SIMPLICIUS

On Aristotle
On the Heavens 3.1-7
This page intentionally left blank
 SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
On the Heavens 3.1-7

Translated by
Ian Mueller

LON DON N E W DE L H I N E W YOR K SY DN EY

 Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

London New York
WC1B 3DP NY 10018
UK USA

www.bloomsbury.com

Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 2009 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Paperback edition rst published 2014

2009 by Ian Mueller

Ian Mueller has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, to be identied as Author of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission
in writing from the publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or

refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted
by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-3843-9

PB: 978-1-4725-5784-1
ePDF: 978-1-4725-0161-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

General editors acknowledgements

The present translations have been made possible by generous and

imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment
for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an
independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the
British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society
(UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del
Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis
Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham
College; the Esme Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown
Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientic
Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria
Solomonides, the Cultural Attach of the Greek Embassy in London.
The editor wishes to thank Han Baltussen, William Charlton, Andrew
Gregory, and Peter Lautner for their comments, Martin Achard and
Fiona Leigh for preparing the volume for press, and Deborah Blake at
Duckworth, who has been the publisher responsible for every volume
since the rst.

Typeset by Ray Davies.

Printed and bound in Great Britain
 Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Abbreviations viii
Introduction 1

Translation 23
3.1 The view of Parmenides and Melissus that nothing comes to be; 25
criticism of Plato for generating bodies from planes
3.2 Natural motion and its priority over unnatural motion; 55
heaviness and lightness; the relation of power to motion
3.3 The definition of element; the existence of elements 76
3.4 There are not infinitely many elements 80
3.5 There is more than one element 92
3.6 The elements come to be from one another, not from what is 105
incorporeal or from another body
3.7-305b28 The elements do not come to be from one another by 111
separation out (ekkrisis)

Appendix: The argument of Cael. 3.5 117

Textual Questions 119
(a) Departures from Heibergs text 119
(b) Simplicius citations of Cael. 3.1-7, 305b28 120
(c) Simplicius citations of other texts 120
(d) Lemmas 121
Notes 123
Bibliography 140
English-Greek Glossary 143
Greek-English Index 151
Index of Passages 172
Index of Names 174
Subject Index 180
Addenda 181

v
This page intentionally left blank
 Acknowledgements
The first draft of my translation of Simplicius commentary on Books 3 and
4 of Aristotles On the Heavens (De Caelo, Cael.) was completed in 2005-6
when I was a Visiting Scholar at Christs College, Cambridge. I would like
to record my gratitude to the fellows of the College and particularly to the
then Master, the late Malcolm Bowie, who provided me with an ideal
working place and a most convivial intellectual and social atmosphere in
which to live.
I would also like to thank the Classics Faculty at Cambridge for both
the use of its library and the continuing stimulation of its seminars and
lectures, in which the interventions of Nicholas Denyer, Geoffrey Lloyd,
Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley, Robert Wardy, and others reminded me
again and again that no interpretive question can safely be considered
settled.
In making this translation I have constantly had to rely on others for
help with linguistic and substantive issues. I am sure I cannot remember
the names of all of those others, but I would like to mention Elizabeth
Asmis, Benno Artmann, Myles Burnyeat, Alan Code, Stephen Menn, Jan
Opsomer, David Sedley, and James Wilberding, Dirk Baltzly, and Daniel
Graham. Baltzly and Graham are the only official vetters whose names
are known to me, but the suggestions and corrections of the other three
were also extremely helpful. I am especially grateful to the general editor
of the ancient commentators series, Richard Sorabji, whose advice and
encouragement were a sine qua non for my completion of this translation.
The most important mainstay for all my endeavours continues to be my
wife and intellectual partner of almost fifty years, Janel Mueller. How
lucky I have been to be able to have dinner conversations with her on the
translations of both Simplicius commentary and the texts of Queen Eliza-
beth I written in foreign languages.

Ian Mueller
Chicago

vii
 Abbreviations
Cael. = Aristotles On the Heavens.
CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882-1909.
DK = Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz (eds and trans.) (1954), Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn, Berlin: Weidmann.
DPA = Goulet, Richard (ed.) (1989- ), Dictionnaire des philosophes an-
tiques, Paris: ditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.
GC = Aristotles On Coming to Be and Perishing.
Guthrie = W.K.C. Guthrie (ed. and trans.) (1939), Aristotle, On the Heav-
ens, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, and London: William
Heinemann.
in Phys. = Simplicius commentary on Aristotles Physics (CAG, vols 9 and
10).
Karsten = Simon Karsten (ed.) (1865), Simplicii Commentarius in IV
Libros Aristotelis De Caelo, Utrecht: Kemink and Son.
Metaph. = Aristotles Metaphysics.
Moraux = Paul Moraux (ed. and trans.) (1965), Aristote: du Ciel, texte
tabli et traduit par Paul Moraux, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
OED = The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989.
Phys. = Aristotles Physics.
Rivaud = Albert Rivaud (ed. and trans.) (1925), Time-Critias (Platon,
Oeuvres Compltes, vol. 10), Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Sider = David Sider (ed. and trans.) (2005), The Fragments of Anaxagoras,
2nd edn, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Stocks = J.L. Stocks (trans.) (1922), De Caelo, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
also in vol. 2 of W.D. Ross (ed.) (1928-52), The Works of Aristotle, 12 vols,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Theophrastus: Sources = William W. Fortenbaugh, Pamela M. Huby,
Robert W. Sharples and Dimitri Gutas (eds and trans.) (1992), Theo-
phrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and
Influence (Philosophia Antiqua 54), 2 vols, Leiden and New York: E.J.
Brill.
Tim. = Platos Timaeus.
TL = Timaeus of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul; cited after
Marg (1972).

viii
 Introduction
This volume is a translation of Simplicius commentary on book 3 of On the
Heavens from its beginning until 305b28 in chapter 7. The remainder of
the commentary on book 3 and all of book 4 will be published in a separate
volume (Mueller (2009)). Most of Simplicius commentary on book 1 has
been translated in Hankinson (2002), (2004), and (2006). Missing from the
translation of the commentary on chapters 1 to 4 are Simplicius ex-
changes with John Philoponus on Aristotles cosmology. Simplicius repre-
sentations of Philoponus criticisms of Aristotle are translated in Wildberg
(1987); Simplicius responses are for the most part still untranslated. The
commentary on book 2 is translated in Mueller (2004) and (2005).
Simplicius was born in Cilicia (in southeastern Turkey) in the late fifth
century of the Common Era. He studied philosophy with Ammonius of
Alexandria (DPA, vol. 1, pp. 168-9) and with Damascius (DPA, vol. 2, pp.
541-93) in Athens or Alexandria. At the time of the closing of the so-called
Platonic school in Athens (529), Simplicius went with Damascius and five
other philosophers to the court of Chosroes, King of Persia. They did not
stay long but returned in or around 532 to the confines of the Byzantine
Empire under a treaty provision protecting them from persecution. It is
not known where Simplicius went; Athens, Alexandria, and, more re-
cently, Harran in southeastern Turkey east of Cilicia have been
suggested.1 But it is now generally agreed that the three great Aristotelian
commentaries safely attributable to Simplicius, those on the Categories,
Physics, and On the Heavens2 were written after Simplicius departure
from Persia when, one assumes, he had the leisure to write these extensive
works and to do the research and thinking they presuppose.

1. The contents of Cael. 3 and 43

Books 3 and 4 of On the Heavens are not about the heavens, the world
between the fixed stars and the moon. Their subject is, as Simplicius says
(551,13), the sublunary simple bodies, that is, the ultimate components
of everything in the world beneath the moon, for Aristotle earth, air, fire,
and water, frequently referred to as elements. Here I give a brief summary
of books 3 and 4 to provide the reader with a general orientation.
Toward the beginning of chapter 1 (298b8-12) Aristotle announces that
he is going to raise the question whether anything comes to be. This leads
him into a dichotomous doxography of the views of his predecessors. Three
2 Introduction
of the categories are filled by Presocratics, namely (i) those who said that
nothing really comes to be or perishes, Parmenides and Melissus; (ii) those
who said that all things come to be, but some of these last forever, others
perish (Aristotle mentions Hesiod); (iii) those who say that there is one
thing which endures, everything else being a transformation of this which
comes to be and is in flux (Aristotle mentions Heraclitus). I shall discuss
Simplicius treatment of these people in sections 2-4 of this introduction.
Aristotle puts off treatment of these three people to another discussion4
and turns to those who make every body come to be, composing them from
planes and dissolving them into planes (298b34-299a1). The criticism of
this view, which Aristotle finds in Platos Timaeus, occupies the rest of
chapter 1. Books 3 and 4 of Cael. place a great deal of pressure on
Simplicius self-proclaimed belief in the harmony of Plato and Aristotle
because they contain extended, explicit criticism of the Timaeus. I shall
discuss how Simplicius proceeds in section 7.
Many of Aristotles arguments against Plato in chapter 1 involve as-
signing to Plato the view that bodies are composed of points and arguing
that since points are weightless, bodies must be too, contradicting the fact
that bodies have weight. For Simplicius what I have called a fact is a
hypothesis which Aristotle makes for the purpose of his arguments and
then demonstrates in chapter 2. Cael. is our source for Aristotles doctrine
of weight and its many difficulties, which emerge particularly in book 4,
when Aristotle does as much as he ever does to establish the existence of
four simple bodies. In fact, his theory of weight would work much better if
there were only two simple bodies, earth and fire. For Aristotle, earth is
heavy and fire is light, or more specifically, earth has heaviness and no
lightness, fire lightness and no heaviness. The heaviness of earth is
exhibited in (or defined by) its motion down to the centre of the spherical
cosmos and its resting around that centre, the lightness of fire in its
motion up to the periphery of the sublunar cosmos, the lunar sphere, and
its resting at or near the periphery. For Aristotle this motion and rest of
earth and fire is natural.
In the light of these remarks we can say that the first purpose of chapter
3 is to show that bodies have weight or lightness. Aristotle begins the
chapter by arguing that every simple body has a natural motion, taking as
obvious that they move and arguing that they must move either naturally
or unnaturally and that unnatural motion presupposes natural motion.
He then argues that things rest naturally at the place to which they move
naturally. There follows, starting at 300b8 arguments against people who,
in Aristotles view give a priority to unnatural motion, the atomists and
Plato in the Timaeus, and then some brief remarks about the cosmogonical
priority of rest in Anaxagoras and Empedocles. At 301a22-b31 Aristotle
uses abstract arguments to show that bodies must be light or heavy, and
gives his problematic account of projectile motion.
Toward the end of chapter 2 Aristotle says (in Simplicius under-
standing), That not everything comes to be and that not absolutely
 Introduction 3
nothing comes to be is clear from what has been said previously (301b31-
3), and gives a difficult argument that not everything comes to be. To
explain where Aristotle showed that not everything comes to be Simplicius
refers to his argument that the heavens are eternal in Cael. 1.3 and to the
discussion of Parmenides and Melissus in chapter 1, a discussion which
includes no argument at all. In any case Aristotles remark provides the
transition to chapter 3 which begins:

It remains to say what things come to be and why they do. Since in
all cases knowledge is based on primary things and the elements are
the primary things which inhere <in things>, we should investigate
which sort of bodies of this kind are elements and why, and thereafter
investigate how many there are and what they are like. (302a10-14)

For Simplicius (600,19-22) Aristotle does not really answer this question
until his work On Coming to Be and Perishing, where we are told that the
four elements or simple bodies are characterised using two pairs of oppo-
sites, earth being dry and cold, water wet and cold, air wet and hot, fire
dry and hot, changes among them being explained in terms of changes of
these qualities.
At the beginning of chapter 3 Aristotle defines an element as something
into which other bodies are divided and which inheres in the bodies } and
which itself cannot be divided into things different in kind from it, and
argues that there are and must be such things. He then says a little bit
about the Presocratics, mentioning the doctrine that there is only one
element and the views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. His next goal is to
determine the number of elements. He proceeds by eliminating the views
of predecessors. In chapter 4 he dismisses the ones who believed that there
are infinitely many elements, Anaxagoras (302b13-303a3) and the
atomists (303a3-b3). In chapter 55 he rejects the doctrine that there is only
one element, distinguishing between those who say it is fire (304a7-
304b11) and those who make it something intermediate between fire and
earth (303b13-304a7). He concludes the chapter with two general argu-
ments against monism based on his doctrine of natural motion.
With the elimination of the alternatives that there are infinitely many
elements and that there is only one, one would expect Aristotle to turn to
showing that there are, in fact, four. But Aristotle starts chapter 6 by
saying that if it is first shown whether the elements are eternal or come
to be it will be evident how many there are and what they are like, and he
does not get to the question of how many elements there are until chapter
4 of book 4.
In 4.4, after the discussion of heaviness and lightness in 4.1-3, Aristotle
argues that fire is absolutely (hapls) light and moves to the periphery of
the cosmos and then that earth is absolutely heavy and moves to its centre
and at 312a8-12 says,
4 Introduction
There is also something between periphery and centre and it is
named differently relative to each of them, since what is intermedi-
ate is a kind of extremity and centre for both. As a result there is also
something else which is both heavy and light; such are water and air.

In chapter 5 Aristotle introduces the idea that each of the four elements
has (in some sense) its own kind of matter. The next and final chapter of
Cael. is a kind of addendum on the role of shape in certain kinds of motion.
(Why does a ball of lead, which sinks in water, float if it is flattened out
sufficiently?) I discuss all of this material and the transition to it at the
end of 3.8 in the introduction to Mueller (2009).
In 3.6 Aristotle gives abstract arguments that the elements are not
eternal and come to be from one another, and in chapter 7 he turns to
criticism of accounts of the way in which they come to be, first criticising
the view, which he associates with Empedocles and Democritus, that a
changing into b is a matter of bits of b contained in a being separated out
(ekkrinesthai) from a. This brings to an end the material discussed by
Simplicius in this volume.6 In the next material Aristotle offers a lengthy
series of criticisms directed mainly at Platos account of elemental change
in the Timaeus. After it Aristotle ends book 3 with a remark which serves
as the transition to the discussion of weight in book 4:

But since the most important differentiae of bodies are those which
relate to affections and acts and powers }, it would be right to speak
first about these so that by studying them we can grasp the differ-
ences of each element with respect to each. (307b19-24)

In the next seven sections of this introduction I discuss some of the

important names mentioned by Simplicius. These discussions of what
Simplicius says about various figures are not exhaustive, and one should
consult the Index of Names for listings of all the passages relating to a
particular person.

2. The Presocratic monists (Thales, Anaximenes,

Anaximander, Hippo, Heraclitus, Hippasus, Diogenes)
Simplicius commentaries are a major source of information for the history
of early Greek philosophy, principally because he quotes many texts which
would otherwise be lost to us, but also because his interpretative discus-
sions, although sometimes infected with anachronistic Neoplatonist ideas,
contain important information.
The only one of the so-called monists whom Aristotle mentions in Cael.
3 and 4 is Heraclitus in his brief doxography at the beginning of 3.1:

Other people say that all other things come to be and are in flux and
none of them is fixed, but only one thing endures and all the other
 Introduction 5
things are natural transformations of it. This seems to be what
Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others mean to say. (298b29-33)

In commenting on this passage Simplicius invokes the people who are

called students of nature in the strict sense, those who said that all
things come to be but that only one thing, which does not come to be,
endures and that the other things come to be from it and are resolved
into it: Thales said that this one thing is water, Anaximenes air,
Anaximander what is intermediate (to metaxu), Heraclitus fire (561,2-
5). Simplicius repeats this kind of recitation, the sort of thing scholars
associate with handbooks whenever Aristotle mentions the view that
there is one element. I quote the passage which stimulates Simplicius
to give his fullest recitation:

Some people hypothesise one only, some hypothesising water, some

air, some fire, and some hypothesise that it is <something> finer than
water but denser than air, which they say contains all the heavens,
being infinite. (3.5, 303b10-13)

Simplicius explicates:

There are several such people, and different people hypothesised this
one element to be something different. Thales of Miletus and Hippo
said it is water because they saw that the seeds of animals and the
nourishment of both animals and plants are made of water. Anaxi-
mander, a fellow citizen and pupil of Thales, said it is something
indefinite which is finer than water and denser than air because the
substratum should be naturally adapted for the change to either; he
was the first to hypothesise that this one is infinite, so that he could
use it for comings to be without stinting; and, it is thought that he
hypothesised infinite worlds and that each of the worlds came to be
from an infinite element of this sort. Anaximenes, a pupil and fellow
citizen of Anaximander, also hypothesised that the principle is infi-
nite, but not also indeterminate; he said it is air, thinking that the
volatility of air is sufficient to account for change. Diogenes of Apol-
lonia hypothesised the same thing <air>, and Hippasus of
Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus, taking into consideration
the active power of fire, said that it is the principle. (615,10-23)

Simplicius mentions all of these people at 602,19-20 when Aristotle con-

siders a consequence of saying there is only one element, and he mentions
Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus as people who make the cosmos come
to be from one thing at 590,18-19 in connection with 3.2, 301a13-14, where
the monists are not clearly relevant. Heraclitus and Hippasus are men-
tioned again in connection with 3.5, 304a7-18 where Aristotle criticises
those who hypothesise fire as the element, but Simplicius is confused by
6 Introduction
Aristotles criticism of people who associate a figure such as the pyramid
with fire. He writes,

It should be asked who holds this view which says that fire is a
pyramid because it is the first body. For Heraclitus, who does say
that fire is the element of other things, does not say that fire is a
pyramid, and the Pythagoreans, who say that fire is composed from
pyramids, do not say that fire is the element of other things since
they also say that fire comes to be from water and air just as air and
water come to be from fire. (621,6-11)

The Pythagorean of whom Simplicius is thinking is the fictitious author

of the post-Platonic pseudepigraph based on the Timaeus, which I discuss
in section 7.7

3. Hesiod
At 3.1, 298b26-9 Aristotle says,

There are some people who say that there is nothing which does not
come to be, but that everything comes to be, and some things that
have come to be endure without perishing, and, again, others perish.
This is especially true of Hesiod and his followers, and later, of
others, the first people who studied nature.

Simplicius (560,16-27) explains Aristotles account of Hesiod by invoking

line 116 of the Theogony, In truth at the very first Chaos came to be, and
he assumes that the other people to whom Aristotle refers are Orpheus
and Musaeus. For Simplicius the writings of these people (many of which
are now considered later productions) are to be interpreted as mythical
representations of Neoplatonist truths. Their talk of coming to be is really
about procession from causes, so the first cause does not come to be, and
when Hesiod says that Chaos came to be, he is indicating (enedeixato) that
there is something prior to Chaos and (by not saying what it is) that this
something is beyond (huper) knowledge or even being named.

4. Parmenides and Melissus

At 3.1, 298b14-24 Aristotle says,

Some of the earlier philosophers did away with coming to be and

perishing entirely. They say that nothing that is either comes to be
or perishes, but is only thought by us to do so. Examples are Melissus
and Parmenides and their followers, who, even if they say other
correct things, should not be considered to speak in a way appropri-
ate to the study of nature, since the existence of some things which
 Introduction 7
do not come to be and are entirely without change is a matter for
another prior enquiry rather than for enquiry into nature. Because
these people assumed that there is nothing else apart from the sub-
stance of perceptible things, but were the first to understand that there
must be certain entities of this kind if there is going to be any knowledge
or thought, they transferred accounts of those entities to these.

Simplicius is convinced that this account is incorrect and that Aristotle is

following his customary procedure of objecting on the basis of a superficial
reading of the text in order to prevent other people from adopting a
superficial Eleaticism as the truth (557,19-20). He even resorts to sar-
casm: And it is clear that Parmenides was not unaware that he himself
came to be, just as he was not unaware that he had two feet, even though
he said that being is one (559,26-560,1), and he refers to a passage in the
Metaphysics (1.5, 986b27-987a2) to show that Aristotle understood Par-
menides better than what is suggested by the Cael. passage he is com-
menting on. Simplicius assumes that the claim that Parmenides and
Melissus believed only in the substance of perceptible things and trans-
ferred accounts of intelligibles to perceptibles rests on a misunderstanding
of their view that being is one. In fact Parmenides and Melissus make the
standard Platonist distinction between what really is, the intelligible
object of knowledge, and what comes to be, the perceptible objects of
opinion. In support of this claim Simplicius cites fragment 1, lines 28-32,
fragment 8, lines 50-2, and fragment 19 of Parmenides and the lengthy
fragment 8 of Melissus, his citations here being our only source for the last
two of these. He cites fragment 8, line 21 for Parmenides belief that what
really is does not come to be, but can only assert that Melissus agrees with
Parmenides. And for their belief that perceptibles come to be he refers
again to fragment 8 of Melissus and gives us our only citation of fragment
11 for Parmenides.

5. Empedocles
Aristotle first mentions Empedocles at 3.2, 300b2 where he says that
Empedocles thought the earth is at rest because of the vortex. Simplicius
paraphrases this statement without comment (582,29-583,1). In the
course of arguing that natural or ordered motion is prior to disordered
motion Aristotle says,

Furthermore, one might further ask whether it would not be possible

that, when things were moving in a disorderly way, some things
would undergo mixtures of the kind from which bodies which are put
together naturally are put together (I mean, for example, bones and
flesh) in the way Empedocles says happens under Love (epi ts
philottos). For he says, Many heads without necks grew. (3.2,
300b25-31)
8 Introduction
In commenting (586,5ff.) Simplicius says that Aristotle intended us to
draw the absurd consequences of such a possibility, namely that if disor-
derly motion could produce neckless heads and things like bones and flesh,
it could also produce a cosmos at some time, but no reason could be given
why a cosmos should be produced at one time rather than another.
Simplicius goes on to discuss the meaning of under Love. He tells us that
Alexander of Aphrodisias thought the words referred to the time when
Love dominates everything, but objects that isolated limbs wandering
about (for which he also gives us our only citation of the continuation of
the line quoted by Aristotle) indicate that Strife still has some power and
Loves is just coming to dominate.8
After he finishes his argument that the cosmos could not arise from a
condition of disorderly movement, Aristotle commends Anaxagoras for
making the cosmos from things at rest. He then says,

Empedocles also passes over coming to be under Love, since he was not
able to put the heavens together by constructing them out of separated
things, making Love the cause of their blending. (3.2, 301a15-16)

According to Simplicius (590,19ff.), Empedocles said that the elements,

which were earlier blended by Love, make this cosmos when they are later
separated by Strife. Instead of supplying the certainly correct genesis
when he essentially quotes Aristotle he writes, Therefore, Empedocles
also passes over the condition of the elements under Love, so that here he
is taking under Love to mean at the time when Love is in total control.9
But, since for Simplicius the total domination of Love represents the
(Neoplatonist) intelligible world in which all things are unified, he is quite
comfortable saying that for Empedocles Love is not responsible for the
coming to be of the cosmos, rather the separation which occurs under
Strife is. Although Simplicius does accept that Love and Strife interact
and rise and fall in power in our cosmos, what he says in connection with
this passage does not help us understand his conception of what we call
Empedocles cosmic cycle.
At the beginning of 3.6 Aristotle argues against the eternity of the
elements on the grounds that we see the simple bodies being dissolved; he
argues that this dissolution must reach a stopping point and says:

If the dissolution were to stop at some point, either the body with
which it stopped would be indivisible or it would be divisible but
would never in fact be divided Empedocles seems to mean to say
something like this. (305a1-4)

Simplicius repeats this and then says of Empedocles:

He says that the elements are divisible, and, unlike Democritus and
his followers, he does not hypothesise that the principles are indivis-
 Introduction 9
ible; but he does suppose that the four elements do not change into
one another and do not perish because he does not allow for a common
matter, but says that their coming to be from one another, which we
see, occurs because of separation out, since everything, being an
actuality, inheres in everything. (628,8-13)

The idea that for Empedocles coming to be of anything is a matter of

separation out of actually inherent bits (rather than the Aristotelian
qualitative change of a substratum) is articulated further at 632,2-16 in
conjunction with 3.7, 305b1-5, where Aristotle begins to criticise theories
according to which change is a matter of separation out (he mentions
Empedocles and Democritus). In the course of that argument at 305b16-20
Aristotle makes a dichotomy between those who say that there is no void
and those who accept it. Simplicius (631,21-34) says that the former are
Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Aristotle says the same thing about these
two men at 4.2, 309a19-21, in connection with his assertion that they made
no distinction between light and heavy.

6. Anaxagoras
In 3.4 Aristotle argues against those who make there be infinitely many
elements, starting with Anaxagoras, whom he treats at 302b13-303a3. At
the end of his discussion of Aristotles arguments Simplicius queries the
claim that Anaxagoras thought there was an infinite number of elements
in the literal sense. Perhaps, he says, infinite means unknowable by us.10
He continues:

It seems that Anaxagoras is indicating a cosmic ordering in two

senses. One ordering is intelligible and unified; in it all things were
together and each thing was all the others because of intelligible
unification. The other is perceptible and made separate from that
unification by demiurgic Mind, which he says itself also proceeds
from the intelligible and orders everything. (608,31-609,3)

At the beginning of 3.3 Aristotle offers as a universally accepted defini-

tion of element that it is something into which other bodies are divided and
which inheres in them and which cannot be divided into things different
in kind. Aristotle leaves open the question whether elements are actually
present in compounds in the way puzzle pieces are present in a completed
puzzle or rather potentially present in the way that Aristotle thinks that
water is present in blood, not as little bits but as blended throughout it.
Simplicius explains, That the elements inhere actually follows for those,
such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who say that coming to be is the
result of blending and separation out, but that they inhere potentially
follows for those who <like Aristotle> say it is a result of qualitative
change (601,7-9). Aristotle himself goes on to say,
10 Introduction
If an element is what we have said it is there must be some things of
this sort among bodies. For fire and earth are contained potentially
in flesh and wood and everything of this sort, since they are obviously
separated out from them. But neither flesh nor wood inheres in fire
either in potentiality or in actuality, since if they inhered they would
be separated out. (302a19-25)

At 602,3, after pointing out that Aristotle is here not using separated out
in the technical sense in which only things which inhere actually can be
separated out, Simplicius gives alleged examples of the kind of process
Aristotle has in mind and concludes, If fire and earth and the others are
contained in flesh and wood, and there is no flesh or wood in fire or earth
either potentially or actually (since if they inhered they would be sepa-
rated out at some time), it is clear that fire and earth and the others
<water and air> are elements of flesh and wood, since they inhere in them,
but the latter are not elements of the former.
Aristotle now invokes Empedocles and Anaxagoras:

Anaxagoras speaks about the elements in a way contrary to Empe-

docles. Empedocles says that fire and earth and the things
co-ordinate with them are the elements of bodies and that all things
are composed of them, but Anaxagoras says the contrary; he says
that the homoiomeries (I mean flesh and bone and everything of that
sort) are elements and says that air and fire are mixtures of these
and all the other seeds for each of them is a collection of all the
invisible homoiomeries so that everything comes to be from these
homoiomeries. (302a28-b4)

In Aristotle the adjective homoiomerous (homoiomers; the neuter singular

of which is also translated as the noun homoiomery11) is applied to something
which in his theory are only divisible into things similar to themselves;
homoiomeries includes Empedocles four elements, earth, water, air, fire, and
such things as flesh and bone, by contrast with such things as a hand or face.
Although Anaxagoras almost certainly did not use any word like homoiomer-
ous, which appears to be an Aristotelian coinage, it would seem from what
we know of his theory of nature that it might be said (perhaps with reserva-
tion) that he believed that the elements included all of Aristotles homoiomer-
ies, simple or composite. In the passage just quoted Aristotle says that, in
saying that the homoiomeries are elements, Anaxagoras took a position
contrary to Empedocles. Simplicius sometimes appears to take this to mean
that Empedocles four elements were not included among Anaxagoras ho-
moimerous elements, most explicitly when he says:

Anaxagoras himself says that these four <earth, water, air, and fire>
are not elements, even though they are homoiomerous. (605,10-11;
cf. 603,17-28)
 Introduction 11
On the other hand at one point he does say:

Anaxagoras calls not just the four elements but also all other things
(the homoiomereities) elements, and says that everything is in every-
thing but all things are characterised by the dominant thing in them;
and so, when several bits of fire which have been separated out
combine, it is thought that fire comes to be. (632,13-16)

In 3.7 Aristotle begins to discuss the way in which the elements come
to be from each other, beginning with Empedocles and Democritus, who,
according to Aristotle, say that they do so by separation out. Aristotle
never mentions Anaxagoras in the course of the discussion, but Simplicius
is confident he is to be included (632,5.9.13), perhaps because, as Sim-
plicius notes (635,6-7) at 3.7, 305b20-8 Aristotle uses an argument very
like one he makes against Anaxagoras in the Physics.

7. The Pythagoreans, Timaeus of Locri,

Platos Timaeus, and Democritus12
For the most part (the exceptions are 580,11 and 610,7) when Simplicius
mentions ideas as Pythagorean he is speaking about things said in Platos
Timaeus. Simplicius believed that Plato based his Timaeus on a work
called On the Nature of the World and of the Soul,13 allegedly written by
Timaeus of Locri, the title character of Platos dialogue. I refer to this work
as TL. It is now generally believed that TL was written at least 300 years
after Platos death. Simplicius treats Platos dialogue and TL as equally
reliable sources for the ideas of the (for us non-existent) person whom he
sometimes calls the Pythagorean Timaeus. When he mentions, e.g., what
Timaeus thought, it is not always necessary or even possible to decide
whether he means the author of TL or the speaker in Platos Timaeus. For
the most part Simplicius relies on the Timaeus for the representation of
views being criticised by Aristotle, but there are several points for which
he cites or relies on TL. The most important of these is the TL invocation
(215,13-17) of form and matter as prior to the construction of the elements
(564,3-8; cf. 641,10-14 in the commentary on 3.7); for others see the entry
Timaeus in the Index of Names.
I have already mentioned that Simplicius is completely committed to
the idea that Aristotle understands and agrees with Plato and that his
criticisms of Plato are directed against superficial readings of Platos text
with the aim of dissuading others from adopting such readings and
perhaps the doctrines they express. Unfortunately Simplicius does not
always tell us how he would explain an Aristotelian criticism along these
lines, but the absence of such an explanation should not be treated as the
abandonment of the explanatory principle. As I have indicated in section
1 Aristotle begins his criticism of Plato in 3.1. In his first criticism
(299a2-11) he insists that the construction of the fundamental solids out
12 Introduction
of planes yields serious contradictions with mathematics by implying that
a line is divisible into points and that a line is not infinitely divisible.
Commenting, Simplicius says,

These are Aristotles words, but, as I always say, he is objecting to

the apparent meaning of the theory. However, it should be said that
if those who say that solids are composed of planes and resolve solids
into planes said that the planes are mathematical and have only
length and breadth, then Aristotle is correct to introduce against
them these absurdities and the ones which he adduces next. But if
they say that the planes are natural and have not only length and
breadth but also depth (which is the first natural thing capable of
entering into combinations), the absurdities adduced against the
planes as being without depth do not follow from their position. And
that they hypothesise that the planes are natural and not mathe-
matical is clear from their saying that they involve matter, and so
they set out matter first and say that it has been given shape by
forms and numbers. (563,26-564,3; the last words are a paraphrase
of Timaeus 53B3-5; similar ideas at 573,3-11, 577,17-19, and 579,3-4,
26-9)

And in order to justify his claim that the planes of the Timaeus involve
matter Simplicius cites TL. Simplicius is now led into a more general
discussion of the interpretation of Platos geometrical chemistry.14 Some,
including Iamblichus, thought Plato was speaking symbolically, that is, I
assume, they did not think the chemistry was intended as a literal truth.
Others left out the chemistry altogether (I assume that they too believed
it was symbolic) and proposed to ascribe to Plato the apparently Aristo-
telian view that earth, water, air, and fire are composites of qualities and
matter:

More recent Platonic philosophers try to show that, according to

what is written, the theory of nature of the Timaeus holds in the
following way: since the four elements are composites of matter and
form and therefore do not satisfy the definition of a principle, they
say that the qualities which are called affective, heat and dryness
and their opposites, coming to be first in matter (or qualityless body)
also compose the four elements }. And if someone were to ask why
fire heats and water cools, they would say Because fire is hot, water
cold. For they posit these things as principles and do not seek further
for a cause beyond the principles. (564,13-24)

Simplicius does not respond to this position directly, although he clearly

thinks it is in some sense incorrect, but instead he brings in Democritus
atomistic explanations as an alternative and then the Pythagoreans:
 Introduction 13
Democritus ascended to atoms on the grounds that those who offer
explanations in terms of hot and cold and such things do so in an
amateurish way (iditiks).15 And in the same way the Pythagoreans
ascend to planes, considering figures and magnitudes to be causes of
heat and cold, since things that separate and divide produce an
awareness of heat, those that blend and pull together an awareness
of cold. (564,24-9)

And after he has explained the Pythagorean/Platonic theory Simplicius says:

I have set out these considerations in order to indicate that it was not
unreasonable for the Pythagoreans and Democritus in seeking the
principles of qualities to rise up to the figures. (565,26-8)

Simplicius concludes his discussion by suggesting that Plato did not think
of his geometrical chemistry as an absolute truth but as a hypothesis,
which is like astronomical theories in being a way of accounting for what
happens in the world. Later, in response to a suggestion that Platos and
Democritus theories are the same, Simplicius offers the following account
of the slight differences between Plato and Democritus in this regard:

Platos view is presumably different from Democritus because it

gives priority to something simpler than bodies, namely the plane,
which is simpler than the atoms (which are bodies) and because it
recognises that symmetries and proportions are demiurgic of the
figures, and because it treats earth differently <from the other
elements because it does not allow for the transformation of earth
into or from them>. (576,16-19)

The reader is referred to the text and translation for further informa-
tion about Aristotles objections to Plato in 3.1 and Simplicius
interpretation of them. In 3.2, 300b8ff. Aristotle argues against the
atomists for only talking about the constrained (unnatural) motion of the
atoms resulting from collision and not their natural motion and against
Plato for saying that prior to the cosmos there was a disorderly motion, a
motion which he says must be unnatural because if it were natural it
would produce a cosmos. Simplicius invokes the standard Neoplatonist
view that the pre-cosmic motion of the Timaeus should not be understood
literally:

If Timaeus said that before the cosmos came to be there really was a
disordered motion of the elements, Aristotle has made correct and
real objections based on natural considerations against Timaeus
doctrine. But if Timaeus wanted to make the point that all cosmic
order comes to matter from the demiurgic goodness by treating in
discourse matter in and of itself without its clothing <of form> with
14 Introduction
only its suitability to receive form and indicated that it moves in a
discordant and disorderly way, and what Timaeus says is productive
of an intellectual doctrine, then Aristotle is doing adequate battle
with the apparent meaning of what is said but not with its true
meaning. (587,26-588,3)

In discussing what Aristotle has to say about atomism, Simplicius

mainly describes and clarifies what Aristotle says against the atomists,
but at the end of his discussion he brings up Alexanders charge that the
atomists would also be subject to the objection raised against the Timaeus
by Aristotle, since the natural is prior to the unnatural, and the natural
produces a cosmos. Simplicius response suggests that he may view con-
strained atomic motion in the same way he views the disorderly motion of
the Timaeus:

Perhaps saying this does not follow for Democritus and his followers
since they said that there is always motion by constraint even when
there is a cosmos and not just before the making of the cosmos, as
Timaeus <of Locri> writes. (585,32-586,2; for an analogous under-
standing of Empedocles and Anaxagoras see 305,20-306,8 in
Simplicius commentary on Cael. 1.10)

Except for one passing mention of the disordered motion of the Timaeus
at 591,15 Plato plays no role in the remainder of the commentary trans-
lated in this volume. Democritus does continue to play a role, but Sim-
plicius provides us with very little information about Democritean
atomism which we would not know from other sources, especially Aristotle
himself.
In 3.4 Aristotle argues against those who hold that there are infinitely
many elements. He turns to the atomists at 303a3:

However, the consequences of what some other people, such as

Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, say are not reasonable either.
They say that the primary magnitudes are infinite in number and
indivisible in magnitude and that several things dont come to be
from one thing or one thing from several, but that all things are
generated by the weaving together and interlocking of the primary
magnitudes. And in a way these people also make everything to be
numbers and to be composed of numbers. For even if they dont
indicate this clearly, nevertheless this is what they mean. (303a3-10)

Simplicius explains that Leucippus and Democritus:

call atoms, which are indivisible because of their smallness and

solidity and also infinite in number and in shapes, elements. And
they said that only these things are continuous, since other things
 Introduction 15
which are thought to be continuous draw together by contact. Accord-
ingly they also did away with division by saying that apparent
division is the parting of things in contact, and so they said that
several things dont come to be from one thing since an atom cannot
be divided and that one thing which is truly continuous doesnt come
from several, but each thing is thought to become one because of the
weaving together of atoms. (609,18-24)

As to the comparison of atoms with numbers, Simplicius says,

Aristotle says that the atoms are in a way numbers because the
atoms resemble monads and because they are not divisible, just as
monads are not, and because nothing continuous comes to be from
the atoms, which are divided by the void, just as nothing continuous
comes to be from monads; for the Pythagoreans say that monads are
distinguished by the void. He adds in a way because there is also
some difference between the absurd consequences for those who
generate things from atoms and the absurd consequences for those
who generate them from numbers. For those who say there is gen-
eration from numbers the absurdity that they generate bodies from
incorporeal parts follows, but those who generate things from atoms
escape this. (610,1-11)

Aristotle goes on (303a10-16) to claim that, although the atomists posited

atoms of infinitely many different shapes, they only specified that fire
atoms were spherical. However, they did distinguish air and water and
the rest by largeness and smallness, as if their nature was a sort of
universal seedbed (panspermia) of all the elements. Without mentioning
the term seedbed Simplicius explains that the atomists said that the
simple bodies are infinite because they differ in shape and shapes are
infinite, but } they did not specify what sort of shape or what shape the
elements which generate each body have, except only in the case of fire.
They said that air and water and the rest come to be from elements which
have the same shapes and differ only by largeness and smallness (611,6-
11; cf. 617,22-6 and 624,29-625,3; at 690,24-6 in his commentary on 4.2
Simplicius says that fire is composed of small spheres, earth of larger
atoms, and water and air of atoms of intermediate size). Just prior to this
Simplicius cites Alexanders account of the reason for assigning the sphere
to fire: the shape of fire and of the atoms from which it is generated is
spherical, so that it is also reasonable that fire penetrates and moves and
causes motion and divides and burns the things to which it comes near
because it is circular and smooth and furthermore because the elements
from which it is composed are small (610,18-22). Subsequently Simplicius,
commenting on 303a24-9, explains the problem which is supposed to arise
from distinguishing the atoms of things other than fire only by size:
16 Introduction
If they say both that these things come to be from one another and
that they differ from one another by the largeness and smallness of
their atoms, it is necessary for them to contradict themselves, since
these <views> clash with one another. For if they say that earth
comes to be from water when the largest <atoms> in the water are
separated out, then, since it is possible that at some time, all of the
largest atoms having been separated out from the water, the separa-
tion out from the air of the largest atoms also gives out, the coming
to be of earth from water and of water from air can also give out with
the result that there is some water from which earth cannot come to
be and some air from which water cannot come to be. So these people
contradict themselves in saying both that these things come to be
from one another and that they differ because of the largeness and
smallness of their elements. And if when the smallest atoms are
separated out they will give out, then water will not come to be from
earth or air from water. However, we do see that every part of water
changes into air and every part of air into water. And if fire is
composed only of spherical atoms and the others out of all <kinds of
atoms> nothing else will come to be from fire and fire will never come
to be from other things. (612,24-613,6)

8. Alexander of Aphrodisias16
Alexander of Aphrodisias lived around 200 CE.17 He is standardly regarded
as the most Aristotelian of the commentators on Aristotles works. His
commentary on Cael. does not survive, but Simplicius numerous refer-
ences to his opinions on passages and related matters show clearly that
Simplicius had it before him in writing his own commentary. However,
although Simplicius sometimes relies on Alexanders reading of a difficult
passage, he more often cites Alexander to disagree with him on both major
and minor points, and it is clear that he regards him as falling for the
superficial reading of Plato and treating Aristotles criticisms as decisive.18
A textual question about 3.2, 300b21-2 provides a good illustration of
Simplicius conception of Alexanders unreasonable disdain for Plato. Ac-
cording to Simplicius (584,27-585,1) Alexander was unhappy with the
standard text, which makes the first mover a self-mover and altered it
because the notion of self-movement is Platonic, whereas for Alexanders
Aristotle the first mover is without motion. Several of the passages from
in Cael. relating to Alexander have been discussed in Moraux ((1973-
2001), vol. 3, pp. 181-241), and I shall content myself with a few remarks
here.19
At 575,27 Simplicius reports Alexanders rejection of an interpretation
of the Timaeus according to which the geometrical chemistry is not to be
taken literally, the only significant point being the similarity of earth,
water, air, and fire to the four solids assigned to them. Alexander thinks
that the chemistry must be literal and not merely symbolic since Plato is
 Introduction 17
willing to deny that earth interchanges with the other elements. Sim-
plicius, who believes (and believes that Plato believes) that earth does
interchange, is willing to invoke the symbolic interpretation as a basis for
rejecting Alexanders objection, but he still insists that explanation of
elemental change in terms of shapes reveals something more fundamental
than Aristotles reliance on qualities in On Coming to Be and Perishing.
Later at 578,20 Simplicius reports Alexanders response to another
attempt to escape difficulties associated with the Timaeus by saying that
Plato constructs the forms of the simple bodies from planes rather than
the bodies themselves. Alexander responds that it is still the case that
Plato generates solids from planes. Simplicius counters by insisting again
that Platos planes are not mathematical. Alexander continues his re-
sponse by saying (578,31-579,2), In addition to this it is unreasonable for
them to say that there is a generation of form; for just as there is no
generation of matter, so there is no generation of form by itself, but
generation is of the two together, and this is what comes to be by the
presence of form and perishes by the absence of form. Here Alexander
sketches a standard view of change, a view which he also expresses at
598,26-599,2. Simplicius queries Alexanders suggestion that form does
not come to be, casting doubt on the idea that form couldnt arrive through
a temporal process rather than instantaneously. He adds that if there
were any people who took the line being attacked by Alexander, they
would have been talking about the emergence of form into existence, not
the change of one thing into another (579,8-12).
At the end of 3.2 Aristotle says,

It is impossible for all body to come to be, unless it is also possible for
there to be a separate void, since if it were to come to be, it would be
necessary that in the place in which what is coming to be now will be
there was previously void, with no body existing. It is possible for one
body to come to be from another, for example, fire from air, but in
general it is impossible for a body to come to be from no previously
existing magnitude. Certainly a body could come to be actual from
something which is potentially a body. But if the body which is
potentially is not already another actual body, there will be a sepa-
rate void. (301b33-302a9)

For Simplicius there is a sense in which all body (or, as he puts it, body
simpliciter) comes to be since the existence of body depends on higher
metaphysical causes, but he does not want to concede that this fact implies
the existence of void. He begins (at 598,26) by citing Alexander, according
to whom Aristotle in this passage is setting out his doctrine of matter:

Aristotle does not think that matter is actually incorporeal, but that
both matter and form are separable in thought, although actually
neither of them exists separately; rather, when something is said to
18 Introduction
come to be from matter, it is said to come to be from something which
is actually but with respect to what is potentially the thing which comes
to be it is said to come to be from that thing as from matter. For Aristotle
says that in general it is impossible that something come to be from no
previously (actually) existing magnitude, that is, from no body. For if
this happened there would be a void. (598,27-599,4)

Simplicius responds to this view first with an unclear argument that

Alexanders position could be extended to the claim that no common
qualities come to be, and continues:

What then? Are there this many sublunary forms which do not come
to be? And why do we say that all sublunary things come to be and
perish? Or is it the case that just as there are common forms in this
world, so too they come to be and perish? But these forms do not exist
per se; rather they exist in individuals, since in this world no colour
or shape which is not a particular thing exists per se, and similarly
in the case of body. So, just as common things exist in particulars, so
too they come to be and perish in those things, but they are always
interchanging in particulars }. Common things appear in the con-
tinuous flux of particulars, and they seem to stand still as one thing
because they are an appearance of the intellectual form which always
is. It is as if one were looking at a face in an eternally flowing river:
the appearance of the face in the water seems to be one and the same,
although it is not the same but gives the impression of being one
because of the enduring face. (599,14-26)

Simplicius concludes by saying,

However, even the Peripatetics, who place all common things in

particulars, think that what is common and lies under particulars
which are always in flux endures while changing. And perhaps one
should say that body simpliciter does not come to be for this reason
<i.e., because only particular bodies come to be, whereas body in
general is eternal> rather than because otherwise one would be
forced to hypothesise a void. (599,27-31)

I end this section with a remark on Simplicius quotations of Alexander.

Heiberg marks the following passages as quotations: 578,2-7; 578,20-
579,2; 583,13-14; 585,1-5; 590,3-11; 594,18-22; 607,7-16; 618,10-619,8;
621,20-5; 624,10-13; 627,21-32; 631,13-15; 634,11-17. I have also treated
as quotations: 617,11-21; 623,4-8; 623,8-16. I do not know why Heiberg
does not mark the first of these as a quotation. The second and third are
that-constructions (Alexander says that }), but I see no reason to doubt
that they essentially reproduce what Alexander said, and, indeed, they
require minimal alteration to be turned into quotations.
 Introduction 19

9. The text
This translation is based on Heibergs edition of Simplicius commentary
on Cael. printed as volume 7 of CAG, which I wish to discuss briefly here.
My remarks are based on Heibergs preface to his edition (cited here by
Roman numeral page) and his earlier, more detailed but slightly discrep-
ant report to the Berlin Academy (Heiberg (1892)). What I say here applies
to books 2-4, the situation for book 1 being significantly different.
For Heiberg the most important manuscript is:

A Mutinensis III E 8, thirteenth-fourteenth century, in the Este

Library in Modena (Wartelle (1963), no. 1052).

Heiberg ((1892), p. 71) singles out A for its correctness and purity. But he
admits that it is badly deficient and hastily written, with frequent incor-
rect divisions of words, misunderstandings of abbreviations, arbitrary use
of accents and breathing marks, extremely many omissions, and frequent
insertions in a wrong place of words occurring in the vicinity. A glance at
the apparatus on almost any page of Heibergs edition makes clear how
often he feels forced to depart from A. On the whole these departures seem
justified, but there are some cases where he follows A and produces a text
which seems to me impossible or at least very difficult.
Heiberg thought that A and another text, which he calls B, derived
independently from a lost archetype. B stops in book 1, the remaining pages
being torn out. Among the other manuscripts which Heiberg cites are:20

C Coislinianus 169, fifteenth century, in the National Library in

Paris (Wartelle (1963), no. 1560).
D Coislinianus 166, fourteenth century, in the National Library of
Paris (Wartelle (1963), no. 1558).
E Marcianus 491. thirteenth century, in the library of San Marco,
Venice. (Mioni (1985), pp. 299-300; not in Wartelle (1963)).
F Marcianus 228, fifteenth century, in the library of San Marco,
Venice (Wartelle (1963), no. 2129).
K Marcianus 221, fifteenth century, in the library of San Marco,
Venice (Wartelle (1963), no. 2122).

Heiberg took D and E to be significantly different from A and B, and C to

be intermediate between D and E, on the one hand, and A and B, on the
other. C and D are, in fact, not complete texts of Simplicius commentary,
but texts of Cael. with extensive marginalia, the majority of which are
derived from Simplicius commentary (not necessarily word-for-word quo-
tations). According to Heiberg E, which is a complete (although lacunose)
text, and D were copied from the same prototype, E being copied by an
uneducated scribe. E was corrected by Bessarion (E2), using the Latin
translation of William Moerbeke, a work to which I shall return shortly.
20 Introduction
Heiberg decided on quite inadequate grounds, that F is a descendant of the
archetype of A. He cites it only where it seems useful, so that, as he says,
nothing can be concluded about its contents in places where it is not
mentioned in the apparatus. Books 2-4 of K were copied from F and again
corrected by Bessarion on the basis of the Moerbeke translation (K2). Not
surprisingly Heiberg makes very little use of K, but he does sometimes
adopt readings of C, D, E, and F.
Heiberg also cites three printed versions of the commentary in his
apparatus:

(a) The editio princeps of the Greek text. Simplicii Commentarii in

Quatuor Libros de Coelo, cum Textu Ejusdem, Venice: Aldus Roma-
nus and Andrea Asulani, 1526.
(b) The editio princeps of the Latin translation of William Moerbeke.
Simplicii philosophi acutissimi, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros De
coelo Aristotelis. Venice: Hieronymus Scotus, 1540.
(c) Karsten, Simon (ed.) (1865), Simplicii Commentarius in IV Libros
Aristotelis De Caelo, Utrecht: Kemink and Son.

Citations of (a) are rare because Heiberg ((1892), 75) realised that it was
a translation back into Greek of Moerbekes Latin translation.21 However,
he did not realise that (b) was corrected in the light of (a). The new edition
of Moerbekes translation, begun in Bossier (2004), is an essential precon-
dition of a satisfactory edition of Simplicius commentary, since Moerbeke
relied on a Greek text which was more complete and less corrupted than
any known today.22 In my reports on what is in Heibergs apparatus
criticus I omit what he says about (b).
Karstens edition was published one year after his death. It includes no
critical apparatus, and has no preface by Karsten. Throughout it is based
on single manuscripts, in the case of book 3 on a manuscript which Heiberg
((1892), 65) takes to descend from A:

Paris Suppl. 16, sixteenth century, in the National Library in Paris

(Wartelle (1963), no. 1575).

In the absence of a critical apparatus or inspection of this manuscript, it

is impossible to tell what alterations of his source Karsten made, but there
is little doubt that he made improvements.23 I have sometimes thought it
desirable to adopt them rather than what Heiberg prints. For Karstens
readings I have relied on Heibergs apparatus, which includes an exten-
sive, although not complete, record of Karstens text. My departures from
Heibergs text are recorded in the footnotes and in the appendix Depar-
tures from Heibergs text. For the text of De Caelo itself I have relied on
Moraux, and for the text of Platos Timaeus Rivaud.
 Introduction 21

10. Brackets and parentheses

In lemmas square brackets are used to enclose those portions of the text
of Aristotle Simplicius is to discuss which are not included in the lemmas
printed by Heiberg, which typically give the first and last few words of the
passage separated by up to (hes). Frequently differences between Greek
and English syntax make an exact correspondence impossible. In the text
square brackets are placed around lower case Roman numerals which I
have inserted for clarification.
Angle brackets are used to set off major and possibly debatable inser-
tions made for clarification. (Many minor insertions such as the
substitution of a noun for a pronoun are made without remark when they
are judged to be relatively certain; in particular I have frequently inserted
a proper name where Simplicius has only a he or a third person singular
verb.) If an insertion represents an addition to the Greek text a footnote
explaining this is attached.
Parentheses are used as punctuation marks and to enclose Greek words
inserted as information. Occasionally they are used to mark an insertion
by Simplicius in a quotation.

