27B.

When Intervention may not be allowed; when intervention may be allowed even after
judgment.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA
G.R. No. L-45168 September 25, 1979
Facts:
In an amended petition filed on November 12, 1970 before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal sought the reconstitution of her
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal alleged to have been
lost or destroyed during the last war, covering two parcels of land.
Opposition to the petition for reconstitution was filed by the Director of Lands, Pedro de
la Pena Leodegario R. Alba, Jr., Angel Cruz, Aurora Favila, Democrito R. Favila and Eufracia R.
Favila some of whom withdrew or never appeared or abandoned their claims. On November 19,
1973, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied the petition for reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-42449 for insufficiency of evidence.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order, or in the alternative, for the
vacation thereof and for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion for
new trial was granted but again denied the reconstitution for the Court still entertains doubt as to
the authenticity and genuineness of the title which is sought to be reconstituted.
The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed Order.
The Director of Lands, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the respondent
court a Motion for New Period to File Motion for Reconsideration alleging excusable negligence
on his part for his failure to file an extension of the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration, to which herein private respondent filed her Opposition. On November11, 1976,
the Court issued its Resolution denying herein petitioner's motions on the ground that the
decision sought to be reconsidered had become final and executory.
On June 14, 1978, the case was submitted for decision. Thereafter, the herein two
motions to intervene were separately filed on December 7, 1978 and December 29, 1978. The
first is filed by Greenfield Development Corporation and the second is filed by Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing. The certificates of title of the movants
covering large areas of land overlap or incroach on properties the title to which is being sought to
be reconstituted by private respondent. The alleged overlapping embraces some 87 hectares of
the property claimed by respondent covering 1,435,062 sq. meters or around 143 hectares which
is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential sector of Metro Manila.

Issue:
Whether the intervention is allowed even after judgment
Held:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial has already been concluded, the petition for certiorari to
review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
The Court agrees with the movants that the indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens
System wig be imperiled should reconstitution be granted, resulting into two holders of
certificates of title to areas that overlap each other. It becomes essential and imperative to
preserve the efficacy and integrity of our registration system. This aspect of the case which
commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based upon
the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention.
In view of the higher and greater interest of the public and in order to administer justice
consistent with a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the
parties and their numerous successors-in-interest, the motions for intervention is granted by the
Court and directs the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands to conduct a
relocation of the respective boundaries of the properties claimed by the movants and the private
respondent.

28A. Modes off Discovery (Rule 23-29)

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
204 SCRA 212
On July 17, 1987, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine
Commission for Good Government, filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against 26 individuals and was entitled
Republic of the Philippines v. Lucio C. Tan, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos et. al. The
complaint alleged that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and
his wife Imelda, in violation of the Constitution and in fraud of the Filipino people, embarked on
a systematic plan accumulating wealth during their term as President and First Lady of the
Republic.
In December 1987, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for leave to
expand or otherwise make more specific certain allegations in the Complaint. This was granted
by the Sandiganbayan in an order dated December 11, 1987.
A separate answer was filed by the twenty-one (21) defendants other than Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Don M. Ferry, Federico Moreno and Lucio Tan.
On August 19, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and for Admission of
Second Amended Complaint. Petitioner sought to substitute defendant Ferdinand Marcos with
his estate, President Marcos having died pendente lite, and include as additional defendants three
(3) individuals who allegedly participated in the Marcoses accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.The
Sandiganbayan granting the Motion for Leave to Amend and for Admission of the Second
Amended Complaint.
On June 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave To Take the Deposition of Rolando C.
Gapud Upon Oral Examination in the Crown Colony of Hongkong. Petitioner alleged that Mr.
Rolando C. Gapud, former financial adviser of President Marcos and his wife, was willing to
testify on matters relevant to the subject of the case.
Issues:
1. Whether Sandiganbayan seriously erred in denying the petitioners Motion for Leave to
Take the Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud on the ground that summons have not yet been
served upon all the respondents and all the respondents have not yet filed their answer to
the complaint.

2. Whether Sandiganbayan erred in stating that the petitioner did not allege that Rolando C.
Gapud will be unavailable as witness to testify during the trial.

Held:
Petitioner claims, however, that the taking of Mr. Gapuds deposition does not require
prior leave of court because Section 1, Rule 24 states that a deposition may be taken after
jurisdiction has been obtained over ANY defendant. The provision does not state that jurisdiction
should first be acquired over ALL the defendants. And since summons has been served on most
of the defendants and some, particularly principal respondent Lucio Tan, have already filed their
answers to the complaint, jurisdiction has already been acquired by respondent Sandiganbayan,
and there is no need for leave to take Mr. Gapuds deposition.
The general rule is that a plaintiff may not be permitted to take depositions before answer
is served. Plaintiff must await joinder of issues because if the discovery is to deal with matters
relevant to the case, it is difficult to know exactly what is relevant until some progress has been
made toward developing the issues.[24] Ordinarily, the issues are made up before the need for
discovery arises, hence, prior to the time of delineation of the issues, the matter is in the control
of the court.
The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said
modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer
has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property
subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the
reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
Petitioner has not cited any fact other than Mr. Gapuds cooperation with the Philippine
government in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth that would support the deponents claim of fear
for his safety. No proof, much less any allegation, has been presented to show that there exists a
real threat to Mr. Gapuds life once he returns to the Philippines and that adequate security cannot
be provided by petitioner for such a vital witness.

28B. Modes off Discovery (Rule 23-29)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB
G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape
with Homicide entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al. presently
pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, presided by Judge Amelita
G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a
Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the
testimonies of the following:
1.] Steven Bucher
Acting Chief, Records Services Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20536
U.S.A.

2.] Debora Farmer

Records Operations, Office of Records
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

3.] Jaci Alston

Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.

4.] Ami Smalley

Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
5.] John Pavlisin
210 South Glasell, City of Orange
California, 92666
U.S.A.

before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of
presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United
States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no
jurisdiction over them.
The trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by
Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. A motion for
reconsideration is filed thereto but was likewise denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered to take the deposition, hence
this petition urging the Supreme Court to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision
of the Appellate Court.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in ruling that Rule 23 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to criminal proceedings

