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Arc-Flash Mitigation
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH FOR COMPANY STANDARD POWER SYSTEM SCHEMES

photocredit

By Rakan El-Mahayni, Arc-flash hazard assessment studies involving

Jamal Bugshan, and a very large oil and gas companys equipment rated 38 kV
Ritchie Pragale and below revealed locations with excessive arc-flash inci-
dent energy. After conducting many additional studies of
power distribution systems for various plants (e.g., refineries,
gas plants, gas-oil separation plants, and natural gas liquid
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MIAS.2016.2600694
plants), we realized that dangerous locations (greater than
Date of publication: 24 February 2017 40 cal/cm 2) are somewhat consistent among various plant

2 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine m ay / j u n e 2 0 1 7 1077-2618/172017IEEE

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types. This knowledge makes planning and budgeting
for implementing arc-flash mitigation predictable from
a corporate perspective. Specific arc-flash mitigation
techniques can be embedded in the specifications of
new projects as well as company material standards to
avoid unnecessary retrofit activities after installation.
Maintenance personnel can also be effectively trained
on arc-flash mitigation and safe work practices when
consistent solutions are implemented. This article dem-
onstrates a systematic approach to address dangerous
arc-flash locations for corporate planning purposes
and provides practical mitigation solutions that can be
applied at many company facilities.
Considerations for Safety Risks
An electrical arc flash can damage equipment and injure
personnel. These injuries can range from minor burns
to third-degree burns as well as blindness, hearing loss,
nerve damage, cardiac arrest, and potentially death.
After a string of arc flashrelated injuries and fatalities,
a large oil and gas company responded with a corporate
initiativethe Arc Flash Electrical Safe Operations Pro-
gram. The program implements arc-flash safety require-
ments in all company facilities, deploys and evaluates
new technologies, develops company-wide electrical
worker certification, develops uniform company proce-
dures, provides clear delineation of responsibilities, and
promotes awareness programs for all electrical workers.
The companys electrical system operators (ESOs)
and technicians are the most exposed to the potential
dangers of arc flash. Arc-flash incidents can occur due
to lack of maintenance or when ESOs or technicians
ignore procedures, take shortcuts, or become overcon-
fident. They can also be caused by equipment failure
(such as mechanical misalignment or insulation failure)
or human error. Figure 1 shows a 15-kV switchgear
cubicle after an arc-flash incident, the result of cata-
strophic equipment failure.
1) to improve overall electrical safety by reducing the risk
of an arc flash
2) to ensure personnel survivability after an arc-flash event
3) to ensure a reliable power supply by limiting equip-
ment damage caused by an arc-flash event.
In addition to the GI, the companys engineering
design standard has minimum requirements for power
system design. These include requiring arc-flash analysis
for all new electrical distribution equipment rated up to
38 kV in accordance with IEEE 1584 [2]. The maximum
allowable amount for incident energy shall not exceed
8 cal/cm2. The arc-flash analysis is to be performed in
conjunction with short circuit and protective device coor-
dination analysis in the detailed design phase.
There are 1,500 substations distributed over 100 oper-
ating facilities, and the company mandated the imple-
mentation of arc-flash safety hazard assessments in all of
them. A best practice procedure was developed to guide
engineers in performing and reviewing arc-flash hazard
analysis using commercially available power system analy-
sis and design software.
Current Mitigation Strategy
The current mitigation strategy involves the deployment
of proven technology such as universal remote racking

Corporate History
The company published a general instruction (GI) doc-
ument in October 2009, which is the guiding document
of the Arc Flash Electrical Safe Operations Program.
However, the groundwork for this GI started much
earlier. The GI provides minimum safe work require-
ments for the protection of personnel against electrical
arc-flash hazards in the workplace in accordance with
the National Fire Protection Association 70E. Standard
for Electrical Safety in the Workplace [1]. The document
applies to construction, commissioning, start-up, opera-
tion, maintenance, and demolition activities at electri-
cal installations whenever there is the possibility that
an electrical arc flash may occur. The GI was recently
updated to include effective hazard mitigation solutions
using engineering and administrative controls. The
main reasons for the update were FIGURE 1. A damaged medium-voltage switchgear cubicle.

