Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146

SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed
for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee, vs. AUGUSTO CE

DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan.
G.R. No. L-14858 December 29, 1960

FACTS: Mariano Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and
a passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on said vehicles for 1957.
To cover the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to the Provincial
Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under postal money orders. The postal
cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August
31, 1957; so does the postal cancellation mark on the face of the money orders. The Registrar
of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section 8 (1), Act 3992,
otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees
was payable on or before the last working day of August; that the last working day of August,
1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal
cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law. Accordingly,
said official sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or otherwise, threatened to
confiscate the certificate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes "B" & "C"). Gonzaga
brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipulation of facts, rendered
judgment.

ISSUE: WON the remittance of petitioner-appellee covering the second installment of
registration fees for 1957, made by registered mail with postal cancellation dated August 31,
1957, was within the time fixed by law.

HELD: As correctly held by the court, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 1880, the Motor
Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on Saturday, Aug. 31, 1957, is immaterial
in the case, it is not pretended by respondent-appellant that the Post Office ceased or has
ceased to transact business and discharge its functions on Saturdays by reason alone of
Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore,the remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the
by law, as provided in Section 8 (I), in connection with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as
amended.lawphil.net The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by
Proclamation No. 437 (dated August 31, 1957) of the President of the Philippines did not have
the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees
without penalty. On the contrary, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O.

DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents. G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981
FACTS: Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to
apply for a loan. Valencia arranged everything about the loan with the bank. He supplied to the latter
the personal data required for Castro's loan application. After the bank approved the loan for the
amount of P3,000.00, Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note
corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank. On the same day, the Valencia spouses obtained
from the bank an equal amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed another promissory note (Exhibit
"2") corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castro affixed thereon her signature as
co-maker. Both loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage on Castro's house and lot. Later, the
sheriff of Manila sent a notice to Castro, saying that her property would be sold at public auction to
satisfy the obligation covering the two promissory notes plus interest and attorney's fees. Upon
request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the auction sale was
postponed, but was nevertheless auctioned at a later date. Castro claimed that she is a 70-year old
widow who cannot read and write in English. According to her, she has only finished second grade.
She needed money in the amount of P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses
Valencia, who accompanied her to the bank to secure a loan of P3,000.00. While at the bank, an
employee handed to her several forms already prepared which she was asked to sign, with no one
explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents. She also alleged that it was only when
she received the letter from the sheriff that she learned that the mortgage contract which was an
encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00 and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to
sign as co-maker of the promissory note without her being informed. Castro filed a suit against
petitioners contending that thru mistake on her part or fraud on the part of Valencias she was
induced to sign as co-maker of a promissory note and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot
to secure the questioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro deposited the
amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus interest. Castro
prayed for: (1) the annulment as far as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and
mortgage (Exhibit "6") insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; and (2) for the discharge of her personal
obligation with the bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the filing of
her complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the
promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank,
and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only.

HELD: Yes. RATIO: While the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her sign the promissory note
and the mortgage contract, they also misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualifications in
order to secure its consent to the loan. Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the
misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed
mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their
consents given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the true
qualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their consents to the
contracts. Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third
person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and
the same is mutual. We cannot declare the promissory note valid between the bank and Castro and
the mortgage contract binding on Castro beyond the amount of P3,000.00, for while the contracts
may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because
the bank was not a participant thereto, such may however be invalidated on the ground of
substantial mistake mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and
misrepresentation inflicted by the Valencias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso, this Court declared
that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a third person, even
without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting parties, resulted in mutual error on the
part of the parties to the contract. The fraud particularly averred in the complaint, having been
proven, is deemed sufficient basis for the declaration of the promissory note invalid insofar as it
affects Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract valid only up to the amount of
P3,000.00.

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks
and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to
be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. \

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs
de oficio.

TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J.

Juego
CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249
FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji
Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal
Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on
arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin,
which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated
Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the
RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria
Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint
against petitioners personnel.

Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

Cui vs Arellano University 2 SCRA 205, May 30, 1961

FACTS; Emeritio Cui was granted scholarship by the defendant university on scholarship merit
as a student of the College of Law. Stipulated in the contract for the scholarship grant is the
following:

In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my

right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant)
the equivalent of my scholarship cash.

