#1
G.R. No. 192486 November 21, 2012
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD
VIRAY, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The case involves a piece of land, lot no. 733, registered
under the name of Ellen and Moses Mendoza. The said lot was
subdivided to 6 parts by Engr.Fajardo but was not officially approved
by the LMB. On, April 29, 1986, Mendoza executed two separate deeds
of absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo Gerard
Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to
spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray).
The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding,
Mendoza, Emerenciana M. Vda.deMallari (Vda. de Mallari) and
respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis),
as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August 20, 1990 a
Subdivision Agreement, or the 1st subdivision agreement (1st SA)
where lot no. 733 was divided to 3 lots: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B and Lot
733-C. Lot 733-C was further subdivided to 13 lots under a 2nd
subdivision agreement (2nd SA) where herein respondents appeared as
owners of some the further subdivided lots covering a part of the lot
sold to herein petitioners.
As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions
involving the same property or portions thereof spawned several suits
and countersuits between petitioner and respondents herein.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the
Sps. Usi but was reversed by the CA on appeal, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Respondents are the legal and valid owners of the subject lot?
HELD: The court held that the petition is barred by res judicata
defined as one that operates as bar by prior judgement when there is a
final judgement on merits rendered by a court with jurisdiction and the
first and second action has identical parties, subject matter or cause of
action.
The better right to possess and right of ownership cannot be
relitigated because of res judicata.
Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing
in their cases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of
Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their
rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion
publiciana and/or accion reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of
actions to recover possession of real property. The third, accion
interdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible
entry and unlawful detainer,44 the issue in both cases being limited to
the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently
of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her
pleadings,45 albeit the court has the competence to delve into and
resolve the issue of ownership but only to address the issue of priority
of possession.46 Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand to vacate following the expiration of the right to
possess, in case of unlawful detainer.47
When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than
one year, one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the
better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty
independently of title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of
possession.48
#2
[G.R. No. 207525. June 18, 2014.
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, represented by MARIA INSPIRACION
PIEDAD-DANAO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and
EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
FACTS:
Bonifacio alleged that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 middle
portion of a parcel of residential land which he acquired through
intestate succession from his late father who inherited the same from
the latter's parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro) and Tomasa Villaray
(Tomasa). He also claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took
place even before his father's death and was validated through a Deed
of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition (Deed of
Confirmation) executed by Alejandro and Tomasa's legal heirs. Further,
Bonifacio alleged that before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow
on the subject lot and assigned numerous caretakers to look after it,
the last of which were Sps. Gurieza.
Sometime in 2005, however, Sps. Gurieza allegedly took interest of the
bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an employee of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that the lot
is public land. Using such information, Sps. Gurieza had the subject lot
declared under their name for tax purposes.
When Bonifacio learned of Sps. Gurieza's acts, he authorized Ofelia
Bay-ag to file a protest before the DENR which deferred further action
on their (Sps. Gurieza's) application before it. Thereafter, Bonifacio sent
his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao (Danao), to the country
to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject lot
unconditionally; and for this purpose, Danao initiated a complaint
before the barangay court. However, during the mediation
proceedings, Sps. Gurieza refused to heed Danao's demand and even
challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus, Bonifacio was constrained
to file the instant case as his last resort.
In their defense, Sps. Gurieza denied Bonifacio's claim and maintained
that in 1974, the subject lot was a vacant and virginal public land and
that the DENR allowed them to possess and occupy the same in the
concept of an owner. As such, they acquired the same through
acquisitive prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and
validity of the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was only
signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa.
The MTC Ruling: ruled in Bonifacio's favor, and, accordingly, ordered
Sps. Gurieza to vacate the subject lot, It found that Bonifacio had a
better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the
house he built thereon as early as the 1950s when he took possession
of the said lot, as well as the affidavits of witnesses who are pioneer
residents of the area, attesting that Sps. Gurieza's claim over such lot is
preposterous.
Dissatisfied, Sps. Gurieza appealed to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling. the RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto.
Aggrieved, Sps. Gurieza elevated the case to the CA by way of petition
for review.
The CA Ruling: the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and
consequently, ordered the dismissal of Bonifacio's Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages.
The CA found, upon further scrutiny of the Deed of Confirmation, that
Emeteria M. Gurieza, whom Bonifacio recognized as one of the heirs of
the subject lot, among others, as well as the other heirs of Alejandro
and Tomasa, did not sign the Deed of Confirmation.
Bonifacio moved for reconsideration but was, however, denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly reversed the RTC ruling and,
consequently, dismissed Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
and Damages against Sps. Gurieza.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. 17
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance,
falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows
the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any
contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful
detainer will lie. 18
Thus, under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint
must be filed "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the defendant
originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a
contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) eventually, the defendant's
possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by
the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the
defendant's right of possession; (c) thereafter, the defendant remained
in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment
thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. 19
In this light, the Court shall solely resolve the issue as to who between
the parties has the better right of possession de facto over the subject
lot. Corollary thereto, issues pertaining to ownership are better
threshed out in another action instituted for such purpose.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court holds that Bonifacio
had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds that the CA erred in
dismissing Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
against Sps. Gurieza.
#3
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA and REMEDIOS VELASCO vs.
WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to
non-payment of rent. It therefore follows that the cause of action for
unlawful detainer must necessarily arise before the termination of the
contract and not the other way around.
#4
G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO
AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO
AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 160914
March 25, 2015
FACTS: Respondents Antonio Hermano and his wife
RemediosHermano were the registered and lawful owners of a house
and lot in Tagaytay City.
On September 1, 2001, petitioner Marcela M. Dela Cruz occupied and
possessed the questioned property pursuant to the alleged
Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario
Enciso Benitez, without the authority and consent of the Hermanos.
On September 27, 2001, A. Hermano, through a counsel, sent a formal
demand letter to Dela Cruz to vacate and turn over the possession of
the property and to pay P 20,000 a month as rent starting September
1, 2001.
Respondent filed an ejectment case against the petitioner at the MTCC;
however, the court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. The
court also stated that respondents proper remedy should be an action
for recovery and not of a summary proceeding for ejectment, because
there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Respondent appealed the decision at the RTC; the said court, however,
affirmed the decision of the lower court entoto. The same filed a
petition for review at the CA, of which, granted the petition, reversed
and set aside the decision of RTC. Furthermore, the court rendered a