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and remote switching devices to move the electrical
worker outside the arc-flash boundary. In addition to
these devices, the program requires arc-flash warning
labels to be installed on all power distribution equipment
rated 38 kV and below. The label must show the calcu-
lated arc-flash incident energy along with the calculated
FIGURE 2. A ground truck is installed using an MV switchgear.
FIGURE 3. An operator using a low-voltage breaker.
FIGURE 4. An MV breaker is racked out, and remote racking is used.
4 IEEE Industry Applications Magazine m ay / j u n e 2 0 1 7
arc-flash boundary. When the calculated arc-flash energy
exceeds 40 cal/cm2, then the equipment must be placed
in an electrically safe work condition prior to any live
work. Furthermore, personal protective equipment with
arc thermal protective value greater than 40 cal/cm 2
should be stored and available in all electrical substations,
ready for use. These initial strategies were put in place
to reduce risk to personnel while the various operating
facilities worked on completing arc-flash hazard analy-
sis. When the calculated arc-flash incident energy and
arc-flash boundaries became available and dangerous
locations (those with arc-flash incident energy greater than
40 cal/cm2) were identified, further arc-flash mitigation
was required for each facility. Figures 24 show normal
daily energized work activities performed throughout
the company. Figure 4 shows the method preferred by
company ESOs: use of a remote racking device available
in nearly all substations throughout the company.
Arc-Flash Energy Levels
Based on NFPA 70E-2012, the company started to use
arc-flash energy levels outlined in Table H.3(b) instead
of hazard risk categories (HRCs). HRCs are strictly associ-
ated with the task method outlined in Table 130.7(C)(15)
(a), while Table H.3(b) is recommended when the arc-
flash assessment is completed using the analysis method.
Table 1 is derived from Table H.3(b). The equipment listed
in the task method must meet specific criteria related to
the available short circuit current and the correspondent
protection clearing time. Hence, the procedure becomes
less straightforward than one might think.
Planning
While the company standards address new projects, they
are retroactive when it comes to safety. A plan was formu-
lated to address dangerous arc-flash locations in existing
facilities even before arc-flash studies are completed. Con-
sequently, the company assembled a corporate team to put
together a master power systems plan. The main purpose
is to budget for expenditures on power systems over the
next five years. The plan included arc-flash mitigation as an
integral safety element. The team had to rely on completed
Table 1. Energy levels per NFPA 70E-2012Annex H
Calculated Incident Energy (cal/cm2)
Arc-Flash
Minimum Maximum Level
0.0 1.2 A
>1.2 12 B
>12 40 C
>40 40+ Danger
Derived from Table H.3(b) in [1].
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studies of various facilities to provide indications of typical

dangerous locations, which could then be used as a basis UTL Bus 1
to 1) specify an appropriate arc-flash mitigation technique 115 kV
600/5
and 2) generalize this approach for all facilities.
T1 FDR
Typical Power System Description OCR 50/51 T1
600/5
For the most part, the utility company provides power
to the company plants at 115- or 230-kV voltage levels
through substations with a double-bus, single-breaker T1
busbar configuration. The power is then distributed OCR 87 T1 50 MVA
Y 115/13.8 kV
throughout the plant at 13.8-, 4.16-, and 0.48-kV voltage 8.5 %z
levels to feed various motor and static loads. In some OCR
3,000/5
cases, the utility power is supplemented by onsite cogen-
eration to maximize the benefit of the steam demand and 3,000/5 50/51 Bus A
MV
improve the overall efficiency of the system. Generally, Bus A MAIN
Bus A SWGR TIE
3,000/5
three types of power distribution schemes are present 13.8 kV
inside any particular plant. The Type I scheme (Figure5)
T3 FDR T4 FDR
consists of a main step-down transformer (T1) to provide
OCR 87 Bus A
power to large motors and Type II/Type III schemes
OCR 300/5 OCR
through a 13.8-kV metal-clad switchgear (bus A). Over- 600/5
lapping differential protection (transformer/bus) is the 50/51 T3 50/51 T4
company standard for Type I protection. The Type II 3,000/5 3,000/5
scheme (Figure 6) receives power from an upstream
Type I feeder to provide power to medium-sized motors FIGURE 5. A Type I scheme showing a 13.8-kV switchgear. OCR:
through a step-down transformer (T3), 4.16-kV switch- overcurrent relay.
gear, and 4.16-kV control-gear [medium-voltage motor
control center (MV MCC)]. No bus differential protection
is available for the 4.16-kV switchgear (MV SWGR 1) in
existing facilities; however, a transformer differential is a T3 FDR
standard requirement for transformers larger than 5 MVA.
The Type III scheme (Figure 7) receives power from an 600/5 OCR
upstream TypeI feeder to provide power to smaller low-
50/51 T3
voltage (LV) motors and other static loads through a step-
down transformer (T4), 0.48-kV metal enclosed switchgear T3
(LV SWGR 1), and 0.48-kV MCC (LV MCC 1). Company Y 10 MVA
standards require MV systems to be resistance grounded 13.8/4.16 kV
6.5 %z
and LV systems to be solidly grounded. MV SWGR 1
4.16 kV MV SWGR 1 MAIN

