Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The core issue of the instant petition hinges on whether petitioners action In Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,[15] the Court differentiated two
for reconveyance has prescribed. The resolution of this issue calls for a kinds of implied trusts, to wit:
determination of whether an implied trust was constituted over the
disputed properties when Jose, the trustee, registered them in his name. x x x In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These
Petitioner insists that an express trust was constituted over the disputed two are differentiated from each other as follows:
properties; thus the registration of the disputed properties in the name of
Jose as trustee cannot give rise to prescription of action to prevent the Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
recovery of the disputed properties by the beneficiary against the trustee. consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They
Evidently, Julianas testamentary intent was to constitute an express trust arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a
over her paraphernal properties which was carried out when transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title
the Fideicomiso was established in S.P. No. 706.[12] However, the disputed but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On
properties were expressly excluded from the Fideicomiso. The probate court the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity
adjudicated the disputed properties to Jose as the sole heir of Juliana. If a in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment.
mistake was made in excluding the disputed properties from They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse
the Fideicomiso and adjudicating the same to Jose as sole heir, the mistake of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought
was not rectified as no party appeared to oppose or appeal the exclusion of not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[16]
the disputed properties from the Fideicomiso. Moreover, the exclusion of
the disputed properties from the Fideicomiso bore the approval of the A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the
probate court. The issuance of the probate courts order adjudicating the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction but
disputed properties to Jose as the sole heir of Juliana enjoys the not expressed in the deed itself.[17] Specific examples of resulting trusts may
presumption of regularity.[13] be found in the Civil Code, particularly Arts.
1448,[18] 1449,[19] 1451,[20] 1452[21] and 1453.[22]
On the premise that the disputed properties were
the paraphernal properties of Juliana which should have been included in A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a direct intention
the Fideicomiso, their registration in the name of Jose would be erroneous to create a trust, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of
and Joses possession would be that of a trustee in an implied trust. Implied justice and to prevent unjust enrichment.[23] It is raised by equity in respect
trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the of property, which has been acquired by fraud, or where although acquired
nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by the
the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of person holding it.[24] Constructive trusts are illustrated in Arts.
the particular intention of the parties.[14] 1450,[25] 1454,[26] 1455[27] and 1456.[28]
The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso at the outset.
The provision on implied trust governing the factual milieu of this case is Jose registered the disputed properties in his name partly as his conjugal
provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which states: share and partly as his inheritance from his wife Juliana, which is the
complete reverse of the claim of the petitioner, as the new trustee, that the
properties are intended for the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso.
Furthermore, the exclusion of the disputed properties from petitioners claim that no overt acts of repudiation may be attributed to
the Fideicomiso was approved by the probate court and, subsequently, by Jose. It may not be amiss to state that in the project of partition submitted
the trial court having jurisdiction over the Fideicomiso. The registration of to the probate court, Jose had indicated that the disputed properties were
the disputed properties in the name of Jose was actually pursuant to a court conjugal in nature and, thus, excluded from Julianas Fideicomiso. This act is
order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed properties clearly tantamount to repudiating the trust, at which point the period for
to Jose created a mere implied trust of the constructive variety in favor of prescription is reckoned.
the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso. In any case, the rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership
over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust
Now that it is established that only a constructive trust was constituted over applies only to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in
the disputed properties, may prescription for the recovery of the properties constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee
supervene? does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is
not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.[31] Thus,
Petitioner asserts that, if at all, prescription should be reckoned only when for the purpose of counting the ten-year prescriptive period for the action
respondents caused the registration of the disputed properties in their to enforce the constructive trust, the reckoning point is deemed to be on 15
names on 13 April 1984and not on 15 September 1969, when Jose September 1969 when Jose registered the disputed properties in his name.
registered the same in his name pursuant to the probate courts order
adjudicating the disputed properties to him as the sole heir of Juliana. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
Petitioner adds, proceeding on the premise that the prescriptive period decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34086 are
should be counted from the repudiation of the trust, Jose had not AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
performed any act indicative of his repudiation of the trust or otherwise
declared an adverse claim over the disputed properties. SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, the ten-year prescriptive period to recover the disputed
property must be counted from its registration in the name of Jose on 15
September 1969, when petitioner was charged with constructive notice that
Jose adjudicated the disputed properties to himself as the sole heir of Juana
and not as trustee of the Fideicomiso.
