1. G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,
vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.,
MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC.,Respondents.
Subject of review: The CA declared the sales and derivative titles
over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and
void.
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on
October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S.
Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and
Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO.
M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by
SILVERIO, SR.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The administrator first appointed by the Court was
EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a
Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the
heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw
as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the
intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was
appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active
exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new
administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and
SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of
administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was
removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO,
JR. was designated as the new administrator.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the
motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting
letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated
SILVERIO SR. as administrator.
Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for
partial consideration to the Order dated 12 December
2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus Order
dated 31 October 2006 upholding the grant of Letters of
Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed SILVERIO
SR., ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and
functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) rendered a decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR.
as administrator.
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certiorari
before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619
challenging the 28 August 2008 decision of the Court of
Appeals. On 11 February 2009, the Supreme Court
issued a resolution denying the petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed
judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of
discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO
JR.s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court on
11 February 2011, denied the motion with finality. An
entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and
LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an
order denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition. The movants filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October
2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is
pertinent to the present petition reads: "WHEREFORE, above
premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves
to grant the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No.
82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City, covered
by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of
Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus
St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT No.
137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S.
Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to undertake
the proper procedure or transferring the titles involved to
the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in
Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests,
penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute the
residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo
S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal
Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio
and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance with the law on
intestacy.
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October
2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the
registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as evidenced by
TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica
P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the lot located
at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23
December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued toMonica
P. Ocampo. The latter subsequently sold said property to ZEE2
Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was
issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C.
SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the
intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the decretal
portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010
as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in
the name of defendant MONICA OCAMPO or any of her
successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles, as
NULL AND VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-
2011000190 in the name of ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. or
any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative
titles, as NULL AND VOID;
 4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and all
of its derivative titles; and 5. Reinstating the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of RICARDO
C. SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE INTSIA
PROPERTYxxx
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA
questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R.
SP No. 121172 Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio,
Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated
March 23,2011 granting Silverio, Sr.s application for preliminary
injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf
from committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject
properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any
way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other
documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order
dated March 23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.s motion or
disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3)
Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary
injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August
18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all
Hence, this petition contending that the CA committed a reversible
error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridgep
roperties upon the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the
sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not include
resolving issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should not
have stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties
sold, which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and
Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court should not
have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to
third parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial
settlementof the estate, especially so when separate actions
assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were already
instituted by petitioner.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment
contending that the intestate court improperly nullified the titles
despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked and may be cancelled only in a
direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Xxx In any case,
respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for value
SC
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having
jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or
conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by
the prospective heirs or administrator
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was
executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of
the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated
derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null
and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloff which
reads: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court
hereby disposes and orders the following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172 is DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June 2011 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating
MR. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is
AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly
DENIED for lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23
March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JRs
Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge
Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly GRANTED
in that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order declaring the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all
derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property
null and void is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was
annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so
far as it authorizes the saleof the three properties in question was
not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and
void.It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision
that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or
obligations.
To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited
only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of
SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and nothing else.
The records show that when the preliminary injunction was issued
on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties were
already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2
RESOURCES INC.7
We affirm the CA.
The CA did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the
intestate court annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded
solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be
prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator
by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale
was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court
under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which
remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the
aforesaid sale.
2. G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo
T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, USA-
GRANTED
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at 30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss --- Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place
of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the
same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal of the petition.
On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that
the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
CA- in favor of respondent wife
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid,
and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
----"resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of
 Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December
17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality
and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file
the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if
the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.
The Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part: SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. An
"interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. 77
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as
his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148
of the Family Code.