Primary Network Design Manual

Primary Network Design
Manual
Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007

Author: Dave Charlesworth Job Title: Senior Network Design Engineer
Approver: John Simpson Job Title: Head of Network Engineering
Primary Network Design Manual
REVISION LOG
Version 1 Prepared by Dave Charlesworth Date October 2007

First issue
Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 2 of 118

The master version of the this document resides in the E.ON UK Documentum database
CAUTION – any other copy may be out of date
© Central Networks plc
CONTENTS
1 OVERVIEW 6
1.1 CONNECTION TO THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK 6
1.2 GSP SUPPLY GROUPS 6
1.3 PRIMARY NETWORK VOLTAGES 7
1.4 11KV NETWORK INFEED 7
1.5 NETWORK PHASE ARRANGEMENTS 8
1.6 EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS 9
1.6.1 132kV Network 9
1.6.2 66kV and 33kV 9
1.6.3 11kV (or 6.6kV) 10
2 DESIGN PRINCIPLES 11
2.1 INTRODUCTION 11
2.2 CONNECTIVITY PLANNING STANDARDS 12
2.3 SINGLE CIRCUIT SUPPLIES 13
2.3.1 Design Principles 13
2.3.2 Design Criteria 15
2.4 TRANSFER CAPABILITY 15
2.5 COMPLEXITY 19
2.6 NETWORK RESILIENCE 21
2.6.1 Flood 21
2.6.2 Storm 22
2.6.3 Malicious Acts 22
2.7 SECURITY OF SENSITIVE SUPPLIES 22
2.8 SEASONAL AND CYCLIC LOAD 23
2.9 LOSSES 23
2.10 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 24
2.11 PROTECTION, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION 25
2.11.1 Introduction 25
2.12 ASSET AND CONFIGURATION STANDARDS 27
3 SUBSTATION LAYOUTS 28
3.1 INTRODUCTION 28
3.1.1 General Information 28
3.1.2 Complex Sites 28
3.1.3 Fault Throwing Switches 29
3.2 132KV NETWORKS 29

3.2.1 Double Busbar Substations 29
3.2.2 Simple Radial 132kV Substation Arrangements 33
3.2.3 132kV Mesh Substations 37
3.2.4 132kV Double Circuit Transfer Arrangements 42
3.2.5 132kV Single Circuit Transfer Arrangements 44
3.4.1 General 46
3.4.2 33kV Source Substations 49
3.4.3 Radial Networks 51
3.4.4 Special Radial Arrangements 56
3.4.5 Rural 33kV Networks 58
3.5 11KV SWITCHBOARD 59
4 NETWORK CONNECTIVITY 60
4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 60
4.1.1 Overview 60
4.1.2 Flexibility 60
4.1.3 Cascade Tripping 60
4.1.4 Voltage Levels 61
4.1.5 Engineering Recommendation P18 – Complexity of 132kV Circuits 61
4.2 PREFERRED ARRANGEMENTS 62
4.2.1 Sub Transmission Networks 62
4.2.2 Radial Distribution Networks 71
4.2.3 Ring Networks 82
5 NETWORK EQUIPMENT 87
5.1 TRANSFORMERS 87
5.1.1 Standard ratings and Impedances 87
5.1.2 Tapping range 89
5.1.3 Vector Group 89
5.1.4 Standard Connections 90
5.2 OVERHEAD LINES 90
5.3 UNDERGROUND CABLES 94
5.3.1 132kV 94
5.3.2 66kV 94
5.3.3 33kV 94
5.4 SWITCHGEAR 95
5.4.1 Specifications 95
5.4.2 Switchgear Ratings 95
6 GUIDANCE NOTES 97
6.1 ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATION P2/6 97
6.1.1 Class of Supply 97
6.1.2 Group Demand 97
6.1.3 Typical Network Arrangements 98
6.1.4 First Outage Requirements 98
6.1.5 Second Outage Requirements 100
6.1.6 Interpretation of Multiple Sites 102
6.2 FIRM CAPACITY 107
6.2.1 First Outage 108
6.2.2 Second Outage 109
6.3 PROTECTION ISSUES 110
6.3.1 Pitfalls with multi-substation ring networks 110
6.3.2 Protection issues with teed rural networks 112
6.4 RING NETWORKS 113
6.5 PRIMARY NETWORK DESIGN 116
6.5.1 Transformer Replacement 116
6.5.2 132/33kV, 120MVA transformers 117
6.5.3 Transformers with Dual Secondary Windings (132/11/11kV or 66/11/11kV) 117
6.5.4 Switchgear Fault Ratings 118

1 OVERVIEW
1.1 CONNECTION TO THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK

The transmission network in England and Wales operates at 275kV and 400kV providing
interconnection between Distribution Network Operators (DNO’s) primary networks, major
generating stations and interconnection across national borders. The transmission operator is
responsible for maintaining a balance between energy demand and generation, thus,
maintaining system frequency within statutory limits. The transmission network is operated as
one interconnected network.
Central Networks obtains a connection to the transmission network at Grid Supply Points
(GSP’s). The connection voltage is exclusively 132kV for CN (East), CN (West) have connection at
132kV and 66kV.
The DNO network is referenced against the RED phase of the Transmission Network, this is
defined as being at 0° or 12 o’clock.
1.2 GSP SUPPLY GROUPS

It is Central Networks policy to operate each GSP independently. Where interconnecting 132kV
circuits exist to provide transfer capability between GSP’s they are operated with open points.
Generally the benefits derived from parallel operation of GSP’s are more than offset by the
complexity of network analysis and effects of excessive fault levels. Analysis for network
planning purposes (including protection design) requires the parameters of the transmission
network to be modelled for normal and abnormal conditions with worst case minimum and
maximum demands (and generation infeeds) to ensure excessive circulating currents are not
present in the primary network. Analysis in real time is virtually impossible, faults on the third
party (NGT) 400kV or 275kV network may cause excessive loading of CN circuits with subsequent
protection operation and potential loss of customer supplies before the control engineer has
time to react.
Transfers between GSP’s are normally made ‘on load’, ie, GSP’s are interconnected at 132kV (or
66kV) during switching time (typically less than one minute). During the time of the parallel
connection the fault levels of the two networks will increase and in some circumstances exceed
equipment ratings. However, due to the short duration of the parallel operation this risk is
minimal.
It is common practice for more than one DNO, or DNO’s and generators, to share a GSP
connection points. At shared sites it is the convention that the transmission operator owns the
132kV busbar and the DNO’s own the equipment in their circuit bay up to the busbar isolator
busbar clamps (or gas barrier for GIS switchgear). At GSP’s connecting just one DNO it is the
convention for the DNO to own the 132kV busbar and the transmission operator to own their
own transformer bays up to the busbar isolator busbar clamps (or gas barrier for GIS
switchgear).
Operational and Planning arrangements between the DNO and the Transmission Network
Operator are defined in the Grid Code.
1.3 PRIMARY NETWORK VOLTAGES

CN operate with 3 primary voltage levels, 132kV, 66kV (CN West only) and 33kV.
The principle function of the primary network is to provide a supply to the 11kV distribution
network, and comprises a 132kV sub transmission and distribution network, and a medium
voltage distribution network with voltage levels of 33kV and 66kV. Although the vast majority of
customers are connected at 11kV and below there are a few major customers connected directly
to the primary network. The primary network provides a synchronising connection with the
transmission network for embedded generation within Central Networks.
The 132kV network differs fundamentally from the medium voltage network in that it is
electrically connected to the NGT transmission network via auto (single winding) transformers.
Due to the inherent design features of auto transformers the vector grouping of the 132kV
network is fixed to the NGT standard (RED phase at 0° or 12 o’clock), and, transformers have a
single neutral connection (thus, earthing arrangements are common for both primary and
secondary transformer neutral connections).
The 33kV and 66kV networks are connected to the 132kV network (or the NGT transmission
network in the case of the 66kV network) by two winding transformers (magnetically coupled).
As the transformer secondary winding is electrically independent from the primary the two
windings can have different configurations and independent earthing arrangements.
1.4 11KV NETWORK INFEED

The 11kV network is supplied from all primary voltage levels, ie, 132/11kV, 66/11kV or 33/11kV. As
with the 33kV and 66kV networks transformation to 11kV is by double wound transformers (or

triple in the case of 132/11/11kV units) and thus enables various options in the configuration of
the 11kV winding (see section 1.5).
1.5 NETWORK PHASE ARRANGEMENTS

Network vector groupings are as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 –Network Vector Groups

Voltage Level Degrees Vector Group Comments
400kv (NGT) 0 12 o’clock
275kV (NGT) 0 12 o’clock
132kV 0 12 o’clock
66kV +30 1 o’clock
33kV +30 1 o’clock See note 1
11kV (CN East) 0 12 o’clock See note 2
11kV (CN West) Various See note 3
Note 1:
Some parts of Lincolnshire (CN East) are marked with red phase at the 9 o’clock (-90º) position,
where this connection exists it is being brought into line with the CN standard as network
modifications take place.
Note 2:
The Toyota car manufacturing plant at Burnaston (CN East - Willington supply group) has a 1
o’clock (+30º) connection. However, this supply has no 11kV interconnection with other parts of
the CN network.
Note 3:
For historical reasons, the phase displacement across the CN West 11kV network is not
consistent. See Long Term Development statement for details.

1.6 EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS

1.6.1 132kV Network
The neutral point of 400/132kV or 275/132kV transformer windings is solidly earthed (zero
impedance) at the GSP. The benefit of this arrangement is that during phase to earth faults the
healthy phases remain at a relatively constant nominal system phase to earth voltage thus
reducing insulation costs. However, earth fault currents are relatively high typically 20% higher
than for phase to phase faults.
All transformers at BSP’s with 132kV primary windings (star connected) have their neutral points
solidly bonded to earth. As a result a network phase to earth fault will result in current flow
through the neutral to earth connections of all transformer primary windings connected into
that GSP network.
High phase to earth fault currents have the potential to create excessively high Rise of Earth
Potential at substation sites requiring particular attention when designing substation earthing
systems. It is CN policy to provide a continuous earth conductor on all 132kV circuits between
substations. The earth conductor is connected to the main earthing system (metallic earth
bonding system) at each substation and provides a return path for fault currents reducing the
current flow to earth and hence reducing ROEP. For steel tower overhead lines the earthing
conductor provides a means of bonding support steelwork to earth at each tower position.
132kV overhead line systems are available using wood pole supports with no earth conductor.
Any design utilising this type of construction must include a risk assessment stating;
• The effects on the BSP substation ROEP when energised from a circuit with no
continuous earth conductor between that BSP and the source GSP
• How the ROEP is maintained within limits for network phase to earth faults on any cable
sheath or metallic structure forming part of that circuit .
1.6.2 66kV and 33kV
As the secondary windings of transformers supplying the medium voltage network are DELTA
connected a neutral connection point is not available at the network transformer. To enable
earth fault detection a neutral point is provided by a separate earthing / auxiliary transformer.
Phase to earth fault current is limited by series impedance is in the fault path and can be
provided as zero sequence reactance in the earthing / auxiliary transformer primary winding or

as an external resistance connected between the earthing transformer primary winding neutral
point and the substation earth.
The position of the zero sequence impedance affects network voltages during earth faults
• With an external NER and a zero impedance fault the faulted phase is at earth potential
with minimal volt drop in the transformer winding, causing the healthy phases to rise in
voltage to line voltage levels relative to earth potential.
• With earth fault current limited by the zero sequence impedance of the earthing /
auxiliary transformer primary winding, its neutral point solidly earthed and a zero
impedance fault, the faulted phase will be at earth potential. However, the internal volt
drop in the transformer winding will be relatively high (ie its terminal volts will decrease
significantly) resulting in minimal neutral – earth voltage displacement, hence the non
faulted phases have a minimal phase to earth voltage increase.
Current policy on the method of earthing, and earth fault current limits, are described in “Central
Networks Application Guide – Primary Transformer Earthing”.
1.6.3 11kV (or 6.6kV)
The secondary windings of transformers supplying the 11kV network are either STAR or DELTA
connected dependant on the vector group of that network. Earthing arrangements are as
described in section 1.6.2.

2 DESIGN PRINCIPLES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The objectives of the design principles are to:
• provide the rationale for the rules in the design manual, especially in terms of balancing
network performance, risk and capital cost;
• ensure that the design rules are consistent and support the network performance
objectives;
• provide background on the view of future requirements of the network and what (if
anything) is planned to accommodate each requirement; and
• ensure that the network shall be designed to comply with all statutory and licence
conditions.
Network performance and risk has been understood by considering both the fault history of the
network and its inherent physical characteristics and configuration. The impact of these on
business performance through, for example, performance incentives schemes (IIP) has been
assessed to review the prioritisation of network improvements. This will continue in an
enhanced Network Review process, reflecting the objectives of the regulatory incentives.
Investigation of major network incidents, resulting in high CI and CML counts, has identified
some common causes of failure. Where network design principles have been identified as a
contributory factor to poor network performance this has been considered and improvements
for design established. It is recognised that in many cases other factors have impacted network
performance that are outside the control of the network designer. However, design for
operability is a key aspect, enabling ease of restoration or of outage planning.
It is intended that all modifications to the primary network should be designed to meet these
principles. The principles provide an understanding of the rationale for design rules in the
manual so that appropriate decisions can be made about the specifics of any design situation.
These principles are based on finding an appropriate balance of cost, performance and risk and
these should be considered specifically in any design work. Application of the principles is
therefore subject to these considerations but should be deviated only where a clear and
overwhelming financial case can be demonstrated.
Consideration has been given to the application of these principles retrospectively across the
network. This has been assessed using the same objective of balancing cost, risk and
performance (including incentive benefits). Risk in this case covers both the risk rating of the

current configuration and the risk associated with making a change to the network. Alternative
strategies have been defined from this work which will feed into the investment plans:
• Strategic action - programmes of network wide proactive change where investment is

justified;
• Selective action - retrospective “upgrade” of the network in high impact areas to achieve
significant benefits at acceptable cost; and
• Opportunistic action - “upgrade” opportunities taken at marginal extra cost where other
issues drive network change.
The following sections cover each of the design principles in detail, describing the reasoning
behind each one and the design criteria that have been concluded.
2.2 CONNECTIVITY PLANNING STANDARDS

Primary Network connectivity shall be designed to meet the standards shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2 – Planning Standards

Ref Title Comments
Statutory The Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations Section 27 -
Instrument 2002 frequency
2002 No. and voltage
2665 requirements
The Grid Code DNO / TSO
obligations
The Distribution Code DNO /
Customer
obligations
CN Power System Operations Manual
ER G5/4 Planning levels for harmonic voltage distortion and the Harmonics
connection of non-linear equipment to transmission and
distribution systems in the United Kingdom.
ER G59/1 Recommendation for the connection of private generating All
plant to the Public Electricity Suppliers’ distribution generation
systems.
ER G75/1 Recommendations for the connection of embedded Additional
generating plant to public distribution systems above 20kV requirements
or with outputs over 5MW. for larger
generators
Table 2 – Planning Standards (Continued)

ER P2/6 Security of Supply.
ER P18 Complexity of 132kV Circuits Ends and
Addresses rule
ER P14 Preferred switchgear ratings.
ER P24 AC traction supplies to British Rail. Single phase
traction
supplies
ER P28 Planning limits for voltage fluctuations caused by industrial, Flicker
commercial and domestic equipment in the United Kingdom.
ER P29 Planning limits for voltage unbalance in the United Kingdom for Unbalanced
132kV and below. Load
ER S34 A guide for assessing the rise of earth potential at substation Earthing
sites.
2.3 SINGLE CIRCUIT SUPPLIES

2.3.1 Design Principles
Supplies to all customers with a group demand greater than 1MW require some means of
restoring supplies during outage of the normal supply circuit to meet the requirements of ER
P2/6, therefore for loss of a single primary network circuit there will always be an alternative
means of connecting customers. In most cases there will be two primary circuits operating in
parallel, the parallel connection is normally made at the busbar of the of the lower voltage
network switchboard at a transformation point.
In some circumstances a parallel connection is not desirable, there are four fundamental reasons
for not operating the primary network with a parallel connection as they may result in:
1. Potentially high circulating currents (parallels across two GSP’s)
2. Increased complexity of network analysis
3. Increased protection complexity
4. fault levels exceed network ratings
Note: Interconnection between 2 GSP supply sources can lead to all of the above.