decision declaring Hermano as the lawful possessor of the property
and order Dela Cruz to vacate the same. With the CAs decision,
petitioner filed a petition for review at the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has adequately pleaded and proved
a case of forcible entry.
HELD: The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession
carries with it the concomitant burden of establishing ones case by a
preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so, respondents herein
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness
of that of petitioner. It is not enough that the allegations of a
complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must prove
prior physical possession. It is the basis of the security accorded by law
to a prior occupant of a property until a person with a better right
acquires possession thereof.
The Court has scrutinized the parties submissions, but found no
sufficient evidence to prove respondents allegation of prior physical
possession.
To prove their claim of having a better right to possession, respondents
submitted their title thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior to the
initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA correctly observed, petitioner
failed to controvert these documents with competent evidence. It
erred, however, in considering those documents sufficient to prove
respondents prior physical possession.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession
contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a
forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to
possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one
flowing out of ownership. These are different legal concepts under
which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession.
Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession
can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may be
the character of the possession, the present occupant of the property
has the security to remain on that property if the occupant has the
advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a better right
lawfully causes eviction.
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive
proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in ones right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in ones actual or
constructive possession.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the proofs submitted by
respondents only established possession flowing from ownership.
Although respondents have claimed from the inception of the
controversy up to now that they are using the property as their
vacation house, that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative
evidence. On the other hand, petitioners claim that she started
occupying the property in March 2001, and not in September of that
year as Antonio alleged in his Complaint, was corroborated by the
Affidavitof petitioners caretaker. Respondents did not present any
evidence to controvert that affidavit.
Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the
element of prior physical possession. Their uncorroborated claim of
that fact, even if made under oath, is self-serving. It does not amount
to preponderant evidence, which simply means that which is of greater
weight or is more convincing than evidence that is offered in
opposition.
As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that the Court is not a trier of
facts. However, the conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and the
RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on the other, compelled us to revisit
the records of this case for the proper dispensation
justice. Moreover, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncements
in this case are without prejudice to the parties right to pursue the
appropriate remedy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED, and the Decision of the MTCC dismissing
the Complaint against petitioner is REINSTATED.
#5 NONE
G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC,
ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all
other persons claiming authority under them, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
#6
G.R. No. 201286 July 18, 2014
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS,
RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C.
ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
The respondents, as co-owners of Lot No. 1595-A, with an assessed
value of assessed value of P57,960 and a market value of P264,930,
filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with
Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City against the petitioner, Inocencia Tagalog. In their
complaint, the respondents alleged that Inocencia occupied a portion
of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis on the
basis of a verbal contract. When Inocencias house of light material
was damaged in a typhoon, Inocencia discontinued paying rent and
stopped inhabiting the house. They then demanded that she remove
the debris, and vacate the land as they will subdivide and develop it for
their own use. Inocencia however refused to vacate, instead she
constructed a two-storey house made of concrete. They informed the
Office of the Municipal Engineer of the construction of the house
without their consent and the required building permit. Despite the
warning given by the municipal official, Inocencia proceeded with the
construction. In her Answer, Inocencia asserted that the lease contract
was still valid and subsisting, not yet terminated by the parties, and she
had not abandoned possession of the land. As further defense, she
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC, as the case was for ejectment and unlawful detainer,
not cognizable by the RTC.
#7
G.R. No. 182953 October 11, 2010
CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA, JOSIE
MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO, JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ,
RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO,
ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEA, EDUARDO ESPINO,
ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES,
MERCY CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO, ANITA
TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO DIMANDAKO, Petitioners,
vs.
MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
of
(MAHA), Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
is
was the registered owner of the lot in dispute which was placed under
community mortgage program (CMP). Through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and
constructed their temporary houses and an office building. Sometime
in 1992, petitioners sought for the annulment of respondents title but
it was dismissed by the RTC. Upon dismissal, respondent demanded
petitioners to vacate the premises. Petitioners asked for a one-year
extension for them to look for a place to transfer. However, it was
repeatedly extended due to respondents tolerance. Petitioners even
propose to become members of MAHA so that they can be qualified to
acquire portions of the lot but they failed to comply with the
requirements despite repeated demands. MAHA then sent formal
demand letters to petitioners to vacate the lot. Unheeded, MAHA filed
the complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
In their answer, petitioners averred that they are the owners
of the subject lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They
likewise argued that the complaint was irregular and defective because
its caption states that it was for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action for
failure by the respondent to prove prior physical possession which is
required in a complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, RTC reversed the
MTCC decision stating that MAHA was able to prove by preponderance
of evidence that petitioners occupation was by mere tolerance and
their occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they
vacate the property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling
that the cause of action was an unlawful detainer case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a superior right of possession
over the property in question.
HELD: No. The evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property,
MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire
portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. But when
they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand
for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already
expired or had been terminated. Well settled is the rule that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which,
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him
which in the present case is an unlawful detainer case.
#8
[G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]
SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND
DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
This case is about a) the need, when establishing the jurisdiction of the
court over an action for forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his
complaint prior physical possession of the property and b) the need for
plaintiff to prove as well the fact of such prior physical possession.
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his wife, Dr.Estrella E. Gavilan-
Abad, bought a registered property from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis
Farrales.
The latter were the wife and sons, respectively, of the late brother of
respondents Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor
(Daisy). Teresita operated a boarding house on the property.
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house
themselves, they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita so she
could continue with her business.
But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly
abandoned the boarding house, forcing the Abads to take over by
engaging the services of Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the
boarding house business.
Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some
toilets repaired.
While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters
to give the boarding house fresh coat of paint. Oscar and Daisy came,
accompanied by two men, and forcibly took possession of the
