its ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus: The point simply is that
when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could
have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.
If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be
placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec.
2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment
may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years
from the finality of the same. Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of
the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless
thing. Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never
become final and executory; hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question.
Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.

GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and

BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Decision dated September 17, 1997,
[1]

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 2340- UDK, entitled Bernardo
Eradel vs. Hon. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case
No. 1075, Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bernardo
Eradel entered and occupied petitioners land covered by Tax Declaration No.
[2]

A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the
tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner
politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the
latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened
him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent
remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorneys Fees
against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio
Ruena. Petitioner appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax
declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their
Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the
Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial courts
basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement,
the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a
Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the
agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to
respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent
[3]

Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for
failure to file his answer to the complaint.
[4]

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May

8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was
ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No. 1065 Cad. 537-D to
petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he
vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorneys fees and the cost of the
suit. Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.
[5]

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging
that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr.,
since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to
Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to
the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it.However, the
trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No. 1029, an administrative case between
petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente,
remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was
forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New
Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land,
he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of
the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who
are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
 On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all
surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of
the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for
Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private
respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the
value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the
RTC granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was
made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February
27, 1997. On March 12, 1997, private respondent filed his petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that
private respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said
court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The
Court of Appeals decreed as follows:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All

proceedings in Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075 filed in
the Court a quo, including its Decision, Annex E of the petition, and its Orders and
Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the
Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. [6]

Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it held that:
I.

THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

OF THE CASE.

II
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER
IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.

III

THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.[7]

The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and
that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
RTC after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents failure
to file an answer to the complaint was justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted
to this Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of
his petition, we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in
[8]

holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E of his
[9]

petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal

Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, Note:
Subject for General Revision Effective 1994. But it appears that Annex E of
his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real
Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, Note: Subject for
General Revision Effective 1994. Petitioner also asked this Court to refer
to Annex F, where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40
[10]

per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the
complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox
copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent
appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. But here we find that in its
[11]

decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and
that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its
decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter. Its [12]

action was neither whimsical nor capricious.

Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was
not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party
by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction, we note that estoppel
[13]

has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and
its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable
enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel
[14]

to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. [15]

In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC

in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who
filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the
said court, believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by
[16]

then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that
[17]

jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said
amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief
that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his
landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs
of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to
answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then
filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted
because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that
motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a
better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and
uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land. But his [18]

motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC
a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion,
hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTCs lack of jurisdiction. This
motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the
case was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for
new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the
denial of private respondents motion for relief from judgment, it went on to
issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
 Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in
overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental
rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived
by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over
[19]

the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The [20]

appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself
barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the
action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is
[21]

not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment

as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer
[22]

jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional

circumstances. The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our
[23]

decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act
may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result
of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If
any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the
blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct
forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such
judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.]
[24]

Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters
of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless thing. [25]

Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could

logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of
error would be out of the question.Resort by private respondent to a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order.
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from
questioning the RTCs jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine
that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication
could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who
claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without
appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still
pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have
moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as
defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction
and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not
to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he
initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTCs cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore,
if the RTCs order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land
prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No. 1029 would remain
unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an
injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now
occupies as tenant-lessee.
Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the
appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail
the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case,
no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable
reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the
suit was properly his landlords concern.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 1075 entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order
that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ
of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO
BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS,
ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS
REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO
IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO
LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G.
ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, AND
NARCISO YABUT, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 17, 1997 which
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
assails the Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by
[1]

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. [2]

The factual background of the case is as follows:

Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property
located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City
of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown
occupants of the subject property. [3]

Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that
expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same
terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped
paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate;
the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the
ejectment case against them. [4]

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents, for brevity)

[5]

filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-
payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the
Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to
purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the
purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a
passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered
payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for
consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the
outcome of the negotiation to purchase.
Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered
judgment on September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants,
ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay
jointly and severally P10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their
rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
allowed by law, as well as P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the
suit. As to the 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate
judgment on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform
[6]

Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the
private respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch
47) of Manila (RTC). In a Decision dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained
[7] [8]

the decision of the MeTC.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
(CA for brevity), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated
March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not
by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) the
[9]

only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but
copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3,
paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA). [10]

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching[11]

thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by

petitioner himself and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five
[12] [13]

days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his motion
[14]

for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the

certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.[15]

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for
[16]

reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent

compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition.[17]

Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:

A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER
SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF
THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE
OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED
AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.

B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION

3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY
SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES
BELOW.

C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS

TO LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT
GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.

II.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN
THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE

RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM
OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF
EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE
 EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF
LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.

B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED PRIORITY RIGHT TO
BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE
LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.

C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED
WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.

D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW
RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST
EVICTION.

E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION
FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT
RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PREMATURE.

G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED

THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR
CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
 IV.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEAST P10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM
THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY
VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE
ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.

V.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND
EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS. [18]

Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure

is called for in view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives
of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring
material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been
glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However,
if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As
enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona: [19]

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied).
[20]

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the

petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a
quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997,
the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was
rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-
month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence. Petitioner received
[21]

notice of the assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April
4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only
thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution
denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17,
1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review
which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15,
1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.
We now go to the merits of the case.
We find the instant petition partly meritorious.
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum
shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-
compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-
91. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against
[22]

forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of
personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only
the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of
record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to
[23]

the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be

availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the
rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. [24]

The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against
forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to
[25]

the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South
Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish
and sign the certification.
 We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the
petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States,
for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the
Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines
within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has
adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which
justifies relaxation of the rule.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
[26]

forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the

[27]

petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial

compliance, pro hac vice.
In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3,
paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the
petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to
require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the
interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the
RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court
[28]

deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require
the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section
3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the
[29]

pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for
reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
[30] [31]

doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs.

[32]

National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent submission of the

[33]

missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial

compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.
Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." When[34]

technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified
in exempting from its operations a particular case. Technical rules of
[35]
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice
is an even more urgent ideal. [36]

The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is worth [37]

echoing: cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity

to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide judicial action is
[38]

that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere
technicalities. This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has
[39]

satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion
for reconsideration, as in this case.
[40]

In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the

merits without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the
elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that
the alleged priority right to buy the lot they occupy does not apply where the
landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that
respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the
government has no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the
subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming
that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending
case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.
We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues
in the present petition for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues
which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are
beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These
issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before
it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit
additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to
promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9,
B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
to wit:

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled,
Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Antonio T. Donato, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Filomeno ARCEPE,

Timoteo Barcelona, Ignacio Bendol, Thelma P. Bulicano, Rosalinda
Caparas, Rosita De Costo, Feliza De Guzman, Leticia De Los Reyes,
Rogelio Gaddi, Paulino Gajardo, Geronimo Imperial, Homer Imperial,
Elvira Leslie, Ceferino Lugana, Hector Pimentel, Nimfa Pimentel, AureliO
G. Rocero, Iluminada Tara, Juanito Vallespin, and Narciso Yabut,
respondents.

G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:

Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located

in Manila, covered by a TCT. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint
before the MeTC of Manila for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43

Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that
expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same
terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped
paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate;
the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the
ejectment case against them.