CN operates sections of the primary network with single circuit supplies and switched
alternatives to:
1. avoid interconnection of two GSP’s

2. avoid overstressing of the network
3. provide low cost 33kV supplies to rural areas where voltage regulation is problem
The Design Criteria does not rule out the use of single circuit primary supplies, however, it does
reduce the absolute number of customers placed at risk and also limits the combined risk of
customer numbers and restoration times.
Where supply circuits are not paralleled the customer is effectively served by a single circuit
primary network with supplies restored by a switched alternative. During a fault outage the
minimum time for supply restoration is defined by ER P2/6 and restoration will be either local
manual, remote manual, remote automated or local automated as required for compliance. All
restoration methods result in loss of supplies to customers during switching time. Remote
restoration relies on the integrity of the control system and its communications. Local manual
restoration is relatively slow due to travelling times.
The time threshold for Customer Interruptions (CI’s) under the Information and Incentives
Project (IIP) is 3 minutes, thus where automated restoration is available supplies will normally be
restored without incurring CI penalties. Delays in restoration over the three minute period also
results in the application of Customer Minutes Lost (CML) penalties, providing an additional
incentive to restore supplies quickly. Local manual restoration will therefore tend towards high
CML penalties. CI risk increases proportionately to the number of customers supplied from the
connection point, CML risk is a product of customer numbers and time to restoration. These
principles are designed to minimise exposure to IIP risk by reducing both the number of
customers supplied by a single primary circuit and restoration times
In view of the above the preferred arrangement is to operate with parallel connections wherever
possible as:
1. It avoids supply losses providing improved service to the customer

2. avoids the requirement for automation schemes where failure may result in CI’s (and
potentially CML’s)
3. Local manual restoration times are excessive resulting in CML’s

2.3.2 Design Criteria
A single circuit supply shall not be used where the number of customers at risk exceeds 6,000.
Where a supply group is supplied from more than one feeder it is permissible for each individual
feeder to supply a maximum of 6,000 customers per independent circuit, i.e. a duplicate feed
could supply a maximum of 12,000 customers (6,000 per feed)
The total number of consumers that shall be disconnected from the supply for loss of a single
circuit and the required method of restoration are defined in Table 3:
Table 3 – Maximum Customers at Single Circuit Risk
Customers Equivalent MVA Switching Method
Up to 2,000 Up to 4 Local Manual
2,000 to 4,000 4 to 8 Remote Manual
4,000 to 6,000 8 to 12 Automated
6,000 or more >12 Parallel Supply only
Notes:
• A proxy of 2kVA per customer may be used to simplify design limiting a single circuit
supply to 12MVA per circuit, ie, a 24MVA primary substation operated with an open bus
section.
• Where restoration switching is at a single substation site and all data inputs to the
scheme are located at that site the automation scheme shall not be reliant on
communications with the control centre for its operation.
• For transfer of open points embedded on the 11kV network automated switching by
sequence scheme is acceptable.
2.4 TRANSFER CAPABILITY

In order to meet the requirements of ER P2/6 the majority of the primary network requires a
minimum of two feeder circuits to each substation or group of substations (supply group).
Although loss of both feeder circuits is rare these incidents have the potential for producing high
CI and CML counts.

Class D supply groups with group demand between 100MW and 300MW require a minimum of
three main supply circuits, (or two main circuits and sufficient transfer capability) to maintain
supplies to up to one third of customers in the group during outage of two main circuits. It is
possible to remain compliant with ER P2/6 and disconnect supplies to up to 200MW of demand
(approximately 100,000 customers) during the time to restore the planned outages. Restoration
of planned works may be several weeks during construction works, this is an unacceptable IIP
risk.
Normally such incidents occur while one circuit is out of service for maintenance or during
network modifications and the second circuit trips on fault. The severity of the incident depends
on the type of fault and the item of equipment that has faulted. An overhead line fault due to
lightning disturbance, followed by a successful auto re-closes, will cause a short time
interruption (< 3 minutes). However, a transformer fault on one circuit during an outage for
transformer replacement on the other has the potential for a prolonged loss of the main supply
to a substation for several days or weeks.
The risk to customers’ supplies for a double circuit outage is reduced by:
1. Reducing the number of customers of each supply group

2. Increasing the number of main supply circuits into the supply group
3. Increasing transfer capability between supply groups
Transfer capability can be utilised during a planned outage, and prior to supply loss, to reduce
the number of customers at risk. During emergency conditions it is usually possible to increase
the number of customers transferred to adjacent supply groups by utilising abnormal running
arrangements.
For transfer capacity to be effective the distance between substations of adjacent supply groups
must also be considered. Excessive distances may result in reduced transfer capability due to
voltage regulation.
After all transfer capability has been exhausted the use of LV mobile generation can be
considered to supply the remaining customers. Generation has little impact on IIP risk of the
primary network as the timescales involved in obtaining and connecting the generation is
excessive. To make any substantial impact on IIP risk the means to restore supplies must be
available within a few hours.

Higher capacity 11kV generation is unproven and not recommended as a strategy for supply
restoration as:
1. Costs are excessive, both rental and fuel,

2. Requires provision of an adequate network earth,
3. Ability of protection systems to operate correctly at low fault levels is suspect,
4. Physical size is prohibitive in locating a suitable connection point, and lack of existing
connection points into the network
An active spares policy is also essential for mitigating long term outage risk due to faults as
manufacturing timescales for main equipment items are in the order of 6 to 10 months.
However, this will have little impact on IIP risk during routine network outages, eg construction
works or maintenance due to excessively long installation times.
Identifying customer numbers at each connection point during network analysis for normal and
abnormal running arrangements is impracticable. Network demand is used as a proxy for
customer numbers (based on 2kVA per customer) with transfer capability expressed in terms of
demand rather than customer numbers.
Generally as demand increases the number of main circuits required to provide supply security
also increases. This improves the ability to retain supplies during second outage conditions and
is reflected in the increase in demand retention / transfer capability requirement. For the
purposes of this criterion main circuits are deemed to be at the highest voltage level feeding
into the load centre, transfer circuits are deemed to be either at the same voltage level or at a
lower voltage level than the main circuits.
The residual demand requiring generation support is provided to limit the number of customers
whose supplies cannot be restored from the network within 18 hours.

The following criteria in Table 4 show minimum levels of retained demand and transfer
capability during second outage conditions (fault outage during planned outage):
Table 4 - Transfer Capability

Group Minimum % demand to be retained / Worst case Notes
Demand Demand retained transferred within residual demand
(MVA) immediately post requiring
fault (% of generation
prefault demand) support
15mins 3 hours 18 hours MVA
<100 0 30 40 50 50 1,2
100 to 150 20 45 60 70 45 1,2,3
150 to 50 60 70 80 60 1,2,3
300
>300 100 0 4
Notes:
1. Where possible designs shall be used that reduce the risk of customer interruptions
during a planned outage by,
a. automated transfer within 3 minutes of the fault outage occurring due to the
characteristics of the network
b. automated transfer within 3 minutes by auto load transfer scheme
c. pre fault transfer (if possible without increasing the probability of loss of supplies
to the customers transferred)
2. During the normal and abnormal running arrangements described above all connected
consumers shall be supplied within statutory voltage limits.
3. Appropriate measures must be in place post first circuit outage to safeguard against
cascade tripping of the remaining circuit(s) due to overload (operation of overcurrent
protection) in the event that a second circuit is lost.
4. ER P2/6 requires all consumers to be restored immediately (ie, loss of supply not
exceeding 60 seconds) for group demands exceeding 300MW. Where this is achieved by
transferring demand at single circuit risk the demand per transfer circuit shall not exceed
100MVA.
The worst case generation support is based on maximum demands. In practice planned
outages are normally between the period April to October when maximum demands are
typically 80% of the winter MD.

2.5 COMPLEXITY
Networks have generally become complex where there are a limited number of circuits from the
source substation to the load centre. As demand has grown firm circuit capacity has become
inadequate requiring capital investment in new circuits. Rather than provide new circuit capacity
from the source substation networks have been interconnected and operated with multiple
parallels so that the circuits of one section of network provides mutual support for another.
Although this practice provides a cost effective solution for each incremental step of
interconnection the network becomes less robust as increase in demand results in increasing
reliance on the circuits emanating from the source substation.
Complex networks are an impediment to real time decision making leading to delays in
restoration times.
Protection, the safety system behind the power system, has to function effectively during
normal, abnormal and extreme network operating conditions. Complex networks generally have
an elevated number of credible running arrangements making them difficult to asses, especially
in relation to identifying fault level scenarios. Protection schemes and settings become complex
and often entail a great deal of compromise with a consequential elevation of risk of incorrect
operation (or non operation) and human error during commissioning and maintenance.
Generally complex networks connect large numbers of customers with risk of extremely high IIP
penalties.
The simplest network arrangement is a double circuit transformer feeder with a parallel on the
transformer secondary circuit. Any failure on one circuit either due to a fault, or human error
during planned works, is unlikely to affect customer’s supplies.
A mesh arrangement, including a simple cross bay arrangement, has circuit breakers connected
across two supply circuits and is thus susceptible to a common mode failure. Work on the
network during planned outage of one circuit results in increased risk of loss of supplies as
active protection components (CT’s) of the ‘live’ circuit are connected in the work zone of the
circuit under outage.
Complex network arrangements generally suffer from the following disadvantages:
• high risk of faults caused by human error;

• can be impossible to grade with standard back up protection;

• some arrangements are impossible to grade using standard main protection schemes
(distance protection);
• power flows cannot be predicted without computer analysis and are difficult to manage
in ‘real time’;
• difficult to establish which items of equipment have failed (in real time) due to multiple
protection relay operations resulting in supply restoration delays, and;
• difficult to manage network planned outages due to the limited number of feeder circuits
into the network from the supply source, outages can produce unacceptable network
risks.
Categorisation of complexity:
• Simple – transformer feeders

• category 1 – single substation with cross bay, ie 3 transformer supplied from 2 circuits
• category 2 – series of substations connected in a ring, each substation using a cross bay
arrangement to control the ring circuit. One teed circuit may be connected to the ring
circuit between substations provided that;
o it is terminated by transformer(s), and,
o the teed circuit does not interconnect with another ring network
• category 3 – Where up to 4 circuits are interconnected remote from the source
substation, using an approved means of interconnection, eg, interconnection of two ring
networks.
• category 4 – either;
o Where up to 4 circuits are interconnected remote from the source substation
where the means of interconnection is not approved, eg, interconnecting circuits
without discrete protection of the interconnector
o As above with more than one interconnection point
o Where the number of interconnected circuits exceeds 4.
Note: category 3 networks do not include networks comprising three or more circuits directly
connected from a source substation to an approved interconnection point, eg, an embedded
double busbar substation. Such circuits are classed as sub transmission networks and are
acceptable provided the means of interconnection is approved.
Interconnecting circuits normally operated as open points are not deemed to add to network
complexity and thus are not included in any of the above classifications.

• Radial or simple ring networks are preferred (see section 4.2.3.1 for extensions to ring
circuits)
• Category 3 should be avoided where possible but may be used for future extensions to
the network provided that all circuits are connected to the same source GSP. Approved
methods of interconnection for category 3 networks are shown in section 4.2.3.2.
• Category 4 networks shall not be used for future extensions
• Where investment is planned to existing category 3 and 4 networks consideration should
be given to simplifying the network connection
2.6 NETWORK RESILIENCE

Network assets are designed to be resilient under most operational conditions, however, under
extreme circumstances network performance may be compromised particularly due to floods,
storms and malicious acts.
Where network performance is vulnerable under these extreme circumstances the feasibility of
enhancing the design should be considered.
For specific guidance refer to the relevant Central Networks asset manual.
2.6.1 Flood
Areas within the 1 in 200 year flood contour should be avoided when locating future substation
sites. For all new primary substation sites measures shall be taken to ensure that 1 in 1000 year
flood levels do not reduce network security and critical operational equipment (and access to it)
shall be installed above the 1 in 1000 year contour level. A list of typical critical equipment is
provided below;
• primary equipment terminations
• relay / control panels
• telecoms / scada equipment and its communication connections
• marshalling kiosks
• terminal pillars
• batteries and chargers, including LVAC supplies
• transformer tapchange and cooling LV supplies

Where possible the ground level of buildings, compounds and access routes shall be raised to
mitigate the risk.
Existing sites which are vulnerable to flooding will have flood protection measures incorporated
into the design of future modifications based on the flood risk. Flood risk will be assessed by the
site position relative to flood contours, e.g. the 1000 year flood contour.
2.6.2 Storm
Experience has shown the areas that are most at risk from storms. In these areas network
design will take account of this higher risk and use design measures that reduce the incidence of
damage.
2.6.3 Malicious Acts
Criticality of assets and strategic risk from malicious acts will be part of the design consideration.
Where criticality and vulnerability are sufficient, the design will include measures to improve
physical security.
2.7 SECURITY OF SENSITIVE SUPPLIES

In general, customers choose the level of security they require to meet the needs of their
particular circumstances. However, in a small number of situations it may be appropriate for
Central Networks to ensure that a greater level of security or resilience is afforded to an
individual or group of customers. Where appropriate, measures to improve supply security will
be part of the design.
Examples of such situations –
Major entertainment venues

Large city centres
Major media centres
Major airports
Major traction supplies

2.8 SEASONAL AND CYCLIC LOAD

Traditionally winter demand against enhanced winter equipment ratings has provided the
trigger for network reinforcement and summer demand was assumed to be within 67% of
winter demand.
Summer demands are now typically 80% to 85% of winter ratings and in some circumstances
may be the trigger for network reinforcement.
For network review, and, when considering connection of new customers to the network, the
effects of seasonal load must be taken into consideration.
Additionally, many items of network equipment are operated based on a cyclic rating. In some
instances (particularly for industrial or city centre demands) the actual load profile will be flatter
than that assumed to rate the equipment and in such cases the cyclic rating must be reduced.
Where there is insufficient data (either in respect to the load shape or the equipment thermal
characteristics) the continuous rating shall be used.
2.9 LOSSES
The effect of network losses should be considered during connectivity design and when
specifying equipment, however, this must be balanced with equipment and installation costs.
Some factors influencing losses are:
• Utilisation – lower circuit utilisation results in lower losses for an equivalent circuit
resistance (losses are proportional to the square of the current)
• Circuit resistance (losses are proportional to resistance), thus larger conductor size will
result in reduced losses
• Transformer losses, - the subject of transformer losses is complicated in that they are
subject to both iron and copper losses. Iron losses can be reduced by using more
expensive core steels and reducing flux density (increasing the size of the core) and
copper losses by increasing the cross sectional area of the windings, all these methods
increase manufacturing costs. For a particular transformer the iron losses are
proportional to the voltage across the winding and thus are practically constant when a
transformer is energised regardless of demand, copper losses are proportional to the
square of the transformer loading (I2R). Other influences on losses are;

o Paralleling transformers, the greater number of transformers on the network the

higher the standing iron loss, however, copper losses are reduced as the demand
per transformer is reduced.
o Direct 132/11kV transformation has a potential benefit of reducing iron losses
when compared with 132/33kV followed by 33/11kV transformation, however, this
will normally be offset by increases in 11kV network losses,
o Transformer impedance – this affects circuit losses, particularly on long circuits.
High transformer impedance tends to increase VAr flow in the circuits and hence
circuit copper losses.
2.10 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

The primary network is designed to enable connection of generation, however, depending on
the size and type of generation the following effects of a generation connection must be
considered;
• Increases in fault levels

• Voltage control and statutory voltage limitations (particularly over voltage)
• Voltage step change
• Network thermal constraints (particularly during periods of minimum demand)
• Power flow monitoring (particularly for circuits with both demand and generation
customers connected)
• Transformer reverse power flow
o some transformer tapchanger diverters are not designed for switching during
reverse power flow
o directional overcurrent protection may be operated during periods of reverse
power flow where standard protection settings are applied
• For large generating stations (>100MW) typically connected to the 132kV network where
ability to remain connected during network disturbances is required. Stability studies
may be required to ensure fault clearance times are adequate. Studies may reveal the
requirement for extensive circuit breaker and protection replacement.