Notes
1. There is now a fairly extensive literature on the subject of Simplicius later
life. For a useful brief summary with references see Brittain and Brennan (2002),
pp. 2-4 (= Brennan and Brittain (2002), pp. 2-4).
2. On Simplicius works see Hadot (1990), pp. 289-303. The authorship of the
commentary on Aristotles On the Soul, which comes down to us under Simplicius
name, is disputed. For arguments see Huby and Steel (1997), pp. 105-40 (contra
Simplicius authorship) and Hadot (2002) (pro), and Perkams (2005) (contra).
Simplicius other extant work is a commentary on Epictetus Manual.
3. In this introduction I take for granted a number of points which are discussed
in the notes on relevant passages in the footnotes to the translation.
4. For Simplicius explanation of Aristotles procedure here see 561,26-562,18.
5. I have outlined the argument of this chapter in an appendix on the argument
of Cael. 3.5.
6. There is also a brief discussion of an obscure theory according to which
elemental change is a matter of change of shape (305b28-306a1).
7. Simplicius only other reference to any of these monists in the commentary
on books 3 and 4 comes in his discussion of 4.1, 308a17-29 at 679,2-6 where he
associates Anaximander and Democritus as people who believe there is no up or
down in the cosmos because the universe is infinite.
8. For the Simplicius other citations of Empedocles in the discussion of 300b25-
31 see the notes on 587,8-26.
9. cf. OBrien (1969), p. 176.
10. At this point Simplicius provides us with our only citation of Anaxagoras
fragment 7.
11. Homomereity translates homoiomereia, a word not used by Aristotle.
12. Democritus forerunner Leucippus is mentioned only in phrases such as
22 Introduction
Leucippus and Democritus. For the six times he is mentioned see the entry on
him in the Index of Names.
13. Marg (1972); text and English translation in Tobin (1985); extensive com-
mentary in Baltes (1972). For Simplicius conception of Platos relation to Timaeus
of Locri and TL see 561,10-11 and 646,5-6 in the commentary on 3.7.
14. For further discussion of this material see Mueller (forthcoming).
15. cf. 576,14-16 and 641,5-7 in the commentary on 3.7, where the same
statement is repeated.
16. I regret very much that I have not been able to take into account the
thorough and acute edition and translation with extensive discussion of the
fragments of Alexanders commentary on Cael. 2-4 now available in Andrea
Rescigno (ed. and trans.), Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commentario al de Caelo di
Aristotele, Frammenti del Secondo, Terzo, e Quarto Libro, Amsterdam: Hakkert,
2008. In the Addenda at the end of this volume I have provided an index of the
passages in this translation presented and discussed by Rescigno.
17. On Alexander see Sharples (1987).
18. See Guldentops (2005). In the entry on Alexander in the Index of Names I
have divided the relevant passages into those where Simplicius accepts what
Alexander says and those where he does not and divided the latter into cases of
significant and not so significant disagreement.
19. I have already mentioned Simplicius disagreement with Alexander on the
interpretation of Empedocles (section 5) and Democritus (section 7).
20. I mention only the MSS cited in my notes.
21. A fact first noticed by Peyron (1810).
22. cf. Bossier (2004), p. CXXXII. The introduction to this work provides a
comprehensive account of the complex situation relating to the manuscripts of the
Moerbeke translation(s), (a), (b), and subsequent Renaissance publications of the
Moerbeke translation.
23. cf. Bergk (1883), p. 143, n. 1 and p. 148.
 SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
On the Heavens 3.1-7

Translation
This page intentionally left blank
 <Simplicius> on the third <book> of Aristotles 551,1
On the Heavens

<Prologue>
There is presumably nothing to prevent us from now recalling the
purpose of this whole treatise. Its subject is the simple bodies in the
cosmos, the first ones which are composed from the principles. There
are five of them, as he proved1 on the basis of the simple motions, that 5
of the thing which moves in a circle and those of the four sublunary
elements. And in the first two books he set out all sorts of theorems
concerning the body which moves in a circle. And in those two books
he also mentioned the things which he thought should be said about
the cosmos since they belong to it because of the heavens: that it is
one and finite, and does not come to be and is imperishable. And what
he said about the earth2 was not said simply about the earth, but 10
about it as having a relation to the heavens; and so he spoke about
the position of the earth in the universe and its rest and shape and
the comparison of its magnitude with that of the heavens.
But now he begins to teach things about the sublunary simple
bodies: that they are neither infinite nor one in number, but they are
four in number; and that they come to be, but not from incorporeal 15
things nor from another body but from one another, and not by
separation out nor by composition and dissolution of planes or atoms.
He will teach about these things in the present book, just as in the
fourth book he will teach about the powers of the sublunary simple
bodies. That he discusses these topics as concerning simple, primary
bodies, just as he did in discussing the heavens is made clear by the
fact that here he again uses the same proemium and shows that the 20
subject of the study of nature is bodies. This will also be made clear
by what will be said in <this> proemium.3

<Chapter 1>
298a24-7 We have previously gone through the discussion of
the first heaven [and its parts and further the stars which move
in it what they are composed of and what their nature is like,
and also said that they do not come to be and are imperishable.]
Here the proemium recalls briefly what was already explained in the
first and the second book. He is calling the whole ethereal body the 552,1
first heaven, since even if the whole cosmos is also called heaven
 26 Translation
because of the first heaven, this first heaven, the heaven in the strict
sense, would be the unitary thing which is composed from eight
spheres which he went through in the first book. He refers directly
5 to the eight spheres as parts of the first heaven since the stars are
also parts of it, but they are parts of parts. He discussed the parts of
the first heaven and the stars in the second book. One should
understand what comes next as being spoken about everything
together, that is, the first heaven and its parts and the stars; for
what they are composed of the fifth substance and what their
10 nature is like that they are not soulless bodies, but bodies with
soul, which share in mind and practical activity (praxis),4 and that
they are spherical in shape, and, in addition, that they do not come
to be and are imperishable and that they do not undergo alteration
or passion and are free from all the difficulties to which mortals are
subject,5 were said and proved about everything together. But if, as
Alexander thinks, Aristotle is pointing out with the words what they
15 are composed of and what their nature is like that <the stars> are
similar to the spheres in which they are located and are spherical and
unmoving, then also the words do not come to be and are imperish-
able cannot apply to everything, as Alexander says, but only to the
stars, and one should understand <the reference to be to> them
because in the first book it was proved that the whole heaven does
not come to be and is imperishable.6

20 298a27-b5 Since7 some of the things which are called natural

[are substances, others are acts and affections of substances (I
call the simple bodies, that is fire and earth and the things
co-ordinate with them, and what is composed of them, that is,
the entire heaven and its parts, and, again, animals and plants
and their parts, substances; and I call the motions of each of
these things and the motions of all other things of which these
are causes by dint of their own power and, further, their altera-
tions and changes into one another acts and affections), it is
evident that it results that the greatest part of enquiry about
nature concerns bodies; for all natural substances are either
bodies or come to be together with bodies and magnitudes. This
is clear from the determination of what sorts of things are
natural8] and from particular investigation.
As I said,9 because he is going to again discuss other simple bodies,
the sublunary ones, he again uses the same proemium which he used
at the beginning of the treatise. The argument, which proceeds on the
25 basis of the first hypothetical mode,10 is the following:

If some of the things which are called natural are substances

and some are acts and affections of such substances, it results
 Translation 27
that the greatest part of enquiry about nature concerns bodies
(since the discussion of the acts and affections of bodies makes
reference to bodies);
but the first; therefore the second as well.

The words inserted in the middle make clear what natural substance 30
is, namely that it is bodies, and what acts and affections are.
In hypotheticals in which the antecedent is not only true but also 553,1
clearly true and undisputed they use the causal (parasunaptikos)
connective since instead of the hypothetical (sunaptikos) connective
if, and so more recent thinkers call this sort of proposition causal.
And in the first book of his Prior Analytics Theophrastus makes clear
the reason for this way of speaking.11 And it is for this reason that 5
now Aristotle, too, does not say if some of the things which are called
natural but since some of the things which are called natural, it
being evident that some of the things which are called natural are
substances and some are acts and affections of substances. But since
there are also hypernatural substances, he reasonably distinguishes
by induction which substances are natural, namely the corporeal
ones; for hypernatural substances are incorporeal. Consequently 10
when he said some of the things which are called natural are
substances he was speaking about the corporeal substances; there-
fore, the consequent, that the greatest part of enquiry about nature
concerns bodies, follows from this antecedent.
Having said fire and earth he adds and things co-ordinate with
them, meaning the other three simple bodies, the fifth and air and 15
water. The words and what is composed of them indicate all the
composites which he goes on to name, the whole heaven (meaning
everything ethereal) and its parts,12 and, again (in the sublunary
realm) animals and plants and their parts; for all sublunary things
are either animals or plants or their parts.
Having said what the natural substances are, he indicates what 20
the natural affections and acts of bodies are, mentioning the changes
of place, which are rather acts of the substances he has mentioned
and the other things of which these substances are causes by dint of
natural power. For fire does not only change place; it also heats and
dries things naturally. And each of the other natural bodies is active
by dint of its own power. And what comes about is the act of what 25
acts and the affection of what is acted on. Alterations are also of this
kind, being acts of what alters something and affections of what is
altered. And so are their changes into one another, that is, their
coming to be and their perishing; these are acts of what makes or
destroys and affections of what comes to be or is destroyed. So if both
natural acts and natural affections belong to natural (that is, corpo- 30
real) substances, it is reasonable that the conclusion of the argument
said that the greatest part of natural science concerns bodies.
 28 Translation
557,1 Either he says the greatest part of instead of all with the
measuredness of a philosopher, or he means it in the strict sense
since the discussion of soul and the first mover also falls to some
extent to the student of nature. For the student of nature also uses
arguments about the unmoving cause for <showing that> circular
5 motion is continuous and eternal. Or perhaps he says the greatest
part concerns bodies because it also concerns the acts and affections
of bodies and these are different from bodies, even if they also involve
reference to bodies. Or perhaps he says it because natural substances
are not bodies without qualification; rather they are either bodies or
they are, as he adds, together with bodies; as a result the greatest
part would concern bodies, if, indeed, some natural substances are
souls, not bodies.
10 He says that it is clear from the determination of what sorts of
things are natural that natural substances are either bodies or (in
the case of the communion of soul with body) come to be together with
bodies, since previously he mentioned fire and earth and spoke of
things co-ordinate with them, and what is composed of them and
generally the things which have in themselves per se a starting point
15 of motion; but all of these are either just bodies or they are together
with bodies. He says that this is also clear from particular investiga-
tion. For each investigation of these <substances> which we call
natural concerns bodies or things which are together with bodies.
These statements are practically the same as what was said at the
beginning of the treatise, namely Most of the science of nature, in
20 fact, concerns bodies and magnitudes and their affections and
changes.13

298b6-8 We have discussed the first of the elements [and what

sort of nature it has and said that it does not perish or come to
be.] It remains to speak about the <other> two.
He has shown earlier and also just now that the study of nature
25 concerns bodies and obviously it concerns the prior, simple bodies
and as a result the composite ones, and he no longer needs to teach
about the nature of body or how many simple bodies there are, having
already given proofs about these subjects. However, having recalled
that he has already discussed one of the simple bodies, the heavenly
body, which he reasonably calls first, since it is prior to the sublu-
nary bodies in position and in time and in the account of the cause,
he turns to the remaining simple bodies, the sublunary ones.
555,1 He calls the heavenly <body> an element because it is simple since
it is not an element of the cosmos, as Alexander says it is, but rather
a part of it; for an element extends through the whole of what is
composed of elements and mingles with the elements which are
together with it. The words what sort of nature it has <refer to the
 Translation 29
fact> that it has the nature of a certain fifth substance which is
transcendent and moves in a circle and <to the fact> that it does not 5
perish or come to be. So it remains to speak about the <other> two,
which come to be and perish. He calls the four sublunary bodies two
because he is uniting them in terms of their motions up or down and
in terms of their impulsions, that is, lightness and heaviness. Having
shown previously14 on the basis of the simple motions that generically
there are three simple bodies, that which moves in a circle, that 10
which moves up, and that which moves down and having spoken
about the one which moves in a circle, he reasonably adds, It remains
to speak about the <other> two.

298b8-14 At the same time it will follow for those who speak
about these things [that they also investigate coming to be and
perishing. For either there is no coming to be whatsoever or it
only occurs among these elements and things composed of them.
Perhaps we should first investigate this very thing: is there
coming to be or isnt there? The earlier philosophers who were
concerned with truth were in disagreement with what we are
now saying] and with one another.
Having spoken about the eternal body and being about to speak 15
about ones which come to be, he first asks if there is or there isnt any
coming to be at all since some people said there is not. And, if there
is, he asks in what way it does not occur and in what way it does,
since some of those who say there is coming to be do not explain it in
an appropriate way. He shows first that the discussion of coming to
be is necessary for the person who is going to speak about sublunary
things, since either there is no coming to be whatsoever or it is only 20
in these sublunary elements and the things composed of them. He
then asks whether there is coming to be or not. For when, as is the
case with coming to be, it is not completely evident and undisputed
whether the thing under consideration is, this is the first problem:
whether the thing is or is not. For the first people who philosophised 25
about the truth theoretically and did not concern themselves practi-
cally or politically with matters of choice and avoidance were in
disagreement both with our statements and with one another; they
were in disagreement with us because we say that there is coming to
be and not in all things but only in sublunary ones, whereas some of
them say that nothing comes to be and others that all things come to
be (and so they also disagree with one another). Consequently, since 30
discord on this subject is great, it is also necessary for the person who
is investigating sublunary things to enquire about coming to be in
general and to ask whether there is coming to be and what things
come to be.
 30 Translation

556,1 298b14-24 Some of the earlier philosophers did away with

coming to be [and perishing entirely. They say that nothing that
is either comes to be or perishes, but is only thought by us to do
so. Examples are Melissus and Parmenides and their followers,
who, even if they say other correct things, should not be consid-
ered to speak in a way appropriate to the study of nature, since
the existence of some things which do not come to be and are
entirely without change is a matter for another prior enquiry
rather than for enquiry into nature. Because these people as-
sumed that there is nothing else apart from the substance of
perceptible things, but were the first to understand that there
must be certain entities of this kind if there is going to be any
knowledge or thought,] they transferred accounts of those15
entities to these.
He divides beliefs about coming to be into four kinds.16 Some people
completely do away with coming to be and say that no things that are
come to be because there is no knowledge of things which come to be
5 and perish since they are always in flux; Parmenides and Melissus
have been thought to speak this way. But others, such as Hesiod,
speak in the contrary way; he says that the very first of the things
which he recognises has come to be:

In truth at the very first Chaos came to be.17

Other people, such as Heraclitus, say that, other things come to be,
10 but there is only one thing, the common substratum from which the
others come to be, which does not come to be. And others say that
there is no body which does not come to be, but they all come to be by
being compounded from planes.
He first discusses Melissus and Parmenides and their followers.
Of these Melissus says that there is no coming to be at all, whereas
Parmenides says that there is none as far as truth is concerned, but
that there is as far as opinion is concerned, and it is for this reason
that Aristotle adds the words but is only thought by us to do so.18 He
15 says that, even if these people say other correct things (they really
understood correctly and in a divine way the one being and intelligi-
ble nature, and they disclosed to their followers that there cannot be
knowledge of things that come to be and change because they are
always in flux), they should not be considered to speak in a way
appropriate to the study of nature since they philosophise about
hypernatural things. For it is a matter for another <enquiry>, first
20 philosophy, to demonstrate what they demonstrate, namely the
existence of some things which do not come to be and are entirely
without change, and it is not a matter for enquiry into nature, which
concerns changing things, since nature is a starting point of change
 Translation 31
and those who do away with change also do away with nature and
natural things.
Someone might say the following. What prevents one from saying
that these people are students of nature and are to be criticised as 25
students of nature? In fact both Melissus and Parmenides entitled
their treatises On Nature.19 But this might not mean so much, since
the word nature might be general insofar as <people> also dare to
speak frequently of the nature of god and we speak of the nature of
things. Moreover, they did not only discuss hypernatural things; they
also discussed natural ones in these same treatises and perhaps for
this reason they did not refrain from entitling these treatises On 30
Nature.20
But what Aristotles censures them for in dismissing the reason 557,1
for their mistake would be really harsh if it were correct. For he says
that they assumed that there is nothing else in reality apart from the
substance of perceptible things, although they were the first to
understand that it is necessary for there to be entities which do not
come to be or change if there is to be scientific knowledge; for there 5
is no knowledge of what is always in flux, and Platos Parmenides
says21 that a person will have no place to turn his mind if the eternal
forms are not hypothesised to exist. And so <according to Aristotle>,
understanding these things, these people transferred accounts which
fit intelligible, unchanging things to perceptible things which come
to be, at least if, proposing to speak about nature, they said things
which are appropriate to intelligible things. And if Melissus entitled 10
his work On Nature or On Being,22 it is clear that he considered
nature to be being and natural things to be beings. But these things
are perceptible. And it is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle says
that they assumed that there is nothing else apart from the sub-
stance of perceptible things: because they say being is one; for, if
perceptibles are thought to clearly exist, if being is one there cannot 15
be anything apart from what is perceptible. And Melissus says:23

If it were <infinite> it would be one, since if it were two things,

those two could not be infinite, but they would have limits
relative to one another.

And Parmenides says:24

It is a whole, of one kind, unshaking and without coming to be.

But, as is his custom, Aristotle here too raises objections against the
apparent meaning of what is said, taking care that more superficial 20
people do not reason incorrectly.25 However, those men hypothesised
a double reality (hupostasis), one consisting of what really is, the
intelligible, the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, something
 32 Translation
which they did not think it right to call being without qualification,
but only apparent being. And so Parmenides says that truth concerns
being, and opinion what comes to be. For he says:26

25 You should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-
rounded truth and the opinions of mortals in which there is no
558,1 true belief. But nevertheless you must also learn these things:
how the things which are believed should be acceptably, since
they permeate all things everywhere.

But also, having completed his account of what really is and being
about to explain perceptibles, he says:27

5 Here I end28 my trustworthy account and thinking about truth;

hereafter learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the decep-
tive ordering of my words.

And, in setting out the ordering of perceptibles, he again says:29

Indeed, in this way, as belief has it, these things were born and
10 now are and hereafter they will grow and reach an end; for them
humans have laid down a name, a distinctive one for each.

So in what sense did Parmenides, who philosophised in this way

about the intelligible, assume that only perceptible things exist this
is now an extraordinary charge to make. And how did he transfer
things which fit intelligibles to perceptibles when he clearly sets out
15 the unity of the intelligible, which really exists, and the ordering of
perceptibles, each separately, and does not think it right to apply the
word being to the perceptible?
But Melissus, too, writing still more clearly in prose, discloses his
own understanding of these things throughout his discussion and not
least in the words which I shall present. Having said that being is
20 one and without coming to be or change and not divided by any void,
but is a whole which is filled by itself, he adds:30

This argument is the greatest sign that it is one alone, but these
are also signs: if it were several things, these things would have
to be like what I say the one is; for if there is earth and water
and air and iron and gold and fire and if one thing is living,
another dead, and one thing is white, another black, and if all
25 the other things which humans assert are true if these things
are so and we see and hear correctly, each thing must be the
way we first believed it to be, and it does not change or become
different but each thing is always exactly as it is. We now claim
to see and hear and understand correctly, but we believe that
 Translation 33
what is hot becomes cold, what is cold hot, what is hard soft, 30
what is soft hard, and that what is alive dies and comes to be
from what is not alive, and that all these things become differ- 559,1
ent and what they were and what they are now are not at all
similar, but that iron (and also gold and stone and everything
else thought to be strong), which is hard, is rubbed away by the
finger when they are in contact,31 and that earth and stone come
to be from water. (The result is that we do not see the things 5
that are nor know them.)32 But these things do not agree with
one another, since we say that there are many eternal things
which have forms and strength, but we think that they all
become different and change from what is seen at any time. So
it is clear that we did not see correctly and we are not correct to
think that those things are many, since they would not change
if they were real but each thing would be like what it was
thought to be; for nothing is stronger than what is real; for if it 10
changed, what is has been destroyed and what is not has come
to be. And so, in this way, if there were many things, they would
have to be like the one.

So Melissus, too, clearly states the reason why these people say that
perceptible things are not but are thought to be. How then could
someone assume that they think that only what is perceptible is?
But they also deny that what really is comes to be. On this topic 15
Parmenides says:33

In this way coming to be is extinguished and destruction is

unheard of.

And Melissus agrees with Parmenides. However, they do say clearly

that perceptibles come to be, Melissus when he says34 What is hot
becomes cold and so on <and>35 Earth and stone come to be from water; 20
and Parmenides, having begun36 to speak about perceptibles, says:37

} how earth and sun and moon and the common ether and
heavenly Milky Way and outermost Olympus and the hot
strength of the stars strove to come to be. 25

And he sets out38 the coming to be of things that come to be and

perish up to the parts of animals. And it is clear that Parmenides
was not unaware that he himself came to be, just as he was not
unaware that he had two feet, even though he said that being is
one. However, one should think that Aristotle adds everywhere 560,1
after his refutation of Parmenides apparent meaning what he
correctly gives voice to in the Metaphysics when he says But
Parmenides seems somehow to perceive }. 39
 34 Translation
5 Alexander says that these people make the following kind of
syllogism:

Only perceptibles exist;

there is knowledge of what exists;
the things of which there is knowledge do not change;
therefore, perceptibles do not change.

Alexander says that, following this argument, these people incor-

rectly transferred what is said truly about unchanging substances to
perceptible things, and so it resulted that these people did away with
10 nature by speaking about natural things in a way inappropriate to
the study of nature.

298b24-299a1 Certain others, as if deliberately, [held the con-

trary opinion to these people. For there are some people who say
that there is nothing which does not come to be, but that
everything comes to be, and that some things that have come to
be endure without perishing, and, again, others perish. This is
especially true of Hesiod and his followers, and later, of others,
the first people who studied nature.
(298b29) Other people say that all other things come to be and
are in flux and none of them is fixed, but only one thing endures
and all the other things are natural transformations of it. This
seems to be what Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others mean to
say.
(298b33) And there are some people who make every body
come to be, composing] them from planes and dissolving them
into planes.
After those who are thought to do away with coming to be com-
pletely,40 he introduces the people who speak in a way contrary to
them, and say that everything comes to be and nothing does not come
to be, but that, although all things come to be, some remain without
15 perishing while others perish. He says that Hesiod is one of these
people. Hesiod makes the very first of the things which he says are,
Chaos, come to be when he says:

In truth at the very first Chaos came to be.41

Aristotle says that Hesiod especially made all things come to be

because Hesiod says that what is for him the first thing came to be.
20 Of the others it is plausible to say that Orpheus and Musaeus and
their followers, who say that everything except what is first came to
be, are the first who studied nature. But it is clear that these people
were using myths to talk about divine things (theologein) and called
 Translation 35
the procession from causes coming to be. Accordingly they all pre-
serve the first cause from coming to be. For even Hesiod, when he
says that Chaos came to be first, indicates that there is something
prior to Chaos from which Chaos came to be, since it is absolutely 25
necessary that what comes to be comes to be by the agency of
something. And Hesiod indicates this in addition: that the first cause
is beyond both knowledge and being named.42
(298b29) Having distinguished in this way views which are con- 561,1
trary to one another, he adds third the view of the people who are
called students of nature in the strict sense, those who said that all
things come to be but that only one thing, which does not come to be,
endures and that the other things come to be from it and are resolved
into it: Thales <said that this one thing is> water, Anaximenes air,
Anaximander what is intermediate (to metaxu), Heraclitus fire. But
it is clear that even if those people said that the one does not come to 5
be, nevertheless it is not unchanging since they say that other things
come to be when it is transformed. But these people did say that this
primary thing, from which the other things come, is a body and does
not come to be.
(298b33) He adduces as fourth those who say that every body
comes to be in the sense that it is composed from planes and again
divided into planes. The doctrine of nature of the Pythagorean Ti- 10
maeus is something of this kind, and it has been set out by Plato in
the dialogue bearing Timaeus name.43 They hypothesise two kinds of
triangles,44 one the scalene which is half of an equilateral triangle (for
which reason it is called a half-triangle45), the other the isosceles
right triangle. From the latter they construct the cube and earth, and
from the former, the pyramid, the octahedron, and the icosahedron,
from which they say fire, air, and water are composed, fire from pyra- 15
mids, air from octahedra, water from icosahedra. They say that as a
result these three change into one another because they are composed
from the same half-triangle; but, since earth came into being from its
own element, the isosceles right triangle, they say that it does not either 20
come to be from one of those three or change into them.
Aristotle says that these people make every body come to be
instead of make body itself come to be, and thereby he already
reduces their argument to absurdity. For the people who speak in
this way make body <itself> come to be, something which he rejects.
For when they say that body comes to be from what is not body, they
are not speaking about the coming to be of some body, but of body
simpliciter.46 25

[299a1-2 The other views are to be discussed elsewhere.]47

Aristotle dismisses the other three views about coming to be, the one
which says that nothing comes to be, the one which hypothesises that
 36 Translation
all things come to be, and the one which says that there is only one
body which endures without coming to be and from which other
things come to be and into which they are resolved, and he turns to
deal with the last view mentioned, the one which constructs bodies
30 from planes. Or as the most honoured of those dear to Plato says with
elegant banter:

But Achilles most of all desired to enter the crowd and meet
with Hector }.48

562,1 However, Alexander explains that <Aristotle proceeds in this way>

because this view was more recent and consequently more persua-
sive, not yet having met with any counter-argument. But Alexander
also says that this hypothesis is first in order because the generation
of body is prior to generation from bodies, since the simple bodies
5 which they generated from planes (and then the bodies composed
from them come to be) ought to be prior. But perhaps Aristotle now
passes over the other views because in the Physics49 he gave a lengthy
argument against them. And perhaps what was said by Parmenides
and Hesiod on the basis of other conceptions50 would not require
much discussion. And of the students of nature one said water <was
the first thing>, another air, another fire, another what is interme-
10 diate. Accordingly, Aristotle, having shown51 on the basis of the
simple motions that there are four simple bodies which move in a
straight line and being about to explain that these bodies come to be
and how they come to be by changing into one another, is reasonable
in first examining this view which also says that the four elements
come to be and does not hypothesise that one of them does not come
15 to be (as the students of nature did) and which also sets out the
manner in which they come to be in a new way and most effectively
does away with their natural impulsions, that is, heaviness and
lightness, the things which Aristotle wishes to use to give form to the
four elements.52

299a2-11 As for those who speak in this way [and construct all
bodies from planes, it is very easy to see in how many ways they
turn out to speak in a way which is contrary to mathematics;
but it is right either not to change mathematics or to change it
using more believable theories than its hypotheses.
(299a6) And then it is clear that by the same reasoning solids
are composed from planes, planes from lines, and lines from
points; and if this is the way things are, it is not necessary that
a part of a line be a line. We have investigated these things
previously in our discussion of change, and said] that there are
20 no indivisible lengths.
 Translation 37

He adduces his first criticism against these people: that they do away
with geometrical principles. And he says that recognising this is
easy, and as a result he omits <to explain the content of> this
recognition. He means that they do away with the geometers very
definitions of point, line, and surface. For if the geometers say that a
point is that of which a part is nothing, a line is breadthless length,
and a surface that which has length and breadth only,53 a line would 25
never come to be from points, so that neither would a surface come to
be from lines nor would a body, which has depth, come to be from a
surface, which has no depth; but if a body came to be from a plane,
the plane would have depth; and if a plane came to be from lines, the
line would not be breadthless; and if a line came to be from points, a
point would not be partless. He says that one should either not 30
change the principles of mathematics, which has so much worth in
scientific precision that what is demonstrated in a way which admits
no dispute is said to be demonstrated by geometrical necessities; or,
if one is going to cast aside things of this kind, one should use theories
which are themselves more believable than those which are done 563,1
away with, but not ones which are novel as these are and absurd.
He calls mathematical principles hypotheses because <mathema-
ticians> assume them hypothetically. They hypothesise that the point
has no parts and such things, since it is not possible to demonstrate
a principle in the discipline for which it is assumed as a principle 5
because demonstration is always from prior things,54 but there is
nothing prior to a principle. As a result the higher sciences demon-
strate the principles of the lower ones: mechanics demonstrates the
principles of architecture, geometry those of mechanics, and first
philosophy those of geometry.
(299a6) And next he adduces a second argument also capable of
reducing the theory to the same absurdity,55 but he reduces it to a 10
different absurdity which is itself also clear, namely that a part of a
line is not a line and what is continuous is not divisible to infinity
(which itself is also contrary to mathematics). What he says is the
following. Whatever relation a plane has to a body, a line has the
same relation to a plane and a point has the same relation to a line,
since all of them are limits. So it belongs to the same theory to
generate a body from planes, and a plane from lines, and a line from 15
points. However, if a line is generated from points, those points will
be part of the line, since a thing which is composed from other things
has those things as parts. Consequently not every part of a line will
be a line if points also are parts of a line. Consequently also the
division of a line will come to an end, and a line will no longer be
divisible to infinity, if a line is composed from points. However, it has 20
been proved in the Physics56 in the discussion of change in which
Aristotle argued against Xenocrates, who said there are indivisible
 38 Translation
lines, that there are no indivisible lengths, that is, that there is no
indivisible part of a line but it is divisible to infinity. Consequently a
line is not composed of points so that neither is a plane composed of
25 lines, nor a solid of planes.
These are Aristotles words, but, as I always say, he is objecting to
the apparent meaning of the theory. However, it should be said that
if those who say that solids are composed of planes and resolve solids
into planes said that the planes are mathematical and have only
length and breadth, then Aristotle is correct to adduce against them
30 these absurdities and the ones which he adduces next. But if they say
that the planes are natural on the grounds that the first natural
thing capable of being constructed should have not only length and
breadth but also depth, the absurdities adduced against the planes
as being without depth do not follow from their position. And that
564,1 they hypothesise that the planes are natural and not mathematical
is clear from their saying that they involve matter, and so they set
out matter first and say that it has been given shape by forms and
numbers.57 And Timaeus himself in his own treatise has written
this:58

The principles of things which are generated are matter as

5 substratum and form as logos of shape. What is generated from
these are the bodies earth and water, air and fire. The genera-
tion59 of these is as follows: every body is composed of planes,
and a plane is composed of triangles, one of which is the
isosceles right triangle, which is a half-square.

And then next, having set out the difference among the triangles, he
constructs from them the four figures, which he assigns to the four
elements.
10 Some interpreters of Plato think that this doctrine of nature based
on the figures is spoken symbolically60 these include the divine
Iamblichus, who also interprets Platos Timaeus in this way , but
more recent Platonic philosophers61 try to show that, according to
what is written, the theory of nature holds in the following way: since
15 the four elements are composites of matter and form and therefore do
not satisfy the definition of a principle, they, like Aristotle, say that the
qualities which are called affective,62 heat and dryness and their oppo-
sites, coming to be first in matter (or qualityless body) also compose the
four elements. (Aristotle also takes into account lightness and heaviness
20 and maintains that these are causes of simple natural motion, nature
being characterised most of all by motion.) And if someone were to ask
why fire heats and water cools, they would say Because fire is hot, water
cold. For they posit these things as principles and do not seek further
for a cause beyond the principles.
Theophrastus in his Physics reports that Democritus ascended to
 Translation 39
atoms on the grounds that those who offer explanations in terms of 25
hot and cold and such things do so in an amateurish way.63 And in
the same way the Pythagoreans ascend to planes, considering figures
and magnitudes to be causes of heat and cold, since things that
separate and divide produce an awareness of heat, those that blend
and compress an awareness of cold. For every body is immediately
determined quantitatively in substance, but shape, even if it is a 30
quality,64 has nevertheless been taken from the genus of quantities, 565,1
so that every body is a quantity which has been given a shape. For in
itself matter is incorporeal, and the second substratum is a body
which is in itself qualityless but which has been given form by a
variety of figures; and the second substratum differs from mathe-
matical body by involving matter and being tangible, touch
apprehending it because of its bulk and not because of heat or 5
coldness. And so they say that this second substratum, being painted
with different figures, produce (huphistanein) the elements which
are more fundamental than the four elements: the elements which
are more fundamental than earth are painted with the cubical figure,
not because the entirety of earth has a cubical shape but because each
part of earth is composed from many cubical figures which are
invisible because of their smallness. And the other elements are 10
composed from the other figures in this way.
They say that all the other powers <of earth, water, fire, and air>
and their changes into one another follow from the difference among
figures of this kind. For these people easily explain how so great an
amount of air comes to be from a small amount of water on the
grounds that the elements of water are many, since the figures for
water are icosahedra, and when they are divided they make many
octahedra and much air, which is composed of octahedra. But how 15
can those who make rarefaction and condensation responsible say
that bodies expand and contract when an incorporeal power65 enters
in? And in general how is an incorporeal power of fire so constituted
as to divide?66 For the incorporeal passes through a body with no
contact, but division occurs because of the shape of the divider. And
they say the same things in the case of coldness. And how, they say,
does the addition of a quality make a bulk heavier? For heaviness is 20
a quantity and not a quality since it is divided <logically> in terms of
equality and inequality. In general, if Aristotle, too, thinks that
qualityless body, the substratum of qualities, comes to be first from
matter and form, and he says that it is finite, how is it not necessary
that it have shape and that shapes exist prior to qualities?67 25
I have set out these considerations in order to indicate that it was
not unreasonable for the Pythagoreans and Democritus in seeking
the principles of qualities to rise up to the figures. But perhaps the
Pythagoreans and Plato did not hypothesise that the construction
from such triangles was certainly like this in every respect, but
 40 Translation
30 rather they did so in the way that astronomers make certain hy-
potheses, different ones making different hypotheses and not
insisting that the variegation in the heavens is certainly like this but
that when principles of this kind are hypothesised the phenomena
can be preserved with all the heavenly bodies moving in a circle in a
uniform way.68 In this way too these people, who in discussion of a
566,1 principle honour quantity and figure more highly than quality, hy-
pothesise these more fundamental figures, which are under the rule
of similarity and symmetry, as principles of bodies, principles which
they considered to suffice for giving accounts of the causes of what
comes to be. And <to see> that they did not assume these principles
5 of bodies as absolute in every respect, listen to what Plato says:69

Of the two triangles the isosceles is of one kind only, but the
scalene is of infinitely many kinds. Therefore, we should choose
the most beautiful of these if we are going to begin in a proper
way. And so if someone can pick out a more beautiful one for the
construction of these things and say what it is, he will prevail
since he is not an antagonist but a friend.

But also before these words he has written the following:70

10 Let us hypothesise71 the72 principle of fire and the other bodies,

proceeding in accordance with the reasonable account which
involves necessity. God and the man who is dear to him know
the principles which are yet higher than these. We must specify
the four most beautiful bodies which are dissimilar among
themselves but some of which are capable of coming to be from
one other when they are dissolved.73 If we hit upon this, we have
15 the truth about the coming to be of earth and fire and the things
intermediate between them which are in proportion.

But I shall proceed to what comes next, desiring as much as

possible to articulate the precision with which Aristotle examines the
apparent meaning of texts of this kind and to indicate in the case of
20 each argument that the true meanings are not at all hurt by the
things he says.

299a11-17 [We will now investigate briefly the impossibilities]

concerning natural bodies which [follow for those who make
there be indivisible lines; for the impossible <mathematical>
consequences will also follow for natural things, but not always
vice versa, since mathematical things are spoken of by abstrac-
tion,] but natural things are spoken of by addition.
He now sets aside what someone might think are objections arising
 Translation 41
from mathematics against those who generate bodies from planes
because they are easy to see and because he has spoken about them 25
in On Indivisible Lines74 (some people ascribe this work to Theo-
phrastus), but, in reality, proceeding in accordance with the figure
which is called paralipsis75 by rhetors, he has also brought in the
more important of these objections, namely that the view would do
away with the definitional principles of mathematics, that a part of
a line will not be a line, that a line will be composed from points, and 567,1
that magnitudes will not be divisible to infinity. He now adduces the
impossibilities concerning natural bodies which follow for those who
make there be indivisible lines, that is to say, for those who construct
bodies from planes. For if the primary bodies are composed of planes,
then the primary lines are also composed of points and therefore 5
divisible not into lines but into points, and they are called indivisible
lines for this reason: they are not divisible into lines.
He shows that these things are more absurd than the mistakes
made in mathematics on the grounds that there are more conse-
quences for natural things because the absurdities from
mathematics which follow from the theory also follow for natural
things, but not all the things which follow from this theory for natural 10
things follow for mathematical ones. Again the confirmation of this
is that mathematical things are by abstraction but natural things
are spoken of by addition. For if matter and affections such as heat,
coldness, heaviness, and lightness, and all resistances and changes
are separated in thought from natural body, what remains is mathe- 15
matical body; but if these things are added to mathematical body, the
result is natural body, so that mathematical body is in natural body.
Consequently the absurdities which follow for mathematical body
also follow for natural body, but the absurdities which follow from
this theory concerning the change and affections of natural bodies,
such as that there would be no change among bodies if they were
composed from planes nor would there be heaviness or lightness 20
or affections in general, do not follow for mathematical bodies.76 So
Aristotle will show that those who hypothesise that the generation
of bodies is of this sort are not able to preserve the affections of
bodies apart from which it is impossible for there to be any natural
body.

299a17-25 There are many things which cannot belong to indi-

visible things [but must belong to natural ones. }77 For it is
impossible for something divisible to belong to an indivisible
thing, but all affections are divisible in two ways, in species or
accidentally: in species as light and dark belong to colour,
accidentally if that to which an affection belongs is divisible
 42 Translation
(and so all simple affections are divisible in this way).] There-
25 fore we should investigate what is impossible in such things.78
If he is calling mathematical things indivisible because they have the
point, which is indivisible, as principle, these things would be proved
as consequences of what he has said previously, and he would be
saying <here> what the things are by which natural things exceed
mathematical ones by addition. For <on this interpretation> he
includes all mathematical things in a common formula and calls
them indivisibles. For all natural bodies are divisible, but it is
30 impossible for something divisible to be in an indivisible.79 He adds
what the divisibles in natural bodies are, saying that they are the
affections. He says that affections are divisible in two ways: in
species as when colour is divided into light and dark, accidentally
568,1 when that to which the affection belongs is divisible. This second
sense is most of all specific to division of affections since there is also
division in species in the case of mathematical things. And so, he
says, whichever affections are simple, that is, whichever are individ-
ual (atomos) and do not contain other things in the way species do
5 are accidentally divisible. So if it is impossible for something divisible
to be in an indivisible thing, the affections in natural bodies are not
in mathematical ones.
This <is the exegesis> if by the initial occurrence of indivisible
things he means mathematical things. However, if by indivisibles
things he means the planes from which they construct bodies, then
either because these planes, being without depth, also do not undergo
10 the division of bodies or because, if bodies are composed from planes,
planes from lines, and lines from points, bodies will, according to
them, also be composed from points and so from indivisibles. But
there are many things which belong to natural bodies, but do not
belong to points, and so80 bodies would not be composed from indivis-
ibles; for if indivisible things do not have anything divisible, neither
15 would what is composed from them. Consequently, using this argu-
ment, he could have proved universally from the universal <truth>
that divisibility belongs to all affections of bodies that body is not
composed from planes. And he does prove this using heaviness and
lightness, which are particular affections, immediately hereafter.
And it is better that one understand what Aristotle says in this
20 way. I base this judgment on his saying Therefore we should inves-
tigate what is impossible in such things to introduce the
demonstration based on heaviness and lightness. He says that what
is impossible should be investigated in such things because it will be
obvious from the investigation of affections that it is impossible for
bodies to be composed from planes.
(He says that all affections are divisible in two ways not because
25 each affection is divisible in the two ways, since simple affections are
 Translation 43
not divisible in species, but because all affections are included in this
division in such a way that some are divisible in one sense, others in
the other.)
299a25-b7 If it is impossible [that each of two parts have no
weight and both together have weight, but either all or some
perceptible bodies have weight, e.g. earth and water have
weight, as even they would say,81 then if a point has no weight
it is clear that lines wont have weight either; and if they dont
neither will planes, so that neither will any bodies. But it is
evident that a point cannot have weight, since everything which
is heavy can also be heavier than something and everything
which is light can also be lighter than something. But it is
perhaps not necessary that what is heavier or lighter be heavy
or light. (In the same way what is large is larger, but not
everything which is larger is large, since many things which are
absolutely small are nevertheless larger than something else.)
If, then, what is heavy is heavier, it must be greater in weight,
and everything heavy is divisible.] But a point is assumed to be
indivisible.
He has shown universally on the basis of divisibility that it is 30
impossible that bodies be composed from planes, and he now shows 569,1
the same thing on the basis of one affection of bodies, weight. He
assumes to start three axioms or hypotheses of the following kind:

[i] If something is composed from certain things, it is impossible

for the composite to have weight, if none of the components have
weight;

[ii] all or some perceptible (that is, natural) bodies have

weight.

For Democritus and his followers and, later, Epicurus say that since 5
all atoms have the same nature they have weight, but because some
are heavier, the lighter are pushed out by the heavier ones, which
sink down, and they move upward; and they say that it is for this
reason that some things seem to be light, others heavy.82 And if not
all natural bodies are heavy, nevertheless it is agreed by everyone
that at least some, such as earth and water, are. And Aristotle tacitly 10
assumes what he has already said:83

[iii] by the same reasoning solids are composed from planes,

planes from lines, and lines from points.

These things being assumed:

 44 Translation
[iv] If bodies are composed of planes and a point has no weight,
it is clear that lines wont have weight either, because of the
first assumption;84
but [v] if lines dont have weight, neither will planes;
15 and [vi] if planes do not have weight neither will any body
because of the third <axiom>;
but [vii] all or some bodies have weight because of the second
thing which is assumed in advance as agreed upon;
therefore [viii] bodies are not composed from planes.

These are the conditional, the additional assumption, and the conclu-
sion.85 First in what follows he demonstrates in many ways what is
20 hypothesised in the antecedent of the conditional, namely that a
point does not have weight; he does so <here> on the basis of the
<propositions> that everything heavy is divisible, but the point is
indivisible and it is not possible for <what is heavy> to be divided into
what is indivisible. He proves that what is heavy is divisible first
from the <proposition> that everything which is heavy is also heav-
ier, just as what is light is also lighter and what is large is also larger.
But if everything heavy is also heavier, it is necessary that it exceed
25 by some weight, so that everything heavy is divisible; for it is divided
into the excess <and the remainder>. But a point is indivisible. And
the conclusion in the second figure86 is that a point is not heavy, that
is, does not have weight. And this is what it was proposed to show.
There is a difficulty which grows out of what he has said. Why does
he say that everything heavy is heavier? For if what is heavier is
570,1 heavier than something heavy, but the heavy thing than which the
heavier is heavier is itself heavier than something else which is
heavy, and this other thing is again heavier, it is necessary to proceed
to infinity.87 This is the difficulty which Aristotle opens up when he
says that everything which is absolutely heavy is also heavier, just
as the light is lighter and the large larger, but that it is not necessary
5 that what is heavier or lighter also be absolutely heavy or absolutely
light. And, indeed, we do not say that everything which is larger than
something is thereby large. For a millet seed is larger than a mustard
seed, and nevertheless a millet seed is not absolutely large. Nor is
what is more worthy of choice absolutely worthy of choice, since
illness is more worthy of choice than wickedness, and being harmed
is more worthy of choice than doing harm, but neither of these is
10 absolutely worthy of choice. For Socrates says in the Gorgias88 that
I would not wish to do either, but if one or the other were necessary,
I would choose to be harmed rather than to do harm. Consequently
even if everything heavy is heavier, it is not the case that everything
heavier is heavy, so that these things do not convert. Nor is heavy
<always> said of what is heavier although heavier is <sometimes>
said of what is lighter and lighter of what is heavier.89
 Translation 45
What does the addition of the word perhaps mean when he says,
But it is perhaps not necessary that what is heavier or lighter be 15
heavy or light? Is it added because, if someone is speaking precisely
he would say that what is not worthy of choice is not to be called more
worthy of choice in the strict sense nor is what is not large to be called
larger, so that what does not share in weight is not to be called
heavier; rather things of this kind which do not share in the name90
are not more worthy of choice or larger or heavier, but one should say
instead that such things are less of the contrary, that what is not
absolutely worthy of choice is less to be avoided, that what is larger 20
but not large is less small, and that what is heavier but not heavy is
less light. But since weight indicates a quantity, it is always divisible,
and therefore it is always heavier.
Alexander points out that it is possible to show, using the same
argument, that no other affection attaches to a point, if, indeed, 25
everything which has an affection absolutely also exceeds something
else with respect to the affection. For even if it does not exceed
something else <which has the affection>, it would at least exceed
what absolutely does not have the affection.91 Consequently nothing
is accidentally divisible into something indivisible.

299b7-14 Furthermore, if what is heavy is something dense,

[and what is light is something rare, and dense differs from rare
in that more <of what is dense> inheres in an equal bulk, then,
if a point is heavy or light, it is also dense or rare. But what is
dense is divisible, a point indivisible.
(299b11) And if everything heavy must be either soft or hard,
it is easy to infer something impossible, since soft is what
withdraws into itself, hard what does not,] but what withdraws 30
is divisible.
Having shown, using the heavier, that weight is divisible, he inferred
that since a point is indivisible, it does not have weight. Next he
proves the same thing using the dense and the rare: 571,1

[i] If a point is heavy or light (he is making a common argument

for both), it will be dense or rare;
[ii] but it is neither dense nor rare;
[iii] therefore, it is neither heavy nor light.

And he proves the conditional [i] by defining dense and rare. For if dense
is what contains more bodies than what is rare in an equal bulk 5
(obviously the bodies <in the dense> have been pressed together), rare
what contains fewer in an equal bulk (naturally the bodies have been
dispersed), then the dense is heavy, the heavy dense, and the rare is
light, the light rare. For water which is evaporated and rarefied becomes
 46 Translation
lighter, and air which is liquefied becomes denser. (However, the
Platonists do not say that the heavy is heavy because of denseness;
10 for they say that fire is denser than earth; however, they do say that
having larger parts produces heaviness.)92 He proves the additional
assumption [ii] categorically in the second figure93 as follows:

The rare and the dense are divisible (since, if94 the bulks are
equal, the dense consists of more, the rare of fewer bodies);
a point is indivisible;
<therefore,>95 a point is neither dense nor rare.

15 So, if points are neither heavy nor light, bodies will not be light or
heavy either, if lines are composed of points, planes of lines, and
bodies of planes.
(299b11) Having proved by means of dense and rare that a point
is neither heavy nor light, he proves the same thing categorically96
using soft and hard.

20 What is heavy is either hard or soft (since it is necessary that

every body be occupied by one of these);
hard and soft are divisible (if, indeed, the hard does not with-
draw into itself, the soft does, and both of these things are said
of what is extended, and what is extended is divisible);
consequently, again, what is heavy is divisible whether it is
hard or soft;
but a point is not divisible;
therefore a point is neither heavy nor light.

25 Therefore neither are bodies heavy or light. And so if bodies are

heavy or light, they are not composed of planes.

299b14-23 Nor will a weight be composed of weightless things.

[For with how many weightless things and with what sort will
this occur? How can they determine this, if they are unwilling
to make things up?
(299b17) And if every weight is greater than a weight by
weight, it will also follow that each thing without weight has
weight. For if four points have weight, and what is composed of
more <points> is heavier than this thing, which is heavy, and it
is necessary that what is heavier than something heavy be
heavy, just as what is whiter than something white must be
white, what is greater by one point will be heavier, and if an
equal amount is subtracted,] one point will also have weight.97
He has proved that bodies are not composed of planes on the basis of
30 the fact that they have weight and lightness but points are neither
 Translation 47
heavy nor light; and he has proved with three arguments that a point 572,1
is neither heavy nor light. Next he proves his first hypothesis,98 that
if something is composed from certain things, then it is impossible for
the composite to have weight, if none of the components have weight.
And the first argument is itself99 the following. If what has weight
comes to be from weightless things, then how many weightless things 5
will produce a weight when they come together? For it is clear that
<for them> a number of weightless things will produce some weight
when they come together. But how will they define this number? For,
unless they are just going to formulate an inexplicable fiction, they
will not be able to say why the number which they state is more
correct than a number which is less or more by one, since the things
which come together are all equally weightless.
(299b17) He adduces a second <argument> which shows that those 10
who say a weight comes to be when weightless things come together
run into contradiction, since it will be proved that each thing which
they call weightless has weight. He proves this, assuming to start a
clear lemma: every weight which is greater than a lesser weight is
greater by weight. For what is heavier than something does not
exceed it by sweetness but by weight. And he makes another assump-
tion: it is necessary that what is heavier than something heavy be
heavy, just as what is whiter than something white must be white. 15
If, then, what is composed of four points has weight, and what is
composed of more (e.g., from five) than the heavy thing which is
composed of four is heavier, and what is heavier than a heavy thing
is heavy and exceeds by weight, then it is necessary that what is
composed of five points exceed what is composed of four by weight,
and it exceeds by a point. If, then, an equal amount is subtracted, that
is, if four points are subtracted from the five, there remains one point 20
by which the five points exceed the four, and they exceed by weight;
for they exceed by weight and they do not exceed by anything else
than by a point. Consequently each point will have weight.
And Alexander develops the argument as follows:

If when a thing is subtracted a greater weight becomes less, that 25

thing is heavy;
but if a point is subtracted a greater weight becomes less;
therefore a point is heavy.

But since Aristotle does not say if a point is subtracted but if an

equal amount is subtracted, perhaps one should rather develop the
argument in this way:

What remains in a heavier thing when an equal weight is 573,1

subtracted is heavy;
but what remains is a point.
 48 Translation

These things which Aristotle says, insofar as they are said against
men who actually do generate bodies from mathematical planes, are
well said and said from the point of view of the study of nature. But
what he says might not be suitable insofar as it is said against the
5 Pythagoreans, who say that the planes are natural and involve
matter and have some depth. For Timaeus himself says that bodies
become heavier because of the number of planes, when he says,
Third the icosahedron, with twenty bases and twelve angles, the
element of water, having the most parts and being heaviest.100 And
10 Platos Timaeus says that what is composed of the fewest identical
parts101 is lightest (elaphrotaton).
Some people also disapprove of his saying that it is impossible that
each of two things have no weight and both together have weight.102
They say that even according to him, although neither matter nor
form has weight, the composite of them does. But Aristotle has
15 anticipated this difficulty and dissolved it. For matter and form
really are elements of the composite; they are potentially heavy and
when they come together they make the composite of them actually
heavy. But Aristotle has shown that, if one hypothesises that bodies
are composed from planes, a point is not potentially but actually
heavy. For also those who say that bodies are composed of planes or
20 planes of lines or lines of points do not say that they are composed as
if from matter and form, but as if from those things as parts. For
matter and form and in general elements in the strict sense, being
potentially proceed into actuality when they come together. And in
this way flesh and bone and each of the other composites come to be
from the four elements when they are altered together and in the
25 composite no longer have their own nature purely. But a wall comes
to be when stone and clay are put together, as opposed to being
altered together, and so the nature of the parts, existing in actuality,
is also in the whole. And it is in this way that a body would be
composed from planes.

574,1 299b23-31 Furthermore, it is absurd if planes can only be

compounded along (kata) a line. [For, just as a line is com-
pounded with a line both in <the dimension of> (kata) length
and in <the dimension of> breadth, so too a plane ought to be
compounded with a plane in the same way. But a line can be
compounded with a line along (kata) a line if it is laid next to it,
but not if it is added to it<s end>. However, if a plane can also be
compounded in <the dimension of> breadth, there will be a body
which is neither an element nor composed of elements, since it is
composed] of planes which are compounded in this way.
Those who generate bodies from planes do not compound the
 Translation 49
planes by making them coincide in <the dimension of> breadth, but
by making them coincide along their linear limits; for they generated 5
the different bodies by making solid angles which differed from one
another in terms of the number of planes <containing them>. For
when three equilateral triangles are drawn together at one vertex
and are joined along the containing lines and have an equilateral
triangle as base, the result is a pyramid having four solid angles, each
of which is composed of three angles, each <equal to> two thirds of a 10
right <angle> (because the <original> triangles are equilateral). And
the octahedron is composed of eight equilateral triangles in all con-
taining twenty-four plane angles, so that it has six solid angles, each
composed of four plane angles. The icosahedron is composed of
twenty equilateral triangles, the <number of> plane angles being
sixty and each of the solid angles in it being composed of five similar 15
planes, so that it has twelve solid angles. The cube is composed of four
squares, each of which is composed of four isosceles right triangles
having their vertices joined in the centre of the square, their sides
being the segments of the diagonals of the square and their bases the
sides of the square; the cube has eight solid angles, each composed of 20
three plane right angles. The dodecahedron is composed of twelve
equilateral and equiangular pentagons; it has twenty solid angles,
each composed of three plane angles of a pentagon, each of which is
<equal to> one and a fifth of a right angle.103
This kind of compounding of planes being along a line, Aristotle 25
says against these people that they speak in an absurd way if they
say that planes are of such a nature as only to be compounded in this
way, since < planes ought to be compounded> just as a line is
compounded with a line both in <the dimension of> length and in
<the dimension of> breadth. He says that a line is compounded with
a line in <the dimension of> breadth (which he subsequently calls 575,1
along a line) if it is laid next to it, but it is compounded in <the
dimension of> length when it is not laid next to it but is added to it
not along a line but at (kata) a point, and in this way it increases the
length; but when something is compounded along a line the breadth
is increased, if, in fact, when lines are compounded <in this way> a
plane results, just as when planes are compounded <in this way> a
body results.104 So, just as a line is compounded in two ways, a plane 5
should also be compounded not only along a line or in <the dimension
of> length, as these people say, but also in <the dimension of>
breadth, so that the planes fit on one another, just as lines which are
laid next to each other fit on one another along the whole of their
length, but lines which are added <at a point> do not. But if planes
can also be compounded in <the dimension of> breadth just as lines 10
can also be compounded in <the dimension of> length, then there will
be a body which comes to be from planes compounded in this way
which is neither an element nor composed of elements, if, in fact,
 50 Translation
what is compounded from planes <in this way> is a body; for it will
not be one of the four bodies which is generated <when planes> are
compounded along a line, since it will not be a pyramid or any other
of the <solids> co-ordinate with it; nor will it be a body composed of
15 these; nor will it be fire or air or any other one of these. But it is not
possible for there to be a body which is neither an element nor
composed of elements.
Concerning what Aristotle asserts here, one should say that if the
people who made this sort of hypothesis said that every compounding
of planes and not <just> compounding along lines makes a body
20 Aristotle would be speaking correctly, but what he says would have
no relevance to those people, if, like Plato,105 they said that body is
made only in accordance with that compounding by which plane
nature contains what is solid. Moreover, it is not surprising if, when
planes are compounded in <the dimension of> breadth, something
incomplete and unnatural is produced in last things. For also accord-
ing to Aristotle,106 there will be some misfirings in the changing of the
25 elements since there will be things which are neither elements nor
composed of elements.
Since Alexander also tries to give his own refutation of the doc-
trine, let us see what he has to say. For he says that since they say
that the other bodies <fire, water, air> change into one another
because in their case generation is from the scalene right triangles,
which are similar to one another and from which the equilateral
30 triangles are composed, but earth does not change into any of the
others because only it came to be from isosceles right triangles it is
clear that these people really did make things come to be from planes
and did not <simply rely on> the similarity of these figures107 to the
simple bodies and that Aristotle is arguing against them in a reason-
576,1 able way. But it should be prima facie clear that it is not necessary
to reject the interpretation which invokes the similarity of the figures
to the elements on the grounds that not all the elements are said to
be composed from the same triangle. For if other things <in the
Timaeus> are expressed symbolically what is to prevent under-
standing this doctrine as symbolic? But it is clear that causes
5 involving the figures are more fundamental than those involving the
qualities <of the simple bodies>, since even Aristotle himself thinks
that shapes come to be in matter prior to the other qualities. That he
does so is clear from the fact that what he108 calls the second substra-
tum is called qualityless body. And, as he demonstrates, shape and
most of all shape when it has been limited, is made substantial
together with three-dimensional body insofar as it is body.109
10 But how, Alexander asks, will the view which says <bodies are
composed> from planes differ from the view of Democritus if, indeed,
it too says that natural bodies are given form because of figures? And
it is easy to say in response to this that it does not differ at all in this
 Translation 51
respect. (As I have said previously,110 Theophrastus reports that
Democritus ascended to atoms on the grounds that those who offer 15
explanations in terms of hot and cold and such things do so in an
amateurish way.) But Platos view is presumably different from
Democritus because it gives priority to something simpler than
bodies, namely the plane, which is simpler than the atoms (which are
bodies) and because it recognises that symmetries and proportions
are demiurgic of the figures, and because it treats earth differently
<from the other elements>.

