VICENTE M. COLEONGCO V.
REGALADO AND HELD:
LEONOR MONTILLA (G.R. No. L-4529 )
FACTS:
Prior to September 1944, Pedro F. Regalado was
the owner of lot No. 1205-A situated at barrio
Mandalagan, Bacolod, Province of Negros
Occidental, of which lot No. 157 was a portion. In
this lot, a building was erected which was being
occupied by the forces of the Japanese Army in
September 1944. Within that month, Regalado sold
lot No. 157 to Vicente M. Coleongco who thus
became the owner of the said property. The total
area of the lot was 1,000 square meters, and the
land occupied by the house was 245 square
meters.
Until the year of 1947, the assessed value of the
whole lot and the house was P1,156 and P4,500,
respectively. It appears from the records that
Coleongco contended that the house erected on lot
157 was included in the sale to him of this
property, and when the City of Bacolod was
liberated by the American Forces that succeeded
the Japanese and occupied said house for about
two months, he received from the local office of
the AFWESPAC as rentals the sum of $93.75 or
P137.50. However, after the American Forces
vacated the house, Regalado occupied the same.
As a result, Coleongco instituted a case at the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 21, 1947, a decision was made stating
that the improvement of lot No. 157, consisting of
a residential house, was the property of the
defendant Regalado. From that decision Coleongco
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but on August
28, 1947, this tribunal declared the appeal
abandoned. Issue Whether or not Coleongco is
precluded from instituting ejectment proceedings
against the defendants.
No. A perusal of the record discloses that the
present action for ejectment was instituted on July
21, 1947, before plaintiff's appeal in Case No. 185
was finally declared abandoned in the Court of
Appeals, and the fact that in said case Coleongco
unsuccessfully claimed to be the owner of the
house in litigation does not preclude his right to
depart from his former contention and to institute
these ejectment proceedings to compel the
defendants to vacate his lot and to remove there
from the building which at first he maintained to
be his, and to further demand payment of the
corresponding rentals for the occupancy of the lot
by said building from September, 1944, when he
bought the property, up to the time said building is
actually removed, except, of course, for the period
that he might have occupied or used that building.
But the record is silent about such use and all
indications are that from September of 1944, the
house was first occupied by the Japanese, then by
the American Forces, after liberation, and right
afterwards in September of 1945 by defendant
Regalado himself and by his successors in interest.
The lower court, however, sentenced the
defendants to pay rents from September, 1945,
and as plaintiff has not appealed from that ruling,
We can only consider the adequacy of the amount
fixed by the court as rentals from September, 1945.
VDA DE AVILES v CA
November 21, 1996
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles family has been in actual
possession of a parcel of land described as a
fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential
land, situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan
since 1957. This property is his share in the estate
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of his deceased parents. The respective areas
allotted to them had been agreed upon and
were measured before the execution of the
agreement. Because he had several children to
support, Eduardo asked for a bigger share and
Camilo agreed to have a smaller area.
Eduardo mortgaged the property with the Rural
Bank and Phil. National Bank branch in Lingayen.
When the property was inspected by a bank
representative, Eduardo, in the presence of the
boundary owners (defendant Camilo Aviles,
Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio
Joaquin) pointed to the inspector the existing
earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the
property and nobody objected.
The real estate mortgage was foreclosed and
the property was sold at public auction, but it
was redeemed by plaintiffs mother and the land
was subsequently transferred and declared in her
name.In 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles moved
the earthen dikes and constructed a bamboo
fence on the northern portion of Eduardos
property, thereby molesting and disturbing the
peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said
portion. Petitioners filed this special civil action for
quieting of title.
TC: dismissed the complaint
CA: affirmed TC decision, reasoning that a special
civil action for quieting of title is not the proper
remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and
that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead.
ISSUE: WON a complaint for quieting of title is not
the proper remedy but rather it should be a case
for ejectment
HELD:
YES. The facts presented unmistakably constitute
a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not
cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title. To
avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a
plaintiff must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real
property.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon a title to real property or any
interest therein.
Petitioners failed to point out any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that
could been a cloud to their title. In fact, both
plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of
the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and
in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted
to them and that the only controversy is whether
these lands were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the
proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and
that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry,
whenever warranted by the period prescribed in
Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also
within the prescribed period, may be availed of by
the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary
dispute may be fully threshed out.
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In this case, the only controversy is whether these
lands were properly measured. There is no adverse
claim by the defendant which constitutes a cloud
thereon. Documents (those executed by private
respondent and his brothers, as well as the
Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by
petitioner Anastacia of the subject property in a
foreclosure sale) in no way constitute a cloud
or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners.
Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties
failure to situate and fix the boundary between
their respective properties.
Petition DENIED and decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
[FULL TEXT]
RUFINA SALAO and LUCIO LUCAS vs. TEOFILO C.
SANTOS
MORAN, J.:
The present action was instituted by plaintiffs
Rufina Salao and Lucio Lucas, now appellants, to
restrain the defendant, Teofilo C. Santos, as
municipal president of Malabon, Rizal, from
enforcing compliance with his letter of October 22,
1935, wherein said plaintiffs were directed to
observe he requirements of ordinance No. 23,
series of 1929, of said municipality, on the matter
of the operation of their smoked fish factory
(umbuyan). The ordinance reads in part as follows:
ARTICULO 1. Se prohibe terminantemente la
fabricacion de toda materia, objeto de industria
que requiere el uso de combustible en edificios que
no sean de materiales fuertes con techo de hierro
galvanizado o de teja.