boarding house.
Frightened, the painters called the Abads who immediately sought
police help. The Abads were later appeased, however, when they
learned that the intruders left the place.
Two days later, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy
forcibly entered and took possession of the property once again.
Because of this, petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaintfor
forcible entry against the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC).
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the place.
They claimed ownership of it by inheritance.
They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same from
the time of their birth.
That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 as attested
to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.
While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself ceased to reside on
the property as early as 1986, they pointed out that she did not
effectively give up her possession.
Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when their parents were still
alive, the latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a loan.
After their mother passed away, they decided to lease portions of the
property to help pay the loan. Daisy managed the operation of the
boarding house.
To bolster their claim, Oscar and Daisy presented copies of rental
receipts going back from 2001 to 2003. They would not have been able
to lease the rooms unless they were in possession.
Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to dismiss the action on the
ground of failure of Abad to show that he and his wife enjoyed prior
physical possession of the property, an essential requisite in forcible
entry cases.
Abad's allegation that he and his wife immediately leased the
property after they bought it was proof that they were never in
possession of it for any length of time.
The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and
Daisy could not acquire ownership of the property since it was
registered.
And, as owner, Abad was entitled to possession.
Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went up to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC in its totality.
It held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn the jurisdiction
of the MeTC over the action since they raised the ground of Abad's
failure to allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first
time on appeal.
Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint alleged that Servillano
owned the property, it may be presumed that he also had prior
possession of it.
No evidence to the contrary having been presented, the presumption
stood.
Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals (CA).
The CA rendered a decision, annulling the decisions and orders of
both the MeTC and the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA pointed out that Abad merely alleged in his complaint that he
leased the property to Teresita after he and his wife bought the same
and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the same.
Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional averment of prior physical
possession, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his action.
Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession from 1967
through the barangay certification. Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the case, all the proceedings in the case were void.
Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence, in
the present petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the
jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property
to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he
enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in question.
HELD:
AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE
Yes, Abad sufficiently alleges in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of
prior physical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with
jurisdiction over his action.
Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable
first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff
had prior physical possession of the property; and, second, that the
defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.
There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint
that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property.
The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as
one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of
the same until deprived thereof."
Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffsprior physical
possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to
confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees.
The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his
allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules.
It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that
dispossession took place under the required conditions.
It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make
out a case for forcible entry.
The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to
prove that he had prior physical possessionfor this gives him the
security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him.
Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the
property after buying the same since they immediately rented it to
Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding house.
Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of ownership
that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September
2002.
Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been
renting spaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by
receipts that they issued to their lessees.
This was long before they supposedly entered the property, using
force, in 2002.
Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts covered rents in a
place called "D's Condominium" in Sampaloc, Manila, and were only
made to appear through handwritten notations that they were issued
for rooms in the property subject of the suit.
But a close examination of the receipts shows that "D's
Condominium" was just the name that Daisy employed in her business
of renting rooms. The receipts did not necessarily describe another
place.
Indeed, they provided blank spaces for describing as the subject of
rent the property subject of this case.
And, except for Abad's bare claim that Teresita and his sons had long
been in possession before they sold it to him and his wife, he offered
no evidence to show that this was in fact the case.
AS THE SECOND ISSUE
Abad failed toprove that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the
property in question.
Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the property in his name, he
has in his favor the right to the actual, physical, exclusive, continuous,
and peaceful possession of the same.
He pointed out that his possession de facto began from the time of
the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale, becoming de
jure once the title was issued in his name.
It is of course true that a property owner has the right to exercise the
attributes of ownership, one of which is the right to possess the
property. But Abad is missing the point.
He is referring to possession flowing from ownership which is not in
issue in this case.
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical
possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the
issue.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove
prior physical possession in his favor.
The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible
entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
#9
G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner,
vs.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan Rafael,
Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo)
cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs
permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon
demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the
Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios
found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already
Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated April 7, 1977.
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo vacate the
land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction
suit against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael,
Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he
declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the
pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint.The
Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo
maintained his original answer.
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate the
property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the
action was one for forcible entry. The CA, however, reversed. The CA
held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively
changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of
possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further, since
the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August
5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from demand
required in ejectment suits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause of
action
2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the complaint; nature of the
action.
First issue: To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause
of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the
defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely
different from that stated in the original complaint.
Here, both the original and the amended complaint have identical
allegations, and required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on
the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of
the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he
leave.It did not introduce a new cause of action.
Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation under the
DARABs jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The records
show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a tenant
of the land.
Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible entry,
since the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of