299b31-300a7 Furthermore if bodies are heavier because of the 20

number of their planes, [as is stated in the Timaeus, it is clear
that line and point will have weight since they are related
proportionally, as we have also said previously.111
(300a3) However, if they do not differ in this way but because
earth is heavy, fire light, then some of the planes will be heavy
and some will be light, and likewise in the case of lines and
points.] For the plane of earth will be heavier than that of fire.
He also adduces this argument against them again on the basis of
heaviness. It goes as follows. If bodies are heavier because of the
number of their planes112 and lighter because of their fewness, as is
written in the Timaeus, line and point will also have weight, which
has been proved to be impossible. (The Timaeus says,113 And further- 25
more what is composed of the fewest identical parts is lightest,
implying that all planes have equal impulsion.) For if a body is
heavier because of the number of its planes, it is clear that each of
the planes makes a contribution to its heaviness. For the greater
weight, that is, the heavier one, is heavier by weight. So if the planes 30
of which a body is composed are heavy, the lines of which the planes
are composed are also heavy, and so are the points of which the lines
are composed. The argument is the same because all of these things 577,1
are limits in the same way. However, it has been proved in several
ways that it is impossible for a point to have weight, since a weight
is divisible and a point is indivisible.
(300a3) But if the difference in weight of bodies does not follow
from the number of planes, but, on the contrary, it follows because 5
earth is heavy and fire light, then the planes of earth are heavy and
those of fire light. (He expresses this by saying For the plane of earth
will be heavier than that of fire instead of saying For the plane of
earth will be heavy, that of fire light.) But if this is so, there will
again be the same difference among lines and among points, so 10
that in this way too the impossibility, that a point has weight or
lightness, will follow. So, if it is necessary that if bodies are
composed of planes they be heavier and lighter either because of
the number of their planes or because some bodies are naturally
 52 Translation
heavy and some are naturally light and some of the planes of which
15 they are composed are heavy and some light, and an impossibility,
namely that a point has weight or lightness, follows from each of the
hypotheses, then the initial <assumption> that bodies are composed
of planes is impossible.
And in response to this one should say the same thing, namely that
they do not suppose the planes to be mathematical planes in such a
way that they are proportional and as planes are to a body so are lines
to a plane and points to a line.

20 300a7-12 In general it follows that at some time there is no

magnitude [or at least that magnitude can be done away with,
if point is related to line in the same way as line to plane and
this to body. For all things which are resolved into one another
can be resolved into what is primary, so that it would be possible
that there be only points] but no body.
This argument, which is even more forced (biaioteron), is not based
on compounding planes but on resolution <into them>. He says that
it will follow from this argument either that at some time no existing
thing is a magnitude or that it is possible that there be none.
25 (Possibly is not and is not differ only temporally.114)
How will this follow? He says, if point is related to line in the same
way as line to plane and plane to body, then just as, according to
them, body is dissolved into planes because it is composed from them,
30 so too plane can be dissolved into lines and lines into points. So that
it is possible that at some time there be only points and no magni-
tude. (He took the monad instead of the point because both have no
parts.115)
578,1 In this connection Alexander, perceiving a similar objection <to
Aristotles own view>, says:

It does not follow for those who say that bodies are composed
of form and matter that it is possible that there be no magni-
tude. For according to them it is not body which comes to be
but only particular body, and a body which comes to be also
5 perishes. Furthermore, according to them, matter is not ac-
tual, but, according to these people, the planes are actual.
But perhaps matter, too, would not be without magnitude in
and of itself.116

One should say the following against this. If Aristotle says,117 There
is a matter for a body and the same matter for a great body and a
small one, how, according to its own definition, can matter have
magnitude if matter is matter of a body and is obviously different
10 from the body, and if there is the same matter for a great body and a
 Translation 53
small one? For if it has magnitude, it is certainly limited to a certain
size.
And against Aristotles argument <expressed in the lemma> the
following should be said. If things which come to be were only
resolved and they were not also compounded because of the ever-
active demiurgic logoi and the heavenly motion and because of acting
on one another and being acted upon by one another,118 then also
according to those who say that things come to be from matter and 15
form, even if it is not possible that magnitude not exist because in the
case of simple bodies the perishing of one is the coming to be of
another, but it is possible for there not to be a human being or a horse
if everything is dissolved into the elements and other things do not
combine, this is no less absurd than the non-existence of magnitude.
Again Alexander says: 20

There are those who say that in the Timaeus Plato does not
construct natural bodies from planes but rather constructs the
form of each body which makes the body the very thing it is; but
the form is incorporeal, and when this form which is generated
from planes comes to be in matter, one form makes fire, another
water, another earth, and another air; so what Aristotle says is 25
not the case and Plato does not generate material body from
planes.119 Against these people it should be said that even if one
were to accept that Plato intended to say this, nevertheless it
would be true that he generates depth from planes. For the
pyramid which is generated from triangles is not without depth,
since a pyramid is not a plane, nor are any of the other <solids>
co-ordinate with the pyramid planes. But it follows for the
person who generates depth from things with no depth that 30
they also make breadth from things without breadth and length
from things without extension. In addition to this it is unrea-
sonable for them to say that there is a generation of form; for
just as there is no generation of matter, so there is no generation
of form by itself, but generation is of the two together, and this 579,1
is what comes to be by the presence of form and perishes by the
absence of form.

This is what Alexander says. But it has been said many times that
these people do not generate depth from things with no depth and
their planes are not mathematical. However it should have been
recognised that we also120 make a body with qualities from matter 5
and form, which are not bodies and are qualityless, unless someone
were to say what I have also said before,121 that planes are taken as
parts, but form and matter as elements. But how can Alexander say
that there is no generation of form? If it is on the grounds that form
does not arrive via a process of coming to be but arrives atemporally,
 54 Translation
10 this also can be doubted. However, those who say that form comes to
be from planes if there were people who said this say it because
it is brought from non-being into being, whether this happens in time
or atemporally.
300a12-14 Moreover, if time [is similar, it would or could be
done away with at some time; for the indivisible instant] is like
a point in a line.122
15 On the basis of the same argument he reduces the theory to some-
thing else even more absurd. He says that since the instant (not the
extended instant, but the indivisible one) is like a point in a line (for
these stand in proportion to one another: as point is to line so is
instant to time), if someone were to say that time is similar to bodies
so that it is composed of instants as bodies are composed of points
20 (through the intermediary of lines and planes) or that time is similar
to lines, which are composed of points, time would be done away with
at some time when it was dissolved into instants, or it could be done
away with. But it is most absurd that there be some time when there
isnt time, since, if some time is a time, to say there is some time when
there isnt time is the same as saying there is a time when there will
not be time. But since each thing is thought to be dissolved into the
25 things from which it is composed, the person who introduces the
resolution of time into instants leaves room for those who say that
time is composed of instants. But it is clear that those who say that
bodies are composed of planes which involve matter and are natural
will not be forced to say that the line is composed of points or that
time is composed of instants.

580,1 300a14-19 The same thing results for those who construct the
heavens out of numbers. [For some people construct nature
from numbers, for example, certain Pythagoreans. For natural
bodies obviously have weight and lightness, but monads cannot
make bodies when they are compounded,] nor can they have
weight.
He says that the same thing results for those who make the cosmos
and natural things out of numbers as results for those who construct
bodies from planes or, in general, things having weight from weight-
5 less things. For when monads are compounded they do not make
bodies. This is not because monads are absolutely indivisible, since
when two or three is compounded it does not make a body either;
rather it is because the monad is from a different species of quantity,
the discrete, but body is from the continuous, and nothing continuous
is composed of what is discrete. But there is no weight in numbers
either. It is prima facie clear that it follows for those who say that
10 things are composed of numbers that they say that things are com-
 Translation 55
posed of monads, since numbers are composed of monads. However,
it is clear that these people said that things are composed from
numbers on the grounds that numbers pre-contain in themselves all
the forms in a fundamental way and that all the forms in the cosmos
have been ordered by numbers, because they sang the praises of
number as father of the blessed ones and of men123 and said that all 15
things resemble number.124

<Chapter 2>
300a20-7 That it is necessary that some motion belong by
nature to all the simple bodies [is clear from the following
considerations. Since they obviously move, it is necessary that
they be moved by constraint unless they have their own proper
motion. But by constraint and unnatural are the same thing.
However, if some motion is unnatural, it is necessary that there
also be a natural motion which it diverges from. And if there are
several unnatural motions it is necessary that there be a single
natural motion, since each thing has a simple natural motion,]
but many unnatural motions.
He has proved the first axiom,125 which says that it is impossible for 20
what has weight to be composed of things which do not have weight,
and also proved that a point does not have weight because a weight
is divisible but a point is indivisible; and he has added other argu-
ments against the original theory.126 Now he demonstrates the sec-
ond of the things which he assumed to start or hypothesised, namely
that all or some perceptible bodies have weight. He proves this by 25
showing that it is necessary for a motion to belong to the simple
bodies naturally and that this motion comes about because of (kata) 581,1
natural impulsions, that is, because of heaviness and lightness. But
if this is so, bodies cannot come to be from planes since bodies are
heavy or light but planes possess neither weight nor lightness, since
neither lines nor points possess these things. He proves that a
natural motion belongs to each of the simple bodies by assuming as 5
clearly true that the simple bodies move; for they obviously do move.
But if he assumed that they move naturally he would have assumed
in an offhand way what he is seeking to prove. For if the things which
move up or down were hypothesised to move naturally, they would
be assumed to move because of lightness and heaviness, and this is
what he proposed to prove. And so, assuming as clearly true that in 10
general these things move, he hypothesises that they move unnatu-
rally and by constraint. For if they do not move naturally (to hypoth-
esise that they did would assume in advance what is sought), but it
is necessary that what moves move either naturally or unnaturally,
it is clear that they would move unnaturally. But it has been proved
 56 Translation
in the Physics127 that it is not possible for something which does not
move naturally and by nature to move unnaturally. For what is not
15 at all naturally constituted so as to move at all would never move at
all, but it is clear that if something simple is naturally constituted so
as to move with a simple motion it is also naturally constituted so as
to move somewhere. Consequently what moves by constraint also
has a natural motion, since unnatural motion is posterior to natural
motion. So if the simple bodies move unnaturally it is necessary that
20 they also have a natural motion. However, even if what moves
unnaturally always also moves naturally, it is not thereby the case
that it is necessary that there be as many natural motions as there
are unnatural ones, since in all things there is just one way to go
right, but many ways to deviate from what is right and err, and
unnatural motion is a kind of error and deviation from the natural.
25 In this case, too, Alexander does well to raise a difficulty:128 since
Aristotle says in the first book of this treatise that the unnatural is
contrary to the natural and one thing is contrary to one thing,129 how
can he say here that each thing has many unnatural motions? And
in this case Alexander resolves the difficulty in many ways, but more
appropriately on the grounds that in the case of the simple bodies
several motions can be said to be unnatural if one takes into account
not only the motion which a simple body has but also the motion
30 which it is not possible for it to have. For motion down from above,
which a thing which moves up from below has by constraint, is
582,1 unnatural for it; and motion in a circle, which it does not even have
at all, might also be called unnatural for it.130 But if Aristotle has
assumed motion as clearly true and hypothesised that motions are
unnatural, I do not think he should take <all> those motions which
something is not naturally constituted so as to have as unnatural;
rather he should take <only> those which it is naturally constituted
so as to have.131 A clod of earth does not only move up unnaturally, it
5 also moves obliquely when it is thrown, and these oblique motions
are not simple and not motions in a circle unless they are around the
centre of the universe. Consequently there is one simple unnatural
motion <for a thing> and it is contrary to <its> natural motion, but
it is possible for simple bodies, when subject to constraint, to also
move with non-simple motions, as was said. Alexander also knows
this way of resolving the difficulty.

10 300a27-b8 This is also clear from the consideration of rest. [For

it is necessary that rest be either constrained or natural. But a
thing remains fixed by constraint, where it also moves by
constraint, and it remains fixed naturally where it also moves
naturally. So, since something obviously remains fixed at the
 Translation 57
centre <of the cosmos>, it is clear that if it remains there
naturally, its motion there is also natural for it.
(300a32) But if it remains there by constraint, what prevents
it from moving? If it is something at rest we will recirculate the
same argument, since it is necessary that either there be a first
thing which is naturally at rest or the argument proceeds ad
infinitum which is impossible. But if what prevents <it from>
moving is itself in motion (as Empedocles says the earth is at
rest because of the vortex), where would it move since moving
ad infinitum is impossible? Nothing impossible occurs, but it is
impossible to have passed through an infinite. Consequently it
is necessary for the moving thing to stop somewhere and to
remain there naturally, not by constraint. But if rest <in a
place> is natural <for a thing>, there is also a natural motion
<for the thing>, namely the] motion to that place.
Having proved on the basis of unnatural motion that it is necessary
for there to be a natural motion for each of the simple bodies, he now
proves the same thing on the basis of rest. He again hypothesises that
it is clearly true that something is at rest as the earth is at rest at
the centre <of the cosmos> and asks whether it rests there natu- 15
rally or unnaturally. For if it rests there naturally, it is clear that
motion there is natural for it, since if something rests somewhere
naturally it also moves there naturally. But motion to the centre
occurs because of heaviness, so that there is a natural motion which
has its starting point in heaviness or lightness.132
(300a32) But if what is at rest at the centre rests by constraint, it 20
would be easy to say that it moves from the centre naturally, since if
something rests somewhere unnaturally, it moves from there natu-
rally. Consequently, again, there is a natural motion which has its
starting point in lightness. However, Aristotle adduces a longer and
perhaps more precise demonstration, arguing on the basis of what is
constrained. For what rests by constraint at the centre always rests
because it is constrained and prevented by something, and what 25
prevents it prevents it either by being at rest or by moving. But if it
is something at rest we will recirculate the same argument. For
either it rests naturally (and it also moves naturally to where it
rests), or it rests unnaturally and by constraint. If the latter it is
possible to again ask the same things about what constrains and
prevents it. But if what prevents <it from> moving prevents not by
being at rest but by moving (as Empedocles says that the earth is at 30
rest because it is prevented from moving by the vortex), one should 583,1
ask this question: if the earth were not prevented from moving by the
vortex, where would it move? For it is necessary for it either to move
ad infinitum or to move somewhere and stop. But it is impossible for
it to move ad infinitum since it is impossible to have passed through
 58 Translation
an infinite <straight line>.133 For nothing comes to be at all if it is
impossible for it to have come to be.134 For since it is impossible for
the diagonal to have become commensurable with the side, it is
5 impossible for it to become commensurable at all. For in every case
if something comes to be naturally, it is also possible for it to have
come to be, but it is impossible to have passed through an infinite
<straight line>, so that nothing can move through this. So, if some-
thing would move if nothing prevented it, it is necessary that when
it moves it moves through a finite <straight line> and stop some-
10 where not by constraint, but naturally. But if rest <in a place> is
natural <for a thing>, there is also a natural motion <for the thing>,
namely the motion to that place, since a thing moves naturally to the
place in which it rests naturally.
Alexander understands the question where would it move to apply
to what prevents the earth from moving and not to the earth. He says,
It would seem that he has not proved what is proposed for proof.135

15 300b8-25 Therefore, Leucippus and Democritus, [who say that

the primary bodies are always in motion in the infinite void,
ought to say what their motion is and what their natural motion
is. For if one of the elements is moved by another by constraint,
nevertheless it is necessary that each of these have some natu-
ral motion from which their constrained motion is a deviation.
And it is necessary for the first cause of motion to cause motion
naturally, not by constraint. For it will proceed ad infinitum if
there is not something which first causes motion naturally, but
the prior thing is always moved by a constrained motion.
(300b16) It is necessary that the very same thing result if the
elements were moving in a disorderly way before the cosmos
came to be (as is written in the Timaeus). For it is necessary
that this motion be either constrained or natural. But if they
were to be moving naturally, it is necessary that there be a
cosmos, if one wishes to investigate attentively. For the first
cause of motion, moving naturally, must cause itself to move,136
and things which do not move by constraint must rest in their
proper places and make the same order which they have now,
things having weight <moving> to the centre and things having
lightness away from it] the cosmos has this separation.137
Having proved that there is a natural motion of bodies and that it is
prior to unnatural motion, since there wouldnt be unnatural motion
unless there were natural, he now criticises those who say that
disordered and unnatural motion is prior to natural motion. There
20 are two forms of this view: Leucippus and Democritus and their
followers said that the things they considered to be primary bodies,
that is, the atoms, are always moving by constraint in the infinite
 Translation 59
void; and Timaeus says that the elements moved in a disorderly way
before the cosmos came to be. Aristotle says the following against the
first view. If one atom is always being moved by another by constraint
and unnaturally, what is the natural motion of the atoms? For it is
necessary that the natural motion of anything, from which its un- 25
natural motion is derivative (this is also the reason it is called
unnatural138), be prior. So if atoms are moved by one another by
constraint, it is necessary either that the first cause of motion cause
motion by moving naturally, not by constraint, or that it be moved by
itself or that it be moved by an unmoving cause, in order for us not to
proceed to infinity. For what is moved by constraint, since it is moved
by some kind of pushing or levering, is moved by something moving.
So if this went on to infinity, then nothing would move. Consequently 30
it is necessary that natural motion be prior to unnatural let them
say what this prior natural motion is and moreover it is necessary 584,1
that unnatural motion not be forever, since natural motion must be
prior to it.
Aristotle also indicates the impossibility of atomic motion when he
says that the primary bodies move in the infinite void. For if all
motion is from one determinate point to another determinate point,
but nothing is determinate in the infinite, nothing would move in the 5
infinite. Moreover, every motion is either up or down, but in the
infinite there is no up or down, as has been proved in the fourth book
of the Physics.139
(300b16) Having said these things against Democritus and his
followers, he turns next to the view of Timaeus and says of it that if 10
the elements were moving in a disorderly way before the cosmos
came to be, it is necessary that this motion be either constrained and
unnatural or natural. And it is clear that if it were disordered, it
would be unnatural. But he also takes natural motion in order to
make the division complete and at the same time in order to make
clear the consequences of being in a natural condition. And so he says
that if the motion were unnatural and constrained, the same things 15
would follow as before <in the case of the atomists>. For again it is
necessary that natural motion, from which unnatural motion is
derivative, be prior. And let them say what this natural motion is.
For if things are moved by one another or by something else by
constraint, it is necessary that the first cause of motion cause motion
by moving naturally in order that we not proceed to infinity, positing
one constrained thing as prior to another, thereby doing away with
all motion, since it is necessary that, if there is motion, natural 20
motion be prior to unnatural. But if someone were to say that the
motion prior to the cosmos is natural, it would be necessary that
there be a cosmos prior to the cosmos if one wishes to investigate
attentively what ordering relative to one another the natural motion
produces in bodies. For the first cause of motion, moving naturally,
 60 Translation
must cause motion140 in such a way that in seeking the natural
25 motion which is prior we do not proceed to infinity by hypothesising
that one thing is always moved by another by constraint.
The first thing which moves naturally is the heavens. It is moved
by itself if Aristotle wrote <The first cause of motion>, moving
naturally, must cause itself to move. But if he wrote, as Alexander
maintains, <The first cause of motion>, moving naturally, must
30 cause motion, it is obviously moved by the unmoving cause. Alexan-
der renders the text this way, even though many books have itself
and not it, afraid, I think, that one should find Aristotle to be saying
that the first cause of natural motions is what is self-moving.141
Alexander says:

585,1 For, according to Plato, before the cosmos came to be, there was
nothing self-moving, that is, no soul. Or perhaps a thing is
self-moving if it is not moved by something else, although it is
not always true that if something is self-moving it is soul, since
even the things which move naturally are in a way self-moving
since they have the starting point of motion in themselves.

5 But one should notice that there are two kinds of starting point of
motion, one related to causing motion, the other to being moved. Or
rather there are three, since there is also one related to causing
motion and at the same time being moved. The starting point related
to causing motion only is in the unmoving cause which first causes
motion; the one related to causing motion and at the same time being
moved is in what is self-moving in the strict sense, that in which the
cause of motion and what is moved are the same in substratum; and
10 in natural things the starting point of motion related to being moved
is nature; for this is the first thing moved by soul and it moves the
body along with itself.142
Now, if the first cause of motion causes motion naturally, it is clear
that things which are moved by it are also moved naturally, and,
being moved naturally, they would move to their proper places and
15 rest. And in this way they would make a cosmos with the present
ordering of bodies, since things with weight would move to the centre
and rest there, and light things would move upward away from the
centre; for the cosmos also has this separation of bodies from one
another now. Consequently there would be a cosmos before the
cosmos came to be. So it is clear that there cannot be a motion prior
20 to the cosmos, if such a motion cannot be either by constraint or
natural.
Alexander also adds the following. If the elements were moving in
a disorderly way on their own for an infinite time and then, starting
at some time, are moved ad infinitum in an orderly way by some-
thing, the motion which these bodies were moving on their own,
 Translation 61
would be natural for them, since things which move because of a
starting point of motion in themselves move naturally. But natural 25
motion fits better with order and cosmos.
And Alexander also adds this. This absurdity, that there was a
cosmos before a cosmos came to be, does not just follow from what is
said in the Timaeus; it also follows for Leucippus and Democritus and
their followers, who say that the atoms move in an infinite void by
constraint. For if it is necessary that the natural be prior to the 30
unnatural, and if, when the natural is, it is necessary that there be a
cosmos, there would be a cosmos before the cosmos came to be. But
perhaps saying this does not follow for Democritus and his followers
since they said that there is always motion by constraint even when 586,1
there is a cosmos and not just before the making of the cosmos, as
Timaeus143 writes.

300b25-31 Furthermore, one might further ask [whether it

would not be possible that, when things were moving in a
disorderly way, some things would undergo mixtures of the kind
from which bodies which are put together naturally are put
together (I mean, for example, bones and flesh) in the way
Empedocles says happens under (epi) Love. For he says,] Many
heads without necks grew.144
He adduces another absurd consequence for those who say there was 5
a disordered motion prior to the cosmos. It seems rather unclear
because of the brevity of its formulation. He asks whether it would
not be possible that before the cosmos there was disorderly motion
such that some things would undergo mixtures of the kind from
which bodies which are put together naturally are put together (for
example, bones and flesh and in general the parts of animals and
plants, and animals and plants themselves) in the way Empedocles 10
says happens under Love when he says, Here many heads without
necks grew.145 Having asked this, he leaves it to us to infer the
opposite of what is expressed in the question and the absurd conse-
quences.146 The opposite is that these things would sometimes mix in
such a way that natural bodies would also be put together from them. 15
The absurd consequences are the following. If it were not possible for
things moving in a disorderly way to also move in such a way that
sometimes the mixtures mentioned would be mixed together, the
motion would not be entirely without order. For the disordered is
indeterminate, so that there would be mixing and not mixing. And so
there would not be disorder in every respect. But if it were possible
for these things ever to mix together to make fire, earth, water, and 20
air and the animals and plants composed of them (because in their
generation of the cosmos those who say the cosmos comes to be
obviously do not make animals out of animals, but out of bodies
 62 Translation
blended together), when this happened there would be a cosmos. For
why if bodies can also mix in this way was there not a cosmos earlier,
but there is now? Such then is the purpose of the whole passage.
25 Alexander understands the words just as Empedocles says hap-
pens under Love } as an example of mixture from which natural
bodies are put together. And he thinks he is supporting his view that
Many heads without necks grew is said <about the period> under
Love,147 Love being the cause of mixture as Strife is the cause of
separation. But how could the phrase head without a neck refer to
30 mixture? The same can be asked about other things mentioned by
Empedocles in these lines:

587,1 Naked arms needing shoulders roamed,

And eyes lacking foreheads wandered by themselves,148

and many other things which are not examples of the mixing from
which natural things are put together. Perhaps then Aristotle, hav-
ing said whether it would not be possible that, when things were
5 moving in a disorderly way, some things would undergo mixtures of
the kind from which bodies which are put together naturally are put
together adds in the way Empedocles says happens, that is, that
things moving in a disorderly way mix (for the words wander and
roam indicate disordered motion).
And how, one might ask, can Aristotle say that these things
10 happen under Love, when Empedocles says that all things become
one because of Love:

All these things came together in <Love> to be just one thing.149

So perhaps Empedocles did not say that these things happen when Love
rules, as Alexander thinks, but at the time when Strife did not yet:

Stand entirely at the last boundaries of the circle,

15 But parts of It remained in the limbs and parts had departed.
And as much as It (he means Strife) continued to run out from
below
So much did a gentle, immortal rush of blameless Love continue
in pursuit.150

So in this condition of things limbs, which existed after the separa-

tion produced by Strife, were still isolated151 but they wandered,
desiring to be mixed with one another.

20 But now (when Love finally ruled over Strife) as god mingled
more and more with god,
These things fell in together, as each of them chanced to meet.
 Translation 63
And in addition to them many other things continued to
emerge.152

So Empedocles said that these things happen under Love not in the
sense of the time when Love already rules, but in the sense of the
time when it is going to rule and is still making visible unmixed 25
single limbs.
But if Timaeus said that before the cosmos came to be there really
was a disordered motion of the elements, Aristotle has made correct
and real objections based on natural considerations against Timaeus
doctrine. But if Timaeus wanted to make the point that all cosmic
order comes to matter from the demiurgic goodness by treating in 30
discourse matter in and of itself, removing its clothing <of form> with
only its suitability to receive form and indicated that it moves in a
discordant and disorderly way, and what Timaeus says is productive 588,1
of an intellectual doctrine, then Aristotle is doing adequate battle
with the apparent meaning of what is said but not with its true
meaning. And just as in the Timaeus Plato indicated that matter in
and of itself moves in a discordant and disorderly way before the
making of the cosmos, so too in the Politicus he separates demiurgic 5
providence from the cosmos in discourse and represents it as being
turned back by fate.153

300b31-301a4 As for those who make there be infinitely many

things moving in an infinite, [if there is one thing which causes
them to move, it is necessary that they move with one motion
so that their motion will not be disorderly, but if they are caused
to move by infinitely many things, they must have infinitely
many motions; for if they were finite, there would be some order
since disorder does not result because motion is not <all> into
the same <place>; for even now all things do not move into the
same <place>,] only things of the same kind do.
He adduces these things against Democritus and his followers, since 10
these are the people who make there be infinitely many things
moving in an infinite void. And so he says against them that what
causes the things to move is either one or finite or infinite. When he
says that what causes them to move is one, he does not mean one in
number but one in form, for example, that it is heaviness or light-
ness. And if there is one thing which causes them to move, it is
necessary that they move with one motion, so that their motion is
not disordered since they are always moving with this motion. 15
But if they are moved by things which are infinitely many in form,
they must have motions which are infinitely many in form. Having
said this he does not add some other absurdity on the grounds that
he has reduced the view to this absurdity: that there would be
 64 Translation
infinitely many motions. For the forms of simple motion are finite,
either in a circle or up or down. And other motions are mixtures of
20 these. But Alexander says that furthermore, if there are infinitely
many things causing motion and infinitely many moving things, it
will follow that there are two infinites, which is absurd. Or <perhaps
the argument would be that> if there were infinitely many causes of
motion, nothing would move at all.154
But if there are finitely many causes of motion, the motions will
also be finite. But motions which are finite in form are ordered, so
that the motions will be orderly, not disorderly. For disorder does not
25 follow from there being several motions and all things not moving
into the same <place>, since heavy and light things do not move into
the same <place>, only things of the same kind do, since heavy
things move to the centre, light things to the periphery. Aristotle
unobtrusively hypothesises that the causes of motion are finite by
saying for if they were finite, there would be some order, but he
unobtrusively takes the motions, not the causes of motion, to be
30 finite.155 He did this because if the motions are finite in form, the
causes of motion will also be finite in form, and most of all because
he has an immediate need for finitely many motions in order that
589,1 there be an order. However, Alexander says that Aristotle leaves out
the hypothesis that the movers are finite because what follows from
their being one also follows from their being finite.

301a4-11 Furthermore, the disorderly is nothing other than the

unnatural, [since order is the proper nature of perceptible
things.
(301a5) However, that what is infinite should have a disor-
dered motion is also absurd and impossible, since the nature of
things is the nature most of them have and for most of the time.
But the contrary of this follows for these people: disorder is
5 natural, and cosmic order is unnatural.] But156 nothing natural
comes about in a random way.
He also adduces this consideration mainly against Democritus and
his followers, since they say that there are infinitely many moving
things. He assumes to start that the disorderly is the unnatural,
since order is what is natural (he calls what is natural nature), and
he assumes something else, namely that the nature of things is the
nature most of them have and for most of the time. For what belongs
10 to most human beings and for most of the time is natural for a human
being. Having posited these things, <he says> that it is absurd and
impossible that what is infinite should have a disordered motion for
an infinite time. For what is infinite and moving for an infinite time
moves naturally, and it is impossible that what moves naturally
move with a disordered motion because the disordered is the same as
 Translation 65
the unnatural. Therefore, it is impossible that what is infinite and 15
moving for an infinite time move with a disordered motion. Thus
there follows for these people the contrary both of the truth and of
their own intention, namely that disorder is natural (since what
belongs for most of the time to most things and belongs primarily is
natural) but that cosmic order is unnatural (since these things move
in a disorderly way for an infinite time and only for a short time 20
weave together with one another and are given a cosmic order). But,
Aristotle says, nothing natural comes about in a random way, but
those who said that natural motion is disordered said that the
natural comes about in a random way, since what is disordered and
has no reference to a determinate end comes about in a random way.

301a11-22 Anaxagoras seems to have grasped this same point 25

correctly, [since he begins by making a cosmos from unmoving
things. And others try to blend things somehow and then move
and separate them. But it is not reasonable to make the coming
to be <of the cosmos> be from separated moving things. There-
fore, Empedocles also passes over <coming to be>157 under Love,
since he was not able to put the heavens together by construct-
ing them out of separated things, making Love the cause of their
blending. The cosmos is composed of separated elements, so it
is necessary for it to come to be from one blended thing.
(301a20) So, that each body has a natural motion, which it
does not move by constraint or unnaturally] is evident from
these things.
He has censured those who make the cosmos out of elements which
previously moved in a disorderly way both because they hypothesised
that the unnatural is prior to the natural and because they said that
disordered motion, which is unnatural because it is disordered, is
natural because <they said that> it is primary, infinite and a motion
of infinitely many things. He now accepts what Anaxagoras says at 30
least with respect to his not making the cosmos out of moving 590,1
separated things but out of unified things at rest. For Anaxagoras
says that all things were together and Mind put them in order by
separating them.
Alexander says:

But it is also possible to say the following in this case. If

Anaxagoras makes the cosmos from things at rest by separating
them and this motion and separation is natural for bodies, their 5
rest would be unnatural for them, since the motion of bodies
starting from a rest which is unnatural is natural. But if the
rest were unnatural for them and lasted an infinite time, the
unnatural rest would be natural for them. Furthermore, if that
 66 Translation
rest is unnatural, there would be some other prior condition
which was natural for them, since it is necessary that the
10 natural be prior to the unnatural. But if this is the case there
would be a cosmos prior to the coming to be <of the cosmos>.

So Alexander. But Aristotle only accepts this one thing in

Anaxagoras, the making of the cosmos out of unmoving unified
things. And he adduces the reason in what he says next. If the cosmos
15 is now composed of separated elements, then if it had come to be,158
it would be necessary for it to have come to be from the contrary
condition, so that it would be necessary for it to have come to be from
something blended and therefore one. Aristotle calls to witness the
other natural philosophers, of whom some, such as Thales, Anaxime-
nes, and Heraclitus, make the cosmos come to be from one thing
while others, such as Empedocles, make it come from things which
20 had been blended; for Empedocles says that the elements, which
were earlier blended by Love, make this cosmos when they are later
separated by Strife. Aristotle says that it is not reasonable to make
the coming to be of the cosmos be from separated moving things,
since if the things in the cosmos are separated and moving, but
coming to be is from contraries, then the coming to be of the cosmos
must be from things which are blended and at rest. Aristotle says,
25 Therefore, Empedocles also passes over the condition of the elements
under Love, that is, he does not make this condition, but only the
separation which occurs under Strife, responsible for the making of
the cosmos. Aristotle says that he was not able to put a cosmos
together by constructing it out of separated things (as the cosmos
obviously is now constituted), making Love the cause of their blend-
30 ing. For the cosmos is not composed of blended elements but of
separated ones. So if coming to be is from contraries, it is necessary
for it to come to be from one blended thing. Therefore, it is reasonable
that in making the cosmos Empedocles did not also make use of
591,1 this159 so that he could give an indication of the cosmic separation
which comes to be by a change from this. And so interpreters have
understood the term passes over correctly. For in his construction of
the cosmos he passes over <coming to be> under Love, since under
Love it was not this perceptible cosmos but the intelligible one and
the things unified in it which came to be:

5 A round sphere, rejoicing in joyous rest.160

But some people interpret passes over to mean that Empedocles

separates Love from Strife as a cause and leaves it by itself.161
(301a20) So, having proposed to prove that some motion must
belong naturally to the simple bodies and assuming as clear that they
move, Aristotle has proved that if they move naturally he has ob-
 Translation 67
tained what he sought and that if they move by constraint and 10
unnaturally, then too it is necessary that natural motion be prior to
the unnatural motion. And he was compelled to turn away from his
argument and speak against the people who hypothesise that the
unnatural is prior to the natural. These people were Democritus and
his followers, who say that before the making of the cosmos infi-
nitely many indivisible things move for an infinite time in an
infinite void, and Timaeus, who says that the cosmos comes to be 15
from a prior discordant motion. Completing his refutation, Aris-
totle concludes with what he initially proposed, that each body has
a natural motion and says that this is evident from what has been
said previously.

301a22-b1 That it is necessary that some things have an

impulsion of weight or lightness [is clear from these consid-
erations. We say that it is necessary for there to be motion.
For162 if what moves does not have an impulsion by nature, it
is impossible for there to be motion toward or away from the
centre. For let A be weightless and B have weight, and let
the weightless <A> have moved through CD and B have
moved through CE in an equal time; for what has weight
will move through a greater distance. If the body having
weight <B> is divided in the ratio of CE to CD (it is possible
for it to be related to one of the parts in it in this way), then
if the whole thing <B> moves through the whole <distance>
CE, it is necessary that the part of it move through CD in
the same time, so that what is weightless and what has
weight will move through an equal distance, which is im-
possible.]
(301b1) The argument is the same in the case of lightness. 20
Having proved that it is necessary that some motion belong naturally
to the simple bodies, he next proves that it is necessary that an
impulsion of weight or lightness belong to bodies which move natu-
rally not to all but to some, namely, all those which move in a
straight line, since the body which moves in a circle transcends these
things. And he shows that the natural motion of these simple bodies
is because of (kata) these impulsions. Having previously assumed163 25
as agreed upon that all the sublunary bodies have weight and light-
ness and having refuted on this basis those who construct bodies from
planes which have neither heaviness nor lightness, he now proves
what he previously hypothesised, namely that it is necessary that all
the simple bodies which naturally move in a straight line have weight
or lightness.
He is not proposing to prove just that there are heavy and light 30
bodies, since in his demonstration he did not hypothesise that some 592,1
 68 Translation
things are heavy and some are light. Rather he is proposing to prove
that there isnt any body which moves in a straight line which is not
heavy or light, and he refers to them as some things because of the
heavenly body. He makes clear that he is proposing to prove that
none of these bodies fail to have an impulsion, by saying straight-
away, For if what moves does not have an impulsion by nature, and
5 a little later164 Furthermore if there were some moving body which
had neither lightness nor weight.
The proof proceeds on the basis of what was previously proved,
namely that downward and upward motion belong naturally to
bodies, and further on the basis of the fact that in an equal time what
has weight moves naturally downward a greater distance than what
10 does not have it this is clearly true if what doesnt have weight
moves at all165 , and third on the basis of the fact that in the case of
things moving by constraint because of the same power what does not
have weight would move a greater distance, what has weight a lesser
one in the same time.166 These things being assumed to start, he
proves that if something moving does not have an impulsion of
weight or lightness, it is impossible for it to move either away from
the centre or to it. And he proves first that it is impossible for
15 something which is weightless to move down, the way in which
things having weight are naturally constituted to move. The proof is
by reductio ad impossibile.

A B F
|| |||

|||
C D E 167

Let B be a body with weight, A a weightless body. And let the

weightless A have moved through a certain distance CD, and let B,
20 which has weight, have moved through a certain distance CE in the
same time. Obviously CE is greater than CD, since, moving down, B,
which has weight, moves through a greater distance in an equal time
than A, which does not have weight. If some part of B, which has
weight, is to the whole B as the distance CD is to CE, which is greater
than CD, let us take away F, since it is possible to cut what is uncut
into the same ratio as what has been cut. The result is that the
weight B is to F as the distance EC, through which B (which has
25 weight) has moved, is to the distance CD, through which the weight-
593,1 less A has moved. So, by alternation,168 as the whole B is to CE, so is
F to the distance CD. But B moves through the distance CE. There-
fore F will also move through the distance CD in the same time; but
the weightless A moved through the distance CD in an equal time;
5 therefore the weightless A and F, which has weight, will move
 Translation 69
through the distance CD in the same time, which is absurd, since in
an equal time what has weight will move downward farther than
what does not have it if one were to hypothesise that even what does
not have weight moves.
(301b1) It will be proved by the same argument that also some-
thing cannot move up if it does not have lightness, since what has 10
lightness will move up through a greater distance than what does not
have it. And if we make the light thing itself be to one of its parts as
the distance through which the light thing moves is to the distance
through which the thing not having lightness moves, then the light
thing will be to its own part as the greater distance is to the lesser.
And, by alternation, the lesser distance will be to the part of the light 15
thing as the greater distance is to the whole light thing. Therefore,
what has lightness and what does not will move up through an equal
distance in an equal time, which is impossible.

301b1-17 Furthermore, if there were a moving body [which had

neither lightness nor weight, it would be necessary that this be
moved by constraint, and being moved by constraint would
make the motion infinite. For since what causes motion is a
certain power and the lesser or lighter, if moved by the same
power, will move farther, let the weightless A have been moved
through CE and B, which has weight, have been moved through
CD in an equal time. If the body having weight is divided in the
ratio of CE to CD, it will follow that what is subtracted from the
body having weight moves through CE in an equal time since
the whole moved through CD. For the speed of the lesser body
will be to that of the greater as the greater body is to the lesser.
So the weightless body and the body having weight will move
through an equal distance in the same time. But this is impos-
sible. Consequently, since the weightless body will move a
distance greater than any assigned, it will move through an
infinite distance. So it is evident that] it is necessary that every
determinate body have weight or lightness.169 20
Having proved that it is impossible that a body having neither
heaviness nor lightness move either up or down naturally, he now
proves that it cannot move unnaturally and by constraint either,
since it follows that it is moved ad infinitum by the power which
moves it. So, if this is impossible, it is also impossible that something
move by constraint by being thrown or pushed or dragged by some- 25
thing if it does not have weight or lightness. In proving this he again
assumes to start what is clearly true, namely that what is lesser or
lighter will be moved farther by the same power. So let A be weight-
less and B be the thing having weight, and let A have been moved
through the distance CE and B, which has weight, through the
 70 Translation
30 distance CD, which is less than CE, in an equal time by the same
power causing motion by constraint. If the body B, which has weight,
594,1 is divided in such a way that as CE is to CD so is B to some part F of
it, it will follow that F, which is taken away from B, the body having
weight, moves through the greater distance CE in the time in which
the whole B moved through CD, since the speed of the lesser body
will be to that of the greater as the greater body is to the less.
However, the weightless A was also moved by the same power
5 through the distance CE in the same time. Therefore, in the same
time the weightless body A and F, which has weight, will be moved
an equal distance by the same power, which is impossible. But since
what is weightless will move a distance greater than any assigned
finite distance (for, whatever thing having weight is taken to move
an assigned greatest distance of whatever size, what is weightless
10 is more easily moved by what constrains it than the thing is), but
it is not possible to move an infinite distance, since every motion
is from one place to another, and what cannot have come to be
cannot be coming to be, as he said previously,170 therefore a body
which does not have either weight or lightness cannot move. So it
is evident that it is necessary that every determinate body have
15 weight or lightness.
As Alexander says, Aristotle uses the word determinate either to
indicate the division or separation between one thing having light-
ness and another heaviness or to indicate moving in a straight line171
and not in a circle. But, he says:

it is better to understand determinate to indicate actually

being and being in a place (and not potentially), since what is
20 potentially a body is not yet either a body or in a place. And
Aristotle may have added determinate because of mathemati-
cal body which is not determinate and actual just as it does not
have weight or lightness.

But I do not know how he can say this since a mathematical body as
mathematical is both determinate and actual. But I think that it is a
reasonable <suggestion> that determinate means moving in a
25 straight line, as being distinguished by lightness and heaviness from
what moves in a circle, which is above this determination. And I
think that it is even more plausible to say that determinate indi-
cates what is circumscribed in itself and in a place. For such a thing
can also change place. For what is continuous with something else in
the way that parts are contained in a whole is not in a place per se
30 nor does it change place per se according to the decree of Aristotle.172
595,1 So, since the detached parts of the elements, that is, of earth and fire
and what is intermediate between these (and not their entireties or
the parts connected with their entirety173) are what moves in a
 Translation 71
straight line, with the words every determinate body he is indicating
the parts of the sublunary elements which move in a straight line; for
there is nothing determinate among heavenly things apart from the 5
entirety of heaven,174 and among sublunary things the entireties are
not determinate but have their parts continuous with one another.
And so he says every determinate body instead of saying every body
which moves in a straight line.
Having assumed that every sublunary body moves either natu-
rally or by constraint and proved that what has neither lightness nor 10
weight does not move either naturally or by constraint, he has as the
conclusion from these assumptions that what has neither heaviness
nor lightness is not a sublunary body.

301b17-31 Since the starting point of motion which inheres in

a thing is nature [and a <starting point of motion which in-
heres> in something else or <in the thing> qua something else
is power, and some motion is natural, some by constraint all
of it ,175 what has power will make natural motion (for example,
the downward motion of a stone) faster, and power is the entire
<cause> of unnatural motion.
(301b22) In both cases the power uses air as an instrument.
For air is naturally constituted so as to be both light and heavy.
And so, qua light, it will produce motion up when it is pushed
and takes its starting point from the power, and, qua heavy, air
will produce motion down; for the power transmits to each of
them as if it were attached to them. Therefore, what is moved
by constraint moves without the thing moving it following
along. For if no such body as air existed, there would not be any
motion by constraint.
(301b29) And air produces a fair wind for the natural motion
of anything in the same way.
(301b30) That everything is either light or heavy] and how
unnatural motions occur in these things is evident.
Having proved that a body which does not have either weight or 15
lightness cannot move either naturally or by constraint, he next
shows what the nature which moves the things which are said to
move naturally is and what the power which moves things which are
said to move unnaturally is, and he shows that nature is in the
moving thing, power in something else. The starting point of change
which inheres in a thing is nature, as he has already shown in the
second book of the Physics.176 And a starting point of motion which 20
inheres in something else is power, since if something is moved by
something else, it has the starting point of motion in that thing. He
adds the words qua something else since some things which move
but not naturally do have the starting point of their motion in
 72 Translation
themselves, but this power is in them not per se but accidentally
25 they are moved by a power which is in something else per se. An
example is if an ill person who is a physician is cured by himself, since
he is not cured by himself qua being an ill person, nor does he have
the starting point of motion as being an ill person; nevertheless, the
art of medicine because of which he is cured is in the ill person
himself, but as if in another person and not as lightness is in fire (and
so all fire is accompanied by lightness, but not every ill person has
30 the art of medicine). By some motion is natural, some by constraint
all of it he means all motion is either natural or by constraint.
And natural motion occurs because of an inhering cause, namely
nature, constrained motion because of a power in something else.
596,1 And when a naturally moving thing is also pushed along by this
power it moves faster than the motion which results only because
of the power; in the case of a stone a power which pushes it along
5 will make its motion downward faster than the motion which
comes about only because of the power, as in the case of the
upward motion of the stone; for only the power causes this upward,
unnatural motion of the stone, but both this power, by pushing
along, and nature produce its downward motion.
(301b22) Next he says how the power causes motion both when it
10 acts on its own and when it acts along with nature. He says that the
power uses air as an instrument in the case of both motions, the
motion up which the power activates in the case of weights when it
alone constrains and the motion down when it pushes nature along.
Air is suitable for both things because it is both light and heavy. He
has said previously177 that the elements intermediate between earth
and fire are like both, since neither of the intermediates is either
15 absolutely heavy (since neither sinks to the bottom of all of the
elements) or absolutely light (since neither rises to the top of all). But
everything which is not absolute has the character it does by a kind
of mixture of its contrary. And air, because it has fine parts, is easily
moved, and so it activates things to move toward what is above
because of its own motion and also by taking on another starting
point of motion from a power; and air activates downward motion,
both because it has a heavy aspect and because, again, it takes a
20 starting point of motion from a power. For the power which causes
motion transmits to each of the airs, the one which is pushed up and
the one which is pushed down (or perhaps he means by each of them
the air and the stone) a kinetic power as if joining together with them
and binding with them. And he adduces a sufficient sign that some
power which is joined together is bestowed by the thing causing the
motion, namely that what is moved unnaturally moves without what
25 has moved it following along. For what moves naturally has nature
as the cause of motion, but it is clear that what moves unnaturally
takes on the power of moving from the power which is causing it to
 Translation 73
move by constraint and that air acts together with it; for if there were
not some body of this kind acting together with it, motion by con-
straint would not be the way it is, since if air did not have a light
aspect, it would not carry what is heavy up, and if it did not possess
a heavy aspect, it would not move fire downward. 30
(301b29) And air produces a fair wind for (that is pushes) the
natural motion of anything by receiving a share of the power from
the cause of motion. The term produce a fair wind for is taken from
the winds which blow from behind and push a ship; these winds are 597,1
called tail winds because they blow from the tail of the ship. But
perhaps the term tail wind is also a metaphorical expression involv-
ing lions, which, they say, drive themselves into a race by striking
themselves with their own tail in place of a whip. 5
(301b30) And then, completing the discussion, he says: that every
body which is sublunary and therefore also moves in a straight line
(since this is what the present discussion is about) is either light or
heavy, how unnatural motions occur in these things in which they
exist, namely that these unnatural motions are posterior to the
natural ones and last less time and that they are moved by the 10
external power of the air, which contributes to the motion that
these things are this way is evident (obviously on the basis of what
has been proved).
Alexander178 thinks that the phrase in these things is elliptical in
formulation, since it lacks either the words and it has been said
previously, or it is as if he said in these things in such a way that
we do not understand in these things which have weight and light- 15
ness, but rather understand in these discussions. Alexander
thought this and he joined the term is evident with the subsequent
words and wrote, But it is also evident that not all things come to be.
However, I find the word evident written as the last word of the prior
sentence and without the connective <but>, so that the next words
read, That not everything comes to be and that not absolutely
nothing comes to be is clear from what has been said previously. But 20
it seems that Alexander found in some copies That not everything
comes to be and that not absolutely nothing comes to be, as is clear
from what has been said and was compelled to join It is evident with
what follows it. I think it would be better to call this a mistake of the
scribe than to accept the interpretation according to which the text
is elliptical. For it would not be plausible to join evident and clear
with one another so that the text says, But it is evident that not 25
everything comes to be and that not absolutely nothing comes to be,
as is clear from what has been said. But whatever the text says has
no bearing on the truth of things. So let us move to what comes next.

301b31-302a9 That not everything comes to be [and that not

 74 Translation
absolutely nothing comes to be179 is clear from what has been
said previously. For it is impossible for all body to come to be,
unless it is also possible for there to be a separate void, since if
it were to come to be, it would be necessary that in the place in
which what is coming to be now will be there was previously
void, with no body existing. It is possible for one body to come
to be from another, for example, fire from air, but in general it
is impossible for a body to come to be from no previously existing
magnitude. Certainly a body could come to be actual from
something which is potentially a body. But if the body which is
potentially is not already another actual body,] there will be a
30 separate void.
Having demonstrated the hypotheses and the whole syllogism of his
argument against those who say that bodies are composed from
planes,180 he next runs off (apotrekhei) to his original division181
598,1 concerning coming to be in which he said that some people, such as
Parmenides and Melissus and their followers, did away with coming
to be entirely, and some, such as the theologians associated with
Hesiod, said the contrary of these people, that all things come to be.
He says that it is clear from what has been said that not everything
5 comes to be, since it has been proved182 that the body which moves in
a circle does not come to be or perish, and it is clear that something
does come to be, since he has taken issue with those who understand
the statements of Parmenides and Melissus as saying that all being
does not come to be.183 And he now proves that not everything comes
to be on the basis of the fact that body simpliciter does not come to
be. For air comes to be from water and one thing from another when
10 their qualities interchange, but the body itself which underlies the
qualities does not come to be. For if it comes to be it comes to be from
what is not a body, since a particular body such as air comes to be
from what is not air, but it comes to be from a body because it does
not come to be qua body but qua air; but if a body comes to be as a
body, it is necessary that it come to be from what is not a body. But
if this occurs, it is necessary that there be a separate void. (Those who
15 said that there is a void hypothesised it in two ways: first, as mixed
with bodies because of the pores contained in them we say that
these pores are filled with air , and, second, as the place of bodies
which comes to be separate from bodies.) So, if a body comes to be and
was not a body already, that requires a certain space which is empty
of body and which can contain it. And then, I think, he resolves the
objection which says, Why isnt matter potentially body just as it is
20 potentially all other thing and why doesnt what is actually body
come to be from what is potentially body, as in other cases? And so
he says, Certainly a body could come to be actual from something
which is potentially a body. But if the body which is potentially is not
 Translation 75
already another actual body (so that a body comes to be from a body
which it is not like), but rather a body comes to be from what is
incorporeal, there will be a separate void. 25
Alexander says that Aristotle is now setting out his doctrine of
matter.184 For <Aristotle> does not think that matter is actually
incorporeal, but that both matter and form are separable in thought,
although actually neither of them exists separately; rather, when
something is said to come to be from matter, it is said to come to be
from something which is actually,185 but with respect to what is 599,1
potentially the thing which comes to be it is said to come to be from
that thing as from matter. For <Aristotle> says that in general it is
impossible that something come to be from no previously (actually)
existing magnitude, that is, from no body. For if this happened there
would be a void. Consequently, according to <Aristotle>, qualityless 5
body, which he calls186 the second substratum, does not come to be,
since, if it came to be, it would have to have come to be from what is
not a body. But this is impossible if there is no separate void.
But perhaps there is no coming to be of any other common genus
either, since there is no coming to be of either colour or shape.187 For
if colour or shape came to be it would come to be from what has no
colour or what has no shape, but it is not possible for there to be a
finite body which is entirely without colour or shape. By the same 10
reasoning the other common qualities, such as heat and coldness,
sweetness and bitterness, would not come to be, if it is necessary that
every body be dominated by some contrary or intermediate. Rather
in every case it is a particular thing188 which comes to be from
something which is naturally constituted <to play this role>. What
then? Are there this many sublunary forms which do not come to be?
And why do we say that all sublunary things come to be and perish? 15
Or is it the case that just as there are common forms in this world,
so too they come to be and perish? But these forms do not exist per
se; rather they exist in individuals, since in this world no colour or
shape which is not a particular thing exists per se, and similarly in
the case of body. So, just as common things exist in particulars, so too
they come to be and perish in those things, but they are always
interchanging in189 particulars, just as time in this world and motion 20
are always interchanging. For there is no time which is not this
certain time190 and no motion <which is not this certain motion>;
rather common things appear in the continuous flux of particulars,
and they seem to stand still as one thing because they are an
appearance of the intellectual form which always is. It is as if one
were looking at a face in an eternally flowing river: the appearance
of the face in the water seems to be one and the same, although it is 25
not the same but gives the impression of being one because of the
enduring face. However, even the Peripatetics, who place all common
things in particulars, think that what is common and lies under
 76 Translation
particulars which are always in flux remains fixed while changing.191
And perhaps one should say that body simpliciter does not come to
30 be for this reason192 rather than because otherwise one would be
forced to hypothesise a void. For if things rarefy and condense, and
it is not necessary that there be a void or that the universe swell (as
Xuthus said it does), and it is not necessary to make the apparently
artificial hypothesis that when one thing is rarefied another is con-
600,1 densed to the same degree,193 what prevents it from being the case
that when one body comes to be another perishes or is condensed at
the same time?