Arc-Flash Studies Control Gear 1 FDR

More than 40 arc-flash studies have been conducted so
1600/5 OCR
far for different facilities. It was observed that a signifi- Control Gear 1
cant number of the dangerous locations are at the line 4.16 kV 50/51
Control
side of the LV switchgear, i.e., the main circuit breaker Gear 1
cubicle (boxed in Figure 7). The ratio of the amounts ISO SW 2 ISO SW 1
of those locations (LV line side) to the total amount of Fuse 2 Fuse 1
dangerous locations is reflected in the last column of Cont 2 Cont 1
Table 2, which was prepared for sample facilities. This
OCR OCR
is not surprising knowing that the arcing fault at this 600/5 600/5
location will be cleared by the upstream protective relay MTR 2 Relay MTR 1 Relay
50/5 50/5
at the high side of the T4 transformer. In most cases,
the arcing current will be lower than the instantaneous
overcurrent pickup, in which case, it may take the relay MTR 2 MTR 1
a few seconds to clear the fault based on its inverse 3,000 HP 3,000 HP
time-overcurrent characteristics.
Figure 8 demonstrates that the overcurrent relay will FIGURE 6. A Type II scheme showing a 4.16-kV switchgear/
take 2.5 s to clear the arcing fault, which will result in control gear.

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extreme arc-flash incident energy of 118 cal/cm2. While the 13.8-kV switchgear (bus A), arc-flash incident energy
less probable because clearing time is typically lower than is, in all cases, below 4 cal/cm2 due to the sensitivity of
the case described earlier, dangerous arc-flash incident the applied high-impedance-bus differential protective
energy could also be present in LV and MV MCCs. As for relaying (87B) [3]. It is worth mentioning that 87B does
not cover the line side of bus A, and the fast clearing
time should only be considered for the line side when a
transformer differential (87T) scheme is overlapping with
the bus differential (87B) (Figure 5). The same discussion
T4 FDR applies to the load side of feeder breakers because the
typical location of differential current transformers (CTs)
is not where the cables exit the switchgear; therefore, the
300/5 OCR incident energy could exceed the incident energy allowed
50/51 T4 by the bus differential scheme. These facts could lead to
a false sense of safety; hence, electrical personnel need to
be aware of the capabilities of the implemented protec-
tion scheme.
T4
Y 3 MVA Technology Evaluation and Deployment
13.8/0.48 kV Arc-flash incident energy is proportional to working dis-
5.75 %z
tance, current, and time. As the working distance increas-
LV SWGR 1 MAIN LV SWGR TIE
es, the arc-flash energy decreases. The working distance
and the system voltage are normally factors that cannot
LV SWGR easily be adjusted. The time duration has the highest
0.48 kV
impact on energy levels. Because of this, most strategies
of arc-flash hazard mitigation focus on faster detection
LV MCC 1 FDR and clearing of the arc flash. It is very important to keep
the arcing time as short as possible. The company evaluat-
ed the following technologies to reduce arc-flash hazards:
LV MCC 1
0.48 kV Bus Differential Protection Relaying (87B)
Bus differential protection 87B is selective and fast with
a typical total operating time of 125 ms. When a fault
MTR 3 FDR MTR 5 FDR occurs in the zone of protection between the main and
feeder breakers, the protective device reacts by tripping
OL 1 OL 3
instantaneously. This limits personnel arc-flash exposure,
Cont 3 Cont 5
significantly reduces arc-flash incident energy, and limits
equipment damage. The application of bus differential
protection must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis
because it can be prohibitive due to the cost of retrofit-
MTR 3 MTR 5
ting: dedicated CTs must be installed on every circuit
100 HP 100 HP
breaker connected to the bus, and extensive field wiring
modification may be required. In addition, 87B cannot be
FIGURE 7. A Type III scheme showing a 0.48-kV switchgear/
implemented in LV systems due to spacelimitations in the
control gear.
switchgear. However, the company revised its standards
to mandate 87B for all 4.16-kV switchgear in Type II
schemes for all future projects [3].
Table 2. Arc-flash study resultsnumber of
locations/level Zone-Selective Interlocking (ZSI)
LV Line As mentioned previously, because the concept of bus dif-
Facility Level A Level B Level C Danger Side (%) ferential protection (87B) is difficult to implement for LV
switchgear, ZSI was developed to emulate the performance
F1 1 53 92 57 46
of 87B in a cost-effective manner. Fault clearing times of
F2 381 136 206 132 55 three to ten cycles can be reached by ZSI. This scheme
F3 1 198 59 152 50 utilizes communication signals between the main and
F4 4 81 96 30 90 outgoing feeder trip units to trip the main breaker with
no intentional delay when the fault is located on the bus