Held:
The Appellate Court finds that the denial of petitioners right to present his witnesses, who
are residing abroad, based on a very shaky technical ground, is tantamount to depriving him of
his constitutional right to due process. This Court recognizes the impossibility of enforcing the
right of petitioner to secure the attendance of the proposed witnesses through compulsory
process considering that they are beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts.
The Supreme Court disagree. It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for
seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of,
as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This issue has, however,
long been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary
exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained
through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful
examination of Exhibits 218 and 219 readily shows that these are of the same species of
documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court.
SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the introduction
of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that
more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive,
hence the petition is granted and decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside.
29A. Demurrer to Evidence in Civil Case
QUEBRAL v. CA
G.R. No. 101941. January 25, 1996
Facts:
A complaint for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment was filed by
private respondent Union Refinery Corporation against petitioner and Higidio B. Gay-ya, Jr. to
collect the amount of P102,991.54, representing the un-paid oil products allegedly purchased by
them from private respondent.
After hearing, the trial court granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment upon
private respondents filing of a bond in the amount of P103,000.00. In compliance with the order
of attachment duly issued by the court on December 28, 1987, a parcel of riceland and a house in
Villa Quirino, San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, declared by petitioner and his wife as their own for tax
purposes, were attached. Personal properties owned by Gay-ya were also attached.
Contending that he was merely a sales agent of petitioner, Gay-ya filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint and to lift the attachment of his properties. The trial court denied Gay-yas
motion to dismiss and to lift the attachment. Petitioner categorically denied that he was a
business partner of Gay-ya but admitted that he was Gay-yas erstwhile co-employee at the Getty
Oil Philippines. Private respondent opposed the motion asserting that Gay-ya converted to his
own use the proceeds of the oil products evidenced in the promissory note dated July 19, 1985
that Gay-ya obligated himself to pay the total amount of P91, 904.73 to private respondent.
The possibility of an amicable settlement between petitioner and private respondent being
remote, the case was heard in due course. On June 15, 1989, after the private respondent had
presented its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence contending that private respondent
had failed to present material and competent evidence sufficient to hold (petitioner) civilly liable
for the claims against him. The trial court rendered a decision holding that there was no evidence
of petitioners participation in the transactions involved hence, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. ordering him to pay plaintiff the sum
of P102, 991. 54 plus interest at legal rate, attorneys fees and writ of preliminary attachment be
permanent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered as the most telling documentary evidence yet
against petitioner his own handwritten letter dated January 19, 1985 to Efren Vargas, an official
of private respondent, which partly reads:
Dear Mr. Vargas,
Bearer is Mr. HB Gay-ya, Jr., my representative. He is accompanying Mr.
DICK COSUE, operator of SHELL SS in Carmen, Rosales, Pang. He is
the cousin of Mr. W. T. KHO
 On this piece of evidence, the Court of Appeals said, defendant Quebral did not deny, as
he could not have denied, his foregoing personal letter to appellants official Efren Vargas who
approved his credit application with said corporation. Were it not for Gay-yas promissory note,
petitioner should be held liable for the total amount of P102,991.54 because he acted upon the
authority given him by the petitioner. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the judgement rendered by the trial court
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in admitting and considering Exhibit K (the handwritten
letter addressed to Mr Vargas signed by Mr. Quebral) as the basis for the finding that Gay-ya
was petitioners representative.

Held:
Exhibit K was formally offered in evidence by private respondent. Asked by the lower
court to comment on the exhibits offered but opted to file a demurrer to evidence. Such move
proved to be costly error.
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the effect on judgement to
demurrer to evidence. Whoever avails of it gambles his right to adduce evidence. Pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 35, if the defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted
and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse
party because the movant loses his right to present evidence.
The petition for review is denied by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed in toto.

29B. Order granting demurrer to evidence should contain facts and law on which it is based.
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. CA
 G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992

Facts:
In the complaint, it was alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation
obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to
secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao,
Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the
sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the
original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64.
On August 29, 1983, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co,
who on the same day transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private
respondent, upon whose petition a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On
September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners, as chairman of its board of directors and its
executive vice-president, respectively, filed their action for "annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery
of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction."
The plaintiffs presented two witnesses and submitted 21 exhibits. The defendants filed a
7-page demurrer to the evidence. Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" the Trial Court in its
order dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11,
1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the
auction sale was appropriately held and conducted.
The petitioners appealed that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of
their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's
sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no
adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court
a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.
Issue:
Whether the CA is correct in affirming the Trials Court Order which has allegedly no adequate
factual or legal basis for the decision.

Held:
The Supreme Court does not agree. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the
issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark
as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Review by the Court of the other issues raised, most of which are factual, e.g., the
allegation of default in the payment of the loan, the existence of a second loan, the nature of the
newspapers where the notices of the sale were published, the authority of the person consenting
to the postponement of the sale, etc., is impractical and unnecessary at this time. These matters
should be discussed in detail in the revised order to be made by the trial court so that the higher
courts will know what they are reviewing when the case is appealed. Hence, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis and this case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court for revision, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the
Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof.

29C. Certiorari does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence.
TADEO v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 129774. December 29, 1998
Facts:
Complainant Ms. Luz M. Sison was the owner of commercial apartments at 731 Edsa
corner Ermin Garcia, Cubao, Quezon City. In 1985, petitioners wife leased from complainant
one unit of the apartment at a monthly consideration of P7,000.00, for a period of five years.
After two years, she also leased the adjacent apartment at an additional monthly consideration of
P4,000.00. However, in early 1988, petitioners wife incurred rental arrears with complainant in
the amount of P113,300.00. In order to settle the account, petitioner negotiated with complainant.
He issued eight (8) postdated checks but all the checks bounced upon deposit with the drawee
bank.
The Assistant Prosecutor of Quezon City filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, eight (8) Informations charging petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Petitioner then moved to quash the informations on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject cases but the trial court denied the motion. After petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty to the charges, the trial court conducted a pre-trial at which the parties marked their
respective documentary evidence. Thereafter, the trial court declared the pre-trial of the cases
closed and terminated.
On May 15, 1994, without prior leave of court, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence on
the ground that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence proving all the elements of
the offense charged. The prosecution filed an opposition thereto. On November 27, 1994, the
trial court declared that there exists a prima facie case after the prosecution has presented its
evidence and rested its case and accordingly denied the demurrer to evidence for lack of merit
and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari seeking to
annul the lower courts orders denying his demurrer to evidence but dismissed the petition, for
lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether certiorari challenge to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence.

Held:
The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that certiorari does not lie to review
a trial courts interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent
to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can
it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. From such denial, appeal in due time is the proper
remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
The prosecution has proved all the essential elements of the offense charged with the sole
testimony of complainant Luz Sison and it has been noted that petitioner did not ask the trial
court for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, he loses the right to adduce evidence
in his defense.
The Supreme Court remands the records to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, which shall be limited to the lower courts imposition of the proper
sentence on petitioner and its promulgation with notice to the parties.

30A. Judgment on the Pleadings

DINO v. VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-43886 July 19, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Irene Dino is the registered owner of a parcel of land together with all the
improvements thereon. Private respondent Francisco L. Ong is the adverse claimant of the said
parcel of land, having filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City.
On April 26 1974, respondent executed an Affidavit and Memorandum of Quitclaim,
waiving and renouncing all his claims, rights and credits over and against the said parcel of land,
for and in consideration of the sum of P90, 000, payable as follows: (a)Down payment of
P40,000.00 on or before February 15, 1974, receipt of which hereby acknowledged; and the
future sums covered by postdated checks in denominations of: (b) Pl0,000.00 payable or
redeemable on or before April 15, 1974; and, (c)P8,000 EACH payable or redeemable on or
before the 15th of June, August, October, December of 1974 and February of 1975,respectively,
and for a total of P40,000.00.
Petitioner failed to comply with her obligations, private respondent filed a complaint
against the petitioner for breach of contract and damages. Despite repeated demands by Plaintiff,
the latter failed and still continues to fail to comply, which Plaintiff was constrained to file this
case in Court to protect his rights and was thus forced to engage the services of counsel and to
defray the costs of this suit.
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner through counsel, offered to pay her obligations
by monthly installments but the same was unacceptable to the private respondent; hence, the pre-
trial conference was considered terminated. Thereafter, private respondent's counsel manifested
in open court, and without objection on the part of petitioner's counsel, that he was submitting
for resolution by the court his alternative motions to declare petitioner in default or for a
judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner filed an opposition.
On 26 January, judgment on the pleadings is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering
the defendant to pay him the balance of P32,000.00 plus liquidated damages of P20,000.00, and
cost of suit. Petitioner moved to reconsider but denied by the court.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to annul and
set aside the judgment on the pleadings, claiming that respondent Judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the judgment on the pleadings and in
issuing the order denying her motion for reconsideration, and that she has no remedy nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law except through the present petition.
Issue:
Whether petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to annul and set aside the judgment on
the pleadings is the correct remedy.