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents) filed a

consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-payment
of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land
Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the
subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots
occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they
counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in a
civil case while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.

In a Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19,

1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the
premises occupied by each of them and to pay. As to the 20 private
respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment on the same day
of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and
dismissing the case without prejudice.

Petitioner appealed to the RTC. It sustained the decision of the MeTC.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition
on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of
the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed,
contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (RIRCA).

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of the

certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself and the
relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five days later, or on April 22,
1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR submitting the duly authenticated
original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.

On June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners MR and its supplement, ruling

Issue:

1) Whether or not the present petition (petition for review on certiorari)

principally assails the dismissal of the petition (petition for review with the CA)
on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to
entertain the petition falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. YES

2) Whether or not the petitioner has adequately explained his failure to

personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule. YES

3) Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3,

paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the
petition, justifies the outright dismissal of the petition. NO

4) Whether or not the instant case should be remanded to the CA. YES
Ruling:

1) YES. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA

is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As
enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners
is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment
and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by
an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the

petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the
court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the
prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on
March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period,
established by jurisprudence. Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA
Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his
motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the
90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on
July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for
30-day extension of time to file a petition for review which was granted by us;
and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within
the period of extension granted to him.

2) YES. The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum

shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-
compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-
91. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against
forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of
personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only
the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of
record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to
the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be
availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the
rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum
shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting
the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to the
physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125
South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally
accomplish and sign the certification.

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the
petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United
States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification
before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the
Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that
petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the
certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.

We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.

3) NO. The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule
6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not
justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the
RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit
additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial
justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may
require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary,
and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a
complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of
the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the records below with his motion for
reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs.
National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent submission of
the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.

Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.

4) YES. Petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits
without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements
of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that the alleged
does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that respondents
cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has
no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject property
located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming that there is a
negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for
consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.

We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in
the present petition for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues
which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that
are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for
certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for
review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require
parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to
receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled,
Gonzaga vs CA (Remedial Law)
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA
vs.
CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY
HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a
parcel of land from private respondent
Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and
containing an area of 240 square meters.
Said lot was specifically denominated as
Lot No. 19 under a TCT and was mortgaged to
the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan.
Petitioners then started the construction
of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on
Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly
identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon
realizing its error, private respondent
informed petitioners of such mistake but
the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in
order to widen their premises. Thus,
petitioners continued with the construction
of their house.
However, petitioners defaulted in the
payment of their housing loan from SSS.
Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by
SSS and petitioners certificate of title
was cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of SSS.
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos.
18 and 19 and demanded from Lucky Homes
that their contract of sale be reformed and
another deed of sale be executed with
respect to Lot No. 18, considering that
their house was built therein. However,
private respondent refused. This prompted
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an
action for reformation of contract and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 36.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. It held that when Lot No. 19 was
foreclosed and sold at public auction, the
reformation, or the swapping of Lot 18 and
Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering
that Sps. Gonzaga were no longer the owners
of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would be
losing Lot 18 without any substitute
therefore. Furthermore, the RTC ruled:
"The logic and common sense of the
situation lean heavily in favor of the
defendant. It is evident that what
plaintiff had bought from the defendant is
Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which
parcel of land has been properly indicated
in the instruments and not Lot 18 as
claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts
being clear and unmistakable, they reflect
the true intention of the parties, besides
the plaintiff failed to assail the
contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same
need no longer be reformed.
A writ of execution was issued. The
petitioners filed a motion to recall said
writ on the ground that the RTC lack
jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), it was vested in
theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga filed a new
complaint with the HLURB, and also a
petition for annulment of judgment with the
CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition, relying on
the doctrine of estoppel laid down in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy.
ISSUE:
WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC to try the case
HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in numerous
cases, is still controlling. In explaining
the concept of jurisdiction by estoppel,
the Court quoted its decision in said case,
to wit:
"It has been held that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he
question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously
for reasons of public policy."
Furthermore, the Court said that it was
petitioners themselves who invoked the
jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It
must be noted that in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners
vigorously asserted their cause from start
to finish. Not even once did petitioners
ever raise the issue of the courts
jurisdiction during the entire proceedings
which lasted for two years. It was only
after the trial court rendered its decision
and issued a writ of execution against them
in 1998 did petitioners first raise the
issue of jurisdiction and it was only
because said decision was unfavorable to
them. Petitioners thus effectively waived
their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves
filed.

G.R. No. 130841 February 26, 2008

SPOUSES VIRGINIA G. GONZAGA and ALFREDO GONZAGA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO AGAN, and ROWENA AGAN, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated April
10, 19971 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43793, denying the petition for review of
petitioners-spouses Virginia and Alfredo Gonzaga of the Decision dated December 20, 1996 of the
Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33; and the Resolution dated August 29, 19972 of the
CA, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners are the registered owners of a residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-240379,3with an area of 247 square meters, more or less, and located in Ecoland Subdivision,
Phase IV, Matina, Davao City. Petitioners admitted that they do not reside at this property.4

In May 1995, petitioners decided to construct a house on the said parcel of land and engaged the
services of a civil engineer to prepare the corresponding construction plan. Petitioners claimed that
there was no occupant on the land when construction began in June 1995.

Sometime in June 1995, petitioners went to inspect the above lot and discovered that a shanty
belonging to private respondents Bienvenido and Rowena Agan had been built on the land in
question.

A demand later made on private respondents to vacate the lot in question went unheeded.5

Thus, on April 26, 1996, petitioners filed a Complaint dated April 18, 19966 against private
respondents for Forcible Entry, Damages, and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Davao City. The case entitled Spouses Virginia Gonzaga and Alfredo Gonzaga v. Bienvenido Agan
and Rowena Agan was docketed as Civil Case No. 3001-E-96. As alleged by petitioners, private
respondents put up the structure by stealth and strategy.

In their Answer dated June 10, 1996,7 private respondents alleged that they are the occupants of a
portion of what is known as the "Sabroso Village." They further alleged that their shanty is within the
land covered by a Free Patent Application dated February 9, 1992 in the name of Ponciano
Sabroso,8 who knew of the shantys existence for a long time and consented to their stay in the
village.

The Ruling of the MTCC

Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a Decision dated August 26, 19969 in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the spouses Virginia G.
Gonzaga and Alfredo Gonzaga, and against the defendants Bienvenido Agan and Rowena
Agan, ordering the defendants to vacate plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. T-240379
and to remove their improvements and structures, or shanty therefrom, and further
defendants are ordered to pay plaintiffs the reasonable value of the use of the land occupied
by them, at P1,000.00 a month, from June 1995, until they vacate, and the sum of
P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, and pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the MTCC held that private respondents failed to rebut allegations that they entered
petitioners property by stealth. The MTCC found as untenable private respondents counter-
allegation that they gained entry to the land in 1983 that is allegedly covered by the Free Patent
Application of Ponciano Sabroso.

The Decision of the RTC

Unconvinced, private respondents appealed the above MTCC ruling to the Davao City RTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 24,772-96. Eventually, the RTC rendered a Decision dated December
20, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED and
judgment is entered dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action for forcible entry.