2.11 PROTECTION, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION

2.11.1 Introduction
There is a statutory duty to protect the public from the effects of faults on the network. When a
fault occurs it is also desirable to ensure that the adverse affects of high fault current is
minimised.
The primary network is protected using fault detection equipment to initiate a trip signal and
circuit breakers to de-energise the faulted section of circuit. Control equipment may be used to
automatically restore supplies following intermittent faults (lightning) and to automate
restoration of supplies to healthy sections of circuit following permanent faults.
Primary network protection use a system of lower voltage secondary circuits to replicate the
main power system with voltage transformers (VT’s) providing a voltage reference and current
transformers (CT’s) providing a current reference. For simple overcurrent protection CT’s only are
required. A voltage reference is primarily required for directional protection and distance
protection schemes, and also for automatic voltage control of transformers.
CT’s and VT’s also provide a means for remote indication of real time network loadings and
voltages.
The primary network is divided into protection zones; zone boundaries being defined by the fault
detection equipment (normally CT’s and VT’s). Not all faults are detected by excessive fault
current, for example, with transformer winding faults other forms of detection are necessary and
for this type of fault ‘Buchholz’ protection is used to detect the presence of gasses produced by
the heating or electrical arcing effects on the insulating oil.
Having detected a fault it is desirable to remove the supply source as quickly as possible. Circuit
Breakers are used on the primary network to break fault currents. Their position on the network
is critical to performance as one or more CB’s will be tripped (opened) on detection of a fault.
The numbers of customers disconnected during this operation will be influenced by the position
and configuration of circuit breakers.
Not all circuit breakers form part of the network protection system, at 132kV circuit breakers are
used for switching operations on the ‘live’ network. On 132kV ‘ring networks’ circuit breakers are
used to disconnect supplies to a section of network that extends beyond a protection zone, the
protection system relies on motorised isolators to disconnect the faulted protection zone and
the circuit breakers re-close to restore supplies to the healthy sections.

There is always the possibility that the main protection system will fail to operate and so back up
protection is required to cover for this eventuality. In order to reduce costs the requirements for
back up protection is not as onerous as that of the main protection schemes. Some forms of
main protection inherently provide back up protection for adjacent zones (distance protection)
whereas others do not (unit protection).
While designing modifications to the network it is essential that the protection and control
systems are incorporated to ensure that;
• protection zones are designed with consideration for limiting the number of customers
affected by a fault
• the network is designed such that primary protection systems will operate within
prescribed timescales for a fault within the protection zone and not operate (unless
designed as a function of back up protection) for faults outside of the zone;
• protection zones shall have back up protection systems that are graded with the main
protection systems and do not to operate before the main protection systems.
• 132kV main protection schemes shall be designed to clear network faults within 120mS
(in line with section CC.6.2.3.1.1 of the grid Code), however, this may be delayed by a
further 500mS to enable grading between protection zones
• For 33kV and 66kV networks, where fault throwers are used for communication of
transformer faults, it is permissible to extend fault clearance times by a further 400mS to
allow for operation of the fault thrower.
• Back up protection schemes shall be designed to clear network faults within 3 seconds;
• Circuits that are predominantly overhead shall be fitted with automated reclose control
equipment
• Circuits that are predominantly underground cable shall not be fitted with automated
reclose equipment.
• any proposed circuit configuration can be protected to meet these protection design
criteria using standard manufactured equipment without the need for bespoke
equipment;
• costs of ancillary protection equipment are accounted for during network design, eg, CT’s,
VT’s, pilot circuits etc.; and
• sufficient space for protection equipment is allowed for when considering the layout of
substation equipment.

2.12 ASSET AND CONFIGURATION STANDARDS

Providing standards for configuration is a primary objective of this network design manual. The
configuration of the network has a direct impact on the long term performance characteristics
and on the near term operability of the system. The design principles here have considered the
alternatives applied across the network (especially across East and West) and provide a common
set of configuration standards as a basis for all design work.
These configuration standards aim to maximise benefits to the company through the best
balance of cost and performance. They also seek to deliver an increased level of operability that
comes both through the easy-to-operate configurations and through fewer configuration
varieties. This will lead to easier outage planning with lower outage risks and faster restoration
of supplies.
Asset standards are not part of the objective of this design manual.

3 SUBSTATION LAYOUTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 General Information
This section of the manual provides a library of standard arrangements for substation
equipment. The purpose of the library is to standardise substation connectivity and enable
standard protection schemes to be employed with the benefit of:-
• reduced design time,
• eliminate design errors,
• standardised site layouts
• reduce risk of commissioning errors
• provide consistency to operators
Arrangements show the equipment required for operability but are not operational diagrams,
generally diagrams do not show:-
• earthing switches
• CT’s and VT’s
• Earthing / auxiliary transformers
• NER’s
• Other minor equipment
Lower voltage switchgear is shown for completeness but does not show positions of isolating
devices, earthing switches, CT’s and VT’s.
It is recognised that standard arrangements are not always applicable for all situations thus
bespoke arrangements may be approved by the Network Design Manager. Otherwise all new
installations or modifications and extensions will be designed to these standards.
3.1.2 Complex Sites
Substation physical layouts shall conform to section 6.3 of the Power System Operations Manual.

3.1.3 Fault Throwing Switches
Substation arrangements are based on eliminating fault throwing switches on the 132kV
network. At 66kV and 33kV they will continue to be an accepted method of communicating
transformer faults to remote supply sources unless other approved means of communication are
available for intertripping.
Rented communication circuits will not be used solely for the use of transformer protection
communication at any primary voltage level.
At 132kV the fault throwing switch is replaced by a transformer circuit breaker (where private
communication circuits are unavailable for intertripping). A live tank circuit breaker only is
needed as there is no requirement for CT’s. Transformer protection will trip this local circuit
breaker to clear a fault.
3.2 132KV NETWORKS

3.2.1 Double Busbar Substations
Grid Supply Point 132kV substations will be double busbar configuration as shown in figure 3.1.
New substations will typically be supplied by two Supergrid Transformers (SGT’s) initially and the
arrangement of figure 3.2 can be used provided sufficient land is purchased at the outset to
extend and accommodate a minimum of four SGT’s. The number of circuits shown is indicative,
an assessment of the total number and hence land requirements will be required during
detailed design.
The drawings show a reserve busbar circuit breaker, this is an enhancement from previous
designs and is included to provide improvements to flexibility in operation when substations are
operated with a bus coupler ‘split’ to reduce fault level.
At shared sites the transmission operator will have ownership and control of the busbar, bus
section, and bus coupler circuits and thus inclusion of the reserve busbar bus section circuit
breaker is not directly under CN’s control.
The principle of operation is common for both AIS and GIS installations. All double busbar
substations shall be designed to enable modification, replacement or extension with no more
than one section of busbar made dead at any time.

Unit type busbar protection will be used for the main busbars with conventional overall and
discrimination zones.
Figure 3.1 – Double Busbar 132kV Substation, 4 SGT’s
Main Reserve
Busbar Busbar
SGT
Circuit
Bus Coupler
Circuit
SGT
Bus Bus
Section Section
SGT
Circuit
Bus Coupler
Circuit
SGT

Figure 3.2 – Double Busbar 132kV Substation, 2 SGT’s
Main Reserve
Busbar Busbar
SGT
Circuit
Bus Coupler
Circuit
SGT
Future Extension
Bus Bus
Section Section
SGT
Circuit
Bus Coupler
Circuit
SGT

Figure 3.3 shows a standard bay arrangement suitable for connection of one outgoing circuit.
Unless there are special circumstances no more than one circuit per bay will be connected.
During major substation reorganisation banked circuits will be separated to provide one
switchbay per circuit.
Figure 3.3 – Standard Bay Layout
Main Busbar Reserve Busbar

Reserve
Busbar
Isolator Circuit
Isolator
Main Circuit
Busbar
Isolator
Where it is not practicable to provide a separate bay for a new circuit the arrangement in figure
3.4 may be used to provide additional security. This arrangement also provides the opportunity
to operate a circuit that would otherwise exceed the maximum number of addresses specified in
ER P18, ie, a 5 address circuit can be operated as 2 x 3 address circuits.
Each feeder circuit shall have dedicated feeder protection.
Figure 3.4 – Banking of 2 circuits at one bay

3.2.2 Simple Radial 132kV Substation Arrangements
Figure 3.5 shows the simplest arrangement of a radially connected 132kV substation.
This example shows a 2 transformer arrangement, this can simply be extended to a three
transformer (on 3 circuits) arrangement for 66kV and 33kV secondary voltages.
The connection of 3 x 132/11kV transformers in parallel is not recommended due to excessive
fault levels on the 11kV network.
Transformer circuit breakers are used to clear transformer faults (Duo Bias unit protection and
Buchholz) eliminating the need for fault throwers and intertripping circuits. Live tank units are
acceptable as there is no requirement for CT’s.
Transformer unit protection CT’s are mounted in the transformer HV bushings and LV
switchboard incoming circuit breaker.
132kV circuit protection from LV backfeed is provided by Directional Overcurrent protection, CT’s
and VT’s mounted on the LV switchboard incoming circuit breaker.
Figure 3.5 – Radial Transformer Feeder

Figure 3.6 shows the application with a transformer having double secondary (11kV) windings.
The principle of operation of the 132kV network is as described in the previous example.
Figure 3.6 – Radial Transformer Feeder with 132/11/11 Transformer

The arrangement of 3.7 is generally designed for transformation to two lower voltage networks,
eg, 132/33kV and 132/11kV using the principles shown in figure 3.5. It also provides an
alternative to the arrangement of figure 3.6 (using 4 x 132/11kV, 30MVA transformers) with the
benefit of standardised voltage control and improved security during planned transformer
outages.
Figure 3.7 – Radial Transformer Feeder with Banked Transformers

Where private communication systems are available between the transformer substation and
the supply source the arrangement shown in figure 3.8 may be used eliminating the need for the
transformer circuit breakers.
Future provision should be made for installation of a circuit breaker as a contingency for loss of
the private communications.
This arrangement is most suitable for cable connected substations where pilot cables have been
laid alongside the power cables.
Figure 3.8 – Radial Transformer Feeder on Cable Circuit

3.2.3 132kV Mesh Substations
Mesh arrangements provide a means of effectively producing multiple protection zones without
the need for each zone to be controlled by a dedicated circuit breaker. They were developed at a
time when 132kV circuit breaker costs were relatively high, however, 132kV circuit breakers costs
have significantly reduced relative to protection and other costs.
The principal of operation is that a transformer or permanent feeder circuit fault will initiate
tripping of circuit breakers to make a section of network dead, the section of network initiating
the trip is isolated automatically and the circuit breakers reclose automatically once the faulted
section is isolated.
Mesh corner faults should be detected by dedicated mesh corner protection (rather than an
extension to the circuit protection) as busbar faults are normally permanent.
The preferred mesh corner arrangement is limited to two circuits per mesh corner, ie 2
transformers, 2 feeder circuits or one of each to reduce complexity of protection and automation
schemes.
Mesh arrangements can either be closed or open. A closed mesh is impracticable with fewer
than 3 circuit breakers and as most 132kV circuits are double circuit tower lines the most
common form of closed mesh is a four switch mesh. The advantage of a closed mesh is that all
in service circuits remain interconnected during a mesh corner outage resulting in maximum
optimisation of circuit loading.
However, an open mesh does have the advantage of providing n+1 discrete connection points
(where n = number of mesh circuit breakers).

Open Mesh Arrangements
Figure 3.9 shows a 2 transformer mesh substation, whereas a radial arrangement would typically
have both circuits connected to the same remote substation the ring arrangement may be
supplied from more than one source provided that both sources are in the same GSP supply
group.
Figure 3.9 – Single Switch Open Mesh, 2 Transformers

Position of mesh corner CT’s are shown for mesh corner 1 and line CT’s for circuit 1, the same
principle is used for mesh corner 2 / circuit 2.
Figure 3.10 shows a 3 transformer arrangement with a third feeder circuit. Position of protection
CT’s are shown for MC 2. MC 1 and MC3 arrangements are as described in figure 3.9.
All circuits must be connected to the same GSP supply group. See figure 3.16 for arrangement
with circuit 2 connected into a different supply group to circuits 1 and 3.
Figure 3.10 – Double Switch Open Mesh, 3 Transformers
66kV, 33kV or 11kV 66kV, 33kV or 11kV
GT1 GT2 GT3
Position of Mesh corner

protection CT’s for MC 2
Position of Feeder circuit

protection CT’s for circuit 2
A A A
Mesh
Corner 2
Mesh
Corner 1 Mesh
Corner 3
132kV 132kV
A
A A
Circuit 2
Circuit 1 Circuit 3

Closed Mesh Arrangement
Figure 3.11 shows a four switch closed mesh arrangement. This design was originally used for
interconnecting transmission circuits and is still used by transmission operators. Examples can
be found on the 132kV network but in many cases the arrangement is not appropriate for a
distribution network and other alternatives should be considered (see figure 3.12).
Figure 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c shows typical network 4 switch mesh network arrangements.
A four switch mesh arrangement is normally used to interconnect two double circuits from a
supply source with ongoing feeder circuits and local transformation.
Many existing sites interconnect double circuits from different GSP’s and thus have to be
operated with open points on the circuit isolators, others do not comply with the criteria for
number and combination of circuits connected to each mesh corner and have bespoke
hardwired auto reclose systems.
Although a 4 switch mesh arrangement is the most common a higher number of circuit breakers
could be used to increase the number of discrete connection points if required.
Figure 3.11 – Four Switch Closed Mesh

A A
Circuit
A A
Circuit Circuit
132kV
A A
Circuit Circuit
A A
Circuit

Line Circuit Breakers
The substation arrangements of figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 all require some form of
communication between substations so that local protection schemes (busbar and transformer
protection) will trip circuit breakers at remote substations prior to auto isolation and reclose.
Where the communication system is rented from a third party (typically overhead line circuits
using rented BT circuits) it may be cost effective to replace the circuit auto isolator (at all circuit
ends) with circuit breakers and manually operated circuit isolators. Figure 3.12 shows the
equivalent arrangement as figure 3.9 to achieve this, the same principal holds for the
arrangements of figures 3.10 and 3.11.
The circuit breakers may be live tank with a single set of post CT’s (as shown) or a dead tank
circuit breaker could be used with CT’s mounted in the bushing turrets providing the facility to
overlap the circuit and busbar protection zones.
Figure 3.12 – Mesh Substation with Line Circuit Breakers

3.2.4 132kV Double Circuit Transfer Arrangements
Figure 3.13(a) shows the standard arrangement for interconnecting two double circuits at a
transformation substation. GT1 and GT2 are normally supplied from GSP1 with the circuit
breakers providing an open point between the two GSP supply groups.
Substation demand can be transferred remotely by telecontrol to GSP 2 by dead transfer

resulting in the running arrangement of figure 3.13(b). Alternatively live transfer may be
possible by closing the circuit breakers at the BSP and opening the feeder circuit CB’s at GSP 1.
The arrangement is primarily designed for overhead line feeder circuits using distance
protection at the source GSP’s with the reach of the protection set to cover the whole circuit
between the two GSP’s. This enables the circuit breakers at the BSP to be used for on load
switching, with no requirements for CT’s and circuit protection.
Where other BSP’s are connected to the main 132kV circuits and intertripping is required as part
of the circuit protection scheme the in line circuit breaker shall be equipped with distance
protection and the intertripping scheme separated into two schemes each one covering the
zone between source GSP and the in line circuit breaker.
Double Circuit Transfer

Figure 3.13(a) – Normal Operation Figure 3.13(b) – Load Transfer

Figure 3.14 shows how four transformers are connected.
Figure 3.14 – Double Circuit Transfer with Banked Transformers

3.2.5 132kV Single Circuit Transfer Arrangements
The arrangements of figure 3.15 and 3.16 are primarily designed to enable load transfer to take
place for compliance with ER P2/6 security standards with class D supplies (group demand in
excess of 100MW).
Although the transfer circuit may be connected to the same GSP supply as the main circuits the
third circuit would typically be connected to another GSP. This has the added advantage of
enabling load transfers between GSP’s
Typically the BSP shown in figure 3.15 will be connected to a network with teed feeders, where
the total demand exceeds 100MW, and transfer of one BSP is sufficient for compliance.
Figure 3.15 – Single Circuit Transfer, Radial Network
66kV, 33kV or 11kV
GT1 GT2
132kV 132kV
Circuit to
GSP 2
M M
Circuits to GSP 1

The arrangement of figure 3.16 provides transfer capability where a cross bay is used to provide
a secure transformer mid point connection. In this case the demand of the single substation
may exceed 100MW, remaining P2/6 compliant on transformer capacity but requiring a third
circuit to cater for a double outage of the incoming supply circuits.
Figure 3.16 – Single Circuit Transfer, Ring Network
66kV, 33kV or 11kV 66kV, 33kV or 11kV
GT1 GT2 GT3
132kV 132kV
A A A
A A
Circuit 3 - GSP
2
Circuit 1 - GSP Circuit 2

1 GSP 1
3.3 66KV NETWORKS

66kV primary networks are used in CN West only. Network configuration is similar to that of the
132kV network except that impedance earthing is used, thus phase to earth fault currents are
relatively low and potential rise of earth potential can be easily controlled.