On his last semester on the University, Cui transferred to Abad Santos University where
his uncle, the previous dean and legal adviser of Arellano University, was now the dean
of the College of Law of Abad Santos University.

Before taking the bar, Cui petitioned the defendant university for the release of his TOR.
The university refused until Cui refunded the scholarship granted to him totaling the
amount of Php 1,033.87, which he did under protest.

Thereafter, he filed for recovery plus damages. The Court of First Instance of Manila
ruled in favor or Arellano University. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation on waiver of right to transfer without having refunded the
scholarship is void.

HELD: Yes. The stipulation contravenes both moral and public policy. Scholarship grants are
not for propaganda purposes but are awards for merits.

Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation

Facts: Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the
tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules
and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for
the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim
their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for
damages.

Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have
already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case
before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they
would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may
have not availed of such a remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever
award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted.
The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the
purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law
sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles
him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

TI TLE: J uan Mi ci ano v Andr e Br i mo

CI TATI ON: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phi l 867
FACTS : J uan Mi ci ano, j udi ci al admi ni s t r at or of t he es t at e i n ques t i on, f i l ed a s cheme of
par t i t i on. Andr e Br i mo, one of t he br ot her s of t he deceas ed (J os eph Br i mo) oppos ed
Mi ci anos par t i ci pat i on i n t he i nher i t ance. J os eph Br i mo i s a Tur ki s h ci t i z en.
I SSUE: Whet her Tur ki s h l aw or Phi l i ppi ne l aw wi l l be t he bas i s on t he di s t r i but i on of
J os eph Br i mos es t at es .
HELD: Though t he l as t par t of t he s econd cl aus e of t he wi l l expr es s l y s ai d t hat i t be
made and di s pos ed of i n accor dance wi t h t he l aws i n f or ce i n t he Phi l i ppi ne I s l and, t hi s
condi t i on, des cr i bed as i mpos s i bl e condi t i ons , s hal l be cons i der ed as not i mpos ed and
s hal l not pr ej udi ce t he hei r or l egat ee i n any manner what s oever , even s houl d t he
t es t at or ot her wi s e pr ovi de. I mpos s i bl e condi t i ons ar e f ur t her def i ned as t hos e
cont r ar y t o l aw or good mor al s . Thus , nat i onal l aw of t he t es t at or s hal l gover n i n hi s
t es t ament ar y di s pos i t i ons .
The cour t appr oved t he s cheme of par t i t i on s ubmi t t ed by t he j udi ci al admi ni s t r at or , i n
s uch manner as t o i ncl ude Andr e Br i mo, as one of t he l egat ees .

Bellis vs. Bellis 20 scra 258

Facts: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death.
Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other
disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children
were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law)
governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory
heirs.

Issue: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional

rights.

Held: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law,
there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national
law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it
shall be governed by the Philippine law.

Albenson Enterprises vs. CA

Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific
Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks.
Check was later dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source
of check and later
discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an
extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the
signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It
was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages
the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform
Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against
Albenson.

Issue: whether or not the respondent have a cause of action for damages based on
abuse of rights

Held: No Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. ..A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN ET. AL. V. REYES

G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J
FACTS: Mr. Reyes attended the personal party thrown for the hotels manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuroka, on account of Dr. Violeta Filart vouching for his attendance, to
which she agreed. While in the buffet table, Ruby Lim, executive secretary of Hotel
Nikko, allegedly ordered him to leave the party in a loud voice, effectively embarrassing
him in front of many people. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that she asked the
respondent to leave in a discreet manner. Petitioner prays for the reversal of the
decision of CA against them.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner violate articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code thus entitling the
respondent for compensation of damages?

HELD:
Petitioner did not violate articles 19 and 21 for there was no intention on her part to
humiliate Reyes as demonstrated by the fact that she was close to be able to kiss the
respondent while she was asking him to leave. Decision of CA was reversed and of
RTC Quezon City affirmed.