<Chapter 3>
302a10-19 It remains to say what things come to be [and why
they do. Since in all cases knowledge is based on primary things
and the elements are the primary things which inhere <in
things>, we should investigate which sort of bodies of this kind
are elements and why, and thereafter investigate how many
there are and what they are like.
(302a14) This will be evident if one hypothesises what the
nature of an element is. Let an element of bodies <be some-
thing> into which other bodies are divided and which inheres
<in bodies> (potentially or actually it194 is still to be debated
which) and which itself cannot be divided into things different
in kind <from it>. In all cases everyone means to say that] an
element is something of this sort.
5 Having shown that neither those who say that all things come to be
nor those who say that nothing does are correct, he next asks what
things come to be. For initially195 he proposed that after the discus-
sion of the body which moves in a circle he would speak about the
other simple bodies, in which there is already coming to be and
perishing. Therefore he said196 it is necessary to investigate coming
to be and perishing and first whether there is coming to be at all
and whether all things come to be or only some. So, having refuted
10 those who do away completely with coming to be and those who
say that everything comes to be, he turns to the question of what
things come to be and why they do. By what things he means
which of the things which have affective qualities and move in a
straight line and by why they do he means when what things
occur does something come to be.
In all things for which there are principles, understanding and
knowledge result from knowing the principles; and the elements are
15 principles of things which come to be (for everything which comes to
be comes to be from something); and the elements are the primary
things which inhere in things which come to be, and knowledge is
 Translation 77
based on primary things; therefore, it is reasonable that the discus-
sion of coming to be should start from the elements.
He says, We should investigate which sort of bodies of this kind
are elements. But since different people hypothesised different
things, after he has first recounted their views, he will state his own 20
doctrine in the books on coming to be,197 where he will also make clear
the cause of the four <simple> bodies coming to be. He says that the
elements are the primary things which inhere in things which come
to be because accidents also inhere in them but they are not primary.
So he says that we should investigate which sort of bodies which
come to be are elements, since some bodies which come to be are 25
elements, some are composed of elements. When it has been deter-
mined which sort are elements, namely the ones which are
composed from contrary affective qualities, one should ask why
these are the elements of bodies which come to be and in addition
how many bodies and what sort are such as to be elements (in fact
there are four, fire, air, water, earth).
(302a14) He says that these things will be evident if we hypothe- 30
sise what the nature of an element is. For by comparing bodies with
the definition of an element we will find how many such things there 601,1
are and what they are. And he next defines element, saying that an
element of bodies <is something> into which other bodies, the ones
composed of elements, are divided. For we are enquiring about the
element of body not as body198 but as composite body. So he does well
to say into which other bodies are divided and which inheres in 5
bodies (potentially or actually it is still to be debated which). For
that the elements inhere actually follows for those, such as Empedo-
cles and Anaxagoras, who say that coming to be is the result of
blending and separation out, but that they inhere potentially follows
for those who199 say it is a result of qualitative change. Aristotle says
that an element itself, even if it can be divided as a body, cannot be 10
divided as an element into things different in kind. And it differs in
this respect from what is composed of elements because the latter can
be divided into the elements, which are different in kind <from it>,
even if <sometimes> it can also be divided into homoiomeries;200 for
flesh can be divided into flesh, but it can also be divided into the four
elements, which differ in kind from one another, but fire cannot be
divided into things different in kind. And the word inhere distin- 15
guishes element from species. For simple body is divided into the
fifth <simple body> and the four, but they do not inhere, since it is
divided as a genus into species, not as something composed of ele-
ments into elements. He says, In all cases (of things composed of
elements) everyone means to say that an element is something of this
sort. For an element of speech201 is that into which speech is divided
and which inheres in it and which itself is not divisible into things 20
different in kind.
 78 Translation

302a19-28 If an element is what we have said it is [there must

be some things of this sort among bodies. For fire and earth are
contained potentially in flesh and wood and everything of this
sort, since they are obviously separated out from them. But
neither flesh nor wood inheres in fire either in potentiality or in
actuality, since <if they inhered> they would be separated out.
(302a25) Similarly if there were only one element, flesh or
wood would not inhere in it. For if flesh or bone or anything else
of this sort is going to exist one should not immediately say that
they inhere potentially, but] one should also investigate202 the
way they come to be.
<The argument is the following:>

[i] Since there is coming to be it is necessary that there be

elements from which what comes to be comes to be, so if an
element is of a certain sort, it is necessary that some bodies be
of this sort;
25 [ii] but elements are the sort of thing which has been described;
[iii] therefore, there are some bodies of this sort.

The conditional [i] is clear from the fact that there is coming to be,
since if there is coming to be it is necessary that there be bodies of a
certain sort from which what comes to be comes to be and into which
it is dissolved. And he confirms the additional assumption [ii] on the
basis of the common preconception that an element is of this sort. He
next gives evidence for the conclusion [iii] that there are some bodies
30 of this sort on the basis of induction, saying, Fire and earth are
contained potentially in flesh and wood and everything of this sort.
602,1 That they are contained is clear from the fact that they are separated
out from them. But they are contained potentially. For saying that
the elements are potentially follows for those who posit that the four
bodies are elements which change into one another qualitatively.
He uses the term separation out203 in its ordinary sense since it
does seem to be used in the case of things which inhere actually. As
5 for fire separating out from flesh, Theophrastus reports that a flame
separated out from the eyes of a human being.204 But the Alexandrian
physician Megethios205 described to me how he saw fire come out of the
hip of a man suffering from sciatica and set blankets on fire, after which
the pain stopped. And that fire separates out from flesh is also made
clear by the scabs of carbuncles which come to be from fire206 and by very
10 high fevers. And they expel fire from pieces of wood by rotating one piece
of wood as a fire drill207 in another. That there is earth contained in these
things is made clear by the ashes which are left after burning. And
moisture which is separated out and vaporised air also make clear <that
 Translation 79
water is contained in things>. So if fire and earth and the others are
contained in flesh and wood, and there is no flesh or wood in fire or
earth either potentially or actually (since <if they inhered> they
would be separated out at some time), it is clear that fire and earth 15
and the others are elements of flesh and wood, since they inhere in
them, but the latter are not elements of the former.
(302a25) Since it has not yet been proved that there are four
elements and there were some who said that there is only one, Thales
and Hippo saying it is water, Anaximenes and Diogenes air, Hip-
pasus and Heraclitus fire, Anaximander what is intermediate, it is 20
reasonable for Aristotle to add that, even if the primary bodies were
not four but one, the things which come to be from that primary body
would not inhere in it either in actuality or in potentiality, but one
should also investigate the way they come to be. For if someone says
that they come to be by separation out, it is necessary that they
inhere, but if it is by change, this is no longer the case. But since it is
thought that elements come to be from composites when they are 25
dissolved and composites come to be from the elements (since those
who make the hypothesis that there is one element generate other
things from it), one does not have to say for this reason that the
element inheres in the composite and the composite in the element
in the same way, nor are inhering in something and coming to be from
it the same thing; for the simple things which come to be from 30
composites did inhere in them; however, although composites come
to be from simples, they do not thereby inhere in them, since having
come to be from something is not a sufficient condition for inhering
in it. Consequently even if flesh and bone and every composite come
to be from simple things, one should not therefore say, as those who 603,1
explain coming to be in terms of separation out do, that these
composites inhere in the simples, but one should also investigate the
way they come to be. For if coming to be is due to alteration, it is not
necessary that these composites inhere.

302a28-b5 Anaxagoras speaks about the elements in a way

contrary to Empedocles. [Empedocles says that fire and earth
and the things co-ordinate with them are the elements of bodies
and that all things are composed of them, but Anaxagoras says
the contrary; he says that the homoiomeries (I mean flesh and
bone and everything of that sort) are elements208 and says that
air and fire are mixtures of these and all the other seeds for
each of them is a collection of all the invisible homoiomeries
so that everything comes to be from these homoiomeries.]
(Anaxagoras gives the same name to fire and to ether.209) 5
Having mentioned as elements air210 and fire and the things co-ordi-
nate with them, which Empedocles also called elements, Aristotle
 80 Translation
next mentions the view of Anaxagoras as being contrary to that of
Empedocles. That is not to say contrary with respect to the concep-
tion of <what it is to be> an element since everyone said that an
10 element is something which inheres in bodies and into which they are
divided and which itself cannot be divided into things different in
kind <from it>.211 Rather disagreement arose insofar as some people
said that this sort of nature attaches to certain bodies and others that
it attaches to other bodies. Empedocles said it attaches to the four
<simple bodies> and called them elements, Anaxagoras said it at-
taches to the homoiomeries, Thales to water, someone else to some-
15 thing else, but each of them invoked the same evidence and said that
he called what he called elements because they are separated out
from other things but other things are not separated out from them.
On this ground Empedocles said the four are elements and
Anaxagoras said the homoiomeries, such as flesh and bone and
things of this sort are; he called them seeds and said that what
Empedocles called elements, air and fire and all the others, are
20 mixtures of these, and all are collections of homoiomeries, although
they do not seem to be composed from them because the homoiomer-
ies are invisible and imperceptible because of their smallness.
(Anaxagoras frequently used the word ether to mean fire.)
Aristotle has stated the view of the elements of each of these
people and at the same time set out the opposition between them,
25 namely that Empedocles says the homoiomeries are all composed
from the four and that these are the elements of all things, whereas
Anaxagoras constructs these four and everything else from the ho-
moiomeries and from the homoiomeries in such a way that they
themselves are also homoiomerous. And Aristotle took his view of
what an element is from the common preconception as something
agreed upon, but he does not take his view of what the bodies of this
30 sort are from Empedocles and Anaxagoras, since they disagree about
this. But, in showing next which bodies are simple, Aristotle will
have shown which bodies are the elements.

604,1 302b5-13 Since there is a proper natural motion for every212

body [and some motions are simple, some mixed, and mixed
motions belong to mixed bodies, simple motions to simple bod-
ies, it is evident that there are certain simple bodies, since there
are simple motions. Consequently it is clear both that there are
elements and why there are.

<Chapter 4>
(302b10) The next thing to investigate would be whether the
elements are finite or infinite and, if finite, what their number
 Translation 81
is. And first] we should observe that they are not infinite, as
some people think } .
For the demonstration that there are simple bodies and that these
are the four, he uses what he has already proved: that natural bodies
are those which have the starting point of motion in themselves per
se this has been proved in the Physics;213 that some motions are 5
simple and some mixed, and that a simple motion belongs to a simple
body and a mixed motion to a mixed body, and that the motion of a
simple body is simple (the simple motions of composite bodies result
from the dominance of the simple bodies in them) these things have
been proved in the first book of this treatise.214 These things being
assumed, since there are simple motions which occur along the 10
simple lines, that is, the straight and the circular, it is evident that
there will also be certain simple bodies, if, indeed, simple motions
naturally belong to simple bodies. But simple bodies are elements
because composite bodies are divisible into them, but they them-
selves are not divisible into things which are different in kind <from 15
them>.
The words why there are may be said because of the simple
bodies. For there are elements because there are bodies which natu-
rally have a simple motion. But the words may also refer to coming
to be because it has been proved that there are elements because
there is coming to be, since if there were no elements it would be
impossible for there to be coming to be.215 20
(302b10) Having proved that there are certain simple bodies,
which are also elements, he next asks whether these are finite or
infinite and, if finite, how many there are. It would be possible to
grasp on the basis of the motions both that they are finite and how
many they are, but he establishes that they are finite by first raising
objections against those who say they are infinite.216 He then deals 25
with those who posit that there is only one element.217 For in this way
what he is going to prove will be more trustworthy because no view
will be troublesome by being persuasive.

302b13-20 [And first we should observe that they are not

infinite, as some people think] and consider first those who
make all the homoiomeries elements [as Anaxagoras does. No
one who maintains this takes element in the correct way. For
we see that many mixed bodies are divided into homoiomeries
(I mean things such as flesh, bone, wood, and stone).218 Conse-
quently, since what is composite is not an element, not every
homoiomery will be an element, but only those which are not
divisible into things different in kind <from themselves>,] as
has been said previously.
 82 Translation
30 Of those who say that the elements are infinite, Leucippus and
Democritus hypothesise the infinitely many atoms, Anaxagoras and
Archelaus219 the homoiomeries, and Aristotle deals with this view
first. He has already spoken against it in the first book of the
605,1 Physics,220 and he now asserts and proves that those who hypothesise
that all the homoiomeries are elements do not make a correct hy-
pothesis. For many composite bodies, which are not elements, are
homoiomerous, since <all> things which are divided into parts which
are similar to the whole are homoiomerous. Flesh and bone and wood
5 and stone are this sort of thing. And it is clear that they are not
simple since, as he has said,221 the simple bodies, fire and earth and
what is intermediate between them, are separated out from them,
and they come to be from several <elements>; for they come to be
from nourishment which is variegated, and wood has some earth, air,
and water, and there is no stone without water since it is impossible
for earth to become continuous without water. And Anaxagoras
10 himself says that these four are not elements, even though they are
homoiomerous. So if nothing composite is an element (because an
element is simple), but some composite body is homoiomerous, just
as fire and earth and what is intermediate between them are, it
follows in the third figure222 that not every homoiomery is an
element, but only one which is not composite and not divided into
15 things different in kind <from itself>. But not every homoiomery
is of this sort, since flesh and bone and such things are homoiomer-
ous, but they divide into things different in kind, from which they
are also composed. Having proved223 that those who say the ho-
moiomeries are elements do not speak correctly, he adds the
universal <criterion> by which one should judge an element: not
by homoiomereity or anything else of this sort, but by indivisibility
20 into things different in kind.

302b20-30 Furthermore, even if one does take an element to be

this sort of thing [it is not necessary to make the elements
infinite. For all the same things would be explained if one
assumed that they are finite; for he would produce the same
thing if there are only two or three such things, as Empedocles
also tries to show.
(302b24) For since they too turn out not to make everything
from homoiomeries (since they do not make a face out of faces
nor do they make anything else which is shaped naturally), it is
evident that it is much better to make the principles finite and
as few as possible, provided all the same things will be provable.
This is what mathematicians also espouse, since they always
assume principles which are finite] either in kind or in quantity.
He has just argued on the basis of homoiomereity and proved that
 Translation 83
not all homoiomeries are elements since they arent all simple. Now
he confronts their infinity and, having accepted homoiomereity as a
hypothesis, he says that even if one assumes that the elements are 25
homoiomerous, it is not necessary for this reason to make them
infinite; for if they are hypothesised to be finite it is possible to
explain the same things, even if one hypothesises them to be few in
number, two or three or four, in the manner of Empedocles. For he
hypothesised that there are four elements and said that each of them
is homoiomerous and explained all coming to be as coming to be on 30
the basis of them. However, Empedocles hypothesises that these
things are simple whereas Anaxagoras hypothesises that they too are
composites of homoiomeries, just as he also makes all other percep-
tible things composites of homoiomeries which are characterised by 606,1
the dominance of one thing in them.
(302b24) And then Aristotle adduces a third argument based on
both homoiomereity and infinity and directed against both. He says
that since, even if they hypothesise that the elements are infinite in
number, they turn out not to make all composites from homoiomeries;
for they do somehow succeed in making perceptible flesh and gold and 5
such things out of homoiomeries with the number of bits of flesh or gold
(imperceptible because of smallness) dominating in the mixture, but it
is not possible for them to compose a face (or the other so-called organic
parts) out of many faces imperceptible in magnitude.
Alexander says that a face is not composed from homoiomeries
because an eye and a nose are not similar. But perhaps Aristotle is 10
saying with more precision that they do not make a face out of faces
because even if homoiomeries have parts which are similar to one
another, they are not said to be homoiomerous for this reason but
because they have parts similar to the whole. And he adds with
complete precision, Nor do they make anything else which is shaped
naturally. For not only does what is composed from things which are 15
dissimilar to each other not have its parts similar to the whole (as
was said in the case of the face), but also even things the parts of
which are similar <in one sense> to each other and to the whole and the
whole of which has been given shape in accordance with a natural
configuration (as in the case of the bone of the skull or of the arm or of
the thigh or a sinew or vein or artery) are not composed of parts which
are similar <in another sense> to the whole. For even if a part of a bone 20
or sinew is bone or sinew, the part is not given shape by the whole,
whereas the whole with its shape is exactly what it is said to be.224
But if, according to them, it is also necessary that some things not
come to be from homoiomeries and if infinity contributes nothing
toward everything being composed out of homoiomeries, nothing
prevents making the homoiomeries finite if, indeed, they are ele-
ments. For even if they are finite, some things will be composed of 25
similar parts and some of dissimilar ones, in the same way as if they
 84 Translation
were assumed to be infinite. So if it is possible to preserve225 the same
things if the principles are hypothesised to be finite and if they are
hypothesised to be infinite, it is better, Aristotle says, to take them
to be finite (as also in mathematics) and as few as possible. For if it
is necessary that, if the principles are unknown, what comes from
30 them is unknown, let the person who wishes to know what comes
from the principles hypothesise finite principles and these as few as
possible because what is infinite is unknowable and what is finite
knowable, and what is finite is as much more knowable as it is more
easily grasped and approaches oneness (h monas). Therefore,
607,1 mathematicians, who wish to have scientific knowledge of their
subjects, assume principles which are finite either in kind or in
quantity. They assume principles finite in kind when they define
point and line and plane, since each of these is not finite in number
but in kind and account. Potamon226 says that mathematical princi-
5 ples are definite in quantity when they assume that the monad is the
principle of number, but Aspasius227 says that the five postulates are
definite in quantity, since they are not five in kind but five in number.
But Alexander says,

It is possible to say that these <principles> themselves, each of

which they took to be definite in form, are finite in quantity,
since the things of which they give definitions as elements are
definite in number. Or perhaps the elements are definite in
10 kind according to them because they define point and straight
line or circular line and whatever they take as primary (what
they also call definitions228); for their kinds are not infinite, but
they have a number. And they are definite in quantity because
<mathematicians> use no infinite straight line or plane when
15 they prove something. For even if they make the hypothesis
that a thing is infinite, they always make use of it by cutting off
a finite <part>.

But perhaps <Aristotle says that the principles are> finite in kind
because <mathematicians> hypothesise nothing infinite but <only>
triangles, squares, circles, points, lines, and planes; and <he says
that they are> finite in quantity because the principles they assume
were numbered, that is, so and so many229 definitions and axioms and
20 postulates, which suffice for the demonstrations of the things which
come after.

302b30-303a3 Furthermore, if one body is said to be different

from another [with respect to their proper differentiae and the
differentiae of bodies are finite (since they differ by perceptible
 Translation 85
things and these are finite but this should be proved)] it is
evident that the elements must also be finite.
This argument also shows that the elements are finite in kind. The
development of the argument proceeds hypothetically as follows. If
all bodies differ from one another by differentiae which are finite in 25
kind and things that differ by differentiae which are finite in kind are
finite in kind, it is necessary that bodies be finite in kind. So if
elements are also simple bodies, it is even more necessary that these
be finite in kind than that the things derived from them be. And it is
prima facie clear that bodies differ from one another with respect to
their proper differentiae, since everything which is different differs 30
by its proper differentiae. And that the differentiae by which bodies
differ are finite in kind is clear from the fact that the differentiae are
perceptible.
And Aristotle proved that bodies differ by differentiae which are 608,1
perceptible in book 7 of the Physics,230 and he proved that perceptible
differentiae are finite in kind in On Perception and Perceptibles231 in
the following way:

Everything perceptible involves a contrariety;

what involves a contrariety involves extremes in kind;
what involves extremes in kind is finite in kind;
therefore, the kinds of perceptibles are finite. 5

And it is possible to develop the argument about the elements cate-

gorically in the following way:

Elements are bodies;

bodies differ from one another by their proper differentiae,
which are perceptible;
things which differ by perceptible differentiae differ by differen-
tiae which are finite in kind;
things which differ by differentiae which are finite in kind are 10
finite in kind.232

Aristotle brings in these things against the doctrine of Anaxagoras

here, but in the first book of the Physics233 he also dealt with the
doctrine that all things are mixed in all things. For Anaxagoras said
that every perceptible body has infinite homoiomeries in it, and that
is why all things are seen to come from all things. Now Aristotle showed
that it follows from this that every perceptible thing is infinite in 15
magnitude,234 since a magnitude which is composed of actual magni-
tudes which are infinite in number must be infinite in magnitude. So if
this is impossible, the elements cannot be infinite. And it is clear that
 86 Translation
this argument does away with infinity in number, but doing away
20 with that does not also do away with infinity in kind.235
However, Anaxagoras says at the beginning of his treatise, All
things were together, infinite in both number and in smallness, since
the small was also infinite. And since all things were together
nothing was clear because of the smallness.236 And he says that, One
should think that all things are in everything.237 But perhaps he
25 means by infinite what we cannot grasp or know,238 as he indicates
with the words so that <it is not possible> to know the number of the
things separated either in theory or in fact.239 He makes clear that
he thinks that things are finite in kind by saying that Mind knows
all things. But if things were really infinite they would be completely
unknowable, since knowledge defines and limits what it knows. But
30 he says, And Mind knew all the things which are mixed together and
separated, both how they were going to be and how they were }.240
It seems that Anaxagoras is indicating a cosmic ordering in two
senses.241 One ordering is intelligible and unified; in it all things were
together and each thing was all the others because of intelligible
609,1 unification. The other is perceptible and made separate from that
unification by demiurgic Mind, which he says itself also proceeds
from the intelligible and orders everything. That he indicates a
certain intelligible cosmic ordering which is prior to the perceptible
ordering and which pre-contained it as cause and spermatically is, I
5 think, clearly confirmed by his words:242 Since this is the way things
are, one should think that there are many things of every sort in
everything which is blended, and seeds of all things, seeds which
have forms of every sort and tastes and colours243 and that humans244
and all the other living things which have souls are put together
<from these seeds?> and that humans have cities which they inhabit
10 together245 and artefacts, just as in our world, and a sun246 and a
moon and other things just as in our world. And obviously these
things are pre-contained in that intelligible ordering spermatically
and as forms, as he says.

303a3-10 However, the consequences of what some other peo-

ple, [such as Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, say are not
reasonable either. They say that the primary magnitudes are
infinite in number and indivisible in magnitude and that sev-
eral things dont come to be from one thing or one thing from
several, but that all things are generated by the weaving to-
gether and interlocking247 of the primary magnitudes.
(303a8) And in a way these people also make everything to
be numbers and to be composed of numbers. For even if they
dont indicate this clearly,] nevertheless this is what they mean.
15 Having proposed to discuss those who hypothesise that the elements
 Translation 87
are infinite in number and having spoken against Anaxagoras and
his followers, who say that the elements are infinitely many ho-
moiomereities, he turns to Leucippus and Democritus and their
followers, who call atoms, which are indivisible because of their
smallness and solidity and also infinite in number and in shapes,
elements. And they said that only these things are continuous, since
other things which are thought to be continuous draw together by 20
contact. Accordingly they also did away with division by saying that
apparent division is the parting of things in contact, and so they said
that several things dont come to be from one thing since an atom
cannot be divided and that one thing which is truly continuous
doesnt come from several, but each thing is thought to become one
because of the weaving together of atoms. Abderites, such as De-
mocritus, called weaving together interlocking. 25
(303a8) Having said that the consequences of what some other
people say are not reasonable either and set out their view, Aristotle
next throws out one reason why the consequences are not reasonable.
He says, And in a way these people also make everything to be 610,1
numbers and to be composed of numbers. So if this is impossible, the
consequences of their doctrine would not be reasonable. He says that
the atoms are in a way numbers because the atoms resemble mo-
nads and because they are not divisible, just as monads are not, and
because nothing continuous comes to be from the atoms, which are 5
divided by the void, just as nothing continuous comes to be from
monads; for the Pythagoreans say that monads are distinguished by
the void.248 Aristotle adds in a way because there is also some
difference between the absurd consequences for those who generate
things from atoms and the absurd consequences for those who gen-
erate them from numbers. For those who say there is generation from
numbers the absurdity that they generate bodies from incorporeal 10
parts follows, but those who generate things from atoms avoid this.

303a10-16 And in addition, [since the bodies differ in shape and

shapes are infinite, they say that the simple bodies are infinite.
But they did not specify further what sort of shape or what shape
each element has, but only assigned the sphere to fire. However,
they did distinguish air and water and the rest by largeness and
smallness, as if their nature was a sort of universal seedbed] of
all the elements.249
Alexander250 understands these words as making the inference that
the people who say that atoms are the principles are involved in a
kind of self-contradiction because they say that the elements differ
from one another in shape and not in substratum. But if this is the 15
case, it is clear that the things which come to be from the elements
will differ from each other in shape.251 It would follow that they
 88 Translation
should say what the shapes of each of the elements and of the things
which come to be from them are, but they say only that the shape of
fire and of the atoms from which it is generated is spherical, so that
20 it is also reasonable that fire penetrates and moves and causes
motion and divides and burns the things to which it comes near
because it is circular and smooth and furthermore because the
elements from which it is composed are small. However, they do not
go on to say what the shape of air or water or earth or their elements
is. They only explain the difference in the size of the elements of
25 which252 these things are composed; they say that air is composed out
of smaller things which are the same in shape <as the things com-
posing water or earth>, water out of larger ones, earth out of even
larger ones, but these elements do not differ because of shape, but
each of them comes to be from the same things which are of all
sorts of shapes. Alexander says that Aristotle does not add what
follows from this, but it would be that if they do not posit that the
30 difference of elements which differ in kind is due to <difference of>
611,1 shape but say that it is due to <difference of> size, then, since air
and water and earth differ only because of the size of their ele-
ments, they do not differ in kind from one another. And so Alexan-
der puts forward these things as a refutation and adduces the
absurd consequence.
But perhaps Aristotle has added these further things because they
5 clarify their view, while at the same time giving the reason why they
say the atoms are infinite in number. He is saying that they said that
the simple bodies are infinite because they differ in shape and shapes
are infinite, but that they did not specify what sort of shape or what
shape the elements which generate each body have, except only in
the case of fire. They said that air and water and the rest come to be
10 from elements which have the same shapes and differ only by lar-
geness and smallness.
And next he makes a start on the refutation of this view when he
says, First of all these people also make the same mistake.253 And
Aristotle does not fail to mention (as Alexander thinks he does) the
absurd consequences of the parts of the view, parts which he has just
15 set out, but he adds a fourth refutation which begins, And at the
same time it is necessary for them to contradict themselves.

303a17-29 First of all these people also make the same mistake,
[not taking the principles to be finite, although <if they did> it
would be possible for them to say all the same things.
(303a19) Furthermore, if the differentiae of bodies254 are not
infinite, it is clear that the elements will not be infinite.
(303a20 In addition, by asserting that there are indivisible
bodies, they must be in conflict with the mathematical sciences
 Translation 89
and do away with many common opinions and perceptible phe-
nomena we spoke about these things earlier in On Time and
Motion.
(303a24) At the same time it is necessary for them to contra-
dict themselves since if the elements are indivisible it is
impossible that air and water and earth differ by largeness and
smallness; for <if they did> they could not come to be from one
another; because the largest bodies will always be insufficient
when they are separated out and they do say that water] and
air and earth come to be from one another in this way.
And, having set out the view of those who say that the atoms are
elements, he uses two refutations against them which he also used 20
against those who say the homoiomereities are elements.255 The first
says that they err if they hypothesise infinitely many principles when
they can explain such things from finitely many.
(303a19) The second runs as follows:

If the differentiae by which bodies differ from one another are

not infinite, neither will the elements be infinite in kind;
but the first;
therefore, the second.

And the conditional is clear since the differentiae in kind <come> 25

from the elements to the composites. And it is clear that the differen-
tiae in kind of bodies are not infinite since they are perceptible (as
has been proved in the seventh book of the Physics), and perceptible
differentiae are finite (as is demonstrated in On Perception and
Perceptibles).256
However, Alexander understands the words if the differentiae of 612,1
bodies are not infinite to be said of the elements.257 Therefore, he
says, either this is said with the sense that difference in shapes is not
sufficient to produce a difference in the elements but only differences
concerning perceptibles can do this, or it is said because the shapes 5
with respect to which they say the elements differ are not infinite, as
Aristotle will show. But perhaps, as I said, one should rather under-
stand what is said as if the differentiae in kind of composite bodies
are not infinite, the elements are not infinite in kind either. For this
argument does away with infinity in kind, but not infinity in number.
(303a20) He next adduces a third <objection>, which applies spe- 10
cifically to these people, namely that, by asserting that there are
indivisible bodies, they are in conflict with the mathematical sci-
ences. For, according to the mathematicians nothing continuous is
indivisible; rather every magnitude is divisible to infinity. So if these
people do away with continuity and the division to infinity of bodies,
they also do away with division in general and with perception and
 90 Translation
15 awareness. For how could one be aware of an affection feeling in his
foot if <our> bodies were not unified? And how could something
divisible into parts come to be from things which are indivisible and
partless? He took issue with this in the Physics,258 which he is now
calling On Time and Motion. And people who are thought to do away
with all other common opinions, some held because they are part of
the most precise science, others because they are clear on the basis
20 of perception, will be thought to be absurd. And according to these
people blending will be done away with, since <they say> there is
only juxtaposition of bodies.
(303a24) He next adduces a fourth objection, directing it toward
the statement that they did distinguish air and water and the rest
by largeness and smallness.259 For if they say both that these things
25 come to be from one another and that they differ from one another by
the largeness and smallness of their atoms, it is necessary for them
to contradict themselves, since these <views> clash with one an-
other. For if they say that earth comes to be from water when the
largest <atoms> in the water are separated out, then, since it is
possible that at some time, all of the largest <atoms> having been
separated out from the water, the separation out from the air of the
largest <atoms> also gives out, the coming to be of earth from water
30 and of water from air can also give out with the result that there is
some water from which earth cannot come to be and some air from
which water cannot come to be. So these people contradict them-
selves in saying both that these things come to be from one another
613,1 and that they differ because of the largeness and smallness of their
elements. And if when the smallest <atoms> are separated out
they will give out, then water will not come to be from earth or air
from water. However, we do see that every part of water changes
into air and every part of air into water. And if fire is composed
5 only of spherical <atoms> and the others out of all <kinds of
atoms> nothing else will come to be from fire and fire will never
come to be from other things.

303a29-b3 Furthermore, even on their conception [one would

not think that the elements turn out to be infinite, since the
bodies differ in shape and all shapes are composed from pyra-
mids, rectilinear shapes from rectilinear pyramids, the sphere
from eight parts. For it is necessary that there be some princi-
ples of shapes, so that whether there is one principle or two or
more,] the number of simple bodies will also be this great.
Just as in the case of Anaxagoras view it was not necessary to say
10 that the elements are infinite, since he260 said that the homoiomere-
ities differ from one another in their affections, but Aristotle proved
that perceptible affections are finite,261 so too in the case of these
 Translation 91
people it is not necessary to say that the principles are infinite. For
if they said that the atoms are infinite because they differ in shape
and shapes are infinite, if there is an argument proving that the
primary shapes of bodies are definite and finite, it is clear that the
principles of bodies will also be definite. He proves that composite 15
shapes are composed from definite simple shapes on the basis of the
fact that all the composite shapes of bodies are composed from
pyramids. For just as in the case of plane figures every rectilinear
plane figure is divided into triangles and is composed from triangles
because the triangle is the simplest and most fundamental of plane 20
figures, so too every solid which is limited by rectilinear planes is
resolved into pyramids, and the pyramid is the simplest among solids
and most fundamental, and rectilinear solid figures are composed
from the pyramid and divided into it.
But it is clear that it is also necessary that there be principles of 25
composite figures. But interpreters really have need of prophetic
power <to determine> how he can say that the sphere is composed of
eight parts. I think that Alexander is correct in pointing out that
Aristotle is saying that all bodies are composed of pyramids, rectilin-
ear bodies of rectilinear pyramids and the sphere of eight pyramids
with spherical bases. For if we bisect a sphere with the circle of the 30
horizon and we draw through the pole of the sphere two great circles
(analogous to the celestial equator and the meridian) cutting each
other and the horizon at right angles, the sphere will be divided into
eight equal segments each of which is a pyramid composed of isosce- 614,1
les triangles drawn toward the centre of the sphere and having an
equilateral triangle as base. If these bases take on a spherical sur-
face, the sphere will be composed of eight such pyramids.262 And with
these words Aristotle is saying that rectilinear bodies are composed 5
of rectilinear pyramids and that a sphere is composed of eight
pyramidish parts which it is not possible to call either simply recti-
linear or circular or even pyramids in the strict sense. And in this
way he indicates that the construction of the sphere is also from
pyramidish figures, but when he says eight parts, he does not add
either rectilinear or spherical. 10
He adds to what he has said, For it is necessary that there be some
principles of shapes because some shapes are simple, some compos-
ite, and in things which are divided in this way the simple things are
principles of the composite ones. Consequently whether the pyramid
is a single principle of shapes or it is shown that there are two or more
principles, it is necessary that the primary bodies be this many in 15
number and not infinite. As Alexander says, Aristotle adds or two or
more because he does not think that the pyramid is a simpler figure
than the sphere, since he doesnt think that the triangle is simpler
than the circle either.
These demonstrations show that the primary bodies are finite in
 92 Translation
20 kind. But it is necessary that what is finite in kind also be finite in
number. For if one of the kinds were infinite in number, things falling
under the other kinds would be outside what is infinite, which is
impossible, since nothing is greater than what is infinite.263

303b4-13 Furthermore, if each of the elements [has some

proper motion and the motion of a simple body is simple, but the
simple motions are not infinite (because there are no more than
two simple motions and places are not infinite), in this way too
the elements will not be infinite.

<Chapter 5264>
(303b9) But since it is necessary that the elements be finite it
remains to investigate whether there is more than one. For
some people hypothesise one only, some hypothesising water,
some air, some fire, and some hypothesise that it is <some-
thing> finer than water but denser than air,] which they say
25 contains all the heavens, being infinite.
He has overturned with several arguments the doctrines which
hypothesise that the principles of bodies are infinite in number,
whether they are homoiomereities, as with Anaxagoras or atoms, as
with Democritus and his followers. Next, making a different kind of
argument, he demonstrates that the simple bodies cannot be infinite
and that if they cannot be infinite, neither can the elements be; for
30 the elements are simple since they are indivisible into things which
are different in kind. He proves that the simple bodies are finite in
number on the basis of motions, as he did at the beginning of the first
615,1 book.265 For if the things which move with the simple motions are
naturally simple bodies, it is necessary that there be as many simple
bodies as there are kinds of simple motions. So if the sublunary
simple motions are not infinite or even more than two (since the
simple motions of <those> bodies are seen to be two, one up and one
5 down, and the places to which the simple motions are directed are
not infinite but two, up and down), the elements will not be infinite
in kind but only two, one heavy and one light.
(303b9) Having proved that the principles of bodies cannot be
infinite and that it is necessary for them to be finite since the simple
motions are finite, he now turns to those who say that there is one
10 element. There are several such people, and different people hypoth-
esised this one element to be something different. Thales of Miletus
and Hippo said it is water because they saw that the seeds of animals
and the nourishment of both animals and plants are made of water.
Anaximander, a fellow citizen and pupil of Thales, said it is some-
thing indeterminate which is finer than water and denser than air
 Translation 93
because the substratum should be naturally adapted for the change 15
to either; he was the first to hypothesise that this one is infinite, so
that he could use it for comings to be without stinting; and, it is
thought that he hypothesised infinite worlds and that each of the
worlds <came to be> from an infinite element of this sort. Anaxime-
nes, a pupil and fellow citizen of Anaximander, also hypothesised
that the principle is infinite, but not also indeterminate; he said it is
air, thinking that the volatility of air is sufficient <to account> for 20
change. Diogenes of Apollonia hypothesised the same thing <air>,
and Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus, taking into
consideration the active power of fire, said that it is the principle.

303b13-22 All those who make this one thing [water or air or
<something> finer than water and denser than air and then
generate other things from this by rareness and denseness do
not notice that they make something else be prior to their
element. For they say that coming to be from their elements is
composition and that dissolution is into the elements, so that it
is necessary for what has finer parts to be prior by nature. So
since they say that fire is the finest of all bodies, fire would be
primary by nature. But it makes no difference,] since it is
necessary that one of the others be primary and not the inter- 25
mediate one.
He first deals with those who posit that the intermediates are ele-
ments, water or air or what is between them, so that they are able to
generate other things from their element by rareness and denseness,
finer ones by rareness, ones with thicker parts by denseness. He says
against these people that they themselves do not notice that they say 616,1
that there is a body which is prior to their element. But this is absurd,
since it is not possible for anything to be prior to an element. It is
clear that they are subject to this contradiction if, indeed, condensa-
tion is composition and rarefaction is dissolution, and they say that
what comes to be from the elements comes to be by composition and
that the elements come to be from composites by dissolution. For
what comes to be by rarefaction comes to be by the dissolution of the 5
thing they say is an element and dissolution into the elements is
resolution, so that what comes to be from rarefaction has finer parts
and is more fundamental than what is rarefied. For what has finer
parts does not come to be by composition, but by resolution, and
resolution is <into>266 an element. The argument is the following:

What is rarefied is resolved, but what is resolved is resolved into 10

an element; therefore, even according to them, finer bodies will
be prior and more elemental, since what is finer comes to be
 94 Translation
from dissolution, and what comes to be from dissolution is an
element.

So if they agree that fire is finer than the intermediates and they say
that it comes to be from the intermediates by rarefaction,267 then fire
will be more elemental according to them.
15 Aristotle says that it makes no difference even if fire is not primary
and finer according to them. For even so it follows that they say that
something else is finer and more elemental, something into which the
resolution of the thing they hypothesise to be an element takes place,
that thing being intermediate and, according to them, resolved into
something finer by rarefaction. So whatever it is that comes to be by
20 rarefaction is more elemental.

303b22-304a7 Furthermore, generating other things by dense-

ness and rareness [is no different than generating them by
fineness and thickness, since they intend that the fine is rare
and the thick is dense. And again to generate things by fineness
and thickness is the same as to generate them by largeness and
smallness, since what has small parts is fine, what has large
parts thick; for what is greatly expanded is fine, but a thing of
this sort is composed of small parts. Consequently it follows
that they divide the substance of other things by largeness and
smallness. It will follow for those who distinguish all things in
this way that they speak relatively, and it will not be the case
absolutely that one thing is fire, another water, another air, but
the same thing will be fire relative to one thing, air relative to
something else.
(304a1) This also follows for those who say there are sev-
eral elements, but also say they differ by largeness and
smallness; for, since each thing is distinguished by quantity,
the magnitudes will have some ratio to one another; conse-
quently it is necessary that of the things which have this
ratio to one another one be air, another fire, another earth,
and another water] because the ratios of lesser things inhere
in greater ones.268
He also brings in this other argument against those who generate
other things from the intermediates by denseness and rareness. He
25 proves that for them the absurdity follows that they speak of every-
thing that comes to be from their own element as relative and that
fire, water, and air are not per se. He gives the following syllogism to
show that this follows for them:

To generate other things by denseness and rareness does not

 Translation 95
differ at all from generating them by fineness and thickness
since the fine is rare and the dense thick;
but to define the differentiae of what comes to be by thickness 30
and fineness is the same as to define them by largeness and
smallness (and he adds why, saying, since what has small parts 617,1
is fine, what has large parts thick; for what is greatly expanded
is fine (so that there is not a great deal of substance in the same
place), but a thing of this sort is composed of small parts);
it follows for the people who say this that they distinguish the
substance of other things obviously the things which come to 5
be from their element by largeness and smallness;
so if large and small are relative, as is also specified in the
Categories269 (even if in the Metaphysics270 Aristotle views them
in terms of quantity and places them under the category of
quantity), it will follow that those who distinguish things in this
way say that everything which comes to be is relative, and it
will not be the case absolutely that one thing is fire, another
water, another air, but the same thing will be fire relative to one 10
thing, air relative to another thing.

Alexander says:

If water is as much greater than air as, being water, it is less

than earth, water will be water relative to earth and earth
relative to air; and, again, if air exceeds fire by as much as it is
less than water, air will be air relative to water and water
relative to fire; and again if air is as much less than water as 15
fire is less than it, it will be the case that, just as it is air relative
to that fire (since it is related to the body, fire, which is finer
than it), so too the same thing will be water and air at the same
time. For these people did not specify that air comes to be from
so and so much of their element and water from so and so much
of it, but they placed the difference from each other of the things 20
which come to be from their element in being greater or less by
a certain amount.

(304a1) Next Aristotle assimilates the view of these people to that

of Democritus and his followers, who hypothesise infinite atoms as
principles and ascribe the difference among the things which come to
be from them to smallness and largeness of atoms, as was said a little
earlier.271 For they said that earth and water and air differ from one 25
another because one is composed from larger <atoms>, another from
the same <atoms> but smaller ones. He says that the same thing
follows for these people. For since they say that the elements272 differ
from one another by largeness and smallness, their magnitudes will
stand in some ratio to one another. So if one thing is earth, another
 96 Translation
water, another air because of the ratio of the magnitudes of their
30 elements to one another and because of such and such an excess, then
if a first body exceeds a second by as much as the elements of earth
618,1 exceed the elements of water, the first will be earth and the second
water; consequently if the elements of water exceed those of air by as
much as the elements of water are exceeded by those of earth, then,
relative to one another, water will be earth and air water. And
similarly in the case of the others.
But it is possible, <Alexander> says, that Aristotle is not saying
5 these things about Democritus view, but against those who say that
there are four elements and that they differ from one another by
largeness and smallness.273 And perhaps this position is reasonable
since Democritus and his followers say that fire does not differ from
the others only in size but also in shape, but Aristotle is making a
common argument which also applies to fire.
Alexander says,

10 The words because the ratios of lesser things inhere in greater

ones274 are somewhat unclear, but what they mean would be
something like because things which are greater than some
things have to certain other things the ratio of the lesser275; for
if things are this way, then with respect to what has the ratio
of the greater to some things there will be some greater things
related to them <in the same way> and again with respect to
what has the ratio of the lesser <to some things> there will be
15 some lesser things related to them <in the same way>, and thus
the same thing will be water relative to one thing and earth
relative to another. But it is possible that Aristotle adds some-
thing of the following sort with these words. Since the lesser is
also contained in the greater276 (since the greater is as much as
the lesser and more, and what is lesser than a particular thing
20 by so and so much can be in some other body), the same body
could have both the ratio of the greater and of the lesser at the
same time. But if it has both ratios, the bodies would be both
things, so that the greater body, which consists of greater
things, will be both this and also be the body which consists of
lesser things. Therefore, earth will be earth and water at the
same time, and again water will be water and air, air air and
fire, so that earth will be all things because of the relation of its
25 parts to one another; for it contains the ratios of the lesser
things because it is composed of greater ones, and it is possible
to take away parts from it in whatever ratio one wishes.
Or perhaps Aristotle says the ratios of lesser things inhere
in greater ones not about everything which is greater but about
the things other than earth, so that what is meant would be
because things greater than other things are <also> less.277
 Translation 97
And as a result of this <earth> has both the ratios of the greater 30
things and the ratios of the less, since water has a lesser ratio
to earth and a greater one to air, and air has to fire a greater
ratio and a lesser one to water, but earth has a greater ratio to
all and fire a lesser one. And so because these things have both 619,1
greater and lesser ratios, they will be relatives. For water will
be earth relative to air since it has a greater ratio; but it will be
water relative to earth, since it has a lesser ratio to earth; and
again air would be earth or water relative to fire, but it would 5
be air or fire relative to water; and even if the earth which is
taken is greater than water, nevertheless it will be lesser than
some other earth and as much lesser as it was greater than the
water; and, this being so, it will be at the same time water and
earth.

I have set out this interpretation of Alexander in his own words, 10

because of those who, as is probable, are better able than I to
understand on the basis of the interpretation what Aristotle says. For
I think Alexanders argument is forced. For even if large and small
are relative, those things to which they belong are not relative. For
even if beloved is relative, nevertheless human, to which it belongs
to be beloved is not relative; and two is exceeded by three by as much
as it exceeds one, and nevertheless two is not one relative to three. 15
Consequently, even if water were as much greater than air as it is
less than earth, and insofar as it is greater and less it would be
relative, nevertheless it is not the case that it is earth relative to air;
nor is air fire relative to water even if it is as much less than water
as fire is than air. For even if water and air are relative insofar as
they are greater and less, they are not relative insofar as they are
water and air. For even if, as Alexander says, these people placed the 20
difference <between the simple bodies> in being greater and less by
a certain amount, this does not make the things to which being
greater and less by a certain amount belongs relative. For two is
defined to be greater than one by one and less than three by one. And
I think that one should say that in what Alexander says at the end,
namely that even if the earth which is taken is greater than water, 25
nevertheless it will be lesser than some other earth and as much
lesser as it was greater than the water; and, this being so, it will be
at the same time water and earth, he is taking earth itself to be
greater than water and not the elements of earth to be greater than
the elements of water. But how reasonable would it be that water and
earth are the same thing at the same time because a part of earth 30
which is taken is greater than some part of water and less than some
part of earth?
 98 Translation

620,1 304a7-18278 Those who hypothesise fire as the element [avoid

this <problem>, but unreasonable results must follow for them.
For some of them assign a figure to fire, for example, those who
make it a pyramid. Of these some speak more simply by saying
that the pyramid is the sharpest of figures279 and fire is the
sharpest of bodies. But others argue more elaborately that all
bodies are composed from what has the finest parts, and solid
figures are composed from pyramids; consequently, since fire is
the finest of bodies and of figures the pyramid has the smallest
parts and is first, but the first figure belongs to the first body,]
fire would be a pyramid.
Having spoken against those who posited one of the intermediates as
element and generated the rest from it by rareness and denseness,
5 he turns to those, such as Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus
of Ephesus, who say that the finest of the four, fire, is the element.
He says that these people avoid putting the elements in the rela-
tional or relative <category> and avoid saying that there are ele-
ments of the element,280 but he adduces some absurdities which
follow for them, first making a division between their views: some of
10 them attach a figure to fire, which they posit as element, some saying
that the figure is a sphere, some that it is a pyramid, although he
does not mention those who say it is a sphere at the moment;281 others
do not attach any figure <to fire> but only make it have the finest
parts.282 But he also divides those who posit that the figure is a pyramid
into those who speak more simply, whom he first discusses, and those
15 who argue more elaborately. He says about those whom he calls simpler
(using the word in a positive sense) that they use an asyllogistic
argument in the second figure with two affirmative premises:

Fire is sharpest;
the pyramid is sharpest;
therefore, fire is a pyramid.

(As Alexander says, people who say that fire stands in a multiple
ratio because both fire and a multiple ratio increase quickly are like
20 these simpler people.283) But perhaps it is possible to develop the
syllogism in the first figure:

The pyramid is the sharpest figure;

the sharpest figure is appropriate for the sharpest body;
and fire is the sharpest body;
therefore, the pyramid is appropriate for fire.

But if this syllogism is correct, Aristotle would be saying that these

people speak more simply by comparison with those whom he speaks
 Translation 99
of next as arguing more elaborately because they prefer something 25
which is more appropriate to the study of nature and thus make the
syllogism more technical. For they assume to start that all bodies are
composed from what has the finest parts (since what has the finest
parts is simplest, and composites are composed from what is simple);
and secondly they assume that all solid figures are composed from
pyramids, so that the pyramid would be the first figure and the one 30
with finest parts; and third they assume, what he has set down later, 621,1
that the first figure belongs to the first body. Having posited these
things, they syllogise that fire is a pyramid in the following way:

Fire is the finest and first body;

the finest and first body was given shape by the finest and first
figure, which is the pyramid; 5
therefore, as regards figure, fire is a pyramid.

It should be asked who holds this view which says that fire is a
pyramid because it is the first body. For Heraclitus, who does say
that fire is the element of other things, does not say that fire is a
pyramid, and the Pythagoreans,284 who say that fire is composed from
pyramids, do not say that fire is the element of other things since they 10
also say that fire comes to be from water and air just as air and water
come to be from fire.

304a18-21 Others do not make any claim about figure, [but only
make <fire> have the finest parts and then say that other things
come to be from it when it is compounded,] as if from shavings285
which are fused together.
He has recounted the view of those who say that fire is a pyramid and
argue for it either in a more simple or a more complicated way. He 15
next describes those who do not assign it any figure but only say
that fire has the finest parts and that other things then come to be
from it when it is compounded, as from shavings which are fused
together or melted down. For thicker things come to be from fire
when it comes together and is condensed, but not when something
is mixed with it.
Alexander says, 20

I think that with this example Aristotle is pointing out the

absurdity of the view: just as when shavings are fused together
some thicker body comes to be from them, indeed, they even
become gold,286 so too if thicker bodies were to come to be from
fire in this way, they too would be fire, differing <from it> only
in thickness and size. 25
 100 Translation

304a21-b6 The same difficulties follow for people who hold

either of these views. [For if they make the primary body
indivisible, the arguments which we have given previously
against this hypothesis will come up again.
(304a24) Furthermore, it is not possible for anyone who
intends to investigate in a way appropriate to the study of
nature to assert this. For if all bodies are comparable in quan-
tity, the sizes of homoiomeries are proportional to one another
and so are the sizes of elements (for example, the sizes of all
water are proportional to all air and the sizes of the element are
proportional to the element and similarly in other cases), and if
air is greater than water and in general what has finer parts is
greater than what has thicker ones, then it is evident that the
element of water will be less than that of air. So if the lesser
magnitude inheres in the greater, the element of air will be
divisible, and so likewise will the element of fire and in general
so will the element of things with finer parts.
(304b2) But if it is divisible, it will follow for those who assign
a figure to fire that a part of fire is not fire because a pyramid
is not composed from pyramids; and it will follow further that
not every body is either an element or composed of elements,
since a part of fire] will not be either fire or any other element.
He says that the same difficulties follow for those who assign a figure
622,1 to fire and for those who say it has no figure if they make it the first
of all things. For we will assert against those who think it is indivis-
ible (whether or not it has a figure) the things we also asserted
against those who make all things from atoms: that their saying that
there is an indivisible magnitude conflicts with the mathematical
sciences;287 the fact that in a way they generate other things from
5 numbers or monads <is problematic>;288 and whatever other things
he said against these people. (He calls what is partless indivisible.)
(304a24) He proves universally that it is not possible to assert that
the element is indivisible and to make natural bodies come to be from
indivisible things while speaking in a way appropriate to the study
of nature as follows:

If the elements of bodies are themselves also bodies and every

body is comparable in quantity with every body (because no
10 body is infinite), then the homoiomeries, such as air as a whole,
water as a whole, and earth and fire as wholes, would also be
comparable with each other; and whatever ratio of size these have
to one another, their elements will also have the same ratio to one
another since they have the <same> sort of nature;289
but these bodies are related to one another in the following way:
the finer of them has a greater bulk than one with thicker parts
 Translation 101
and extends farther, water than earth, air than water, and fire 15
than air (and it is also clear from their change into one another
that this is the way things are; for air which comes to be from
water, which is less in bulk, becomes greater, and likewise in
the other cases);
therefore, the elements of things with finer parts are also
<greater>, since they are of this sort and generate things of this
sort;
therefore, the element of fire will be greater in bulk than the 20
elements of air;
but if it is greater it is also divisible, since what is greater than
something contains both that than which it is greater and its
excess over it, so that it is divisible into what is equal < to the
lesser magnitude> and the excess over it;
therefore the element of fire is divisible.

One might raise the following difficulty. How, when he said pre-
viously290 that what has small parts is fine and what has large parts 25
thick (and in interpreting these statements Alexander says that
what is composed of what is double what air is composed of is water,
what consists of what is triple is earth), can he now say that the
element of water will be less than that of air? Perhaps he said
previously that water has larger parts than air because in the same
bulk what is thicker and denser has more substance than what is 30
finer and rarer, but here he says that the <element> of water is less
than that of air because when the substance is the same what is 623,1
thicker and denser is more contracted than what is finer and rarer,
as the coming to be of a great amount of air out of a small amount of
water makes clear.291
Alexander does well to raise the following question:

What Aristotle has proved in this passage, namely that the

element of fire is not indivisible, might be fitting against those 5
who say that atoms or planes are the principles of natural
bodies, but how is it fitting against the people who were being
discussed, who say <only> that the element is fire?

And he resolves the objection by saying:

<Aristotles conclusion> would also follow for these people if

they said that the elements of fire are certain small fires which
do not perish. For the fire in our world is seen to perish, but it 10
is necessary that an element be imperishable. Therefore there
are certain elements of fire. But if this is so and there are also
certain elements of what comes to be from fire and these come
to be because of the alteration and change of fire,292 then the
 102 Translation
elements of fire and of the other things would have a ratio to
one another, a ratio which the things composed from them also
15 have, and in this way the element of fire would be of greater
bulk than the elements of those things. But if this is so the
element of fire is also divisible (as has been proved293).