It should be pointed out also that Jose had already indicated at the outset
that the disputed properties did not form part of the Fideicomiso contrary to
THIRD DIVISION complaint a Joint Affidavit[3] executed on May 10, 1979 by Isidro Catandijan
and MaximinaCaezo attesting to her acquisition of theproperty.
SOLEDAD CAEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAEZO G.R. No. 148788
and VICTORIANO CAEZO In her complaint, the petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of land in
Petitioners, Present: 1939 from CrisogonoLimpiado, although the transaction was not reduced
into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the property.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she entrusted the
Chairperson, said land to her father, Crispulo[4] Rojas, who took possession of, and
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, cultivated, the property. In 1980, she found out that the respondent, her
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the
NACHURA, and same. She also discovered that the tax declaration over the property was
REYES, JJ. already in the name of Crispulo Rojas.[5]
CONCEPCION ROJAS, Promulgated: In her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the petitioners
Respondent. claim, it was her husband, Crispulo Rojas, who bought the property from
November 23, 2007 CrisogonoLimpiado in 1948, which accounts for the tax declaration being in
Crispulos name. From then on, until his death in 1978, Crispulo possessed
and cultivated the property. Upon his death, the property was included in
his estate, which was administered by a special administrator,
BienvenidoRicafort. The petitioner, as heir, even received her share in the
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x produce of the estate. The respondent further contended that the
petitioner ought to have impleaded all of the heirs as defendants. She also
DECISION argued that the fact that petitioner filed the complaint only in 1997 means
that she had already abandoned her right over the property.[6]
NACHURA, J.:
On July 3, 1998, after hearing, the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of the
petitioner, thus:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 7, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53236, and Resolution
dated May 9, 2001. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds a preponderance of
evidence in favor of plaintiff Soledad Caezo and against defendant
Concepcion Rojas by declaring plaintiff the true and lawful owner of the
land more particularly described under paragraph 5 of the complaint and
On January 29, 1997, petitioner Soledad Caezo filed a Complaint[2] for the hereby orders defendant Concepcion Rojas:
recovery of real property plus damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Naval, Biliran, against her fathers second wife, respondent Concepcion a) To vacate and surrender possession of the land to
Rojas. The subject property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 plaintiff;
square meters, situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran. Caezo attached to the b) To pay plaintiff the sum of P34,000.00 actual
damages, P10,000.00 for attorneys fees
and litigation expenses; and evidence on record showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner
c) To pay the costs. from the property. The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads as
follows:
SO ORDERED.[7]
The respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Further, ordering defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas and all persons
Naval, Biliran. On October 12, 1998, the RTC reversed the MTC decision on claiming rights or interest under her to vacate and surrender possession of
the ground that the action had already prescribed and acquisitive the land aforecited to the plaintiff or any of her authorized representatives,
prescription had set in. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: Ordering the Provincial and/or Municipal Assessors Office to cancel the
present existing Tax Declaration in the name of Heirs of Crispolo Rojas
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Trial Court referring to the above-described property in favor of the name of Soledad
of Naval, Biliran awarding ownership of the disputed land to the plaintiff Rojas Vda. De Caezo, Ordering the defendant-appellant Concepcion Rojas to
and further allowing recovery of damages is hereby REVERSED in toto. There pay the plaintiff-appellee the sum of P34,000.00 in actual damages, and to
is no award of damages. pay for the loss of her share in money value of the products of the coconuts
of said land from 1979 to 1997 and to pay further until the case is
The said property remains as the legitime of the defendant Concepcion terminated at the rate of P200.00 per quarter based on the regular
Rojas and her children. remittances of the late Crispolo Rojas to the plaintiff-appellee, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
SO ORDERED.[11]
The CA held that the petitioners inaction for several years casts a serious The petitioner insists that the respondents petition for review before the CA
doubt on her claim of ownership over the parcel of land. It noted that 17 was filed out of time. The petitioner posits that the CA may not grant an
years lapsed since she discovered that respondent was in adverse additional extension of time to file the petition except for the most
possession of the property before she instituted an action to recover the compelling reason. She contends that the fact that respondents counsel
same. And during the probate proceedings, the petitioner did not even needed additional time to secure the certified copy of his annexes cannot be
contest the inclusion of the property in the estate of Crispulo Rojas. [13] considered as a compelling reason that would justify an additional period of
extension. She admits, though, that this issue was raised for the first time in
The CA was convinced that Crispulo Rojas owned the property, having their motion for reconsideration, but insists that it can be raised at any time
bought the same from CrisogonoLimpiado in 1948. Supporting this since it concerns the jurisdiction of the CA over the petition.
