Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Trumps Foreign Policy: 2/3rds
Reactive, 1/3 Proactive
Carlyle A. Thayer
October 29, 2017

As preparation for President Trump's tour to Asia, we request your assessment of key
issues as follows:
Q1. Nearly a year since Trump has officially taken office, many people wonder about
if his Asian policies are reaction-based rather than sustainable and effective ones.
What are your opinions about his policies to the region?
ANSWER: Trumps foreign policy is two-third reactive and one-third proactive. Trump
has been forced to focus on two major issues: (1) the Assad regimes use of chemical
weapons has forced Trump to take up the fight against Islamic State terrorism in Syria
and Iraq and oppose Irans spoiling role and (2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and their means of delivery in North Korea. Trump has adopted reactive policies
without an overall strategy. This is exemplified by Trumps long-war in Afghanistan.
The one-third proactive element is reflected in Trumps promotion of free and fair
bilateral trade. He pulled the U.S. out of the TPP, he is threatening to withdraw from
the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico, his is pressuring
China to level the economic playing field, and he has put the Korea-US trade
agreement (KORUS) in his sights.
Q2. How do you assess the Trump administrations approach to Southeast Asia thus
far?
ANSWER: Trumps approach to Southeast Asia has been transactional with a heavy
stress on bilateral relations. It appears that multilateralism is not in Trumps
vocabulary. Trump has received four heads of government from Southeast Asia in the
White House, the first was Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, followed by the prime
ministers of Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Trump invited President Duterte of the
Philippines but he has yet to take up the invitation. Trump focused heavily on
economic and commercial issues and was wooed when Southeast Asian leaders
announced the value of goods they would purchase from the United States.
The Trump Administration, thanks to Secretaries James Mattis and Rex Tillerson, has
enunciated a clear policy on the South China Sea. But this does not form part of any
discernable strategy.
Q3. North Korea will be focused much on Trumps tour to Asia, including meeting with
families of Japanese kidnapped people by North Korea, a (likely) visiting tour to DMZ.
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But how will he assure the region about plans to convert pressure into diplomatic
opportunity, not war? How do you anticipate North Korean leadership will react to
Trump's tour?
ANSWER: The Trump Administration, to use an American expression, speaks with a
forked tongue. Trump revels in military threats such a fire and fury and total
destruction of North Korea, while Secretaries of State and Defence, respectively,
Tillerson and Mattis, speak of diplomacy. Trump will give reassurances to South
Korean and Japan that if they are attacked by North Korea the United States
unequivocally will meet its alliance commitments. This could well lead to a limited or
even nuclear war. President Trump is unlikely to play the diplomatic card as this would
be a sign of weakness in his view. Rather Trump will stress that North Korea will be
forced to stand down from its nuclear program due to external pressure.
North Korea has always been good at brinkmanship engaging in provocation but just
sort of escalation to armed conflict. North Korea will unleash a propaganda barrage
against the deranged American president and threaten all sorts of action. Trumps
visit to Asia will only reinforce North Koreas leaderships conviction that the United
States intends to do them harm and that nuclear weapons are the only means to deter
the U.S.
Q4. Will South China Sea issue be overshadowed in Trumps agenda during the tour?
How will Trump reassure American partners and allies about commitment to freedom
of navigation and the rule-based order?
ANSWER: Unless China undertakes some highly provocative act, maritime disputes in
the South China Sea will be overshadowed by North Korea and economic issues.
President Trump has already approved a new more proactive freedom of navigation
plan (FONOPS) for the South China Sea. Trump will repeat the same formulations on
the South China that were put in the joint statements issued with the prime ministers
of Vietnam and Singapore. It is clear FONOPs will continue along with continuous
patrols by U.S. Navy warships and continuous flights by U.S. Air Force bombers on and
over the South China Sea. As for a rules-based order, Trump has no strategy to
implement his call for China and the Philippines to implement the Award by the
Arbitral Tribunal and for adherence to international law including UNCLOS. Trump will
give political support for the early conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct. On
this aspect it will be all Trump talk but no action.
Q5. How will Trump see the trip to advocate for American economic interests in the
region, as well as about the US sustained economic engagement policy with the
region?
ANSWER: When Trump signed the Executive Order withdrawing from the Trans Pacific
Partnership he made clear that bilateral free trade agreements were the only means
of doing business with the United States. Trump Administration officials have stated
publicly that the United States will only support trade and investment liberalization
under APEC if each nation agrees to high-standards in services, protection of
intellectual property and e-commerce and digital commerce. These officials have
stressed that these standards must be met if they want a free trade agreement with
the United States. These commitments must be included in national work plans with
clear benchmarks and deadlines. In sum, a Free Trade Agreement in Asia and the
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Pacific will only come to fruition when all APEC members are committed to Trumps
standards.
Q6. Vietnam has consecutively welcomed two American presidents. What can be
implied from the events with the engaging efforts by Hanoi with Washington, and the
impacts from these visits with the Vietnam-US relationship?
ANSWER: Vietnam benefits the most by hosting President Trump on an official visit to
Hanoi. Prime Minister Phuc already obtained Trumps commitment to expand the
comprehensive partnership across a wide number of areas. Nothing has
fundamentally changed over the last five months. The United States recognizes
Vietnams role as a constructive contributor to regional and global security, especially
Vietnams commitment to UN peacekeeping. Both sides acknowledge a growing
convergence but not congruence in strategic interests.
There is fluidity in the economic relationship with both sides willing to discuss how to
increase the involvement of American companies in Vietnam. Both sides share a
commitment to cooperate to a certain extent on defence and security issues, including
possible collaboration on defence technology and co-production. Vietnam has
obtained a commitment from the United States to continue its efforts to address war
legacy issues such as Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance. In sum, the
comprehensive partnership will continue to serve as the firm foundation for closer US-
Vietnam relations in coming years. Vietnam will retain its strategic autonomy and
independence by multilateralizing its relations with the major powers but not aligning
with one.
Q7. Personally, what are your the most concerning issues from President's trip to Asia?
ANSWER: I am most concerned by media reports that President Trump will cut short
his visit to Manila and not attend the East Asia Summit. This would be a terrible blow
to creating a more effective leaders led forum that could over time address security
issues. I am also concerned that Trump will be turned off by ASEANs go-slow
consensus approach and act if only inadvertently to undermine ASEANs centrality
in Southeast Asian affairs by courting China. I am most concerned that Trump may
leave the impression that the United States is becoming an isolationist power that has
given up its traditional leadership role, particularly in Asia. This will only clear the stage
for Xi Jinping to make China great again.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Trumps Foreign Policy: 2/3rds Reactive, 1/3
Proactive, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October 29, 2017. All background
briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.