(304b2) The inference of what comes next against the things

presented previously makes clear that Aristotle is proving this for
every sort of hypothesising of fire. For having said, For if they make
the primary body indivisible and having led this hypothesis around
20 into its contrary and shown that it is necessary for the primary body
to be divisible, he <now> adds that if the element of fire is divisible
(as has been proved) it will follow for those who assign the pyramid
to it that a part of fire is not fire, which is absurd, since we see that
fire is homoiomerous. This follows if the figure for the element of
fire is a pyramid, and it is divisible, as has been proved. And the
25 parts of a pyramid are not both294 pyramids (even if one of the parts
is sometimes a pyramid). The result is that the parts of fire are not
fire, at least if its being fire were to lie in having the shape of a
pyramid.
Aristotle adduces as a second absurdity for those who assign a
figure to fire that not every body is either an element or composed of
elements, which is really absurd. This follows because a part of a
30 pyramid is neither a pyramid (and so an element) nor composed of
pyramids (and so composed of elements). So if fire is a pyramid, a part
of fire is neither fire (because not a pyramid) nor any other element,
that is, it is not air or water or earth (he is now calling these simple
624,1 bodies elements) since each of these came to be from a compounding
of fire, but a part of a pyramid is a portion of fire.295 And it would be
absurd in another way to say that a portion of fire is air or water or
earth, since if this were so what comes to be from an element would
be parts of it.
5 But if someone were to say that even if a part of a pyramid is not
a pyramid, nevertheless it is at least composed of pyramids because
every solid figure is divisible into pyramids and a part of a pyramid
has some shape and consequently there is some other body which is
composed of fire, then on their view a part of a simple element will
be composite and, although not a pyramid, will be composed of
pyramids. Alexander says,

10 Furthermore, division will go to infinity if, when a pyramid is

simple, a part of it is composite, and, again, a part of a composite
is a pyramid, which is simple, and a part of the pyramid is
again, according to them, composite. But if this were so nothing
would be an element.
 Translation 103

304b6-11 For those who distinguish <earth, water, air, and

fire> by size [<it follows that> there is an element prior to the
element, and this proceeds ad infinitum, if every body is divis-
ible and the one with the smallest parts is an element.
(304b9) Furthermore, it follows for these people that they
should say that the same thing is fire relative to one thing, air
relative to another,] and again for water and earth. 15
After those who assign a figure to fire, using the pyramid or even the
sphere (for the same arguments would fit them296), he turns to those
who distinguish by size and say that fire is the element because it is
finest and has the smallest parts compared to other things. He says
that for those who distinguish by size it follows that there is an
element prior to the element, and this proceeds ad infinitum. He 20
shows briefly how this follows by saying if every body is divisible and
the one with the smallest parts is an element. For if something is an
element because it has the smallest parts, and it is divisible into its
parts, then a part, because it is smaller, will be prior to it, and
similarly again for a part of a part if every body is divisible and
divisible ad infinitum. And so anything which is hypothesised to be
an element because of having small parts will be done away with if 25
what is small is divisible into what is smaller. (One should under-
stand that this absurdity follows because he transforms fine into
small and having fine parts into having small parts.297)
(304b9) He says that the absurdity which he previously showed to
follow for those who define the difference of bodies by the largeness
and smallness of their elements (as Democritus and his followers said 625,1
that three bodies, air, water, and earth differ by the smallness of
their elements, which have the same shape298) also follows for these
people, namely that the elements are not what they are because of
their own nature but they rather have their being in their relation to
one another. So he says that this absurdity also follows for those who 5
say that fire is an element because it has fine parts. For the same
body has smaller parts than this one and larger parts than that and
will be air relative to this and water or earth relative to that. For
since fire is an element of air because it is finer than it and the excess
in fineness which it has stands in some ratio, when air exceeds 10
something else by this excess in fineness, it will be the element of that
thing and will be fire relative to it, at least if being fire lies in being
so and so much finer.299 And the same argument applies to the others.

304b11-22 There is a mistake which is common to everyone

[who hypothesises that there is one element: they make there
be only one natural motion, which is the same for all things. For
we see that every natural body has a starting point of motion,
 104 Translation
so if all bodies are some one thing, all will have one motion. And
a body must have this in such a way that it moves more to the
extent that it becomes greater, just as fire moves faster with its
own motion up the greater it becomes. But it turns out that
many things move down faster <the greater they become>.
(304b19) Consequently, for these reasons, and in addition
since it was determined previously that there is more than one
natural motion, it is clear that it is impossible that there be one
element. But since there are neither infinitely many nor one,]
15 it is necessary that there be more than one and finitely many.
He has spoken previously against those who say that one of the
intermediates, water or air or what is between them, is the element
and then against those who say that fire is the element. Now he
adduces an absurdity which is common to everyone who says there
is one element: they make the natural motion of everything to be one
20 and the same, since they will all move with the motion which is
proper to the element from which they are constructed. So since we
see that every natural body has a starting point of motion, if all
bodies are some one thing, insofar as they are composed of one thing
from which they also get their starting point of motion, all bodies will
have a motion which is one in kind. And the difference between them
is in terms of more and less, and it is a consequence of <the body
25 being> greater or smaller, just as fire moves faster with its own
motion up the greater it becomes. And if fire were the only element
everything would naturally move up, some things faster and some
slower. But in fact some things also move down. And that these
things are not unnatural is made clear by the fact that in their case
(as in the case of fire) the greater moves down faster, but if they were
30 moving by constraint the greater would move slower, not faster.
(304b19) Then in conclusion he says that because of everything
which has been said against those who say that there is one element,
626,1 whether it is an intermediate or fire, and because of all that has been
said as a common objection to those who say that there is one
element, and (he says) since it was determined previously that there
is more than one natural motion, } it is impossible that there be one
element. This argument based on the simple motions would give a
common proof that there are elements and that they are neither
5 infinitely many nor one. For, because there are simple motions and
they are neither one nor infinitely many, but are more than one but
finitely many, since the simple motions belong to the simple bodies
and there are as many simple bodies as there are simple motions and
simple bodies are elements, it is clear that on the basis of the motions
it is true to say that it is impossible that there be one element, just
10 as it is impossible to say there are infinitely many (he also did away
with this <possibility> with the argument about motions and many
 Translation 105
others). So, he says, since it is absolutely necessary that the elements
be neither infinitely many nor one, there must be more than one and
finitely many.

<Chapter 6>
304b23-305a1 We should investigate first whether <the ele-
ments> are eternal [or whether they come to be and perish; for
if this is proved, both how many they are and what they are like
will be evident.
(304b25) It is impossible that they are eternal; for we see fire
and water and each of the simple bodies being dissolved. But it
is necessary that dissolution either be infinite or come to a stop.
If it is infinite the time of dissolution (and, again, the time of
composition) will also be infinite, since each of the parts is
dissolved or composed in a different time. The result will be that
there is one infinite time outside of another when the time of
composition is infinite and still prior to it the time of dissolution
is also infinite. The result is that there is an infinite outside of
an infinite,] which is impossible. 15
After proving that it is not possible for the elements to be infinitely
many or one and inferring from this that it is necessary that for them
to be more than one and finitely many, the next thing would be to ask
how many and what are they like. However, he says that first one
should enquire whether they are eternal or whether they come to be
and perish; for if this is proved both how many they are and what 20
they are like will be evident.
(304b25) He next proves that they are not eternal in the following
way. He takes it to be clear that all the sublunary bodies which we
acknowledge, the composite and the simple ones (he found the simple
ones on the basis of the simple motions300), are seen being dissolved
and perishing, the composite bodies more than the simple ones; and
he sets out the ways in which it would be possible for the simple
bodies to be dissolved and also be eternal, so that by refuting these 25
ways he will obtain the result that the simple bodies are not eternal.
It is reasonable that he singles out the simpler of the acknowledged
bodies and argues with respect to them since the elements ought to
be found among them, unless by doing this he would seem to be
begging the question since he has not yet proved how many elements
(that is to say, simple bodies) there are and what they are.301 He says
that if the simple bodies are seen being dissolved and there is going 30
to be something among them which is eternal (as it is appropriate for
an element to be), it is necessary either that the dissolution proceed 627,1
to infinity so that dissolution is never complete or that dissolution
come to a stop and cease when the whole is not yet dissolved; for in
 106 Translation
either of these ways it is possible that some part endure eternally
even if the whole does not. So, if it is not possible either for these
things to be dissolved to infinity or for the dissolution to come to an
5 end with something indissolvable, it is clear that these things will
not be eternal.
And he proves that the dissolution of them does not go on to
infinity by first assuming that they are dissolved in a time, that they
are dissolved and composed in different times (for they are also seen
being composed, and it is not possible for the same thing to undergo
both in the same respect <at the same time>), and that the time of
10 composition is as great or even greater than the time of dissolution,
since composition is always more difficult than dissolution. When
these things are assumed, the result will be that there is one infinite
time outside of another, which is impossible, since it is not possible
for there to be something finite outside an infinite, and certainly not
something infinite. (He says each of the parts because these four
15 elements are parts of the universe.302)
Alexander raises the difficulty why the time of composition will be
different, since it is possible that there be a dissolution of one thing
and a composition of another at the same time, e.g. a dissolution of
air and a coming to be of fire. For although it is impossible for the
same thing to be dissolved and composed simultaneously in the same
respect, nothing prevents it being dissolved in one respect and com-
20 posed in another. And he resolves the difficulty as follows:

Even if each of them is dissolved into some things and comes to

be from some things, the dissolution of each of them to infinity
would in turn be the composition of something else to infinity
with the very same things into which there was dissolution
being again united and composed. So if the dissolution of fire
proceeds to infinity, and at the time when the fire is dissolved
it doesnt come to be and it isnt composed, it would be composed
25 and come to be at another time and not that in which it is
dissolved. But this time is <assumed to be> infinite. Therefore
the time in which fire is composed is outside an infinite time.
And since it does not come to be in a shorter time than it
perishes, but the time of perishing is infinite, the time of its
composition will also be infinite. And if someone were to say
that in the same infinity of time some of the fire comes to be and
30 some perishes and what has come to be in turn perishes and
other things come to be (and this is the truth), such a hypothesis
does not keep any fire eternal.

628,1 305a1-14 But if the dissolution were to stop at some point,

[either the body with which it stopped would be indivisible or it
 Translation 107
would be divisible but would never in fact be divided Empedo-
cles seems to mean to say something like this.
(305a4) It cannot be indivisible because of the things we said
previously.
(305a5) But neither can it be divisible but never dissolved.
For a lesser body is destroyed more easily than a greater. So if
what is great is destroyed in this destruction in such a way that
it is dissolved into lesser things, it is reasonable that what is
less be even more subject to this. But we see that fire perishes
in two ways: when it is extinguished and destroyed by its
contrary and when it wastes away by itself. What is less under-
goes this by the action of the greater and does so faster to the
degree that it is less.
(305a13) Consequently it is necessary that] the elements of
bodies perish and come to be.
Having done away with one way in which the elements could be
eternal depending on the idea of dissolution to infinity, he has turned
to the other in which it is hypothesised that dissolution stops at some
point. And he proves that it is impossible that it stop at something 5
which is such as to be no further dissoluble. For if it stops, it either
stops with something which is indivisible or with something which is
divisible but will not be divided (that is, destroyed), as Empedocles
says. For he says that the elements are divisible, and, unlike De-
mocritus and his followers, he does not hypothesise that the princi-
ples are indivisible; but he does suppose that the four elements do not 10
change into one another and do not perish because he does not allow
for a common matter, but says that their coming to be from one
another, which we see, occurs because of separation out, since every-
thing, being an actuality, inheres in everything.303
(305a4) But it is impossible that the division of bodies stop with
what is indivisible, as Democritus said. For it has been proved that
bodies cannot be composed of indivisibles, since if they were nothing 15
would be continuous, and there would be no division, no awareness,
and no blending. And it has also been proved that there is no
indivisible body.304
(305a5) But neither can that with which dissolution stops be
divisible but never divided, since we see in the case of all bodies that the
lesser is destroyed more easily than the greater, if it is of the same kind
and nature. So, if the greater is destroyed by being dissolved, as fire and 20
air and each of the others are seen to be, it is much more reasonable that
the lesser will be destroyed, since it is more easily affected. Conse-
quently dissolution will not stop with something divisible.
He shows that what is less is destroyed more easily with the
example of fire. There are two ways in which fire perishes: when it
is extinguished by its contrary and when it wastes away by itself; 25
 108 Translation
and in both cases what is less is more easily affected and is destroyed
more easily. And this would be what is made clear by the fact that
there are two ways in which fire perishes: fire does perish, and a
lesser amount is always destroyed more easily than a greater one.
(305a13) One should understand what he says about fire as also
applying to the other <simple bodies>. So if their dissolution does not
30 proceed to infinity and it does not come to an end at some point with
things that will not be further dissolved, it remains that the ele-
629,1 ments of bodies perish and come to be. By choosing these four bodies,
he is not begging the question, as a person might suspect; rather,
having singled out the simple bodies which were found on the basis
of the simple motions, he is enquiring whether these or some one
among them is eternal. For where else than in things which are
5 generally acknowledged would there be <something eternal>?

305a14-22 Since <the elements> come to be [they will come to

be either from what is incorporeal or from a body, and if from a
body either from a different body or from one another.
(305a16) Now the doctrine which generates them from what
is incorporeal produces a separate void, since everything which
comes to be305 that in which it comes to be will be either
incorporeal or it will have a body. And if it has a body there will
be two bodies in the same <place> at the same time, the body
which comes to be and the previously existing body. But if it is
incorporeal it is necessary that there be a marked off void,] but
it has been proved previously that this is impossible.
He has proved that the elements come to be and perish. He next uses
a precise division to enquire whether they come to be from what is
incorporeal or from a body, and, having proved that it is impossible
for them to come to be from what is incorporeal he obtains the result
10 that they come to be from a body; but if from a body either from a
different body or from one another. For it is necessary that either
they come to be from themselves or they do not come to be from
themselves; however, what comes to be comes to be by the activity of
something else, not by its own activity, so that it does not exist before
its own coming to be.306 If, then, they do not come to be from them-
selves, either they come to be from each other or they come to be but
not from each other, which is the same as saying they come to be from
15 other things. So having proved in turn that it is impossible for them
to come to be from another body,307 he has the remaining alternative,
that the elements come to be from one another; for, since the division
is into contradictories, when the other alternatives are eliminated
the remaining one is necessarily left over.
(305a16) He proves first that it is impossible for <the elements> to
come to be from what is incorporeal because the doctrine which
 Translation 109
generates them from what is incorporeal produces a separate void,
which has been proved impossible. He proves that this is so on the
basis of the fact that every body which comes to be comes to be in 20
some place.308 For it is necessary that every body, especially one
which comes to be and is sublunary,309 be in a place. Therefore,
elements which come to be from what is incorporeal, since they are
bodies, will also be in some place. In that place in which the things
which come to be come to be and which, coming to be, they occupy,
either some body existed previously and occupied it or there was no
body in it. But if there was some body occupying the place previously, 25
there would be two bodies in the same place, the previously existing
one and the one which has come to be, both contained in the same
circumscribed place; and in this way there will be a body in a body
and one body containing another, which he also proved impossible in
the Physics (for the absurdity that the largest thing is contained in 30
the least, the sea in a cup, follows).310
This is the meaning of what is said. But the text which says since 630,1
everything which comes to be that in which it comes to be will be
either incorporeal or it will have a body is really unclear and, as
Alexander also thinks, seems to be mistaken, a part of it being having
been left out and the full text being since everything which comes to
be comes to be in something, and that in which it comes to be will be
either incorporeal or it will have a body, which means that every- 5
thing which comes to be will be in a place and this place in which
there is coming to be, that is, in which there is something which
comes to be, will either contain some other body or it wont. (He calls
a place with no body incorporeal.) If someone were to say that what
existed previously departed from the body which comes to be, there
will be an empty place into which <what existed previously> goes.
For it cannot go into the place of that from which <what comes to be> 10
comes to be, since <what comes to be> is assumed to come to be from
what is incorporeal.311 This is the result if the place in which what
comes to be will be contained some body before the one which comes
to be. But if it contained no body there will be some marked off void
which receives the body which comes to be from what is incorporeal,
but it has been proved in the fourth book of the Physics that it is
impossible that there be a void.312 15

305a22-32 However, it is not possible for the elements to come

to be from some body313 either, [since <if they did> it would
follow that there is another body prior to the elements. But if
this body has weight or lightness, it will be one of the elements,
and if it has no impulsion, it will not be able to move and will be
a mathematical body, and, being this way, it will not be in a
place; for a thing which rests in a place can also move in it. And
 110 Translation
if it is moved by constraint it moves unnaturally, and if it is not
moved by constraint it moves naturally. So if this body is in a
place and somewhere, it will be one of the elements; and if it is
not in a place, nothing will come from it since what comes to be
and what it comes to be from must be together.
(305a31) Since it is not possible for the elements to come to
be either from what is incorporeal or from another body,] it
remains that they come to be from one another.
Having proved that it is impossible for bodies to come to be from what
is incorporeal, he turns to proving that they cannot come to be from
some other body either the words some body mean some other
20 body. Once this is proved, <the alternative> that the elements come
to be from one another remains.
Proposing to prove that they do not come to be from some other
body, he produces a brief syllogism for this by saying, since <if they
did> it would follow that there is another body prior to the elements.
This is clearly absurd because the elements should be prior to other
things, and because it is necessary to proceed to infinity if elements
25 also come to be <from something else>, and because <what they come
to be from> would be the elements rather than the things which we
hypothesise. Having indicated these things which are evident and
more general, he next also raises objections to the doctrine from the
point of view of the study of nature. If this body from which someone
says that the elements <come to be> has weight or lightness, it would
be one of the hypothesised elements: if it had weight, it would be one
30 of those which move toward the centre, and if it had lightness, it
would be one of those which move toward the periphery. And if it had
631,1 no impulsion, it would not be able to move and would be a mathemati-
cal body. For how would it move if it had neither weight nor
lightness? And if it didnt move either as a whole or in its parts, it
would be mathematical, since natural body is distinguished from
mathematical body most of all by the fact that <a natural body> has
a starting point of motion in itself. And therefore, being this way and
5 having no impulsion or starting point of motion it is nothing but
mathematical and not in place. This itself is absurd in itself that
there is a natural body which is not in a place , but Aristotle also
recognises another absurdity if it is not in place:314 nothing comes to
10 be from it. For what comes to be must be in the place in which the
substratum from which it comes to be is, since what comes to be takes
on the place of the thing from which it comes to be, so that nothing
can come to be from what is not in a place.
He proves by impossibility that if <the body in question> did not
have impulsion, it would not be in a place. For if it were in a place,
15 not moving and being at rest, it could move in (that is, to)315 this
place, since a thing is naturally constituted so as to move to the place
 Translation 111
in which it rests. And if it rests in a place by constraint, it also moves
to it by constraint and unnaturally, but everything which moves by
constraint also has a natural motion, since in all things what is
unnatural is posterior to the natural. And if it rests in a place
naturally, it can also move to the place naturally. So, if it is com- 20
pletely unmoving, it will neither rest in a place nor be in a place at
all; nor will anything come to be from it. But if it is in a place, it will
also change place,316 and it will have weight or lightness and be one
of the four elements. Alexander says, If it is not in a place, it can be
added that there is a void in which what comes to be will be, since
there is the same consequence as for those who generate body from 25
what is incorporeal.317
(305a31) Having proved these things, Aristotle reasonably con-
cludes that the elements come to be from each other, since, as has
been demonstrated, they cannot come to be either from what is
incorporeal or from another body.

<Chapter 7>
305a33-b10 Again we should investigate the way in which they
come to be from each other, [whether in the way in which
Empedocles and Democritus say they do or in the way those who
dissolve <the elements> into planes say they do, or whether
there is some other way beside these.
(305b1) Empedocles and Democritus and their followers are
not aware that they do not make <the elements> come to be
from one another really, but only in appearance. For they say
that each thing is inherent and separated out, as if coming to be
were from a reservoir, but not from some matter; nor do they
say that coming to be occurs when there is change.
(305b5) And then, even if this were how things are, the
consequences would be no less unreasonable since the same
magnitude is not thought to become heavier when it is pressed
together, but it is necessary for those who assert that water is
separated out from air in which it inheres to say this,] since 30
when water comes to be from air it is heavier.
He has proved that the remaining <possibility> is that the elements
come to be from each other, since he has proved that they come to be 632,1
and come to be neither from what is incorporeal nor from another
body. He next enquires about the way in which they come to be from
each other. And there are different views on this subject: Empedocles
says that the elements are eternal and explains coming to be by their
mixture and separation; Anaxagoras318 says that everything is in 5
everything and posits that coming to be is separation out; and
Democritus (and also those who speak about planes) make the com-
 112 Translation
ing to be of the elements from each other occur by the blending and
separation of atoms (or of planes). He first deals with Empedocles
and Democritus and Anaxagoras and their followers <together>
because he recognises that it is common to their views that each
10 posits elements which are eternal and thinks that they come to be
when they are separated from the other things. For Empedocles of
Acragas seems to say that when water comes to be from air or air
from water they previously inhere actually in a blend and then are
separated out. And Anaxagoras calls not just the four <simple bod-
ies> but also all other things (the homoiomereities) elements, and
says that everything is in everything but all things are characterised
15 by the dominant thing in them; and so, when several <bits of> fire
which have been separated out combine, it is thought that fire
comes to be. And Democritus says that his elements, that is, the
atoms, come to be from one another in the sense of being separated
from a mixture, since when water is dissolved the atoms are
separated and combine into air, one kind of atom being woven
together with another.319
(305b1) Aristotle says that these people do not make the elements
20 come to be from one another really, but only in appearance because
they say that each of their elements inheres in actuality and is
separated out as if coming to be were from a reservoir, but not from
some matter, and did not occur because of change. The difference
here is that what comes to be from a reservoir exists actually <in the
reservoir> and is separated out, but what comes to be from matter
changes from being potentially into being actually.
25 (305b5) He says that even if it were granted to these people that
separation out is coming to be (even though this is an intrinsic
absurdity) even if this were how things are , nothing less absurd
would follow for them. He assumes as clearly true that the same
magnitude does not become heavier when it is pressed together; for
a cloak, when folded, is not heavier than itself when unfolded, nor is
wool, when compressed, heavier than itself when carded. But saying
30 this follows for those who make things come to be by separation out;
for if water comes to be by separation out from air, nothing else
happens to it than a sort of compression and condensation, since
there was equally water in the air but it was diffused. However, the
water which is separated out would be heavier than it was when it
633,1 was in the air. Therefore, according to these people the same body
becomes heavier when it is compressed. However, taken by itself, no
body which has weight is lighter with air than apart from air, if its
weight is judged in air rather than in water; for the mixture of air
contributes to the lightness of heavy things which are in water
5 because air rises to the top of water, but it does not rise when it is in
air, because air does not have lightness when it is in air. And
Aristotle too says this when he says since the same magnitude is not
 Translation 113
thought to become heavier when it is pressed together; for the term
pressed together indicates being deprived of the air which lies in
between.

305b10-20 Furthermore it is not necessary that if bodies which 10

are mixed together [are separated one of them always occupies
more space. But when air comes to be from water, it does take
up more space since what has finer parts comes to be in a
greater space. And this is certainly evident in change since,
when what is moist is evaporated and vaporised, vessels con-
taining the masses burst because they do not have enough
room.
(305b16) Consequently, if there is no void at all and bodies
dont expand (in the way those who say these things assert), the
impossibility is evident. But if there is a void and bodies do
expand] it is unreasonable that what is separated must always
take up more space.
He adduces a second absurdity for these people. To start he assumes,
again as clearly true, that it is not necessary that if from bodies which
are mixed together one of them is separated it occupies more space.
But when320 air comes to be from water it does take up more space
(not just more space than it occupied when it was in the water but
also more than it occupied together with the water, since when what 15
has finer parts is rarefied it occupies more space than what has
thicker parts). And, if when air comes to be air without previously
being such, it is reasonable that when it comes to be air it occupies
more space, but if the air was such and existed before, it is not
reasonable that it would occupy more space after being separated
out.321 Having given credence on the basis of argument that air which 20
comes to be from water occupies more space because it has finer
parts, he also adds clarity on the basis of perception: in a change in
which sweet wine is resolved into vapour, that is, vaporised, the
containing vessels often burst because they do not have enough
room. (He says it is not necessary that if bodies which are mixed are 25
separated one of them always occupies more space because of what
he will say next.322 For even if there were a void so that bodies could
expand out somewhat, nevertheless this would not always or neces-
sarily happen, as it does in the case of air.)
(305b16) Having previously323 argued in this way on the basis of
water that it will be heavier when it is separated out and then on the 30
basis of air that it occupies more space <when it comes to be from
water>, he now produces a third argument based on space, saying
that if (as he has proved324) there is no void at all into which bodies 634,1
can expand, the impossibility is prima facie clear in itself. For in what
way or how can a body always remain the same and also take up more
 114 Translation
space if there is not any empty space which contains no body into
which a body with finer parts can spread? But if (as Democritus and
5 his followers say) there is a void into which bodies expand, insofar as
the space is concerned bodies could spread out into it, but it is
unreasonable that the other body (such as air) must always take up
more space when it is separated from the mixture.
Alexander initially interprets the passage in this way as directed at
a separate void (since this would be a space into which bodies expand),
10 but without notice he turns to the interspersed void325 and says:

It is unreasonable to make the intervention of the void the

explanation of spreading out. For by what necessity or power
could this intervening void separate and divide bodies since it
is incorporeal and suited to giving way, not to acting? Further-
more, why wouldnt everything separated out spread and
15 occupy more space if the intervening void is the explanation of
this? But when water is separated out from air it does not
spread, it contracts, whereas when air is separated out from
water it always spreads.

But perhaps Aristotle is speaking about the interspersed void in the

whole argument, since, according to Democritus and his followers,
this is the explanation of the expansion of bodies; for the separate
20 void is not the explanation of expansion, but it supplies the room for
expanding things. And this is the reason why Aristotle says if there
is no void at all (that is, no separate void and no interspersed void),
bodies would not expand, as Democritus and his followers say they
do because of the intervention of the void; rather they would keep
their own nature even when they were mixed together <with other
things>, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras declared (these are the
25 people who say these things).326 Aristotle says that the impossibility
is evident because even when air was separated it would be necessary
that air remain the same and occupy an equal space and not take up
a greater one, as it is now seen to do. But, he says, if there is an
interspersed void and expansion in the way Democritus wishes, it is
unreasonable that the atoms not have been divided by the void when
30 they were mixed together, but undergo this when they are separated,
so that what is separated occupies more space. And if this is what he
is saying, what he says first would be referring to Anaxagoras and
Empedocles, who said there is no void, and what he says sub-
sequently refers to Democritus and his followers, a person who
accepts that there is a void interwoven <among the atoms>.327

635,1 305b20-8 It is also necessary that coming to be from each other

give out [since infinitely many finite things do not inhere in a
 Translation 115
finite magnitude. For when water comes to be from earth, some
of the earth has been extracted, if coming to be is by separation
out. And again the same thing happens when water comes to be
from the remaining earth. So if this always happens, it will turn
out that infinitely many things inhere in a finite magnitude.
But since this is impossible, things will not always come to be
from each other.] We have, then, said that change into one
another is not by separation out.
With this argument he does away with the <view> that coming to be
is because of separation out, with all things inhering in all things in 5
actuality, as Anaxagoras said. Aristotle also used this argument
against Anaxagoras in the first book of the Physics;328 there he was
enquiring about the principles of bodies, but here he is enquiring
about the way in which they come to be from each other. And so he
says that if coming to be is due to separation out and this because all
things exist in all things, it is necessary that coming to be from each
other give out, which is not what those who make this hypothesis 10
intend. And this is proved by first assuming that infinitely many
finite things do not inhere in a finite magnitude. He is careful to say
infinitely many finite things since even if bodies are divisible to
infinity, to infinity is one thing and actually infinite is another; and
things which are divisible to infinity are continuous, but the things 15
Anaxagoras is talking about are bounded, since they do not unite
with one another because they are of different kinds. So if things
which are finite in magnitude are infinite in number, when they are
added together they produce something infinite in magnitude, but
the <original> whole, which is not infinite in magnitude but finite,
would not consist of infinitely many bounded things, that is, things
which are actually circumscribed.329
This being posited, if the330 coming to be of water were by separa- 20
tion out from earth, then when water came to be from earth and
likewise again came to be from the remaining earth, if this happened
always, it would turn out that infinitely many finite things inhere in
a finite thing, since this division to infinity is not of something
continuous but is a separation out of things which are actually
distinct. So if it is impossible that infinitely many finite things inhere
in something finite, it is impossible that water always come to be 25
from that earth, if coming to be is by separation out; therefore, the
coming to be of water from the earth will give out. So if these people
want it to be the case that water always comes to be from earth (and
the other elements are seen to come to be from each of the elements),
the coming to be of the elements from each other would not be by
separation.
This page intentionally left blank
 Appendix
The argument of Cael. 3.5
In 3.5 Aristotle argues against the view that there is only one element. At
the end of the chapter (304b11-21) he offers a clear argument for this
conclusion: if there were only one element there would be only one natural
motion, but there is more than one such motion. However, what precedes
that argument is notoriously unclear. Here I want to try to provide an
outline of the chapter, indicating some of Simplicius interpretive stances.
Aristotles general strategy is clear. He considers only (I) those who make
the element something intermediate between earth and fire and (II) those
who make it fire. He does not consider earth presumably because, as he
says in the Metaphysics (1.8, 989a5-6), no one thought earth was the only
element because earth has large parts. Aristotle first (303b13-304a7)
argues against (I) that such people ought to make fire the element and
then (304a7-b11) against (II).

I. 303b13-304a7. Against those who make the element something interme-

diate between earth and fire.
A. 303b13-22. Aristotle assigns to these people the view that non-elements
come from elements by condensation (puknsis) or composition (sunthesis)
and elements come to be from non-elements by rarefaction (mansis) or
dissolution (dialusis; Simplicius also introduces the term resolution (analu-
sis)). But what is produced by rarefaction or dissolution is fine (leptos), so the
one element ought to be what is finest, for Aristotle fire. Aristotle will take
up the view that fire is the element at 304a7 but he first adds another
argument against those who use rarefaction and condensation:
B. 303b22-304a7. This kind of view really makes the difference among
things a matter of size since what is rare or fine has small parts and what is
dense has large parts. Aristotle claims that this makes what something is
relative. He goes on to extend this objection to those who say there are several
elements, but also say they differ by largeness and smallness. Simplicius first
(617,22-5) suggests on rather weak grounds that Aristotle is thinking of the
atomists, but he then admits that Alexander might be right to deny that the
atomists are Aristotles opponent; it seems clear that neither Alexander nor
Simplicius is in a position to name an alternative. At the end of his lengthy
discussion of this passage (619,9-31), Simplicius rejects Aristotles argument.
As he puts it, Even if water and air are relative insofar as they are greater
and less, they are not relative insofar as they are water and air.
118 Appendix: The argument of Cael. 3.5
At 304a7 Aristotle says that those who make fire the only element
escape this. Simplicius reasonably enough assumes that this is making
what something is relative, but Aristotle may simply mean that they
escape the argument of 303b13-22, as they obviously do. For it is not clear
why if someone were to say that other things come to be by condensation
and rarefaction from fire and from each other he wouldnt face the same
difficulty, and indeed, at 304b6 Aristotle apparently refers to people who
make fire the element and assign it no particular shape as distinguishing
things by size, and he argues that they are committed to the relativity to
which he has already objected.

II. 304a7-b11. Against those who make the element fire.

A. 304a7-21. Description of the position.
1. 304a7-18. Those who assign a figure, e.g. the pyramid, to fire.
(Simplicius (621,6-11) is perplexed about what monist might have as-
signed the pyramid to fire.)
a. Those who argue simply.
b. Those who argue more elaborately.
2. 304a18-21. Those who assign no particular figure to fire, but make
other things result from fire when it is compounded or condensed in the
way in which shavings are fused together. (Simplicius makes no sugges-
tion as to whom this might be.)
B. 304a21-b6. The arguments.
1. 304a22-b1. If the element fire is indivisible.
a. 304a21-4. Invocation of previous arguments against indivisibles.
b. 304a24-b1. This is a very obscure argument which speaks about the
elements of water, air, and fire (apparently indivisible particles of them),
and assumes that the sizes of the great masses of water, air, and fire are
proportional to the sizes of their particles, so that the element of fire will
be larger than that of air and hence (at least theoretically) divisible. (At
622,24-623,3 Simplicius raises an objection to the argument and offers a
weak response. He goes on to describe Alexanders curious suggestion that
on the view being considered the elements of, e.g., fire are small fires.)
2. 304b2-11. If the element of fire is divisible, then:
a. 304b2-6. If a figure is assigned to fire (A.1) a part of fire will not be fire,
and a part of fire will be neither an element nor a composite of elements.
b. 304b6-11. If a figure is not assigned to fire (A.2), it being assumed
that these people distinguish elements by size, then:
i. 304b6-9. there is a contradiction if all bodies are infinitely divisible
and an element is taken to be something with smallest parts (because
there is no such thing as smallest parts);
ii. 304b9-11. for the reasons stated at 303b22-304a7 (I.B), what some-
thing is will be relative.
 Textual Questions
(a) Departures from Heibergs text
Listed here are places where I have translated a text different from the
one printed by Heiberg. In many cases notes on the lines in the translation
provide more information.

556,26 Replace the question mark with a full stop.

557,16 After gar insert apeiron with DK.
559,3 (Melissus) For homou rhen read homouren, a suggestion of Bergk
(1843).
559,16 (Parmenides) For to read ts with DK.
559,19 After hexs insert kai, a suggestion of Heiberg.
559,21 For arxasthai read arxamenos, a suggestion of Stein (1864-7).
559,27 For paradedkasi read paradidsi with D, E, and Karsten.
563,5-6 For eis proteron read ek protern with D, E, and F.
568,13 After ara insert ouk, a suggestion of Heiberg.
571,14 For kai read kan with Karsten.
572,4 For auti read auto with D and E.
573,10 For hautou read autn, the accepted text of Plato.
576,26 For hautou read autn, the accepted text of Plato.
579,5 Omit kai hmeis with F and Karsten.
594,18 For diirmenon read euthuporoumenon with Karsten.
599,1 Bracket men ti with C.
599,14 For to read tode with Karsten.
599,20 For hs read en with D, E, and Karsten.
605,17 Bracket .
605,20 Replace the question mark with a full stop.
607,19 Place the accent on the second syllable of posoi rather than the first.
610,24 For autn read hn, a suggestion of Heiberg.
613,10 For elegon read elegen, a suggestion of Heiberg.
616,15 Replace the raised dot with a comma.
618,18 Insert a raised dot after periekhetai, a typographers omission.
631,22 Bracket ton with D, E, and Karsten.
632,19 For toisde read toiaisde with D.
633,14 For ei oun, hotan read hotan d with Karsten.
635,20 For onts read h with D and Bessarion.
120 Textual Questions

(b) Simplicius citations of Cael. 3.1-7, 305b28

Here I bring together places where Simplicius apparently read a text
different from that printed by Moraux. In general Heibergs text repro-
duces A. I have paid no attention to the numerous differences regarding
elision (e.g. de vs. d) or minor variations in spelling (e.g. hauton vs.
heauton or teleiotaton vs. teletaton).

Moraux Heiberg
298a27 epei de 553,6 epeid (citation)
298b5 ta poia 554,12 poia (citation)
298b5 phusei 554,13 ta phusei (citation)
300b25 diataxin 585,18 diastasin (paraphrase)
301a24 de 592,4 gar (citation)
302a17 gar 601,6 de (citation)
303a19 skhmatn 611,23 smatn (paraphrase)

(c) Simplicius citations of other texts

Here I bring together places where the text of a citation by Simplicius of a
passage from a text other than Cael. 3.1-7, 305b28 as printed by Heiberg
differs from the text of a standard edition of the work. In general Heibergs
text reproduces A. I have paid no attention to the numerous differences
regarding elision (e.g. de vs. d) or minor variations in spelling (e.g. hauton
vs. heauton or teleiotaton vs. teletaton).

Anaxagoras
Sider Heiberg
B1.2 smikrotta 608,22 mikrotta
B4b.8 ti sumpanti 608,24 sumpanti
B12.16 kai diakrinomena 608,30 omit
B4a.4 khroias kai hdonas 609,8 hdonas kai khroias
B4a.4 ge 609,8 omit
B4a.6 sunmmenas 609,9 sunikmenas
B4a.7 te autoisin 609,10 omit

Aristotle, De Caelo
Moraux Heiberg
268a1 phainetai 554,20 tunkhanei

Empedocles
DK31 Heiberg
B27.4 perigei 591,5 perigthei

Melissus
DK30 Heiberg
B6.3 apeiron ei 557,16 ei
 Textual Questions 121
B8.20-1 homoiren 559,3 homou rhen

Parmenides
DK28 Heiberg
B8.4 esti gar oulomeles 557,18 oulon mounogenes
B8.4 ateleston 557,18 agenton
B8.21 ts 559,16 to (not as part of fragment)
B8.50 pau 558,5 paus

Plato, Timaeus
Rivaud Heiberg
54D4 tautn 566,10 tn
54D5 hupotithemetha 566,11 hupotithmetha
54E2-3 atta dialuomena 566,14 auta dialuomena atta
56B1 ex oligistn 573,10 ex olign
576,26 ex olign
56B2 autn 573,10 hautou
576,26 hautou

[Timaeus of Locri], On the Nature of the World and the Soul

Marg (1972) Heiberg
215,15 ha gennasis 564,6 apogennasis

(d) Lemmas
Here I bring together places where the text in a lemma printed by Heiberg
differs from Morauxs text of Aristotle. In general Heibergs text reproduces
A. I have paid no attention to the numerous differences regarding elision (e.g.
de vs. d) or minor variations in spelling (e.g. hauton vs. heauton or teleiotaton
vs. teletaton). I should perhaps note that the lemmas in Heiberg generally
give only the first and last few words of a passage, and so represent less than
10 per cent of the text of De Caelo.

Moraux Heiberg
298b24 ekeithen 556,2 ekei
300b25 diataxin 583,16 diastasin
301a11 kaitoi ouden 589,5 ouden gar
302a27 prostherteon 601,21 therteon
302b5 pantos 604,1 omit
This page intentionally left blank
 Notes
1. In 1.2.
2. In 2.13 and 14.
3. Simplicius compares the beginning of this chapter, 298a24-b8 with the
beginning of the whole work, 268a1-6; see also his commentary on that passage at
6,30-8,8.
4. cf. 2.12, 292a20-1.
5. cf. 2.1, 284a14.
6. Alexanders claim can be represented in English by saying that the they and
their in what they are composed of and what their nature is like refer to the stars
and indicate that they are like the spheres, but that they in they do not come to
be and are imperishable applies to everything (that is, either the first heaven or
it and the spheres and the stars). His position is grammatically possible because
of the further and the and also said, but Simplicius claim that the two they and
the their should have the same referent seem more likely.
7. The lemma agrees with our text of Aristotle in having epei de, but at 553,6
Simplicius cites this text with epeid.
8. Moraux prints ta poia esti phusei; in a citation at 554,12 Heiberg prints poia
esti ta phusei with D and E. A has ta poia esti ta phusei, Karsten ta poi esti phusei.
9. At 551,18-22.
10. i.e. modus ponens, the first Stoic unprovable; see, e.g., Kneale and Kneale
(1962), pp. 162-3.
11. 552,31-552,4 are text 112C of Theophrastus: Sources and text 1015 of Hlser
(1987-8). On the distinction see also, e.g., Diogenes Laertius (Marcovich (1999)), 7.71.
12. Simplicius substitutes mer for Aristotles moria.
13. Simplicius quotes the first sentence of Cael. with tunkhanei in place of
phainetai.
14, In 1.2.
15. Heiberg prints ekei with A, although D, E, F, and Karsten have ekeithen,
the reading of our texts of Aristotle.
16. This first paragraph relates to both this and the next lemma.
17. Theogony (West (1966)), line 116.
18. It is not clear why Simplicius reads this distinction into what Aristotle says
here, but see Metaph. 1.5, 986b10-987a2, where Aristotle suggests that Par-
menides was more commendable than Melissus because he made some attempt to
deal with phenomena; see 560,1-4 with the note. The lengthy fragment 8 which he
quotes below shows clearly that Melissus claimed that things are only thought to
come to be.
19. Replacing Heibergs question mark with a full stop, as in DK28A14. If the
question mark is retained, the question (Is it because both Melissus }?) would be
sarcastic.
20. Most of this paragraph is DK28A14. For other indications that Parmenides
poem was called On Nature see Diogenes Laertius (Marcovich (1999)), 8.55) and
Sextus Empiricus (Mutschmann (1914)), Adversus Mathematicos 7.111, and the
two texts of Galen cited in DK30A4, which also mention Melissus, for whom see
124 Notes to pages 31-34
line 10 below with the note. The standard work on the title On Nature is
Schmalzriedt (1970). Schmalzriedt denies that Parmenides would have used such
a title or any title at all, and he is doubtful that Melissus used it.
21. Plato, Parmenides 135B8.
22. Most of this sentence is part of DK30A4, which also includes in Phys.
70,16-17, which says the same thing about the title of Melissus treatise; see also
556,25-30 with the note.
23. DK30B6. The word infinite, not printed by Heiberg, is inserted in DK on
the basis of Simplicius paraphrase at in Phys. 103,28-9; cf. [Aristotle], On Melis-
sus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias 1, 974a11-12.
24. This is a version of DK28B8.4, although the version in DK is substantially
different. For discussion see Tarn (1965), pp. 82, 88-95.
25. That is, Aristotle gives arguments against a text based on a superficial
reading of it, but his purpose is to prevent people from reasoning the way the
superficial reading suggests is proper.
26. DK28B1.28-32, on which see Tarn (1965), pp. 210-16. Simplicius is our only
source for the second sentence.
27. DK28B8.50-2.
28. Here Simplicius has a future will end (paus) rather than the present pau,
which is printed in DK. Simplicius has pau at 146,23 of in Phys.; the manuscripts
are divided at 41,8 of the commentary, where Diels, the editor, prints paus.
29. DK28B19, quoted only here.
30. DK30B8, quoted only here.
31. Translating the homouren, printed by DK, following Bergk (1843), p. 106.
Heiberg prints homou rhen with all the manuscripts and printed texts he cites,
and conjectures <kai> homou rheein.
32. The words in parentheses are probably inserted by Simplicius; cf. Barnes
(1982), p. 622, n. 3.
33. DK28B8.21. I have translated the ts printed by DK, following what Diels
prints at 145,22 of in Phys. Heiberg prints to, Karsten hs (neither as part of the
quotation).
34. In fragment 8, just quoted.
35. The insertion of kai is a suggestion of Heiberg; Karsten prints hes tou (and
so on up to).
36. Reading arxamenos, a suggestion of Stein (1864-7), p. 797, for the arxasthai
printed by Heiberg.
37. DK28B11, only quoted here.
38. Reading paradidsi with D, E, and Karsten rather than the paradedkasi
(they have set out) of A, printed by Heiberg. There is no evidence that Melissus
set out any kind of cosmogony.
39. Simplicius refers in a rather obscure way to Metaph. 1.5, 986b27-987a2,
where Aristotle says: But Parmenides seems somehow to speak with more percep-
tion; for thinking it correct that beside what is what is not is nothing, he
necessarily thought that being is one }, but, being constrained to follow appear-
ance and accepting that what is one according to reason is more than one according
to perception, he next posits that the causes are two and the principles are two,
calling them hot and cold, that is fire and earth; and he ranges the hot with what
is and the other with what is not.
40. That is, Parmenides and Melissus, who, Simplicius has just argued do not
do away with coming to be.
41. Theogony (West (1966)), line 116.
 Notes to pages 35-38 125
42. For Simplicius, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Musaeus all expressed in mythologi-
cal terms Neoplatonist ideas of the unfolding of what is from an ineffable, timeless
first principle.
43. See section 7 of the introduction.
44. The geometrical constructions which are summarised here correspond to
Tim. 53C5-56E8. There are useful diagrams in Vlastos (1975), pp. 74-9. It should
be borne in mind that Aristotle and Simplicius use the words pyramid, octahe-
dron, icosahedron (and dodecahedron) to refer to the regular, so-called Platonic,
solids; they do not use the words generally to mean, e.g., a solid figure bounded by
plane surfaces, of which one (the base) is a polygon of any number of sides, and the
other surfaces triangles having as bases the sides of the polygon, and meeting at
a point (the vertex) outside the plane of the polygon or a three-dimensional figure
having eight plane faces, to quote the relevant definitions of pyramid and
octahedron in the OED.
45. hmitrignon, a term found in TL at 216,2.
46. Simplicius position might be expressed this way. For Aristotle body is
eternal but the simple bodies come to be from each other by qualitative change,
and he treats the Timaeus theory as an alternative physical theory of the change
of the simple bodies into one another. But the Timaeus theory is a metaphysical
account of the principles from which body is constructed. (It is to be borne in mind
that for Simplicius this construction is not the description of a temporal process
but a way of representing an eternal truth about the structure of things; see
especially 305,14-306,25 in his commentary on 1.10.)
47. This sentence, which marks the transition to a discussion of the Timaeus
view of the coming to be of body, is not included in the scope of any lemma. I have
inserted it here.
48. Homer, Iliad (West (2000)) 20.75-6.
49. Aristotle discusses the first and third views in Phys. 1.2-4, but he does not,
as far as I know, discuss the Hesiodic view.
50. cf. 556,15-24 and 560,22-7.
51. Actually, for Simplicius, Aristotle has not yet shown this (see, e.g., 602,18),
but will do so starting in 4.4.
52. Here Simplicius refers to the difference between Aristotles account of
natural motion up and down and Platos account of heaviness and lightness. See,
e.g., 679,18-682,3 in his commentary on 4.1.
53. Simplicius recalls the first, second, and fifth definitions of Euclids Elements
(Heiberg (1883) 4,1-6).
54. Reading the ek protern of D, E, and F rather than the eis proteron of A,
printed by Heiberg; Karsten has ek proterou.
55. Presumably the absurdity of contradicting mathematics.
56. 6.10.
57. Simplicius paraphrases Tim. 53B3-5. For Simplicius what we might call the
geometrical chemistry of the Timaeus is not a case of something like mathematical
physics. It is a purely physical theory which presupposes a doctrine of matter very
similar to (and perhaps identical with) the doctrine of prime matter traditionally
ascribed to Aristotle. The triangles of Platos Timaeus result when this matter is
given a geometrical shape.
58. TL, 215,13-17. Simplicius quotes all but the description of one of the
triangles at 641,11-14 of his commentary on chapter 7; see also in Phys. 7,23-7.
59. Marg (1972) prints ha gennasis, Heiberg apogennasis. The MSS of Sim-
plicius show considerable variation.
126 Notes to pages 38-42
60. See also below 575,27-576,10 with the note on 576,10.
61. Among these was presumably Pericles of Lydia, the dedicatee of Proclus
Platonic Theology (Saffrey and Westerink (1968), 5,6-7); see in Phys. 227,23ff.,
where the view that matter is qualityless body is ascribed to the Stoics among
earlier people and to Pericles among recent ones. It seems to me very unlikely that
the recent Platonic philosophers is a reference to Proclus himself (so Steel (2005),
p. 187, n. 72), since the view described here bypasses Platos geometrical chemistry
and associates the qualities of the simple bodies directly with matter, whereas, as
Steel himself indicates, Proclus is a defender of that chemistry; see Mueller
(forthcoming).
62. The term affective quality (pathtik poiots) is taken from Aristotles
Categories. See 8, 9a28-10a10, and see also Simplicius discussion of this passage
at 252,23-261,16 of his commentary on the Categories (CAG 8) and the note on 9a28
in Ackrill (1963).
63. 564,24-6 are text 238 of Theophrastus: Sources; 24-9 constitute DK68A120
and are part of Luria (Krivushina and Fusaro (2007)), 171. Simplicius more or less
repeats these words at 576,14-16 and 641,5-7; see also in Phys. 35,22-36,7.
64. As Aristotle says it is at Categories 8, 10a11-16.
65. That is, a quality. These defenders of Plato argue that the (Aristotelian)
view that the change from, say, water to air is a qualitative change cannot explain
why the resulting quantity of air is greater than the original quantity of water.
66. cf. Platos description of fire at Tim. 56A4-B2.
67. As Plato is held to have said.
68. Simplicius also makes this suggestion about the character of Platos geomet-
rical chemistry at 641,23-8 in his commentary on chapter 7.
69. Plato, Tim. 54A1-6.
70. Plato, Tim. 53D4-E5.
71. Heiberg prints hupotithmetha, a reading of some MSS of Plato, Rivaud
(and Karsten) hupotithemetha.
72. The Timaeus has tautn. Heiberg prints tn, noting that D, Bessarion, and
Karsten have tautn.
73. Heiberg prints auta dialuomena atta ginesthai, Rivaud and Karsten atta
dialuomena gignesthai.
74. Although this treatise comes down to us among the works of Aristotle, its
ascription to him has been much doubted, as has its ascription to Theophrastus.
It is listed as a work of Theophrastus by Diogenes Laertius (Marcovich (1999))
5.42. Themistius (in Cael. (CAG 5.4), 148,39-149,2) and Philoponus (in GC (CAG
14.2), 34,2-3) also mention the possibility that the treatise is by Theophrastus.
Simplicius treats it as Aristotelian at 423,3-4 of in Phys., and it is included in a list
of Aristotles works in Arabic (see Dring (1957), p. 222).
75. Defined in the OED as the rhetorical device of emphasising or drawing
attention to something by professing to say little or nothing about it, or affecting
to dismiss it }.
76. It would perhaps be better to say that Simplicius examples are not
absurdities for mathematical bodies, but rather truths about them.
77. Omitting the words For example if there is something indivisible (hoion ei
ti estin adiaireton), which are bracketed by Moraux and not mentioned by Sim-
plicius.
78. The lemma is difficult, and Simplicius struggles with it. He considers two
interpretations, the second of which he says he prefers. On the first (567,26-568,7)
the word indivisible here means mathematical, and Aristotle is simply pointing
 Notes to pages 42-46 127
out that the affections of natural bodies, such as colour and weight or lightness do
not belong to mathematical entities. On the second (568,8-23) he is claiming that
natural bodies cannot be composed of indivisibles because indivisibles cannot have
affections (since affections are divisible (accidentally)) and what does not attach to
the components of something does not attach to the thing.
79. Here indivisible is used in the ordinary sense and not to mean mathemati-
cal, and Simplicius first reconstruction is infected by ambiguity.
80. Inserting ara, following a suggestion of Heiberg. Karstens hste is equally
plausible.
81. For Aristotle fire and air have lightness rather than weight (in the sense
that they move from the centre), but for Plato they too are heavy (in the sense that
they too are drawn to be with their like).
82. Aristotle discusses the atomist theory of weight in 4.2, 308b30-309,18. For
an account with references see Taylor (1999), pp. 179-84.
83. cf. 299a6-8 (562,20).
84. Technically the third hypothesis is also needed here.
85. [vii] is the additional assumption, [viii] the conclusion; [iv],[v], and [vi]
together give the conditional; if bodies are composed from planes and a point has
no weight, bodies will not have weight.
86. In the mood Camestres. The syllogism is:
What is heavy is divisible;
a point is not divisible;
therefore, a point is not heavy.
87. This is not a serious difficulty for someone who accepts, as Aristotle does,
the idea of infinity as only potential, not actual.
88. Simplicius paraphrases 469C1-2 of Platos Gorgias.
89. That is, one thing can be heavier than a second and lighter than a third.
90. i.e. the positive form of the adjective. Simplicius point here is that Aristotle
uses perhaps because What is heavier is heavy is true if we use heavier in the
strict sense, applying it only to things which do have weight rather than lightness.
91. This addition is apparently designed to avoid the (harmless) infinite regress
signalled by Simplicius at 569,28-570,2.
92. The basis for this parenthetical remark is unclear, but it is presumably
something said in Platos Timaeus. I suggest tentatively that when Simplicius says
that fire is denser than earth, he is thinking of 58B1-6 where it is said that the
particles of fire are more pressed together than those of the other elements; for the
idea that larger parts produce heaviness see, e.g., 58D8-E2, where it is said that
the kind of water which is composed of large and uniform things is heavy.
93. Camestres.
94. Reading Karstens kan rather than the kai printed by Heiberg; the sense is
not in doubt.
95. The ara inserted after h by Bessarion in K and Karsten or after stigm by
Bessarion in E is plausible.
96. Simplicius is careless about whether the major term is heavy or heavy or
light, but the syllogism he has in mind is again in Camestres and may be
represented as:
What is heavy or light is divisible;
a point is not divisible;
therefore, a point is not heavy or light.
97. I have tried to translate the vulgate text along the lines of Simplicius
interpretation rather than the altered text of Moraux, who explains his decisions
128 Notes to pages 47-52
in Moraux (1961), 25-7. As Moraux himself says, there is no question that Sim-
plicius read (and struggled with) the vulgate text.
98. cf. 569,2-4.
99. I have translated the auto of D and E rather than the auti of A. With the
latter the sense would be And the first argument for him is the following.
100. TL 216,18-19.
101. Simplicius cites 56B1-2, which in Rivauds text runs elaphrotaton ex
oligistn sunestos tn autn mern. Heiberg prints elaphrotaton to ex olign
sunests tn hautou mern, while noting that D and E have oligostn (?) and A, D,
E, and Karsten have autou. I have translated elaphrotaton to ex oligistn sunestos
tn autn mern. See also 576,25-6 with the note.
102. At 299a25-6 (568,26).
103. Simplicius description in this paragraph is based on 54D3-55E6 of Platos
Timaeus. For perspicuous pictures of the five regular solids see the article Platonic
solid on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic_solid).
104. It would be possible to object that when one mathematical plane is laid on
another the result is not a body or two juxtaposed planes, but a single plane.
Aristotle knows this, but he thinks that believers in atomic magnitudes such as
Plato cannot adopt this alternative. For Simplicius the alternative is not available
as a defence of Plato because Simplicius believes that Platos planes have depth;
see, e.g., 563,26-564,10. Simplicius gives his own response to Aristotle in the next
paragraph.
105. Heiberg cites Tim. 53C6-8, where, in introducing the construction of the
regular solids, Timaeus says, Every kind of body has depth, and it is entirely
necessary that the plane nature enclose depth.
106. Simplicius apparently assumes that in Aristotles theory the qualitative
change of one simple body into another might involve intermediate stages at which
neither an element nor a compound of elements would be present. One can imagine
arguments to this effect, but I do not know what exactly Simplicius has in mind.
107. Cube, pyramid, octahedron, icosahedron.
108. Aristotle does not use the term second substratum. Perhaps he is
Alexander; cf. 599,5 with the note.
109. Apparently the symbolical interpretation of the chemistry of the Timaeus
stressed similarities between the four elements and the solids associated with
them. Alexander thinks that the chemistry must be literal and not merely symbolic
since Plato is willing to deny that earth interchanges with the other elements.
Simplicius is willing to invoke the symbolic interpretation as a basis for rejecting
Alexanders objection, but he still insists that explanation of elemental change in
terms of shapes reveals something more fundamental than Aristotles reliance on
qualities in GC.
110. At 564,24-6.
111. cf. 299a6-8 (562,19).
112. Simplicius changes Aristotles word order to make what he means clearer.
113. Simplicius invokes 56B1-2. Cf. 573,10-11 with the note. Here Heiberg
prints eti te elaphrotaton to ex olign sunests tn hautou mern, noting that D, E,
and Karsten have oligistn and that A, D, E, and Karsten have autou. I have
translated eti te elaphrotaton to ex oligistn sunestos tn autn mern, as in the
previous passage.
114. An obscure remark, which has the appearance of a gloss and is omitted in
D and inserted by Bessarion in E. Simplicius ought to be describing the difference
between is not at some time and possibly is not. Perhaps, then, one should insert
 Notes to pages 52-57 129
a pote, so that Simplicius is pointing out that is not at some time has a temporal
qualification which is lacking in possibly is not. Or one might keep the text as it
stands and say that Simplicius is marking a (not really relevant) distinction
between is not now and might not be at some time or other.
115. This parenthetical remark is difficult to construe. I take it that either he
is Plato, and that Simplicius is referring either to Platos so-called unwritten
doctrines in which the one or monad, and not points, is made primary or to
Aristotles lost report of those doctrines. It is, however, possible that, as Moraux
ad 300a9 suggests, Simplicius text said monad rather than point.
116. I take Alexander to be suggesting that the matter of a composite might be
of some size. Simplicius does not accept this doctrine and proceeds to argue that
Aristotle is in no position to espouse it.
117. Phys. 4.9, 217a26-7.
118. Simplicius shares Aristotles view that the universe is sustained eternally
because the perishing of one thing is the generation of another and that this
process is kept going by the eternal motion of the heavens. As a Neoplatonist he
also believes that the process of coming to be involves the action of incorporeal
principles (demiurgic logoi). These factors make it impossible for things to be
resolved into planes (or points), and without them Aristotle himself would have to
admit the absurd view that everything could be resolved into the four elements.
119. At 579,12 Simplicius casts doubt on the existence of such people. Alexander
discusses the same sort of interpretation of the Timaeus in Quaest. 2.13 (Bruns
(1892), p. 58).
120. Reading with F and Karsten only the first of the two kai hmeis printed by
Heiberg.
121. cf. 573,15-28.
122. I have not found a good way to render this lemma and Simplicius comment
on it into English. In the translation the words at some time and some time
render the Greek pote, the word time by itself renders khronos.
123. Simplicius quotes the line which he is here paraphrasing at in Phys. 453,12
and 1102,20. The line is also quoted by Asclepius in his commentary on books 1 to
7 of Aristotles Metaphysics (CAG 6.2) at 38,19 and paraphrased by Proclus in his
commentary on Platos Timaeus (Diehl (1903-6)) at 1,16,32. Lydus (On the Months
(2.11.24 (Wnsch (1898))) cites a very similar line as a saying of Orpheus about
the number six, and in the Orphic Hymn to Kronos (Quandt (1955), 13.1) Kronos
is addressed as father of the blessed gods and of men.
124. Simplicius also quotes these words at 1102,22 of in Phys.; for other
citations see the note on this passage in Hagen (1994), p. 125.
125. cf. 569,2-4
126. i.e. Platos theory.
127. Simplicius refers to Phys. 4.8, 215a1-6.
128. The difficulty does not affect the main argument of the lemma.
129. cf. 1.2.269a9-10.
130. Here Alexander proposes to interpret unnatural (para phusin) as not
natural rather than as contrary to the natural. Simplicius proposes that, in the
case of the simple motions up and down, only the simple motion contrary to a
things natural motion should be considered unnatural for it.
131. The formulation here is too compressed. Simplicius should say he should
take only the contraries of those which it is naturally constituted so as to have.
132. The words or lightness are irrelevant here; a reader has suggested
bracketing them.
130 Notes to pages 58-62
133. Here and at line 7 Simplicius writes tn apeiron adunaton dielthein where
Aristotle has to apeiron dielthein. I have supplied grammn on the basis of 1.5,
272a28-9, where Aristotle says adunaton tn apeiron dielthein } and tn apeiron
is clearly an infinite straight line. At 583,8 and 9 Simplicius writes kineitai <tn
apeiron> and peperasmenn kinthnai, and I have translated move through an
infinite (or finite) straight line. These supplements are not certain and the
translation of the present and aorist tenses in this passage is difficult, but
Simplicius point is clear: something cannot be in the process of doing something
(present tense) if it is not possible for it to ever have done it (aorist).
134. cf. Phys. 6.10, 241b6-7.
135. Although Alexanders reading is grammatically possible, it does not seem
that the question Where would it move is appropriate to the vortex, which is only
supposed to revolve around the earth. However, one cannot be sure that Simplicius
is not reporting just one possibility considered by Alexander. On Simplicius own,
more plausible reading Aristotle proves at most that the earth rests naturally
somewhere, not necessarily at the centre.
136. On the text of this sentence see the note on 585,1.
137. diastasin, which Heiberg prints with A and F. Moraux prints diataxin
(arrangement), which is in D and E and printed by Karsten. The manuscripts of
Aristotle are divided between the two. In his paraphrase at 585,18 (where Karsten
prints diataxin) Simplicius has diastasin.
138. para phusin, which Simplicius associates with is derivative from
(paruphestken).
139. Simplicius refers to chapter 8, 215a8-11.
140. In this paraphrase of 300b21-2 Simplicius substitutes auto for heauto, adopt-
ing a reading of Alexander which he goes on to reject in the next paragraph; see the
note on 585,1. Moraux (1973-2001), vol. 3, p. 234, n. 246 argues that all of 584,9-585,20
with the exception of 584,27-585,1 and 585,5-12 derives from Alexander.
141. And so say something that resembles what is said at 245C5-246A2 of
Platos Phaedrus. The issue addressed in this paragraph is the text of 300b21-2,
for which I have translated Morauxs text, to te gar prton kinoun anank kinein
heauto kinoumenon kata phusin. This is the reading of most manuscripts, and as
Simplicius says, many books. Alexander substituted auto for heauto, giving a text
which might be translated For the first cause of motion, moving naturally, must
cause motion. A number of modern scholars, including Allan (1936), adopt this
text. In this paragraph I have used my two translations to render what Simplicius
describes in terms of the choice between the two pronouns.
142. Here Simplicius expresses his disagreement with Alexanders suggestion
that nature is an unmoved mover. He finishes up his exegesis of the lemma in the
next paragraph.
143. Marg ((1972), pp. 107-8) quite reasonably takes Simplicius to be referring
to TL 206,11-17.
144. See 586,12 with the note.
145. Line 1 of DK31B57, from which Aristotle omits the initial here in the
lemma. For other citations see Wright (1981), p. 115.
146. Simplicius formulation is not perspicuous, but he proceeds to explain his
meaning.
147. The issue raised here is the meaning of Aristotles phrase under Love.
Alexander thinks it means when Love dominates everything, Simplicius (almost
certainly correctly; see OBrien (1969), pp. 172-5) when Love is gaining the
ascendancy. The discussion is not as clear as it might be.
 Notes to pages 62-69 131
148. The rest of DK31B57. These two lines are only preserved here. On
Simplicius accuracy in citing Empedocles see OBrien (1969), pp. 276-86.
149. Line 5 of DK31B35. Simplicius quotes the first fifteen lines of this
fragment at 529,1-15 of the commentary on 2.13.
150. Lines 10-13 of DK31B35.
151. mounomel, a hapax incorporated in DK31B58.
152. DK31B59. This passage is our only source for the full fragment, although
Simplicius quotes the words as all (hapanta for hekasta) of them chanced to meet
at 327,20 and 331,2 of in Phys.
153. cf. Politicus 272E5-6 where the cosmos is spoken of as being turned back
by its fated, innate desire. In this paragraph Simplicius gives the standard
Neoplatonist interpretation of the Timaeus as a cosmogonical myth designed to
reveal eternal truths about the universe.
154. Perhaps the idea is that with infinitely many different causes any one
would be counteracted by another and the sum could produce no cumulative effect.
155. Simplicius thinks that Aristotles argument should be based on the
trichotomy: one cause of motion, infinitely many causes of motion, finitely many
causes of motion. And he wants the third case to be taken up with the words for
if they were finite. But since they is feminine it clearly refers to the motions
(phorai), not the causes of motion (kinounta).
156. Heiberg prints ouden gar with A and F, although D and E have kaitoi
outhen, and Karsten has the reading of our texts of Aristotle, kaitoi ouden, words
which Simplicius cites at 589,21.
157. Aristotles text requires that genesin be understood here. At 590,25 Sim-
plicius supplies diathesin (condition).
158. As, of course, it has not.
159. The condition of total blending under Love.
160. This is line 4 of DK31B27 and line 2 of DK31B28, except that DK print
perigei (encircling) instead of the perigthei (joyous) printed by Heiberg the
manuscripts are quite various here. For other citations and their problems see
Wright (1981), pp. 104-5. In construing the sphere of Empedocles as an intelligible
cosmos, Simplicius Platonises his ideas.
161. I take this to mean that Empedocles took Love as an independent cause
operating in opposition to Strife in cosmic processes, an interpretation much more
congenial to modern scholars than Simplicius Platonising one.
162. At 592,4 Simplicius cites these words with a gar. Aristotle and Karsten (at
592,4) have de.
163. cf. 569,2-10, although the assumption there only concerned weight.
164. At 301b1 at the beginning of the next lemma (593,19).
165. But, in fact, what doesnt have weight would not naturally move down at
all; cf. 593,8-9.
166. This third assumption is used in the argument of the next lemma (593,19).
167. This figure is based on the one printed by Heiberg, which, he says, is
slightly different from the one presented by A, D, and Bessarion. It is perhaps not
perspicuous to the modern reader because the whole line segment beneath B and
F represents what is called B in the text. The same figure can be used with the
proof in the next lemma.
168. Note that the move here is technically illegitimate because it supposes that
it makes sense to talk about the ratio between a weight and a distance. See also
593,14-16.
169. Taking the diorismenon of 301b17 with sma and not with baros, as, e.g.,
132 Notes to pages 70-74
Guthrie and Stocks do. Simplicius and Alexander clearly take diorismenon with
sma Simplicius even quotes the words as anank pan sma dirismenon baros
ekhein kouphotta at 594,14 although they have difficulty explaining what
Aristotle means; see 594,16-595,8.
170. cf. 583,4-5 with the note.
171. Heiberg prints dirismenon to diirmenon (determinate indicates di-
vided). It seems to me that something like Karstens euthuporoumenon, which I
have translated, must be right; cf. 595,24-6.
172. cf. Phys. 4.4, 211a17-b5.
173. The great masses of earth, water, air, and fire remain where they are.
174. Because parts of the heaven never change their position and are never
separated from it.
175. At 595,30 Simplicius explains that Aristotle means to say that all motion
is either natural or constrained.
176. cf. 2.1.192b21-2.
177. Simplicius is apparently referring to 1.3, 269b23-9, as Heiberg indicates,
but Aristotle is much more explicit on this subject later at 4.4, 311a15-29.
178. The discussion in this paragraph concerns the last sentence of the present
lemma and the first sentence of the next. In Morauxs text, which I have trans-
lated, these read:

Hoti men oun hapan kouphon baru, kai ps hai para phusin kinseis
ekhousi en toutois, phaneron. Hoti doute pantn esti genesis outh hapls
outhenos, dlon ek tn proeirmenn.

On the basis of what he found in some texts Alexander thought that the final
phaneron of the first sentence should attach to the second, which should read:

Phaneron de hoti oute pantn esti genesis outh hapls outhenos, hs dlon ek
tn eirmenn (But it is evident that not everything comes to be and that not
absolutely nothing comes to be, as is clear from what has been said).

This forced Alexander to say that something was left out of the first sentence,
namely the words kai proeirtai, so that the first sentence would be:

Hoti men oun hapan kouphon baru, kai ps hai para phusin kinseis
ekhousi en toutois kai proeirtai.

Alexander says (and Simplicius apparently concurs) that this text would have to
be read as saying And it was said before in these discussions that everything is
either heavy or light and it was said how unnatural motions exist. Simplicius
concludes by espousing the kind of text we find in Moraux, while admitting that
the dispute has no substantial interest.
179. outh hapls outhenos <esti genesis>. Guthries translation nothing is
generated in a absolute sense represents the usual way these words are rendered.
But it appears from 597,31-598,7 (cf. 600,5) that Simplicius understood the words
in the way I have translated them. This difference goes hand-in-hand with a
difference in understanding of Aristotles words what has been said previously.
On the standard modern view (see, e.g., Stocks or Moraux ad loc.) Aristotle is
referring to his rejection of a void in Phys. 4.6-9; contrast 598,3-7.
180. cf. 568,30-569,18.
 Notes to pages 74-78 133
181. cf. chapter 1, 298b12-299a1 (555,13; 556,1; 560,11).
182. cf. 1.3, 270a12-22.
183. Simplicius refers to 298b14-24 in the previous chapter (556,1). Aristotles
main discussion of Parmenides and Melissus in Phys. 1.2-3 does not address the
issue of coming to be.
184. I take it that in the remainder of this paragraph Simplicius sets out
Alexanders account of Aristotelian doctrine; he goes on to express his misgivings.
It is, however, possible that where I have inserted the name Aristotle one should
insert Alexander.
185. Agreeing with C in eliminating men ti in 599,1. It would also be possible
to read mentoi with E, F, and Karsten. I take the point of this opaque sentence to
be that when, e.g., air is said to come to be from matter, the truth is that it comes
to be from, e.g., water, but we say it comes to be from matter because water is
potentially air; cf. Moraux (1973-2001), vol. 3, p. 230.
186. He calls is the reading of A, they call that of D, E, and F. Moraux
((1973-2001), vol. 3, p. 230) takes he to be Alexander. But Simplicius appears to
assign the term second substratum to Aristotle at 576,7-8.
187. Simplicius thinks that Alexanders argument against the coming to be of
body could be generalised to various genera. What he says about colour and shape
is clear enough, but I do not understand his argument in the case of things like
heat and coldness.
188. Reading tode with Karsten rather than the to printed by Heiberg; cf. line
18 below. In this sentence Simplicius expresses the view of Alexander: only
particulars come to be. Simplicius proceeds to express his own contrary view.
189. Reading the en of D, E and Karsten rather than the hs of A and F printed
by Heiberg.
190. Or is not some time, if we follow D and E.
191. Simplicius compares the Peripatetic view that there is a permanent
substratum underlying all change with his (Platonist) view that there are common
qualities in the perceptible world which (in another sense) underlie constant
qualitative change.
192. i.e. because only particular bodies come to be, whereas body in general is
eternal.
193. cf. Phys. 4.9, 216b22-30, where Aristotle refers to Xuthus as holding this
same doctrine. In his comment on this passage at in Phys. 683,24 Simplicius says
that Xuthus was a Pythagorean. In his note ad 216b25-6 Ross (1936) indicates how
little is known about Xuthus.
194. Our texts of Aristotle have a gar here. At 601,6 Simplicius cites these
words with a de.
195. cf. the beginning of this book at 298b6-8. (554,22ff.)
196. cf. 3.1, 298b8-12 (555,13ff.).
197. GC. It is important to bear in mind that for Simplicius Aristotle does not
establish his account of the four simple bodies until this work.
198. That is, about form and matter.
199. Like Aristotle.
200. A homoiomery (such as flesh) is something which can be divided (in the
ordinary sense) only into parts like itself.
201. i.e. a letter.
202. Heiberg prints therteon with A. D and E have protherteon, Karsten
prostherteon, which is what Moraux prints and what Simplicius uses at 602,23.
134 Notes to pages 78-81
Heiberg also prints prostherteon at 603,2 with F, although A and D have
protherteon.
203. ekkrisis, a noun, the verb related to which Aristotle uses in the lemma.
Simplicius thinks that this word is applied in philosophical contexts to things which
inhere actually in something, and not to things which inhere only potentially in the
way Aristotle says here that fire and earth are contained in flesh and wood.
204. This sentence is text 281 of Theophrastus: Sources. In a note the editors
point out that in his description of Alcmaeons account of vision Theophrastus says,
It is clear that the eye contains fire, since when it is struck fire flashes out (De
Sensu (Stratton (1917)), 26).
205. I have been unable to identify this person further.
206. cf. [Galen], Medical Definitions 337 (Kuhn (1821-33) 19, 434,15-16): A
carbuncle is a scabrous ulceration which is accompanied by spreading and dis-
charges and sometimes by swelling and fever.
207. trupanon. The OED explains that the term fire drill is used for a primitive
contrivance, consisting of an obtuse-pointed stick which is twirled between the
hands with the point in a hole in a flat piece of soft wood till fire is produced.
208. On this remark see section 6 of the Introduction.
209. cf. 1.3, 270b24-5 and Meteorology 1.3, 339b21-3 and 2.9, 369b11-15.
210. Air is presumably Simplicius mistake.
211. cf. 302a16-18 at the beginning of this chapter (600,3).
212. Heiberg follows A in omitting pantos. It is printed by Moraux and occurs
with some variation in the MSS Moraux cites and in D, E, F, and Karsten.
213. cf. 2.1, 192b8-23.
214. 1.2, 268b14-269a2.
215. cf. 600,5-30.
216. In the remainder of this chapter.
217. In chapter 5.
218. This sentence is obscurely expressed. Simplicius understands Aristotle to
mean only that many composite bodies (non-elements) are homoiomerous.
219. cf. in Phys. 27,23-8.
220. see chapter 4, 187a26-188a18.
221. cf. 302a21-5 in the preceding chapter (601,21) with Simplicius commentary.
222. By Ferison.
223. Bracketing the and changing the question mark to a full stop.
224. Simplicius claims that a thigh bone, for example, is not homoiomerous
because, even if pieces of it have the same material composition as the whole, they
do not have the same form, the form which makes the thigh bone a thigh bone.
225. szein as in szein ta phainomena (preserve the phenomena).
226. I assume Potamon (also mentioned at 652,9 in the commentary on chapter
7, on which see the note in Mueller (2009)) is the eclectic philosopher, probably of
early imperial times mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (Marcovich (1999), 1.21); cf.
the Suda, s.v. Potamn (2126) (Adler (1930), p. 181).
227. A Peripatetic of the earlier second century CE, on whom see Moraux
(1973-2001), vol. 2, pp. 226-93. The five postulates are the postulates of Euclids
Elements.
228. Or terms (horoi). This whole discussion of what Aristotle means by saying
that mathematical principles are finite (peperasmenon) is infected by the introduc-
tion of the word definite (hrismenon) and the related words define and
definition.
229. Placing the accent on the second rather than the first syllable of posoi.
 Notes to pages 85-87 135
b d
230. cf. chapter 2, 244b5 -5 with the note on 244b5-5d in Ross (1936).
231. cf. 6, 445b20-446a20. Simplicius gives a rather abstract representation of
Aristotles argument, which is roughly that perceptible qualities occur as opposites
or extremes (e.g. white/black, sweet/bitter) and intermediates between them, and
that, although the intermediates constitute a continuum, there are only finitely
many perceptibly different intermediates.
232. Simplicius omits the conclusion: elements are finite in kind.
233. Chapter 4, 187a26-188a18.
234. This is not a point stressed by Aristotle, but Simplicius finds it in 188a2-5,
which he calls (in Phys. 171,31-2) the strongest refutation of the apparent meaning
of Anaxagoras position.
235. It is hard to see how this statement can be true, since if there are not
infinitely many things (e.g. elements), there cant be infinitely many kinds of
things; cf. 614,19-23 with the note.
236. This is the first part of fragment 1 of Anaxagoras (DK59); for the fragments
of Anaxagoras I use the versions of Sider, which preserves the numbering of DK.
In this case Simplicius text of Anaxagoras differs from Siders only in having
mikrotta where Sider has smikrotta. Simplicius quotes the whole of the fragment
at 155,26-30 of in Phys.; for the extent of the quotation see Sider, pp. 75-6.
237. These are the last words of fragment 4b. Simplicius text differs from
Siders only in having en sumpanti where Sider has en ti sumpanti. The whole
fragment is pieced together from two citations in in Phys. at 34,21-6 and 156,4-9.
238. For this interpretation of Anaxagoras see also in Phys. 165,30-166,2 and
174,4-18.
239. Anaxagoras fragment 7, preserved only here.
240. A version of a small part of Anaxagoras fragment 12, almost the whole of
which is quoted by Simplicius at in Phys. 156,13-157,4; for numerous other
quotations of parts of the fragment in that commentary see Sider, p. 125. The
citation here differs from the version printed by Sider only in having apokrino-
mena where Sider prints apokrinomena kai diakrinomena. And Simplicius partial
quotation distorts the grammar of what Anaxagoras wrote.
241. Having defended Anaxagoras against Aristotles charge that he made the
elements literally infinite, Simplicius now offers a Neoplatonist interpretation of
Anaxagoras.
242. What follows is the beginning of Anaxagoras fragment 4a. Simplicius
quotes the whole fragment at in Phys. 34,29-35,9.
243. Sider has colours and tastes.
244. Simplicius omits a ge printed by Sider.
245. Simplicius has sunikmenas, where Sider after much hesitation prints
sunmmenas.
246. Simplicius omits a te autoisin printed by Sider.
247. Reading the epallaxei of several MSS of Aristotle rather than the peripal-
laxei printed by Moraux, although it is found in no MSS. For discussion see
McDiarmid (1958).
248. This claim appears to be derived from Phys. 4.7, 213b22-7, where Aristotle
says that according to the Pythagoreans the void distinguishes the nature of
numbers. In his comment (in Phys. 652,4-6) Simplicius speaks of distinguishing
the monad from the dyad and the dyad from the triad; cf. in Phys. 880,22-3.
249. Simplicius does not comment on this last clause or the word panspermia
(universal seedbed). Aristotle apparently means that earth, water and the rest
contain atoms of a variety of shapes.
136 Notes to pages 87-95
250. Simplicius explains Alexanders view that the present lemma is an (incom-
pletely expressed) objection to atomism. Starting at 611,4 Simplicius presents his
own view that Aristotle is here explicating, not attacking, atomism; rather his
refutation begins in the next lemma, and, in particular, his refutation of the
doctrine set out in the present lemma starts at 303a24.
251. It is not clear to me why this should be true. There is no obvious connection
between the shape of, say, fire atoms and the shape of fire.
252. The text is problematic here. I have tried to translate Heibergs suggestion
that the autn of A and the autou of D and E might be hn.
253. Simplicius quotes 303a17 in the next lemma and then 303a24-5 in the
same lemma.
254. Moraux prints skhmatn here. It is clear that Simplicius (611,23-7) and
Alexander (612,1) read smatn.
255. cf. 302b20-30 (605,21) and 302b30-303a3 (607,22).
256. For the references see 608,1-3 with the notes.
257. Simplicius reads the conditional of the second argument as if the differen-
tiae in kind of composite bodies are not infinite, neither are the elements (= atoms)
infinite (in kind), that is, roughly, if differences in shapes of the atoms are
supposed to explain qualitative differences in composites, the atoms dont have to
have infinitely many different shapes. Alexander apparently offered two interpre-
tations of the conditional, both based on the claim that bodies here means
elements, that is, primary things, and on the idea that for the atomists the
differentiae of elements are shapes. Alexanders first interpretation is not clear to
me since it only seems to say that differences of shapes wont produce qualitative
differences. On the second reading the conditional goes together with Aristotles
subsequent argument at 303a29-303b3 (613,7) that there are finitely many pri-
mary shapes, which should mean that there are finitely many elements. The last
sentence in this paragraph suggests that Alexander was talking about infinity or
finiteness in number, but nothing in the representation of his position makes
reference to number as opposed to kind. At 614,19-23 Simplicius gives an unfortu-
nate argument that what is finite in kind is also finite in number.
258. It is difficult to give a precise reference here. Heiberg gives 6.3-4. I think
6.1 is more likely.
259. 303a14-15 (610,12); see Simplicius discussion at 610,13-611,16.
260. Translating Heibergs suggestion of elegen rather than the elegon which he
prints.
261. cf. 302b30-303a3 (607,21) with Simplicius discussion.
262. The construction can be visualised by dividing an orange into two halves
and the halves into four quarters each. The eight segments obtained are, of course,
not pyramids, but, as Simplicius says, pyramidish (puramoeids).
263. This argument has nothing to do with finiteness in kind, and could be used
to show directly that nothing can be infinite in number: let C be an infinite class
which has a as member; then C without a is infinite and a falls outside it.
264. I have outlined the argument of this chapter in an appendix on the
argument of Cael. 3.5.
265. cf. 1.2, 268b14-26.
266. Translating the eis inserted by Heiberg.
267. Heibergs raised dot should be replaced by a comma.
268. Simplicius discussion of this paragraph starts at 617,22; he takes up the
obscure last phrase at 618,10-619,31.
269. cf. 6, 5b11-29.
 Notes to pages 95-103 137
270. cf. 5.13, 1020a17-25.
271. cf. 303a10-16 in the preceding chapter (610,12).
272. i.e. the atoms.
273. I do not know who these people might be.
274. The remainder of the discussion of this lemma is about this obscure phrase.
At 619,9 Simplicius, having giving three (not entirely clear) suggestions of Alex-
ander about it, dismisses Alexanders exegesis but confesses his own inability to
understand what Aristotle means.
275. Here and in what follows ratio of the lesser (or greater) and also lesser
(or greater) ratio seem to mean what we would represent by a fraction less (or
greater) than 1. Alexanders point here might be expressed by saying that there is
always something greater (or less) than something which is greater (or less) than
something.
276. The typographer has omitted a raised dot after periekhetai.
277. Alexanders suggestion is that the lesser things are water, air, and fire,
amounts of which, being less than earth, are contained in it.
278. For the next material see the appendix on 3.5.
279. cf. Tim. 56A7.
280. cf. 303b13-22 (615,24) with Simplicius discussion.
281. These are the atomists (cf. 303a12-14 in the preceding chapter (610,12)),
although they did not make fire the only element.
282. See the next lemma.
283. For this argument see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 1.12, 77b40-78a2.
284. i.e. Timaeus. For arguments that the person whom Aristotle has in mind
is Xenocrates see Cherniss (1944), pp. 143-4.
285. psgma. For the association of Heraclitus with minima called psgmatia
or psgmata see Aetius (Diels (1879)), 1.13.2. Cherniss ((1935), p. 14) assumes
that Aristotle is here talking about Heraclitus, an assumption which Simplicius
does not even consider.
286. Alexander is thinking specifically of gold shavings.
287. cf. 303a20-3 in the preceding chapter (611,17).
288. cf. 303a8-10 in the preceding chapter (609,13).
289. Apparently this means that, e.g. the magnitude of the total mass of air is
to that of the total mass of water as the magnitude of the atomic element of air is
to that of the atomic element of water. It is never made clear what this means or
why it should be true.
290. At 303b24-6 in the previous chapter (616,21).
291. An attempt to prop up Aristotles loose way of talking about quantities in
this part of Cael.
292. Alexander imagines a theory in which the change of earth, water, air, and
fire into one another is explained by the change of their elements into one another.
293. In the present lemma.
294. Simplicius considers only division into two parts.
295. The point is perhaps that nothing other than fire could result from a
compounding of portions of fire.
296. cf. 620,11.
297. cf. 303b25-7 (616,21). For Simplicius Aristotle is here criticising the view
he set out at 304a18-21 (621,12), where he spoke of finest parts.
298. cf. 303a10-16 (610,12) and 303b22-304a7 (616,21) with Simplicius discus-
sion.
299. An assumption Simplicius has rejected at 619,9-31.
138 Notes to pages 105-114
300. cf. chapter 3, 302b5-9 (604,1), where Aristotle infers the existence (but not
the number) of simple bodies from the simple motions.
301. cf. 629,2-5.
302. It seems more likely that Aristotle simply means that a body will be
dissolved or composed one part at a time.
303. With this discussion of Empedocles see Wright (1981), pp. 36-40.
304. With this paragraph see also 612,10-21.
305. I have translated the really unclear text which Simplicius read. At 630,1-5
Simplicius, following Alexander, proposes to insert the words comes to be in
something, and here. Modern editors have followed this suggestion.
306. Simplicius supplies an argument to rule out a fourth alternative not
considered by Aristotle: that something might come to be from itself.
307. As Aristotle does in the next lemma.
308. Here Simplicius presupposes the insertion which he describes in the next
paragraph.
309. The whole heaven not being in place.
310. Simplicius refers to Phys. 4.6, 213b4-15. See his comment on that passage
(in Phys. 649,4-650,14). See also his comment on Phys. 4.1, 209a4-7 (in Phys.
529,29-530,30). And for a general discussion of the issue raised here see Sorabji
(1988), pp. 60-122.
311. I am not sure what Simplicius is thinking here. Perhaps it is that what is
incorporeal could not occupy a place.
312. cf. Phys. 4.8.
313. i.e. some other body; see 305a31-2.
314. Simplicius skips over 305a26-9 (for a thing } elements); he returns to
these words in the next paragraph.
315. That is, when Aristotle says move in it (en touti) he means move to it
(epi touton).
316. The kata topon of D, E, and Karsten seems preferable to the kata ton topon
(presumably something like move with respect to that place) of A, which Heiberg
prints.
317. cf. 305a16-21 (629,6).
318. Aristotle does not mention Anaxagoras in the discussion which follows, but
Simplicius takes him to be arguing specifically against Anaxagoras at 305b20-8
(635,1); see his discussion of that passage.
319. Translating the toiaisde of D rather than the toisde printed by Heiberg.
320. Translating Karstens hotan d rather than the ei oun, hotan, printed by
Heiberg.
321. That is, air which actually exists in a mixture should not occupy more space
when it is extracted from the mixture, but something which is only potentially air
might occupy more space when it becomes actually air.
322. In the last sentence of the lemma.
323. At 305b5-10 in the preceding lemma (631,29).
324. in Phys. 4.8.
325. The distinction between the separate void and the interspersed void (to
paresparmenon kenon) is roughly the distinction between empty space outside of
bodies and empty spaces inside them. Arguments that motion would be impossible
without a void (cf., e.g., Phys. 4.6, 213b4-15) are taken to invoke a separate void,
arguments that a void is required for condensation and rarefaction or nutrition
and growth (cf., e.g., Phys. 4.6, 213b15-22) an interspersed void. See, for example
 Notes to pages 114-115 139
in Phys. 683,1-4. The explicit distinction may go back to Strato of Lampsacus, on
whom see Furley (1985).
326. cf. 4.3, 309a19-21 with the note on 686,14 in Mueller (2009).
327. Simplicius distinguishes between the targets of the first and second
sentences of 305b16-20: without a void Empedocles and Anaxagoras cannot ex-
plain why when water changes to air the volume of air is greater than that of the
water because they think that the air was actually in the water; and Democritus
void cannot explain why air atoms move farther apart when they are separated
from water.
328. cf. chapter 4, 187b22-188a2.
329. perigegrammenn. Simplicius treatment of infinite division is surprisingly
sophisticated in this passage. He is aware that the division of a finite magnitude
into finite portions can go on forever (that is to infinity), but he accepts Aristotles
view that such a division can never be completed (that is, the number of divisions
can never be actually infinite). Following Aristotle, Simplicius thinks of such
division as a matter of marking off previously unmarked portions of a continuous
magnitude. But, according to Simplicius, this sort of division isnt relevant to
Anaxagoras separation since what is separated is already marked out in the
original whole.
330. I have translated the h which appears in D and as a Bessarion insertion.
Heiberg prints onts with A; he reports that E and F have nothing.
 Bibliography

Ackrill, J.L. (trans.) (1963), Aristotles Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford:

Clarendon Press.
Adler, Ada (ed.) (1930), Suidae Lexicon, pt. 4, Leipzig: Teubner.
Allan, D.J. (1936), Aristotelis De Caelo Libri Quattuor, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Baltes, Matthias (1972), Timaios Lokros, ber die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele
(Philosophia Antiqua, 21), Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Barnes, Jonathan (1982), The Presocratic Philosophers, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Bergk, Theodor (1843), De Aristotelis Libello Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgia, cited
after Peppmller (1886).
Bergk, Theodor (1883), Fnf Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Griechischen Phi-
losophie und Astronomie, Leipzig: Fues Verlag.
Bossier, F. (ed.) (2004), Simplicius, Commentaire sur le Trait du Ciel dAristote,
Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, vol. 1 (Corpus Latinum Commentari-
orum in Aristotelem Graeca, 8.1), Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Brennan, Tad and Brittain, Charles (trans.) (2002), Simplicius: On Epictetus
Handbook 27-53, London: Duckworth.
Brittain, Charles and Brennan, Tad (trans.) (2002), Simplicius: On Epictetus
Handbook 1-26, London: Duckworth.
Bruns, Ivo (ed.) (1892), Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Scripta Minora, Quaestiones, De
Fato, De Mixtione (Supplementum Aristotelicum 2), Berlin: Reimer.
Cherniss, Harold (1935), Aristotles Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cherniss, Harold (1944), Aristotles Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diehl, Ernst (ed.) (1903-6), Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, 3
vols, Leipzig: Teubner.
Diels, Hermann (ed.) (1879), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin: Reimer.
Dring, Ingemar (1957), Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Studia
Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 5), Gteborg: Elander.
Furley, David (1985), Stratos theory of the void, in Jrgen Wiesner (ed.), Aris-
toteles Werk und Wirkung, vol. 1, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1985, 594-609, reprinted in Furley (1989), 149-60.
Furley, David (1989), Cosmic Problems, Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Guldentops, Guy (2005), Platos Timaeus in Simplicius In De Caelo. A confronta-
tion with Alexander, in Leinkauf and Steel (eds) (2005), 195-212.
Hadot, Ilsetraut (1990), The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic
sources, in Sorabji (ed.) (1990), 275-303.
Hadot, Ilsetraut (2002), Simplicius or Priscianus ?, Mnemosyne 4.55, 159-99.
Hagen, Charles (trans.) (1994), Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 7, London: Duck-
worth.
 Bibliography 141
Hankinson, R.J. (trans.) (2002), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1-4,
London: Duckworth.
Hankinson, R.J. (trans.) (2004), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.5-9,
London: Duckworth.
Hankinson, R.J. (trans.) (2006), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10-12,
London: Duckworth.
Heiberg, J.L. (ed.) (1883), Euclidis Elementa, vol. 1, Leipzig: Teubner.
Heiberg, J.L. (1892), Handschriftliches zum Commentar des Simplicius zu Aris-
toteles de caelo, Sitzungsberichte der kniglich preussischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Berlin: Reimer, 59-66.
Huby, Pamela and Steel, Carlos (trans.) (1997), Priscian: On Theophrastus On
Sense-Perception with Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12, London:
Duckworth.
Hlser, Karlheinz (1987-8), Die logischen Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4
vols, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
Kneale, William and Kneale, Martha (1962), The Development of Logic, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Krivushina, Anastasia and Fusaro, Diego (trans.) (2007), Democrito: Raccolta dei
Frammenti, Interpretazione, e Commentario di Salomon Luria, Milan: Bom-
piani.
Khn, Karl Gottlob (ed.) (1821-33), Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, 20 vols, Leipzig:
Cnobloch.
Leinkauf, Thomas and Steel, Carlos (eds) (2005), Platos Timaeus and the Foun-
dations of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, The Middle Ages, and Renaissance,
Leiden: Leiden University Press.
Marcovich, Miroslav (ed.) (1999), Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, Stuttgart
and Leipzig: Teubner.
Marg, Walter (ed. and trans.) (1972), Timaeus Locrus, De Natura Mundi et
Animae, Leiden: E.J. Brill.
McDiarmid, J.B. (1958), Phantoms in Democritean terminology, PERIPALLAXIS
and PERIPALASSESTHAI, Hermes 86, 291-8.
Mioni, Elpidio (1981), Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum Codices Graeci
Manuscripti, vol. 1, Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato.
Moraux, Paul (1961), Kritisch-exegetisches zu Aristoteles, Archiv fr Geschichte
der Philosophie 43, 15-40.
Moraux, Paul (1973-2001), Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, 3 vols (Peripatoi,
5, 6, and 7.1), Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter.
Mueller, Ian (trans.) (2004), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.1-9, Lon-
don: Duckworth.
Mueller, Ian (trans.) (2005), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.10-14,
London: Duckworth.
Mueller, Ian (trans.) (2009), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.7-4, Lon-
don: Duckworth.
Mueller, Ian (2009), Whats the matter? Some Neoplatonist answers, in Richard
Mohr (ed.) with Kirk Sanders and Barbara Sattler, One Book, the Whole
Universe: Platos Timaeus Today, Las Vegas: Parmenides Press.
Mueller, Ian (forthcoming), Plato asserts, Aristotle objects, Alexander, Proclus,
and Simplicius respond, to appear in the proceedings of a conference on
Neoplatonism and Science organised by Christoph Horn and James Wilberding
in Bonn, September, 2007.
Mutschmann, Herman (1914) (ed.), Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 2, Leipzig: Teubner.
142 Bibliography
OBrien, D. (1969), Empedocles Cosmic Cycle, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Peppmller, Rudolf (ed.) (1886), Kleine Philologische Schriften von Theodor Bergk,
vol. 2, Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses.
Perkams, Matthias (2005), Priscian of Lydia, commentator on the de Anima in
the tradition of Iamblichus, Mnemosyne 4.58, 510-30.
Peyron, Amedeo (1810), Empedoclis et Parmenidis Fragmenta, Leipzig: I.A.G.
Weigl.
Quandt, Wilhelm (ed.) (1955), Orphic Hymns, Berlin: Weidmann.
Ross, W.D. (ed.) (1936), Aristotles Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Saffrey, H.D. and Westerink, L.G. (1968), Proclus: Thologie Platonicienne, Livre
1, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Schmalzriedt, Egidius (1970), PERI PHYSES: Zur Geschichte der Buchtitel,
Munich: Wilhelm Fink.
Sharples, R.W. (1987), Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation,
Aufstieg und Niedergang der rmischen Welt II.36.2, 1176-1243.
Sorabji, Richard (1988), Matter, Space and Motion, London: Duckworth.
Sorabji, Richard (ed.) (1990), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators
and their Influence, London and Ithaca: Duckworth and Cornell University
Press, 1990.
Steel, Carlos (2005), Proclus defence of the Timaeus against Aristotles objec-
tions, in Leinkauf and Steel (eds) (2005), 163-93.
Stein, Heinrich (1864-7), Die Fragmente des Parmenides Peri Phuses, in Sym-
bola Philologorum Bonnensium in Honorem Friderici Ritschelii, Leipzig:
Teubner, 763-806.
Stratton, George, Malcolm (ed. and trans.) (1917), Theophrastus and the Greek
Physiological Psychology before Aristotle, London: Allen and Unwin.
Tarn, Leonardo (ed. and trans.) (1965), Parmenides, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Taylor, C.C.W. (trans.) (1999), The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus (Phoenix,
supplementary vol. 36), Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto
Press.
Tobin, Thomas H. (trans.) (1985), Timaeus of Locri, On the Nature of the World
and the Soul, Chico: Scholars Press.
Vlastos, Gregory (1975), Platos Universe, Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Wartelle, Andr (1963), Inventaire des Manuscrits Grecs dAristote et de ses Com-
mentateurs, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
West, M.L. (1966) (ed.), Hesiod, Theogony, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
West, M.L. (2000) (ed.), Homerus Ilias, Munich and Leipzig: K.G. Saur.
Wildberg, Christian (trans.) (1987), Philoponus: Against Aristotle on the Eternity
of the World, London: Duckworth.
Wright, M.R. (1981), Empedocles: the Extant Fragments, New Haven and London:
Yale University Press.
Wnsch, Richard (ed.) (1898), Ioannis Laurentii Lydi Liber de Mensibus, Leipzig:
Teubner.
 English-Greek Glossary

This glossary is derived from the Greek-English Index and gives standard Greek
equivalents for many nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and a few prepositions in
the translation. It does not include equivalents for most Greek words which are
used only once by Simplicius or words which have no relatively simple equivalent
in English. The reader will get a better sense of the range of a Greek word by
looking at the Greek-English Index for the word and ones closely related to it.

able: dunatos ascend: anabainein

above: an ascribe: anapherein, anatithenai
absolutely: hapls ask: ertan, ztein
absurd: apemphainn atopos assign: apodidonai, protithenai
accept: apodekhesthai, dekhesthai, assume: hupolambanein, lambanein
enkrinein, sunkhrein assume in advance: prolambanein
accident: sumbebkos assume to start: prolambanein
accidentally: kata sumbebkos assumption, additional: proslpsis
acknowledge: sungignskein atemporally: akhrons
act (v.): energein atom: atomos
act together with: sunergein attach: prosaptein
acted on, be: paskhein avoid: diapheugein, pheugein
activate: energein aware, be: eidenai
actuality: energeia awareness: sunaisthsis
add: epagein, epipherein, prostithenai axiom: axima
addition: prosthesis
adduce: epagein, paragein base: basis
adequate: hikanos beautiful: kalos
affected easily: eupaths begin: arkhesthai
affection: pathos, pathma beginning: arkh
affective: pathtikos belief: doxa, pistis
agree: homologein believable: pistos
air: ar belong: huparkhein
alter: alloioun beloved: philos
alter together: sunalloioun between: metaxu
alteration: alloisis black: melas
alternation: enallax blend (v.): sunkrinein
always: aei blending (n.): krasis, sunkrisis
amateurish: iditiks body: sma
angle: gnia bone: ostoun
animal: zion book: biblion
antecedent: hgoumenon bounded: peperasmenos
appearance: emphasis breadth: platos
approach: plsiazein breadthless: aplats
appropriate: oikeios briefly: suntoms
appropriate, be: proskein bring in: paragein
argue: epikheirein, sullogizesthai bring in against: prosagein
argument: epikheirma, epikheirsis bulk: onkos
144 English-Greek Glossary
call (v.): kalein
categorically: katgoriks
causal: parasunaptikos
cause: aitia, aition
cease: pauein
censure (v.): aitiasthai, enkalein
centre: kentron, meson
change (intrans.): exallattesthai,
kineisthai, metaballein
change (trans.): kinein
change (n.): kinsis, metabasis,
metabol
characterise: kharaktrizein
choose: hairein, prokheirizesthai
circle: kuklos
circle, moving in a: kuklophortikos
circular: periphers
circumscribe: perigraphein
clarify: saphnizein
clear: enargs, dlos, saphs
clearly true: enargs
cold (adj.): psukhros
cold (n.): psuxis
coldness: psukhrots
colour: khrma
colourless: akhrmatos
combine: sunistanai
come to be: gignesthai
come to be in: engignesthai
coming to be (adj.): gentos
coming to be (n.): genesis
coming to be, not: agentos
commensurable: summetros
common: koinos
common thing: koinots
comparable: sumbltos
compare: paraballein
compel: anankazein
complete (adj.): teleios
complete (v.): sumperainesthai,
sumplroun
completely: pantels
compose: sunistanai, suntithenai
composite: sunthetos
composition: sunthesis
compounding: sunthesis
compress: pilein
conception: ennoia, prolpsis
conclude: sumperainesthai
conclusion: epiphora
condensation: puknsis
condense: puknoun
condition: diathesis, katastasis
confirm: paristanai, pistousthai
confirmation: pistis
conflict, be in: makhesthai
connect: sunaptein
connective: sundesmos
consequence: akolouthon
consider: nomizein
constrain: biazesthai
constrained: biaios
constraint: bia
construct: kataskeuazein, sunistanai,
suntithenai
construction: sustasis
contact (n.): aph
contain: khrein
contained in, be: eneinai
continuous: sunekhs
contract: sustellein
contradiction: antiphasis, enantiologia
contrariety: enantisis
contrary: enantios, hupenantios
contribute: suntelein
coordinate (adj.): sustoikhos
corporeal: smatikos
correct: orthos
correct, be: katorthoun
correctly: hugis, kals
cosmos: kosmos
cosmos, to make the: kosmopoiein
credence, give: pistousthai
criticise: euthunein
cubical: kubikos
cure (v.): hugiazein
cut (v.): temnein
dark: melas
deal with: hupantan
dear: philos
define: horizein
definition: horos
demiurgic: dmiourgikos
demonstrate: apodeiknunai
demonstration: apodeixis
dense: puknos
denseness: puknots
depth: bathos
depthless: abaths
derivative from, be: paruphestkenai
describe: digeisthai, historein
destroy: phtheirein
destroyed easily: euphthartos
destruction: phthora
determine: diorizein
develop: sunagein
diagonal: diametros
 English-Greek Glossary 145
differ: diapherein eternal: aidios
difference: diaphora ether: aithr
different: allos, diaphoros, heteros ethereal: aitherios
differentia: diaphora evaporated: araioumenos,
difficult: duskhers exaerizomenos
difficulty: aporia, duskhereia evidence: tekmrion
difficulty, raise a: aporein evident: phaneros, prophans
directly: prosekhs example: paradeigma
disagree: diapherein exceed: huperekhein
disagreement: diaphnia excess: huperokh
disclose: ekphainein exist: huparkhein
discord: diaphnia exist previously: prohuparkhein
discordant: plmmelos expand: epekteinesthai
discrete: dirismenos expansion: epektasis
discuss: dialegein, hupantan, expel: ekballein
prokheirizesthai explain: aitiasthai, aitiologein,
disorder: ataxia apodidonai, apologizesthai,
disordered: ataktos didaskein, exgeisthai
dissimilar: anomoios explanation: aition
dissolution: dialusis extreme: eskhatos
dissolve: dialuein eye: ophthalmos
distance: diastma
distinction: diorismos face: prospon
distinguish: antidiairein, diairein, fair wind, produce a: sunepourizein
diakrinein, diistanai, diorizein fast: takhus
divide: diairein, dialambanein, fellow citizen: polits
diistanai few: oligos
divine: theios fewer: elattn
divisible: diairetos fewest: elakhistos
division: diairesis, tom figure: skhma
doctrine: areskon, theria figure, assign a: skhmatizein
dominance: epikrateia figure, without: askhmatistos
dominate: epikratein, kratein find: heuriskein
down: kat fine: leptos
fine parts, having: leptomers
earth: g fineness: leptots
easy: hetoimos, prokheiros finite, be: peperanthai
elaborate: kompsos fire: pur
element: stoikheion first: prtos
elements, composed of: stoikheitos fit (v.): epharmozein, harmozein
empty: kenos flesh: sarx
end (n.): peras, telos flow (v.): rhein
end, come to an: katalgein follow: akolouthein, hepesthai,
endure: diamenein, hupomenein, sumbainein
menein foot: pous
enquire: ztein force: anankazein
enquiry: historia forced: biaios
entire: holos form: eidos, idea
entirety: holots form, give: eidopoiein
entitle: epigraphein frequently: pollakis
entity: phusis full: plrs
equal: isos fundamental: arkhoeids
equilateral: isopleuros fused together: sumphusmenos
establish: kataskeuazein general: koinos
146 English-Greek Glossary
generally: katholou
generate: gennan
generation: genesis
generative: genntikos
genus: genos
geometrical: gemetrikos
give out: epileipein, hupoleipein
god: theos
gold: khrusos
good: kalos
great: megas
half-triangle: hmitrignon
happen: prosgignesthai
hard: sklros
harm (v.): adikein
harsh: sklros
hear: akouein
heat (n.): thermots
heat (v.): thermainein
heaven: ouranos
heavenly: ouranios
heavens: ouranos
heaviness: baruts
heavy: barus
higher: anthen
homoiomereity: homoiomereia
homoiomerous: homoiomers
horizon: horizon
hot: thermos
human being: anthrpos
hypernatural: huper phusin
hypothesis: hupothesis
hypothesise: hupotithenai
hypothetical: hupothetikos
ill: nosn
immediately: euthus
imperceptible: anaisthtos
imperishable: aphthartos
impossible: adunatos
impulsion: rhop
include: perilambanein
incorporeal: asmatos
increase (v.): auxein
indeterminate: aoristos
indicate: dloun, emphainein,
endeiknusthai, epideiknunai,
hupodeiknunai
indissolvable: adialutos
indivisible: adiairetos, atomos
induction: epagg
infer: sullogizesthai, sunagein
infinite: apeiros
infinity: apeiria
inhere: enuparkhein, huparkhein en
insofar as: kath ho, kath hoson
instant: to nun
insufficient, be: hupoleipein
intellectual: noeros
intelligible: notos
interchange (v.): ameibesthai
intermediate: mesos, metaxu
interpret: exgeisthai
interpretation: exgsis
interpreter: exgts
interspersed: paresparmenos
intervention: paremptsis
introduce: epagein, paratithenai
investigate: episkeptesthai,
skeptesthai, skopein, therein
investigate also: prostherein
investigation: theria
invisible: aoratos
isosceles: isoskels
join: sunaptein, suntattein
join together: sunartan
keep: phulattein
kind: eidos
know: eidenai, epistasthai, gignskein,
gnrizein
knowledge: epistm, gnsis
large: megas
large parts, having: megalomers
largeness: megethos
last: eskhatos
later: husteros
lay next to: epitithenai
least: elakhistos
leave out: paraleipein
left over, be: hupoleipesthai
length: mkos
lesser: elattn
light: kouphos, leukos
lightness: kouphots
limit (n.): peras
limit (v.): peratoun
line: gramm
living thing: zion
Love: Philia, Philots
magnitude: megethos
maintain: axioun
man: anr
mass: onkos
 English-Greek Glossary 147
material: enhulos order (n.): taxis
mathematical: mathmatikos order (v.): diakosmein, tattesthai
mathematics: mathmata ordering: diakosmsis
matter: hul outermost: eskhatos
meaning: ennoia own, ones: idios
meaning, apparent: phainomenon
medicine, art of: iatrik part: meros, morion
meet: tunkhanein particular: kata meros, kath hekaston
mention: hupomimnskein, partless: amers
mnmoneuein pass over: paraleipein, parienai
mind: nous pentagon: pentagnon
mistake: hamartma per se: kath hauto, kath hautn
mix: mignunai perceptible: aisthtos
mixed: miktos perception: aisthsis
mixture: migma, mixis perhaps: iss
mode: tropos periphery: perix
monad: monas perish: phtheiresthai
motion: kinsis, phora perishable: phthartos
move (intrans.): ienai, pheresthai, perishing (adj.): phthartos
kineisthai perishing (n.): phthora
move (trans.): kinein persuasive: pithanos
moved easily: eukintos phenomena: phainomena
multiple: pollaplasios philosopher: philosophos
philosophise: philosophein
name: onoma philosophy: philosophia
natural: eikos, phusikos, phusei, kata phrase: lexis
phusin physician: iatros
natural philosopher: phusiologos place (n.): topos
nature: phusis place (v.): tithenai
nature, doctrine of: phusiologia plane: epipedon
nature, student of: phusikos plant: phuton
nature, study: phusiologein Platonic: Platnikos
necessary: anankaios plausible: eikos, pithanos
necessity: anank point: smeion, stigm
need (v.): deisthai point out: ephistanein
new: kainopreps portion: morion
next: ephexs, loipon posit: tithenai
nourishment: troph position: thesis
novel: kainopreps possible: dunatos
number: arithmos possible, be: endekhesthai, eneinai
posterior: husteros
object (v.): hupantan postulate: aitma
objection: enstasis potentiality: dunamis
observe: therein potentially: dunamei
obvious, be: phainesthai power: dunamis
obviously: dlonoti precise: akribs
occupy: epekhein, katalambanein, precision: akribeia
katekhein pre-contain: prolambanein
often: pollakis present, be: prokeisthai
one: monas preserve: szein, phulattein
only: monos pressed together, be: sumpileisthai
opinion: doxa presumably: iss
opposite, be: antikeisthai prevail: kratein
opposition: enantisis prevent: kluein
148 English-Greek Glossary
previous: proteros
prima facie clear: prodlos
primary: prtos
principle: arkh
prior: proteros
prior, be: prohuparkhein
proceed: badizein, ienai, proienai,
prokhrein
produce: huphistanai, parekhein
proemium: prooimion
proper: oikeios
proportion: analogia
proportional: analogos
propose: protithenai
proposition: axima
prove: deiknunai
pupil: hetairos
purpose: skopos
push: epthein, thein
push along: sunepthein
push out: exthein
pyramid: puramis
pyramidish: puramoeids
qua: hi
quality: poion, poiots
qualityless: apoios
quantity: poson
question, raise the: ephistanein
rare: manos
rarefaction: mansis
rarefy: manoun, khein
rareness: manots
reality: hupostasis
reason: aitia, aition
reasonable: eikos, eulogos
recall: hupomimnskein
receive: dekhesthai, tunkhanein
recent: neos
recognise: enidein, ennoein
recount: historein
rectilinear: euthugrammos
reduce: apagein
reductio ad impossibile: apagg eis
adunaton
refer: anapherein, apoteinesthai
refutation: antilogia, elenkhos
refute: antilegein, dielenkhein,
elenkhein
region: topos
reject: ekballein
relation: skhesis
remain: hupoleipesthai,
kataleipesthai, leipesthai, menein
remaining: loipos
report (v.): historein
require: deisthai
resemble: eoikenai
reservoir: angeion
resistance: antitupia
resolution: analusis
resolve: analuein, luein
rest (n.): remia, mon
rest (v.): remein
result (v.): sumbainein
right: orthognios
room: khra
rule (n.): epikrateia
rule (v.): epikratein
scalene: skalnos, promks
science: epistm
scientific: epistmonikos
see: horan, idein, theasthai
seed: sperma
seek: epiztein, ztein
seem: eoikenai
segment: tmma
self-moving: autokintos
separate (v.): aphistanai, apokrinein,
diakrinein, diistanai, khrizein
separate out: ekkrinein
separation: diakrisis
separation out: ekkrisis
set down: tithenai
set out: ektithesthai, paradidonai,
paratithenai
shape: skhma
shape, give: skhmatizein
shape, without: askhmatistos
share (v.): metekhein
sharp: tmtikos
shavings: psgma
shorter: elattn
show (v.): deiknunai
side: pleura
sign: smeion, tekmrion
similar: homoios
similarity: homoiots
simple: haplous
simply: hapls
sinew: neuron
single out: eklegesthai
sink down: huphizanein
sink to the bottom: huphistanai
size: megethos
 English-Greek Glossary
small: mikros, oligos
small parts, having: mikromers
smaller: elattn
smallness: mikrots
soft: malakos
solid: stereos
soul: psukh
space: khra, topos
speak against: anteipein
species: eidos
specific: idios
specify: horizein
spermatically: spermatiks
sphere: sphaira
spherical: sphairikos, sphairoeids
spreading (n.): khusis
square: tetragnon
stand (v.): histanai
star: astr, astron
stone: lithos
stop (v.): histanai
straight line: eutheia
straight line, move in a: euthuporein
straightaway: euthus
strict sense, in the: kuris
Strife: Neikos
study (n.): pragmateia
subject, be a: hupokeisthai
subject to, be: paskhein
sublunary: hupo selnn, huposelnos
substance: ousia
substratum, be a: hupokeisthai
subtract: aphairein
suffice: arkein
sufficient: hikanos
suitable: epitdeios
suitable, be: harmozein
supply: parekhein
surface: epiphaneia
sweetness: glukuts
syllogism: sullogismos
syllogism, produce a: sullogizesthai
symbolically: sumboliks
symmetry: summetria
tacitly: dunamei
take: lambanein, metalambanein,
paralambanein
take up: epilambanein
teach: didaskein
text: lexis
thick: pakhus
thick parts, having: pakhumers
thickness: pakhuts
149
thing: pragma, khrma
think: nomizein, oiesthai
thought: epinoia
time: khronos
together: homou
touch (n.): aph
transcend: exirsthai
transfer: metapherein
transform: metalambanein
transmit: paradidonai
treatise: pragmateia, sungramma
triangle: trignon
true: alths
trustworthy: pistos
truth: altheia
try: peirasthai
turn (v.): trepein, metabainein
turn out: sumbainein
turn to: metienai
unaware, be: agnoein
unchanging: akintos, ametabltos
unclear: asaphs
undergo: hupomenein, paskhein
underlie: hupokeisthai
understand: akouein, eidenai,
ekdekhesthai, gignskein,
gnrizein, noein
undisputed: anamphilektos
unification: hensis
unify: henoun
unite: henoun
unity: hensis
universally: katholou
universe: to pan
unknowable: agnstos
unmoving: akintos
unnatural: para phusin
unreasonable: alogos
up: an
use (v.): khrasthai, khrsthai
use also: proskhrsthai
variegated: poikilos
vertex: koruph
vessel: angeion
view (n.): doxa
view (v.) theasthai
void: kenos
wander: planasthai, plazesthai
water: hudr
way: tropos
weave together: sumplekein
150 English-Greek Glossary
weaving together (n.): sumplok withdraw: hupeikein
weight: baros wood: xulon
weightless: abars word: onoma, rhma
well: kals words: lexis, rhta
white: leukos write: graphein
whole: holos
 Greek-English Index