These characteristics allow the use of fault throwers (that are precluded at 132kV) and the use of
unearthed overhead line feeders.
In many respects the 66kV network is a hybrid of the 132kV and 33kV networks and is generally
designed to supply rural areas with a minimal number of supply points. Due to the lengths of
circuit a 33kV supply network would to be prohibitive due to poor voltage regulation.
The 66kV network suffers from three main disadvantages;

1. It prohibits interconnection of 132kV networks resulting in low capability for load
transfer during outages particularly between GSP’s
2. 66kV overhead line designs must conform to IEC 60826 (Overhead Transmission Lines at
45kV and Greater) leading to increased network costs when compared to a 33kV
alternative.
3. Operating with an additional primary voltage level to 132kV and 33kV results in another
level of network overheads in expertise, spares, data holding etc.
Due to the above this network should not be designed to expand beyond its existing
geographical boundary. During asset replacement, or when network reinforcement is required,
the feasibility of uprating to 132kV should be explored.
3.4 33KV NETWORKS
3.4.1 General
3.4.1.1 Characteristics of 33kV Networks
132kV and 33kV networks characteristics are different resulting in changes to the approach to
connectivity design as highlighted below;
1. Reduced earth fault current due to impedance earthing enabling;
a. potential for reduced rise of earth potential
b. smaller sites with higher earth mat resistance
c. the use of fault throwers as a means of communication of transformer faults to
remote substations
2. Circuit MVA capacities reduced (same current level results in 25% MVA capacity
compared to 132kV) generally leading to fewer customers connected per circuit and
acceptability of higher fault rates and less costly protection methods.
3. More susceptible to voltage regulation problems resulting in reduced feed area

33/11kV Substation designs are provided to cater for the following types of 33kV network:
1. Urban
2. Semi Urban
3. Rural
The radial networks described in section 3.3 and 3.4 typically apply to urban and semi urban
networks and comprise of direct circuits or circuits with no more than one tee connection. These
arrangements may apply to rural feeders in some circumstances particularly where voltage
regulation becomes an issue but generally rural supplies enable a greater number of substations
to be connected from a pair of standard 24MVA or 40MVA circuits. Rural circuit arrangements,
both radial and ring, are shown in section 3.5
Urban:
Urban network arrangements apply to cities or large towns with one or more BSP’s within the
urban area. Circuits are generally cable connected and a single substation demand is expected
to approach the limits of its dedicated circuit capacity. Typically this will be a substation with 2 x
24MVA or 2 x 40MVA 33/11kV transformers with radial connected circuits.
Semi Urban:
Semi urban networks are generally similar in topology to urban networks but would typically
supply large towns or business parks / industrial areas remote from the BSP. Circuits are
typically a mixture of underground and overhead construction. In many cases circuits are simple
dedicated connections to a single 33/11kV substation supplying a high demand areas.
As networks develop it is not unusual to find teed or banked circuits to other substations, in
some cases single circuit supplies to outlying rural areas.
In many cases double circuit wood pole overhead lines are in service, these suffer from
insufficient clearances between circuits requiring double circuit outages when working in
proximity to the conductors. All future designs using wood pole construction shall be single
circuit.

Rural:
Rural networks are typically overhead construction providing supplies to small towns or villages.
Substation demand is normally relatively low and several substations may be supplied by a pair
of feeder circuits, a large proportion of substations will be connected by single circuit at 33kV
with restoration at 11kV by transfer of open points.
3.4.1.2 Pole Mounted Air Break Switch Disconnectors
The justification for pole mounted ABSD’s must be made on the basis of the economic benefit in
reducing IIP risk against increased installation costs and capitalised costs of inspection and
maintenance.
Reduction in IIP risk shall be made on the basis of;

• Numbers of customers affected,
• Length of circuit and unit length fault rate,
• For firm connections the percentage of time customers are at risk during planned
outages,
• IIP bonus / penalty regime
3.4.1.3 Pole Mounted Auto Reclosers
PMAR’s should only be considered were standard protection schemes at circuit terminations
provide unsatisfactory clearance times.
3.4.1.4 Ring Main Units (RMU)
The switchgear arrangements shown in this section may be provided using RMU’s where a cost
effective equivalent arrangement to the examples shown are available.

3.4.2 33kV Source Substations
3.4.2.1 Single Busbar Substations
The standard arrangement for new 33kV primary single busbar substations is shown in figure
3.17. The arrangement is based on an indoor metal enclosed switchgear installation. A three
transformer supply, with two bus section switches, can be accommodated where network fault
ratings permit. A three section busbar arrangement may also be used where a three circuit
network connection is required.
Figure 3.17 – 33kV Switchboard
Transformer 2 Transformer 1
CIRCUITS CIRCUITS
3.4.2.2 Switchgear Extension
When all spare feeder bays have been used it is permissible to bank two circuits on one feeder
switch provided both circuits are of the same type, the thermal rating of the feeder bay
(including CT’s) is adequate, the resultant configuration is compliant with ER P2/6, and, the
circuits can be suitably protected.
When the above conditions cannot be met and further connections are required an assessment
should be made for extending the switchboard, if possible with the same type of switchgear.
Normally the existing switchgear is obsolete and unless decommissioned units are available the
only means of extension is by a ‘joggle box’ busbar connection. In many instances particularly
with outdoor ‘weatherbeater’ type switchboards this is impracticable and uneconomic.
If the existing switchboard is due for asset replacement it should be replaced at this time by a
new board. If the existing switchboard is not due for asset replacement a new section of board
should be installed and interconnected as shown in figure 3.18.

The configuration enables firm double circuit connections between bus sections 1 and 2, 1 and 3,
and, 2 and 3. Also firm triple feeder connections can be made if required. When the original
section of board becomes due for asset replacement the configuration should be retained with
the original switchboard only being replaced.
The interconnector circuit shall have circuit breakers at each end and be protected by a unit
protection scheme that trips the interconnector only and maintains supplies to the switchgear
busbars
The number and position of feeder bays on the new section of switchboard should be assessed
at the time and shall provide sufficient circuit breaker bays for one feeder circuit per bay and
spares for anticipated future bays within the timescales of the development plan.
Provision of a second switchboard should also be considered when uprating transformer

capacity at a site using the same criteria as above.
Figure 3.18 – 33kV Switchboard Extension

Interconnector
3.4.2.3 Outdoor 33kV Substations
Outdoor substations suffer from;

• malicious acts (vandalism and theft)
• risk of trip due to wildlife, eg, birds, cats etc
• higher maintenance costs, and,
• higher safety risk due to exposed live busbars

Extension of 33kV outdoor substations should not be considered as they are normally time
expired with relatively poor condition infrastructure.
3.4.3 Radial Networks
The standard arrangements of figure 3.19 to 3.20 are used for radial primary substation
connections.
Typical networks are shown in figures 4.8, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.17 and cover most requirements for
urban and semi urban radial networks.
Three transformer 33/11kV substation arrangements are shown in figures 4.11 and 4.12.
Single circuit arrangements for rural radial networks are shown in figures 4.7 and 4.10.
3.4.3.1 Cable Connected Circuits
Figure 3.19a shows a direct supply with no isolator at the transformation substation. This design
shall be restricted to modifications of existing installations already directly connected in this way
(eg transformer replacement) and where the following criteria are met;
• the supply circuit is not banked or in anyway shares a source circuit breaker with another
circuit,
• the circuit is cable in its entirety from source circuit breaker to transformer cable box,
• private pilot communications are available (normally a pilot cable laid with the main
power cable)
New 33/11kV substations shall not be connected in this way and where practicable the
connection shown in figure 3.19b shall be used for cable circuits with private pilot cable
intertripping.

Cable Connected Circuits

Figure 3.19a Figure 3.19b Figure 3.19c
11kV 11kV 11kV
T1 T1 T1
33kV
33kV
33kV
A A
M
Circuit 2
Circuit Circuit Circuit 1
Figure 3.19b shows the requirement where another circuit is banked at the supply source or teed
along the route of the circuit. All transformers sharing the common connection point must have
auto isolation facilities.
Note: cable joints for teeing from 400sq mm cable are not available, if this arrangement is
required it will be necessary to either bank the second circuit at source or tee at the remote
33/11kV substation as shown in figure 3.19c.
3.4.3.2 Overhead Connected Circuits:
Figure 3.20a shows a standard transformer connection supplied by overhead line, from either a
dedicated supply or where a second circuit is banked at the supply source or teed at some point
on the circuit.
Figure 3.20b shows the arrangement for an ongoing circuit connection within the 33/11kV
substation.

Overhead Line Connected Circuits

Figure 3.20a Figure 3.20b
11kV 11kV
T1 T1
FT FT
A A
33kV
33kV
M
Circuit 2
Circuit Circuit 1
Where suitable private communications exist between the substation and supply source
intertripping may be used and rather than fault throwers for transformer protection.
3.4.3.3 Mixed Circuits
Mixed Overhead Line and Cable Connected Circuits

Figure 3.21a Figure 3.21b
Ongoing cable circuit:
The substation in figure 3.21a is supplied by overhead line with an ongoing cable circuit. The
substation connected to circuit 2 arranged as figure 3.19a or 3.19b.

Circuit 1 to be protected by distance protection with zone 1 set to reach 80% up to the tee point
with zone 2 reaching into transformer T1 HV winding and into circuit 2. Auto reclose is required
for zone 1 faults only.
A fault thrower is used for communication with the source circuit breaker for transformer faults.
Transformer isolation provided by local intertripping to LV circuit breaker and HV auto isolation.
The ongoing circuit 2 will normally be protected by hi-set protection at CB ‘A’. Auto reclose shall
not be provided on this cable circuit.
Ongoing overhead circuit:
The substation in figure 3.21b is supplied by cable with an ongoing overhead circuit. The
substation connected to circuit 2 arranged as figure 3.20a.
Circuit 1 to be protected by distance protection with zone 1 set to reach 80% up to the tee point
with zone 2 reaching into transformer T1 HV winding and into circuit 2.
Auto reclose shall not be provided on circuit 1 (cable).
Communication with the source circuit breaker (circuit 1) for transformer faults will be provided
by pilot wire intertripping. Transformer isolation provided by local intertripping to LV circuit
breaker and HV auto isolation.
The ongoing circuit 2 protected by hi-set protection at CB ‘A’ with auto reclose.

3.4.3.4 Banked Feeders
Figure 3.22 – Banked Feeders
SUBSTATION A SUBSTATION B
11kV 11kV
T1 T2 T1
FT FT FT
A A A
33kV 33kV
Circuit 1 Circuit 2
(banked)
The preferred method of connection to a 33kV switchboard is one feeder per circuit breaker.
However, when networks develop it is sometimes necessary for two feeders to share one
common circuit breaker. Circuit operation is similar in principal to a teed feeder. Normally
circuits are banked to utilise the relatively high thermal capacity of the feeder bay, typically 800A
or 1250A (and in some instances 2000A), that is not available from a tee connection.
Banked connections shall not be used where the variance in circuit impedance of the two circuits
exceeds 20%.
The arrangement of figure 3.22 shows two circuits banked to one circuit breaker at the supply
source. Substations A and B are shown with the overhead connection arrangement but the
principle holds for cable connected. Substation B may be a single transformer site or one of 2
(or more) transformers connected to the lower voltage switchboard.

3.4.4 Special Radial Arrangements
3.4.4.1 33/11kV substations supplied from two BSP’s
Figure 3.23 shows the arrangement for a 33/11kv substation with each transformer supplied by
different BSP’s. The arrangement is particularly useful for providing load transfer capability
between the two BSP’s during BSP transformer circuit outages.
The arrangement shown is for overhead line connected 33kV circuits, cable circuits may be used
for one or both circuits and where pilot cables are available the fault throwers can be removed.
Network arrangement is shown in figure 4.13.
Figure 3.23 – 33/11kV Substation supplied from 2 BSP’s
11kV
T1 T2
FT FT
A A
33kV
M M
Circuit 1 Circuit 2
BSP1 BSP2
One particularly useful application of this arrangement is to supply two 33/11kV substations from
a double circuit would pole line and still maintain a firm supply to both substations during a
double outage of the circuit, see figure 4.14.
This is a preferred arrangement for 33/11kv substations located approximately midway (typically
30% to 70%) between two BSP’s supplied from the same GSP.
The arrangement of figure 3.23 provides facility for feeding through the primary substation
during supply failure to one of the BSP’s to energise that BSP 33kV busbar.

3.4.4.2 BSP interconnecting circuits
The three diagrams of figures 3.24a, 3.24b and 3.24c show applications of interconnecting circuits
between BSP’s that supply 33/11kV transformers. The substations may be single transformer
substations or may be one circuit of two or more feeding the substation.
The normal running arrangement is to supply the 33/11kV transformer from one or the other
BSP, and by moving open points it is possible to transfer load between BSP’s.
A direct interconnector between two BSP’s has limited application under normal network
operation as the load on a 33kV busbar is usually much higher than the interconnector circuit
capacity. However, situations arise during developments of the network, particularly when new
BSP’s are installed and connected to existing 33/11kV substations, where interconnections
become available. During emergency operation, say for loss of the infeed into a BSP,
backfeeding the 33kV busbar (after transferring as much load as possible) can drastically reduce
the number of customers off supply.
BSP Interconnecting Circuit Arrangements

Figure 3.24a Figure 3.24b Figure 3.24c
Figure 3.24a shows the requirements for connection when both circuits are overhead
construction and the tee point is remote from the BSP’s and the 33/11kV substation. The
arrangement has the disadvantage that a fault on the section from the tee point to the open
point will interrupt supply to the transformer.
Pole mounted ABSD near the tee point may be used if it can be justified on the balance of cost
and IIP risk, see section 3.3.1.3.
Figure 3.24b shows a similar arrangement to 3.24a with the tee point at the 33/11kV substation.
In this case motorised isolators (A1 and A2) are used to provide the open point. Both isolators
are motorised for remote operation and during normal operation one will be open and one
closed. Load transfer is possible by transferring the open point. This arrangement can be used
as BSP interconnector when both isolators are closed.
Figure 3.24c is a variation of 3.24b, where one circuit is cable connected and the other overhead
line, providing auto reclose of the overhead line section of circuit.
Feeder protection at one BSP’s will be required to detect faults through to the circuit breaker at
the other, without operating for faults on the 11kV side of the transformer.
Arrangements of figures 3.24a and 3.24b are suitable for cable connected circuits by replacing
the fault thrower with pilot wire intertripping.
3.4.5 Rural 33kV Networks
3.4.5.1 Radial Networks
Rural networks are generally (not always) overhead line connected and the 33/11kV substation
arrangements shown in figures 3.20, 3.22, 3.23 and 3.24 will apply in most instances. At rural
locations with long distances between adjacent BSP’s the interconnection capability of figure
3.24 is likely to be severely limited by poor voltage regulation.
Design of rural networks can be problematic due to low fault levels at the remote ends and poor
voltage regulation. Low fault levels are particularly a problem where it is difficult to discriminate
between a fault at a location remote from the BSP and an 11kV fault at a substation nearest the
BSP.
One particular problem area is a relatively high load density in a rural area remote from a BSP
site. Although a pair of circuits may be dedicated to feed the substation a 24MVA load will
almost certainly require 40MVA cable circuits and possibly special low impedance transformers.
It is preferable to use 3 x 24MVA circuits with transformers paralleled on the 11kV busbar. The
11kV busbar fault level will normally be well within the 250MVA limit of the 11kV network. An
alternative is to feed the area from two 33/11kV substations on three or more circuits.

