EUROCON 2007 The International Conference on Computer as a Tool Warsaw, September 9-12

Blackout Prevention
and Power System Self-Restoration
Dr.habil.sc.ing. Jekabs Barkans, Mg.sc.ing.Diana Zalostiba
Riga Technical University, the Institute of Power Engineering, Riga, Latvia, e-mail: diana@eef.rtu.lv

Abstract Blackouts of power systems occur in
transmission networks (TNs) as the result of dangerous
emergency overloading. These are followed by cascade
tripping of transmission lines and power plants and, finally,
by collapse of a power system. Since the known automatic
emergency protection means are insufficiently universal, the
authors propose an additional simple and reliable tool that
would allow for turning off such a collapse, with fast self-
restoration of normal operating condition within only ~ 100
seconds.
Keywords blackout prevention, island formation, power
system restoration, synchronization
emergency outage of a thermal power station occurred,
which resulted in damage of a 1000MW turbine [1].
Cascade processes develop very fast, with a speed that
exceeds many times the capability of personnel to
perceive the situation and think it over. As a result, people
can interfere in the process only in the post-emergency
stage in order to restore the operating condition. Therefore
for the power systems it is necessary to have emergency
protection automatics whose role would be to prevent the
beginning of a cascade process and its progress.
II. THE PROCESSES CAUSING COLLAPSE OF A PS AND THE
RESTORATION OF NORMAL OPERATING CONDITION

I. INTRODUCTION A. Initiation of a cascade process in the course of PS

A cascade-type emergency causing a power system
(PS) blackout is a problem of great concern. Such
emergency extends over large territories, leaving without
electricity hundreds of thousands or even millions
consumers creating serious disturbance of national
economy activities and inflicting heavy losses on it as well
as bringing the threat to the equipment. Thus, for example,
during the energy collapse of 1965 in the USA the
blackout
When analyzing the proceeding of major blackouts [1]-
[7] we have revealed that, at the emergency beginning, the
line overloading with active power flows that owes to the
fault of an important element gives rise to a cascade
process and a blackout of the power system (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Stages of a power system blackout