conclusion, the appellate court cited the following circumstances: (1) the
property was declared for taxation purposes in Crispulos name and he had The petitioner further posits that prescription and laches are unavailing
been paying the taxes thereon from 1948 until his death in 1978; (2) because there was an express trust relationship between the petitioner and
Crispulo adversely possessed the same property from 1948 until his death in Crispulo Rojas and his heirs, and express trusts do not prescribe. Even
1978; and (3) upon his death in 1978, the property was included in his assuming that it was not an express trust, there was a resulting trust which
estate, the proceeds of which were distributed among his heirs.[14] generally does not prescribe unless there is repudiation by the trustee.
For her part, the respondent argues that the petitioners are now estopped
The CA further held that, assuming that there was an implied trust between from questioning the CA Resolution granting her second motion for
the petitioner and her father over the property, her right of action to extension to file the petition for review. She notes that the petitioner did
recover the same would still be barred by prescription since 49 years had not raise this issue in the comment that she filed in the CA. In any case, the
already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the contested property in grant of the second extension of time was warranted considering that the
1948.[15] certified true copy of the assailed RTC orders did not arrive at the office of
respondents counsel in Cebu City in time for the filing of the petition.
On May 9, 2001, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.[16]
On the merits, the respondent asserts that the complaint is barred by
In this petition for review, the petitioner, substituted by her heirs, assigns prescription, laches and estoppel. From 1948 until his death in 1978,
the following errors: Crispulo cultivated the property and was in adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner. It took the A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
petitioner 49 years from 1948 before she filed the complaint for recovery of ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such
the property in 1997. Granting that it was only in 1980 that she found out property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
that the respondent adversely possessed the property, still petitioner performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
allowed 17 years to elapse before she asserted her alleged right over the latter.[21] Trusts are either express or implied.[22] Express trusts are those
property. which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some
writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a
Finally, the respondent maintains that the other co-owners are trust.[23] Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
indispensable parties to the case; and because they were not impleaded, deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or,
the case should be dismissed. independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
The petition has no merit. equity.[24] An implied trust may either be a resulting trust or a constructive
trust.
On the procedural issue raised by the petitioner, we find no reversible error
in the grant by the CA of the second motion for extension of time to file the It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire
respondents petition. The grant or denial of a motion for extension of by prescription a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the
time is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[18] The CA obviously trust.[25] The following discussion is instructive:
considered the difficulty in securing a certified true copy of the assailed
decision because of the distance between the office of respondents counsel
and the trial court as a compelling reason for the request. In the absence of There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership
any showing that the CA granted the motion for extension capriciously, such of property entrusted to him, or that an action to compel a trustee to
exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by this Court. convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of
the cestuique trust does not prescribe, or that the defense of
On the second issue, the petitioner insists that her right of action to recover prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a
the property cannot be barred by prescription or laches even with the person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property held in trust can
respondents uninterrupted possession of the property for 49 years because be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.
there existed between her and her father an express trust or a resulting
trust. Indeed, if no trust relations existed, the possession of the property by That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
the respondent, through her predecessor, which dates back to 1948, would possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not
already have given rise to acquisitive prescription in accordance with Act acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act
No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure).[19] Under Section 40 of Act No. 190, an 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
action for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be continuing and subsisting trust."
brought only within ten years after the cause of action accrues. This period
coincides with the ten-year period for acquisitive prescription provided The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in
under Section 41[20] of the same Act. trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not
Thus, the resolution of the second issue hinges on our determination of the repudiated the trust.