A 33/11kV substation may be selected as a rural hub for future uprating to a BSP. Initially the
substation can be supplied by 2 x 33kV cable circuits, or possible 2 x 132kV circuits running at
33kV feeding into a 33kV switchboard.
3.4.5.2 Ring Networks
Simple ring networks are advantageous where two or more 33/11kV substation may be supplied
by two feeder circuits from the same BSP.
Two transformer substations are connected into the 33kV network as shown in figure 3.23 but
for a ring network the bus section circuit breaker is closed. Typical network arrangements are
shown in figure 4.19 and 4.20a.
3.5 11KV SWITCHBOARD

11kV switchboard arrangements are the same as shown for 33kV switchboards as shown in
figure 3.21.
Care must be taken when designing large capacity 11kV substations (particularly high capacity
132/11kV) that all feeder circuits can be connected into the substation without excessive de-
rating. Substations in urban areas, where most or all of the circuits are cable, may be prone to
excessive de-rating of cables due to;
1. close proximity of other cables and
2. de-rating effects of laying cables deeper
Cable identification and repair is made increasingly difficult by laying cables at multiple depths
in close proximity.
Cable tunnels or trenches overcome some of the above problems but are easy targets for
malicious acts and are not recommended.

4 NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
4.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

4.1.1 Overview
The arrangements shown in this section are provided to assist in designing the primary network
for compliance with the design principles of section 2 and standard arrangements of section 3.
Drawings are representative of connectivity and do not show all substation equipment.
Extensions and modifications to the primary network should be designed with consideration for
capital and revenue costs balanced against operational resilience. In general simple radial feeds
are preferred unless a specific case can be made for more complex arrangements.
4.1.2 Flexibility
The ability to restore supplies during loss of main network circuits is determined by the
availability of transfer capability. Speed of restoration is determined by the method of switching
ranging from automated to local manual.
On load transfer capability (ie without customer disconnection) is possible only where two
adjacent networks are;
• of the same network voltage,
• the same vector group,
• the same phase rotation.
4.1.3 Cascade Tripping
Networks should be designed so that during normal operation and during planned outage
conditions any unplanned trip event does not cause severe thermal overload of any part of the
network or cause operation of any protection devices.
In practical terms this means that during planned outages there must be the facility to re-
arrange the network (where required) so that load is disconnected during an unplanned trip
event. This is normally achieved by breaking circuit parallels and operating the network at
single circuit risk. Although this appears to increase the risk to customer supplies for an

unplanned trip in reality it reduces the number of customers at risk per circuit and eliminates the
risk of cascade tripping caused by severe overload (and eliminates the risk of damage to
network assets).
4.1.4 Voltage Levels
With regard to network voltage levels Central Networks operate at the following voltage levels;
Table 5 - Network Voltages

Network Voltage Function
132kV Sub Transmission / primary voltage
33kv and 66kV Primary voltage
6.6kV and 11kV HV Distribution
400V LV Distribution
In addition CN West operates with 11kV network vector groups of red phase at 0° (12 o’clock),
+30º (1 o’clock), and -90º (9 o’clock) relative to the 132kV network Red phase. CN East operates
with one 11kV vector group of 0° (12 o’clock).
4.1.5 Engineering Recommendation P18 – Complexity of 132kV Circuits
Although ER P18 is aimed to limit the complexity of 132kV circuits the principles are applicable to
all primary voltage levels. ER P18 places three main restrictions on the design of the network.
1. The normal operating procedure or operating gear operation for making dead any 132kV
circuit shall not require the opening of more than seven circuit breakers. These circuit
breakers shall not be located on more than four different sites.
2. Not more than three transformers shall be banked together on any one circuit at any one
site.
3. No item of equipment shall have isolating facilities on more than four different sites.

4.2 PREFERRED ARRANGEMENTS
4.2.1 Sub Transmission Networks
Prior to the introduction of the 275kV and 400kV networks the 132kV network was designed as a
transmission network (National Grid) for interconnecting power stations and load centres.
As new larger generating stations where introduced in the 1950’s and 1960’s feeding into the
275kV (and later the 400kV) ‘supergrid’ network Grid Supply Points (GSP’s) were introduced to
feed into the 132kV network.
In the early 1970’s the 132kV network became a sub transmission / distribution network and
ownership transferred from the CEGB to local area electricity boards (forerunner of the DNO).
At that time the 132kV network still included several small coal-fired generating stations,
however, most if not all of these power stations have now closed. Embedded power stations
connected to the 132kV network are now limited to a few gas fired stations constructed in the
1990’s and more recently large windfarms.
The development of the 132kV network from a National Grid transmission network to a Sub
Transmission / Distribution network has resulted in;
• 132kV double busbar substations (ex generating stations) in city locations now supplied
from GSP’s up to 30km’s away. These substations are generally approaching the end of
their useful life (1930’s construction). Replacement by double busbar substation is usually
not appropriate for the requirements of the network,
• Interconnection of networks using a mesh substation, typically 4 switch closed mesh.
Again this arrangement may not be appropriate for future networks and simplification of
the arrangement should be considered when asset replacement is required.
There are many potential arrangements to replace the embedded double busbar or closed mesh
substation arrangements with simplified protection schemes. Typical networks using standard
substation arrangements for 132kv sub transmission networks are shown in the following
examples. Figure 4.2a and 4.2b shows simpler alternatives for replacing an embedded double
busbar arrangement of figure 4.1, and, figure 4.4 to 4.6 show alternatives for replacing a 4 switch
mesh arrangement shown in figures 4.3a to 4.3c.

4.2.1.1 Replacement of Double Busbar Substation
Figure 4.1 – Existing 132kV Sub Transmission

This arrangement exists where supplies to city demand centres were originally provided by local
generation.
BSP 1 would originally be a generation infeed substation with a 132kV double busbar switching
station to provide supplies to BSP’s 2,3 and 4. To maintain supplies after closure of the
generation station a new GSP and interconnecting 132kV circuits were constructed at a remote
location. In most cases a double busbar arrangement is not required at BSP 1 substation and a
more cost effective solution can be found when asset replacement is required. Typical
alternative arrangements to be considered are shown in figures 4.2a and 4.2b.
Figure 4.1
BSP 2
Ex generating
station
GSP 132kv
BSP 1 - 132kv s/s
s/s
BSP 3
Typically Up to
4 busbar 4 busbar
sections sections
BSP 4
City Boundary

Figure 4.2a – Mesh Replacement for 132kV Sub Transmission

In this arrangement the double busbar substation of figure 4.1 is replaced by 2 open mesh
arrangements (auto isolation not shown). For loss of any two supply circuits from the GSP all
BSP transformers will remain connected or will be re-connected after reclose sequence is
complete.
Figure 4.2a

Figure 4.2b – Single Busbar Switching Arrangement for Sub Transmission

This is an alternative to figure 4.2a. Although this arrangement increases the number of 132kV
circuit breakers at BSP 1 it may be more cost effective due to simplification of protection and
elimination of intertripping between the GSP and BSP1. It also has the advantage that a fault or
planned switching between BSP1 and other BSP’s does not affect other circuits and
interconnection between other GSP’s can be accommodated with capability of ‘on load’ transfer.
Figure 4.2b
Cct 1
BSP 3
Cct 3
Tower
line 1
Tower
GSP 132kv line 3
s/s
BSP 2
BSP 4
Cct 4
Alternative
Cct 2 supply from
GSP 2
Typically
4 busbar
sections
Tower
line 2
BSP 1

4.2.1.2 Replacement of Closed Mesh Substations
Figure 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c – Existing 132kV Closed Mesh Arrangements
The networks shown in figure 4.3a and 4.3b are typical network arrangements with
interconnection of circuits using a closed mesh arrangement. Figure 4.3a shows an arrangement
with teed radial circuits and figure 4.3b shows a ring network.
Many closed mesh substations are either over complex for the network requirements, and / or,
at a point of interconnection between two GSP’s with the open point on the mesh corner isolator
of the interconnecting circuit. Transfer capability is thus restricted to dead transfer by de-
energising the mesh corner (including any circuit connected to that mesh corner), see figure 4.3c.
In many cases the arrangement of figure 4.4 provides a more cost effective and flexible
alternative.
Figure 4.3a

Figure 4.3b
BSP 1
GSP 132kv
s/s
Cct 1 mc 3 mc 2
Cct 3
Cct 4
BSP 3
Cct 2 mc 4 mc 1
Typically
4 busbar
sections
BSP 4 BSP 2
Figure 4.3c

Figure 4.4 – 132kV Interconnection Between GSP’s, Double Circuit Transfer
In this arrangement BSP 2 has 2 circuit breakers normally run in the open position. GSP 1
supplies BSP 1 and BSP 2, GSP 2 supplies BSP 3.
BSP 2 demand can be transferred to GSP 2 by opening the motorised isolator and closing the
circuit breaker. This operation is simplified where transformer circuit breakers are installed at
BSP 2. Also BSP 3 demand can be transferred to GSP 1 by closing the circuit breakers at BSP 2.
Protection is simplified to standard transformer feeder protection. The circuit breakers used
purely for on load switching only, feeder protection provided at the GSP circuit breakers. Where
intertripping exists between any substations on the circuit between GSP 1 and 2 (eg, Network
Rail connection) it will be necessary to install feeder protection at the open CB at BSP 2.
The arrangement can also be used with four circuits from the same GSP source if required
particularly if more BSP’s are connected. The in line circuit breakers providing a means of
breaking the circuits (reducing the number of ends and addresses) for compliance with ER P18.
Figure 4.4

Figure 4.5 - 132kV Interconnection Between GSP’s, Single Circuit Transfer Method 1
This arrangement enables transfer of BSP 2 demand at single circuit risk. In this example the
transfer is reliant on the circuit 1 to BSP 3 being available.
Typically this connection is required when the demand of BSP 1 and BSP 2 exceeds 100MW for
compliance with ER P2/6 (class D supply).
Where the two source substations are from different GSP’s the interconnecter also provides GSP
transfer capability.
Figure 4.5

Figure 4.6 - 132kV Interconnection Between GSP’s, Single Circuit Transfer Method 2
This is similar to 4.5 above, the single interconnecting circuit providing mutual second outage
support to either network.
Figure 4.6
BSP 1
M
Source
Substation
1 M
BSP2
BSP 3
M
Source
Substation
2 M
BSP4

4.2.2 Radial Distribution Networks
Radial Networks are characterised as circuits from a source substation that terminate at the
primary winding of one or more transformers. Terminating circuits with transformers provide
three major advantages for detection of network faults,
1. Fault current on the lower voltage network is reduced on the higher voltage network in
proportion to the transformer winding ratio,
2. The high impedance of a transformer winding relative to circuit impedance, and,
3. Dependant on transformer neutral earthing arrangements, earth fault current on the
lower voltage network produce phase – phase currents (not earth currents) on the
higher voltage network.
Also as power normally flows from the higher voltage network to the lower voltage network a
reversal can be detected to trip the transformer lower voltage circuit breaker.
A further advantage is that protection equipment is segregated, there is no protection

equipment associated with circuit 1 that will trip circuit 2.
Representations of typical applications of radial networks are shown below (figures 4.7 to 4.18).
Circuit breakers and isolators etc are not shown. Detailed substation arrangements are shown
in section 3 (Substation Layouts).
Figure 4.7 - Simple Single Feeder with Lower Voltage Backfeed.
Normally employed at rural 66/11kV and 33/11kV substations where the 11kV network cannot
maintain voltages within statutory limits.
Where open points are manually operated the number of customers should be limited to 2,000
(4MVA). Up to 6,000 customers (12MVA) can be connected with this type of arrangement where
backfeeds are automated.
Figure 4.7

Figure 4.8
Simple dual feed arrangement, used at all voltage levels.
Figure 4.8
Figure 4.9 – Double Circuit Radial Network

More than one substation sharing feeder circuits.
Can be utilised at all voltage levels but typically employed at 132kV in rural areas where the
capacity of the circuits substantially exceeds the demand at each substation.
Where total demand exceeds 100MW interconnection with other networks is required to meet
the requirements of ER P2/6. Lower voltage interconnection between substations on the same
higher voltage network can be utilised during transformer outages but not circuit outages.
This example shows the maximum number of substations that can be connected within the
limitations of ER P18.
Figure 4.9
Source
Substation

Figure 4.10 – Double Circuit Radial Network with Tee

Combination of arrangements 4.7 and 4.8 above. Typically employed at 66kV and 33kV.
Figure 4.10

Figure 4.11 – Three Transformer Substation Supplied From Same Source (GSP or BSP)
This arrangement shows a transformation point with three circuits supplied from the same
source. A three circuit supply provides higher transformer utilisation than an equivalent two
circuit supply; each transformer can be loaded up to 67% nominal load compared to 50% with a
two circuit feed.
Actual firm capacity during first outage condition is dependant not only on the least rating
condition of the remaining circuits supplying the demand but also their ability to share demand
in proportion to their rating.
11kV busbar:
For 132/11 or 33/11kV networks feeding an 11kV busbar: It is normal practice to operate with one
transformer feeding an isolated section of busbar (created by open bus section switch) to reduce
fault level within the rating of the 11kv network. The number of customers connected to the
isolated section of busbar (single circuit feed) shall not exceed the limits stated in the design
criteria of section 2 (Design Principles).
33kV busbar:
Generally for 132/33kV networks feeding a 33kV busbar the fault rating of the switchgear is the
limiting factor and is generally adequate to enable all three transformers to be paralleled.
Where fault level exceeds the switchgear rating a reduction in fault level can be obtained by
operating with one transformer on open standby. Typically the numbers of customers connected
to the busbar at this voltage level will necessitate an automated changeover scheme to be
employed for loss of a circuit.
Figure 4.11

Figure 4.12 - Three Transformer Substation Supplied From Diferrent Source (GSP or BSP)
A variation of 4.11 above where the third circuit supplied from another source substation. In this
example load sharing is likely to have more impact than in example 4.11
Single GSP supply source:

Where the two source substations are connected to the same GSP it is preferable to operate the
network with parallel supplies, ie, no open points.
This may not be possible due to fault level restrictions at the lower voltage switchboard, typically
a problem at 11kV but may also be at 33kV or 66kV.
If parallel operation is planned network studies should be carried out to ensure that reverse
power flows across transformers are not likely to occur in normal operation or during circuit
outages. The tapchange control scheme may also need replacing.
Different GSP supply source:

Where the source substations receive their supplies from different GSP’s it will be necessary to
operate with an open point as reverse power flows are more likely to occur and are difficult to
predict.
Where the transformers supply an 11kV network the open point will typically be at position 3 and
the transformer supplied from Substation 2 and the 11kV network will be at single circuit risk for
faults on the primary network.
Where the transformers supply a 33kVor 66kV network from the 132kV network the open point
will typically be at position 2 and the transformer supplied from Substation 2 will be on open
standby.
132kV networks supplied from GSP’s with 132kV Static VAR compensation, or other forms of
capacitive switching installed, should not be operated with transformers energised and off load.
In these circumstances the open point should be preferably be at position 3 leaving the
transformer energised and on load. Care should be taken to ensure demands do not exceed the
limit on customers at single circuit risk. Open points at position 1 (plus at points 2 or 3) are used
occasionally to de-energise the transformer and reduce iron losses.