This index, which is based on Heibergs text with my emendations, gives the
English translations of many nouns, verbs, adjectives, and some adverbs used by
Simplicius; certain very common words (e.g. einai, ekhein, legein) and number
words are omitted, as are words which only occur in quotations (or apparent
quotations) of other authors. When a word occurs no more than ten times, its
occurrences are listed; in other cases only the number of occurrences is given.
Occurrences in lemmas and as part of a book title are ignored. Sometimes
comparatives, superlatives, and adverbs are included under the positive form of
an adjective, sometimes they are treated separately. There is a separate index of
names.

abars, weightless, 18 occurrences in aisthsis, perception, 612,14.19 (both

Simplicius, 7 in Aristotle
abaths, without depth, 562,27;
563,33; 568,9; 578,28.30 (both
Alexander); 579,3
adiairetos, indivisible, 33
occurrences in Simplicius, 8 in
Aristotle; see also atomos
adialutos, indissolvable, 627,5
adikein, to harm, 570,9-11(4)
adunatos, impossible, 59 occurrences
in Simplicius, 23 in Aristotle
aei, always, 28 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Melissus), 8 in
Aristotle
ar, air, 123 occurrences in
Simplicius (18 Alexander, 1
Melissus, 1 TL, 1 Plato), 21 in
Aristotle
agathots, goodness, 587,20
agentos, not coming to be, 24
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Parmenides), 4 in Aristotle
agnoein, to be unaware, not know,
559,27; 606,29
agnstos, unknowable, 606,31;
608,25.28
agnizesthai. to do battle, 588,3
aidios, eternal, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Melissus, 1
Alexander), 2 in Aristotle
aidiots, eternity, 628,3
aisthanesthai, to perceive, 578,1
with 303a23); 613,11; 633,22
aisthtos, perceptible, 38 occurrences
in Simplicius, 4 in Aristotle
aitma, postulate, 607,6.19
aithr, ether, 559,23 (Parmenides);
603,22 (with 302b4)
aitherios, ethereal, 552,2; 553,17
aitia, reason, cause, 17 occurrences
in Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle; see
also aition
aitiasthai, to censure, make
responsible, explain, 565,16;
589,27; 590,26; 634,11 (Alexander)
aitiologein, to offer explanations,
564,26; 576,15
aition, cause, reason, explanation, 12
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 1 in Aristotle; see also
aitia
akhrmatos, without colour, 599,9.10
akhrons, atemporally, 579,9.11
akintos, unchanging, unmoving, 17
occurrences in Simplicius, 3 in
Aristotle
akolouthein, to follow, be a
consequence, 36 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle
akolouthia, translated using the
verb follows, 623,17
akolouthon, consequence (567,27);
next (626,18)
152 Greek-English Index
akolouths, next, 600,6
akouein, to hear, understand, 15
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Melissus, 1 Parmenides, 1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
akribeia, precision, 562,31; 566,18
akribs, precise, 582,23; 606,11.14;
612,19; 629,9
akribologeisthai, to speak precisely,
570,16
altheia, truth, 555,25; 556,13;
557,23.26 (Parmenides); 558,6
(Parmenides) (all 5 with 298b13);
566,15 (Plato); 589,17; 597,27; 609,23
alths, true, 14 occurrences in
Simplicius (3 Melissus, 1
Parmenides, 1 Alexander)
alloisis, alteration, qualitative
change, 553,27 (with 298b1); 601,9;
603,3; 623,13 (Alexander)
alloioun, to alter (active), 553,27(2)
alogos, unreasonable, 565,26;
634,6.12 (Alexander).29 (all 3 with
305b18); also 304a9 and 305b6
ameibesthai, to interchange, 598,9;
599,20
amereia, partlessness, 577,28
amers, partless, 562,30; 563,4;
612,16; 622,6
ametabltos, unchanging, 628,10
amiktos, unmixed, 587,25
amphidoxein, to doubt, 579,9
amphisbtsimos, to be debated,
601,6 (with 302a17)
anabainein, to ascend, 563,7; 564,26;
576,16
anagein hupo, to place under, 617,8
anairein, to do away with, 27
occurrences in Simplicius, 5 in
Aristotle
anaisthtos, imperceptible, 603,21;
606,7.9
anaitios, inexplicable, 572,9
analambanein, to return to, 596,19
analloios, not undergoing alteration,
552,12
analogein, to be analogous, 613,32
analogia, proportion, 576,18; 579,17;
620,19.20 (both Alexander)
analogos, proportional, 566,16
(Plato); 577,18 (with 300a2); also
304a26
analuein, to resolve, 561,4.29;
563,29; 578,12 (with 300a11(2));
613,22; 616,10(2).11.19
analusis, resolution, 577,23; 579,25;
616,6.9(2)
anamignusthai, to be mixed with,
598,15
anamphilektos, undisputed,
indisputable, 553,1; 555,24; 562,32
anankaios, necessary, 555,19.31;
576,1; 588,16 (with 301a1); 590,16
(with 301a19).31; 591,8; 606,30;
629,17; 10 other occurrences in
Aristotle
anankazein, to compel, force, 579,28;
591,12; 597,22; 599,30
anank, necessity (usually translated
using necessary), 80 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander, 1
Plato), 34 in Aristotle
anapherein, to refer, ascribe, 554,8;
566,26; 589,24; 604,18
anaphora, reference, 552,19
anaphs, with no contact, 565,19
anaphuesthai, to grow out, 569,28
anastrephesthai, to be turned back,
588,6
anatithenai, to ascribe, 617,24
anatrepein, to overturn, 614,26
anemos, wind, 597,2
anepismants, without notice,
634,10
anr, man, 557,21 (Parmenides);
566,12 (Plato); 573,3; 580,14
(Pythagorean saying); 602,7
anerkhesthai, to rise up, 565,28
angeion, reservoir, vessel, 632,22.24
(both with 305b4); 633,24 (with
305b15)
anisots, inequality, 565,22
an, up, above, 24 occurrences in
Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle
anomoeids, of different kinds,
635,16
anomoios, dissimilar, 566,13 (Plato);
606,15.26
anthen, from above, higher, 566,12
(Plato); 581,31
anteipein, to speak against, 591,12;
609,16
antepikheirein, to make a different
kind of argument, 614,29
anthrax, carbuncle, 602,9
anthrpos, human being, 558,11
(Parmenides),25 (Melissus);
 Greek-English Index
578,17; 589,10; 602,6; 609,8.9 (both
Anaxagoras); 619,23
antidiairein, to distinguish, 594,25
antigraph, copy of a text, 597,21
antikeisthai, to be opposite, 564,17;
586,13.14
antilambanesthai, to apprehend,
565,5
antilegein, to argue against, refute,
563,22; 575,27.31
antilogia, refutation, argument
against, 562,2; 591,17; 611,12.15.20
antiphasis, contradiction, 572,11
antiphatikos, contradictory, 620,16
antistrephein, to convert, 570,12
antitupia, resistance, 567,15
aoratos, invisible, 565,9; 603,21 (with
302b3)
aoristos, indeterminate, 586,18;
615,14.20
apagein, to reduce, 561,22; 563,10(2);
579,15; 588,15
apagg eis adunaton, reductio ad
impossibile, 592,16
apaths, not undergoing passion,
552,12
apeiria, infinity, 605,25; 606,3.23;
608,19(2); 612,8; 627,29 (Alexander)
apeiromegeths, infinite in
magnitude, 608,16
apeiros, infinite, infinitely many, 172
occurrences in Simplicius (8
Alexander, 2 Anaxagoras,1
Melissus, 1 Plato), 32 in Aristotle;
see also eis apeiron and ep apeiron
apemphainn, absurd, 563,2
aperilptos, ungraspable, 608,25
aphairein, to subtract, take away, 11
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle
aphairesis, abstraction, 567,12 (with
299a16)
aph, touch, contact, 565,6; 609,20
aphistanai, to separate, 588,5
aphthartos, not perishing,
imperishable, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 3 in
Aristotle
aphthons, without stinting, 615,16
aplats, breadthless, 562,25.29;
578,30 (Alexander)
apoblepein, to take into
consideration, 615,23
apodeiknunai, to demonstrate, 13
153
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
apodeixis, demonstration, 563,5;
568,21; 582,24; 592,1; 604,3;
607,20; 614,9
apodekhesthai, to accept, 589,30;
590,13; 597,24
apodidonai, to assign, explain, give,
13 occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 2 in Aristotle
apoginskein, to reject, 561,23
apogumnoun, to remove the
clothing, 587,30
apoios, qualityless, 564,18; 565,3.23;
576,8; 579,5; 599,5
apokrinomenos, separated,
608,26.30 (both Anaxagoras);
632,18(2)
apoleipein, to allow for, 628,11
apologismos, giving of an account,
566,4
apologizesthai, to explain, 562,1
apolusis, parting, 609,21
apopheugein, to escape, 610,11
apophthengesthai, to give voice to,
560,2
aporein, to raise a difficulty, 581,25;
622,24; 627,16
aporia, difficulty, 569,28; 570,2;
573,15; 581,28; 582,9; 627,20
aposkptein, to say with banter,
561,31
apospmenos, detached, 595,1
apoteinesthai pros, to refer to,
634,32
apotrekhein, to run off, 597,32
apotunkhanomena, misfirings,
575,25
apsukhos, soulless, 552,10
araioumenos, evaporated, 571,8
(to) areskon, doctrine, 598,26; 600,20
arithmeisthai, to be numbered,
607,18
arithmos, number, 32 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 5 in
Aristotle
arkein, to suffice, 566,3; 607,19;
615,20
arkh, principle, starting point,
beginning, 75 occurrences in
Simplicius (3 Alexander, 2 Plato, 1
TL), 7 in Aristotle; other uses: ex
arkhs, initial, 568,7; 577,16;
580,23; 591,17; 598,1; 600,6; tn
154 Greek-English Index
arkhn, at all, initially, 581,15.16;
583,6; 634,8; en arkhi lambanein,
to beg the question, 626,28; 629,2
arkhesthai, to begin, 551,13; 559,21;
566,8 (Plato); 585,22; 608,21; also
301a13
arkhitektonik, architecture, 563,7
arkhoeids, fundamental, 565,8;
566,2; 576,5; 580,12; 613,20.22;
616,7
artria, artery, 606,19
asaphs, unclear, 586,6; 630,3
askhmatistos, without shape,
without figure, 599,9.10; 621,28;
622,2
asmatos, incorporeal, 26
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle
asphals, carefully, 635,12
astr, star, 552,6.7; see also astron
astron, star, 552,9.17 (both with
298a25); 559,24 (Parmenides); see
also astr
astronomos, astronomer, 565,30
asullogistos, asyllogistic, 620,16
ataktos, disordered, 28 occurrences
in Simplicius, 5 in Aristotle
ataxia, disorder, 586,19; 588,24.26
(both with 301a3); 589,17 (with
301a10)
atels, incomplete, 575,23
athroisma, collection, 603,20
atmtos, uncut, 592,24
atmos, vapour, 633,2
atomos, indivisible, 53 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 7 in
Aristotle; the feminine h atomos,
used by Simplicius and Alexander
(from the Epicurean h atomos
phusis) is usually translated atom.
atopia, absurdity, 561,12
atopos, absurd, 45 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 2 in
Aristotle
autarks, sufficient, 602,32
autokintos, self-moving, 585,1.2-4
(4, all Alexander); 585,9
auxein, to increase (transitive),
575,3; see also auxesthai
auxesthai, to expand, increase
(intransitive), 565,17; 620,20
axima, axiom, proposition, worth,
553,3; 562,31; 569,2; 580,20; 607,19
axiopistos, trustworthy, 604,26
axioun, to maintain, think right,
557,22; 558,16; 564,19; 584,29; also
302b14.29
badizein, to proceed, 624,20 (with
304b8)
baros, weight, 91 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 32 in
Aristotle
barus, heavy, 115 occurrences in
Simplicius, 24 in Aristotle
baruts, heaviness, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
basis, base, 573,8; 574,8.19; 613,30;
614,2.3
bathos, depth, 562,28; 563,31; 573,5;
578,28.30 (both Alexander); 579,3
bebathusmenos, having depth,
562,27
beltin, better, 606,27 (with 302b27)
bia, constraint, 34 occurrences in
Simplicius, 20 in Aristotle
biaios, constrained, forced, 577,22;
584,11-19 (4 with 300b19); 619,11
biazesthai, to constrain, to be
constrained, 582,8.24.25.29;
594,10; 596,11
biblion, book, 551,6.17; 552,1.4.7.19;
584,31; 600,21; 614,32
blaptesthai, to be hurt, 566,20
blos, clod of earth, 582,4
boulsis, intention, 589,17
boulesthai, to mean, intend, wish,
want, 12 occurrences in Simplicius
(2 Alexander, 1 Plato), 8 in Aristotle
brakhin, arm, 587,1 (Empedocles);
606,18
brakhulogia, brevity of formulation,
586,6
brakhus, brief, 630,22
deiknunai, to show, prove, 130
occurrences in Simplicius (4
Alexander), 4 in Aristotle
deisas, afraid, 584,31
deisthai, to need, require, 554,26;
562,9; 598,18; 613,27
dekhesthai, to receive, accept, 578,26
(Alexander); 630,13
dlonoti, obviously, 554,25; 571,5;
578,10; 584,30; 586,22; 592,19;
609,11; 617,6
dlos, clear, 44 occurrences in
 Greek-English Index
Simplicius (1 Melissus), 12 in
Aristotle
dltikos, indicative, 633,9
dloun, to make clear, indicate,
mean, 18 occurrences in
Simplicius, 1 in Aristotle
dmiourgikos, demiurgic, 576,18;
578,13; 587,30; 588,6; 609,2
diabebaiousthai, to insist, 565,31
diaduesthai, to penetrate, 610,20
diairein, to divide, distinguish, 40
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 7 in Aristotle
diairesis, division, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
diairetikos, dividing, 564,28
diairetos, divisible, 50 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 12 in
Aristotle
diaitasthai, to treat, 576,19
diakas, burning, 602,9
diakosmein, to put in order, 580,14;
590,3; 609,3
diakosmsis, (cosmic) ordering,
558,8.16; 587,29; 608,31; 609,4
diakrinein, to separate, distinguish,
12 occurrences in Simplicius, 2 in
Aristotle
diakrisis, separation, 586,29; 587,19;
590,5 (2, both Alexander).27; 591,1;
632,4.7
diakritikos, separating, 564,28
dialambanesthai, to be divided,
558,20; 610,6; 634,29
dialegein, to take issue with, to
discuss, 556,30; 598,6; 612,17
dialogos, dialogue, 561,11
dialuein, to dissolve, 28 occurrences
in Simplicius (4 Alexander, 1
Plato), 6 in Aristotle
dialusis, dissolution, 21 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander), 5 in
Aristotle
diamenein, to endure, 634,3
(h) diametros, diagonal, 574,19; 583,5
diapherein, to differ, disagree, 45
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 10 in Aristotle
diapheugein, to avoid, 620,7 (with
304a8)
diaphnia, discord, disagreement,
555,32; 603,11
diaphora, difference, differentia, 33
155
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle
diaphoros, different, 565,7; 574,6;
632,3
diarthroun, to articulate, 566,18
diaskhmatizesthai, to be given
shape, 564,2
diaskopein, to investigate, 555,31
diastasis, separation, 585,18 (with
300b25)
diastma, distance, 28 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
diataxis, decree, 594,30
diathesis, condition, 584,14; 590,25
diatribein, to concern oneself, 555,26
diazgraphein, to paint, 565,7
didaskein, to teach, explain,
551,13.17; 554,26; 558,4; 562,12
digeisthai, to describe, 602,7
dieinai, to pass through, 565,19
dikein, to extend, 555,4
dielenkhein, to refute, 598,6; 612,17
dierkhesthai, to go through, 552,7;
583,4.7 (both with 300b5); also
298a27
diests, extended, 571,23
diexasmenos, dispersed, 571,6
diistanai, to separate, divide,
distinguish, 561,1; 590,21 (with
301a14); 634,12 (Alexander); see
also diests
dikhs, in two ways, 567,32; 568,24
(both with 299a20); 575,5
din, vortex, 583,1.2 (both with 300b3)
dirismenos, determinate, discrete,
14 occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander), 1 in Aristotle
diorismos, distinction, 594,26
diorizein, to determine, distinguish,
11 occurrences in Simplicius, 7 in
Aristotle; see also dirismenos
diplasios, double, 622,2
ddekaedron, dodecahedron, 574,21;
also 307a16
dokein, to seem, to be thought, 47
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Melissus, 2 Anaxagoras, 2
Alexander, 1 Parmenides, 1
Aristotle), 3 in Aristotle
doksis, impression, 599,26
doxa, view, belief, opinion, 38
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Parmenides, 1 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle
156 Greek-English Index
dran, to do, 578,14
drastrion, active power, 615,23
dromos, race, 597,4
dunamei, potentially, tacitly, 19
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander), 6 in Aristotle
dunamis, power, potentiality, 59
occurrences in Simplicius (1 Plato,
1 Alexander), 7 in Aristotle; see
also dunamei
dunasthai, to be possible, able, 24
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander, 1 Melissus), 2 in
Aristotle
dunatos, possible, able, 36
occurrences in Simplicius (1 Plato,
1 Alexander), 5 in Aristotle
duskhereia, difficulty, 552,13
(Aristotle)
duskhers, difficult, 622,1 (with
304a22)
eidenai, to understand, know, be
aware of, 566,12 (Plato); 582,8;
594,23; 600,14; 608,26 (Anaxagoras)
eidopoieisthai, to be given form,
562,17; 576,12; 606,18
eidos, form, kind, species, 94
occurrences in Simplicius (9
Alexander, 1 Melissus, 1 TL), 5 in
Aristotle
eikos, plausible, reasonable, 560,21;
566,11 (Plato); 597,24; 619,20
eikots, reasonably, naturally, 11
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
eilikrins, pure, 573,25
eis apeiron, ad infinitum, 583,3 (2
with 300b1 and 4); 585,23 (with
300b14); 593,23; 624,20.25 (both
with 304b8)
ekballein, to reject, expel, 576,2;
602,10
ekdekhesthai, to understand, 568,19;
610,14
ekkhrein, to depart, 630,8
ekkrinesthai, to be separated out, 19
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander), 5 in Aristotle
ekkrisis, separation out, 19
occurrences in Simplicius, 2 in
Aristotle
eklegesthai, to pick out, single out,
566,8 (Plato); 626,27; 629,4
ekphainein, to disclose, 556,17;
558,18
ekteinesthai, to extend, 622,15
ektithesthai, to set out, 598,27;
609,27; 611,13.19; 626,25
ektrepein, to turn away from, 591,12
elakhistos, fewest, least, 606,29.31
(both with 302b28); 629,30
elattn, fewer, lesser, smaller,
shorter, 54 occurrences in
Simplicius (21 Alexander), 11 in
Aristotle
elaunein, to drive, 597,5
elenkhein, to refute, 591,27; 600,10;
626,26
elenkhos, refutation, 560,3; 611,3
elleiptiks, elliptically, 597,13
ellips, elliptical, 597,23
emblepein, to look at, 599,25
emphainein, to indicate, 570,22; see
also emphainesthai
emphainesthai, to appear, 599,23
emphasis, appearance, 599,24.25
enallax, by alternation
(mathematical term), 593,1.15
enantiologia, contradiction, 610,13
enantios, contrary, 26 occurrences in
Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle; enantia
legein translated contradict; see
also hupenantios
enantisis, contrariety, opposition,
603,24; 608,3.4
enapodein, to bind, 596,21
enargeia, clarity, 633,22; ek ts
enargeias lambanein translated as
to assume as clearly true at
581,6.10; 582,2; 591,9; 633,27
enargs, clear, clearly true, 12
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
endeiknusthai, to indicate, 560,24;
584,3; 595,4; 608,25.31; 609,3;
614,8; 630,26
endeixis, indication, 565,26
endekhesthai, to be possible, 575,10
(with 299b24.29); 577,24-578,17 (6
(1 Alexander) with 300a11); 579,22
(with 300a13); 622,6 (with 304a24)
endidonai, to bestow, 596,23
endoxon, common opinion, 612,18
(with 303a22)
eneinai, to be possible, to be
contained in, 590,3; 601,31-602,13
 Greek-English Index
(5 with 302a32); 608,24; 609,26
(both Anaxagoras)
energeia, actuality, 573,22.27; 602,22
(with 302a24); 628,13; 632,22;
635,5; see also energeiai
energeiai (dat.), actually, actual, 24
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle
energein, to act, be active, activate,
553,25; 578,13; 596,9.11.18.19
engignesthai, to come to be in,
564,17; 576,7
enhulos, involving matter, material,
564,1; 565,4; 573,5; 578,25
(Alexander); 579,27
enhuparkhein, to inhere, 30
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 11 in Aristotle
enidein, to recognise, 576,19; 631,8;
632,9
enistanai, to object, 604,25
enkalein, to censure, 557,1
enklma, criticism, 562,21
enkrinein, to accept, 636,16
enkuklis, in a circle, 565,32; 594,18
ennoein, to understand, recognise,
557,4.8; 579,4
ennoia, conception, meaning, 562,8;
566,19; 603,10; 630,1
enokhlein, to be troublesome, 604,27
enstasis, objection, 566,23; 578,2;
598,19; 612,22; 623,8
enthade, in this world, 599,16.21
eoikenai, to seem, resemble, 560,3
(Aristotle); 597,21; 608,31; 610,4;
630,3; also 298b32; 301a11; 305a3
epagein, to adduce, introduce, add,
say, 37 occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
epagg, induction, 553,9; 601,30
epallaxis, interlocking, 609,25 (with
303a8, on which see the note at
609,14)
epamphoterizein, to be like both,
596,14
ep apeiron, to infinity, 25
occurrences in Simplicius (5
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
epekhein, to occupy, 633,14.26;
634,31 (all 3 with 305b11); see also
katekhein
epektasis, expansion, 633,27-634,28
(7 with 305b18)
157
epekteinesthai, to expand,
634,1.20.23
epeoikenai, to resemble, 580,16
(Pythagorean saying)
epharmog, coincidence, 574,4
epharmozein, to fit, 557,9; 558,14;
575,7.8
ephkein, to come to, 587,30
ephexs, next, 18 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
ephiesthai, to desire, 587,9
ephistanein, to point out, raise the
question, notice, 570,24; 584,23
(with 300b21); 585,5; 613,27; 623,4;
624,27
epideiknunai, to indicate, 566,20
epigraphein, to entitle, 556,25.30;
557,11
epikheirein, to argue, 582,24;
605,23; 633,29
epikheirma, argument, 17
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
epikheirsis, argument, 579,15;
633,31; 635,4.6
epikrateia, rule, dominance, 587,12;
604,8; 606,1
epikratein, to rule, dominate,
587,21.24.25; 606,6; 632,15
epilambanein, to take up (space),
633,11; 634,3.8.28 (all 4 with
305b19)
epileipein, to give out, 612,29(2);
613,2; 635,26
epinoia, thought, 567,13; 598,28
epipedon, plane (figure), 119
occurrences in Simplicius (8
Alexander, 1 TL, 1 Plato), 16 in
Aristotle
epiphaneia, surface, 562,24.25.27(2)
epipherein, to add, 560,4; 588,17;
614,11
epiphora, conclusion, 553,31; 569,18;
601,29
epipolaios, superficial, 557,20
epipothein, to yearn, 641,8
epismainein, to disapprove of,
573,12
episkeptesthai, to investigate,
568,22; 626,19; also 299a10;
episkepteon occurs at 568,20 (with
299a25), 304b23, and 305a33
epistasthai, to know, 600,14
epistm, science, knowledge,
158 Greek-English Index
554,1.19 (Aristotle); 556,17; 557,6;
560,6(2); 563,7; 612,11.19 (both
with 303a21); 622,4
epistmonikos, scientific, 557,5;
562,31; 607,1
epitdeios, suitable, satisfying,
564,16; 596,12
epitdeiots, suitability, 587,31
epitithesthai, to be laid next to,
575,1-9 (3 with 299b28)
epiztein, to seek, 565,27
epthein, to push, 596,22.32
epsukhmenos, having soul, 552,10
eptugmenos, folded, 632,29
remein, to rest, be at rest, 26
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 5 in Aristotle
remia, rest, 582,13 (with 300a27);
583,10 (with 300b7); 590,6.9 (both
Alexander)
ergds, difficult, 627,10
erion, wool, 632,30
ertan, to ask, 564,21; 582,15.29;
583,1; 586,6.13(2)
ertsis, question, 586,13
eskhara, scab, 602,9
eskhatos, extreme, last, outermost,
559,24 (Parmenides); 575,24;
587,14 (Empedocles); 608,4(2)
ethos, custom, 557,19
eualloitos, volatile, 615,21
eukintos, easily moved, 594,10;
596,17
eulogos, reasonable, 10 occurrences
in Simplicius (1 Alexander), 3 in
Aristotle
eupaths, easily affected, 628,21.26
euperilptos, easily grasped, 605,33
euphthartos, easily destroyed,
628,19-28 (4 with 305a6)
euphus, naturally adapted, 615,15
eutheia, straight line, 11 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander), 0 in
Aristotle
euthugrammos, rectlinear, 14
occurrences in Simplicius, 2 in
Aristotle
euthunein, to criticise, 556,25; 583,18
euthuporein, to move in a straight
line, 594,25; 597,7
euthus, immediately, straightaway,
564,30; 592,4
exaerizomenos, evaporated, 571,8
exallattesthai, to change
(intransitive), 599,27
exammenos, carded (wool), 632,30
exatmizomenos, vaporised, 602,12
exgeisthai, to interpret, explain,
555,18; 564,12; 591,6; 622,25
exgsis, interpretation, 576,2; 619,9;
634,9
exgts, interpreter, 564,11; 591,2;
613,27
exirsthai, to transcend, 555,5;
591,24
exelenkhein, to dismiss, 557,1
exerkhesthai, to come out, 602,8
exetastikos, examining, 566,18
exetazein, to examine, 562,13
exthein, to push out, 569,7
exthen, external, 597,10
exumnein, sing the praises of, 580,15
g, earth, 90 occurrences in
Simplicius (17 Alexander, 3
Melissus, 1 TL, 1 Plato), 13 in
Aristotle
genesis, coming to be, generation,
114 occurrences in Simplicius (4
Alexander, 1 Parmenides, 1 Plato),
16 in Aristotle
gentos, coming to be (adjective), 20
occurrences in Simplicius, 3 in
Aristotle
gennan, to generate, 21 occurrences
in Simplicius (5 Alexander, 1 TL),
4 in Aristotle
gennma, offspring, 588,2
genntikos, generative, 610,19;
611,8; 622,19
genos, genus, 555,10; 565,1; 599,8;
601,17
gemetria, geometry, 563,8
gemetrikos, geometrical, 562,21.32
gemetros, geometer, 562,23
gignesthai, to come to be, 264
occurrences in Simplicius (21
Alexander, 7 Melissus, 2 Hesiod, 2
Plato, 1 Parmenides), 38 in
Aristotle
gignskein, to know, understand,
559,5 (Melissus); 606,30;
608,27.29.30 (Anaxagoras)
gleukos, sweet wine, 633,22
glukuts, sweetness, 572,13; 599,12
gnm, understanding, 558,18
 Greek-English Index
gnrizein, to know, understand,
600,15; 619,11
gnsis, knowledge, 556,5; 557,5 (both
with 298b23); 560,27; 600,17 (with
302a11); 607,1; 608,28
gnstos, knowable, 606,32
gnia, angle, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
gramm, line, 172 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 16 in
Aristotle
grammikos, linear, 574,5
graphein, to write, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius, 3 in Aristotle
guion, limb, 587,18
gumnoun, to remove clothing, 587,30
hairetos, worthy of choice,
570,7-20(8); haireta translated
matters of choice at 555,26
hamartma, mistake, 611,13.17
(both with 303a17); also 304b11
hapls, absolutely, simply, without
qualification, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius, 4 in Aristotle
haploun, to unfold, 632,29
haplous, simple, 121 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 16 in
Aristotle
haptesthai, to be in contact, 609,21
haptos, tangible, 565,5
harmozein, to fit, be suitable, 573,6;
585,26; 623,7.8 (both Alexander);
624,17
hgoumenon, antecedent (of a
conditional), 553,1.11
hkista, least (adverb), 558,9
helkein, to drag, 593,25
hmartsthai, to be mistaken, 630,3
hmitrignon, half-triangle (the
word used by TL for the right
triangle with angles of 30 and 60
degrees), 561,13.18
hensis, unity, unification, 558,15;
609,1,2
henoun, to unite, unify, 590,2.13;
591,6; 608,32; 612,16; 627,23
(Alexander); 635,16
hepesthai, to follow, be a consequent
or consequence, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle
hetairos, pupil, 615,13.18
hetoimos, easy, 565,13; 581,8
159
heuriskein, to find, 585,1; 597,18.21;
601,1; 626,23.28; 629,4
hikanos, sufficient, adequate, 588,3;
596,24; 612,3
himation, cloak, 632,28
hippos, horse, 578,17
histanai, to stand, stop, 12
occurrences in Simplicius, 3 in
Aristotle
historein, to report, recount,
describe, 564,24; 576,14; 600,20;
602,6; 621,14.16
historia, enquiry, 552,27; 553,12
(both with 298b2)
holos, whole, entire, 30 occurrences
in Simplicius, 3 in Aristotle; see
also hols
hols, in general, entirely, at all, 22
occurrences in Simplicius, 8 in
Aristotle
holots, entirety, 595,3(2).6(2)
homals, in a uniform way, 565,33
homoeids, of the same kind, 628,19
homoiomereia, homoiomereity, 11
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle; see also homoiomers
homoiomers, homoiomerous (the
neuter usually translated
homoiomery), 32 occurrences in
Simplicius,7 in Aristotle; see the
note on 601,12
homoios, similar, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Melissus), 0 in
Aristotle; see also homois
homois, similarly, in the same way,
11 occurrences in Simplicius, 4 in
Aristotle
homoioskhmos, having the same
shape, 625,3
homoiots, similarity, 566,2; 575,30;
576,2
homologein, to agree, 559,6
(Melissus); 569,10.17; 591,26;
603,29; 616,14
homnumos, having the same name,
561,11
homou, together, 590,2; 608,21.23
(both Anaxagoras); 608,32
horan, to see, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius (4 Melissus, 1
Alexander), 4 in Aristotle
horistikos, definitional, 566,28
horizein, to define, specify, 571,4;
572,7; 601,2; 607,3.12; 608,29;
160 Greek-English Index
616,31; 617,28 (Alexander); 625,1;
see also horizon, hrizesthai
hrizesthai, to be determinate or
definite or defined, 13 occurrences
in Simplicius (4 Alexander), 0 in
Aristotle
horizon, horizon, 613,20.32
hormasthai, to arise from, 566,23
horos, definition, 562,23; 607,13
(Alexander).19
hs etukhe, in a random way,
589,21-4 (3 with 301a11)
hudatoumenos, liquefied, 571,9
hudr, water, 125 occurrences in
Simplicius (26 Alexander, 1
Melissus, 1 TL), 19 in Aristotle
hugiazesthai, to be cured,
595,26.27.28
hugis, correctly, 560,9; 605,17
hugrots, moisture, 602,12
hul, matter, 33 occurrences in
Simplicius (5 Alexander, 1 TL, 1
Aristotle), 1 in Aristotle
hupantan, to deal with, discuss,
object to, 13 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
huparkhein, to belong, to exist, 22
occurrences in Simplicius, 6 in
Aristotle
hupeikein, to withdraw, 571,22 (2
with 299b13 and 14(2))
hupenantios, contrary, 563,12 (with
299a4); see also enantios
huperekhein, to exceed, 15
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
huperokh, excess, 569,26;
617,30.32; 622,22(2); 625,10.11
hupertithesthai, to set aside, 566,24
huphests, fixed, 599,27
huphistanai, to produce (565,8;
575,24); to sink to the bottom
(596,15); to suppose (628,11); see
also huphests
huphizanein, to sink down, 569,7
hupodeiknunai, to indicate, 588,1.5;
591,1
hupokeisthai, to underlie, be a
substratum or subject, be assumed,
18 occurrences in Simplicius (1
TL), 1 in Aristotle
hupolambanein, to assume,
557,3.14; 558,12; 559,14 (all 4 with
298b22); 566,5
hupoleipein, to give out, be
insufficient, 635,21 (with 305b20);
also 303a27; see also
hupoleipesthai
hupoleipesthai, to remain, be left
over, 572,21; 602,12; 631,32;
635,21 (with 305b24)
hupomenein, to endure, undergo,
561,3 (with 298b31).28; 568,9;
627,4.9
hupomimnskein, to recall, mention,
551,2; 554,28; 620,11
hupomnsis, recollection, 551,25
hupo selnn, sublunary, 20
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle; see also huposelnos
huposelnos, sublunary, 595,5.12;
629,21; see also hupo selnn
hupostasis, reality, 557,3.21
hupothesis, hypothesis, 13
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 2 in Aristotle
hupothetikos, hypothetical,
552,25.31; 607,24
hupotithenai, to hypothesise, 68
occurrences in Simplicius (1 Plato,
1 Alexander), 4 in Aristotle
hupotopein, to surmise, 629,3
hupourgein, to contribute to, 597,11
husterizein, to fall more slowly,
693,16 (with 310a10)
husteros, later, posterior, 569,5;
581,18; 590,20; 597,9; 621,1;
631,18; 634,33
iatrik, art of medicine, 595,28.30
iatros, physician, 595,26; 602,7
idea, form, 609,7 (Anaxagoras).11
idein, to see, 566,25; 575,28
idios, ones own, specific, 561,19;
568,1; 591,7; 593,14; 612,10
iditiks, amateurish, 564,25;
576,14
ienai, to proceed, move, 570,2;
583,29.30; 584,20.26 (all 4 with
300b1.14); 597,28; 630,25
ismerinos (kuklos), celestial
equator, 613,32
iskhiadikos, suffering from sciatica,
602,7
iskhion, hip, 602,7
isognios, equiangular, 574,22
isopleuros, equilateral, 561,12;
574,7.8.10.11.14.22; 575,33; 614,2
 Greek-English Index
isorrhopos, having equal impulsion,
576,26
isos, equal, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius, 7 in Aristotle; see also
iss
iss, presumably, perhaps, 10
occurrences in Simplicius, 2 in
Aristotle
isoskels, isosceles, 561,13.19; 564,8
(TL); 566,6 (Plato); 574,17; 575,34;
614,1
isots, equality, 565,22
kaiein, to burn, 610,21
kainopreps, new, novel, 562,16;
563,1
kainos, recent, 562,1
kalein, to call, 18 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 0 in
Aristotle
kalos, beautiful, good, 566,7-13 (3, all
Plato); 597,2; see also kals
kals, correctly well, 13 occurrences
in Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle
katalambanein, to occupy, 633,14
(with 305b12)
katalgein, to come to an end,
563,19; 627,5; 628,30
kataleipesthai, to remain, 567,15;
573,1.2; 630,20
katalimpanein, to leave, 591,7
katalogadn, in prose, 558,17
katanosis, recognising, 562,22
kataphatikos, affirmative, 620,16
kataskeuazein, to construct,
establish, 590,28 (with 301a17);
604,25; 609,10 (Anaxagoras)
kataskeu, construction, 591,3
katastasis, condition, 587,18; 590,9
(Alexander).16
kata sumbebkos, accidentally,
567,33; 568,4 (both with 299a21
and 22)
katgoria, category, 617,8
katgoriks, categorically, 571,12.20;
608,6
katekhein, to occupy, 571,21;
629,24(2); 633,15-30(7); 634,15
(Alexander).27
kath hauto, kath hautn, per se, in
itself, 19 occurrences in Simplicius,
0 in Aristotle
kath hekaston, particular, 552,21;
554,16 (both with 298b5)
161
kath ho, insofar as, 619,20; 625,22;
see also kath hoson
kath hoson, insofar as, 603,12;
619,16.19; see also kath ho
katholikos, universal, 568,15
katholou, universally, generally, as a
whole, 554,14; 568,16.30; 605,18;
622,8; 631,3
kat, down, 24 occurrences in
Simplicius, 3 in Aristotle
katorthoun, to go right, be correct,
581,22; 600,5
katthen, from below, 581,31
kausis, burning, 602,11
kausoun, to set on fire, 602,8
keisthai, to be assumed, 604,10
kenkhros, millet seed, 570,7(1)
kenos, void, empty, 37 occurrences in
Simplicius (3 Alexander), 8 in
Aristotle
kentron, centre, 574,18; 614,2; see
also mesos
Khaos, Chaos, 556,8 (Hesiod).
560,17.18 (Hesiod).24.25(2)
kharakterizesthai, to be
characterised, 564,21; 606,1; 632,15
kharients, elegantly, 561,31
kheisthai, to be rarefied, spread out,
633,16; 634,14.16.17 (all 3 Alexander)
khra, room, space, 579,25; 598,18;
634,20; see also topos
khrein, to contain, 598,18;
629,27.28.30
khristos, separate, 634,22
khrizesthai, to be separated, 18
occurrences in Simplicius, 1 in
Aristotle
khrasthai, to use, 16 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle
khrma, thing, 590,3; 608,21.24 (both
Anaxagoras).32; 609,7 (Anaxagoras)
khrsis, way of speaking, 553,5
khrma, colour, 567,32 (with
299a21); 599,8.9.19
khronos, time, 49 occurrences in
Simplicius (5 Alexander), 10 in
Aristotle
khrusos, gold, 558,24; 559,3 (both
Melissus); 606,5.7; 621,22
(Alexander)
khusis, spreading, 634,4.11
(Alexander)
kinein, to cause motion or change, to
162 Greek-English Index
move or change (transitive), 38
occurrences in Simplicius, 11 in
Aristotle; see also kineisthai
kineisthai, to be moved or changed,
to move or change (intransitive),
281 occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander), 29 in Aristotle; see also
pheresthai
kinsis, motion, change, 236
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander, 1 Aristotle), 29 in
Aristotle; see also phora
kintikos, kinetic, 596,21
kintos, moving, 581,15
koinnia, communion, 554,12
koinopoiein, to assimilate, 617,22
koinos, common, general, 22
occurrences in Simplicius, 1 in
Aristotle
koinots, common thing, 599,11.23
kluein, to prevent, 16 occurrences in
Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle
kompsos, elaborate, 620,14.25 (both
with 304a13)
koruph, vertex, 574,7.18; to kata
koruphn ts sphaires translated
pole of the sphere at 613,31
kosmeisthai, to be given a cosmic
order, 589,21
kosmikos, cosmic, 591,1
kosmopoia, making of the cosmos,
586,2; 588,4; 590,26; 591,15
kosmopoiein, to make the cosmos,
589,28; 590,2.4(Alexander).13.32
(all 5 with 301a30)
kosmos, cosmos (plural: worlds), 43
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander, 1 Parmenides at 558,7,
where translated ordering), 3 in
Aristotle
kouphos, light, 53 occurrences in
Simplicius, 12 in Aristotle
kouphots, lightness, 42 occurrences
in Simplicius (1 Alexander), 7 in
Aristotle
kranion, skull, 606,18
krasis, blending, 612,20; 628,16
kratein, to rule, dominate, prevail,
566,2.9 (Plato); 599,13
krinein, to judge, 633,4
kuathos, cup, 629,30
kubikos, cubical, 565,8.9(2)
kuklikos, moving in a circle, 594,26
kuklophoria, circular motion, 554,4
kuklos, circle, 582,1.6;
587,14(Empedocles); 588,19;
591,24; 607,17; 613,30.31; 614,17
kukloun, to recirculate, 582,27 (with
300a33)
kuklophortikos, moving in a circle,
551,5.6; 555,5.10.11; 598,5; 600,7
kumainein, to swell, 599,32
kurios, authoritative, 566,28; see also
kuris
kuris, in the strict sense, 552,3;
554,2; 561,2; 570,16; 573,22; 585,9;
614,7
lambanein, to take, assume, 38
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander), 7 in Aristotle; to en
arkhi lambanein translated as to
beg the question at 626,28 and
629,3
lanthanein, to not notice, be
unaware, to do unobtrusively,
588,28.29; 615,29 (with 303b16);
also 305b2
leiots, smoothness, 610,21
leipein, to lack, 597,14; see also
leipesthai
leipesthai, to remain, 629,1.15.17;
also 305a32
lmma, lemma, 572,12
leptomers, having fine parts, 13
occurrences in Simplicius, 6 in
Aristotle
leptos, fine, 24 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 7 in
Aristotle
leptots, fineness, 616,29 (with
303b24).30 (with 303b25); 625,10.11
leukos, white, light, 558,25
(Melissus); 567,33 (with 299a22);
572,15 (3 with 299b21(3))
lexis, phrase, words, text, 597,13;
618,17 (Alexander); 630,1
lithos, stone, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius (3 Melissus), 2 in
Aristotle
logos, argument, discussion, account,
statement, speech, text, theory,
view, doctrine, reasoning,
definition, ratio, 118 occurrences in
Simplicius (14 Alexander, 1
Parmenides, 1 Melissus, 1
Anaxagoras, 1 TL, 1 Plato), 15 in
Aristotle
 Greek-English Index
loipos, remaining, next, final, 19
occurrences in Simplicius, 3 in
Aristotle
loxos, oblique, 582,5
luein, to resolve, 581,28; 598,19;
623,8; 627,20
lusis, resolution, 582,9
makar, blessed, 580,14 (Pythagorean
saying)
makhesthai, to be in conflict with,
612,10 (with 303a21); 622,3
makros, long, 582,23
malakos, soft, 571,19-24 (4 with
299b11 and 13)
manos, rare, 14 occurrences in
Simplicius, 4 in Aristotle
mansis, rarefaction, 565,16; 599,31;
616,3.5.8.14.19.20
manots, rareness, 615,27.28 (both
with 303b15); 616,21.24.28 (all 3
with 303b23); 620,3
manousthai, to be rarefied, 599,13;
616,7.10
manteia, prophetic power, 613,26
marainesthai, to waste away, 628,25
(with 305a11)
mastix, whip, 597,4
mathmata, mathematics, 562,31;
563,12 (both with 299a4);
566,23.28; 567,7.9; 606,28 (with
302b29)
mathmatikos, mathematical, 30
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle; ho
mathmatikos translated
mathematician at 606,33 and
612,12
megalomers, having large parts,
571,11; 617,2 (with 303b27);
622,25.29; 625,8
megas, large, great, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle; see also
meizn and megistos
megethos, size, magnitude,
largeness, 45 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander, 1
Aristotle), 16 in Aristotle
megistos, largest, greatest, 558,21
(Melissus); 594,10; 612,27-9 (3 with
303a28); 613,31; 629,29
meiousthai, to contract, 565,17
meizn, greater, larger, 70
occurrences in Simplicius (23
163
Alexander, 1 Empedocles), 13 in
Aristotle
mkhanik, mechanics, 563,7
mkos, length, 12 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 2 in
Aristotle
melas, dark, black, 558,24 (Melissus);
567,33 (with 299a22)
menein, to remain, endure, 560,15;
599,28; 634,26; also 300a29 and 30
and 300b6
meristos, divisible into parts, 612,17
meros, part, 67 occurrences in
Simplicius (3 Alexander, 2 Plato), 6
in Aristotle; ta kata meros
translated particulars
mros, thigh, 606,19
msembrinos (kuklos), meridian,
633,9
mesiteuein, to lie in between, 633,9
mesos, intermediate, 20 occurrences
in Simplicius (1 Plato), 6 in
Aristotle; to meson usually
translated centre; dia mesou
translated by means of at 571,18
mestos, filled, 598,16
metabainein, to turn, go, 609,17;
624,17; 628,4; 630,10
metaballein, to change, 561,18.20;
575,34; 613,4; 632,25 (with 305b5)
metabasis, change, 553,28 (with
298b1); 615,5; also 305b14 and 27
metabol, change, 11 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 0 in
Aristotle
metalambanein, to take, receive a
share, transform, 596,32; 597,2;
624,27; 631,11
metapherein, to transfer, 557,8;
558,14; 560,8 (all 3 with 298b24)
metaphora, metaphorical expression,
597,3
metaskhmatizesthai, to be
transformed, 561,6 (with 298b31)
metaxu, (intermediate) between, 15
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle, to metaxu usually
translated intermediate
metekhein, to share in, 570,18.19
methodos, discipline, 563,5
metienai, to turn to, 555,1; 584,9;
615,10; 630,19
metokhos, sharing in, 552,11
metriots, measuredness, 554,2
164 Greek-English Index
metron, measure, 600,1
migma, mixture, 606,7; 621,20;
632,18; also 302b1
mignusthai, to be mixed, 17
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Empedocles), 2 in Aristotle
mikromers, having small parts,
617,1 (with 303b27); 622,25 (with
304a16); 624,18-22 (3 with
304b9).26.28; 625,7
mikros/smikros, small, 14
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Anaxagoras, 1 Aristotle, 1
Alexander), 3 in Aristotle
mikrots/smikrots, smallness, 19
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Anaxagoras), 5 in Aristotle
miktos, mixed, 588,20; 604,6-7 (3
with 302b6.7(2)); also 302b16
mixis, mixture, 12 occurrences in
Simplicius, 1 in Aristotle
mnm, mention, 551,9
mnmoneuein, to mention, 603,7.9
mokhleia, levering, 583,29
monakhs, in one way, 581,22
monas, monad, one, unitary thing, 15
occurrences in Simplicius, 1 in
Aristotle
mon, rest, 551,12; 590,6.7 (both
Alexander)
monoguios, consisting of a single
limb, 587,26
monos, only, 57 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Empedocles, 1
Alexander), 2 in Aristotle
morion, part, portion, 14 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander), 6 in
Aristotle
morphousthai, to be given shape,
565,4
muthos, myth, 560,22
nastots, solidity, 609,18
naus, ship, 597,1.3
Neikos, Strife (Empedocles), 21
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
(hoi) neteroi, more recent thinkers,
553,3; neteroi applied to Platonic
philosophers at 564,13
neuron, sinew, 606,19-20(3)
noein, to understand, 556,16 (with
298b22); 591,2
noeros, intellectual, 588,1; 599,24
notos, intelligible, 11 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
nomizein, to think, consider, 15
occurrences in Simplicius, 1 in
Aristotle
(ho) nosn, ill person, 595,26-30(4)
nosos, illness, 570,8
nous, mind, 552,11; 590,3; 608,28.30
(both Anaxagoras); 609,2 (both
references to Anaxagoras)
oiesthai, to think, 552,14; 582,3;
584,32; 597,23; 598,19; 608,27;
609,5; 613,27; also 302b12
oikeios, proper, appropriate, ones
own, 564,3; 585,14 (with 300b23);
607,19.30; 608,7 (all 3 with
302b31); 620,22.23; 625,20; also
300a22; 301a5; 302b5; 303b4
oligokhronios, lasting a short time,
597,9
oligos, few, small in amount, 565,13;
573,10 (Plato); 576,26 (Plato);
605,28; 623,2; also used with a
temporal sense in the phrases ep
oligon (for a short time), met oliga
(a little later), pro oligou (a little
earlier)
oligots, fewness, 576,25
onkos, bulk, mass, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 2 in
Aristotle
onoma, word, name, 556,27; 558,11
(Parmenides).16; 570,19; 602,3;
603,22
onomasia, being named, 560,27
onomazein, to name, 553,16
opheilein, to be obligated, 626,28
ophthalmos, eye, 602,5; 606,10
organikos, organic, 606,8
organon, instrument, 596,10 (with
301b22)
orthognios, right (said of a
triangle), 561,13.19; 564,7 (TL);
574,17; 575,33; 576,1
orthos, right, said of an angle:
574,10.21.24; 613,31; in moral
sense: 581,23; see also orths
orths, correctly, 558,26-559,9 (4, all
Melissus); 605,2 (with 302b15);
620,24
sis, pushing, 583,29
ostoun, bone, 573,23; 586,9 (with
300b29); 602,33 (with 302a26);
 Greek-English Index
603,18 (with 302a32); 605,5.15
(both with 302b17); 606,18.20(2)
thein, to push, 593,25; 597,1 (with
301b24)
oura, tail (of an animal), 597,4
ouraion, tail (of a ship), 597,2
ouranios, heavenly, 554,28; 555,2;
559,23 (Parmenides); 565,33;
578,14; 592,3; 595,5
ouranos, heaven, heavens, 13
occurrences in Simplicius, 4 in
Aristotle
ourios, tail (wind), 597,2
ousia, substance, 25 occurrences in
Simplicius, 5 in Aristotle
pakhumers, with thick parts,
615,29; 622,15 (with 304a31);
633,17
pakhus, thick, 616,30; 617,1 (both
with 303b25 and 27);
621,19.22.24.25 (last 2
Alexander).30; 623,1
pakhuts, thickness, 616,29.30 (both
with 303b24 and 26); 621,24
(Alexander)
pantakhou, everywhere, in every
case, always, 560,3; 583,6; 599,13;
627,11
panti, in every respect, entirely,
565,28; 566,4; 574,11; 586,18;
599,10
pantels, completely, 555,23; 608,28;
631,20
pantodapos, of all sorts, 551,6; 610,27
pantoios, of every sort, 609,6.7 (both
Anaxagoras); 623,17
pants, always, absolutely, certainly,
11 occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
paraballein, to cast aside, compare,
562,33; 601,1; 620,25
parabol, comparison, 551,12
paradeigma, example, 586,27; 587,3;
621,21 (Alexander); 628,23
paradeiknunai, to represent, point
out, 588,7; 621,21 (Alexander)
paradidonai, to set out, transmit,
551,7; 558,8.15; 559,27; 561,11;
562,16; 564,2.9; 596,22 (with
301b26); 603,24
paragein, to bring in, adduce,
566,28; 579,11; 596,24
paragignesthai, to arrive, 579,9
165
paragraphein, to make a charge,
558,13
paraiteisthai, to refrain from, 556,30
parakolouthein, to follow along,
596,25 (with 301b27)
paralambanein, to take, 577,27;
579,7; 584,14
paraleipein, to pass over, leave out,
fail to mention, 589,2; 590,25;
591,2.3.6 (all 4 with 301a16);
611,14
paraleiptikon skhma, paralipsis,
566,27
paralogizesthai, to reason
incorrectly, 557,20
parapempesthai, to dismiss, 561,26
pararriptein, to throw out, 609,27
parasunaptikos, causal (connective),
553,2.3
parathesis, juxtaposition, 612,21
paratithenai, to set out, introduce,
560,14; 565,26; 619,9
parekbainein, to deviate, 581,23
parekbasis, deviation, 581,24
parekhein, to produce, supply,
564,29; 584,24; 634,21
paremballesthai, to be inserted,
552,30
paremplok, interweaving, 634,34
paremptsis, intervention, 634,11
(Alexander).23
paresparmenos, interspersed,
634,10.18.22.28
parienai, to pass over, 562,6.22
paristanai, to make a point, confirm,
587,29; 609,5
paruphestkenai, to be derivative
from, 583,26; 584,17
paskhein, to be subject to, be acted
on, undergo, 553,26; 597,16; 616,2;
634,30; also 305a9 and 11
pathma, affection, 568,3 (with
299a23)
pathtikos, affective, 564,16;
600,12.27
pathos, affection, 30 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Aristotle), 3 in
Aristotle
pauein, to cease, 558,5 (Parmenides);
602,8; 627,2
peirasthai, to try, 564,14; 575,27;
also 306b3
peisis, being acted upon, 578,14
plos, clay, 573,26
166 Greek-English Index
pemptos, fifth, 552,9; 553,15; 555,5;
601,16 (only references to the fifth
element included here)
pentagnon, pentagon, 574,22.23
peperanthai, to be finite, 608,5 (with
303a1); also 303b9; see also
peperasmenos
peperasmenos, finite, finitely many,
bounded, 73 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 13 in
Aristotle
pephukenai, to be (naturally)
constituted, 565,18; 574,26;
581,15.16.17; 582,4(2); 592,15;
599,14; 631,16; also 298b32 and
301b23
pepossthai, to be determined
quantitatively, 564,30
peras, limit, end, 557,17 (Melissus);
563,14; 574,5; 577,2; 619,24
peratoun, to limit, 608,29; 613,21
periagein, to lead around, 582,6;
623,19
periekhein, to contain, 574,8; 575,21;
614,25 (with 303b12); 618,18.25
(both Alexander); 630,7.12(2);
633,24 (with 305b15)
periektikos, containing, 568,4
perigraph, circumscription, 629,27
perigraphein, to circumscribe,
594,28; 635,19
perilambanein, to include, 567,29;
568,26
perileipesthai, to remain, 629,17
(hoi apo tou) Peripatou, the
Peripatetics, 599,28
periphereia, circularity, 610,21
periphers, circular, 604,11; 607,12
(Alexander)
peripherogrammos, circular, 614,7
peripiptein, to run into, 572,11
peristrephein, to rotate, 602,11
perittos, extraordinary, 558,13
(to) perix, periphery, 588,26; 631,1
phainesthai, to be obvious, 581,6
(with 300a22); 590,28; also 300a17
and 30; see also phainomena and
phainomenon
phainomena, phenomena, 565,32;
also 303a22
phainomenon, apparent meaning,
557,19; 560,3; 563,26; 566,17; 588,2
phaneros, evident, 14 occurrences in
Simplicius, 14 in Aristotle
pherein, to carry, 596,30; see also
pheresthai
pheresthai, to move (intransitive), 30
occurrences in Simplicius, 21 in
Aristotle; see also kineisthai
pheuktos, to be avoided, 555,26; 570,20
Philia, Love (referring to
Empedocles), 587,12; 590,20; see
also Philots
philos, dear, beloved, 561,31; 566,12
(Plato); 619,13(2)
philosophein, to philosophise, 555,25
(with 298b12); 556,19; 558,13
philosophia, philosophy, 556,21;
563,8
philosophos, philosopher, 554,2;
564,13
Philots, Love (referring to
Empedocles), 586,11.26.28;
587,9.17.21.24.25 (all 8 with
300b30); 590,25.29; 591,3 (all 3
with 301a16 and 18); see also Philia
phleps, vein, 606,19
phlox, flame, 602,6
phora, motion, 20 occurrences in
Simplicius, 1 in Aristotle; see also
kinsis
phthartos, perishing, perishable,
556,5; 599,15; 629,1 (with 305a13).8
phtheirein, to destroy, 553,29; see
also phtheiresthai
phtheiresthai, to perish, be
destroyed, 18 occurrences in
Simplicius (6 Alexander), 6 in
Aristotle
phthora, perishing, destruction,
553,28; 555,7; 578,5
(Alexander).16; 600,8.9; 627.28
(Alexander); 628,27 (with 305a8);
also 298b9.15
phulattein, to keep, preserve,
560,23; 627,32 (Alexander); 634,24
phusei, natural, by nature, 552,20.25;
553,6(2).7.10; 554,13 (all 7 with
298a27 and b5); 577,13; 581,14
(with 300a21); 592,5 (with 301a24);
also 303b19 and 21; see also (kata)
phusin
(h) phusik, study of nature, 551,20
(ho) phusikos, student of nature,
554,4; 556,24.25; 561,2; 562,9.15
phusikos, natural, 57 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 12 in
 Greek-English Index
Aristotle; see also phusiks, (h)
phusik and (ho) phusikos
phusiks, naturally, in a way
appropriate to the study of nature,
based on natural considerations,
553,24; 556,18 (with 298b18);
560,9; 573,5; 587,28; 620,26; 622,8
(with 304a25); 630,27
(huper (tn)) phusin, hypernatural,
553,8.10; 556,19.29
(kata) phusin, natural, naturally,
117 occurrences in Simplicius (6
Alexander), 28 in Aristotle; see also
phusei
(para) phusin, unnatural,
unnaturally, 58 occurrences in
Simplicius (6 Alexander), 9 in
Aristotle
phusiologein, to study nature,
560,20 (with 298b29)
phusiologia, doctrine of nature,
561,10; 564,10
phusiologos, natural philosopher,
590,18
phusis, nature, entity, 40 occurrences
in Simplicius (1 Plato, 1 Aristotle),
10 in Aristotle; see also phusei,
(huper (tn)) phusin, (kata) phusin,
(para) phusin
phuton, plant, 553,18.19 (both with
298a32); 586,9.10.21; 615,13
pileisthai, to be compressed, 632,29;
633,1
pilsis, compression, 632,32
piltikos, compressing, 564,29
pistis, belief, confirmation, 557,27
(Parmenides); 567,12
pistos, believable, trustworthy,
558,5 (Parmenides); 563,1 (with
299a5)
pistousthai, to confirm, give
credence, 601,29; 633,20
pithanos, persuasive, plausible,
562,2; 594,27; 604,27
planasthai, to wander, 587,2
(Empedocles).8.19
plasma, fiction, 572,9
plasmatds, artificial, 599,32
(hoi) Platnikoi, Platonists, 571,9
Platnikos, Platonic, 564,12.13; see
also (hoi) Platnikoi
platos, breadth, 11 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Alexander), 2 in
Aristotle
167
platukos, extended, 579,16
plazesthai, wander, 587,8
plmmelos, discordant, 587,31;
588,4; 591,16
pleonazein, to exceed, 567,28
plrs, full, 558,21; 630,4
plsiazein, to come near, 606,23;
610,21
plthos, number, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Anaxagoras), 3 in
Aristotle
plttein, to strike, 597,4
pleura, side, 574,19.20; 583,6
pneein, to blow, 597,1.3
pneumatousthai, to be vaporised,
633,23 (with 305b14)
poikilia, variegation, 565,31
poikilos, variegated, 565,4; 605,8
poion, quality, 565,22; 566,1
poiots, quality, 14 occurrences in
Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
polits, fellow citizen, 615,13.19
politiks, politically, 555,26
pollakhs, in many ways, 581,23.28
pollakhou, frequently, 603,22
pollakis, frequently, often, 556,27;
633,23
pollaplasios, multiple, 620,19.20
polueids, in many ways, 569,20
polutimtos, most honoured, 561,30
poros, pore, 598,16
poson, quantity, 13 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 3 in
Aristotle
potamos, river, 599,24
pous, foot, 560,1; 612,15
pragma, thing, 556,24; 580,5; 589,9
(with 301a8); 597,27; also 298b26
pragmateia, treatise, study,
551,2.21; 552,24; 554,19.24; 581,26;
604,9
pragmatoeids, complicated, 621,15
praktiks, practically, 555,25
praxis, practical activity, 552,11
proagesthai, to proceed, 607,24
proanastellein, to open up, 570,3
proaxioun, to prefer, 620,6
proballesthai, to be put forward,
611,3
problma, problem, 555,23
prodedeikhthai, to have been proved
previously, 592,7
prodlos, prima facie clear, 576,3;
580,11; 607,30; 634,2
168 Greek-English Index
prodidakhtheis, previously
explained, 552,1
proeirkenai, to have been said
previously, 567,27; 591,18;
597,14.20; also 301b33
proerkhesthai, to proceed, 552,25;
609,3
prohodos, procession, 560,23
prohuparkhein, to be prior, exist
previously, 16 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 2 in
Aristotle
prohupotithenai, to hypothesise in
the antecedent, give priority to,
569,19; 576,17
proienai, to proceed, 566,17; 573,22;
592,7
prokeisthai, to be proposed, to be
present, 551,17; 569,27; 581,10;
583,14 (Alexander); 591,30; 592,3
prokheirizesthai, to discuss, to
choose, 556,12; 629,2
prokheiros, easy, 562,22; 566,25;
582,20
prokhrein, to be possible, to
proceed, 606,6; 627,1
prolambanein, to assume in advance
or to start, to pre-contain, 18
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
(koin) prolpsis, (common)
conception, 601,28; 603,28
prologizesthai, to take into account
also, 564,19
pronoein, to take care, 557,20
pronoia, providence, 588,6
prooimion, proemium, 551,20.21.25;
552,23
prophans, evident, 555,24; 630,27
prosagein, to bring in against,
608,11; 616,24
prosaptein, to attach, 620,9.12 (both
with perihaptein at 304a10)
proskein, to be appropriate, 555,8;
557,10; 626,31
prosekhs, directly, 552,5; 588,32;
611,13
prosengizein, to draw near, 609,20
prosgignesthai, to enter in, happen,
565,17; 632,32
proskeisthai, to be added, 610,8
proskhrsthai, to use also, 554,5;
590,32
proslambanein, to take on also,
596,19
proslpsis, additional assumption,
569,18; 571,12; 601,28
prospon, face, 599,24-6(3);
606,8-16(5, with 302b25(2))
prosthk, addition, 565,21
prostherein, to investigate also,
602,23; 603,2 (both with 302a27)
prosthesis, addition, 567,13 (with
299a17).28
prostithenai, to add, 20 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle; see also proskeisthai
proteros, previous, prior, 41
occurrences in Simplicius, 19 in
Aristotle
prteuein, to be prior, 555,1
prothumeisthai, to desire, 566,19
protithenai, to propose, assign,
555,23; 557,9; 591,8.17; 594,8.10
(both with 301b15); 600,6; 609,15;
630,22; see also prokeisthai
prtos, first, primary, 101 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Hesiod, 1
Alexander), 24 in Aristotle
psgma, shavings, 621,18.22
(Alexander) (both with 304a21)
psukh, soul, 554,3.10.11; 585,2.3
(both Alexander).12; 609,9
(Anaxagoras)
psukhein, to cool, 564,22
psukhros, cold, 558,29.30; 559,19 (all
3 Melissus); 564,22.25; 576,15
psukhrots, coldness, 565,6.20;
567,14; 599,12
psuxis, cold, 564,28.29
ptaisma, mistake, 597,23
puknos, dense, 16 occurrences in
Simplicius, 7 in Aristotle
puknsis, condensation, 565,16;
599,31; 616,3; 632,32
puknots, denseness, 571,9;
615,27.28 (both with 303b15);
616,25.28 (both with 303b23); 620,4
puknousthai, to be condensed,
599,33; 600,1; 621,19
pur, fire, 148 occurrences in
Simplicius (28 Alexander, 2 Plato,
1 Melissus, 1 TL), 31 in Aristotle
puramis, pyramid, 56 occurrences in
Simplicius (5 Alexander), 8 in
Aristotle
puramoeids, pyramidish, 614,6.8
 Greek-English Index
puretos, fever, 602,10
Puthagorikos, Pythagorean (applied
to the author of TL), 561,10
rhadios, easy, 576,12; also 299b12;
see also euperilptos, eupaths,
euphthartos
rhgnusthai, to burst, 633,23 (with
305b15)
rhein, to be in flux, flow, 556,5.18;
557,5; 599,24.27; also 298b30
rhma, word, 619,9
(ta) rhta, words, 558,19; 609,5
rhteon, one should say, 563,27;
570,20; 575,18; 577,17; 578,7.22.26;
602,28; 603,1
rhtr, rhetor, 566,27
rho, flux, 599,22
rhop, impulsion, 13 occurrences in
Simplicius, 3 in Aristotle
saphnizein, clarify, 552,30; 611,4
saphs, clear, 558,17; 559,12.18;
609,5; also 303a10
sarx, flesh, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius, 6 in Aristotle
sbennumenos, extinguished, 628,25
(with 305a10)
(to) smainomenon, sense, 568,1
smantikos, referring to, 586,30
smeion, point, sign, 15 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Melissus, 1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle; see also
stigm
sinpi, mustard seed, 570,7
skalnos, scalene, 561,12; 575,33;
Simplicius quotes Plato using
promks at 566,6
skepsis, enquiry, 556,12 (with 298b20)
skepteon, we should investigate,
600,18.24 (both with 302a12)
skhma, figure, shape, 82
occurrences in Simplicius, 12 in
Aristotle
skhmatizein, to assign a figure or
figures, 621,28; 623,21.28 (all 3
with 304b2); 624,16; see also
skhmatizesthai
skhmatizesthai, to be shaped,
given a shape, 565,2; 606,15.21
(both with 302b26); 621,5
skhesis, relation, 551,10; 618,25
(Alexander); 620,6; 625,5
sklros, hard, harsh, 557,2;
169
558,30(2); 559,3 (all 3 Melissus);
571,19-24 (4 with 299b11 and 13)
skopein, to investigate, 600,9 (with
302b11)
skopos, purpose, 551,3; 586,25
sma, body, 413 occurrences in
Simplicius (21 Alexander, 2 TL, 2
Plato, 2 Aristotle), 74 in Aristotle
smatikos, corporeal, 553,9.11.31;
569,1
szein, to preserve, 565,32; 567,22;
606,26
sperma, seed, 603,18 (with 302b2);
609,7 (Anaxagoras); 615,12
spermatiks, spermatically, 609,4.11
sphaira, sphere, 17 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Empedocles), 2 in
Aristotle
sphairikos, spherical, 552,11; 610,19;
613,29; 614,3.9
sphairoeids, spherical, 552,16; 613,5
stasimos, stable, 660,12
stenokhria, lack of room, 633,24
(with 305b16)
stereos, solid, 16 occurrences in
Simplicius, 2 in Aristotle
stertheis, deprived, 633,9
stigm, point, 676,6; see also smeion
stoikheitos, composed of elements,
555,4; 601,3.11.17.19
stoikheids, elemental, 616,17
stoikheion, element, 259 occurrences
in Simplicius (15 Alexander), 56 in
Aristotle
strma, blanket, 602,8
sullogismos, syllogism, 597,32;
621,21.24.26
sullogizesthai, to produce a
syllogism, infer, argue, 560,5;
586,14; 616,28; 620,17; 621,3.15;
630,22
sumbainein, to follow, result, turn
out, 26 occurrences in Simplicius (1
Melissus, 1 Alexander), 27 in
Aristotle; see also sumbebkenai
sumbebkenai, to attach, 570,25; see
also sumbebkos
sumbebkos, accident, 600,23; see
also kata sumbebkos
sumbltos, comparable, 622,9.11
(both with 304a26)
sumboliks, symbolically, 564,11;
576,4(2)
summetria, symmetry, 566,2; 576,18
170 Greek-English Index
summetros, commensurable, 583,5
sumpepilmenos, pressed together,
571,5
sumperainesthai, to complete,
conclude, 591,17; 597,6; 625,31;
631,26
sumperasma, conclusion, 569,26
sumphusmenos, fused together,
621,18.22 (Alexander) (both with
304a21)
sumpileisthai, to be pressed
together, 571,5; 632,28; 633,8(2)
(all with 305b7)
sumplekesthai, to be woven
together, 589,21; 632,19
sumplroun, to complete, 558,3;
591,16
sumplok, weaving together,
609,24.25 (both with 303a7)
sunagein, to infer, develop (an
argument), draw together, 570,32
(with 299b12); 572,24; 573,1; 574,7;
595,11; 605,13; 608,6; 610,14;
620,21.24; 626,17
sunagg tou logou, development of
the argument, 607,24
sunairein, to unite, compose, 552,4;
558,8
sunairesthai, to support, 586,27
sunaisthanesthai, to be aware,
612,15
sunaisthsis, awareness, 564,29;
612,14; 628,16
sunalloioun, to alter together,
573,24.26; 602,2
sunanairein, to do away with also,
608,20
sunaptesthai, to be joined,
connected, 574,8.18; 595,3;
sunmmenon translated
conditional at 569,18.19; 571,3;
601,26; 611,25
sunaptikos, hypothetical, 553,3
sunartan, to join together, 596,21.24
sundesmos, connective, 553,2;
597,19
sunekheia, continuity, 612,13
sunekhs, continuous, 15 occurrences
in Simplicius, 0 in Aristotle
sunelthein, to come together,
572,5.6.10; 573,17
sunepthein, to push along,
596,3.5.8.12
sunepourizein, to produce a fair
wind for, 596,31; 597,1 (both with
301b29)
sunergein, to act together with,
596,27.28
sungens, of the same kind, 588,27
(with 301a4)
sungignskein, to acknowledge,
626,22.26; 629,5
sungramma, treatise, 556,25.29;
564,3; 608,21
sunienai, to come together, 572,9;
573,23; 621,18
sunistanai, to construct, compose,
put together, combine, 45
occurrences in Simplicius (3
Alexander, 2 Plato), 8 in Aristotle
sunkeisthai, to be composed, 45
occurrences in Simplicius, 5 in
Aristotle; see also suntithenai
sunkerannusthai, to mingle with,
555,4
sunkhneuomenos, melted down,
621,18
sunkhrein, to accept, 605,25; 634,34
sunkrima, blend, 632,13
sunkrinein, to blend, 586,23;
590,16-31 (5 with 301a20); 590,19
(with 301a14); 609,7 (Anaxagoras)
sunkrisis, blending, 590,29 (with
301a18); 601,7; 632,7
sunkritikos, blending, 564,29
sunolos, entire, 553,17 (with 298a31)
sunousiousthai, to be made
substantial together with, 576,9
suntattein, to join, 597,17.22.24
suntelein, to contribute, 576,29;
606,23; 633,4
sunthesis, composition,
compounding, 15 occurrences in
Simplicius (2 Alexander), 3 in
Aristotle
sunthetos, composite, 38 occurrences
in Simplicius (2 Alexander), 1 in
Aristotle
suntithenai, to compose, compound,
construct, add together, 30
occurrences in Simplicius (2
Alexander), 11 in Aristotle; see also
sunkeisthai
suntoms, briefly, 551,25; 624,21
(ou) suntrekhei, to clash, 612,26
sustasis, construction, 565,28; 566,9
(Plato); 614,9; 625,20
 Greek-English Index
sustellesthai, to be contracted, 623,1;
634,16 (Alexander)
sustoikhos, coordinate, 553,14;
554,13 (both with 298a30); 575,14;
578,29 (Alexander); 603,7 (with
302a29)
takhos, speed, 594,3 (with 301b11)
takhu, quickly, 620,20
tattesthai, to be given order, 585,23;
588,24; 589,21
taxis, order, 10 occurrences in
Simplicius, 4 in Aristotle
tekhnikos, technical, 620,27
tekmairesthai, to base a judgment,
568,19
tekmrion, sign, evidence, 596,24;
603,15
teleios, complete, 556,3; 560,13;
584,13; 600,10
teleutaios, last, 561,29
telos, end, 589,23; 597,18
temnein, to cut, 592,23.24; 613,30.32
tephra, ashes, 602,12
tetragnon, square, 574,17.18.19.20;
607,17
thalassa, sea, 629,30
thattn, faster, 596,3.5 (both with
301b20); 625,25-30 (4 with 304b17
and 19); also 305a12
thaumastos, surprising, 575,22
theasthai, to see, view, 602,7; 617,8
theios, divine, 556,16; 564,11
theologein, to talk about divine
things, 560,22
theologos, theologian, 598,3
therein, to investigate, observe,
584,23 (with 300b20); 604,2 (with
302b12); also 298b11; 299a13;
304a25
therma, theorem, 551,7
thertiks, theoretically, 555,25
theria, investigation, doctrine,
554,16.17 (both with 298b5);
568,22; 588,2
theos, god, 566,12 (Plato).27
thermainein, to heat, 553,24; 564,22
thermos, hot, 558,29.30; 559,19 (all 3
Melissus).24 (Parmenides);
564,22.25; 576,15
171
thermots, heat, 564,16.27.28; 565,6;
567,14; 599,11
thesis, position, 551,11; 554,29; 563,32
tithenai, to posit, place, set down, 18
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle
tmma, segment, 574,19; 613,33
tmtiktatos, sharpest, 620,17-22 (5
with 304a12)
toikhos, wall, 573,25
tolman, to dare, 556,28
tom, division, 563,19; 609,21;
612,14(2); 624,10 (Alexander);
635,23
topos, place, space, region, 58
occurrences in Simplicius (4
Alexander), 11 in Aristotle; see also
khra
trepein, to turn, 557,7 (Plato); 600,12
trignon, triangle, 24 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 TL, 1 Plato, 1
Alexander), 0 in Aristotle; see also
hmitrignon
trikhi diastatos,
three-dimensional, 576,9
triplasios, triple, 622,22
troph, nourishment, 605,8; 615,12
tropos, way, mode, 21 occurrences in
Simplicius (1 Plato, 1 Alexander),
10 in Aristotle
trupanon, fire-drill, 602,10
tunkhanein, to receive, meet, hit
upon, 551,9; 554,20 (Aristotle);
562,2; 566,15 (Plato); see also hs
etukhe
xrainein, to dry, 553,24
xrots, dryness, 564,17
xulon, wood, 601,31-602,16 (6 with
302a21 and 23); 605,5.8 (both with
302b17)
ztein, to ask, enquire, seek, 18
occurrences in Simplicius, 0 in
Aristotle
zion, animal, living thing, 11
occurrences in Simplicius (1
Anaxagoras), 1 in Aristotle
 Index of Passages
(a) Testimonia and fragments
I list here passages from Simplicius which are the only or a principal source for a
testimonium about or fragment of various ancient authors.
MELISSUS (DK30)
ANAXAGORAS (Sider) A4: 557,10-11; B6: 557,14-17; B8:
B7: 608,26 558,19-559,12
ANAXIMANDER (DK12) PARMENIDES (DK28)
A17: 615,13-18 A14: 556,25-30; B1.31-2:
EMPEDOCLES (DK31) 557,25-558,2; B8.21: 559,17; B11:
B35.5, 10-13: 587,8-17; B57: 559,20-7; B19: 558,8-11
586,29-587,4; B58: 587,18-19; THEOPHRASTUS (Theophrastus:
B59: 587,20-3 Sources)
DEMOCRITUS (DK68) 112C: 552,31-552,4; 238: 564,24-6;
A61: 569,5-9; A120: 564,24-9 281: 602,5-6
LEUCIPPUS (DK67)
A16: 583,20-2