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 The process is expressed as follows.
Large-scale tripping of the lines resulting from
ground faults, with remaining damage inflicted by
sagging of the line wires;
Large-scale tripping of the generators from
overloading protection caused by the transit
voltage avalanche;
Large-scale tripping of the load caused by the
transit voltage avalanche.
Such cascade processes are the main cause of outages
of power plants in the stage of emergency beginning,
before the loss of stability occurs.
B. Large-scale tripping of the lines
With overloading, the temperature of wires increases,
which can become even higher when the weather is hot
and sunny. In turn, with the temperature of wires
increasing their sagging becomes greater. As the distance
to ground decreases the wires turn out to be laying on it
thus causing ground faults. A large-scale tripping of the
lines starts, at which the faults remain and the automatic
re-closing [ARC] is unsuccessful.
Thermal (the right quadrant) and mechanical (the left
quadrant) processes in the line wires are illustrated in Fig.
2, where the wire temperature is shown with accounting
for the air temperature ta (gray and black curves) and the
distance to ground h (given in meters) [6, 8, 9]. The values
of current are related to the allowable ones. A flashover
occurs before the wires have reached the ground.
C. Transit voltage avalanche and its impact on the
systems functioning
1) Types of the voltage avalanche
The voltage avalanches are stationary emergency
operating conditions at which the voltage considerably
decreases [10]. Three types of the voltage avalanche can
be distinguished:
ground tw conductors temperature, oC (2)
tw=60.9oC;
h=9.9m
tw=81.4oC;
h=8.9m
3 1
0 2 4 6 8 10
h distance to ground, m (3)
Fig. 2. Nomogram of the overload, the conductors temperature and the distance to ground
(the rated voltage Unom=750kV; allowable current I nom=860A at conductor temperature tm=70 C; conductor type - steel aluminum AC-4x400/93)
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The voltage avalanche of a load center, which occurs at
local load centers in the cases when the reactive power
source equivalent to the node possesses a negative
voltage dependence of reactive power (the power
decreases with decreasing voltage). The reactive power
balance in the node is stabilized by the load shedding
automatics responding to indicators of a voltage fall.
The accompanying voltage avalanche, which takes
place simultaneously with the frequency fall in the
active-power-deficient part of a power system, with this
part separating in the emergency order. The voltage fall
is in this case limited by the operation of load shedding
automatics [LSA] simultaneously with the frequency
stabilization. Obviously, this should be insensitive to
the voltage deviations.
The transit voltage avalanche, which establishes when
the voltage is decreasing along the transmission
network transit as the result of its emergency
overloading. Such an avalanche spreads to a wide
territory where many generating stations are operating.
2) Transit voltage avalanche
Avalanches of the kind are especially dangerous in the
cases when in the operating lines, owing to their
emergency overloading, a voltage fall in the TL transit
occurs, with disconnection of parallel lines and re-
distribution of active power flows. As a result, with the
increase in the transversal component of voltage drop
U=(PX/U) , and, simultaneously, the decrease in the
reactive power losses Q=(P2X/U2), there arise
additional reactive power flows and increase in the
longitudinal component of voltage drop U=(QX/U).
After that, on the power receiving side the voltage can
drop by 15-20% (see Fig. 3), where P1 and U1 are
allowable values while P2 corresponds to the overloading
and U2 has reached the emergency level.
350
ta=40oC
280
2
ta=20oC
210
140
70
12 14 0 0.4 0.8
Im1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8
I/Im overload, r.u. (1)
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Fig. 3. Schematic representation of a voltage avalanche
3) Large-scale tripping of generators
On the one hand the voltage instantaneously drops, in
an avalanche-wise way, to the values to which the
excitation regulators of generators at the nearby
generating stations respond by increasing the excitation
current above the rated values.
According to the Potier diagram, the excitation current
is [11]:
( a (U U 0 ) + k I r ) + ( k I a )2 ,
2
I ex =
where a and k are constants depending on the design
parameters of a generator,
Ia, Ir are the active and reactive currents of the
generators stator, relative units;
U, U0 are relatively the voltage on stator terminals and a
constant by means of which the characteristic curve of the
magnetization of a generators excitation system is
approximated, relative units;
At the constant active power the generators receive a
large reactive power:
( EU )2 ( Pk )2 U 2
Q ,
k authors can state that, using advanced and well-thought-
where P is the generator active power, relative units;
E is the variable electromotive force and U is the
voltage on the generator terminals, relative units. In this
case E and U change in the opposite directions and the
reactive power of the generators becomes maximally high.
Taking into consideration that the described situation
corresponds not to a transient process but to a stationary
condition, there is a long run excess of the stator and
excitation currents over the rated values. As a result, the
overloading protection of generators operate (that is,
protection against external damage), followed by their
switching off. Along with that a large-scale outages of
power plants in the low voltage zone occurs thus causing a
PS blackout.
4) Large-scale load tripping
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On the other hand, the voltage drop affects the load. It
is known that low voltage causes changes in consumption
in compliance with static characteristics of the load. In
addition, since a significant portion of the load is
connected through magnetic starters, these latter begin
disconnect in quantities, and the corresponding load is
lost. However, the load required for operation of thermal
stations should be not less than 40% of the rated capacity
of operating equipment. Therefore the load tripping can be
a serious obstacle to the operation of generating stations
thus promoting the disruption of the operating condition.
From the mentioned above it is clear that the technical
measures meant for avoidance of cascade processes must
be urgently realized, with the main purpose to keep the
