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SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that
respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document
against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy
Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v.
Rosa C. Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal
became final and executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On
February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.[3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,[4] informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for
the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito
Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for
violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal
Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of
Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in
truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April
11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using
any other name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married
only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are
pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasig City;[6] (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business,
vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the then
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;[7] (3) complaint for dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before
the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted
out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before
the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of
public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information
relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent.
She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
disbarred.
2

Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he


alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding
bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.[10] He also
states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal
with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct,
which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no
way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as
counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel
only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the
alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth
certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant
failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted
respondents motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution
based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She
stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those
who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various
criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals
where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint
or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice
imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and
the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of
trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest.[15] Only by such confidentiality and protection
will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is
that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice.[16] Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will
encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount
importance to the administration of justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is
the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his clients secrets or
confidence and not to abuse them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client
relationship,[19] and continues even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal
profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely
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go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation
with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.[21] With
full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal
representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors
essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[22]
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment.[23] The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife
leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In
their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease
rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by
counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms
of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of
their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client.
As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid
lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to
counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong
than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.[26] The client must intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered
to the opposing party,[29] an offer and counter-offer for settlement,[30] or a document
given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,[31] are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.[32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.[34]
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If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal


assistance,[36] and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even
specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent.
She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is
a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.[38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
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SECOND DIVISION

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, A.C. No. 6174


Complainant, Present:

CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING,
Respondent. November 16, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1] of the Board of Governors,


Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint[2] for disbarment filed by
Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City
Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent
drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks.[3] Respondent
advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter
before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation[5] filed by


respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the
latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent
appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the


Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he
drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in
deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional
engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee
for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant
would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant,
based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
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To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant
against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand
letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal
cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time
friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30 years since complainant is the
godmother of Ms. Torralba.[7] Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he
accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters request that they be represented by him in
the cases filed against them by complainant and complainants daughter. He
maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial
pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him
and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings should
only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter
of the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties
achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his
efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the
other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly
led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict
of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for
the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[8]

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating


Commissioner,[9] as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant


regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.

It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa and I.S. No. 03G-
19582-84 entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants
in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise mother and
daughter and that these cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and
complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and


complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal
favor to complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the
moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored
checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The
fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that
respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the
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criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by


referring to complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter sent to the defaulting
debtor[10], respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client relationship. Such
admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying
with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends
beyond the duration of the professional relationship.[11] We held in Burbe v. Atty.
Magulta[12] that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.[13]

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a] lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from
representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without
showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties,
respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of


public policy and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns of the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.[15]

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.[16]

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests


of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.[18] This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[19] Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.[20] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[21]

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of
action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the
opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the
confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
8

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of
the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of
law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a
copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
9

G.R. No. L-23183 December 29, 1924


FILOMENA ONA, applicant.
PATRICIA ISLAS, ET AL. (opponents), petitioners, vs. SERVILIANO PLATON, Judge of First
Instance of Tayabas, and FILOMENA ONA, Respondents.
Tiburcio Ind. Villacorte for petitioners.
Zoleta and Trinidad for respondents.
OSTRAND, J.:
It appears from the record that in December, 1920, the herein petitioners filed a petition
in the Court of First Instance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act for the review
of a decree in a land registration case. On March 23, 1921, the court denied the
petition for review without permitting the petitioners to present their evidence. Upon
appeal to this court the order denying the petition was reversed and the record
remanded to the court below for the reception of evidence. 1
The evidence having been received, the Court of First Instance on April 16, 1924, again
denied the petition for a review and on May 5, 1924, the petitioners herein filed a
motion for a new trial. The motion was heard and denied on the 17th of the same
month and two days later due notice of the denial was sent to the attorney for the
petitioners at his office address in Manila. The letter containing the notification was
returned to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the latter part of June, 1924, marked
"unclaimed." On August 26, 1924, the petitioners presented their exception to the order
of May 17th denying the petition for a new trial and announced their intention to
appeal to this court. A bill of exception was filed on August 29, 1924, but the trial court
refused to approve and certify it on the ground that the time for presenting it had then
expired.
On September 2, 1924, an order was entered declaring the decision in the land
registration case final, and on the 24th of the same month a writ of possession was
issued directing the sheriff of the province to place the applicant for registration, the
herein respondent, Filomena Ona, in possession of the land. The petitioners thereupon
brought the present action for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance to approve and certify the bill of exceptions filed on August
29, 1924.
Counsel for the petitioners argues that under section 26 of Act No. 2347 an appellant in
a land registration case has thirty days from the date upon which he receives a copy of
the decision within which to present his bill of exceptions; that the order from which his
clients desire to appeal must be considered a "decision" within the meaning of said
section; that as he never received a copy of the order, the thirty days period had not
begun to run at the time the bill of exceptions here in question was presented.
It may well be doubted whether section 26 of Act No. 2347 is applicable to appeals
from orders relating to petitions for review, but assuming that such is the case, the
respondent judge was nevertheless, in our opinion, fully justified in declining to certify
the bill of exceptions in the present case. The bill was not presented until over three
months after the notice of the order from which the petitioners desire to appeal should
have reached their counsel in the ordinary course of the mails. The notice was duly sent
by registered letter to counsel at his address in the City of Manila and it is not intimated
that the address was erroneous. There is nothing in the record to show that the postal
authorities did not properly perform their duty and we must presume that the usual
notice of the arrival of the letter at the Manila post office was delivered at the office of
said counsel. He failed to claim the letter and it was returned to the Court of First
Instance marked "unclaimed ." His failure to receive a copy of the order in question was
therefore entirely due to his own negligence of which he cannot now be allowed to
take advantage. As a practicing lawyer it was his duty to so arrange matters that
official communications sent by mail would reach him promptly. Having failed to do so,
he and his clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence. That he may have
been absent from his office at the time the notification here in question arrived is no
excuse.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with the costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.
10

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino
while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross
immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and


is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant.

Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.2

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and


Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight
years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy)5 seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated
the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for
lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the
same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-
evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
37, Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
11

administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal


acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system
or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.9
(Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character.10

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition
meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the
legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the
herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent
returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard
and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was appointed
as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessors
Office, which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School
Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by
helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida
P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D.
Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office;18 (5)
Certification by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare
Development Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20
(7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine
(9) Barangay Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial
Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-
Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior
Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that
respondent has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office
of the Human Resource Management Officer attested that he has no pending
administrative case.27 He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or
accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he
has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28

Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated


Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30
His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to
actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a
regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his
12

previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered
by complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his children in compliance with
the Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent
was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu
National High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service
from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman
Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.36 From
the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has productive
years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1wphi1


He is, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance
with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent


Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

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