Held:
No, the questioned judgment on the pleadings is a final judgment; hence, it is appealable.
Petitioner therefore could have appealed from the aforesaid judgment, but she did not. Having
failed to appeal from the said judgment, she may not avail of the writ of certiorari to offset the
adverse effect of her omission.
Petitioner maintains that her answer to the complaint tendered an issue, as it did not only
deny the material allegations contained therein but it also set up special as well as affirmative
defenses. Hence, she argues, there is no room for a judgment on the pleadings.
In her memorandum, petitioner further contends that the private respondent's reply should not
have been treated as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings for non-compliance with the three-
day notice rule and for lack of a notice of hearing. The petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which states that where an answer "admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading", does not state whether the motion for judgment on the pleading
may be considered ex-parte or only after notice of hearing served on the adverse party.

30C. Judgement on the Pleadings

CORNELIO ARROYO v. WENCESLAO CALDOZA

G.R. No. L-17454. July 31, 1963.

FACTS:

Appellee Cornelio Arroyo filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to
recover from appellants a parcel of land located in the municipality of Dagami, Leyte.

Appellants filed an answer. Paragraph II of the answer states:

That the defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations in paragraphs two and three of the complaint. The truth of the matter is that the
defendants have not occupied or taken any property belonging to the plaintiff. They took
possession and ownership only of the land belonging to them, which properties were possessed
and owned originally by their predecessors-in-interest, who were the parents of the defendants.
The plaintiff did not make any demand mentioned in paragraph three of the complaint, knowing
that he is not the owner of the lands occupied by the defendants.

Appellee moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that appellants' answer
did not tender an issue.

Acting on said motion, the Court rendered the judgment appealed from.

ISSUE:
Whether Judgment rendered on the pleadings was proper.

HELD:
The Court cannot render a judgment on the pleadings when the allegations of the defendants
answer are sufficient to raise the issue of ownership and possession over the land described in the
complaint.
The answer reproduced by the defendants is sufficient to raise the issue of ownership and
possession over the land described in the complaint. In other words, it appears clearly from the
allegations thereof that the appellants denied appellees claim of ownership and previous
possession, and clearly asserted their own claim.

30D. Bases of Summary Judgment

Allied Agri-Business Development Co. Inc. vs Court of Appeals and Cherry Valley Farms
Limited
G.R. No. 118438 December 4, 1998

FACTS:

On 14 October 1986 respondent Cherry Valley Farms Limited (CHERRY VALLEY), a

foreign company based in England, filed against petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development
Co. Inc. (ALLIED) a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for collection of
sum of money alleging, among others that: (a.) on 1 September 1982 up to 16 February 1983, or
for a period of less than six (6) months, petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten (10) separate orders
and received from respondent CHERRY VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and ducklings
which in value totaled 51,245.12; (b) ALLIED did not pay the total purchase price of 51,245.12
despite repeated demands evidenced by a letter of Solicitor Braithwaite of England in behalf of
CHERRY VALLEY; (c) instead of paying its obligation, ALLIED through its president wrote
CHERRY VALLEY on 17 July 1985 inviting the latter to be a stockholder in a new corporation
to be formed by ALLIED, which invitation however was rejected by CHERRY VALLEY on 26
September 1985; and, (d) ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly acknowledged through
a letter of 8 October 1985 the obligation of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY. The
complaint also prayed that ALLIED be made to pay the sum of 51,245.12 or its peso equivalent
at the time of payment, plus legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment,
and twenty percent (20%) of the total amount being claimed from petitioner as attorneys fees;
and, to pay the costs of suit.

On 27 February 1986 ALLIED filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint. On 19 July 1988, CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIEDs counsel a Request for
Admission.

ALLIED filed its comments/objections alleging that the admissions requested were
matters which the private respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness during the
trial and thus petitioner need not answer.
In its Reply to comments / objections, CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no need on
its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission, for these pertained
to incidents personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner alone. Thereafter, on 2 August
1998, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion with the trial court to resolve the objections of
ALLIED to the request for admission.

On August 11, 1988 the trial court issued an order disregarding ALLIEDs comments /
objections to request for admission. ALLIED moved to reconsider the order; however, lower
court denied ALLIEDs motion for reconsideration and directed the latter to answer the request
for admission. Upon failure of ALLIED to submit a sworn answer to the request for admission,
Cherry Valley filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that there was already an implied
admission on the matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Court
which was granted by the trial court.

ALLIED appealed to the CA. CA rendered a decision affirming the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court with modification.

ISSUE:
Whether the Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted based on the implied
admission of ALLIED upon its failure to submit an answer to the request for admission.

HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Request for
admission. - At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with
the request unless copies have already been furnished. The purpose of the rule governing
requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve
parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can
be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less
than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters. Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do any of the
following acts:
(a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is requested, in which case,
he need not file an answer;
(b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving upon
the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the request,
which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as the court
may allow on motion and notice;
(c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission
is requested; or,
(d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.
 It showed that although petitioner filed with the trial court its comments and objections to
the request for admission served on it by private respondent, the trial court disregarded the
objections and directed petitioner after denying its motion for reconsideration, to answer the
request within five (5) days from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the matters of which the
admission was requested would be deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the required
answer within the period.
The motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the
ground that there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the
complaint were not disputed was correctly granted by the trial court. It is a settled rule that
summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a partys
failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact
exists.

30E. Form of Affidavits and supporting Papers

HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIOvs.AURORA O. SANTOS,

G.R. No. L-46892 September 30, 1981

FACTS:

On January 14, 1974, Amparo del Rosario filed a complaint against the spouses Andres F. Santos
and Aurora O. Santos, for specific performance and damages allegedly for failure of the latter to
execute the Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square meters of land, part of
Lot 1, Psu-206650, located at Barrio Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, in malicious breach of a Deed of
Sale dated September 28, 1964.

Amparo del Rosario died on Sept. 21, 1980 so that she is now substituted by the heirs named in
her will still undergoing probate proceedings. Andres F. Santos also died, on Sept. 5, 1980, and
he is substituted by the following heirs: Jovita Santos Gonzales, Arnulfo O. Santos, Archimedes
O. Santos, Germelina Santos Ravida, and Andres O. Santos, Jr.

Plaintiff claimed fulfillment of the conditions for the execution of the Deed of Confirmation of
Sale.