lines and power plants in operation. Otherwise the loss of
stability and the separation of a power system in most
disadvantageous places and with serious complications are
inevitable. The measures should be radical, as daring and
simple as possible, directed to the liquidation of the line
overloading. If the maximum possible number of
generating stations is being kept in operation the parts of a
power system will be reconnected automatically within
few seconds.
D. Restoration of the normal work of a power system
The restoration of PS functioning can proceed in two
ways:
with personnel involvement, or
by self-restoration, without personnel
participation.
In the former case, after a severe cascade emergency
(1) against which no universal means exist, the restoration of
a power system is complicated owing to the absence of
voltage in large territories. The operations for which
electric energy sources are required cannot be performed.
For the power stations to resume operation it is necessary
to start the technological processes that consume a
relatively large power for their auxiliaries services. If in
the process of a power systems blackout there occurred
separation of some regions with formation of islands
where generating stations are still under operation, from
these stations energy is supplied to the idle-standing
stations putting them into operation step-by-step. In total,
to restore the functioning of a power system
approximately two days are needed.
Based on the analysis and their own experience the
(2)
over anti-emergency automatics, it is possible to avoid a
blackout in a PS, with the emergency elimination within
about two minutes without personnel participation.
III. CONDITIONS OF OVERLOAD APPEARANCE AND THEIR
CONTROL
A. Conditions of dangerous overload appearance
Analysis of the blackouts that occurred in the world
evidences that dangerous overloads often arise in the cases
when the (n-1) principle is neglected. It should be
provided that the power flows are limited in such a
manner that at tripping of one element the network is not
overloaded. There are cases when in an emergency
process several elements are tripped. Then for two
elements the condition becomes (n-2) (and so on).
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 Fig. 4. The structural scheme of events
The structural scheme of Fig. 4 shows different
situations of the kind.
The probability of coincidence in time for two
independent events is relatively low, therefore in practice
it is not taken into account when the problem of limiting
the power flows is concerned, since otherwise the carrying
capacity of lines would be used far too insufficiently.
The damage can be remaining, A, or transient, B. This
latter has the easiest consequences. If there is a
considerable time interval between disconnections, then in
the time between the first and the second disconnections it
is possible to repeat the (n-1) analysis under new
circumstances, and no emergency will start; otherwise a
cascade emergency could be expected.
It is natural that for fast analysis of an emergency a
real-time mathematical model should be used, with
involvement of analytic programs for normal and
emergency operating conditions [7, 8].
B. A real-time mathematical model
The model consists of the following components (most
of them already existing [2, 7, 12]):
1. a program for estimation of the situation, including
the elimination of the measurement error;
2. a program for determination of operating condition
worsening; the program defines the flows that are
maximum allowable for realizing the (n-1) principle;
3. a program for instructions, which gives verbal
instructions to the personnel under normal and pre-
emergency operating conditions
4. a program for simulation, which fixes the control
dozes for each of the possible emergency
disconnections in order not to allow the initiation of a
cascade emergency. The control doses are stored in
the models memory in the form of matrices
containing the degree of complexity of the initial
operating condition and its discrete changes. To each
initial scheme its own dosed matrix corresponds (see
(see Fig. 5).
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Fig. 5. Dosed matrices
C. Control doses
The optimal control doses in the normal operating
condition are fixed in the memory of the mathematical
model, but during an emergency they must be realized as
fast as possible. This can be ensured by using a logic
signal instantaneous operation channel which fixes a
particular disconnection. Such a logic signal produces an
appropriate dose and the address of its realization from the
model memory. For the logic signal to operate a special
high-frequency or a satellite channel should be used.
IV. THE SET OF ANTI-COLLAPSE AND SELF-RESTORATION
MEASURES FOR A POWER SYSTEM
A. The measures to be taken to avert a collapse
These measures should be taken in definite operating
conditions of a power system:
in normal operating conditions, which are protected
from emergency situations by proper safety measures;
pre-emergency operating conditions, which are set in
the cases when there is disconnection of an important
element indicating an overload although a dangerous
emergency has not yet started;
emergency operating conditions, when dangerous
emergency processes have already begun.
In turn, the measures to be applied for the control of
these operating conditions can be divided as follows (see
Fig. 6):
organizational measures, connected with the personnel
activities, in compliance with the written or electronic
instructions. Such instructions should be corresponding
to the operation speed of a person and to the choice
limitations. In order to raise the reliability, the
execution of instructions can be made partly automatic.
In the normal operating condition they are used in a
routine way, whereas in the pre-emergency condition
the programs are needed that would issue instructions
for urgent actions under changed circumstances;
technical measures that are unavoidable in the
emergency operating conditions, when the events
develop too fast to be controlled with the personnel
operational speed, so a collapse can be averted only by
 fast-acting means not requiring personnel participation. TABLE I.
POWER DISTRIBUTION COEFFICIENTS
The personnel can be involved in the process at the
post-emergency stage only. It should be noted that the Power sources at the load centers
use of technical measures for limitation of power flows 1 2 3 4 5
increases the carrying capacity of PS cross-section. 11 12 13 14 15
1
B. Organizational measures (Fig. 6) 2 21 22 ... ... ...

