Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

Surnames

1. An adopted child can revert back to his original name, upon meritorious
grounds.
We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be using a
name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person
may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other
surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What
the law does not prohibit, it permits.||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, [May 21,
1992], 284-A PHIL 643-663)
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind
that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and
child. ||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, [May 21, 1992], 284-A PHIL 643-663)

2. Middle names may be dropped, by virtue of a court order and only upon
meritorious circumstances.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's
surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only
a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as
his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. EHDCAI
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.
(Here, the petition to drop the middle name, through Rule 108, has been denied. Petitioners here
failed to substantiate the need to drop the middle name, their reason mainly is convenience.)
||| (Julian Lin Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, [March 30, 2005], 494 PHIL
149-163)
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

3. A child can use his mothers surname. The use of the fathers surname is not
absolute.
The word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that
there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of
its mother to which it is equally entitled. |||
(The ground relied upon here to change the surname is to avoid confusion. Alfon has been using
the mothers surname since childhood.)
(Alfon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-51201, [May 29, 1980], 186 PHIL 600-604)
The requirement that under Article 364 of the Civil code legitimate children shall principally use
the surname of the father is not absolute because under Article 264 of the same Code legitimate
children have the right to bear the surname of the father and of the mother. Hence, if there is
sufficient reason (here there are ample reasons) for the change of a child's surname from that of
the father to that of the mother, the court may authorize the same. Moreover, the matter of
whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the
court.|||
(Here, the ground relied upon is that his Japanese last name is prejudicial. Post-war era)
(In re: Oshita v. Republic, G.R. No. L-21180, [March 31, 1967], 125 PHIL 1098-1104)

4. As a general rule, a child cannot use the surname of his or her stepfather.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage because of her
surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private
respondent to bear her step-father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While
previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective step-fathers even
without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the present case.
In Calderon vs. Republic (19 SCRA 721), and Llaneta vs. Agrava (57 SCRA 29), this Court
allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation in
the present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were
not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs. Republic ( 8 SCRA 282), where the circumstances
appears to be similar to the present case before us, the Court upheld the Republic's position: "We
find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first
husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real
paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling
of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore family,
our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside."
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic(113 SCRA 789), the Court ruled that: "To allow said minors to
adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in
confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born
during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla,
thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit."||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88202, [December 14, 1998], 360 PHIL 323-331)
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their
father. Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "legitimate children . . . shall
principally use the surname of their father.''
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their
father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said
minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact
sired by her second husband, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.
a. Note that in many cases, the court deemed it best that it is the children who
will initiate his or her change of name.
The instant action taken by petitioner in behalf of her minor children is premature. Indeed, the
matter of change of their surname should be left to the judgment and discretion of the children
themselves when they reach the age of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their
surname, then they themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may
permit.
||| (In Re: Padilla v. Republic, G.R. No. L-28274, [April 30, 1982], 199 PHIL 226-230) (In Moore,
the ruling is the same. The rule in Moore was summarized in this case. Padilla and Moore states
the general rule, in relation to the use of surname of a person other than the parents of the
child.)(Moore v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18407, [June 26, 1963], 118 PHIL 285-288)
b. An adopted child cannot use the surname of the husband of the adopter, in
cases where the latter did not consent in the adoption.
As petitioner-appellant made the adoption without concurrence of her husband, her name as
adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between her and the
adopted, and the consent of her husband to the adoption by her individually did not have the
effect of making an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of the husband's surname.
Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter (Article 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would result if the adopted child
were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption. It would mislead
the public into believing that the child had also have been adopted by the husband and, later, if
questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be presented
to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.|||
(Here, the child is not a natural child of the mother but an adopted one. The principle is the same,
as a general rule, a child cannot use a surname that is not of his father or mother. The husband
of the adopter in this case is similar to a step-father.)
(Note that if the adoption was joint, then the husband of the adopter will be the father of the
adopted.)
(In re: Georgiana v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18284, [April 30, 1963], 117 PHIL 1058-1062)

5. An illegitimate child can use the surname of his putative father, provided
that the putative father must have acknowledge his putative child.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child's paternity; hence, no separate
action for judicial approval is necessary.||| (Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, [July 31,
2009], 612 PHIL 167-181)
a. The acknowledgment must be duly proven.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
(Here, between the parents, there is no legal obstacle to marry each other. The evidence
presented here is the handwritten autobiography of the father)
||| (Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, [July 31, 2009], 612 PHIL 167-181)

6. Neither the father nor the mother can compel the child what surname he or
she will use. The right to choose what surname to use is with the child.
It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of
the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children's surname as Antonio. HTAEIS
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent's
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over
the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
||| (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, [February 18, 2014], 727 PHIL 448-461)
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.|||
(The law says the child may use. The choice is then given to the child.)
(Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, [February 18, 2014], 727 PHIL 448-461)
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

7. An illegitimate child primarily uses the surname of his mother. The correct
remedy in cases a child wants to change his surname of his non-recognizing
father to that of his mother is Rule 103.
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines), the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child
shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis
ours) cCHETI
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother's surname from birth. The
records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni's putative father to actually
recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article
366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. . . . (emphasis ours)
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni's petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed)
that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni's petition sufficiently established that,
under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother's intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.|||
(The Court here allowed the non-joinder of indispensable parties, (the father in this case) since
the proceeding is under Rule 103 which is a summary proceeding. Rule 108 is not, hence
indispensable parties must be joined.)
(Republic v. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, [February 2, 2007], 543 PHIL 72-81)