eviction suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer: (1) the
defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice
to defendant, terminating the latter's right of possession; (3) the
defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the
enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff's last
demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a
complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land
upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at
the beginning of defendants possession.
Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in the
complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not require the
plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of such rules.The
Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and that
when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under
a promise that she would leave upon demand.These allegations clearly
imply the Dionisios "tolerance" of her (or any of her assignees).
Petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the CA is reversed and that of the MTC reinstated.
#10
G.R. No. 176341 July 7, 2014
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
FACTS:
Manuel Torres, assigned three (3) parcels of land to Tormil Realty &
Development Corporation located in Pasay City and all improvements
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation.
However, despite the assignment, title to the real properties remained
in the name of Manuel Torres. Later on Manuel Torres unilaterally
revoked the assignment.
Subsequently, Manuel Torres and Edgardo Pabalan established Torres-
Pabalan Realty Incorporated. As part of his capital contribution, Manuel
Torres, assigned the three (3) parcels of land to Torres-Pabalan Realty
Incorporated. Edgardo Palaban was then the General Manager and
Administrator of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation and he
later on resigned. In 1985, the construction of the Torres Building on
the land was completed and was rented out.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case with the SEC to compel Manuel
Torres to fulfil his obligation by turning over the documents necessary
to effect the registration and transfer of titles in the name of the
properties assigned to it by Manuel.
Edgardo was the Administrator of Torres-Pabalan Realty. He then set
up a law office together with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura on the 2nd
floor of the building. Torres building was later then declared for tax
purposes.
SEC, then made a decision in favour of Tormil which was later affirmed
by SEC EnBanc. Manuel appealed to the CA. During the pendency
thereof, Pro-Guard entered into a lease contract with Edgardo for the
lease of a unit at the 3rd floor of the building. In exchange for the rental
payments, Pro-Guard provided security services to Torres-Pabalan.
Then the CAs decision was released. CA ruled in favour or Tormil.
Tormil then sent letters to the law office and Pro-Guard to settle their
accounts with the previous owner and enter into new lease contracts
with Tormil. Since Tormils letters were ignored, it sent demand letters
to vacate the premises and pay their rentals from the time they have
occupied the said rented units. Since, their letter was once again
unheeded, Tormil filed an ejectment suit with the MeTC against
Edgardo and Augustus and Pro-Guard.
Tormil averred that the occupancy by defendants of units in Torres
building was out of tolerance.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormils ownership of the parcels of
land where the building stands and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was
the owner of the same. It was also the onewho funded the buildings
construction. Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the building were
surreptitiously and unlawfully cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC
Case. Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was paying rentals to the
owner, Torres-Pabalan, in the form of security services provided to the
latter. It likewise called attention to the fact that it was no longer in the
premises as Tormil forcibly ousted it therefrom.
MeTC ruled in favour of Tormil. RTC affirmed MeTC ruling. CA likewise
affirmed the decision. All the courts have ruled that Tormil have
sufficiently proved its entitlement to possession of the property. What
is left is the determination of the reckoning point when Pro-guard and
Edgardo and Augustus will pay the rentals.
ISSUE:
When is the reckoning point of payment of the rentals, is it from the
time of occupation of the property or at the time of demand?
HELD:
While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer
suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the
unit in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned from
the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of
the demand to vacate.
In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in
prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually
becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to
possess. In other words, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of
such action within a year after the withholding of possession meaning
that if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, [then]
an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful detainer) is proper.
Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit
in March 1994 up to November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to
possess the premises was not challenged. It was only after Tormil
prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it terminated
Pro-Guards right to possess the unit it was occupying through a letter
to vacate dated November 16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that point
that Tormil is considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-
Guards occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guards possession became
unlawful at that same moment. This is supported by the allegation in
the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not because
of non-payment of rentals, but because of withdrawal of tolerance.
Tolerance or [t]oleration is defined as the act or practice of permitting
or enduring something not wholly approved of, while tolerated acts
are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner
of the property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which
ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.
With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is
settled that: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.
In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to
consign the payment of rentals. One legal cause for consignation is
when two or more persons claim the same right to collect. Various
claimants to a debtor's payment must have the appearance of a right
to collect such that the debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not
based on negligence, as to who is entitled to the payment.
The dispute regarding the validity of Manuel's assignment to
Tonnil of the realties was pending before the SEC, Tormil did not claim
to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of the premises. It neither sought
payment of rentals which it now claims Pro-Guard should have
consigned during the pendency of its suit against Manuel.
As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the lease contract
remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan.
The latter was occupying and running the building, as evidenced by
several tax declarations in its name which, while not conclusive proofs
of ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner.
Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act on behalf of Torres-
Pabalan, administered the premises. Pro-Guard is not permitted to
deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Pro-Guard is ordered to pay reasonable and fair rentals
beginning Nov. 16, 1998 up to the time that the premises are fully
vacated.
#11
G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998
MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA ARCAL, and VIRGILIO
ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN & LETTY RICAFRENTE,
RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE RICAFRENTE, CORA
GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, CARMEN
TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING ARCAL, NORA and ALEX BOCITA,
ELVIE TAHIMIC, ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA ARGUSON,
LIZA ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY ARGUSON,
FIDENG and CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO, ENGAY and
SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA,
NENENG and RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES, YOLLY and
ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER PAULINO, CHARLIE PANGANIBAN,
DELIA and PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA, BERTING and NORMA
BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE, DELLY and FREDO NUNEZ,
ANDRO and ELLEN JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE, NENA
VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and NONONG IBONG, CHITA and
RESTIE REYES, SONNY and DONG REYES, and WALLY and DAISY
REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC of
Tanza, Cavite against private respondents as defendants. Subject of the
complaint was a 21,435 square meter parcel of land in Sta. Cruz de
Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite with title in the names of Maria,
Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina Arcal. It was alleged that defendants
occupied the subject land thru plaintiffs implied tolerance, or
permission but without contract with plaintiffs. From the dates of their
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from
defendants, nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their
occupancy therein;
Meanwhile, Lucio Arvisu and substantially all defendants filed with RTC
of Cavite, a civil case for Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
Damages against Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deseased),
Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal. The said complaint was