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side of the feeder breakers (feeder/

tie cubicles). Most ZSI schemes are Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8)
effective only for ground fault and .5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 10K 3K
short time functions; therefore, an 1K 1K
Normal Coordination/ Line-Side
engineering analysis must be con- 500 500
Energy (Main Circuit Breaker
ducted to ensure that the available 300 Cubicle) = 118 cal/cm2 300
arcing current is greater than the
short time pickup setting. In addition, 100 100
ZSI does not reduce arc-flash incident 50 LV SWGR 1 MAIN 50
energy for line-side faults. The cor- 30 30
LV MCC1 FDR
porate team recommended this solu-
tion to reduce arc-flash energy at the T4
10 10
bus side for LV switchgear in Type III T4 P RELAY-P
5 OC1 5
schemes [4, p. 26.1.22].
(s) 3 3 (s)

Energy-Reducing Maintenance Switch

(EMRS)
The ERMS is used to lower relay/ .5
trip unit pickup levels and sacrifice .3
coordination only when personnel
are performing energized work or .1
when maintenance is being per- .05
formed. Technicians must manu- .03
ally enable the ERMS before doing
maintenance work and then dis- .01
able it when work is complete. A .5 1
local/remote indication is incorpo- Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8)
rated to alert plant personnel that
the system is in maintenance mode. FIGURE 8. A Type III scheme showing typical time overcurrent coordination (OC).
The ERMS should also be padlock-
able to enable technicians to apply
lockout/tagout procedures. The team recommended
implementing ERMS as follows:
a) reduce arc-flash incident energy in LV MCC: enable the
ERMS at the upstream LV feeder circuit breaker (LV
MCC 1 FDR; see Figure 7)
b) reduce arc-flash incident energy at the line side (main
breakers cubicle) of an LV switchgear: enable the ERMS
associated with the microprocessor digital protective
relay at the upstream HV feeder circuit breaker (50/51
T4; see Figure 7).
The ERMS must be deactivated after live work is com-
pleted to avoid possible protection miscoordination and
subsequent loss of selectivity during a fault condition. The
ERMSs overcurrent pickup setting must be set lower than
the available arcing current with no intentional delay to
effectively reduce arc-flash incident energy.
To further illustrate the impact of reducing the clear-
ing time, the time current curve in Figure 9 demonstrates
the reduction in arc-flash incident energy for the case
described in Figure 8, where the arc-flash incident energy
has been reduced from 118 cal/cm2 to 6 cal/cm2. This is
easily accomplished by applying an ERMS at the upstream
feeder protection (T4 Feeder) [4, p. 26.1.16]. Lastly, Table 3 is
extracted from a recent arc-flash study showing the impact
of implementing an ERMS at a sample facility.
1 LV SWGR 1 MAIN-3P 1
LV SWGR1-Source PD la .5
.3
T4 P RELAY-3P
T4 .1
.05
.03
LV MCC1 FDR-3P
.01
3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 3K 10K
Optical Detection Relays
Various protective relay manufacturers offer optical
detection as a feature in their products. Point-and-loop
optical sensors coupled with CTs to provide current
supervision are utilized. The relay is programmed
to trip an upstream circuit breaker at a preset light
intensity accompanied by an instantaneous increase
in current. Because overcurrent detection is based on
an input analog signal, the relay will trip faster than
any overcurrent protection. Therefore, the system pro-
tection selectivity could be compromised during this
condition. In addition, there is no guarantee that the
optical sensors will not have to be replaced after an
arc-flash incident. Because this solution is an integral
part of the switchgear assembly, it must be tested and
certified by the switchgear manufacturers to provide
confidence to end users; at present, it is not tested.
For these reasons, the team did not recommend this
solution.
Solution Matrix
Based on the aforementioned schemes and recommended
arc-flash mitigation solutions, substation components
were recorded by examining the databases for 1,500 sub-
stations. Arc-flash mitigation was based on the concept