Figure 4.12
Figure 4.13 – 33/11kV Substations Supplied from Two BSP’s

This arrangement normally applies to 33kV networks with transformation to 11kV.
This circuit arrangement has the advantage of providing transfer capability between source
substations. During circuit outages at either source substation the demand at substation 3 can
be transferred (on single circuit risk) if required to the other.
The arrangement also has a benefit that under fault outage conditions at one of the source
substations demand naturally migrates to the other source due to changes in network
impedance (the source substation with depleted infeed capability will have a higher than normal
impedance).
The normal open point provides a means of feeding Substation 2 busbar from substation 1 (or
vice versa) during emergencies.
Single GSP supply source:
Normally in this application the transformers would be paralleled on the lower voltage
switchboard and no open point is required.
Different GSP supply source:
If the two supply sources are in different GSP groups the bus section switch on the lower voltage
busbar can be opened (if required) to prevent excessive circulating currents or fault level.

Figure 4.13
Figure 4.14 - 33/11kV Substations Supplied from Two BSP’s (Double Circuit)
This is a similar arrangement to 4.13 above but supplies 2 substations.
This is particularly useful at 33kV where a double circuit wood pole overhead line interconnects
two BSP’s. Note: proximity work on one circuit of double circuit wood pole overhead line
requires both circuits to be de-energised.
Figure 4.14
Substation
3
Source Source
Substation Substation
1 2
Normal
open points
Substation
4
Figures 4.15a and 4.15b – 11kV Network Infeed at a BSP

Where transformation to 11kV is required at a BSP two methods may be employed to achieve
this.
The arrangement shown in 4.15a uses a local 33/11kV substation supplied from the BSP 33kV
switchboard.
The arrangement in 4.15b utilises the 132kv network to derive the 11kV supply by direct 132/11kv
transformation.

Figure 4.15a
The advantages of this arrangement are;
• 33/11kV transformer capacity can be flexible to meet the 11kv demand, ie, use of
7.5/15MVA or 12/24MVA units,
• Reduced installation costs of 33/11kv transformers compared with 132/11kV,
• Typically there will be some means of transferring the 33/11kV substation to another
33kv feed during a double outage on the 132kV network feeding the BSP.
• Two levels of voltage control between the 132kV network and the 11kV network.
Figure 4.15a
Figure 4.15b
The advantages of this arrangement are;
• The use of 132/11kV transformation frees capacity on the 132/33kv transformers
• Using the winter ratings of standard transformers, 90MVA at 132/33kv and 30MVA at
132/11kV, the aggregate firm (cyclic) rating of this arrangement is 156MVA and matches
the winter maximum post fault rating of the majority of existing 132kv overhead lines
(Lynx conductor - 160MVA).
Figure 4.15b
132/11kV
Source 132/
Substation 33kV
132/11kV

Figure 4.16 – Alternative arrangement to 2 x 132/11/11kV or 3 x 132/11kV Substation

This is an alternative to either a three transformer substation with cross bay, or, a two
132/11/11kV transformer connection.
With respect to the former it enables firm supplies into the 11kV network. Typically a three
transformer arrangement is operated with two transformers in parallel and one transformer
connected to an isolated section of network to avoid overstressing.
With respect to the latter it removes the potential problem of voltage control due to load
imbalance on the two secondary windings.
Figure 4.16

Figure 4.17 – Two 33/11kV Substations Supplied by 3 Circuits

This arrangement is typically used on 33kV networks to supply 2 x 24MVA firm capacity 33/11kV
substations.
The direct feeds are 24MVA circuits and the shared feed a 40MVA circuit. The arrangement can
be utilised effectively to connect a new 33/11kv substation where a double circuit overhead line
presently supplies a single substation.
Both 24MVA circuits should be connected to the same section of 33kV busbar at the source
substation (ie, in a separate protection zone to the 40MVA circuit).
The resultant arrangement will allow proximity work to be carried out on the double circuit line
with supplies maintained on the 40MVA circuit. Any potential shortfall in capacity if the
aggregate substation maximum demand exceeds 40MVA can normally be resolved by transfers,
timing of outage, or, generation.
Figure 4.17

Figure 4.18 – 33kV Tee Connections

Rural radial connected network. Two ongoing circuits from one primary substation.
This type of network would normally be protected by HISET protection (main protection) and
would be set to reach into the transformer at Primary 1.
This sets the reach of the HISET protection along the ongoing circuit and if the circuit impedance
is high (long rural circuits) will not reach the transformers a Primary 2 or 3 (see section 6.3.2).
The remaining section of circuit being protected on IDMT protection. IDMT protection is not
acceptable as a circuit main protection and in such circumstances it will be necessary to use
other types of protection.
Figure 4.18

4.2.3 Ring Networks
Ring networks are used for two types of network arrangement:
1. to feed multi-substation networks where circuit capacity is much greater than

transformer capacity and several transformers can be connected to one circuit,
2. at single substation sites, using a cross bay arrangement, to provide a secure supply to
three or more transformers at a single substation site when supplied from two circuits
4.2.3.1 Extension of multi-substation ring networks
Figure 4.19 below shows the preferred method of connecting a new substation into a ring
network.
Figure 4.19 – Standard Ring Network
SUB 2
New Double Circuit
Substation
Radially Connected
Source
Substation Break into
existing circuit
SUB 1
New Double Circuit
Substation
Ring Connected
The preferred arrangement is to extend the ring through a mesh substation as shown for SUB 1.
When extending the ring in this way the circuits to the new substation must be adequately rated
to supply all remaining connected substations in the event of an unplanned outage at any point
of the ring.

Teed circuits (SUB 2) terminated by transformers with no interconnection into other networks
are permissible provided that;
1. no more than one tee per section of ring is connected (ie, one tee connection between
two cross bay circuit breakers), and,
2. the main protection scheme will clear all faults within main protection clearance times
(see section 2.14).
Where circuits are teed from ring circuits protected by distance schemes the remote ends of the
tee section may not be fully protected within main protection fault clearance times as zone 2
reach is defined by the characteristics of the ring circuit and is set to reach 50% (by circuit
impedance) into the following protection zone. The implications for protection of the tee section
are that;
1. The impedance of long tee circuits may exceed the zone 2 setting leaving the remainder
of the circuit with zone 3 clearance times. Zone 3 is regarded as back up protection only.
2. As there are two sources of fault current to the tee point the distance protection
‘appears’ to see the fault to be electrically at a further distance than it actually is and
protection under reach occurs. Thus in the most severe cases sections that appear to be
adequately protected with zone 2 clearance times will trip in zone 3 clearance times.
Under reach at a point electrically mid way between the two sources of a simple ring will
cause an under reach of 50% the impedance (and hence length) of the tee circuit.
Under reach is more problematic when the tee point is further away from the electrical midpoint
of the ring network, thus circuits teed from the first section of a ring network are the most
vulnerable to this effect.
Rural 33kV Ring Network:
Figure 4.20a shows an application for a 33kV rural ring network. Primary substations 3 and 4
form part of a ring network supplied from BSP 1. The ring between BSP 1 and BSP2 must
contain an open point.
The circuit to one transformer of Primary 2 is teed from the ring and the problems of under
reach as discussed above may apply to the tee section. This can be overcome by applying zone 1
and zone 2 settings to the ring network and protecting the tee section with a PMAR with hi-set
protection as shown in figure 4.20b
Primary 1 has a single circuit supply and thus has restrictions on the number of customers
connected.

Rural 33kv Ring Networks

Figure 4.20a – Rural 33kV Ring Network
Figure 4.20b Rural 33kV Ring Network, Protection Issues for Tee Connection
4.2.3.2 Interconnection of multi-substation ring networks
A maximum of two ring networks may be interconnected to form a more complex ring provided
that the interconnection is either;
1. A closed four switch mesh, or,
2. by a single or double circuit between two substations (one from each ring network)
provided that each interconnecting circuit has discrete protection with circuit breakers at
either end.

Figures 4.21a, 4.21b and 4.21c show examples of interconnection using a 4 switch mesh, a double
circuit and a single circuit respectively.
Figure 4.21a – 4 switch mesh interconnection
Figure 4.21b – double circuit
Figure 4.21c - single circuit
4.2.3.3 Single Substation Ring Network
Figure 4.22 shows the application of circuit breakers to create a secure mid point to the primary
connection of three transformers. The principal can be extended for connection of more
transformers if required. A practical limit is at the point when the rating of n-1 transformers
exceeds that of n-1 circuits.
Figure 4.22 – Three Transformer Firm Connection from 2 Circuits

Connecting the third transformer in this way is relatively expensive in terms of protection. When
compared to a radial network the double cross bay typically requires distance protection towards
the supply source with accelerated intertripping and mesh corner protection and auto reclose. A
further consideration is that a three (or more) transformer site may overstress the lower voltage
switchboard and / or network requiring open points on the lower voltage switchboard (hence
single circuit outage risk) to reduce fault levels.
An alternative is to use four transformers in two pairs and remove the cross bay arrangement.

5 NETWORK EQUIPMENT
5.1 TRANSFORMERS
Transformers with 132kV primary windings shall comply with the ‘CN Grid Transformer
Specification’, and will be CMR rated to the requirements of ENATS 35-3.
Transformers with 66kV or 33kV primary windings shall comply with the ‘33/11.5kV and 66/11.5kV
Transformer Technical Specification’, and will be CER rated to the requirements of ENATS 35-2.
5.1.1 Standard ratings and Impedances
Impedance has been selected on the basis of a two transformer substation (paralleled at the
secondary winding) with maximum fault level applied to the primary winding terminal. With this
arrangement the maximum fault level of the network connected to the transformer secondary
will be within 95% of the network rating allowing for +/-10% tolerance during manufacture. The
values of maximum primary fault levels used in the calculation (at the primary winding
connection) are shown below.
• 132kV - 31.5kA
• 66kV - 20.0kA
• 33kV - 31.5kA
Note: In practice, fault levels at the primary winding connection are normally lower than the assumed values. This
will provides some headroom for connection of generation, and in some cases paralleling of more than 2
transformers.

Table 6 - Standard Transformer Ratings and Impedances

Voltage Nameplate % Impedance (tolerance of +/-10%) Notes
Ratio Rating On rating At 100MVA
(kV) (MVA) base
132/66 90 13.5 15.0 66kV network rated at
17.1kA
25kA
17.1kA
132/33 120 18.0 15.0 33kV network rated at 25kA
17.1kA
13.1kA (250MVA)
132/11/11 2 x 30 18.0 (primary 60.0 primary When paralleled across 2
winding) transformers (one
9.0 (secondary 30.0 secondary winding each).
winding) secondary 11kV network rated at
13.1kA (250MVA)
66/11.5/11.5 TBC TBC TBC 11kV network rated at
13.1kA (250MVA)
66/11.5 40 TBC TBC 11kV network rated at
13.1kA (250MVA)
33/11.5 40 35.0 87.5 11kV network rated at
13.1kA (250MVA)
13.1kA (250MVA)
33/11.5 24 17.0 70.8 Low impedance unit for use
where 33kV fault level low
13.1kA (250MVA)
Note: the above table is based on all 11kv networks having a minimum fault capacity of 250MVA. Items in bold are
preferred sizes.

5.1.2 Tapping range
Standard tapping ranges are:
Table 7 – Tapchange Range

Voltage Tap Range Tap Range Notes
Positions per tap
132/66 -20% to +10% 19 1.67%
132/33 -20% to +10% 19 1.67%
132/11/11 -20% to +10% 19 1.67%
132/11 -20% to +10% 19 1.67%
66/11.5 -17.16% to 17 1.43%
+5.72%
66/11.5/11.5 -20%+10% 19 1.67%
33/11.5 -10% to +10% 17 1.25% 1
Notes:
1. On circuits where target busbar volts cannot be achieved using the standard tapping range it is permissible
to use a tap range of -17.16% and +5.72% (17 tap positions of 1.43%).
5.1.3 Vector Group
The standard transformer arrangement for 132/66kV and 132/33kV transformers is the STAR /
delta (Yd) connection.
The standard 132/11kV arrangement in CN East is STAR / star, STAR / star and STAR / delta
configurations apply in CN West.
The standard 33/11.5kV arrangement is DELTA / star.
The vector group of a transformer is determined by the relative phase relationship of the high
voltage and low voltage networks to be interconnected by the transformer.
Generally
• Star / delta transformers with HV bushing connections require links for YD1 or Yd11
connection
• Delta / star transformers with HV bushing connections require links for Dy1 or Dy11
connection
• 132/11kV transformers in CN East region are all Yy0 (with the exception of Burnaston BSP
that is Yd)

• 132/11kV transformers in CN West may be either Yy or Yd connected dependant on

location (see CN West LTDS)
5.1.4 Standard Connections
Arrangements are based on the transformer connection methods shown in Table 8.
Table 8 – Transformer Connections

Primary Secondary Primary Connection Secondary Connection
Voltage Voltage (kV)
(kV)
132 66 Bushing Bushing
132 33 Bushing Cable Box
132 11 Bushing Cable Box
66 11.5 Bushing Cable Box
33 11.5 Cable Box Cable Box
5.2 OVERHEAD LINES

5.2.1 132kV Network
New Installations:
New build double circuit 132kV overhead lines shall be constructed to ENATS 43/7 ‘132kV Steel
Tower Transmission Lines Specification L4(M) with UPAS (300mm2 AAAC) phase conductors
sagged for 75 °C operation.
Where higher circuit ratings are required heavy duty double circuit 132kV overhead lines shall be
constructed to ENATS 43/9 ‘132kV Steel Tower Transmission Lines Specification L7(C) , with
RUBUS (500mm2 AAAC) phase conductors sagged for 75 °C operation.
Single circuit 132kV overhead lines may be used to provide a third circuit into a network where
the group demand exceeds 100MW for compliance with ER P2/6 (class D supply groups). A wood
or steel pole construction conforming to ENATS 43-50 is acceptable for this application providing
the general overhead line design type and the detailed installation design (span lengths, pole
sizes etc) are approved by CN. Conductor type to be used may be either UPAS or POPLAR
(200mm2 AAAC) depending on required circuit capacity.