ART. 2. Todos los propietarios administradores,
industriales o encargados de todo edificio, camarin
o local destinado para la fabricacion de cualquier
articulo de materia prima que requiere el uso de
combustibles para su transformacion en materias
alimenticias o de otra industria, proveeran el
edificio, camarin o local destinado al efecto de una
chimenea o tubo de escape que sera de metal o de
hierro galvanizado o de carbon y tendra una altura
adecuada, de modo que el humo, carbon o chispas
que despiden no perjudique a los edificios
contiguos, ni constituyen el mayor peligro de
conflagracion.
ART. 3. Para los efectos de esta ordenanza, toda
fabricacion de ladrillos, alfareria o cal, trituracion,
molienda o quema de piedras, huesos o conchas, la
fabricacion de fosforos y otros negocios de caracter
antihigienicos, nocivo, ofensivo o peligroso,
guardaran una distancia de 40 metros de las casas
o edificios contiguos; y la fabricacion de materias
alimenticias asi como tambien la quema de los
desperdicios de tabacos, guardaran una distancia
de 20 metros de las casas o edificios a su alrededor.
...
The evidence discloses that for many years prior to
the enactment of this ordinance, plaintiffs had
already established a smoked fish factory in the
barrio of Baritan, Malabon, Rizal, and had
continually operated the same since then. On
October 30, 1933, Lucio Lucas, one of the plaintiffs
herein, was criminally prosecuted in the justice of
the peace court of Malabon for non-compliance
with the requirements of the ordinance
aforementioned, but was acquitted to the charge.
Thereafter, the intervenor herein, Eligio Gozon.
whose house is situated near the smoked fish
factory of the appellants, denounced said factory
as a nuisance, by lodging a complaint in the central
office of the Bureau of Health seeking relief against
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its continuance. An investigation was then
conducted by the health authorities, and as a result
thereof it was found that appellants' smoked fish
factory was being operated not in accordance with
the requirements of said ordinance. Whereupon,
the Bureau of Health and the district health office
took steps to enforce the ordinance and to that
effect the president of the sanitary division of the
municipality addressed a letter to one of the
plaintiffs, requesting compliance therewith.
Compliance was refused on the ground that said
plaintiff was not within the purview of the
ordinance in accordance with the decision of the
justice of the peace court above stated. The health
authorities then addressed themselves to the
municipal president who, for some reason or
another, failed or omitted to act on the matter.
Accordingly, the Department of the Interior, on the
application of Eligio Gozon, intervened, and after
several exchanges of correspondence with the
provincial governor, the municipal president was
required to enforce the order of the health
authorities. Consequently, the municipal president
addressed to one of the plaintiffs herein the letter
of October 22, 1935, aforementioned., requiring
the latter to comply with the ordinance of 1929
within 30 days on threat of having his license
revoked. On October 10, 1935, however, the
municipal council of Malabon had already enacted
ordinance No. 10, series of 1935, amending
ordinance No. 23 of 1929, the pertinent provisions
of which follow:
ARTICLE I. Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, is
hereby amended by adding a new article thereto
which reads as follows:
"Art. 3-(3). That this ordinance shall be effective
only with regard to those that will be established
after the approval hereof, and shall not be
applicable to those already operating at the time of
the approval of this ordinance."
ARTICLE II. The effectivity of this ordinance shall
retroact to the date of the approval of ordinance
No. 23, series of 1929.
Plaintiffs, in view of the president's order,
instituted the present action for injunction to
restrain him from enforcing his order. The trial
court dismissed the action. Hence, this appeal.
It is not disputed that appellants' smoked fish
factory was established long before the enactment
of the ordinance in question. Municipal ordinances,
like all statutes, are to be construed as having only
prospective operation unless the intention to give
them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. There
is nothing in the ordinance showing the intention
to give it a retrospective effect. On the contrary, it
expressly refers to "fabrica o negocio que se ha de
levantar" and not to factories already established.
That such was the intention of the ordinance of
1929 is confirmed by ordinance No. 10 of 1935,
which expressly provides that the amended
ordinance "shall not be applicable to those already
operating at the time of the approval" of the same.
This amendatory ordinance is valid, despite the
allegation to the effect that the municipal
president intended its enactment for the
protection of appellants and to frustrate the order
of the health authorities. Whatever might have
been the personal motives of the municipal
president, no improper motive can be attributed to
the municipal council in its enactment, and,
therefore, the same stands as the expression of the
true intention of the body. Besides, this
amendatory ordinance was duly approved by the
provincial board in its resolution No. 1874.
Moreover, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per
se and nuisance per accidens. The first is
recognized as a nuisance under any and all
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circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
menace to public health or safety, and, for that
reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity. The second is that
which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether
such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
(Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal
Council of Iloilo, 24 Phil., 471; Monteverde vs.
Generoso, 52 Phil., 123, 127.) Appellants' smoked
fish factory is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry. If it be, in fact, a nuisance due
to the manner of its operation, then it would be
merely a nuisance per accidens. (Iloilo Ice and Cold
Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra;
Monteverde vs. Generoso, supra.) Consequently,
the order of the municipal president and those of
the health authorities issued with a view to the
summary abatement of what they have concluded,
by their own findings, as a nuisance, are null and
void there having been no hearing in court to the
effect.

Judgment is reversed, with costs against appellees.