ordered to be dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. An
appeal was made to the Court and said appeal was considered
abandoned and dismissed.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs, except Virgilio
Arcal, MTC rendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs
ordering defendants among others, to vacate the property in question
and remove residential houses and improvements introduced therein
and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs.
On appeal with the RTC by defendants, the foregoing decision was
reversed and set aside, and the said complaint for ejectment was
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the proper action after the
prejudicial question is resolved in a fair and adversary proceeding.
Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the
premises in question, but they proved futile as they refused and failed,
and still refuse and fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiffs.
Private respondents failed to file their answer, prompting petitioners to
file a motion to render judgment. MTC held that petitioners are
registered owners of the property and as much they have the right to
enjoy possession thereof. On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the MTC's
decision.
Private respondents filed a petition for review with CA. CA, ruled in
favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint filed does not constitute an unlawful
detainer suit. (NO)
HELD:
CA made the conclusion that from the allegations in the complaint, it
can be gleaned that private respondents did not actually occupy the
subject property upon the tolerance of petitioners, as tolerance was
withdrawn when demands to vacate were made on private
respondents prior to the commencement of the ejectment case;
therefore, unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy. The SC
disagreed with CA.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which,
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.
The filing of the first ejectments case signified that petitioners sought
the ouster of private respondents from
possession of the property. Proceeding in the case were suspended
with the filing for Annulment of Title with Reconveyance and
Damages by Lucio Arvisu and several of private respondents. The first
ejectment case was eventually dismissed and the judgment of dismissal
attained finality. The ejectment case was later resolved in favor of
petitioners, but on appeal, the case was dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question in the
second case filed by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners.
Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership, the
proceedings in the first ejectment case were suspended. Petitioner
could not but await the outcome of these case and preserve the status
quo.
The rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer must be filed within
one year from demand, demand being jurisdictional. This one-year
period is counted from the last demand. An unlawful detainer suit
involves solely the issue of physical or material possession over the
property or possession de facto, that is who between the plaintiff and
the defendant has a better right to possess the property in question. In
the case at bar, petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer was
confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of the property
and was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed in
their suit assailing petitioners right to ownership.
#12 NONE
G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
#13 NONE
G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact
EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
#14
G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural
guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
In his forcible entry complaint, petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented
by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia, alleged that he
is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the
owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located at Corner
Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal (subject
land). Petitioners family contented that since Javier was born, he has
lived in the residential house erected thereon. Upon Vicentes death,
petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over
the same. On March 26, 2007, despite the petitioners vigorous
objections, respondent Susan Lumontad gained entry into the subject
land and started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on
a 150 sq. m. portion thereof. The dispute was submitted to barangay
conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between the
parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent
the instant forcible entry complaint, averring, in addition to the
foregoing, that reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of
the above-said portion may be fixed at 5,000.00 per month.12
In her Answer respondent admitted that during Vicentes lifetime, he
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject land.
Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the
subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-
002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she took possession of the said
portion not as aan illegal entrant but as its owner.17
The MTC Ruling
MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.19
It was found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two
(2) lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to
petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and
where the subject building was erected, was given to one Anthony de
la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage,
but was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through
sale.20 Based on this finding, the MTC concluded that petitioner had
no cause of action against respondent since she was merely exercising
her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot.21
Also, the MTC observed that petitioners complaint failed to aver the
required jurisdictional facts as it merely contained a general allegation
that respondents entry into the disputed portion was made by means
of force and intimidation, without specifically stating how, when, and
where were such means employed. With such failure, the MTC
intimated that apetitioners remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria instituted before the proper
forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and ordered respondent to
vacate the disputed portion and surrender possession thereof to
petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the
amounts of P5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said
portion, as reasonable compensation for its use and occupation, and
P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, including costs of suit.24
On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and
possessor of the property in question, has the right to be respected in
his possession and that respondent forcibly and unlawfully deprived
him of the same.27
Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration, which was
denied. Thus the petitioner filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
Set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter court for
trial on the merits.31 It held that the issue of possession of the subject
land is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership, such that the
former issue cannot be determined without ruling on who really owns
such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits
in the exercise of the latters original jurisdiction in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule
40 of the Rules of Court. It further stated that petitioner was not able to
sufficiently establish that respondent employed force and intimidation
in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject landas he failed to
demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred during his
dispossession of said property.39
The Issue Before the Court
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and ordered
the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the merits in an
action for recovery of ownership and possession.
The Courts Ruling
Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for
forcible entry, petitioners case nonetheless fails to impress on the
merits.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that
the allegations in the petitioners complaint do not make a case for
forcible entry but another action cognizable by the RTC.42
A plain reading of petitioners complaint shows that the required
jurisdictional averments, so as to demonstrate a cause of action for
forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said pleading alleges that
petitioner, as the original owners, i.e., Vicentes, successor-in-interest,
was in prior physical possession of the subject land but was eventually
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by
respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the
same and, thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly, with these
details, the means by which petitioners dispossession was effected
cannot be said to have been insufficiently alleged as mistakenly ruled
by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The "how" (through unlawful
entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March 26,
2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the
dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint.
Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a
general allegation that respondents entry in the premises was made by
means of force and intimidation47 and, consequently, that a forcible
entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that a forcible
entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus
erred in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the
merits in an action for recovery of possession and ownership, otherwise
known as an accion reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section
8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible
entry complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
#15
G.R. No. 158231 June 19, 2007
BABY ARLENE LARANO,* Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA T.