In a motion to dismiss, defendants pleaded, inter alia, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the
court a quo over the subject of the action and lack of cause of action. Defendant also claimed that
the demand set forth in the complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
Finally, defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable
under the statute of frauds and that the cause or object of the contract did not exist at the time of
the transaction.

After an opposition and a reply were filed by the respective parties, the Court a quo resolved to
deny the motion to dismiss of defendants. Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim
interposing more or less the same defenses but expounding on them further.
Plaintiff filed a reply and answer to counterclaim and thereafter a motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the defenses of defendants fail to tender an
issue or the same do not present issues that are serious enough to deserve a trial on the
merits, submitting on a later date the affidavit of merits. Defendants filed their corresponding
opposition to the motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Not content
with the pleadings already submitted to the Court, plaintiff filed a reply while defendants filed a
supplemental opposition.

With all these pleadings filed by the parties in support of their respective positions, the Court a
quo still held in abeyance plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings
pending the pre-trial of the case.

From the various pleadings filed in this case by plaintiff, together with the annexes and affidavits
as well as the exhibits offered in evidence at the pre-trial, the Court a quo found the facts as
having been duly established since defendant failed to meet them with countervailing evidence
The court a quo thereupon concluded that there are no serious factual issues involved so the
motion for summary judgment may be properly granted. Thereafter, it proceeded to dispose of
the legal issues raised by defendants and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.

According to the court a quo, "since Santos, in his Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment failed to meet the plaintiff's evidence with countervailing evidence, a circumstance
indicating that there are no serious factual issues involved, the motion for summary judgment
may properly be granted."

ISSUE:
Whether the Court a quo erred in granting the motion for summary judgment and / or judgment
on the pleadings.

HELD:
Where a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings has been filed, as in
this case, supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as may be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto served therewith.

Examining the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in the records, appellants failed to substantiate
the claim that the cause of action of appellee has been extinguished.

The action of the court a quo in rendering a summary judgment has been taken in faithful
compliance and conformity with Rule 34, Section 3, Rules of Court, which provides that "the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
31. Summary Judgment

ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR vs. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO,

FACTS :
On February 15, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of property premised on the allegations that they were the registered owners pro-
indiviso of a parcel of agricultural land at Guibuangan, Pototan, Iloilo with an area of 2.0089
hectares, more or less, identified as Lot No. 7340, their ownership thereof being evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-77367 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. The parcel of land
was acquired through purchase by the Plaintiffs on September 6, 1973 following which they
caused to be undertaken by a licensed Geodetic Engineer the relocation survey, as a result of said
survey, plaintiffs came to know and discover that the northeastern half portion of the lot has been
eaten up and occupied by the new waterbed of the Suage River as a result of the natural change
in its course, while the remaining southwestern portion is occupied and possessed by defendant
Ricardo Ladrido. The Plaintiffs also later came to know that the defendant has occupied and
possessed for more than two years not only the aforesaid parcel 2 but also the old abandoned
riverbed of the Suage River which was the original boundary on the west of the land in question.
Notwithstanding demands made by the plaintiffs, defendant without any justifiable reason
refused to vacate the aforesaid area occupied by him or surrender the possession thereof to the
plaintiffs.
In his answer, defendant respondent Ricardo Ladrido denied the substantial allegations
in the complaint and averred as special and affirmative defenses.
On June 14, 1974, plaintiffs-petitioners amended their complaint by impleading Rosendo Te as
defendant from whom they purchased the land in question upon the latter's assurance that the
title is clean and the landholding is not possess nor subject to any lien, encumbrances or claims
by third persons.
Defendant-respondent Rosendo Te filed his own answer to the amended complaint.
On August 8, 1975, defendant-respondent Ricardo Ladrido filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing the action of plaintiffs and declaring defendant Ricardo Ladrido the owner
of the land in question on the basis of the alleged admission of the plaintiffs in their complaint as
well as of the law and jurisprudence on the matter. Defendant Rosendo Te filed his "Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment".
On August 19, 1975, respondent Judge issued the Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs-petitioners filed the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. This was followed by the
submission of their Record on Appeal but before the petition for review could be filed, counsel
for petitioners moved for the certification of the case to the Supreme Court. The motion was
granted by the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in deciding the case by Summary Judgment.
HELD:
Yes. Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases
where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by
the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place
of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means
a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for
summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion
supported also by affidavits, deposition ' or other documents (Section 3, Rule 34). In spite of its
expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the
minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this
remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not
to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is
resolved against the movant.
The aforementioned guidelines were not observed, the mere reliance on an "admission"
arrived at by construction and dubitable by its terms, rather than a clear and positive concession
cannot be a basis for a summary judgment. Respondent's motion is not supported by an affidavit
of merit or any document attesting the state of facts relied upon in the motion. Neither has the
court afforded the parties a hearing on both the motion and opposition to the same. Clearly, the
trial court in cursorily issuing a summary judgment, committed a correctible error.ch

32. Fraud, Accident, Mistake, or Excusable Negligence as grounds for new Trial or
Reconsideration/ Petition for Relief from Judgment

PAN-ASIATIC TRAVEL CORP vs.COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-62781 August 19, 1988

FACTS:

On March 21, 1980, Destinations Travel Phil., Inc. filed a complaint against Pan-Asiatic
Travel Corp. for the refund of the price of alleged unutilized airplane tickets issued by the latter
for passengers recruited by the former, which refund allegedly totalled P48,742.33.

On June 4, 1980, DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. After

receipt of said Motion, PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Dismiss
for the sole purpose of objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction over its person on the ground that
it was not properly served with summons. Two days after the filing of the Motion to Dismiss,
DESTINATIONS filed on June 25, 1980 an amended complaint increasing its claim for
reimbursement of refunds to P103,866.35. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, PAN-
ASIATIC was informed of the filing of the amended complaint; hence, it withdrew its Motion to
Dismiss.

Subsequently, a copy of the amended complaint and summons were served on PAN-
ASIATIC. PAN-ASIATIC filed several motions for extension of time within which to file its
answer. However, instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars which was
granted by the trial court. DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, on May 9,
1981, it served and filed a Motion to Admit attached "Second Amended Complaint" which
Second Amended Complaint detailed the causes of action.

Said Second Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial judge in an Order dated May
28, 1981, which Order was served on petitioner on June 9, 1981. However, no new summons was
served on petitioner. On July 15, 1981 DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default which was granted. Then, trial was held ex parte.On January 4, 1982 the trial court
rendered judgment by default against PAN-ASIATIC, which received a copy of the decision on
January 25, 1982.

On February 24, 1982, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to
Vacate Judgment by Default, alleging that the trial court's decision was rendered without
jurisdiction because petitioner was never served with summons on the Second Amended
Complaint, and that it was deprived of its day in court on account of fraud, accident, mistake
and/or excusable negligence. The motion was denied by the trial judge in an Order dated March
31, 1982. A copy of the Order was served on petitioner on April 2, 1982. On the same date, April
2, 1982, PAN-ASIATIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of March 31. While the
Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed on April 30, 1982 its notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal, and at the same time withdrew its Motion for Reconsideration
which withdrawal was granted by the trial court.

On May 19, 1982, DESTINATIONS filed a Motion for Execution which the trial court
granted on June 15, 1982. Meanwhile, the appeal of PAN-ASIATIC, was Dismissed on the
ground that the Decision of January 4, 1982 had become final and executory and that the appeal
was filed beyond the reglementary period.

