You are on page 1of 3

Asia Program

Policy Brief
February 12, 2010

Summary: Just as the United States


Why Japan is Important to the West
has gone back-and-forth on the
strategic importance of Japan, Tokyo by Michael J. Green1
has debated the nature of its role in
the international system. The result-
ing oscillation by both states neces-
In the summer of 1853, Commodore Fifteen years after the clash between
sitates a careful examination of Matthew Perry pulled his naval squad- Perry and Marshall, the Meij-era political
Japan’s importance. The U.S.-Japan ron out of Shanghai and set sail for Edo philosopher, Nakae Chomin, published
security alliance enables strategic Bay, where he intended to carry out his A Discourse by Three Drunkards on
stability in Asia, and Japan remains orders of opening the Tokugawa Shogu- Government, a fictional debate on Japa-
both a potent economic force and nate to commerce and friendly relations nese foreign policy between “a gentleman
a democratic anchor in the region. with the United States. He later said that, of Western learning” who wore a bowler
Both the United States and its Euro- “the Japanese are a rational people... hat and extolled the virtues of democracy
pean allies must consequently step who would be more open to conviction and economic modernization, and a “tra-
up strategic dialogue and coopera- than their neighbors the Chinese, over ditionalist” who still wore samurai swords
tion with Japan.
whom in almost every essential they and called for a strategy of military ex-
hold a vast superiority.” Left behind in a pansion and autarky in Asia. A Discourse
furious rage was the U.S. Commissioner by Three Drunkards foreshadowed 150
to China, Marshall Humphrey, who had years of debate in Japan about whether
briefly commandeered several of Perry’s the nation’s destiny ultimately lay with
warships to display the flag and protect the West or with Asia, or whether Japan
American merchants during the Taiping could—as the early 20th century
Rebellion. Shortly before the Navy pulled modernizer, Inazo Nitobe, urged—
out, Humphrey had sent a report to the become a “bridge across the Pacific.”
U.S. Secretary of State arguing that the
United States had the “highest interests” The dangers of a drifting alliance
in “sustaining China,” lest the Celestial
Kingdom “become the theatre of wide- The American strategic pendulum
spread anarchy, and ultimately the prey of continues to swing between Japan and
European ambition.” America’s destiny in China—just as Japan’s sense of iden-
Asia, he pleaded, was with China. tity hovers between Asia and the West.
Today, the Japanese government frets
It would not be the last time that mili- about American “Japan passing” because
tary and diplomatic leaders would clash the Obama administration argues that
over Asia policy—nor the last time that none of the world’s major challenges
American strategy would swing in can be solved without China (seemingly
emphasis between Japan and China. consigning Japan to a secondary role).
1744 R Street NW Meanwhile, the Obama administration
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 745 3950
F 1 202 265 1662 1
Michael J. Green is senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and associate professor at
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He served on the National Security Council staff from 2001 through 2005, finish-
E info@gmfus.org ing as special assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Asia Program

Policy Brief
is pushing back against Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoya- First, Japan’s alliance with the United States serves as the single
ma’s proposal for an East Asia Community that his supporters most important element in maintaining a stable strategic
argue would help Japan reduce its “dependence” on the United equilibrium in Asia at a time of profound power shifts that
States. might otherwise heighten insecurity, rivalry, and conflict. The
U.S.-Japan alliance deters North Korea from using force against
Most of the rest of Asia watches these swings in American and its neighbors or China from using force against Taiwan. U.S.
Japanese orientation with some consternation, because from bases in Japan are indispensable to the ability of the American
their perspective one thing is obvious: a strong U.S.-Japan military to maintain a forward presence in the Western Pacific
alliance actually strengthens each partner’s relations with the rest and to project power as necessary across the entire hemisphere
of Asia. The Bush administration unapologetically put Japan at as far as the Gulf and Southwest Asia. For the rest of Japan’s
the center of its Asia strategy and the U.S.-China relationship neighbors, the alliance allows muted defense spending and a fo-
became stronger and more stable than ever—not in spite of the cus instead on economic development and regional integration.
first seat for Japan, but because of it. Prime Minister Junichiro Take away Japan as an ally of the United States and the West, and
Kozuimi used to argue that his strong partnership with the the rest of Asia takes a darker turn.
United States enhanced Japan’s diplomatic position in Asia, and
except for perennial difficulties with China and the populist Second, Japan remains the second largest economy in the world
left-wing government of Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea (and in exchange rate terms, and the second leading contributor
some self-inflicted wounds caused by the Prime Minister’s visits to all of the critical international institutions that uphold the
to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine), Japan’s position in Asia neoliberal order, from the United Nations to the International
was strong under Koizumi. The 2008 survey from the Chicago Monetary Fund and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Council on Global Affairs on “soft power” in Asia found that Perhaps more importantly, Japan is arguably the world’s leader
Japan tracked ahead of China and behind only the United States in advanced technologies, from robotics to smart grids and
across the region in terms of perceived influence. Other polls hybrid engines, that will be critical to creating a “green” economy
by Gallup demonstrated Japan well ahead of any other Asian in the 21st century. Japan’s economy is maturing and slowing
nation in the esteem of South and Southeast Asians. In contrast, down, to be sure, but the woes of the Japanese economy today
most Asian leaders have reacted with concern at Hatoyama’s East are being overplayed by the media just as the strengths of Japan’s
Asia Community proposal—not because of the idea itself, which economy were exaggerated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Japan
many had previously endorsed, but because it appeared aimed at is a rich, high-technology country and will remain so for the
weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance. indefinite future.