CALENDACION,** Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated
in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna.
petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby
the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-SQM portion of
petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500K as down payment
and the balance payable in nine installments of P500K each, until
September 2001.
Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of
the riceland was transferred to respondents under the
CONDITION that they shall account for and deliver the
harvest from said riceland to petitioner. However,
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY the installments and to
account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.
Petitioner sent a demand letter to vacate the riceland within 10
days from receipt thereof, but the demand went unheeded.
Consequently, she filed on an unlawful detainer case
respondents before the MTC.
Respondents allege that: (a) a Contract to Sell was executed but
deny that it contains all the agreements of the parties; (b)
petitioner has no cause of action because the 3-year period within
which to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; (c) MTC has
no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint failed to
allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made
upon them.
MTCS RULING: Vacate the premises and pay the amount of
P365K for the use and occupation of the property.
RTCS RULING: Upon appeal, RTC affirmed the decision and
modified the amount to P400K.
CA RULING (PetRev): Set aside RTCs Decision and dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings
before the MTC for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the
main issue extend beyond those commonly involved in
unlawful detainer suits, but one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the RTC, not the MTC.
o According to CA, the issues in the case pertain to WON: (a)
there was a violation of the Contract to Sell; (b) such violation
gives the petitioner the right to terminate the contract and
consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of
the harvest from the Riceland
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: CA should have dismissed outright
the petition since it contains no verification as required by the
Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint before the
MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific
performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the
complaint but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions
and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the
answer.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Verification is just a formal
requirement and petitioner waived her right to question the
defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA
 correctly pointed out that the present case involves one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is
the rights of the parties based on the Contract to Sell.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer NO
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.
Jurisdiction in Ejectment Cases
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations
pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant
and it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties.
The TEST FOR DETERMINING the sufficiency of those allegations
is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. The
facts upon which an action for unlawful detainer can be brought
are specially mentioned in 1, Rule 70 (see ROC)
In UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right
to possess. Hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive
because in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and
the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants
right to continue in possession.
In present case, petitioner must comply with TWO REQUISITES
for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be
failure to pay the installment due or comply with the
conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the
periods specified in 2 of Rule 70 (15 days in case of land and 5
days in case of buildings).
o FIRST REQUISITE: Refers to the existence of the cause of
action for unlawful detainer
o SECOND REQUISITE: Refers to the jurisdiction requirement of
demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
BOTH DEMANDS to pay installment due or adhere to the terms
of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the
vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It
is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises
and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the
withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the
vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such
action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or
comply with the conditions of the Contract and to vacate the
premises is required under the rule.
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the
terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a
person's possession unlawful. The giving of such demand
MUST be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Complaint failed to Constitute a Case of Unlawful Detainer
Petitioners allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. Petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the
terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state
that petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with
the conditions of the contract. The 10-day period granted
respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated
by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does
not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in
a detainer suit may be proved by the presentation of competent
evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that
effect, but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the
contract is rescinded. The rescission of contract is a power vested in
the RTC. The rescission of the contract is the basis of and a condition
precedent for the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty.
Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation
entitling one party to take possession of the land and building, in case
the other party violates the contract, cannot confer upon the former
the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to.
Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of
possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear
and determine.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
13, 2003 of the CA is AFFIRMED
#16
A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998
SALVACION P. ONQUIT, complainant, vs. JUDGE AURORA
BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and SHERIFF IV DANILO O.
MATIAS, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which the
complainant and her two brothers were co-defendants. Complainant
raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Respondent
Judge denied all motions raised by defendants ruling that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and not those raised by
defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge, the claim
regarding the nature of the case at bar would not automatically divest
the court its jurisdiction. Subsequently, the complainant raised to the
Supreme Court a complaint against Respondent Judge, alleging the
she acted with grave abuse of discretion in that the land subject of the
forcible entry case is an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court.
Issue: W/N the Respondent Judges Court had jurisdiction over the
case
Held: Yes. Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be
divested of jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the
answer. What determines the nature of an action and a
court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the plaintiff.
Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint, which in
this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And,
jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over
an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to
determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of
respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that,
considering the evidence presented, the land in question is an irrigated
riceland, but not tenanted. This matter was even brought up on a
petition for certiorari with prohibition to the Regional Trial Court of
Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied. These antecedents are
sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not act with
grave abuse of authority in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in
her sala.
#17 NONE
[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996.]
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, BENEDICTO DANAN, BIENVENIDO
BELLEZA, ROBERTO MALLARI, FELICIANO MALLARI, PESCASIO
DIMARUCUT, REYNALDO TIMBANG, ALFREDO SANTOS, FERERICO
SANTOS, LAMBERTO DANAN, JESUS CASTRO, VICTORINO TALA,
MARIANO SANTOS, IGNACIO CASTRO DE LA CRUZ, WILFREDO
TAPALLA, REYNALDO OSBUAL, ANTONIO SANTOS, TEOFILO
MUNOZ, MANUEL NAGUIAT, FELICISIMO MACASPAC, ROMAN
BERNAL, JR., FAUSTINO PANGAN, FRANCISCO MACASPAC,
CARLITO AGUILUZ, FIDEL CASTRO, SALVADOR TALA, ROMEO
TALA, LUCIANO MANLAPAZ, TOMAS PAULE, DANNY MANUEL,
BENIGNO PORTALES, CONRADO MALLARI, MARTA DANAN,
REGINA TIMBANG, CONCHITA VISDA, AMELIA ALFARO, VIOLETA
ALFARO, CONCHITA MALIT, SEVERINA RIVERA, FLORENCIA
PAULE, ROSITA BERNAL, GLORIA MALLARI, LILIA SERRANO,
NORMA CABUAN-BAUTISTA and ANITA MANGANTI, Petitioners,
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The Hon. CARLOS BARTOLO,
Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao, Pampanga,
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA,
MAJOR JESUS MANINANG (PNP), SPO3 CARLOS GUINTO (PNP),
SPO1 JESUS KABILANG (PNP), SPO4 EDGARDO LALIC (PNP) &
SPO4 DOMINADOR LACANLALE (PNP) and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 50, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, Respondents.
cause of action for unlawful detainer but rather accion publiciana,
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC
Issue: Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
for ejectment.