8. The general rule is a child cannot use the surname of his step-father (the
mothers husband). However, the exception is that an illegitimate child can
use the step-fathers surname, if it is for the best interest of the child.
"While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein
shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is
prohibited by law from taking another surname with the latter's consent and for justifiable
reasons." If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change if his name through judicial
proceedings, upon a showing of a "proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why
a natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his best interests.||| (Calderon v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-18127, [April 5, 1967], 126 PHIL 1-6)
A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so
is clearly for the best interest of the child. ||| (Calderon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18127, [April 5,
1967], 126 PHIL 1-6)
In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits.
Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry
on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.|| (Llaneta v.
Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, [May 15, 1974], 156 PHIL 21-24)

9. A married woman is under no obligation to use his husbands name or

surname. She has the choice on what name to use.
A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the
ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the
three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. ||
(The issue in this case is the change of surname in her passport. It is true that a wife may use
her husbands surname, her maiden name, or her husbands name. However, such change of
name, for purposes of that stated in the passport, is not allowed, under the Passport Law.)
(Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, [March 5, 2010], 628 PHIL 181-193)
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband
(Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372,
Civil Code ). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 370. A married woman
may use: "(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or "(2) Her
maiden first name and her husband's surname, or "(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a
word indicating that she is his wife, such as 'Mrs.'" "Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage,
and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: "(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
"(2) She or the former husband is married again to another persons."|||
(Here, a Muslim Divorce was effected.)
(Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court, G.R. No. 94986 (Resolution), [February 23,
1995], 311 PHIL 696-716)
10. No judicial authorization is necessary for a woman to revert back to her
maiden name, nor to use the surname of her husband upon marriage.
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the
husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p.
725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. ||| (Yasin v. Honorable Judge
Shari'a District Court, G.R. No. 94986 (Resolution), [February 23, 1995], 311 PHIL 696-716)

11. When a child is adopted, he or she shall use the surname of the adopter. In an
adoption, only the surname is changed, not the proper name.
the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee' s surname to follow that
of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
||| (Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, [February 9, 1996], 323 PHIL 606-642)

12. In a Petition for Change or name, it is the Official name in the civil register
that may be changed.
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be
changed? By Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So
it is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is
his real name.8 And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status
of persons. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known
in the community when at variance with that entered in the civil register is unofficial and
cannot be recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register.
||| (In re: Jesus Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20306, [March 31, 1966], 123 PHIL 318-
324)
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

13. A change of name because of the fact that he is known by the community of
the alternate name is not a sufficient reason, especially if the petition has
been convicted.
A person with a criminal record will have evident interest in the use of a name other than his own,
in an attempt to obliterate an unsavory record; hence, the mere fact that the applicant has been
using a different name and has become known by it does not per se alone constitute "proper and
reasonable cause", or justification, to legally authorize a change of name. There being no showing
that petitioner will be prejudice by the continued use of his true name, for in fact he has been
using it all along together with the other names he has assumed on different occasions, we fail to
see any error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the petition. Where
prior convictions exist, it is the court's duty to consider carefully the consequences of the change
of name, and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. It must not be forgotten that
the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.||| (Ong Peng
Oan v. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, [November 29, 1957], 102 PHIL 468-470)

14. Sex reassignment is not a proper ground to warrant a change of name.

Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.||| (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No.
174689, [October 19, 2007], 562 PHIL 953-974)

15. The use of the common law spouse of his or her partners surname, when
allowed by the latter, is not usurpation of name. The wife cannot claim
damages thereto.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests of
the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner
and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are
as follows: (1) there is an actual use of another's name by the defendant; (2) the use is
unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person.
None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the
petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario
Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his surname||| (Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880,
[September 27, 2004], 482 PHIL 385-407)
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the
representation that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wife's status, which gives rise
to an action for damages.||| (Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, [September 27, 2004], 482
PHIL 385-407)
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

16. A former wife cannot restrain the subsequent wife from using the husbands
surname.
There is no merit in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private respondent's stand is to
contradict Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code.
It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil
Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's surname. She
cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it." (Tolentino,
Civil Code, 1974 ed., p. 681).
Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case
before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of
divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred
to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in
the latter case, it is as if there had been no marriage at all.
The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner would be an
act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into contracts with third
persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino.
The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury or
deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully protected
in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal purposes.
There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that the mere use of
the surname Tolentino by the private respondent cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's
rights. "
(Dr. Tolentino was the husband in this case.)
||| (Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41427, [June 10, 1988], 245 PHIL 40-48)

17. A woman not the wife of a man cannot use the latters surname, especially if
no marriage between them ever occurred.
There being no marriage between appellant "S" and appellee "P", it would be improper for the
latter to continue using the former's surname and representing herself as his wife. Article 370 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her husband;
and impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise.|||
(A restatement of the doctrines in Dapar, Tolentino and this case is that as a general rule, a
woman that is not the wife of a man cannot use the latters surname. The exception would be if
the woman was married to the man and if the man consented to the use of his surname. In both
exceptions, no damages can be claimed. Thus, Silva is the general rule, Tolentino and Dapar are
the exceptions. Also, in Tolentino, the former wife cannot enjoin the subsequent wife from using
the husbands last name.)
(Silva v. Peralta, G.R. No. L-13114, [November 25, 1960], 110 PHIL 57-74)

18. The use alone of a person of a name of another, without the intention of
usurping it, is not criminal.
Jurisprudence in Persons and Family Relations

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually
usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases.
The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his
real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended.
||| (Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, [April 10, 1996], 326 PHIL 157-168)