GO vs.

CA

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,

almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his
car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. Aneyewitness of the
incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same
to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after
the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by
2 lawyers, the policedetained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought
against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has
been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for
the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions
undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary

investigation.

HELD: Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of
any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary
investigation should have been scheduled to determineprobable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required
appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail
bond.
DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for
allegedly entering into an anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware
and accessories with the Systems Plus, Incorporated.

It appears that four years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the
allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC and on the allegations in an
unverified complaint filed before the Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners
had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact
there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being
conducted.

Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration alleging among others that they
were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy
disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied. They filed a motion to quash
but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation?

HELD: YES. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been
conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation infringed upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case.[22] In Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan,[23] we held that an undue delay of close to three (3) years in the
termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in that case warranted the dismissal of the case.

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their
case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was
still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were
merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to
follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the
charges against them had already been dismissed.

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause
against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be
present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Webb vs. de Leon

Facts: Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre.
Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge Zosimo
Escano who inhibited himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair
Judge Escano issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274,
presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the
others voluntarily surrendered. They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.

Issue:

(1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them

Ruling: In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can
exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises
under that person's control. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. That before issuing warrants
of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty
of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.