QUISUMBING vs MERALCO
GR No. 142943, 3 April 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house located at
Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants
inspectors were conducting a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters
at the house. Permission was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. It was found that the
meter had been tampered with and the information was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors brought the meter
to their laboratory for further verifications. If proven that the meter was indeed
tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services.
The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the laboratory. And
unless they pay the amount of P178, 875.01 representing the difference in the bill, their
electric supply will be disconnected.
The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
1. MERALCO acted without due process and lack of regard for Quisumbings rights
and reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on
the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.
The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of
electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the
people. Meralco may immediately disconnect service in cases of meter tampering, but it
has to be personally witnessed and attested by an officer of the law or by a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no
government official or ERB representative was present.
Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential 0f P193,
332. 96 while MERALCO was ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages
including attorneys fees.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, VS. ROMEO A. JADER,

respondent GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular
examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he
was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his
application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation
for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and
Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiffs name appeared. Thus, he attended the
investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at
the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he
incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from
the latters negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. The
CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and
ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.

RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral
damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock,
trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he
should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those
appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all
the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and
therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for
negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was
affirmed with modification.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C.

HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO
M. TOBIAS 176 SCRA 778 August 25, 1989

Facts: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing

agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and
General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he
was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered
him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and
initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private
investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports
from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total
of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in

January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil
case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge
Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners
to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks
about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook,
and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners
against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations
of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code.

TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

CITATION: 133 SCRA 179
FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE
Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his
house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart
is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured
was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission
and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote
a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No
rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto,
the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to
demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published
an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of
the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad,
the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE: W/N St. Louis Realty should be held liable under Art. 21 and 26.

HELD: YES. Affirmed

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To
suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up.
It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or
that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
 and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental
anguish.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA

219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical exchange student. He later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents.
The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She filed a
complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied
the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at
one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since
he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed
marriage, neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing
money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and
reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for damages.

HELD:

Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when
a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious
desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue
and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to
have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the
wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard
of the laws of the country.

TITLE: Pe vs. Pe
CITATION: 5 SCRA 200
FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one
of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to
visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The
defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each
other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages
was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral,
good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The
defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as
a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced

to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Wassmer vs. Velez 12 scra 648

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared
in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as
actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held: Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and
only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with
Art. 21 on the New Civil Code. When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under
the same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded when it is proven that
the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest/ Brief
G.R. No. L-14628
Procedural Facts: Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered
decision in favor of P (soledad). Lower Courts decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by increasing compensatory damages and moral damages.
Substantive Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten
(10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy
developed among them Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born.
However defendant married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of
promise to marry?
HELD: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she
cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover
compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys
fees.
REASONING: Because of defendant-appellants seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is
liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under
the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Constantino vs. Mendez

209 SCRA 18
FACTS: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her
mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on
damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working
as a waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married
man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became
pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was
set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.
HELD: Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim
that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan
and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was
not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual
intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. More
so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual
intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving
force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAO

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in
one of Pastors friends house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicentas
parents arranged for them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their
marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving
an anonymous letter alleging that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with
matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went
back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her husbands welfare in her letters,
she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-
prosecution because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single
and left for the United States. She filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on
the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character which the Nevada court
granted even when she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escao, her
parents Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections. He asked
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the
remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the
other to recover damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie
in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and
participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in
favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder,
as security for the payment of a loan.

As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon,
respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the
Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial
sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.

Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on
October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period,
respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of
Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to
dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion
for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on
annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ
of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a
Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of
sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

HELD: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of
a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which
can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in
civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a
criminal case.

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMON D.

LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents
160 SCRA 441
April 15, 1988
Facts: This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by
petitioner when the Court denied his motion for reconsideration due to lack of merit.
Private respondent Paz Abayan filed an information for bigamy against
petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior
marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his second marriage was
void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence,
intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can
proceed.

Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First
Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that
the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

Held: The respondent judge answered in the negative. The Court sustained him. The
requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of
the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private
respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato
failed to prove that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO

34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant Felix Icao, were neighbors in
Dapitan City. They had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent. Carmen got pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by
defendant. As a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.

Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack
of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and damages.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens
rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

GELUZ vs. CA
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazos wife Nita Villanueva, came to know petitioner physician Antonio
Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she
and Oscar were legally married. To conceal the pregnancy from her parents, she decided to
have it aborted by Geluz. She had an abortion again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.

After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got pregnant again and had yet another abortion
at Geluz clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his
election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor has he given consent on the
abortion.

ISSUE:

Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an
aborted child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were unable to find any basis for an
award of moral damages. Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.

Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but,
including his wife would be the beneficiaries.

It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money from the payment to be made since he
sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim,
which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA

G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933

FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law
Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an unmarried scion of a prominent
family in Manila. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child is his and he wanted
his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote
letters which are solicitous of Antonia and the babys welfare. He made hospital
arrangements through his friend for Antonias delivery.

After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and married another woma.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge
of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of
Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia are sufficient
proof of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the fathers
resolution to admit the status.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling Syquia to provide
support for the child Ismael Loanco.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs

Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montao
Facts: In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the
death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for
arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montao act as the
arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of Montao.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA,
death benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in this
case, no death has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a
fetus has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the
Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that
the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA
nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put
in question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is
already a legitimate dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg
cell).

2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is
no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is
not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil
personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillanos fetus had had life
inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the
unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an
employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE

45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the
Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent
of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution.

DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC

G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976

FACTS:
On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering defendants
Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to
pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of
interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to
pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment.

Upon defendants failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had
become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the
foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which he had given as security under the bond. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in
its order of November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action
was filed. Orias death was not known to Quality Plastic AND that Testate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Orias duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment against
Oria and the execution against his land.

ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Orias estate?

HELD:
The lower courts judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He
had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The execution sale of Orias land is also void. However, Quality plastics cannot be held liable
for damages and other costs because they were in good faith in including Oria as defendant
for no one informed them of his death.

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman

Facts: PT&T initially hired Grace de Guzman as a reliever for an employee who had a
maternity leave from November 1990 to April 1991. From June 10-July 1991 and from
July 19-August 8, 1991, she was again engaged by the said company to relieve another
employee who took a leave on both periods. In September of the same year, Pt&T hired
de Guzman as a probationary employee. In the job application form that she filled up for
the said hiring, she indicated her civil status to be single even though she got married
in May of 1991. It was later found out that de Guzman also indicated the same civil
status for her June and July engagements. Petitioner PT&T sent a memorandum to de
Guzman, requiring her to explain the above mentioned discrepancy. She was reminded
about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her
reply letter, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T s policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden
her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January
29, 1992.NLRC held that de Guzman was illegally dismissed, and ordered her
reinstatement and payment of back wages and COLA. NLRC denied PT&Ts motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this case.

Issue: WON de Guzman may be dismissed on the ground of her marital status

Held: De Guzman was entitled to reinstatement and the payment of back wages. She
should not have been dismissed because of her marital status.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is a special
contract, the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution. Hence, it
cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations.
Therefore, it is unlawful for PT&T, and for any employer, to prejudice an employee
merely by reason of marriage.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252
FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her
parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the
conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and
demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept
on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and
stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal
home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.

HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in
the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her
in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The
law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if
the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the
case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Leoncia Balogbog vs. CA, G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS: In 1968, the respondents brought an action for partition and accounting,
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino B., and as such they were
entitled to the 1/3 share of Gavino in Basilios estate. The petitioners denied knowing
the respondents. They alleged that Gavino died single and they are not aware that he
has two sons. The petitioners further questioned the validity of marriage between their
brother and Catalina.

ISSUE:
(1) WON the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of
marriage certificate.
(2) WON Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may
be rebutted when there is a proof to the contrary. Although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidences may be shown to prove the marriage.
(2) Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the
Civil Registry does not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate children.
The legitimacy was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses including Catalina.
Moreover, although made in another case, Gaudioso admitted that Ramonito is his
nephew.

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.

SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
respondents.