ROMERO, J.: Ruling: YES

#18 It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is determined by the averments

in the complaint.
G.R. No. 142503 June 20, 2003
In the complaint for ejectment filed before the Hagonoy MTC, it was
ROMUALDO C. PEREZ, petitioner, alleged by plaintiff Cruz that defendant (now petitioner) Perez pleaded
vs. that he be allowed to construct his house as he had no other parcel of
APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent. land on which to build a house. The complaint further alleged that it
was by mere tolerance that Cruz, now respondent herein, allowed
Perez to occupy a small portion of the lot. Petitioner Perez constructed
QUISUMBING, J.:
his house without paying any rent for the reasonable use and
occupancy of said portion of Cruz's lot.
FACTS:
Taking the allegations in the complaint as basis, in our view, there

Cruz is the owner of Residential Lot No. 5095 declared in his is no doubt that the case is one for unlawful detainer. The
name as per Sworn Statement Index No. 14-0248-537, as Hagonoy MTC had the jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case
required by Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 464, as amended by P.D. No. No. 979.
1621.

Cruz averred that he inherited this lot from his mother,
Anent petitioner's claim that the issue is not one of mere possession
Salvestia Crisostomo who, in turn, acquired the same from
but rather of ownership, Dehesa v. Macalalag25 is instructive. For
herein petitioner Romualdo Perez, through a "Kasulatan ng
in Dehesa, we held that in ejectment cases, the defendant cannot
Bilihang Patuluyan."
deprive the court of jurisdiction by simply claiming ownership of the
Cruz claimed that Perez requested his permission to build his
property involved.
house on a small portion of said property, as Perez had
nowhere to erect his dwelling on. This request was granted,
as they are close relatives.6 When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed an application for pleadings and the question of physical possession cannot be
issuance of title covering the subject land with the Land resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
Management Section, Department of Environment and ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
Natural Resources (DENR), Region III, San Fernando City, possession.26 Should the inferior court make any determination on
Pampanga. When Cruz learned of Perez's design, he the issue of ownership, the same shall not be conclusive and shall
immediately opposed the application. be without prejudice to the right of the parties to ventilate before
Accordingly, Cruz demanded that Perez remove his house the proper court their claims of ownership over the same land.
from the land and vacate the same. When petitioner failed to
heed the demand, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful #19
detainer against him.
Perez denied Cruz's ownership of the property. He claimed
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
to be owner of the lot in question, having inherited the same
from his grandmother. He asserted that he had been in
continuous possession for many years. SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA
To support his claim, Perez presented Tax Declaration and SORDEVILLA, Petitioners,
official receipts of tax payments. Perez submitted that the vs.
MTC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 979, as the issue MARIA COPRADA, Respondent.
involved was one of ownership, not mere possession, of the
land. PERALTA, J.:
On February 12, 1992, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 979
on the ground of want of jurisdiction, holding that the main
FACTS:
issue is one of ownership, not mere possession de facto. Cruz
appealed said decision to the RTC -Malolos
On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case

Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the Regional Executive
against Coprada before the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that
Director of the DENR, Region III, disapproved the survey of
they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in San
Lot No. 50759, Cad. 304-D, submitted by Perez, thereby
Miguel, Majayja. In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners
sustaining Cruz's opposition. Cruz was then directed to file
to allow her and her family to use and occupy the land for their
the appropriate public land application for the land subject
residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises
of the controversy.10
should petitioners need to use the same. Coprada and her family were
On June 29, 1992, the RTC of Malolos, reversing the MTC
allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners
ruling, and ordering the remand of the records of Civil Case
never made an attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that
No. 979, for trial on the merits.
respondent and her eight children have no other place to live in. the a
On remand, the MTC decided in favour of Cruz. On appeal by
few years later the financial condition of Copradas family, having
Perez, RTC reversed MTCs decision.
acquired her own residential house. This prompted petitioners to
RTC found that question of ownership was inextricably
institute an ejectment case against Coprada. Respondent avers that she
intertwined with the issue of possession. Since the issue of
had already acquired ownership over the contested lot when she orally
possession could not be resolved without first addressing the
purchased it. And further avers that the claim has already prescribed
question of ownership, Civil Case No. 979 should have been
and thus barred by laches.
dismissed.
On appeal by Cruz to the CA, CA ruled in favour of Cruz
MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On
(reversed and set aside RTC decision)
appeal to the RTC, the ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA
Hence, this appeal by Perez.
reversed the RTCs decision and reinstated the MCTCs ruling.