The counterclaim is likewise dismissed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.10

The RTC predicated its ruling on the premise that petitioners, although claiming to be owners of the
subject property, failed to prove prior actual physical possession, a necessary element in an action
for ejectment. To the RTC, petitioners should have not commenced an action for forcible entry but
an accion publiciana suit.
Thus, petitioners filed with the CA on March 4, 1997 a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 43793.

The Ruling of the CA

On April 10, 1997, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, denying due course to petitioners
petition for review mainly on the strength of the following observations:

A perusal of the complaint would show that apart from claiming ownership of the lot in
question, petitioners have not asserted prior possession thereof, much less the manner of
their dispossession, which is essential in an action for forcible entry.

As correctly pointed out by respondent Court, plaintiffs action should be one for recovery of
possession or an accion publiciana, not for forcible entry.11

From this Resolution, petitioners sought reconsideration. However, the CA, in its second assailed
Resolution dated August 29, 1997, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, we have this Petition for Certiorari.

The Issues

The issues raised in the petition are set forth in the following assignment of errors:

I.

The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to give due course to the
petition for review filed therewith as it committed a gross mistake in appreciating the facts of
the case.

II.

The court a quo erred in holding that petitioners action should not be for forcible entry but for
accion publiciana.12

The Ruling of this Court

The petition must be dismissed.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court
under Rule 65 when an appeal under Rule 45 is the proper remedy and should have been filed.

Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65, the remedy of certiorari may only be availed of in
the absence of any other remedy in the ordinary course of law open to the petitioner. The provision
states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
 aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the CA had already finally disposed of the case with the issuance of the
Resolution dated April 10, 1997 denying due course to petitioners petition for review of the RTCs
decision, and the Resolution dated August 29, 1997 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, the remedy of an appeal under Rule 45 was then already available to petitioners.

Sec. 1 of Rule 45 states:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.

Petitioners, therefore, then had 15 days from their receipt on September 10, 1997 of the Resolution
dated August 29, 1997, or until September 25, 1997 within which to file a petition for review under
Rule 45. Instead, they filed on September 25, 1997 the instant Petition for Certiorari dated
September 18, 1997.

Clearly, the proper remedy in the instant case should have been the filing of a petition for review
under Rule 45. This Court has repeatedly ruled that reviews under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of
Court are mutually exclusive and the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made a substitute
for a petitioners failure to timely appeal under Rule 45.13 Thus, under Sec. 5(f) of Rule 56,14 a
petition for certiorari interposed when an appeal is proper and available may be dismissed.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we overlook the procedural infirmity of the instant petition and
treat it as an appeal under Rule 45, the recourse must still be dismissed.

As it were, the issues raised by petitioners revolve around the matter of possession before private
respondents allegedly entered forcibly the property. Petitioners argue that, contrary to the findings of
the CA and RTC, they had prior possession of the subject property. Pursuing the point, petitioners
state that absolute ownership necessarily connotes possession.

Petitioners posture is specious.

Sec. 1 of Rule 70 prescribes the rules when an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer is
proper, thus:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor or vendee or other
person, against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or person
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
 them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is quite clear from the foregoing provision that for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the person
lawfully entitled to the possession of the property must allege and prove that he was deprived of
such possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. And when the law
speaks of possession, the reference is to prior physical possession or possession de facto, as
contra-distinguished from possession de jure.

To borrow from Justice Edgardo Paras, for a complaint for forcible entry to prosper, the plaintiff must
allege in his complaint that he had prior physical possession of the land and that the defendant
unlawfully deprived him of such possession through any of the grounds provided in Rule 70, Sec.
1.15

The requirement of prior physical possession in ejectment cases was explained by this Court in
Mediran v. Villanueva, to wit:

Juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership, and from this distinction are
derived legal consequences of much importance. In giving recognition to the action of
forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact
has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve
the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and
the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession
of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes
himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against
the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in
a court of competent jurisdiction; and he can not be permitted, by invading the property and
excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to
try the property right.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, the Court stressed the basic inquiry in forcible
entry cases:

The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property
possession de facto, not possession de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the
issue. If ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such question, but
only to determine the question of possession.17

Of the same tenor, but formulated a bit differently, is what the Court wrote in Bejar v. Caluag:

To make out a suit for illegal detainer or forcible entry, the complaint must contain two
mandatory allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff; and
(2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. This latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed property by the
intruder has been unlawful from the very start. Then, the action must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry to the property or, in cases where stealth was employed,
from the date the plaintiff learned about it.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly then, complainants in forcible entry cases must allege and eventually prove prior physical
possession. Else, their cases fail, as here.

Petitioners claim that they have prior physical possession by virtue of their absolute ownership of
the subject land is untenable. Obviously, they equate possession as an attribute of ownership to the
fact of actual possession. They are of course wrong, possession de facto and possession flowing
from ownership are different legal concepts.

We agree with the CA and RTC that the proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion
publiciana case, a plenary action for recovery of possession in ordinary civil proceedings in order to
determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title.19 It differs from a forcible entry
action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper. Additionally,
considering that more than one (1) year has already elapsed from the time that possession of the
subject land was allegedly taken from petitioners, and that an action for forcible entry may only be
filed within one (1) year from the plaintiffs deprivation of possession of the land, an accion
publiciana is the only remedy available to petitioners now to determine who has the better right to
possession of the land.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition, and AFFIRM the CAs Resolutions dated April 10, 1997
and August 29, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43793.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Escobal vs Garchitorena (Remedial Law)

ARNEL ESCOBAL
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon.
David C. Naval, RTC Judge
(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis--
vis of the RTC)
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO,
SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the
PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence
Group of the Philippine National Police. On
March 16, 1990, the petitioner was
conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking at a caf bar and restaurant in
Naga City when he somehow got involved with
a shooting incident that resulted to the
death of Rodney Nueca.
Escobal was preventively suspended from the
service. When arraigned, he pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to
Quash the Information alleging that the
court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
PNP members and officers. RTC denied the
motion.
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its
case and petitioner presented his evidence.
On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic
of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he
argued that since he committed the crime in
the performance of his duties, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion
but ordered the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the
crime charged was committed by the
petitioner in relation to his office as a
member of the PNP.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an
Order declaring that the petitioner
committed the crime charged while not in
the performance of his official function.
The trial court added that nonetheless,
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,the
issue had become moot and academic since
the amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The
petitioner did not have a salary grade of
"27" as provided for in or by Section
4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the
prosecution to amend the Information
pursuant to the ruling in Republic v.
Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include
therein an allegation that the offense
charged was not committed by the petitioner
in the performance of his duties/functions,
nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said
order, reiterating that based on his
testimony and those of his witnesses, the
offense charged was committed by him in
relation to his official functions. He
asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was
enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be
applied retroactively.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to
file a Re-Amended Information and to allege
that the offense charged was committed by
the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his
office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975,
to thereafter transmit the same to the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of
the case to the RTC, contending that the
latter has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the case falls in the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the
RTC
HELD:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation
to their office, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to
their office, it is essential that the
facts showing the intimate relation between
the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not
enough to merely allege in the Information
that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because
that would be a conclusion of law. The
amended Information filed with the RTC
against the petitioner does not contain any
allegation showing the intimate relation
between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction
over the offense charged when on November
24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of
the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed
the crime in relation to office. The trial
court erred when it ordered the elevation
of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending
P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the
offender committed the crime charged in
relation to his office but occupies a
position corresponding to a salary grade
below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court
or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may
be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. In this case, the petitioner was
a Police Senior Inspector, with salary
grade "23." He was charged with homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence,
the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20
and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners contention that R.A. No.