(b) Passages quoted or paraphrased by Simplicius

ANAXAGORAS (Sider) HESIOD

B1.1-3: 608,21-3; B4a.1-8: 609,6-11;
B4b.8-9: 608,24; B12.15-17:
608,29-31
ARISTOTLE
Cael. (not including 3.1-7) 2.1,
284a14: 552,12-13; 2.12,
292a20-1: 552,11
Metaph. A.5, 986b27-987a2: 560,1-4
Phys. 4.9, 217a26-7: 578,7-8
EMPEDOCLES (DK31)
B27.4 (=B28.2): 591,5; B57.1:
586,12
EUCLID
Elements (Heiberg (1883)) 1, defs.
1,2,5: 562,24-6
Theogony (West (1966)) 116: 556,8;
560,18
PARMENIDES (DK28)
B1.28-32: 557,25-558,2; B8.4:
557,18; B8.50-2: 558,5-7
PLATO
Gorg. 469C1-2: 570,9-11
Parm. 135B8: 557,6-7
Plt. 272E5-6: 588,5-7
Tim. 53B3-5: 564,2-3; 53C5-56E8:
561,11-21; 53D4-E5: 566,10-16;
54A1-6: 566,5-9; 54D3-55E6:
574,3-24; 56B1-2: 573,10-11;
576,25-6
[TIMAEUS OF LOCRI] (Marg (1972))
215,13-17: 564,4-8; 216,18-19: 573,8-9

(c) Early texts cited in the notes

Only passages not cited in (a) or (b) are mentioned here. References are to the line
in the Greek text on which a footnote number occurs.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS 1.2, 268b14-26: 614,32; 1.2,

Quaest. (Bruns (1892)) 2.13: 578,26 268b14-269a2: 604,10; 1.2,
ARISTOTLE 269a9-10: 581,27; 1.3, 269b23-9:
Cael. (not including 3.1-7) 1-2: 551,5; 596,13; 1.3, 270a12-22: 598,1;
 Index of Passages
1.3, 270b24-5: 603,6; 1.5,
272a28-9: 583,4; 4.2,
308b30-309a8: 569,9; 4.3,
309a19-21: 634,25; 4.4 ff.:
562,11; 4.4, 311a15-29: 596,13
Cat. 6, 5b11-29: 617,7; 8,
9a28-10a10: 564,16; 8, 10a11-16:
565,1
Metaph. 1.5, 986b10-987a2: 556,14;
5.13, 1020a17-25: 617,7
Meteor. 1.3, 339b21-3: 603,6; 2.9,
369b11-15: 603,6
Phys. (Ross (1936)) 1.2-3: 598,7;
1.2-4: 562,7; 1.4, 187a26-188a18:
605,1; 608,12; 1.4, 187b22-188a2:
635,7; 1.4, 188a2-5: 608,16; 2.1,
192b8-23: 604,6; 2.1, 192b21-2:
595,20; 4.1, 209a4-7: 629,30; 4.4,
211a17-b5: 594,30; 4.6-9: 597,29;
4.6, 213b4-15: 629,30; 634,11;
4.6, 213b15-22: 634,11; 4.7,
213b22-7: 610,7; 4.8: 630,15;
634,1; 4.8, 215a1-6; 581,14; 4.8,
215a8-11: 584,8; 4.9, 216b22-30:
600,1; 6.1: 612,17; 6.3-4: 612,17;
6.10: 563,21; 6.10, 241b6-7:
583,5; 7.2, 244b5b-5d: 608,1;
An.Po. 1.12, 77b40-78a2: 620,20
Sens. 6, 445b20-446a20: 608,3; 612,1
[ARISTOTLE]
MXG 1, 974a11-12: 557,16
ASCLEPIUS
in Metaph. 1-7 (CAG 6.2) 38,19:
580,14
DIOGENES LAERTIUS (Marcovich (1999))
1.21: 607,5; 5.42: 566,15; 7.71:
551,5; 8.55: 556,30
GALEN (Khn (1821-33))
On the Elements according to
Hippocrates 1 1.487,11-14: 556,30
Commentary on Book 1 of
Hippocrates On the Nature of
Man 15.5,10-11: 556,30
[GALEN] (Khn (1821-33))
Medical Definitions 337 (19,
434,15-16): 602,9
LYDUS
On the Months (Wnsch (1898))
2.11.24: 580,14
ORPHIC HYMNS (Quandt (1955))
173
13.1: 580,14
PHILOPONUS
in GC (CAG 14.2) 34,2-3: 566,26
PLATO
Phdr. 245C5-246A2: 585,1
Tim. 53C6-8: 575,21; 56A4-B2:
565,18; 56A7: 620,1; 58B1-6:
571,11; 58D8-E2: 571,11
PROCLUS
in Tim. (Diehl (1903-6)) 1,16,32:
580,14
Platonic Theology 1 (Saffrey and
Westerink (1968)) 5,6-7: 564,13
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
Adversus Mathematicos
(Mutschmann (1914)) 7. 111:
556,30
SIMPLICIUS
in Cael. (outside of 551-635)
529,1-15: 587,11; 641,5-7: 564,26;
641,11-14: 564,4; 641,23-8:
565,33; 679,18-682,3: 562,18
in Cat. (CAG 8) 252,23-261,16:
564,16
in Phys. (CAG 9 and 10) 7,23-7:
564,4; 27,23-8: 604,31; 34,21-6:
608,24; 34,29-35,9: 609,5;
35,22-36,7: 564,4; 41,8: 558,5;
70,16-17: 557,11; 103,28-9:
557,16; 145,22: 559,16; 146,23:
558,5; 155,26-30: 608,23;
156,13-157,4: 609,11;
165,30-166,2: 608,25; 171,31-2:
608,16; 174,4-18: 608,25; 227,23
ff.: 564,13; 327,20: 587,23; 331,2:
587,23; 423,3-4: 566,26; 453,12:
580,14; 529,29-530,30: 629,30;
649,4-650,14: 629,30; 652,4-6:
610,7; 683,1-4: 634,11; 683,24:
600,1; 880,22-3: 610,7; 1102,20:
580,14; 1102,22: 580,17
SUDA pt. 4 (Adler (1930))
2126: 607,5
THEMISTIUS
in Cael. (CAG 5.4) 148,39-149,2:
566,26
THEOPHRASTUS
De Sensu (Stratton (1917)) 26: 602,6
[TIMAEUS OF LOCRI](Marg (1972))
206,11-17: 586,2
 Index of Names
(a) Names mentioned by Simplicius
In many cases information on a person or persons or a reference to where
information can be found is provided in a note on a given passage. Page and line
numbers indicate where a given name is found.

Achilles: 561,32 (quotation of Homers Iliad 20.75-6)

Alexander of Aphrodisias:
1. Cases in which Simplicius says nothing negative (15): 570,24 (extension of
Aristotles argument at 299a25-b7 that points have no weight to the claim
that points have no qualitative properties); 585,21 (claim that if things
moved in a disorderly way on their own for an infinite time that motion
would be natural); 613,27 (interpretation of Aristotles claim at 303b1 that a
sphere is composed of eight pyramids); 614,16 (assertion that Aristotle does
not think that the pyramid is simpler than the sphere or that the triangle is
simpler than the circle); 617,11 (explanation of Aristotles statement at
303b30-304a1 that certain people are committed to the idea that the same
thing will be fire in relation to one thing and air in relation to another);
618,11; 619,9.20 (various interpretations of Aristotles statement at 304a6-7
that the ratios of lesser things inhere in greater ones); 620,18 (gives as an
example of people who speak more simply (304a11) people who say that fire
stands in a multiple ratio because both fire and a multiple ratio increase
quickly); 621,20 (explanation of Aristotles reference (304a21) to
fused-together shavings); 622,25 (in connection with 303b24-6 said that what
is composed of what is double what air is composed of is water, what consists
of what is triple is earth); 623,4 (his explanation of why at 304a22-3 he
associates indivisibility with the doctrine that fire is the element of all
things); 624,10 (argument against the claim that even if certain parts of a
pyramid are not pyramids, they are divisible into pyramids); 627,16 (answers
the question why Aristotle assumes at 304b28-33 that in a certain
hypothetical situation the times during which there is composition and
dissolution are different); 630,3 (generally accepted emendation of the text at
305a17); 631,24 (adds another absurd consequence to the assumption
(dismissed by Aristotle at 305a29-31) that the elements might come to be
from a body without a location); 634,8 (uses both the separate void and the
interspersed void in interpreting 305b18-20)
2. Cases of disagreement of some significance (9): 575,27 (criticism of the
Timaeus answered by Simplicius); 578,1 (defends Aristotle against the
charge that bodies might all dissolve into form and matter and suggests that
matter might have a size; this suggestion rejected by Simplicius); 578,20;
579,2 (criticism of the Timaeus answered by Simplicius; assertion that form
does not come to be rejected by Simplicius); 581,25; 582,29 (one of his
explanations of why Aristotle seems to say both that a thing has only one
natural motion and more than one rejected by Simplicius, who acknowledges
that Alexander also was aware of his solution); 584,29.31 (his proposal to
substitute auto for heauto in 300b21 explained by Simplicius in terms of
 Index of Names 175
Alexanders fear that Aristotle might be saying something Platonic); 585,1
[italics indicate that the name Alexander does not occur] (his view that
naturally moving things are in a way self-moving rejected by Simplicius on
the ground that nature is moved by soul and moves the body along with
itself); 585,27 (his claim that the atomists are committed to the view that
there was a cosmos before the coming to be of the cosmos rejected by
Simplicius on the ground that disordered motion continues after the cosmos
has come to be); 586,26; 587,13 (his view that at 300b30 Empedocles phrase
under (epi) Love refers to the time when Love is under control rejected by
Simplicius, who says it refers to the time when Love is gaining the
ascendancy); 598,26 (his explanation of Aristotles theory of matter and why
the assumption that all body comes to be would imply a void rejected by
Simplicius)
3. Cases of disagreement of less significance (15): 552,14 (his grammatical
construal of a 298a24-7 rejected by Simplicius); 555,3 (his explanation of why
Aristotle uses the term first of the elements at 298b6 rejected by
Simplicius); 560,5 (his summary explanation of Aristotles description of
Eleatics at 298b14-24; it is clear from what has preceded that Simplicius
does not accept this explanation); 562,1.3 (his explanation of why at 299a1
Aristotle turns to Plato first countered by Simplicius); 572,24 (his construal
of the argument at 299b17-23 rejected by Simplicius); 583,12 (his view that
at 300b3 Aristotles question where would it move concerns what prevents
the earth from moving whereas Simplicius thinks it concerns the earth);
588,20 (his suggestion that to extend what is said at 301a1 with the further
inference that if there are infinitely many causes of motion and infinitely
many moving things there will be two infinities, which is absurd, countered
by Simplicius with the claim that an infinity of movers is sufficiently absurd;
Simplicius adds the suggestion that infinitely many causes of motion would
mean that nothing moved); 589,1 (his claim that at 300b31-301a4 Aristotle
leaves out the alternative that the number of movers might be finite rejected
by Simplicius, who says that Aristotle makes the hypothesis unobtrusively);
590,4.12 (his arguments when commenting on 301a11-22, against the
cosmogony of Anaxagoras countered by Simplicius assertion that Aristotles
only point was to commend Anaxagoras for making the cosmos come to be
from unmoving things); 594,16 (his remark in discussing the meaning of the
word determinate at 301b17 that mathematical body is neither determinate
nor actual rejected by Simplicius); 597,13.21 (his rendering of the text of
301b30-3 rejected by Simplicius, who characterises the issue as
insignificant); 606,9 (his explanation of homoiomery at 302b25 refined by
Simplicius); 607,7 (his explanation of why Aristotle says (302b29-30) that
mathematicians always assume finite principles rejected by Simplicius);
610,13.28; 611,3.14 (his claim that at 303a10-16 Aristotle is making an at
least implicit argument against the atomists rejected by Simplicius, who
holds that Aristotle is merely setting out atomist views); 612,1 (his
interpretation of bodies at 303a19 as elements rejected by Simplicius, who
takes it to mean composite bodies)
Anaxagoras: 589,30; 590,13 (both with 301a12; commendation for making the
cosmos out of unmoving things); 601,8 (he and Empedocles say that coming
to be is the result of blending and separating and so are committed to the
view that elements exist actually rather than potentially in compounds);
603,8-26 (4 with 302a28; made the homoiomeries elements); 603,22 (with
302a31; often referred to fire as ether); 604,31 (he and Archelaus
hypothesised the homoiomeries as the elements); 605,10 (with 302b14; was
mistaken to make the homoiomeries elements); 605,31 (says perceptible
176 Index of Names
things are characterised by the dominance of one thing in them); 608,11 (in
Physics 1 Aristotle showed that Anaxagoras was wrong to think that all
things are mixed in all things); 608,21-609,12 (3; a Platonising interpretation
of Anaxagoras); 632,5-13 (3; his basic ideas); 634,25.32 (he and Empedocles
denied that there is a void); also 609,16; 613,9; 614,28; 635,5.15
Anaximander: 561,4 (held that all things are transformations of an
intermediate which endures forever); 602,20 (what is intermediate is the only
element); 615,13 (a pupil and fellow citizen of Thales, took the principle to be
finer than water and denser than air because the substratum should be
naturally adapted for the change to either; he was the first to hypothesise
that this one is infinite, so that he could use it for comings to be without
stinting; and, it is thought that he hypothesised infinite worlds and that each
of the worlds came to be from an infinite element of this sort; 615,18 (a
fellow citizen and teacher of Anaximenes)
Anaximenes: 561,4 (held that all things are transformations of air, which
endures forever); 590,18 (makes the cosmos come to be from one thing);
602,19 (air is the only element); 615,18 (a pupil and fellow citizen of
Anaximander, took the principle to be infinite air because he believed that
change could be accounted for by reference to airs volatility)
Archelaus: 604,31 (he and Anaxagoras called the homoiomeries elements)
Aristotle (named 46 times)
Aspasius: 607,5 (his explanation of why Euclids postulates are definite in
quantity)
Democritus of Abdera: 564,24.27 (the value of atomistic explanations of
qualities; see also 576,14 and 641,7 in the commentary on 3.7 (Mueller
(2009)); 569,5 (for him and later Epicurus all atoms have weight and the
heavier ones push out the less heavy ones, making them seem light);
576,11.14 (the differences between his atomism and the geometrical
chemistry of the Timaeus); 588,10 (holds that there are infinitely many
things moving in an infinite void; cf. 589,6; 591,14); 609,17 (with 303a4; calls
atoms, which are indivisible because of their smallness and solidity and also
infinite in number and in shapes, elements; cf. 604,30); 609,25 (also with
303a4; called the weaving together (sumplok) of atoms interlocking
(epallaxis?)); 617,22 (ascribes the difference among things which come to be
from atoms to the smallness and largeness of atoms); 618,7 (said that atoms
of fire differs from other atoms in shape); 625,2 (atoms of air, water, and
earth have the same shape but differ in smallness); 628,10 (believed in
indivisibles; also 628,24); 632,6.9.17 (all with 305a4 and 305b2; makes the
elements come to be because specific atoms separate out from collections);
634,5-29 (says there is a void into which bodies expand; also 634,23.33);
634,19 (explains the expansion of bodies in terms of the void interspersed
(paresparmenos) between the atoms, the separate void providing room for
expansion; also 642,29); also 614,28; 618,5
Diogenes of Apollonia: 602,19; 615,21 (hypothesised air as the only element)
Empedocles: 583,1 (with 300b2; thought the earth is at rest because of the
vortex); 586,10-587,24 (7, with 300b29; says that neckless heads were formed
epi ts philottos; Simplicius argues against Alexander on the meaning of the
Greek phrase); 590,19-591,7 (3 with 301a16; Aristotle says that he passes
over the coming to be of the cosmos epi ts philottos, but Simplicius
interprets him to be saying correctly that for Empedocles the cosmos came to
be from an intelligible reign of Love because of the incursion of Strife); 601,8
(he and Anaxagoras say that coming to be is the result of blending and
separating and so are committed to the view that elements exist actually
rather than potentially in compounds); 603,8-24 (6 with 302a28; Empedocles
 Index of Names 177
held that there are 4 elements); 628,8 (with 305a3; held that the elements
are infinitely divisible but will never be divided ad infinitum; he did not
believe in a common matter); 632,3.9.11 (all with 305a34 and 305b1;
explained the change of something as a matter of bits in the thing separating
out); 634,24.32 (he and Anaxagoras say there is no void)
Epicurus: 569,6 (Democritus and his followers and, later, Epicurus say that
since all atoms have the same nature they have weight, but because some are
heavier, the lighter are pushed out by the heavier ones, which sink down,
and they move upward; and they say that it is for this reason that some
things are thought to be light, others heavy.)
Hector: 561,32 (quotation of Homers Iliad 20.75-6)
Heraclitus of Ephesus: 556,10; 561,5 (both with 298b3; held that all things are
transformations of fire, which endures forever); 590,19 (makes the cosmos
come to be from one thing); 602,18 (fire is the only element); 615,22 (he and
Hippasus made fire the only element in the belief that the volatility of fire is
sufficient to account for change); 620,6 (he and Hippasus made fire, the finest
of the four simple bodies, the element); 621,7 (did not say that fire is a
pyramid)
Hesiod: At 298b26-9 Aristotle says, For there are some people who say that
there is nothing which does not come to be, but that everything comes to be,
and some things that have come to be endure without perishing, and, again,
others perish. This is especially true of Hesiod and his followers, and later, of
others, the first people who studied nature. In discussing this Simplicius
mentions Hesiod at 560,16.24. and 562,8, and disputes Aristotles claim.
Simplicius refers ahead to this passage at 556,6 and back to it at 598,3.
Hippasus of Metapontum: 602,19 (he and Heraclitus made fire the only
element); 615,11 (he and Heraclitus made fire the only element in the belief
that the volatility of fire is sufficient to account for change); 620,5 (he and
Heraclitus made fire, the finest of the four simple bodies, the element)
Hippo: 602,19 (he and Thales said that water is the only element); 615,11 (he
and Thales held that water is the only element because they saw that the
seeds of animals and the nourishment of both animals and plants are made
of water)
Iamblichus: 564,11 (treats Platos Timaeus as symbolic)
Leucippus (always mentioned together with Democritus): 583,20.29 (with
300b8); 604,30; 609,17 (with 303a14)
Megethios: 602,6 (Alexandrian Physician, otherwise unknown, described to
Simplicius a case of fire coming out of the hip of a man)
Melissus: 556,6-559,9 (8 with 298b17, which is referred back to at 597,32-598,7,
where Melissus is mentioned twice; Simplicius offers a Platonising
interpretation of Melissus thought in which he insists that Melissus
recognised that there is coming to be)
Musaeus: 560,21 (used myths to talk about divine subjects)
Orpheus: 560,21 (used myths to talk about divine subjects)
Parmenides: 556,5-562,8 (14 with 298b17, which is referred back to at
597,32-598,7, where Parmenides is mentioned twice; Simplicius offers a
Platonising interpretation of Parmenides thought in which he insists that
Parmenides recognised that there is coming to be)
Plato: 557,1 (sets out the ideas of Timaeus of Locri in the Timaeus); 561,30
(Homer dear to Plato); 557,6 (reference to 135B8 of the Parmenides); 564,11
(some interpreters of him think the Timaeus was written symbolically);
565,29 (put forward his geometrical chemistry as a hypothesis); 566,5
(quotation of Tim. 54A1-6); 573,10 (citation of Tim. 56B1-2); 575,21 (how he
thought planes were compounded); 578,21.26; 585,2 (all 3 Alexander)
178 Index of Names
Potamon: 670,5 (his explanation of what it means to say that mathematical
principles are definite in quantity)
Pythagoreans: 564,26; 565,26.29; 573,5; 621,9 (all 5 associating them with
doctrines expressed in Platos Timaeus); 580,11 (with 300a17; said that all
things are composed from numbers because numbers pre-contain in
themselves all forms); 610,7 (say that monads are distinguished by the void)
Socrates: 570,10 (says in the Gorgias that he would not wish to harm or be
harmed, but, if required to choose, he would choose to be harmed)
Thales of Miletus: 561,4 (held that all things are transformations of water,
which endures forever); 590,18 (makes the cosmos come to be from one
thing); 602,19 (he and Hippo said that water is the only element); 603,14
(water is the only element); 615,11 (he and Hippo held that water is the only
element because they saw that the seeds of animals and the nourishment of
both animals and plants are made of water); 615,13 (fellow citizen and
teacher of Anaximander)
Theophrastus: 553,4 (made a distinction in his Prior Analytics between the
connectives if and since); 564,24 (reports in his Physics that Democritus
invoked atoms because he found qualitative explanations amateurish; also
576,14); 566,26 (some people ascribe On Indivisible Lines to Theophrastus
rather than Aristotle); 602,5 (reports that a flame separated out from a
persons eyes)
Timaeus:
a (Platos dialogue Timaeus), 564,13; 576,25 (with 300a1); 578,21; 585,28
(both Alexander); 588,1.3; also 300b17
b (the author of TL), 561,10; 564,3; 573,7; 586,2
c (the character in a), 573,10
d (either b or c), 583,22; 584,10; 587,26.28; 591,15
Xenocrates: 563,22 (his belief in indivisible lines argued against in Aristotles
Physics)
Xuthus: 599,32 (invoked the swelling of the universe to explain rarefaction)

(b) Scholars cited in the notes

This index does not include editors of texts unless they are mentioned for their
position on an editorial or interpretive issue; reference to a page and line indicate
the position of a note in which the scholar in question is mentioned.

Ackrill, J.L., 564,16

Allan, D.J., 585,1, p. 22
Baltes, Matthias, p. 22
Barnes, Jonathan, 559,5
Bergk, Theodor, 559,3, p. 22
Bessarion, Basilius, 566,10; 571,14; 577,25; 635,20
Bossier, Fernand, p. 22
Brennan, Tad, p. 21
Brittain, Charles, p. 21
Cherniss, Harold, 621,9.13
Diels, Hermann, 558,5; 559,16
Furley, David, 634,11
Guldentops, Guy, p. 22
Guthrie, W.K.C., 593,20; 597,29
Hadot, Ilsetraut, p. 21
Hagen, Charles, 580,17
Heiberg, J.L., passim
 Index of Names 179
Huby, Pamela, p. 21
Karsten, Simon, passim
Kneale, Martha, 552,25
Kneale, William, 552,25
Marg, Walter, 564,6; 586,2
McDiarmid, J.B., 609,13
Moraux, Paul, passim
OBrien, D., 586,28; 587,2, p. 21
Perkams, Matthias, p. 21
Peyron, Amedeo, p. 22
Rivaud, Albert, 566,11.14; 573,10
Ross, W.D., 599,32
Schmalzriedt, Egidius, 556,30
Sharples, R.W., p. 22
Sider, David, 608,23.24.31; 609,7.9.10
Sorabji, Richard, 629,30
Steel, Carlos, 564,13, p. 21
Stein, Heinrich, 559,21
Stocks, J.L., 593,20; 597,29
Tarn, Leonardo, 557,17
Taylor, C.C.W., 569,9
Vlastos, Gregory, 561,12
Wright, M.R., 586,12; 591,7; 628,13
 Subject Index
This index lists places where Simplicius discussion goes beyond straightforward
exposition of Aristotles text. See also the other indices, and the table of contents.
Aristotle discusses the surface
meaning of texts, 557,19-20;
563,26-7; 566,17-20; 575,18-22;
587,26-588,7
atoms, shapes and sizes of,
610,13-611,11; 612,1-9
coming to be
denial of by Parmenides and
Melissus, 556,12-560,10
Simplicius doctrine of, 599,7-600,2
connectives, causal and hypothetical,
552,31-553,6
elements
number of, 555,7-12; 604,3-27;
607,23-608,20
Platos theory of the elements,
564,10-24; 575,27-576,19; 578,20;
579,2
what are the elements, 603,7-31;
604,30-605,20; 615,8-23
what is an element, 600,30-601,20
elemental change
Aristotles account is given in GC,
600,19-21
explanations of, 564,24-565,28;
578,7-11; 631,32-632,25; 635,19-29
Platos explanations are hypotheses,
565,28-566,16
formalisation of argument, 554,24-31
(first hypothetical mode);
568,30-569,27 (second figure);
570,32-571,17 (second figure and
second hypothetical mode);
571,18-26 (a categorical
argument)
infinity, 635,11-19
inherence, what inheres in what,
600,30-602,17
mathematical principles, finitude of,
606,22-607,20
matter
Aristotles doctrine of, 598,26-599,7
matter and form are not parts of a
composite, 573,12-28; 579,4-12
planes of the Tim. are material,
563,27-564,10; 573,3-11;
577,17-19; 579,24
Plato believed in prime matter,
563,33-564,10
Neoplatonist interpretations of earlier
figures, 560,19-27 (Hesiod,
Orpheus, Musaeus); 590,19-591,6
(Empedocles); 608,31-609,12
(Anaxagoras)
numbers, construction of cosmos from,
580,3-17
simple bodies, the subject of Cael.,
551,1-13; 554,24-555,1
Timaeus of Locri as source for Platos
Timaeus, 561,8-11
void, 500,99-600,2; 598,7-25; 610,3-7;
629,18-630,15; 633,29-634,34
 Addenda
(added in proof)

1. I wish to add a further thank you to Jan Opsomer, who sent me some excellent
corrections of my translation of 563,26-566,20, which I have incorporated.

2. Readers interested in an interpretive overview of Simplicius commentaries on

Aristotle should now consult Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Sim-
plicius: The Methodology of a Commentator, London: Duckworth, 2008.

3. As mentioned in the Introduction the fragments of Alexanders commentary on

Cael. (mostly from Simplicius, but also including some material from Themistius
and Averroes) have been presented, translated, and thoroughly discussed in
Andrea Rescigno (ed. and trans.), Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commentario al de
Caelo di Aristotele, Frammenti del Secondo, Terzo e Quarto Libro, Amsterdam:
Hakkert, 2008. For the readers convenience I give here a list of the passages from
Simplicius included as fragments by Rescigno; an asterisk indicates that the name
Alexander does not occur in the passage.

Passage Rescigno number Pages in Rescigno

552,14-19 174 374-5
554,24-553,13* 175 374-7
555,1-6 176 377-8
560,5-10 177 380-1
561,25-562,6 179 381-3
566,23-567,4* 180a
567,11-21* 180c 384-8
569,28-570,28 181a 389-96
572,24-6 182a
573,12-28 182b 397-400
575,27-576,12 183 400-7
578,1-7 184a
578,20-579,2 184b 408-10
581,25-582,9 185 410-13
583,12-14 186 413-17
584,21-585,5 187a
585,21-32 187b 417-25
182 Addenda

586,5-29 188a
587,8-23 188c 425-32
588,14-22 189a
588,28-589,3 189b 432-8
590,3-11 190a
590,24-591,7* 190b 439-43
591,21-592,3* 191b 443-5
594,16-22 192a 445-8
596,31-597,3 193a* 448-50
597,13-26 194 451-3
598,26-599,7 195a 453-6
604,3-10 196* 457-8
606,9-10 197a
606,33-607,16 197b 458-60
607,24-608,20* 198a 460-4
610,13-611,4 199a
611,13-16 199b 465-468
612,1-6 200 468-9
613,25-614,10 201a
614,15-18 201b 469-73
617,6-21 202a
618,10-619,8 202b
619,20-4 202c
622,24-7 202d 474-80
620,15-20 203 480-2
621,20-5 204 482-3
623,4-16 205a
624,4-13 205b 483-6
627,16-32 206 486-9
628,6-13* 207a 489-90
629,18-630,15 208a 491-8
631,21-5 209 498-9
632,25-633,2* 210a 499-501
633,29-634,17 211a 502-507