On July 7, 1982, PAN-ASIATIC filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal
and in issuing the writ of execution. The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petitioners appeal was filed within the reglementary period.

HELD:

Petitioner contends that its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Vacate
Judgment by Default is in the nature of a Petition for Relief under Rule 38. Hence, the Order
denying the Omnibus Motion which was received by petitioner on April 2, 1982, is itself
appealable. PAN-ASIATIC thus argues that it had thirty (30) days from April 2, 1982 within
which to appeal said Order. Since it filed its notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal
on April 30, 1982, then, it is claimed, the appeal was perfected on time.

Petitioner's premise is incorrect. The Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to
Vacate Judgment is in the nature of a Motion for New Trial under Rule 37, and not a Petition for
Relief under Rule 38.
Be it recalled that a copy of the Judgment by Default was received by PAN-ASIATIC on January
25, 1982. The Omnibus Motion was filed on February 24,1982, which was within the period to
appeal. Since the motion was filed before the decision became final, it could not be a Petition for
Relief under Rule 38, but a Motion for New Trial.

... It is a well-known rule that (a petition for relief under Rule 38) may be filed
only when the order or judgment from which it is sought has already become final
and executory (Veluz vs. J.P. of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557; Anuran vs. Aquino, 38
Phil. 29; Quirino vs. PNB, 101 Phil. 705; 54 Off. Gaz. [14] 4248), so that as long
as the judgment against which relief is sought has not yet become final, the
petition aforesaid is not available as a remedy. Instead, the aggrieved party may
file a motion for new trial, under Rule 37 in courts of first instance, and under
section 16, Rule 4, in inferior courts, in order that the court may correct any
errors, mistakes or injustices committed in its judgment. [Punzalan v. Papica, et
al., 107 Phil. 246 (1960).]

Since the Omnibus Motion is in the nature of a Motion for New Trial, the Order denying
said motion is NOT itself appealable. However, the time during which the motion was pending
must be deducted from the thirty-day appeal period. Pursuant to section 3, Rule 41 which reads:

SEC. 3. How appeal is taken.Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.

The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new
trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37. But where such a motion has been filed during office
hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected
within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the
denial of said motion.

From January 25, 1982 (the date when PAN-ASIATIC received a copy of the Judgment
by Default) to February 24, 1982 (the date when the Omnibus Motion was filed) is twenty-nine
days. Petitioner therefore had one more day from April 2, 1982 (the day when PAN-ASIATIC
received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion), within which to appeal. Instead of
appealing, however, petitioner filed on the same day, April 2, 1982 a motion for reconsideration
of the Order, only to withdraw it on April 30, 1982, as it filed its notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal.
 Since the motion for reconsideration was withdrawn, then it is as if no motion for
reconsideration was ever filed. Thus, the one day remaining period remained unchanged. Clearly,
therefore, the appeal interposed on April 30, 1982 was filed out of time.

33A. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment

CITY OF MANILA vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100626 November 29, 1991

FACTS:

This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila against private
respondent Army and Navy Club for violation of the lease agreement between them over a parcel
of land on Roxas Boulevard in the said city. A summary judgment in favor of the petitioner was
rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and seasonably elevated to the Regional
Trial Court. To stay its execution, ANC filed a supersedes bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00,
which was approved by Judge Reyes. He subsequently affirmed the appealed judgment on June
7, 1991.

On June 10, 1991, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground that
the judgment had already become final and executory under RA 6031. Judge Reyes granted the
motion the same day and at 4:00 o'clock that afternoon the writ of execution was served on
ANC.
ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, but hours later, sensing that the motion
could not be acted upon, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

On July 3, 1991, that court issued the questioned decision, prompting the filing of the
present petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and contends that decisions of the
regional trial court in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and are final and executory
under RA 6031.

The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129, decisions of the regional trial
court in cases originating from and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts are not final but subject to appeal in a petition for review to the Court of
Appeals. Such decisions cannot be executed where the period of time for the defendant to perfect
his appeal has not yet expired.

ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior
courts are final and executory.
HELD:
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality of judgment
becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In
such a situation, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a
ministerial duty of the court.
Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its appellate
capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect, both laws
recognize that such judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of, adjudicate, or
determine the rights of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet "final and
executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary period for appeal. During that period,
execution of the judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of right.

The private respondent had up to June 25, 1991 to appeal the decision of the regional trial
court. The motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June 10, 1991, before the
expiration of the said reglementary period. As the decision had not yet become final and
executory on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not have been granted.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the trial court authorized was an execution pending
appeal.

While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the
Rules of Court, this provision must be strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule.
The reason allowing this kind of execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or
damage of the losing party should it secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any
such justification, the order of execution must be struck down as flawed with grave abuse of
discretion.

The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional
trial court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the
metropolitan trial court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal,
which can be issued by the regional trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.

The petitioner has shown no weighty justification for the application of the exception.
Hence, the respondent court committed no error in reversing the Regional Trial Court of Manila
and annulling the writ of execution issued by it on June 10, 1991, pending appeal of its decision.
33B. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment

REBURIANO v. CA
G.R. No. 102965 January 21, 1999
FACTS:

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. ordering Reburiano to pay
P55,000.00 with interest for the unpaid bottles of soft drinks it received from the company. RTC
issued a writ of execution. However, before the promulgation of the decision of the RTC, Pepsi
amended its articles of incorporation to shorten its term of existence. The RTC was not notified
of this fact. Reburiano then moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that Pepsi no
longer had juridical personality, hence, it could no longer sue and be sued. RTC denied
Reburianos petition to quash the writ of execution. An appeal was made. CA dismissed the
appeal. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pepsi still had juridical personality to puruse its case against Reburiano
after a shortening of its corporate existence.

HELD:

Yes. Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation whose charter
expires by its own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate
existence for other purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued
as a body corporate for 3 years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the
purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its
affairs, to dispose of an convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established. However, Reburiano further argues that
when Pepsi undertook a voluntary dissolution, there was no showing that a receiver or trustee
was ever appointed. He contends that Sec. 122 of the Corporation Code above cited does not
authorize a corporation, after the 3 year liquidation period, to continue actions instituted by it
within said period of 3 years.