7975 should not be applied retroactively
has no legal basis. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural
law, which may be applied retroactively.

G.R. No. 166429 December 19, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed
and constructed to serve as the countrys show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned
controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it
has not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to
mention its deplorable discredit in the international community.

In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,1 the contracts which the Government had
with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now
before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal
complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the
Courts 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law.

The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan v.
PIATCO,2promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession Agreement
for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III" entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements
thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA
3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of
25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of
PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract
and that the agreement was contrary to public policy.3

At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by
PIATCO and were nearing completion.4 However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of
the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO
for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his Separate Opinion,
Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice Callejo, declared as follows:

Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the
Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of
Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors both local and foreign. After
all, there is no question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and
parcel of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of government.5

PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of
the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004
(2004 Resolution).6However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of
PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA
3 facilities. The holding of the Court on this crucial point follows:

This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA
IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their
construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in
accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of PIATCO and its investors.7

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession
of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate
operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities.8 It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International
Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes,9 although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions
before those two bodies.10

Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the
immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the
issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the
NAIA 3 facilities.

The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of 3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion)13 in
Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for
taxation purposes.14

The case15 was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon.
Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC
issued an Order16 directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to
"take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v.
Serrano,17 the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing
of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation.
The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that "[t]he case record shows that [the
Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the
Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint." Also
on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was
able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was
issued.18

However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21
December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the
present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act
No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-
Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many
respects.

There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No.
8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or
the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher,
and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the
Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount
of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the
Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such amount to
be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the
RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of
Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the
Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform
such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending
expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was
prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA
3] to other parties."19

The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the Government filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January
2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed
three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That
same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.

The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on 10 January 2005.
On the same day, it denied these motions in an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the
third Order now assailed before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the
earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance "the superfluous part of
the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other
parties."20

Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 13 January 2005.
The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005,
and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the
expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005.21

The Government, in imputing grave abuse of discretion to the acts of Hon. Gingoyon, raises five
general arguments, to wit:

(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present expropriation proceedings;

(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of the amount of US$62.3
Million to PIATCO considering that the assessed value as alleged in the complaint was only 3
Billion;

(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from enjoining the performance of acts
of ownership;

(iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was erroneous; and
(v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself from the expropriation case.22

Before we delve into the merits of the issues raised by the Government, it is essential to consider the
crucial holding of the Court in its 2004 Resolution in Agan, which we repeat below:

This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III
facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For
the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as
builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law
and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.23

This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this decision of the Court.
Indeed, Agan, final and executory as it is, stands as governing law in this case, and any disposition
of the present petition must conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004 Resolution.

The 2004 Resolution Which Is

Law of This Case Generally

Permits Expropriation

The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two
aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in
accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA
3 until such just compensation is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid
down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain.

It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines
which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions
of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation,
pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.

The Government does not contest the efficacy of this pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution,24 thus
its application

to the case at bar is not a matter of controversy. Of course, questions such as what is the standard
of "just compensation" and which particular laws and equitable principles are applicable, remain in
dispute and shall be resolved forthwith.

The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has
the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the
payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby
the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State
already owns.25 There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already
owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3
stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment.

However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is
understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation
prior to the takeover by the Government of
NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the
unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as
things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal
was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the
structures.

The determination of just compensation could very well be agreed upon by the parties without
judicial intervention, and it appears that steps towards that direction had been engaged in. Still,
ultimately, the Government resorted to its inherent power of eminent domain through expropriation
proceedings. Is eminent domain appropriate in the first place, with due regard not only to the law on
expropriation but also to the Courts 2004 Resolution in Agan?

The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures,
adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property.26 The public purpose for the
expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on
Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in
the name of the

Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment
to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the
NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority,
another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."27

Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have
acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain
though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be
accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites
under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained.
Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.

Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or
construe these rules in accordance with the Courts prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve
the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is
concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights
and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition.
Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely diminished.

It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or
Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case.

Application of Rule 67 Violates

the 2004 Agan Resolution

The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in
this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No.
8974 which does apply. Earlier, we had adverted to the basic differences between the statute and
the procedural rule. Further elaboration is in order.

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.
Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may
expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling
ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended
for national government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner
than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property
"for national government infrastructure projects."28 Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard
and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.

Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings
through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which necessitate an
authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or
Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular
exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974
concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of
possession.

The first paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 67 provides:

SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depository. Upon the
filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits
with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the
court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit
of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on
demand to the authorized government depositary.

In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states:

SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. Whenever it is necessary to acquire real

property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project
through expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines:

a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof;

...

c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and

importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 hereof.

Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the
project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court
a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

...

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit
with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it
to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the
Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such
payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the
improvements or structures under the replacement cost method,29 or if no such valuation is available
and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.

It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974.
Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can
obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed
value with an authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out
that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA
3 is a national government project. Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect
of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the adjudication of this case.

It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the
exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a
fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from
its own final and executory orders.

Section 2 of Rule 67 provides that the State "shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if [the plaintiff] deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of the court."30 It is thus apparent that under the provision, all
the Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to deposit the amount equivalent to the
assessed value with an authorized government depositary.

Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid down in the 2004
Resolution that "[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent
PIATCO as builder of the said structures"? Evidently not.

If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as
just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of
possession. Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution.
Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the prescription laid
down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the
Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities.

Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that
Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn
violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just
compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the
scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The
following portion of the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting
to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). "x x x Because the Senate believes that, you know, we
have to pay the landowners immediately not by treasury bills but by cash.

Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment, no, of possession, we might as well
pay them as much, no, hindi lang 50 percent.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in favor of the landowners, e.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Thats why we need to really secure the availability of funds.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. Its the same. It says here: iyong first paragraph,
diba? Iyong zonal talagang magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a
payment kaagad. (TSN, Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill 1422
and Senate Bill 2117, August 29, 2000, pp. 14-20)

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, no. Unang-una, it is not deposit, no. Its
payment."

REP. BATERINA. Its payment, ho, payment." (Id., p. 63)31

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It
is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of
Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well
as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules
recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters
regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting
claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint
shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court."32

Given that the 2004 Resolution militates against the continued use of the norm under Section 2,
Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act No. 8974? We find that it is, and moreover, its
application in this case complements rather than contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004
Resolution.

Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits

to the Situation at Bar

and Complements the

2004 Agan Resolution

Rep. Act No. 8974 is entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location
For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes." Obviously, the law is
intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as "national government projects."

Sec. 2. National Government Projects. The term "national government projects" shall refer to all
national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects
undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act
No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or
installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.

As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended,33 which pertains
to infrastructure or development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now
wholly or partly implemented by the private sector.34 Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it
is the project proponent which undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given
infrastructure facility.35 In Tatad v. Garcia,36 the Court acknowledged that the operator of the EDSA
Light Rail Transit project under a BOT scheme was the owner of the facilities such as "the rail tracks,
rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant."37

There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed
and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment
of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that
the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part
of PIATCOs ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment
for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.

Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities
should now be determined. Under Section 415(1) of the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably
immovable or real property, as they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil.38 Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just be
packed up and transported by PIATCO like a traveling circus caravan.

Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by
PIATCO. This point is critical, considering the Governments insistence that the NAIA 3 facilities
cannot be deemed as the "right-of-way", "site" or "location" of a national government infrastructure
project, within the coverage of Rep. Act No. 8974.

There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not, under any sensible contemplation, a "right-of-way." Yet we
cannot agree with the Governments insistence that neither could NAIA 3 be a "site" or "location".
The petition quotes the definitions provided in Blacks Law Dictionary of "location" as the specific
place or position of a person or thing and site as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of
property set aside for specific use."39 Yet even Blacks Law Dictionary provides that "[t]he term [site]
does not of itself necessarily mean a place or tract of land fixed by definite boundaries."40 One would
assume that the Government, to back up its contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that
a "site" or "location" exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles and weeds. There is none.
Indeed, we cannot accept the Governments proposition that the only properties that may be
expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of land. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its
coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered
to the soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the laws policy, refers to
"real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just
compensation."41 Section 4 is quite explicit in stating that the scope of the law relates to the
acquisition of "real property," which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions
adhered to the soil.

It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules commonly provide for a rule for the
valuation of improvements and/or structures thereupon separate from that of the land on which such
are constructed. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 itself recognizes that the improvements or
structures on the land may very well be the subject of expropriation proceedings. Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 7 of the law provides for the guidelines for the valuation of the improvements or
structures to be expropriated. Indeed, nothing in the law would prohibit the application of Section 7,
which provides for the valuation method of the improvements and or structures in the instances
wherein it is necessary for the Government to expropriate only the improvements or structures, as in
this case.

The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered.
Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of
expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the
inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a
variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon
are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation,
and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of improvements
seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through
similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation,
parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a
disparate treatment between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.

Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that laws application in this case, the threshold
test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the
2004 Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any
takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the
extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least
some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The
utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it
assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the
property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of
the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No.
8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.

Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs
the instant expropriation proceedings.

The Proper Amount to be Paid

under Rep. Act No. 8974

Then, there is the matter of the proper amount which should be paid to PIATCO by the Government
before the writ of possession may issue, consonant to Rep. Act No. 8974.

At this juncture, we must address the observation made by the Office of the Solicitor General in
behalf of the Government that there could be no "BIR zonal valuations" on the NAIA 3 facility, as
provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport
terminals. The Court agrees with this point, yet does not see it as an impediment for the application
of Rep. Act No. 8974.

It must be clarified that PIATCO cannot be reimbursed or justly compensated for the value of the
parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands. PIATCO is not the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3
facility is constructed, and it should not be entitled to just compensation that is inclusive of the value
of the land itself. It would be highly disingenuous to compensate PIATCO for the value of land it
does not own. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to the value of the
improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the determination of just compensation cannot
include the BIR zonal valuation under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.

Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the owner of the property
the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements
and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot
apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to "the value of
the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the
"implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or
structures on the land." Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the
improvements/structures are to be based using "the replacement cost method."42 However, the
replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.

In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of
just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate
amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not
only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.

Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the
improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination.43 Yet Rep.
Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take
possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section
4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a government infrastructure project
is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned,
the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking
into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]."44 The "proffered value" may
strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act
No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which "proffered value" should be based,45 as well as
the certainty

of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value.46

In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount of 3
Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of
the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the
erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the
amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of 3 Billion as the proffered value
under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value,
the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its
proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.

How should we appreciate the questioned order of Hon. Gingoyon, which pegged the amount to be
immediately paid to PIATCO at around $62.3 Million? The Order dated 4 January 2005, which
mandated such amount, proves problematic in that regard. While the initial sum of 3 Billion may
have been based on the assessed value, a standard which should not however apply in this case,
the RTC cites without qualification Section 4(a) of Rep. Act No. 8974 as the basis for the amount of
$62.3 Million, thus leaving the impression that the BIR zonal valuation may form part of the basis for
just compensation, which should not be the case. Moreover, respondent judge made no attempt to
apply the enumerated guidelines for determination of just compensation under Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 8974, as required for judicial review of the proffered value.

The Court notes that in the 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, the RTC noted that the concessions
agreement entered into between the Government and PIATCO stated that the actual cost of building
NAIA 3 was "not less than" US$350 Million.47 The RTC then proceeded to observe that while Rep.
Act No. 8974 required the immediate payment to PIATCO the amount equivalent to 100% of the
value of NAIA 3, the amount deposited by the Government constituted only 18% of this value. At this
point, no binding import should be given to this observation that the actual cost of building NAIA 3
was "not less than" US$350 Million, as the final conclusions on the amount of just compensation can
come only after due ascertainment in accordance with the standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974,
not the declarations of the parties. At the same time, the expressed linkage between the BIR zonal
valuation and the amount of just compensation in this case, is revelatory of erroneous thought on the
part of the RTC.

We have already pointed out the irrelevance of the BIR zonal valuation as an appropriate basis for
valuation in this case, PIATCO not being the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facilities stand.
The subject order is flawed insofar as it fails to qualify that such standard is inappropriate.

It does appear that the amount of US$62.3 Million was based on the certification issued by the LBP-
Baclaran that the Republic of the Philippines maintained a total balance in that branch amounting to
such amount. Yet the actual representation of the $62.3 Million is not clear. The Land Bank
Certification expressing such amount does state that it was issued upon request of the Manila
International Airport Authority "purportedly as guaranty deposit for the expropriation complaint."48 The
Government claims in its Memorandum that the entire amount was made available as a guaranty
fund for the final and executory judgment of the trial court, and not merely for the issuance of the writ
of possession.49 One could readily conclude that the entire amount of US$62.3 Million was intended
by the Government to answer for whatever guaranties may be required for the purpose of the
expropriation complaint.

Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire US$62.3 Million is only
inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount
of 3 Billion as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as "to be held by [Land Bank]
subject to the [RTCs] orders,"50should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear evidence that the
Government intended to offer US$62.3 Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the
wording of the Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the
consistent position of the Government on that aspect.

In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and not 3
Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that the higher amount represents the valuation of the
structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the land wherein NAIA 3 is built.
The Order dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence of
contravening proof, the proffered value of 3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should
prevail.

Strikingly, the Government submits that assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 is applicable, the
deposited amount of 3 Billion should be considered as the proffered value, since the amount was
based on comparative values made by the City Assessor.51 Accordingly, it should be deemed as
having faithfully complied with the requirements of the statute.52 While the Court agrees that 3 Billion
should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot deem the Government as having
faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property
owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct
payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.

Writ of Possession May Not

Be Implemented Until Actual

Receipt by PIATCO of Proferred

Value

The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC authorized the issuance of the
writ of possession to the Government notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had
yet been made to PIATCO, despite the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that there must first be
payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did direct the LBP-Baclaran to
immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the
writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the Government shall have actually paid
PIATCO. This is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that
requires immediate payment of the initially determined amount of just compensation should be
effected. Otherwise, the overpowering intention of Rep. Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first
before transfer of repossession would be eviscerated.

Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule
67, or even Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code
merely provided that the Government deposit the initial amounts53 antecedent to acquiring
possession of the property with, respectively, an authorized

Government depositary54 or the proper court.55 In both cases, the private owner does not receive
compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates
immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of the Government.

Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate prepayment, and no
amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards
eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a
position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded just
compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded
immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination
of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed
by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same
degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.

While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no requirement that it
undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as
practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is
inherently more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the
social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree
whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.

The Court has the duty to implement Rep. Act No. 8974 and to direct compliance with the
requirement of immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21
December 2004 should be held in abeyance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to
PIATCO of the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals 3,002,125,000.00.

Rights of the Government

upon Issuance of the Writ

of Possession

Once the Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of 3 Billion, it will be entitled
to the Writ of Possession. However, the Government questions the qualification imposed by the RTC
in its 4 January 2005 Order consisting of the prohibition on the Government from performing acts of
ownership such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. To be
certain, the RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, expressly stated that it was not affirming
"the superfluous part of the Order [of 4 January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding
concessions or leasing any part of NAIA [3] to other parties."56 Still, such statement was predicated
on the notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until final payment of just
compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to perform such acts of ownership.

In deciding this question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored, particularly the declaration
that "[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as
builder of the said structures." The obvious import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid just
compensation, the Government is barred from "taking over," a phrase which in the strictest sense
could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA 3, much less operation of the facilities.

There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and thus allow
the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. For one,
the national prestige is diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For
another, the continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it has not
already. And still for another, the economic benefits to the Government and the country at large are
beyond dispute once the NAIA 3 is put in operation.

Rep. Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that governs the extent of the
acts the Government may be authorized to perform upon the issuance of the writ of possession.
Section 4 states that "the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the implementation of the project." We hold that accordingly,
once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that
are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of
the Writ of Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the
complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and
equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport,
and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport.

The Governments position is more expansive than that adopted by the Court. It argues that with the
writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts de jure on the expropriated property. It
cites Republic v. Tagle,57 as well as the statement therein that "the expropriation of real property does
not include mere physical entry or occupation of land," and from them concludes that "its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the
rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property."

This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle,58 but not from the ratio decidendi of
that case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of possession in favor of the Government was still
necessary in light of the fact that it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the
Government was entitled to the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ vested
not only physical possession, but also the legal right to possess the property. Continues the Court,
such legal right to possess was particularly important in the case, as there was a pending suit
against the Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of possession would serve to safeguard the
Government from eviction.59

At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious, that there is no transfer of ownership as of yet by
virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede that the Government is entitled to exercise more
than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed to
grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner. Certainly,
neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the Governments proposition that it
acquires beneficial or equitable ownership of the expropriated property merely through the writ of
possession.

Indeed, this Court has been vigilant in defense of the rights of the property owner who has been
validly deprived of possession, yet retains legal title over the expropriated property pending payment
of just compensation. We reiterated the various doctrines of such import in our recent holding
in Republic v. Lim:60

The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[61 ], thus:

"Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnors title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or
the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.

x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time
of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property
does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the
decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held
that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to
the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to
public use. In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon
the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although
the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy
further said that both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and
use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is
such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid...."(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is
conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.

Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[62 ] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands
consists of two stages, to wit:

"x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint" x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed.
In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation[63 ] , we ruled that, "the process is not completed until
payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently refuse to pay just
compensation due to the private property owner whose property had been

expropriated. At the same time, Lim emphasizes the fragility of the rights of the Government as
possessor pending the final payment of just compensation, without diminishing the potency of such
rights. Indeed, the public policy, enshrined foremost in the Constitution, mandates that the
Government must pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial
attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right to just compensation.

Final Determination of Just

Compensation Within 60 Days

The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. As
earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just
compensation. The proffered value stands as merely a provisional determination of the amount of
just compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the
Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to
pay the property owner the final just compensation.

In Lim, the Court went as far as to countenance, given the exceptional circumstances of that case,
the reversion of the validly expropriated property to private ownership due to the failure of the
Government to pay just compensation in that case.64 It was noted in that case that the Government
deliberately refused to pay just compensation. The Court went on to rule that "in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property."65

Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final determination of just compensation
may be had. Section 4 provides:

In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agencys proffered value, the
court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date
of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the
just compensation as determined by the court.

We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Rep.
Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the laws avowed policy "to ensure that owners of real property acquired
for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation."66 In this case,
there already has been irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation,
and it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the just compensation due PIATCO within sixty
(60) days from the filing of the complaint last 21 December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it
is feasible to effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination
within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in
Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules.

Of course, once the amount of just compensation has been finally determined, the Government is
obliged to pay PIATCO the said amount. As shown in Lim and other like-minded cases, the
Governments refusal to make such payment is indubitably actionable in court.

Appointment of Commissioners

The next argument for consideration is the claim of the Government that the RTC erred in appointing
the three commissioners in its 7 January 2005 Order without prior consultation with either the
Government or PIATCO, or without affording the Government the opportunity to object to the
appointment of these commissioners. We can dispose of this argument without complication.

It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with
the ascertainment of just compensation.67 This protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule
that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation
proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that
regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does
allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on
expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a
commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of
Court.

But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be sanctioned in
expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the
determination of just compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular, the
governing standards for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement
cost method in the valuation of improvements and structures.68

Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in the
expropriation case on who should be appointed as commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that
such a requirement should be imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v.
Ramirez69 that "there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the recommendations of the
parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to ensure their fair
representation."70 At the same time, such solicitation of recommendations is not obligatory on the part
of the court, hence we cannot impute error on the part of the RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion
in the appointment of the commissioners.

What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these
commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These objections though must be made
filed within ten (10) days from service of the order of appointment of the commissioners.71 In this
case, the proper recourse of the Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to file
an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67, and not as it has done, assail
the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that the expropriation proceedings
in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the commissioners,72 it
is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days from finality
of this decision.

Insufficient Ground for Inhibition

of Respondent Judge

The final argument for disposition is the claim of the Government is that Hon. Gingoyon has
prejudged the expropriation case against the Governments cause and, thus, should be required to
inhibit himself. This grave charge is predicated on facts which the Government characterizes as
"undeniable." In particular, the Government notes that the 4 January 2005 Order was issued motu
proprio, without any preceding motion, notice or hearing. Further, such order, which directed the
payment of US$62 Million to PIATCO, was attended with error in the computation of just
compensation. The Government also notes that the said Order was issued even before summons
had been served on PIATCO.

The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power73 and should not be allowed on
the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature
of the judges rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with
law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge.
We emphasized in Webb v. People:74

To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged
adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves,
however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To
be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct
observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a
general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and
consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and
prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's
integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a
case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and
patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.75

The Governments contentions against Hon. Gingoyon are severely undercut by the fact that the 21
December 2004 Order, which the 4 January 2005 Order sought to rectify, was indeed severely
flawed as it erroneously applied the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act
No. 8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ of possession.
The 4 January

2005 Order, which according to the Government establishes Hon. Gingoyons bias, was
promulgated precisely to correct the previous error by applying the correct provisions of law. It would
not speak well of the Court if it sanctions a judge for wanting or even attempting to correct a previous
erroneous order which precisely is the right move to take.

Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005 Order, without the
benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu
proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned
depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction.76 Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent
power of courts "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice,"77 a power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order.78This
inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it
has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice
to a party litigant.79

Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to make the RTCs previous order conformable to
law and justice, particularly to apply the correct law of the case. Of course, as earlier established,
this effort proved incomplete, as the 4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Rep. Act No. 8974
in several respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most basic
premise of the case that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings.

Nonetheless, the Government belittles Hon. Gingoyons invocation of Section 5(g), Rule 135 as
"patently without merit". Certainly merit can be seen by the fact that the 4 January
2005 Order reoriented the expropriation proceedings towards the correct governing law. Still, the
Government claims that the unilateral act of the RTC did not conform to law or justice, as it was not
afforded the right to be heard.

The Court would be more charitably disposed towards this argument if not for the fact that the earlier
order with the 4 January 2005 Order sought to correct was itself issued without the benefit of any
hearing. In fact, nothing either in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8975 requires the conduct of a hearing
prior to the issuance of the writ of possession, which by design is available immediately upon the
filing of the complaint provided that the requisites attaching thereto are present. Indeed, this
expedited process for the obtention of a writ of possession in expropriation cases comes at the
expense of the rights of the property owner to be heard or to be deprived of possession. Considering
these predicates, it would be highly awry to demand that an order modifying the earlier issuance of a
writ of possession in an expropriation case be barred until the staging of a hearing, when the
issuance of the writ of possession itself is not subject to hearing. Perhaps the conduct of a hearing
under these circumstances would be prudent. However, hearing is not mandatory, and the failure to
conduct one does not establish the manifest bias required for the inhibition of the judge.

The Government likewise faults Hon. Gingoyon for using the amount of US$350 Million as the basis
for the 100% deposit under Rep. Act No. 8974. The Court has noted that this statement was
predicated on the erroneous belief that the BIR zonal valuation applies as a standard for
determination of just compensation in this case. Yet this is manifest not of bias, but merely of error
on the part of the judge. Indeed, the Government was not the only victim of the errors of the RTC in
the assailed orders. PIATCO itself was injured by the issuance by the RTC of the writ of possession,
even though the former had yet to be paid any amount of just compensation. At the same time, the
Government was also prejudiced by the erroneous ruling of the RTC that the amount of US$62.3
Million, and not 3 Billion, should be released to PIATCO.

The Court has not been remiss in pointing out the multiple errors committed by the RTC in its
assailed orders, to the prejudice of both parties. This attitude of error towards all does not ipso
facto negate the charge of bias. Still, great care should be had in requiring the inhibition of judges
simply because the magistrate did err. Incompetence may be a ground for administrative sanction,
but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.

The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a standard that a judge should be inhibited
from hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the judge. Such loss of trust on the part of the
Government may be palpable, yet inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the feelings of the party-
litigants. Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased,
and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand the
judicial process. The test in believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the
litigants claim of bias, but the Courts judicious estimation, as people who know better than to
believe any old cry of "wolf!", whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.

The Court acknowledges that it had been previously held that "at the very first sign of lack of faith
and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit
himself from the case."80But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched rule that "a judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to
his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-

examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of
Justice is not impaired."81 And a self-assessment by the judge that he/she is not impaired to hear the
case will be respected by the Court absent any evidence to the contrary. As held in Chin v. Court of
Appeals:

An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the "just
and valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for
which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. We have repeatedly held that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence and without fear or favor. There should be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and
there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of
the case. To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have
stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other
than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.82

The mere vehemence of the Governments claim of bias does not translate to clear and convincing
evidence of impairing bias. There is no sufficient ground to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon
from hearing the expropriation case.

In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:

(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the
Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation
in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable
to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.

(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment
by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides
certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.

(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the
Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of 3 Billion,
representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.

(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the
NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA
3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the
conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the repair,
reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and
equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining
to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day
international airport."83

(5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60)
days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with "law and equity" as
ordained in Again and the standard set under Implementing Rules of Rep. Act No. 8974 which is the
"replacement cost method" as the standard of valuation of structures and improvements.

(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners
for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67
shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or
the rulings of the Court in Agan.

(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to
PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.

(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the
nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to
conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005
and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE,
pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3
facilities;

2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized start the implementation
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that
are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project;

3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to
determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.

The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the
parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the
appointment of the commissioners decreed therein.

The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Liga ng Mga Barangay vs Atienza, Jr

(Remedial Law)
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE
ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF
MANILA
G.R. No. 154599 January 21,
2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Liga is the national
organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines which pursuant to the Local
Govt Code, constitutes the duly elected
presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter,
and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters. On March 2000, the Liga adopted
and ratified its own Constitution and By-
laws. Pursuant to its Constitution, it also
adopted and ratified its own Election Code.
Thereafter, it came out with its calendar
of activities and guidelines for the
implementation of its election code. The
synchronized elections for highly-urbanized
city chapters was also set on Oct. 21,
2002.
On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council
of Manila enacted an ordinance providing
among other things, for the election of
representatives of the District Chapters in
the City Chapter of Manila and setting the
elections for both chapters 30 days after
the barangay elections.
Upon being informed that the ordinance had
been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his
approval, the Liga sent him a letter
requesting that said ordinance be vetoed
considering that it encroached upon or even
assumed the functions of the Liga through
legislation. However, Atienza stillapproved
and signed the ordinance, and issued an
executive order for its implementation.
This prompted the Liga to file a petition
for certiorari with the SC. Respondents
defend the validity of the assailed
ordinance and executive order and prays for
the dismissal of the petition on the ff
grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is
unavailing; 2) two actions were pending
before the RTC Manila questioning the
ordinance and executive order; 3)
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4)
act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli;
and 5) the city council does not fall
within the ambit of tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions
ISSUE:
WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza
committed grave abuse of discretion when
they enacted and approved the ordinance
purposely to govern the elections of the
Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which
provides a different manner of electing its
officers, despite the fact that the law
mandates such elections to be governed by
the Liga Constitution and By-laws
HELD:
The SC ruled that the action, in its
essence, seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality/illegality of the
ordinance. Thus it partakes of an action
for declaratory relief of which the SC has
only appellate and not original
jurisdiction.
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The
concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be
taken, as according to parties seeking any
of the writs, an absolute unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which the
application therefore will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
The hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for
issuance of extraordinary writs against the
first level (inferior) courts should be
filed with RTC, and those against the
latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of
the SCs original jurisdiction to issue the
writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefore,
clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is an established policy. It
is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and
attention, which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prvent further
overcrowding of the Courts docket.
Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of
Litits Pendentia are present. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or when a final
judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. For litis pendentia
to exist, the following requisites must be
present: 1) identity of the parties, or at
least such parties as are representing the
same interest in both actions; 2) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; 3) identity with respect to the @
preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
Requisites for filing of a Writ of
Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to
issue, the following requisites must
concur: 1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the

Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the
[1] [2]

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs.
Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who
ventured into investing in the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent,
in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation,
petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle
Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a
reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter
condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989,
respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat,
executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly
states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and
delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989
or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and
fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total
amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
 Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent
returned to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-
President, Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial
completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable
forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement
shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery
dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit
still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its
building administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move
in on August 22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find
that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was
constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding
payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand,
prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
150, MakatiCity, a complaint against the former for specific performance and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted
the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus,
respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the
[3]

petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance
of its obligation to the respondent.The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against

defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy
Ng Kok Wei the following:

1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and

Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999,

affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred
unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended,
provides:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
[4]

nature:

xxx

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed

by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.

x x x.

Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction

over the instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific
performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the
owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. [5]

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case,
petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing
such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse. [6]
 Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the
trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can
no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a
factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the
trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and
carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Whether or not [7]

petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result

thereof, are indeed factual questions.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being
assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts. These exceptions are not present
[8]

here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARDILLO401 SCRA 583TOPIC

: Jurisdiction
FACTS:
Judge Sardido decided a case involving Falsification of Documents. Since one of the defendantsin a case
is an RTC judge, he removed the name of the RTC judge from the roster of the defendants.
JudgeSardido's basis for removing the name of the RTC judge is Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89. The
Circularsays that "the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, all cases involving
judges oflower courts and justices xxx"In the case, Judge Sardido referred the criminal aspect together
with the administrative aspect to the SC.
ISSUE:
whether the criminal aspect of the case is cognizable by the SC.
RULING:
No. Only the administrative aspect of the case is what must be forwarded to the Supreme Court.The trial
courts retain jurisdiction to try the criminal aspect of a case involving judges. SC Circular 3-89refers to
administrative cases not to criminal cases.
KATON VS. PALANCA437 SCRA 565
TOPIC:

DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

FACTS:
On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office of theBureau
of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property knownas
Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion
orreclassification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead
patent.Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, that since the subject
landwas no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural
landfor disposition under the Public Land Act.However, there were also several favorable endorsements
that were made to survey the islandunder the request of herein respondents. Then, the records show that,
on November 8, 1996, one of therespondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for the
portion of the island consisiting of8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application on June 8, 1972. Therespondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No.
14527 and OCT No. G-7098 on March3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.Petitioner
assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title coveringcertain portions of
Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same wereobtained through fraud.
Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.The petitioner seeks to nullify the
homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of therespondents covering certain
portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole

island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homesteadpatent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land
to agriculturalland. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective
portions andhave declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying
taxes thereonfor twenty years.Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar
as the island isconcerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a
merehomestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his
right overthe land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. Respondents filed their Answer
with Specialand/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed
a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend
his Complaint
so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.The
Motion
to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration
of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999,
forbeing a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the
trialcourt with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only
Motion forReconsideration of the aforesaid Order.Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of
prescription invoking residual prerogative.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in
thePetition?"
RULING: Yes.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded eitherin a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter,
(2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or theevidence on
record.In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In
Gumabon v.Larin11 we explained thus:"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally
limited to instances when the court clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed toprosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with anyorder of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation ofthe right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for
qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3,Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about noradical change. Under the new rules, a court
may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from thepleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is anothercause of action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by aprior judgment or by statute of limitations. x
x x."12 (Italics supplied)On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, asfollows:"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.

A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected

as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
"A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject
matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time."In appeals by notice of appeal, the
court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appealsfiled in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties. "In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only
over the subject matter thereof upon theapproval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the otherparties."In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, the court may issueorders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigatedby the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appealin accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and
allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The
"residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have l
ost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon thepe
rfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to
thetransmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains
itsso-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigentlitigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore,
on residual
jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection andpreserv
ation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referredto as
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
proprioupon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
Section 2of Rule 1 of the same rules.To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it
dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on
more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" and for
prescription of
the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
todismiss the action.
FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE558 SCRA 63TOPIC :
JURSDICTION / ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTCfound him
guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdictionon the
case .The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches
hasalready precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC

the trial went on for 4 yearswith the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising
the jurisdictional infirmity. Thepetitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter may be raisedat any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further
absent herein, the principle of lacheswill not be applicable.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said
issue
was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA.

RULING:
No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue
of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
byestoppel.Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factualmilieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for
the Sibonghanoydoctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly
as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In
Sibonghanoy, theparty invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the
proceedings hadalready been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches.In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado,after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion forReconsideration a
ssailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action.Her
compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt
and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in
the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural
fear todisobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to
comply.The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
consideringthat heraised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no
considerable period had yetelapsed for laches to attach.Petition for review on certiorari is granted.
Criminal case is dismissed.
HANNAH SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN653 SCRA (7/6/11)
TOPIC:
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as studentregent of UP
to serve a one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner togetherwith her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc(OSFRI).
On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres.Estrada
gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The source of funds, according to theinformation,
was the Office of the President.However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent and system-wide alliances ofstudents conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with theOmbudsman. After due investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal
case against Serana and herbrother, charging them of Estafa.Serana moved to quash the Information,
contending that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdictionover the offense charged nor over her person
in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends thatEstafa falls under Crimes Against Property and not
on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public Officers,only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was notthe governement that was duped, but Pres.
Estrada, because the money came from the Office of thePresident and not from government funds. As to
jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UPstudent regent, she is not a public officer since she
merely represents her peers, in contrast to the otherregents who held their positions in an ex officio
capacity.The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana
RULING:
YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonieswithin the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense iscommitted by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, andthat; 2) The
offense is committed in relation to their office.It is well-established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office. At most, it is merelyincidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by himfor the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
andconferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power,
anindividual is interested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
himfor the benefit of the public.Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The
Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction overthe other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, the SC held that while the first partof Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provisions of lawplaced under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she
is placed there by express provisions of law.Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities, oreducational foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Boardof Regents performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By expressmandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606

Katon v. Palanca, et al., G.R. No. 151149, 07

September 2004.
21JAN
[PANGANIBAN, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Katon contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan,
Palawan, had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition
upon his request and at his instance. However, Palawan authorities then favorably endorsed the request
of Respondent Palanca, together with some others, which resulted in the issuance of homestead patent
in Palancas favor in 1977 among others. In 1999, filed a petition which seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the Palanca et al. as well as the reconveyance of
the whole island in his favor. Palanca et al. filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court
dismissed Katons Complaint as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was dismissed motu
proprio pursuant to the appellate courts residual prerogative. The CA ruled that prescription had already
barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questions this dismissal. He submits that the CA erroneously
invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu
proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual
prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly
exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate
court.
ISSUE:
Was the Court of Appeals correct in applying residual prerogative in dismissing a case motu
proprio based on prescription?
HELD: YES.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the
evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or
action. xxx On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal,
but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial
court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA
referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an
action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under
authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

FIGUEROA V. PEOPLE (CIVIL)

The Court, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on
when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at
length in Calimlim. The general rule should however be, as it has always been, that the
issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal and is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel. ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, to bar a litigant from asserting the
court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the
court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not duffer any
harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches
in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his
appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of
estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith
become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then
enforces, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.
In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the
Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Cavalry once more after more or less 15 years. The same,
however, does not obtain in this instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law.
It is to be applied rarely - only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great case and the equity must be strong in its favor. When
misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking
judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction is null an void for want
of jurisdiction.