The power flows in dangerous cross-sections, when
acting up on the load of power stations under normal
operating conditions, are continuously controlled and
limited. The extent of power flow limitation depends on
the topology of transmission network.
In the case when the TN cross-section consisting of
parallel lines has a radial structure, the power flow should
not exceed the value
P = Ptr .k / n ,
In this expression n is the number of lines in a network
fragment;
k is the number of still operating lines , (k/n<1);
Ptr is the allowable power flow in transit lines.
Thus, for example, if the NT cross-section consists of
two lines and one of them is disconnected the power flow
should be equal to a half of the allowable value
(P=1/2Ptr). If the network fragment contains three
parallel lines, then disconnecting one of them we will
have a power flow reduced by up to two thirds
(P=2/3Ptr). This means that, from reasons of the carrying
capacity of wires, the power flow through dangerous
network cross-sections should be smaller than the
allowable.
If a transit possesses a loop-wise topology, then for the
power flow in the still operating part of a PS
approximately defined coefficients exist, which show
what portion of the power to be received from the load
centers is flowing through a corresponding line. The
coefficients can form a matrix whose members are
arranged in the d.c. configuration of the network
impedances.
Lines
3 31 ... ... ... ...
4 41 ... ... ... ...
5 51 ... ... ... ...
The columns of the table in which the power or its
changes are inputted correspond to the load centers, and
its rows to the power lines. In the intersections,
(3) distribution coefficients ij are written, where i stands for
the power lines and j for the power sources. Thus, for
example, at 35=0.4 through line 3 a 40% portion of
active power P5 or its change P5 is flowing, with the
power in this line changing by 0.4P5.
As concerns a loop-wise network, the power flow
limitations are determined there by all the lines of
dangerous cross-section, where one should take into
account possible equalizing flows and mutual influence of
different cross-sections. Besides, the limitations in one
dangerous cross-section can influence those in other cross-
sections. In practice, for determination of power
distribution coefficients one should use a mathematical
model of the operating condition in a PS functioning in
real time.
If the power flow limitations are observed, the
disconnection of one element would not cause a cascade
emergency, however, in this case there will be worsening
in the operating condition which will then correspond to a
pre-emergency operating condition. Such being the case,
urgent organizational measures should be taken, using
instructions or the data obtained with the help of a real-
time mathematical model.