Facts: Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora,
are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.
Complainants filed an administrative complaint with the OCA on October 5, 1992 on the
following charges: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly
reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. The case was
thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, for investigation report and recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge illegally solemnized marriages.

RULING: Yes. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license, he is the

one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage
certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves
show that he did not solemnize the marriage.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ 185 SCRA 45

FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She cohabited with the petitioner against her will
and always had the intention of escaping. She died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenios residence on Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court
then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas
body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for
autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: WON Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?

HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman
or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated under Art. 294
of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a
man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to
be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.

WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ,

defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez
went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked
the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the
law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find
this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of
promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation.

ISSUE: WON Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
moral damages?

RULING: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not
considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage
license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to
demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and
ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she
suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because
the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back
and the wedding will push through.

Alcantara vs. Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment
be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the
decision.

Issue: WON was there an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license
is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996

FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge Hernando Domagtoy for two acts:

1. For solemnizing the wedding between Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga. The groom is
merely separated from his wife. The judge relied on the affidavit by the MTC Judge of Basy
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years, thus the
presumption that she is already dead.
2. For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma Del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of the above acts.

HELD:
 1. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wifes
presumptive death. In the absence of which, he remains married to the first wife thus, legally
incapacitated to contract a subsequent marriage. It was an error to have accepted a joint
affidavit. The judges negligence resulted to solemnizing a bigamous marriage.
2. The justification that the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was solemnized in his home
on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Gemma alone is erroneous. According to the Family
Code, marriage can be solemnized outside of the Courts jurisdiction upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and given a stern warning that repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ARAES vs. JUDGE OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Araes and Orobia as husband and wife until her husband passed away. Since the marriage
was a nullity, she was deprived to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and to receive
the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the
marriage of the parties having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete. He agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan.

He discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he suggested
resetting it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. He reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala which never
materialized.

Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her
own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage outside of his jurisdiction and without
the requisite of marriage license given his reason of human compassion and given the fact
that the petitioner already desisted from her complaint?

HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia
in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline
of court personnel, would be undermined.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal

Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Laxamana vs. Jose T. Baltazar

No. L-5955 19September1952
FACTS OF THE CASE:
July 1952 the mayor of Saxmoan Pampanga was suspended the vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar,
assumed office as mayor by virtue of sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However
the Provincial Governor acting under the Revised Election Code sec 21(a) with the consent
of the Provincial Board appointed Jose L. Laxamana as mayor of Saxmoan, who
immediately took the corresponding official oath.

ISSUE: Whether or not Revised Admin Code should prevail over Revised Election Code?
HELD: The exceptional case is the suspension of mayors where the Revised Admin Code
prevails. In case of conflict between two provisions of law, it is well-settled principle of
statutory construction that a special provision is paramount to a general provision.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with the same
subject in a more detailed way, the two shall be harmonized if possible but if there be any
conflict the latter will prevail (When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent
the latter is paramount to the former)
I hope this helps.

LIM TANHU vs. REMOLETE

66 SCRA 425

FACTS:
Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, a Chinese citizen partner,
owner with controlling interest of Glory Commercial Co. Antonio Lim Tahhu and Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but wer mere employees of Chuan, both are
naturalized Filipinos.

Tan Put alleged that Tan Hu and several others took actual/active management of the
partnership through fraud and machination. She is claiming entitlement to the share of
capital and profits including assets acquired during the lifetime of Chuan, being the widow
of the latter.

Chuan died in 1966 which dissolved the partnership and shares corresponded to him ws
given to his legitimate wife Ang Siok Tin and his chidren, all residing in Hongkong.
Defendants contended that Tan Put is merely a common-law wife. Their union was
dissolved by Chuan himself when he was still alive and she was given a settlement. They
were unable to bear a child who would have been a lawful heir of Chuan.

ISSUE:
Is Tan Put entitled to claim Chuans share in the company?

HELD:
Primary evidence of marriage is the authentic copy of the Marriage certificate. Other
competent evidence may also be accepted when the absence of the Marriage Certificate is
satisfactorily explained. Certification of the person who solemnized the wedding is not
admissible evidence of marriage.