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multiple setting groups and digital

Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8) inputs. This solution is not possi-
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 3K 10K ble with traditional solid-state trip
1K 1K units. Therefore, all trip units must
500 ERMS/Line-Side Energy 500 be upgraded to digital trip units with
(Main Circuit Breaker
300 300 dual instantaneous setting capabili-
Cubicle = 6 cal/cm2)
ties. The solution matrix results are
100 100 shown in Table 4.
50 LV SWGR 1 MAIN 50
30 30
Other Effective Arc-Flash Hazard
LV MCC1 FDR
Instantaneous Reduction Methods
overcurrent pickup T4
10 10
setting is set at a T4 P RELAY-P Transformer Overcurrent Protection
5 value lower than OC1 5 Philosophy
(s) 3 the available arcing 3 (s)
fault current. In many cases, arc-flash incident
energy can be reduced by simply
1 LV SWGR 1 MAIN-3P 1 changing the philosophy of trans-
.5 LV SWGR1-Source PD la .5 former overcurrent protection. Pro-
.3 .3 tection engineers are accustomed to
T4 P RELAY-3P using extremely or very inverse char-
.1 .1 acteristics, which are based on early-
T4
.05 .05
generation electromechanical relays
.03
(Figure 8). Such characteristics often
.03
LV MCC1 FDR-3P result in extreme arc-flash incident
.01 .01 energy at the line side of the equipment
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 3K 10K at the secondary side of the transform-
Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8) er (LV SWGR 1 at 118 cal/cm2). With
modern digital microprocessor relays,
FIGURE 9. A Type III scheme showing ERMS implementation and its impact on incident energy. the curve could be reshaped to emulate
the characteristics of an LV circuit
breaker (Figure 10). However, care
should be exercised with such an approach as most micro-
Table 3. ERMS implementationImpact on incident processor protective relays operate the timed and instan-
energy for a samplefacility taneous overcurrent elements independently, which could
potentially cause miscoordination with downstream pro-
As Found Recommended tective devices [8]. This modification results in a dramatic
Scenario Scenario (ERMS) reduction in the arc-flash incident energy from 118 cal/cm2
Device ID Total Total to 23 cal/cm2 (Figure 11). Similarly, in the LV breakers sol-
(0.48-kV Energy Energy Energy Energy id-state trip units, using the flat (out) instead of I2t (in) for
rating) (cal/cm2) Level (cal/cm2) Level the short time-delay setting will often reduce the arc-flash
incident energy at the downstream LV MCC [5].
LVSG-01
42.96 Danger 6.71 Level B
IN
Extended ZSI
CB 556 73.15 Danger 7.32 Level B As noted in Table 2, many of the locations with exces-
CB 635 53.37 Danger 7.12 Level B sive arc-flash incident energy are at the line side
CB 843 43.19 Danger 6.75 Level B of the LV switchgear (Figure 7). A fast clearing time
could be achieved by establishing a communication
CB 846 23.57 Level C 7.19 Level B
link between the relays at the high side and the low
EC-P-B-02 39.27 Level C 6.54 Level B side of the transformer. Substation automation standard
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850
CB: circuit breaker.
could be implemented to exchange generic object ori-
ented substation event (GOOSE) messages about the
of the previously explained ERMS. It is obvious that this location of the faults and subsequently trip the high-
solution is not possible with electromechanical relays. side breaker in six to seven cycles [breaker oper-
Therefore, certain electromechanical relays will need ation time, relay processing, and GOOSE messaging
to be upgraded to microprocessor digital relays with (4 ms)] when the fault is located at the line side. The

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Table 4. Solution matrix for 1,500 substations

Suggested Component
Solution Description Quantity Remarks
Type III scheme Digital trip LV main circuit 950 Replace trip units of 480-V main power
units/ERMS breakers circuit breakers
Digital trip LV outgoing feeder 2,147 Replace trip units of 480-V feeder power
units/ERMS circuit breakers circuit breakers
Type II and Type Microprocessor Power transformer 1,358 Replace overcurrent protective relays of
III schemes relays/ERMS feeders feeder circuit breakers upstream of power
transformers
Type II scheme Microprocessor 4.16-kV MCCs 225 Replace overcurrent protective relays
relays/ERMS of feeder circuit breakers upstream of
MV MCCs (directly fed motors are not
counted)