Rise of earth potential at the base of metallic supports, or cable sheath of any underground
cable, must comply with BSEN 50341 clause 6.2.4.
Where un-earthed single circuit wood pole overhead lines are used care is required to ensure
that substation rise of earth potential does not exceed 650V under all operating conditions.
Re-conductoring:
When re-conductoring any circuit the replacement conductor should be sagged to provide the
maximum thermal rating of the conductor type within the constraints of the overhead line
design (tower design, condition etc).
When re-conductoring existing overhead lines where the existing phase conductors are single
Lynx the feasibility of replacing with UPAS should be considered.
When re-conductoring existing overhead lines where the existing phase conductors are twin
Lynx, Zebra or Finch the feasibility of replacing with RUBUS should be considered.
Circuit ratings are shown in the Table 9 below:
Table 9 – Overhead Line Ratings

Conductor Pre fault rating Post fault 24 P27 rating
Type / size (MVA) hour rating (MVA)
(MVA)
Conductor 50 65 75 50 65 75 50 65 75
temp °C
Season
2
Lynx / 175 mm Winter 111 126 134 132 150 160 118 134 143
ACSR
Spring / 103 119 128 123 142 153 110 127 137
Autumn
Summer 89 108 118 106 128 141 95 115 126
2
Zebra / 400 mm Winter 191 216 231 227 257 275 203 230 246
ACSR
Spring / 178 205 221 211 244 263 189 218 235
Autumn
Summer 154 186 204 183 221 243 164 198 217

Table 9 – Overhead Line Ratings (continued)

Conductor Pre fault rating Post fault 24 P27 rating
Type / size (MVA) hour rating (MVA)
(MVA)
Conductor 50 65 75 50 65 75 50 65 75
temp °C
Season
POPLAR / 200 Winter 120 137 146 143 163 174 128 145 155
2
mm AAAC
Spring / 112 129 140 133 154 166 119 138 149
Autumn
Summer 97 117 129 115 139 153 103 125 137
2
UPAS / 300 mm Winter 159 180 193 189 214 230 169 192 205
AAAC
Spring / 147 171 185 176 203 220 157 182 196
Autumn
Summer 128 155 170 152 184 203 136 165 181
RUBUS / 500 Winter 218 247 265 259 294 316 232 263 282
2
mm AAAC
Spring / 203 235 254 241 280 302 216 250 270
Autumn
Summer 175 213 234 209 253 279 186 227 249
Notes:
• Post Fault ratings may be applied for up to 24 hours provided that circuit loadings were
initially below the pre fault ratings (84% of post fault rating)
• Post fault ratings are based on 12% exceedence, P27 ratings are based on 3% exceedence
• P27 ratings are reduced to 96% based on feeding city or industrial loads
• All ratings are based on supplying demand with a minimum of 2 circuits, for single circuit
supplies (eg a non firm customer supply) the level of permitted exceedence reduces to
0% with subsequent reductions in ratings.
• AAAC conductor ratings based on L2 type aluminium alloy
• Wind Speed 0.5 metres / second, solar radiation = 0

• Seasons are
o Summer - May / June / July / August, ambient temperature 20 °C
o Spring / Autumn - March / April / September / October / November, ambient
temperature 9 °C
o Winter - December / January / February, ambient temperature 2 °C
• Ratings above calculated using EATL Spreadsheet OHRAT2 using the cyclic loadings below
(based on ACE Report 104, Figure G5).
demand at
or above
Input
(% of
Imax)
100 0.00
95 0.25
90 0.84
85 2.19
80 4.98
75 11.0
70 20.0
65 33.0
60 47.0
55 61.0
50 79.0
45 89.0
40 97.0
35 100.0
30 100
25 100
20 100
15 100
10 100
5 100
0 100
5.2.2 66kV Network
Under Preparation
5.2.3 33kV Network
See section 3.4.2 of the Network Design Manual

5.3 UNDERGROUND CABLES

5.3.1 132kV
Most 132kV cables are installed on circuits that are predominately overhead to prevent a
‘wirescape’ where all the circuits meet at GSP’s, or, relatively short underground cable sections
crossing development areas. For these applications cable ratings shall not be less than the
maximum rating of the associated overhead line system for all seasons of summer, spring /
autumn and winter for all conditions of pre and post fault and P27. The overhead line system
rating being defined as the maximum thermal rating that can be applied to the existing
conductor type (normally 75 °C). All cables must have sufficient thermal independence to be
fully loaded simultaneously.
Where a BSP, or group of BSP’s, are to be supplied by cable circuit only the rating of the circuit
will be determined by the initial and future anticipated demand. Consideration should be given
to the benefits of providing a cable with a higher rating than initially required to facilitate future
developments and provide enhanced emergency performance against the marginal cost
increase bearing in mind the relatively high cost of excavation compared to cable cost.
For the purposes of calculating cycle rating the load curve defined in section 5.2.1 should be
used.
In any event the minimum conductor size shall be 400 mm2 (copper conductor, XLPE insulation).
5.3.2 66kV
Under Preparation
5.3.3 33kV
See section 3.4.1 of the Network Design Manual

5.4 SWITCHGEAR
5.4.1 Specifications
Switchgear shall comply with the following Central Networks specifications;
• 132kV and 66kV Outdoor Circuit Breakers Technical Specification,

• 132kV and 66kV Disconnectors, Earthing Switches, and Fault Throwing Switches
Specification
• 33kV Indoor Metal Enclosed Technical Specification
• 11kV Indoor Metal Enclosed Technical Specification
It is generally preferred that all switchgear shall be ENA approved, if not ENA approved the
switchgear type must be approved by CN Network Engineering.
66kV and 132kV switchgear shall comply with ENATS 41-37

33kV and 11kV switchgear shall comply with ENATS 41-36
Substation switchgear arrangements using air insulated busbars and overhead connected open
terminal switchgear is preferred at 132kv and 66kV although cable connected indoor GIS
switchgear is permissible when constrained by limitations of space or if a necessity to obtain
planning consents.
All 33kV and 11kV substation switchgear shall be metal enclosed cable connected.
5.4.2 Switchgear Ratings
Minimum thermal ratings: are shown in Table 10.
Table 10 – Switchgear Minimum Ratings

132kV 66kV 33kV 11kV (40MVA 11kV (24MVA
transformer) transformer)
Busbar 2000A 2000A 2000A 2000A 1250A
Transformer Incomers 2000A 2000A 2000A 2000A 1250A
Bus section 2000A 2000A 2000A 2000A 1250A
Feeders 2000A 1250A 1250A 630A 630A
Notes:

• For 33kV switchboards at least one feeder switch per section of busbar shall be of the
same rating as the busbar (a minimum of 2000A) for possible future use as a switchboard
interconnector.
• 66kV and 33kV circuit breakers shall have a minimum 3 phase symmetrical and single
phase fault breaking capacity of 31.5kA. This should be increased to 40kA where the X/R
ratio exceeds 18.85 (DC time constant of 60mS).
• 132kV circuit breakers shall have a minimum 3 phase symmetrical fault breaking capacity
of 31.5kA and single phase break capacity of 40kA. The 3 phase break capacity shall be
increased to 40kA where the X/R ratio exceeds 18.85 (DC time constant of 60mS).
• 11kV circuit breakers shall have a minimum 3 phase symmetrical and single phase fault
breaking capacity of 25kA.
Unless otherwise stated, fault ratings are 3 second ratings based on an X/R ratio of 18.85 (60mS
DC time constant).
For further details refer to Network Design Manual section 3.3.4.2

6 GUIDANCE NOTES
6.1 ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATION P2/6

The application of ER P2/6 with regard to ‘Class of Supply’ and its application to the network has
been the cause of some confusion.
6.1.1 Class of Supply
Distribution networks are classified in ranges of group demand in table 1 of ER P2/6 as follows
Class Group Demand

A Up to 1MW
B 1MW to 12MW
C 12MW to 60MW
D 60MW to 300MW
E 300MW to 1500MW
The class of supply determines the restoration requirements under first and second outage
conditions.
For each increase in classification level security of supply requirements become more onerous
and increasing levels of investment are required for compliance.
6.1.2 Group Demand
Group Demand is defined as:
For a single site:

The appropriate estimated maximum demand given in the adopted load estimates or the Area
Board’s own estimates for those points for which no load estimates have been adopted.
For multiple Sites:

The sum of the appropriate estimated maximum demands in the adopted load estimates with
allowance for diversity appropriate to the Group, or the Area Board’s own estimates for those
parts of the system for which no load estimates have been adopted.

6.1.2.1 Interpretation of Group Demand
Area Board’s are now Distribution Network Operators (DNO’s)
The definition of group demand refers to load estimates that where adopted by the Electricity
Council pre privatisation. The practice of adoption ceased on privatisation and load estimates
are not adopted by any external organisation. The actual and forecast maximum demands
published by the DNO’s in their ‘Long Term Development Statement’ should be used for ER P2/6
purposes.
6.1.3 Typical Network Arrangements
Sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 provide general guidance and shows typical network arrangements for
the classes of supply B to E. Figure 6.1 relates to first outage requirements and figure 6.2 to
second outage.
6.1.4 First Outage Requirements
BSP A feeds 3 primary substations, A1, A2 and A3.
The group demand at primary A1 is less than 12MW and falls into class B requiring just a single
circuit supply with transfer capability to restore supplies within 3 hours (the example shows 11kV
load transfer to primary A3 by manual switching).
The demand on primary A2 falls into class C but it is still acceptable to supply the group with a
single circuit, however, class C groups have a more stringent requirement for supply restoration.
For a first outage condition restoration of group demand less 12MW or two thirds group demand
(whichever is smaller) must be restored within 15 minutes. This would normally be achieved by
telecontrol switching of a 33kv circuit (in the example transfer at 33kv to BSP D). Any shortfall
must be restored within 3 hours. Normally the 33kv backfeed will restore all supplies but if not
this requirement may be met by manual switching (in the example transfer capability at 11kV
from primary A3).
The group demand at primary A3 also falls into class C. Substations sites for this application
would typically have 2 x 24MVA or 2 x 40MVA, 33/11kV, transformers with supplies paralleled at
the 11kV busbar by bus section switch.

BSP B shows a typical 132kV feed arrangement to a Class C supply group. This would be a
relatively small BSP with group demand between 12MW and 60MW. Substations sites for this
application would typically have 2 x 30MVA, 132/11kV transformers or 2 x 60MVA, 132/33kV,
transformers with supplies paralleled at the 11kV or 33kV busbar (as appropriate) by bus section
switch.
BSP C shows a typical 132kV feed arrangement to a Class D supply group (group demand 60MW
to 300MW) with a group demand up to 100MW.
BSP D shows a larger Class D supply group with a group demand exceeding 100MW.
Figure 6.1

6.1.5 Second Outage Requirements
All the primary substations supplied from BSP A have no requirement to maintain supplies
during second outages. The BSP itself does benefit with the 33kv interconnection to BSP D.
BSP B group demand is less than 100MW so again no requirement to maintain supplies during
second outages.
BSP C group demand is also less than 100MW so again no requirement to maintain supplies
during second outages. The interconnector provides support to BSP D.
BSP D group demand exceeds 100MW thus a third circuit is required to restore supplies. For
group demand between 100MW and 150MW restoration of GD less 100MW must be restored
within 3 hours, for group demand between 150MW and 300MW restoration of one third of GD
must be restored within 3 hours.

The entire supply group falls into Class E of ER P2/6 and all consumers must remain connected
for a double outage. Thus a minimum of 3 permanently connected circuits are required to supply
such a supply group.
Figure 6.2
Second Outage Requirements

Single feed 33kV network
Class B
No second outage Open point -
requirement manual close
Double feed 132kV network (3hrs)
Class C
Group demand 12-60MW
No second outage
requirement Primary Double feed 33kV network
BSP B A1
Class C
Primary No second outage
BSP A
A3 requirement
Open point - manual

Primary
close (3hrs)
A2
BSP C
Single feed 33kV network
BSP D
Class C
Double feed 132kV network Group demand 12-60MW
Class D Open point - backfed at 33kV
Group demand 60-300MW remote close No second outage
for group demand <100MW (15mins) requirement
No second outage
requirement Open point -
manual close
Double feed NGT network (3hrs)
Class E Double feed 132kV network
Class D
Group demand >300MW
(immediate restoration >2 for group demand between 100MW and 150MW
fully rated infeeds) restoration of GD less 100MW
for group demand between 150MW and 300MW
restoration of one third of GD
NGT 275kV or 400kV
(restoration required within 3 hours)
132kV
33kV
11kV

6.1.6 Interpretation of Multiple Sites
The definition for multiple sites provided in ER P2/6 is too vague and taken to the extreme would
result in all parts of the network falling under the requirements of a class E supply. How ER P2/6
is interpreted has the highest impact for double outage conditions between supply classes C, D
and E.
Central Networks interpretation of the application of ER P2/6 to multiple sites is to categories

network supplies to substations as one of the following:
1. independent supplies
2. interdependent supplies
3. shared supplies
6.1.6.1 Independent Supplies
Supplies to substation sites are defined as independent when the loss of the two most critical
supplies materially reduces supply capacity at one substation site only.
Where a substation site is supplied by two main supply circuits a double outage will result in loss
of supplies to that site, and, where interconnection exists, a reduction in transfer capability to
adjacent sites. Reduction in transfer capability through loss of interconnection, is only regarded
as ‘material’ if it results in none compliance with ER P2/6 at any adjacent substation site.
Figure 6.3 shows an example of independent supplies. In this example all four BSP’s have a
group demand below 100MW, however, the total group demand for the area supplied exceeds
100MW and could possibly exceed 300MW.
In these circumstances the four BSP’s and their supply networks can be classed as independent.
The class of supply at each site being determined by the total demand at that site.

Figure 6.3 – Independent Supplies
GSP B GSP A
BSP B
BSP A
BSP C
BSP D
GSP D
GSP C
132kV
6.1.6.2 Interdependent Supplies
Supplies to substation sites are defined as interdependent when the loss of the two most critical
supplies to one substation site reduces transfer capability of adjacent substation sites.
In figure 6.4 all four BSP’s have group demands in excess of 100MW.
GSP A normally supplies BSP A by a double circuit network connection; similarly GSP B normally
supplies BSP B by double circuit network connection. However for a group demand in excess of
100MW there is a requirement to restore supplies (as stated in table 1 of ER P2/6) within 3 hours.
The interconnector between BSP A and BSP B provides transfer capability to both sites. It
should be noted that for class D supplies there is no requirement to restore supplies to all
customers (group demand) other than in the ‘time to restore arranged outage’. Also, an
interconnector between two GSP’s would normally be operated with an open point to avoid
parallels across the two supply groups.
A double circuit outage between GSP A and BSP A results in the loss of transfer capability to BSP
B and thus reduces security at BSP B. Hence supplies to BSP A and BSP B are interdependent.
Supplies to BSP C and BSP D are essentially the same as the above example with the exception
that both BSP’s are supplied from the same GSP. In this case it is unnecessary to operate the
network with an open point on the interconnector circuit.
Figure 6.4 – Interdependant Supplies
Although supplies to each substation are interdependent the risk at each site can be managed
so that the risk of losing supplies to both sites is minimal. Groups of interdependent circuits
should be identified and planned outages restricted to one critical circuit at a time.

6.1.6.3 Shared Supplies
Where more than one substation site shares a supply network then the class of the shared
section of the network is defined as the total demand from the source of supply up to the tee
point.
In figure 6.5 BSP A and BSP B have group demands that fall into class C and thus in isolation a
double circuit to each BSP is adequate. In this example the total group demand on the two
circuits from GSP A to the tee point exceeds 100MW and is thus a class D supply. Any transfer
capability between BSP A and BSP B has no benefit as supplies to both BSP’s are lost for a
double outage.
The example of BSP C and BSP D is similar except that BSP C is a class D substation and the
combined demand on the circuits between GSP C and the tee point exceeds 300MW (class E).
Figure 6.5 – Shared Supplies

Both cases fail to meet the ER P2/6 standard. If circuit capacities allow it would be simple to
achieve compliance by installing a single circuit interconnector between BSP A and BSP D to
form an interdependent network as shown in figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6 – Use of Interconnector for P2/6 Compliance
BSP A can be supplied from BSP D during a double outage of the circuits from GSP A, (supplies
to BSP B would be lost).
BSP D can be supplied from BSP A during a double outage of the circuits from GSP C, and, BSP C
can be supplied by the single circuit from GSP B.
Due to the interdependence of the circuits in this example not more than one planned outage is
allowed at any time on any of,
• the two circuits from GSP A,
• the two circuits from GSP C,
• the single circuit from GSP B to BSP C, and,
• the interconnector between BSP A and BSP D.

Another example of a shared supply is shown in figure 6.7. This is a ring network typically used
for 132/11kV distribution. In this example the aggregate group demand, after diversity, of all the
BSP’s results in a class D group demand on the two circuits feeding the network from GSP A.
The circuit from GSP C to BSP C, normally operated with an open point, providing a third feed
into the network.
Figure 6.7 - Ring Network

Class D
GSP A
BSP B
BSP A
BSP D
BSP C
GSP C
132kV
Again restrictions on planned outages apply, no more than one planned outage should be
allowed at any time on the two main circuits from GSP A and the interconnector from GSP C.
6.2 FIRM CAPACITY

The interpretations above describe how substation sites and the networks feeding them are
classified. This section deals with the ability of the network to meet requirements during
outages.
The ability of a substation site (or circuit) to comply with the ER P2/6 security standard is
dependant on the demand restored, relative to group demand, within the time limit
requirements of the class of supply.