existence of a trust over the property --- express or implied --- between the
petitioner and her father. x xxx
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the certainty. It cannot rest on vague, uncertain or indefinite declarations. An
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust inference of intention to create a trust, predicated only on circumstances,
where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation can be made only where they admit of no other interpretation.[31]
amounting to an ouster of the cestuique trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestuique trust, and (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.[26]
Although no particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, a clear intention to create a trust must be shown; and the proof of
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the fiduciary relationship must be clear and convincing. The creation of an
party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily express trust must be manifested with reasonable certainty and cannot be
show the existence of the trust and its elements.[27] The presence of the inferred from loose and vague declarations or from ambiguous
following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes circumstances susceptible of other interpretations.[32]
the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly
designated to carry out the trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly In the case at bench, an intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from
identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestuique trust, or the petitioners testimony and the attendant facts and circumstances. The
beneficiaries whose identity must be clear.[28] Accordingly, it was incumbent petitioner testified only to the effect that her agreement with her father
upon petitioner to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And was that she will be given a share in the produce of the property, thus:
petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden.
The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be Q: What was your agreement with your father Crispulo Rojas when you left
established by parol evidence.[29] It must be proven by some writing or this property to him?
deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an express A: Every time that they will make copra, they will give a share.
trust existed between the petitioner and her father was the self-serving
testimony of the petitioner. Bare allegations do not constitute evidence Q: In what particular part in Mindanao [did] you stay with your husband?
adequate to support a conclusion. They are not equivalent to proof under A: Bansalan, Davao del Sur.
the Rules of Court.[30]
Q: And while you were in Bansalan, Davao del Sur, did Crispolo Rojas comply
In one case, the Court allowed oral testimony to prove the existence of a with his obligation of giving your share the proceeds of the land?
trust, which had been partially performed. It was stressed therein that what A: When he was still alive, he gave us every three months
is important is that there should be an intention to create a trust, thus: sometimes P200.00 and sometimes P300.00.[33]
Finally, the respondent asserts that the court a quo ought to have dismissed
the complaint for failure to implead the other heirs who are indispensable
parties. We agree. We note that the complaint filed by the petitioner sought
to recover ownership, not just possession of the property; thus, the suit is in
the nature of an action for reconveyance. It is axiomatic that owners of
property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable
parties. Without them being impleaded, no relief is available, for the court
cannot render valid judgment. Being indispensable parties, their absence in
the suit renders all subsequent actions of the trial court null and void for
SECOND DIVISION children, namely: MAXIMO LABISTE, MOISES
LABISTE, GERVACIO LABISTE, SATURNINA
HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE G.R. No. 162033 LABISTE and QUIRINO LABISTE; (6) SEVERO
(also known as TranquilinoLaviste) LABISTE, deceased and survived by his children,
represented by: (1) GERARDO LABISTE, Namely: FELIX LABISTE, RUFINA
representing the Heirs of Gregorio Labiste; Present: LABISTE, SIMPLICIO LABISTE,
(2) OBDULLIA LABISTE GABUAN, VICENTE LABISTE and PATRICIO
representing the heirs of Juan Labiste; QUISUMBING, J., LABISTE,
(3) VICTORIA G. CHIONG, representing Chairperson, Respondents.
the Heirs of EulaliaLabiste; (4) APOLINARIA CARPIO MORALES,
LABISTE YLAYA, representing the TINGA, x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Heirs of NicolasaLabiste; (5) DEMOSTHENES VELASCO, JR., and
LABISTE, representing the Heirs of Gervacio BRION, JJ. DECISION
Labiste; (6) ALEJANDRA LABISTE;
representing the Heirs of SINFROCIO TINGA, J.:
LABISTE, and (7) CLOTILDE LABISTE CARTA,
representing the Heirs of Andres Labiste, This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Petitioners, Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 June 2003[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 65829.
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
- versus 9. The appellate court denied petitioners[3] motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated 15 January 2004.
HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE, survived by his Promulgated:
children, (1) ZACARIAS LABISTE, deceased The factual antecedents are as follows:
and survived by his children, namely: CRESENCIA
LABISTE and EUFRONIO LABISTE; (2) May 8, 2009
BERNARDINO LABISTE, deceased and survived
by his children, namely: POLICARPIO LABISTE, On 29 September 1919, the late EpifanioLabiste (Epifanio), on his own and
BONIFACIO LABISTE, FELIX LABISTE, on behalf of his brothers and sisters who were the heirs of Jose Labiste
GABINA LABISTE, CAYETANA LABISTE and (Jose), purchased from the Bureau of Lands Lot No. 1054 of the Banilad Friar
ISABEL LABISTE; (3) LUCIA LABISTE, Lands Estate, with an area of 13,308 square meters, located at Guadalupe,
deceased and survived by her children, namely: Cebu City for P36.00.[4] Subsequently, on 9 June 1924, then Bureau of Lands
ISAAC LABISTE, GENARO LABISTE, Director Jorge B. Vargas executed Deed of Conveyance No. 12536 selling
BRAULIA LABISTE, BRAULIO LABISTE, and ceding Lot No. 1054 to Epifanio and his brothers and sisters who were
ASUNCION LABISTE, ALFONSO LABISTE the heirs of Jose.[5]
and CLAUDIA LABISTE; (4) EPIFANIO
LABISTE and CLAUDIA LABISTE; After full payment of the purchase price but prior to the issuance of the
deceased and survived by his children, deed of conveyance, Epifanio executed an Affidavit[6] (Affidavit of Epifanio)
namely SILVESTRE LABISTE, in Spanish on 10 July 1923 affirming that he, as one of the heirs of Jose, and
PAULA LABISTE and GERARDA LABISTE; his uncle and petitioners predecessor-in-interest, TranquilinoLabiste
(5) ANA LABISTE, deceased and survived by her (Tranquilino), then co-owned Lot No. 1054 because the money that was
paid to the government came from the two of them. Tranquilino and the Civil Case No. CEB-16943, with the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents claimed
heirs of Jose continued to hold the property jointly. that the Affidavit of Epifanio and the Calig-onansaPanagpalit were forgeries
Sometime in 1928, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued Original and that petitioners action had long prescribed or barred by laches.[14]
Certificate of Title No. 3878 for Lot No. 1054. On 2 May 1928, Engineer
Espiritu Bunagan (Engr. Bunagan), Deputy Public Land Surveyor, subdivided The RTC in a Decision dated 23 August 1999[15] ruled in favor of petitioners.
Lot No. 1054 into two lots: Lot No. 1054-A with an area of 6,664 square After evaluating the documents presented by petitioners, the RTC found
meters for Tranquilino and Lot No. 1054-B with an area of 6,664 square that they are genuine and authentic as ancient documents and that they are
meters for Epifanio. The subdivision plan prepared by Engr. Bunagan was valid and enforceable.[16] Moreover, it held that the action had not
approved by Jose P. Dans, Acting Director of Lands on 28 October 1928.[7] prescribed as the complaint was filed about a year after the reconstitution
of the title by respondents. The judicial reconstitution was even opposed by
Subsequently, on 18 October 1939, the heirs of Tranquilino[8] purchased the petitioners until a compromise agreement was reached by the parties and
one-half (1/2) interest of the heirs of Jose[9] over Lot No. 1054 for P300.00, approved by the RTC which ordered the reconstitution. The RTC further held
as evidenced by the Calig-onansaPanagpalit[10] executed by the parties in that the reconstituted title did not give any more right to respondents than
the Visayan dialect. The heirs of Tranquilino immediately took possession of what their predecessors-in-interest actually had as it is limited to the
the entire lot. reconstitution of the certificate as it stood at the time of its loss or
destruction.[17]
When World War II broke out, the heirs of Tranquilino fled Cebu City and
when they came back they found their homes and possessions destroyed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, while affirming petitioners right to the
The records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, Office of the City Assessor property, nevertheless reversed the RTCs decision on the ground of
and other government offices were also destroyed during the war. prescription and laches. It affirmed the RTCs findings that the Affidavit and
Squatters have practically overrun the entire property, such that neither the Calig-onansaPanagpalit are genuine and authentic, and that the same
petitioners nor respondents possess it. are valid and enforceable documents.[18] Citing Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, it held that petitioners cause of action had prescribed for the action
In October 1993, petitioners learned that one of the must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
respondents,[11] Asuncion Labiste, had filed on 17 September 1993 a petition accrues upon the written contract which in this case was when petitioners
for reconstitution of title over Lot No. 1054. Petitioners opposed the predecessors-in-interest lost possession over the property after World War
petition at first but by a compromise agreement between the parties II. Also, the lapse of time to file the action constitutes neglect on petitioners
dated 25 March 1994, petitioners withdrew their opposition to expedite the part so the principle of laches is applicable.[19]
reconstitution process. Under the compromise agreement, petitioners were
to be given time to file a complaint so that the issues could be litigated in an Hence, the present petition.