Petitioners argument: He contends that the alleged tolerance given ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict
by respondent to him in occupying the land does not give rise to a respondent from the subject property.
HELD:
LAND TITLES
As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person
illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can
never be barred by laches.
In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate
her allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962.
Coprada's submission that there was an oral sale is a mere
afterthought.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered
by a title, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the
respondent's unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the
property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title
of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is
evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that
the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners
of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a
collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The
validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by
respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No.
1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct proceeding
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the
title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has the
right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
#20
G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO
ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS,
LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL, PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY
BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA
MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO,
ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME
CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA
MADEJA, JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN MANONG,
EDMUNDO/FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA,
ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO ROMERO,
SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners,
vs.
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T.
NEPOMUCENO, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: A complaint for ejectment was filed before the MeTC by Palisoc
et al. (Palisoc) against Bugarin et al. (Bugarin). The MeTC declared
Palisoc as the rightful possessors and ordered Bugarin to vacate the
premises and pay Palisoc et al. the rentals.
Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc moved for execution
pending appeal. The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC
decision. Bugarin filed a MR with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution. The RTC denied the MR and granted Palisocs motion
for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a supersedeas bond or to
pay the back rentals. This decision was received by Bugarin on March
12, 2003. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of
Execution. Palisoc filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition
since Bugarin refused to vacate the premises. The RTC deferred action
on the motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust legal remedies available to
them. Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to
Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA
72791 was not complied with.
Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special
Order of Demolition. The RTC declared the decision denying
Bugarins appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of
the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Bugarin filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA on April 10,
2003. Bugarin contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order of Demolition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC properly ordered the demolition.
Bugarins position:
(1) The MeTCs orders violated the mandatory requirements of RA 7279
since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or
demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of
resettlement.
(2) There was neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
(3) The orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of
the law.
Palisocs position:
(1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no proof that Bugarin et al. are
registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries.
(2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law
had already been complied with. Bugarin were already notified on
March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition, when the writ of execution
was served.
HELD: YES, the MeTC orders were properly issued.
A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid
further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the
execution is practically ministerial. The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it
only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a supersedeas bond; and (3)
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the
appeal.
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately
executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review,
before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin
received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their MR. They
had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the CA.
Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on April
10, 2003.
DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the
judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true
even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is: (1) its
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the exercise of power in
excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence and availability of the right
of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the certiorari is that there should be no appeal.
Bugarins petition for certiorari before the CA was filed as a substitute
for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but
was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition
for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and
executory.
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the MeTC. The
MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the order to enforce the RTC
judgment. The orders also did not violate RA 7279. Under the said law,
eviction or demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for
eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is
shown on record that Bugarin et al. are underprivileged and homeless
citizens as defined in RA 7279. The procedure for the execution of the
eviction or demolition order under RA 7279 is not applicable.

Lastly, the order of demolition had already been executed. Bugarin had
already vacated the area and Palisoc now possess the properties free
from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of
possession. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot
and academic.
of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. The
RTC then reversed the MTCs decision.
Issue (1) Can RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conduct a
relocation and verification survey of lot in question? (2) Was an action
for unlawful detainer proper?

Ruling: The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case,

shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection,
#21 Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides:

G.R. No. 136274 September 3, 2003 Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership.
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by
FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners, xxxx
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the
MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or
CORONA, J.: required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

In the case SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs. CA, et al., Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of
GR 136274, September 3, 2003, although an ejectment suit is an the relocation and verification survey in aid of its appellate
action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the jurisdiction and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing
parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
he or she is: on the survey and the surveyors testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
#22 NONE
(2) CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the
G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014 context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner, property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs
vs. property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
MIAQUE, Respondents.
unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under
any contract, express or implied. The defendants possession was lawful
#23 NONE at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or
G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014 termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession
of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ- centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
TABINO, Petitioners, possession de facto.
vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over
the case. The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the
DEL CASTILLO, J.: allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by
the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that
#24 has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015 the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION any contract, express or implied.
GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.
that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of
their property by the respondents; or how the respondents entry had
BERSAMIN, J.:
been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents
had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents
Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a
illegal use and occupation of the property. As such, the action was
relocation and verification survey which showed that respondents had
not unlawful detainer.
encroached on a portion of said lot. When the respondents refused to
vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession
thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for
unlawful detainer.
#25 NONE
MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the
decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately January 27, 2016
dismissed case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation G.R. No. 217694
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, discovery of their entry into the subject premises will not and cannot
vs. automatically create an action for unlawful detainer. It must be stressed
ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent. that the defendants possession in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but simply became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
MENDOZA, J.: right to possess. The plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of possession. Otherwise, if it was
#26 unlawful from the start it is actionable for forcible entry. Filing for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
In this instant case, the failure of petitioners to allege the key
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer was not
Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN
met, the MCTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. A void
AND TERESITA PUNZALAN, Respondents.
judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. Petitioners may
be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but they unfortunately
PERALTA, J.:
availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession. Nevertheless, they
may still opt to file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with
FACTS:
the proper RTC.

Petitioners alleged that their mother, Rufina Vda. De

This petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Catacutan, who died on November 17, 2005, had acquired a parcel of
Appeals; dated February 17, 2012, and Resolution dated July 25, 2012,
land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga, consisting of 3, 272 square
are AFFIRMED.
meters. They contended that respondent spouses Punzalan
constructed their house on a portion of said lot without their consent
and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking that #27 NONE
they would vacate once their need for the property arises. However,
when they made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to vacate. G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016
Thus, on April 9, 2008, petitioners wrote the spouses a formal demand
letter to vacate. Still they refused to leave the property. On August 22, BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE BAPTIST
2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with the S.B.C., INC., Petitioners, v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH,
INC. AND REYNALDO GALVAN, Respondent.
MCTC.

The MCTC then rendered a Decision on June 22, 2009, in PERALTA, J.:

favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants were ordered to vacate and

surrender its possession to the plaintiffs. #28 NONE

The Spouses Punzalan brought the case to the RTC. The RTC January 18, 2017
also then affirmed the MCTC Decision in toto. Aggrieved, the Spouses
Punzalan forwarded the cases to the Court of Appeals. On February 17, G.R. No. 221071
2012, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
denied hence this petition. The petitioners insist that their complaint
causes an action for unlawful detainer which therefore gives the MCTC REYES, J.:
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners claim or cause of action is

one for unlawful detainer and not for forcible entry.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disagrees. A complaint for unlawful

detainer should have the following: 1) the defendants initial possession
of the property was lawful; 2) that such possession became illegal; 3)
because they refused to vacate and as a result deprived the plaintiff of
the property; and 4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment
within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property.

Despite the petitioners contention, the Supreme Court finds

that the allegations make up a case for forcible entry and not unlawful
detainer. The evidence clearly reveal that the spouses possession was
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated. The Spouses Punzalan
started to occupy the lot and built a house in it without the permission
and consent of petitioners. This is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry.

In the similar case of Zacarias vs Anacay, the fact that

petitioners actually tolerated the spouses continued occupation after