Fig. 6. The break-down of anti-emergency measures depending on the PS operating conditions

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 A major technical and economic problem is
enlargement of the carrying capacity in dangerous TN
cross-sections. If for elimination of a cascade emergency
automatic means are used, then, by providing conditions
for their faultless operation, we can partly take off the
power flow limitations as compared with the TN carrying
capacity under normal operating conditions.
C. Technical measures (Fig. 6)
The only possibility to prevent the development of a
cascade emergency is a timely elimination of the line
overloading. This could be achieved by using fast-
operating preventive automatics devised for this purpose.
The overloading can be avoided by reducing the power
generation on the output side of the dangerous cross-
section or by reducing the load on its receiving side.
Fast generation decrease can be achieved by switching
off the functioning generators or realizing a forced load
relief of turbines at the generating stations. Taking into
account that the hydro power plants are in operation only
for a short time and that the operation of nuclear plants
should not be disturbed if possible, the tripping usually
concerns the condensation thermal plants if they are
situated close to the lines to be off-loaded. For example, if
the line off-loading should be P, for the electric plants it
is (1/) P. This means that at =0.35, the off-loading
for electric plants should be 2.85P, which is often
problematic.
For a load relief of a dangerous cross-section
employing the means related to the power receiving side it
is possible to put into operation reserve generators, which
would be switched on and take load within several
minutes (for their starting and synchronization), which is
effective in the case when in a TN there is not an
emergency but a pre-emergency operating condition. In
the opposite case it is necessary to shed the load exploiting
the central channel; however, in this case the power
proportioning task will not be carried out.
For the cases when it is difficult to use the mentioned
tools, the authors propose a new universal means a
preventive short-term sectioning of a power system.
To obtain greater insight into this approach one more
type of cascade emergency that of frequency avalanche
should be considered.
D. Frequency emergency and the means for its
prevention
A frequency emergency takes place at separation of the
power deficient regions of PS.
1) Response of generating stations to a frequency
avalanche
The response of generating stations on a frequency drop
is mainly determined by the peculiarities of the feeding
pumps working against backpressure used for the boilers.
The output of these pumps depends on the turns of motors.
If the turning (the rotational speed) of electric motors
slows down by 10% the yield decreases to the extent
dictated by the pressure drop in the boilers followed by
their switching off by the means of technological
protection, the outage of generating stations and the
collapse of the deficient part of power system.
The frequency decline affects also the operating
condition of nuclear plants. The circulation pumps of a
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reactor are also functioning against backpressure and their
peculiarities are similar to those of feeding pumps. Under
the conditions of frequency drop the circulation slows
down, which hinders quenching the active zone and leads
to forced decline in the output of generating stations
followed by inevitable impact on the power balance.
The response of gas turbines to the frequency changes
is determined by the output of the compressor on a
turbines spindle. The compressor supplies air under
pressure into a combustion chamber and for the cooling of
turbine blades. At the increasing frequency the
compressor output also decreases, with the combustion
product temperature rising. In order not to exceed the
allowable temperature the turbines must be off-loaded,
which, in turn, affects the frequency. This should be taken
into account when estimating the sizes of automatic load
shedding. In particular cases, under emergency conditions
the turbines are switched off which promotes collapse.
2) Automatic elimination of a frequency avalanche
and restoration of normal operating conditions
To avoid a collapse, the frequency is to be kept for a
short time in a zone that is acceptable for generating
stations to maintain their work. This can be achieved by
means of the fast-acting under-frequency load shedding
automatics [AUFLS1] (V) which disconnects the
consumer lines at the frequency reaching setting values.
This allows for recovery of the power balance and
maintenance of the frequency in order to avoid rejection
of feeding pumps. The automatics has the minimum time
settings (0.5-0.1s) and various frequency settings, and,
owing to the inertial time constant, at comparatively small
deficits (up to 25-30%) the selectivity of load shedding
will be ensured.
at ng
o m zi
s
ic
ut li
A oca
L
Fig. 7. A simplified scheme of automatic operation under emergency
conditions (V AUFLS1; VI AUFLS2; VII synchronization;IX re-
closing of previously disconnected lines; 5 reduced frequency)
At larger deficits the selectivity cannot completely be
ensured any more, but it is not especially important at
occasional emergency events, since the disconnection of
consumers lines is only short-term.
The AUFLS1 action is followed by short-term reduced
frequency (Fig. 7, (5)). A long-term operation with
reduced frequency unfavorably influences the electric
machines, makes the operating conditions labile and is
dangerous since the power balance can be violated again
under the conditions of reduced generating capacities.
It is known that the electric machines working to the
grid possess a definite relationship between the induction
and voltage (emf) of magnetic field, which reads:
U
B= , (4)
2 f kw w s
 where f is the frequency, Hz;
kw is the coefficient characterizing the winding design;
w is the number of winding turns;
s is the core cross-section, m2.
Therefore, the induction of the cores is directly
proportional to the voltage and inversely proportional to
the frequency. With increasing voltage the cores of
electric machines become overexcited, and their magnetic
permeability (=B/H). Taking into account that the
reluctance of the cores is inversely proportional to the
magnetic permeability (Rmagn=c/), the leakage field
grows, which causes overheating of massive design
elements. These circumstances are taken into account by
limiting the existence time for reduced frequency (Fig. 8),
which is performed automatically. Otherwise it would be
necessary to employ special protection devices with the
response time depending on the integral values of voltage
and frequency deviations: t1=f1(U) and t2=f2(f).
In order to reset the frequency to the normal level an
additional disconnection of consumers is done using
automatic stages of slow automatic under frequency load
shedding [AUFLSII] with delays of few seconds, (VI),
which by means of the process control elements perform
in turn retiming the failure setting at the normal frequency
level thus ensuring that there is feedback. Then automatic
reconnection of the power systems parts, (VII), occurs
with the help of the devices for synchro-monitoring
available all over the lines. After that the re-closing of the
automatically controlled consumers line, (IX), is done.
The duration of the self-restoration is approximately 100s,
which is determined by the time of AUFLSII operation.
The load is usually restored within 10-15 minutes after the
connection of magnetic circuit-breakers at the consumers.
Therefore for the cases of frequency emergency a
reliable self-restoration principle has been created to be
used for localization and liquidation of heavy cascade
blackouts [13,14].
E. Short-term preventive sectioning
Separation of a deficient region leads to a frequency
decrease there, while in a power system part with
excessive power the load shedding occurs. The proposed
approach of short-term preventive sectioning allows for
load relief in the overloaded line.
For this purpose, under normal condition the region
should be watched that receives energy via dangerous
cross-sections of a TN, and, if necessary, to preventively
separate it for a short time at preliminarily defined optimal
places. The restoration of normal functioning proceeds
following the mentioned algorithm (see Fig. 9).
In the deficient region the off-loading will take place,
up to the complete frequency recovery, the
synchronization of the separated power system parts, and
re-closing of consumers lines after about 100 s. In such a
way the emergency will be eliminated.
As a result, the dangerous overloading will be
eliminated and the lines will keep operation with
allowable load. In such a way it is possible to avert a
cascade lines disconnection owing to their stable damage,
large-scale tripping of generating stations caused by
overloading of the generators at reduced voltages and
tripping of the boilers caused by load disappearance as
well as stability loss followed by spontaneous division of
a power system into parts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Cascade emergencies causing blackouts of PS occur
as a consequence of overload in transmission lines at
disconnection of major PS elements. The only way to
avert such an emergency is fast-acting automatic load
shedding in a line using the centralized preventive load
relief system.
VIII
g
z in s 6
c a li a tic
Lo tom
Au
5
Re omat
Au