Agreement with Chuan which was signed by Tan Put that she received settlement for
property interests when they terminated their common-law union has greater weight over
the certification issued by Mons. Jose M. Recoleto which does not show the reason why
there was no Marriage Certificate. In as much as the bishop did not testify, the same is
hearsay.
VDA DE CHUA vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 118635, 5 March 1998

FACTS:
Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock with Roberto Lim Chua, single and begot two children
with him. Chua died intestate in May 28, 1992. Florita filed for petition for declaration of
heirship and guardianship for her sons and real and personal properties of their minor
children.

Court ordered hearing and publication of the said petition in Maguindanao, Cotabato City
and Davao City.

Antoinetta Garcia Vda de Chua filed an opposition to dismiss due to improper venue since
the deceased died in Davao, then Davao RTC has the proper jurisdiction. The court denied
the motion for lack of merit.

During the hearing, Garcia contended that she was the legal wife and that Chua resides in
Davao at the time of his death. She presented a photocopy of their Marriage Certificate. She
also submitted TCT, Residence certificate, ITR and passport all stating that he is married.

Florita On the other hand submitted birth certificates of their children as well as
certification from the Local Civil Registrar that Chua does not have existing marriage
registered. Judge Banzali also denied having solemnized the said wedding.

ISSUE:
Where is the deceaseds residence and could Antoinetta be the legal wife and heir of Chua?

HELD:
Evidence proved that Chuas residence is in Cotabato although he frequents Davao and
usually stays there for business purposes.

Garcia was unable to establish proof of her alleged marriage which consequently denies her
entitlement to oppose Vallejos petition.

Photostat copy of the marriage certificate cannot be admitted as evidence. Only the original
or an authenticated copy would suffice as evidence of marriage.
Certification from the Local Civil Registrar that no such marriage was recorded and
certification from the alleged solemnizing officer denying the act made her evidence as well
as the other documents worthless.

REPUBLIC vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994

FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro file a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage with Edwin
Cardenas on the ground that no Marriage License was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of the marriage. Edwin failed to file an answer and was declared in default.

Angelina and Edwin had a civil wedding with Judge Pablo Malvar in Pasay City without the
knowledge of Castros parents. Cardenas procured the requirements including the marriage
license in Pasig MM. They cohabited for four months and bore a child. They parted and the
child was adopted by Castros brother with the consent of Cardenas.

SCRO of Pasay issued a certification that marriage license of the spouses does not appear
from their registry. Castro also testified that she did not apply for marriage license and did
not sign anything until the marriage certificate.

The lower court denied the petition stating that the certification is inadequate to establish
non-issuance of the marriage license. The inability to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was none issued.

ISSUE:
Would the documentary and testimonial evidence presented be sufficient to grant a decree
of nullity?

HELD:
At the time of their marriage the governing law was the New Civil code which states that the
absence of a marriage license would render the marriage void ab initio.

The fact that only Castro testified cannot be held against her. Her husbands default after duly
served with notice cannot be faulted on Castro.

The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro which was undisputed by any
party, sufficiently established the absence of the marriage license. Thus, marriage was null
and void ab initio.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,

petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian
Family Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government.
Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior
dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia.
March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
in the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to
Samson in November 1997.
In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in
1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by
Philippine Laws.
2. Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the
Australian decree of divorce.
3. Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced
marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad.

Held:
1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
2. No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he
showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official
act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due
execution. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity
to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that
presentation solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient.
3. Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we
REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D.

RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820
Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the
marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and
Alexandria Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was
denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again
denied by the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners
motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling
issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their
children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent judge.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of
divorce from a foreign country.

Held:
Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign
country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children.
In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial
court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued
on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has
parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and
Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON.
CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents
174 SCRA 653
June 30, 1989
Facts:
This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the
order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI.
Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7
September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manilawhere their
only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986,
Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree
of divorce on the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage.
27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with
a certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983. Several motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the
petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former husband.
(2) Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery
against the petitioner.

Held:
(1) The petitioners family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound
to Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However, Philippine laws recognize decrees
validly and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse
who obtained a divorce decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to
the Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law.
(2) As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the action for adultery under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond
had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent. SO ORDERED.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen in Hongkong in
1972. They had two children. They got divorced in Nevada U.S.A in 1982 and both certified
that they do not have any community property to divide. Alice remarried to Theodore Van
Dorn.