Where a parallel connected network is used to feed a substation site an unplanned outage of
any one circuit may result in the overload of components of the remaining circuits. This is
acceptable provided the designed overload capability of that network component is not
exceeded. Generally transformer and cable ratings include overload capability in their rating
data. It is acceptable for an overload condition, due to a fault outage, to create a small amount
of accelerated insulation ageing and therefore reduce the potential life of the asset. However,
network components with low thermal inertia (joints etc) are prone to sudden failure and result
in further unplanned circuit outages and loss of supplies to customers. Also excessive
transformer overloads may result in an over temperature trip condition. If a potential overload
condition does exist, and transfer capability is relied upon to reduce demand following the
unplanned outage, the transfer must be completed within the designated short time overload
capability of the remaining circuit components.
Generation contribution factors are determined by table 2 of ER P2/6.
Only generation that has the capability of remaining connected during the fault period, or, can
be reconnected at declared export capability within the required timescales defined in the table
1 of ER P2/6 for the class of supply, shall be considered as contributing to security of supply.
Great care should be taken when relying on generation to meet the requirements of P2/6.
Generation output can be depleted without notice at any time leaving the network in a state of
none compliance. Replacement network capacity could typically take up to a year to install
where additional transformer capacity is required and several years for additional overhead
circuit capacity.
6.2.1 First Outage
The most onerous first outage event is an unplanned fault outage.
Firm capacity is the remaining capacity at a substation site (or circuits) after the loss of the most
critical circuit. Remaining capacity includes;
• the capacity of any remaining feeder circuits, and,
• transfer capability, and,
• generation contribution
Substation sites with group demand up to 60MVA (class C) have no requirement to immediately
restore supplies during first outage, however, in practice most substations with demands in
excess of 12MVA will have duplicate infeeds.

Table 1 of ER P2/6 states that for a class D supply ‘a loss of supply not exceeding 60 seconds is
considered as an immediate restoration’. Designing a network using this criterion can result in
up to 300MW of demand reliant on a single circuit feed. Assuming an average demand per
customer of 2kW any short term interruption could affect up to 150,000 customers. This level of
customer service is deemed unacceptable. The maximum numbers of customers supplied at
single circuit risk is stated in section 2.2 (Table 3) of this manual.
6.2.2 Second Outage
The most onerous second outage event considered is an unplanned fault outage during a
planned outage. Second outages based on two concurrent unplanned outages are NOT
considered.
Group demand must exceed 100MW before there is a P2/6 requirement to restore supplies.
Firm capacity is the remaining capacity at a substation site (or circuits) after the loss of the two
most critical circuits. Remaining capacity includes;
• the capacity of any remaining feeder circuits, and,
• pre fault transfer capability, and,
• post fault transfer capability, and,
• generation contribution

6.3 PROTECTION ISSUES

6.3.1 Pitfalls with multi-substation ring networks
The arrangement of figure 6.8 and 6.9 below shows some of the problems that can occur when
extending ring networks. Due to the potential risk to customers connected to complex ring
networks the only acceptable arrangements are the ring circuits shown in figure 4.19, 4.20a and
interconnected rings as shown in figures 4.21a, 4.21b and 4.21c.
The standard protection scheme for a ring network is distance protection, this may be enhanced
for 132kV networks by accelerated intertripping to maintain zone 1 protection times to all parts
of the network. All networks using distance protection as the main protection scheme must
clear faults within a minimum of zone 2 protection times. Zone 3 shall not be used for main
protection schemes at any part of the network.
Teed connections from ring networks are prone to the following problems when using distance
protection.
Under reach:
Figure 6.8 shows a tee connection between two substations of a ring network.
Zone 1 distance protection settings for both SUB 1 and SUB 2 are defined at 80% of the circuit
impedance between the substations, ie, SUB 1 zone 1 reaches 80% into the circuit to SUB 2 and
SUB 2 zone 1 reaches 80% into the circuit to SUB1. Zone 2 is normally set to reach 50% into the
next zone. This defines the maximum reaches of zone 1 and zone 2 protection along the teed
circuit from both SUB 1 and SUB 2 and will be different depending on the relative position of the
tee point. The maximum reach along the tee circuit is only obtainable when supplied from one
or other of SUB 1 or SUB 2.
Under normal conditions the tee point will be supplied from both ends of the circuit, ie, from
SUB 1 and SUB 2. When supplied from both points fault current is shared and volt drop across
the ring reduced, thus the distance protection at both SUB 1 and SUB 2 receive a higher voltage
reference and lower current reference for the fault and hence the fault position appears to be
further away.

This moves the demarcation of cover between zones 1 and 2 and more importantly between
zones 2 and 3. Figure 6.9 shows this effect between zones 1 and 2 with a definite zone 1 section
(blue) a definite zone 2 section (red) and a section that can be either (green).
Figure 6.8 – Distance Protection Under Reach
SUB 3
Sub 1, Zone 1 -
SUB 1 Single circuit feed SUB 2
Sub 2, Zone 1 -
Single circuit feed Sub 1, Zone 1 -
Under reach
Sub 2, Zone 1 -
Under reach
Supply 1 Supply 2
Sub 2, Zone 1
80% cover Sub 1, Zone 1
80% cover
Zone 1
Zone 2
Either Zone 1 or 2
Zone 3 Main Protection Zones:
Figure 6.9 shows a ring network protected by distance protection where the limit of zone 2 reach
of SUB 1 is to 50% between SUB 2 and SUB 3. Zone 1 of SUB 2 will reach 80% into the circuit
towards SUB 3 thus providing a 20% error margin against zone 1 reach beyond SUB 3 and a 30%
error margin between SUB 2 main protection and SUB 1 Zone 2 back up protection (on the circuit
between SUB 2 and SUB 3).
This sets the maximum zone 2 reach for SUB 1 along the tee section to SUB 4. In some instances
zone 2 reach falls short of the end of the circuit. Also due to the under reach problem described
above the zone 2 reach will vary in practice. When supplied from a single source (either SUB 1 or
SUB 2) the whole of the tee circuit may be protected in zone 2 times, but when supplied from
both substations the furthest section from the tee point may appear to both SUB 1 and SUB 2
protection schemes as a zone 3 fault.
Where this occurs the tee connection point should be made at the nearest substation and the
ongoing circuit connected through a circuit breaker, or the ring extended to loop through the
substation as shown in figure 4.19, section 4.2.3.1.

Figure 6.9 – Distance Protection Under Reach on Long Tee Sections
6.3.2 Protection issues with teed rural networks
Figure 6.10 shows a 33kV radial network with hi-set used for main circuit protection. The hi-set
reach is set to cover the transformer HV winding at primary 1. This defines the reach for the
ongoing circuit to primary 2. For long feeders the impedance of the ongoing circuit is relatively
high and may exceed the primary 1 transformer HV winding impedance leaving a section of the
circuit covered only by the IDMT back up protection.
Rural networks are particularly susceptible to this problem where there are many small capacity
substations on multiple teed circuits.
Figure 6.10 – High Set Protection with Teed Feeders

6.4 RING NETWORKS

The arrangement in figure 6.11 below shows a multi-substation application that serves the same
function as the radial equivalent in figure 6.12.
Ring Network
Figure 6.11
Equivalent Radial Network

Figure 6.12

Some features of the each design are shown in Table 11 below:
Table 11 – Features of Ring and Radial Networks

Condition Feature
Ring Radial
Single circuit outage One transformer at each end of One transformer from each
(fault) circuit disconnected initially but substation disconnected. All
auto restored. network now at single circuit risk.
Double circuit outage The worst case scenario is a All supplies disconnected.
(fault during planned planned outage on one of the
outage) circuits from the source
substation and a fault on the
second circuit from the source.
In all other cases some supplies
are maintained, at best just one
substation being disconnected.
Complexity (ER P18) No P18 issues, the ring can be A maximum of two teed circuits
extended within the limits of are allowed on a circuit between
thermal rating and voltage source substation and remote
regulation. substation to comply with ER P18
maximum addresses rule
(maximum of 4 addresses).
Susceptibility to Human Circuits that are under outage Circuits protection is generally
Error contain active protection independent.
equipment. Error can result in
loss of supplies to customers
Voltage regulation An outage of one of the first A single outage increases
sections of circuit from the demand on the remaining circuit
supply source into the network and load doubling, thus increased
results in all of the network volt drop in the circuits. Although
demand supplied from the the effective circuit length does
other. This not only increases not change the number of
the demand on each section of paralleled transformers in service
circuit but also the distance at each substation is reduced
from source substation to the (typically by 50%, 2 transformer
last BSP on the ring and may substation). Thus voltage
result in excessive voltage regulation is likely to be no better
regulation. than the equivalent ring network.

Table 11 – Features of Ring and Radial Networks (Continued)

Condition Feature
Ring Radial
Flexibility (Overhead line Ring connection possible at any Tee off available at any point of
circuits) point but expensive heavy duty main circuit route. (may need
(DJT) tower required to achieve tower replacement from
this. suspension to tension tower).
Flexibility (cable circuits) Feasible to construct with single Tends to require double circuit
circuits between substations to connections to the main feeder
form a ring. circuit.
Tee / ring point into Ring connection may be Generally requires cable for one
substation (overhead possible by overhead circuit. Other with overhead
connection) connection, conversely may connection
require cable for both circuits
depending on relative position
of substation and main circuit
connection point
Costs – Circuits All circuits must be sufficiently Smaller conductor size possible
rated to supply several on tee circuits compared with
substations (very expensive). main route.
Costs – Main plant Cross bay of 2 x isolators and 1 x No cross bay costs
circuit breaker required at each
site, thus increased costs (very
expensive).
Costs – Protection Distance protection and mesh High voltage network protected
corner protection with auto by low cost DOC scheme at
reclose required for each feeder transformation points.
circuit due to cross bay.
Possible additional cable and
sealing end costs if cross bay
cannot be established by simple
overhead connection.
The main advantages of ring networks are;

1. circuits and transformers are independent and a circuit fault does not result in a
permanent outage of its associated transformer(s).
2. a circuit fault tends to deplete security less than an equivalent radial network

3. secure mid point transformer connections can be made available from two supply
circuits (ie for 3 transformer substation)
4. This arrangement can be achieved with single circuit supplies with direct routes between
substations
However, there are several disadvantages;

1. Cross Bay costs are relatively high
2. there is a greater risk of human error during protection testing / maintenance as active
components of one protection zone are physically connected into an adjacent zone.
3. network extension connections are generally not as flexible as radial equivalents
4. extension to the ring require circuits ratings capable of supplying several substations
rather than being rated just for the new substation being connected.
5. Loss of the first circuit from the source may result in poor voltage regulation for the last
substation connected. For a substation near the supply source on a ring network the
distance from supply source around the ring could be almost twice that of the furthest
substation of an equivalent radial network.
6.5 PRIMARY NETWORK DESIGN
6.5.1 Transformer Replacement
Table 6 of section 5.1.1 shows the standard transformer voltage ratio’s, ratings and impedances
for new transformers. The units in bold are preferred standard sizes and impedances.
The transformer impedance values are designed to ensure the fault level of the associated lower
voltage network does not exceed 95% of the LV network fault rating based on a 3 second fault
rating of;
• 20kA at 66kV
• 25kA at 33kV
• 13.1kA at 11kV
In most instances the LV network fault level will be much lower than the values stated above.
However, there are existing assets on the network that have much lower fault ratings, for
example some 33kV switchgear at primary substations have a fault rating as low as 13.1kA.
Normally the fault level will decay sufficiently not to affect embedded assets but this must be
checked during network analysis.

Where replacement by the preferred standard transformer results in a fault level that exceeds
95% of the lower voltage network asset fault rating the high impedance equivalent unit should
be used (where available). If the use of a higher impedance unit still results in excessive fault
level the LV assets affected should be replaced and the preferred standard transformer used.
Where replacement by the preferred standard transformer results in the inability to provide the
LV busbar target voltage under all normal operating conditions (first outage and second outage
where appropriate) with the transformer operated at its maximum thermal rating (peak demand
for a cyclic load) a lower impedance standard transformer, or, a transformer with an extended
tapping range, or both, may be used (where available).
6.5.2 132/33kV, 120MVA transformers
132/33kV, 120MVA transformers are not as cost effective as 90MVA units, and, they suffer from
the disadvantage of placing a large number of customers at risk during outages. Also, the
incoming 33kV circuit breaker and cable tails must be rated at 2730A to obtain full cyclic capacity
from the transformer (33kV switchgear incomers are typically 2000A rated). Thus, 120MVA units
should only be used where a case can be made on economic grounds and where it is
impracticable to obtain the required firm rating using smaller units.
6.5.3 Transformers with Dual Secondary Windings (132/11/11kV or 66/11/11kV)
132/11/11kV, 2 x 30MVA transformer arrangements suffer from four main disadvantages (in
addition to other disadvantages of 132/11kV transformation).
1. With the secondary windings parallel connected as shown in figure 6.13 the demands on
each pair of windings must be reasonably well balanced to obtain satisfactory voltage
control, this can be achieved relatively easily when a double busbar 11kV switchboard
with on load remote controlled busbar isolators is used, however, double busbar
switchboard costs are 50% to 100% higher than a single busbar version.
2. the full transformer rating cannot be achieved unless the demand on its secondary
windings are balanced,
3. voltage control problems can be overcome by parallel connection of the secondary
windings as shown in figure 6.14. However during 132kv fault outages the associated
11kv network is disconnected from supply and relies on an automation scheme to restore
supplies for permanent faults. This operating arrangement is effectively a single circuit
supply and is unlikely to comply with the requirement of section 2.3 (single circuit
supplies) of this manual,
4. Unless the load density is high and thus feeder circuit distances to adjacent 11kV infeed
points are short there may be insufficient transfer capability.
There use should be limited to high load density areas, eg city centres or high demand
customers, where load transfers are available to adjacent substations (see section 2.4).
Parallel Connection Arrangements for 132/11/11 transformers

Figure 6.13 Figure 6.14
11kV 11kV
GT1 GT2
Circuit 1 Circuit 2
6.5.4 Switchgear Fault Ratings
When assessing the fault capability of circuit breakers the maximum peak make and maximum
break conditions must be considered for 3 phase faults. Where the X/R ratio exceeds 18.85 the
switchgear fault rating will be reduced to the next lower standard fault rating (eg, a 31.5kA
switchboard at X/R ratio of 18.85 is de-rated to 25kA where the X/R ratio exceeds 18.85). Single
phase fault levels for 66kV, 33kV and 11kV switchboards are normally within the capability of the
circuit breakers due to neutral – earth impedance. Note: and X/R ratio of 18.85 is equivalent to a
DC time constant of 60mS.


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Primary Network Design

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007

Version 1 Prepared by Dave Charlesworth Date October 2007

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 2 of 118

3.2 132KV NETWORKS 29

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 5 of 118

1.1 CONNECTION TO THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK

1.2 GSP SUPPLY GROUPS

1.3 PRIMARY NETWORK VOLTAGES

1.4 11KV NETWORK INFEED

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 7 of 118

1.5 NETWORK PHASE ARRANGEMENTS

Table 1 –Network Vector Groups

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 8 of 118

1.6 EARTHING ARRANGEMENTS

1.6.2 66kV and 33kV

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 9 of 118

1.6.3 11kV (or 6.6kV)

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 10 of 118

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 11 of 118

• Strategic action - programmes of network wide proactive change where investment is

2.2 CONNECTIVITY PLANNING STANDARDS

Table 2 – Planning Standards

Table 2 – Planning Standards (Continued)

2.3 SINGLE CIRCUIT SUPPLIES

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 13 of 118

1. avoid interconnection of two GSP’s

1. It avoids supply losses providing improved service to the customer

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 14 of 118

2.3.2 Design Criteria

2.4 TRANSFER CAPABILITY

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 15 of 118

1. Reducing the number of customers of each supply group

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 16 of 118

1. Costs are excessive, both rental and fuel,

2.4.1 Design Criteria

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 17 of 118

Table 4 - Transfer Capability

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 18 of 118

Complex network arrangements generally suffer from the following disadvantages:

• high risk of faults caused by human error;

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 19 of 118

• Simple – transformer feeders

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 20 of 118

2.5.1 Design Criteria

2.6 NETWORK RESILIENCE

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 21 of 118

2.6.3 Malicious Acts

2.7 SECURITY OF SENSITIVE SUPPLIES

Examples of such situations –

Major entertainment venues

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 22 of 118

2.8 SEASONAL AND CYCLIC LOAD

Some factors influencing losses are:

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 23 of 118

o Paralleling transformers, the greater number of transformers on the network the

2.10 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

• Increases in fault levels

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 24 of 118

2.11 PROTECTION, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION

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2.11.2 Design Criteria

Version: 1 Date of Issue: October 2007 Page 26 of 118