4
sto ics
t

VI
rin

IV V
g

VII
III
3 IX
II

N
2 Co o r
I nd ma
ent tics

iti l
ive

on
Pr oma
t
v
Au

1
e

Fig. 9. The operation scheme of protection automatics (I static stability

control; II dynamic stability control; III preventive short-term
isolating of the deficient region; IV automatics for interrupting out-of-
step operation; V AUFLS1; VI AUFLS2; VII synchronization; VIII
line disconnection at voltage rise indications; IX re-closing of
previously disconnected lines; 1 static stability faults; 2 dynamic
stability faults; 3 out-of-step operation; 4 frequency drop
Fig. 8. Time limits of core overexcitation avalanche; 5 reduced frequency; 6 voltage rise avalanche)

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 2. If possible, for the load relief the tripping of [3] State of New York Investigation, Report on the New York City
generators or fast-acting off-loading of turbines on the Blackout July 13, 1977, January 1978
receiving side of TN cross-section; on the output side this [4] UCTE, Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the 28
September 2003 Blackout in Italy, April 2004 (http://
can be done with the help of a central channel. The
www.ucte.org/pdf/News/20040427_UCTE_IC_Final_report. pdf)
mentioned means are often unavailable or difficult to
[5] RTE, A4 Annex 4: Major Incidents throughout the World, 2004
proportionate. (http://www.rte-
3. For self-elimination of a frequency avalanche france.com/htm/an/mediatheque/telecharge/memento_surete_2004
emergency within ~ 100s without personnel participation /memento_surete_2004_annexe4__.pdf)
simple techniques have been developed and used, whose [6] J.Barkans and D.Zalostiba, New Principles of Power System
effectiveness is proved by long-term operation. They can Protection against Collapse in the Present Stage of Development,
Latvian Journal of Physics and Tehnical Sciences. Latvia, vol. 3,
be used for protection against power system collapse, by pp. 3-22, 2006.
preventive short-term separation of a power system region [7] S.Sovalov, Anti-emergency Control in Power Systems Moscow:
towards which the TL overloading power flows. Energoatomizdat, 1988 (in Russian).
[8] A.Zalessky, Electrical Power Transmission Moscow:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT Gosenergoizdat, 1948 (in Russian).
This work has been partly supported by the European [9] A.Vanags, Electrical Networks and Systems Riga: RTU, 2002
(in Latvian).
Social Fund within the National Programme, in the
framework of the project Support for the development of [10] J.Barkan, Automatization of the Operating Conditions by Voltage
and Reactive Power, Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1984 (in
doctoral and post-doctoral studies at Riga Technical Russian).
University. [11] J.Barkan and L.Orehov, Automatization of Power Systems,
Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 1981.
REFERENCES [12] B.Iofyev, Automatic Emergency Power Control in Energy
[1] The Federal Power Commission, Report to the President on the Systems Moscow: Energia, 1974 (in Russian).
Power Failure in the Northeastern united States and the Province [13] J.Barkan, N.Markushevych, R.Rudzitis, V.Golubev, Frequency-
of Ontario on November 9-10, 1965 Activated Load Shedding as an Automatic Anti-Emergency
[2] U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on Means, Elektrycheskye Stancii (Electric Power Stations), vol.5,
the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada, 1966 (in Russian).
April 2004 (www.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/media/docs/final/ [14] J.Barkans, J.Vasylyevs, Patent LV13341 B: Operational Method
finalrep_e.htm ) of Automatic Equipment to Prevent the Power System in Case of
Emergency, Latvia, 2005.

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