SC held that in the case of Gelano vs. CA, a corporation that has a pending action and
which cannot be terminated within the 3 year period after dissolution is authorized to convey all
its property to trustees to enable it to prosecute and defend suits by or against the corporation
beyond the 3 year period. No reason could be conceived why a suit already commenced by the
corporation itself during its existence, not by a mere trustee who, by fiction, merely continues the
legal personality of the dissolved corporation, should not be accorded similar treatment allowed
to proceed to final judgment and execution thereof. Counsel of the dissolved corporation can be
considered a trustee. Also, the board of directors may be permitted to complete the corporate
liquidation by continuing as trustees by legal implication. Moreover, the Corporation Code
provides that no right or remedy in favor or against any corporation, its stockholders, members,
directors, trustees, or officers, shall be removed or impaired either by the shall be removed or
impaired either by the subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent
amendment or repeal of this Code or of any part thereof.
33C. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment

Hiyas Savings and Loan bank vs CA

GR No. 95625, October 4, 1991

FACTS:

RTC rendered decision and ordered that the plaintiff shall pay Hiyas Savings and Loan
Association the following sums: (1) P200,000 representing the principal amount of loan with
14% interest per annum, (2) ten percent (10%) of the amount due as and by way of attorneys
fees; and (3) the costs of the suit. On June 7, 1989, private respondents deposited in court two
treasury checks in the amount of P428,600 in satisfaction of judgment favoring Hiyas Savings
and Loan Bank in a civil case. The amount of P40,735.35 was applied by the petitioner as
attorneys fees. However, on August18, 1989, petitioner filed an amended motion for execution.
Petitioner claimed that the total liability of the private respondents was P448,941.92. Hence,
there was still an unsatisfied balance which it claimed to be P20,250.38 as 10% of attorneys fee
from the interest of principal obligation. The motion was denied and dismissed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the attorneys fee will only be based to 10% of the principal amount due?

HELD:
There is no ambiguity as regards the amount of attorneys fees awarded. It is clear that
the final and executory decision of the RTC awarded ten percent (10%) of the amount due as
attorneys fees. Since there was no qualification that the ten percent attorneys fees shall be taken
only is the total amount due on the loan obligation (principal + interest). Had the decision really
intended that the attorneys fees shall be ten percent (10%) of the principal only, it could have so
provided. Courts are cautioned to be careful in writing their decisions, to be clear and precise in
the use of words, especially in the dispositive portion. The petition was granted declaring that the
total amount of the judgment debt unsatisfied in Civil Case is P20.250.38 plus 14% interest until
full payment.

33D. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment

SALVA v. CA
G.R. No. 132250. March 11, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners, the Salvas, filed a complaint against the respondent (Governor Sato) and the
relocated families for Forcible Entry on the lot owned by NFA. The petitioners offered evidences
of numerous affidavits of their neighbors attesting to their actual, physical and notorious
possession of the NFA land for more than thirty (30) years, photographs of their houses; poultry
sheds and plantations on the NFA land, and various realty tax declarations and realty tax
receipts in the name of petitioners covering said land. Respondent filed her Answer to
petitioners' Complaint but she neither submitted any affidavits of her witnesses nor presented any
other evidence during the trial. On October 7, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court, through the
Honorable Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue, rendered judgment against respondent Governor Sato
and the relocated families who were found to have unlawfully entered the disputed property at
the time it was actually possessed and occupied by herein petitioners.

Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose. Before the Regional Trial
Court, respondent claimed that the parcel of land being occupied by petitioners was different
from that allocated as relocation site. To resolve this issue, the Honorable Judge Fernando Z.
Caunan conducted an ocular inspection of the lot where all parties were represented. Also
present were the officers of the Municipal Planning and Development Council and the Engineer's
Office. The relocated squatters were called and asked to confirm whether or not they have
actually entered the property in question. RTC found that 31 of the respondents did not enter the
premises in question and they were not found therein at the time of the ocular inspections. The
Regional Trial Court affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court but voided it with
respect to the thirty one (31) defendants, who were found to have never been relocated to the
property in question.

On March 27, 1995, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the foregoing Decision. It
was approved by the Regional Trial Court in an Order dated April 3, 1995. Petition was
dismissed and the respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, on January 10,
1996, the Court of Appeals ordered that entry of judgment be issued and that the records of that
case be returned to the Municipal Trial Court for execution. Entry of judgment was promptly
made on January 24, 1996. On March 25, 1996, the Municipal Trial Court issued a Writ of
Execution for the enforcement of its Decision in Civil Case No. 1425 as affirmed by the RTC
and CA.

On April 24, 1998, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, praying that the MTC
be enjoined from implementing its final and executory Decision in Civil Case No. 1425 and that
the same be declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. On
October 22, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition for having been filed as a substitute for a lost appeal. On
November 12, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On January 12, 1998,
respondent Court of Appeals reversed itself. It granted respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
and dismissed petitioners' Complaint for Forcible Entry in Civil Case No. 1425. On March 17,
1998, the instant Petition for Review by Certiorari was filed by petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing a decision already entered in the Entry of
Judgment and already executed.
HELD:
The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it reversed its
original decision to uphold the validity of the Municipal Trial Court judgment which had already
become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari to nullify and set it aside was
without procedural sanction. In Amigo v. Court of Appeals, the Court must remind the parties
that the case brought up to the Court of Appeals is an extraordinary action that has sought to
annul the writs of execution and demolition issued under and by virtue of a final judgment that is
alleged to be void for want of jurisdiction. The petition should not thus be used as a strategem to
once again reopen the entire controversy and make a complete force of a duly promulgated
decision that has long become final and executor. It is a settled rule that a judgment which has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence may no longer be modified in any
respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment becomes final, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.

33D. Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment

PBC vs. CA
G.R. No. 126158. September 23, 1997

FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, private respondent Falcon Garments Corporation (Falcon) opened
Current Account No. 25-00640-7 at BMA Quezon City Branch of petitioner Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom). Subsequently, on November 27, 1992, private respondent Falcon
obtained a loan from petitioner in the principal sum of Four Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P4,700,000.00) with interest at 17% per annum and penalty at 12% per annum in case of
default. Falcon failed to pay its loan on due date and went in default in December, 1993.

On February 9, 1995, Falcon filed a complaint, praying for the restoration to Falcons
current account of alleged unauthorized withdrawals totalling P12, 729,092.78 which were made
from 1990 to 1992, plus interest, damages, and attorneys fees. In its answer, PBCom denied
liability and interposed a compulsory counterclaim in the sum of P4,700,000.00, plus the
stipulated interest and penalty, damages, and attorneys fees.

On January 2, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision against PBCom. PBCom filed a
motion to appeal, but was considered dilatory by the trial court. The trial court ordered execution
pending appeal in favor of Falcon. CA also agreed with RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering execution of judgment pending appeal.

HELD:
 The trial court concluded that the foregoing statements presented during the hearing of
the motion for execution pending appeal constitute good reasons for the discretionary
execution. The Court of Appeals agreed, but SC is of a different persuasion and view.
The reasons relied upon are not compelling and thus can not constitute good reasons. It is
significant to stress that private respondent Falcon is a juridical entity and not a natural
person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on the verge of facing civil or
even criminal suits, the immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be
justified as Falcons situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may be ill or
may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the corporation will not per se justify a
discretionary execution unless there are showings of other good reasons, such as for instance,
impending insolvency of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory. But even as to
the latter reason, it was noted in Aquino vs. Santiago (161 SCRA 570 [1988]), that it is not for
the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate
court. Hence, it is not within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution
pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its bases for
finding good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory
intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending
appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in case where the
motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance with Section
2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is well-settled general principle that a
writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated. Execution which is not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must
conform particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision (GSIS
vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 233 [1993]). An order of execution which varies the tenor of
the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.