c ompany standard specifies IEC61850

for all protective relays including the Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8)
autotransfer scheme relays for LV .5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 3K 10K
switchgears. 1K 1K
Alternatively, when the LV and 500 500
MV switchgears are in near prox- 300 300
imity, the same functionality could
be achieved with direct hard wire 100 100
bet ween microprocessor-based 50 LV SWGR 1 MAIN 50
relays. Consequently, the relays digi- 30 30
LV MCC1 FDR
tal input/outputs could be used to
block upstream relays from operat- T4
10 10
ing instantaneously when the fault T4 P RELAY-P
5 OC1 5
is seen by the downstream relay
(s) 3 3 (s)
(Figure 12). This would establish
an extended ZSI scheme to include
1 LV SWGR 1 MAIN-3P 1
the line side of LV switchgears in
the protection zone, resulting in a .5 LV SWGR1-Source PD la .5
reduced incident energy level (6 cal/ .3 .3
cm2 at LV SWGR 1s line side). One T4 P RELAY-3P
remaining challenge is that the low- .1 T4 .1
side CTs are typically located on the .05 .05
line side of the main circuit breaker, .03 .03
which means that the main circuit LV MCC1 FDR-3P
breaker cubicle will not be covered .01 .01
by this protection scheme. Therefore, .5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 1K 3K 10K
bus-side CTs need to be specified to Amps 10 Bus A (Nom. kV = 13.8, Plot Ref. kV = 13.8)
resolve this issue, but this will likely
require an additional section in the FIGURE 10. A Type III scheme showing relay characteristics modification and its impact on arc-
switchgear (i.e., a bigger footprint). flash incident energy.
Overall, this scheme might become
more cost effective when we start to see more LV circuit regulations. Corporations with large industrial complexes
breaker trip units with IEC61850 capabilities [6]. There is must plan for expenditures to procure and install such
one manufacturer that offers such trip units. mitigation even before a complete arc-flash analysis has
been conducted. This article introduced a systematic
Conclusions approach to account for locations where mitigations will
Arc-flash hazard mitigation has become increasingly be required based on company standard power system
important over the last decade due to various safety schemes. Furthermore, typical locations with excessive

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despite its simplicity, the ERMS is very effective in reduc-

ing arc-flash incident energy at the line side of LV switch-
OCR
gears. While more expensive, microprocessor protective
relay communication capabilities using IEC 61850 proto-
cols can be used to achieve similar results without manual
Cable 3
intervention. This protocol should be widely adapted by
LV breaker trip unit manufacturers to improve system
protection and personnel safety. Alternatively, the same
T4
functionality could be achieved with digital relays using
3 MVA hard-wire connection when the LV and MV switchgears
are in near proximity [7].

Acknowledgments
Level C
AFB = 14.74 The authors would like to thank Lisardo Lourido Martelo
IE = 22.76 and Ali Turken of Saudi Aramco for their contributions in
FCT = 0.383 developing this article.
LV SWGR 1
25.52 0.48 kV Author Information
.549 Rakan El-Mahayni (rakan.mahayni@aramco.com),
Level C
Jamal Bugshan, and Ritchie Pragale are with Saudi
AFB = 10.11
IE = 13.06 at 24 inch Aramco, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. El-Mahayni and Prag-
FCT = 0.220 ale are Senior Members of the IEEE. Bugshan is a
Member of the IEEE. This article first appeared as Arc-
FIGURE 11. A Type III scheme showing a reduction in arc-flash incident Flash Mitigation for 1500 Substations; A Corporate
energy. Approach at the 2015 IEEE IAS Petroleum and Chemi-
cal Industry Committee Conference. This article was
reviewed by the IAS Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Committee.
50 MV 50-ms
Pickup Time Delay References
[1] Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, NFPA 70E, 2015.
Trip
AND [2] IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, ANSI/IEEE
MV Circuit
Standard 1584, 2002.
50 LV Breaker
[3] J. L. Blackburn, Protective Relaying Principles and Applications, sec-
Pickup ond edition. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 335356.
NOT
[4] Eaton Consulting Application Guide, 15th ed., Eaton Corp., Glendale
Heights, IL, 2011, pp. 26.1.22.
50 LV Pickup: Low-Side Relay Instantaneous Pickup [5] Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial
and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Standard 242, 2001.
50 MV Pickup: High-Side Relay Instantaneous Pickup
[6] F. Dixon, M. T. Yunas, V. Wedelich, J. Howard, H. E. Brown, S. N.
50 ms: Time Delay to Avoid Nuisance Tripping Sauer, Y. Xu, T. Markello, and W. Sheikh, Mitigating arc flashes using IEC
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