ordinary action and the reconstituted title was to be deposited with the
Clerk of Court for a period of sixty (60) days to allow petitioners to file an The genuineness and authenticity of the Affidavit of Epifanio and the Calig-
action for reconveyance and to annotate a notice of lispendens. The Register onansaPanagpalit are beyond cavil. As we have ruled in a litany of cases,
of Deeds of Cebu City issued the reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-7853,[12] in resort to judicial review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals under Rule
the name of EpifanioLabiste, married to TomasaMabitad, his brothers and 45 is confined only to errors of law.[20] The findings of fact by the lower court
sisters, heirs of Jose Labiste on 14 December 1994. However, respondents are conclusive absent any palpable error or arbitrariness.[21] The Court finds
did not honor the compromise agreement. no reason to depart from this principle. Moreover, it is a long settled
doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
Petitioners filed a complaint[13] for annulment of title seeking the of Appeals, are binding upon the Court. It is not the function of the Supreme
reconveyance of property and damages on 13 January 1995, docketed as Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of
Appeals for these are deemed final and conclusive and may not be reviewed rule requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to the
on appeal.[22] beneficiary. The only act that can be construed as repudiation was when
respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in October 1993. And since
The sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not petitioners petitioners filed their complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has
cause of action has prescribed. not yet prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to them.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the rules on prescription and the It is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application
principle of laches because what is involved in the present case is an express is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat
trust. justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[28] Neither should its application be
used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to
which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the
trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.[23] Trust
relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of
is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust another.[29] The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this
comes into being by operation of law.[24] case.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some However, to recover the other half of the property covered by the
writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an private Calig-onansaPanagpalit and to have it registered on the title of the
intention to create a trust.[25] Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o property, petitioners should have filed an action to compel[30] respondents,
particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being as heirs of the sellers in the contract,[31] to execute a public deed of sale. A
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." The Affidavit of Epifanio is in the conveyance of land made in a private document does not affect its validity.
nature of a trust agreement. Epifanio affirmed that the lot brought in his Article 1358,like its forerunner Article 1280 of the Civil Code of Spain, does
name was co-owned by him, as one of the heirs of Jose, and his uncle not require the accomplishment of the acts or
Tranquilino. And by agreement, each of them has been in possession of half contracts in a public instrument in order to validate the act or contract but
of the property. Their arrangement was corroborated by the subdivision only to insure its efficacy,[32] so that after the existence of said contract has
plan prepared by Engr. Bunagan and approved by Jose P. Dans, Acting been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the proper
Director of Lands. document.[33] But even assuming that such action was filed by petitioners,
the same had already prescribed.
As such, prescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust
is repudiated. The Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar the It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract
action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee specifically intended to have retroactive effect.[34] Consequently, it is the Old
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which applies in this case since
the cestuique trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made the Calig-onansaPanagpalit was executed on 18 October 1939 while the
known to the cestuique trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and New Civil Code took effect only on 30 August 1950. And section 43 of Act
conclusive.[26] Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the Torrens title was No. 190, like its counterpart Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, provides
issued in the name of Epifanio and the other heirs of Jose. It has been held that action upon a written contract must be filed within ten years.[35]
that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held in trust by him
for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.[27] The
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 30 June 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
65829 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9 dated 23 August 1999 is
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in petitioners are
hereby DECLARED the absolute owners of one-half of Lot No. 1054 or Lot
No. 1054-A under TCT No. RT-7853.The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is
hereby ORDERED to CANCEL TCT No. RT-7853 in part and issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title to petitioners, heirs of TranquilinoLabiste,
covering Lot No. 1054-A. No costs.
SO ORDERED.