34. Fresh Period Rule; Governing period to file an Appeal

NEYPES v. CA
G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injuction before the RTC against the private
respondents. The trial court, in an order, dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, peitioers assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only
on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only
five days had lapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final
order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 31, section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final,
which we already determined to refer to July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

35. Perfection of Appeal

RP, through DECS v. CA

G.R. No. 132425. August 31, 1999

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, the Tanguilans, filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership
with damages against the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), represented by
its Division Superintendent of Schools of Cagayan, Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The parcel
of land in question is designated as Lot No. 7133 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan with an area of three thousand four hundred ninety-four (3494) square meters and
covered by OCT No. 2145 issued in the name of the spouses Domingo Tanguilan and Modesta
Addun. On January 18, 1996, summons was served upon the defendant DECS (petitioner
herein). Peregrino N. Alan, the Schools Division Superintendent, filed a motion for extension of
time to file a responsive answer. In the order of the trial court on February 2, 1996 the motion
was granted whereby the defendant was given until February 17, 1996 within which to file its
answer. On February 22, 1996, defendant filed a manifestation and motion for new period to file
answer to the complaint. On February 23, 1996, the plaintiffs moved to declare defendant DECS
in default for failure of the latter to file an answer within the period fixed by the court. The court
rendered the defendant in default and the ordered judgment was against the defendant. The
defendant filed a motion to appeal but was not granted for being filed out of time. Accordingly a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction was filed with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals issued its
questioned decision dated January 28, 1998 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred gravely in rendering the decision.

HELD:
Yes. The petition is without merit. The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or
inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute. As such it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provision of law. t is well-settled that failure to perfect an appeal within the period
provided for by law has the effect of rendering the decision or judgment final and executory.
Petitioner acknowledged that the appeal was filed two (2) days after the expiration of the period
to appeal. This being the case the decision of the trial court dated October 29, 1996 became final
and executory upon the expiration of the period to appeal.

Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory,
and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal.
36A. Grounds for Annulment of a judgment
BARCO vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No 120587 January 20, 2004

FACTS:
Nadina Maravilla (Private respondent) married Francisco Maravilla. Later on, the spouses
decided to live separately and they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage. Nadina
gave birth to a daughter and named her June Salvacio. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco
Maravilla as the father but despite of the notation of her daughters birth certificate, Nadina
subsequently claimed that the real father of her child was Armando Gustilo, a former
Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship. At the time of Junes birth, Gustilo was
married to Caraycong. Nadina and Gustilo were married in the United States after two and a half
years of Nadinas marriage to Francisco was alleged to have been annulled in the Philippines.
On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries in
the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with the RTC. She prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June that she will carry the
surname of her alleged real father Gustilo. Notably, Francisco affixed his signature to the
Petition signifying his conformity thereto. Three days later Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein
he acknowledged June as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to
Nadinas petition.
By 7 of September in 1983, Nadina filed an Amended Petition, this time impleading
Francisco and Gustilo as respondents. The Office of the Sol. Gen. filed a Motion to Dismiss the
petition on the ground that the RTC "had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. They cited
various jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be corrected under a
Rule 108 petition for correction of entries. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and thereafter
issued an order granting the petition and ordering the requested corrections to be effected.
In December 19, 1986 Gustilo died and two estate proceedings arose from his death. Jose
Vicente Gustilo allegedly a biological child of Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
seeking the annulment of the RTC Order of 7 January 1985 which had effected changes in the
civil status of June. The Court of Appeals commenced hearings on the petition, and on 11
January 1994, Milagros Barco filed in her capacity as the natural guardian and/or guardian ad
litem of her daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-in-
Intervention attached thereto. Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment
of the RTC Order as she was likewise fathered by Gustilo. The appellate court held that neither
Jose Vicente nor Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, the two grounds that would justify the annulment of a final judgment.32 It ruled that while
Jose Vicente and Barco had not been made parties in the Petition for Correction, the subsequent
notice and publication of the Order setting the case for hearing served as constructive notice to
all parties who might have an interest to participate in the case. The publication of the Order
conferred upon the RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Before this Court, Barco
assails that RTC Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
1.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the parties due to the failure of impleading Barco as a
party to the petition for correction.
2.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the nature of the action or the subject matter.

HELD:
1.) YES
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was
the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would
know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example,
a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of
his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and
Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires
notice by publication.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have
been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole
world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to
the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
2.)
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides only two
grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
 Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the
action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the party whose name is sought to be
changed, this does not alter the reality that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.62 In
complementation of grant of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108 provides that the verified
petition to the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Barco in this case posed defenses of prescription and lack of capacity to bring action to
the extent that a finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of
the action. Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court from its power to decide
the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or
omission of the parties. Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue and prescriptions as grounds for
dismissal of an action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not raised within the proper
period.
It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that
Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which led to the change of her daughters name, the
fact that the RTC granted the Order despite the existence of these two grounds only characterizes
the decision as erroneous.
The RTCs possible misappreciation of evidence where in RTC erred in directing that the
name of Nadinas daughter be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June Salvacion
Gustilo." Following the trial courts determination that Gustilo was the father of June, but
prescinding from the conclusive presumption of legitimacy for the nonce assuming it could be
done, the child would obviously be illegitimate is again at most, an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do not extend to
the competence of the RTC to decide the matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground to
annul the final order.

36B. Grounds for Annulment of a judgment

CARILLO v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 121165 September 26, 2006
FACTS:

Maria Gonzales filed a complaint of action for specific performance against Spouses
Priscilla and Jose Manio seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought from
Priscilla Manio. She also asked for damages and attorneys' fees. Gonzales said she paid
downpayment to Priscilla because she had an SPA from her son Aristotle, the owner of the
land.
For failure to file an Answer, The Manios were declared in default and the Trial Court
ruled in favor of Gonzales. Gonzales deposited the balance with the court and filed motion for
execution, which was withdrawn because the decision was not served on defendants. The
Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of 12 midnight. Since no appeal that has been
made Trial Courts decision became final and executory.
But on December 14, 1990 Maria Paz and Rosalina Dabons, claiming to have bought
the land from Aristotle, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment
and orders of the Trial Court. They alleged that the decision was void for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons as the real parties in interest. Court of Appeals issued
resolution restraining TC from implementing its decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was basis to annul the decision of the Trial Court

HELD:
Yes, there was basis to annul the Decision of the Trial Court. Though Gonzales insists
that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC's judgment because they are not
parties to the specific performance case but the Court specify that the Dabons insists are parties
in interest because they are buyers, owners and possessors of the contested land. An action
should be brought against the real party in interest. The real party in interest is the one who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit.
Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge), Guyot (Clerk of Court), Senoy
(Deputy Sheriff), Risonar ( Registrar of Deeds), and Gonzales. Carillo, Guyot, Senoy and
Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs
sought. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case.

Pertinently, Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules on Civil Procedure explicitly provides the
two grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
the Court of Appeals found that indices of fraud attended the case before the trial court:
1. the plaintiff deliberately excluded the Dabons as party to the case despite knowledge that
the Dabons had alleged that they had bought the land from Aristotle.
2. the Sheriffs Return was suspiciously served at midnight,
3. the trial court ordered the plaintiff to deposit the full payment of property, but
subsequently ordered its withdrawal.
 4. there was no notice given to the person named in the certificate of title which Gonzales
wanted to be annulled.

Likewise, under Rule 47, a judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the real
parties in interest. Thus the Court of Appeals did not err in granting the annulment of the judgement.