Both Obama and Hatoyama have come to recognize the pitfalls Third, Japan anchors a growing number of successful democra-
of any drifts in the bilateral relationship. In his November 14, 2009 cies within Asia. While Japanese leaders continually debate their
speech, in Tokyo, President Obama reiterated that Japan would re- identity, on the ground Japanese governments of all stripes are
main “the cornerstone” of U.S. policy in Asia, and Hatoyama used doing more than ever before to reinforce democracy, human
his summit meeting with Obama that day to reassure the public rights, rule of law, and good governance as Asian and not just
that he believes the United States has an “indispensable role” in the “Western” norms. Since at least 2004, conservative Liberal
Asia-Pacific region. Democratic Party (LDP) governments argued in East Asian
forums where no Westerners were present that the region must
Rediscovering Japan’s importance do more to advance democratic principles. The liberal-leaning
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government has eschewed
Reassuring words on the occasion of a bilateral summit will only some of this “neocon”-sounding rhetoric on democracy, but
go so far, however. The important thing will be for both leaders the new government is also much closer to Japan’s small NGO
to demonstrate with actions the priority they place on the community than the LDP, and has consequently been far more
alliance. And for that purpose, it is critical to remind ourselves outspoken about human rights violations in China and other
why Japan is important to the West and should remain the authoritarian states. South Korea, India, Indonesia, and other
cornerstone of U.S. (and one would hope all democratic Asian democracies continue to champion their own democratic
nations’) strategies toward Asia. brands vis-à-vis a rising China, even as they debate how much

2
Asia Program

Policy Brief
to “interfere” in the affairs of other states. But as that discussion
continues in the region, Japan can serve as a bulwark against About GMF’s Asia Program
the dangerous notion that there are shared “Asian values” that
The German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program addresses the implications
somehow privilege authority over human dignity.
of Asia’s rise for the West—in particular, how Asia’s resurgence will im-
pact the foreign policy, economic, and domestic challenges and choices
A middle power?
facing the transatlantic allies—through a combination of convening,
writing, strategic grants, study tours, fellowships, partnerships with
It is not only important for the United States and the West to
other GMF programs, and partnerships with other institutions. Led by
appreciate why Japan is essential to sustaining a liberal and
Senior Fellow for Asia Daniel Twining and Transatlantic Fellow Andrew
prosperous international order, but also for Japanese themselves
Small, the program’s initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum
to make this assessment. In between the debate over Japan’s
and India Forum, seminars and other activities in Japan, a Japanese
Western and Asian identities is a small but growing school of
fellowship program, Asia-related panels at GMF’s flagship events at
thought arguing that the nation should be less ambitious and
Brussels and Halifax, and a paper series on transatlantic approaches to
seek instead the role of a “middle power.” Some of the aca-
wider Asia and on deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and
demic proponents of this view mean that Japan should have a
the West. For more information see http://www.gmfus.org/asia.
more activist international role akin to Australia, New Zealand,
or Canada, which would not be a bad model. But for not a few
About GMF
politicians in Japan, the middle powers that seem most appealing
are idealized versions of Sweden and Switzerland, where national
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
resources might be spent on creating a welfare state and interna-
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
tional relations involve more neutrality and less risk. It was this
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
illusion that led many leading DPJ politicians to argue during
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
their transition to power that Japan’s role in Afghanistan should
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
be to serve as a “neutral broker” that could mediate between
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
NATO and the Taliban—a role that would have badly undermined
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
the West’s goals in Afghanistan and befuddled, if not encouraged,
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
the enemy.
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
Japanese leaders will have to make the arguments to the Japanese
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both
people about why their nation is so crucial to the international
sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
order, but the United States can help by stepping up strategic
DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels,
dialogue with Japan in the wake of the 50th anniversary of the
Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 2010—a good occasion for
crafting a fresh vision for the alliance. NATO and the European
Union should also encourage higher-level strategic dialogue and
cooperation with Japan. Indeed, the EU will find that its China
policy will improve markedly once Brussels demonstrates the
diversity and intensity of its other partnerships in Asia.

You might also like