37. Dismissal of an Appeal

LAZARO vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No 137761 April 6, 2000
FACTS
Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong Spouses Jose and Anita Alesna as
private respondents filed a civil action for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong against Petitioners Gabriel Lazaro and the heirs of
Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, the private
respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
The CA dismissed the appeal for failure of the private respondents to pay the required
docket fees within the prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued Resolution granting their Motion
for Reconsideration and reinstating the appeal. On the other hand the petitioners also filed their
own Motion for Reconsideration assailing the Resolution but the CA denied their motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA in issuing dismissal of the appeal due to non-payment of CA Docket Fees
valid

HELD:
Yes because the private respondents failed to pay the required docket fees within the
reglementary period. The Rules of Court specifically provides that appellate court docket and
other lawful fees should be paid within the period for taking an appeal.
Submission of private respondents that the aforecited rule is merely directory, the
payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: "Failure of the appellant to
pay the docket and other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41" is a ground for the dismissal
of the appeal. Verily, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or the rule.
In such case an existing jurisprudence and the Rules mandate that the appeal should be
dismissed. Sc

38. Form of Decision rendered by the Appellate Court

Solid Homes v Laserna
G.R. No. 166061 April 8, 2008
Facts:
April 1977, respondents Evila Laserna and Gloria Cajipe (buyers) entered into a Contract
to sell with petioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI) as seller. The respondents made the down payment
and several monthly installments. When the respondent had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase
price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT of the subject property upon the finalk payment of the balance. But the petioner
did not comply with the demands of the respondents. Whereupon the respondents filed a
complaint for delivert of title and Execution of Deed of sale with damages against the petitioner,
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The Petitioner filed a Motion to
Admit Answer asserting that the respondents have no cause of action against it because the
respondents failed to show that they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to
Sell, since the respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property.
October 1992, HLURB rendered a decision denying respondents' prayer for the issuance
of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the TCT. However, directed the petitioner to execute and
deliver the Deed of Sale and TCT the moment that the purchase price is fully settled. He also
ordered the Petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the
respondents.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. By August 2994, the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a decision
modifying the October 1992 decision.
Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the decision, thus it appealed the same before the
Office of the President. June 2003, after evaluation the established facts and pieces of evidence,
the Office of the President affirming in toto the August 1994 Decision of the HULRB Board of
Commissioners. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the June 2003 Decision. However,
the Office of the President denied the same.
The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. July 2004, the appellate
court rendered a decision denying due course and dismissing the petitioner's Petition for Review
for lack of merit and affirming the decision of the Office of the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the office of the
president considering that the complaint of the respondents lacks cause of action

HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious. Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not
apply to decisions rendered in Administrative Proceeding, as in the case at bar. Said Section
applies only to judicial proceedings. The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not
violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. The facts of
the present case were not contested by the parties and it can be easily determined by the hearing
officer or tribunal. Even the respondents admitted that, indeed the total purchase price for the
subject property has not yet been fully settled and the outstanding balance is yet to be paid by
them. The case is just a simple action for specific performance with damages, thus, there are
neither doctrinal complications involved in this case that will require an extended discussion of
the laws involved.
Also, during the hearing conducted by HLURB, it became apparent that respondents'
cause of action against petitioner is not limited to non-execution and non-delivery by petitioner
of the Deed of sale and TCT of the property, which is dependent on their full payment of the
purchase price thereof but also the wrongful rescission by the petition of the Contract to Sell.
The Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and
sufficient, and said so in its own decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the
product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases were already contained
in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB
Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule
65.

39. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

ENCARNACION v AMIGO
G.R. No 169793 September 15, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Encarnacion was the registered owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by
virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. Respondent Amigo allegedly
entered the premises and took posession of a portion of property sometime in 1985 without the
permission of the then owner.
Hence, a letter demanding the respondent to vacate the property was sent by the
petitioner on February 1, 2001, and it was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001.
Respondent still refuse to vacate the property and thus made the petitioner file a complaint for
ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court in Isabela.
In the Respondent's answer, he alleged that he has been in actual possession and
occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of free Patent and
titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irrregularities.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On appeal,
Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the ground that as the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petitioner for review under Rule 42 before the Court of
Appeals which remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. CA held that the proper
action is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer based on the allegations in the complaint
filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is accion publiciana?

HELD:
Yes, it is a case of accion publiciana and the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible
entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the MTC. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the
proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper RTC.
While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12,
2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year
from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner
became the owner of the lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a
portion thereof. Almost 6 years have elapsed from the date of the petitioner's dispossession in
1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001. The length of time that the petitioner
was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion
interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year
period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC.
In evaluating the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals commited no reversible error
in holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana and ordering the remand of the
case to the Regional Trial Court who acquire jurisdiction over the case.
40A. Contempt of Court
TEL-EQUEN v DATUMANONG
G.R. No 150274 August 4, 2006
FACTS
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents,
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct
prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others which found them
guilty and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties
After his Motion for reconsideration was denied, Tel-Equen appealed to the Court of Appeals. It
was also denied hence they appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending with
the SC, DPWH Sec. Datumanong issued a memorandum order dismissing Tel Equen from the
service.
Tel-Equen, filed this present case to cite the former DPWH Secretary Datumanong in
contempt for issuing the said memorandum order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Datumanong should be cited in contempt.
Held: No
The contempt power must be exercised with utmost self-restraint. The issuance of the
Memorandum Order by Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. There should an implied
willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice in order for a conduct to be
contumacious which is not so in the case at bar. It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision affirming the dismissal that Sec. Datumanong issued the memorandum and after
ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order was issued by the court.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no
vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his
case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
Sec. Datumanon cannot be held in contempt of court in the absence of malice or wrongful
conduct in issuing the memorandum but the remedy of the petitioner is to elevate the error to the
higher court for review and correction. Wherefore the case is dismissed for lack of merit
40B. Contempt of Court
WICKER and RAYOS v ARCANGEL
G.R. No 112869 January 29, 1996
FACTS:

Kelly Wicker together with his wife Wynee Dieppe and Tectonics Asia Architects and
Engineering Co., brought suit in the RTC of Makati against LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others for
annulment of certain deeds. The case was assigned to branch 134 formerly presided over by
judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replace by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel. It appears
that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the
respondent Judge Arcangel from the case.
Respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by
complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable
for direct contempt.

HELD:
The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without
which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent with the foregoing principles and based
on the above mentioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are
guilty of contempt.
Allegations made by the Plaintiff against respondent judge are derogatory to the integrity
and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of
justice in this country.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a
lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional
assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep.
Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,Atty. Rayos bears as much
responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty.
Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives
not supported by the record or have materiality to the case."
Yes, there was basis to annul the Decision of the Trial Court. Though Gonzales insists
that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC's judgment because they are not
parties to the specific performance case but the Court specify that the Dabons insists are parties
in interest because they are buyers, owners and possessors of the contested land. An action
should be brought against the real party in interest. The real party in interest is the one who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit.
Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge), Guyot (Clerk of Court), Senoy
(Deputy Sheriff), Risonar ( Registrar of Deeds), and Gonzales. Carillo, Guyot, Senoy and
Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs
sought. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case.