Upton filed a suit in June 1983 stating that Reyes business in Manila is conjugal property.
He demands to render an accounting to the business and declare his right to manage the
business. Reyes moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action is barred by the
previous judgment in Nevada divorce wherein they both acknowledged having no
community property as of June 11, 1982.

Reyes motion was denied by the lower court stating that the property is located in the
Philippines so that the divorce decree has no bearing.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties to their property in the Philippines?

HELD:
Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no
standing to sue in the case where the husband is entitled to control over conjugal assets.

The divorce obtained abroad being valid in his countrys court may be recognized in the
Philippines. The divorce decree granted in Nevada released Reyes from the marriage for the
marriage had been severed by one party ceases to bind either.
Getting a divorce decree in the US court and contending that it is not valid and binding in the
Philippines being contrary to local law and public policy estopped Uptons declaration.

Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses

Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie
upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony
pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the
children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a
petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for
adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of their children. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption necessary.

Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of
abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without
the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

Tenchavez vs. Escao

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
FACTS: In February 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao secretly married
each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of
prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When
Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao
withdrew from having a re-celebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having
an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later,
Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she
subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that
Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and caused her to be
estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time
awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts
of the Philippines.

RULING:
No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved
under the Philippine Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed
valid under the Philippine Law to which Escao was bound since in the time the divorce
decree was issued, Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the
wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any
justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on
the basis of adultery.

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981. Both are
Filipino citizens. They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to the U.S. in 1986
with one son.

Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000,
Orbecindo learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried. Orbecindo then
filed a petition for authority to remarry. The court granted the petition since there was no
opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory relief. The
following are the requisites:

1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried
can also be allowed to remarry.

However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record and are only based on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized American
citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had remarried an American. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon submission of evidence in his favor.

NIAL vs. BAYADOG

328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. Almst two years thereafter Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is valid

HELD:
The two marriages involved herein is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time
of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
The 5-year cohabitation period should be the years immediately preceding the marriage and
it should be characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. In the case at bar Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time he cohabited with another.

It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed. Void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4 children. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
Judge Sanchez. The Judge knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.

In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit. Had he known that Manzano was married he would have refused to
solemnize the marriage

David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia
Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been
marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore

ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous marriage?

HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a legal
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely
de facto, as in the case at bar.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage.

Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the

MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.

COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR. 237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same
Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint
was field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal
solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages
even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not
reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.

HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that
the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void
ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally and
administratively liable.

* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code
provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government.

MARIATEGUI Vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4
children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other
hand had a son named Ruperto.

Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3
children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband
and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and
was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration
of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition
of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition
dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid and entitles their children of heirship for
the properties left by Lupo.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband
and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life. Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights

DOMINGO vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property against petitioner Roberto Domingo. They were married on November 29, 1976
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlinda sued for bigamy.

Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia while he has
been unemployed and dependent. Out of her personal earnings, she purchased properties
amounting to P350k, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto. In
June 1989, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman and he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.
The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; 2. their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect;
and 3. Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at
the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management
and administration of the attorney-in-factMoises Avera, her brother

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for the purpose of remarriage. It is
necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his
partner was not lawfully married thus free from being charged with bigamy.

The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the formers previous marriage
was still subsisting, thus, bigamous and void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes.

There is no need for a separate action of partition of property because it will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They
had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had
lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died
in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was
void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit
for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma
is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. They were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son, Andre O. Molina
was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility. He preferred to spend time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money. He depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.

Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner. In
October 1986 the couple had a very intense fight, which resulted to their estrangement until
Reynaldo finally abandoned them. Roridel desires to have the marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridels
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage,
Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and Roridels
failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. The petitioner is not asking
support or for damages. Their common child is in the custody of the petitioner.

ISSUES:
Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent to psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The present case, does not show that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance
of some marital obligations.

Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to be established:

(The Molina Doctrine)

1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage,
the couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julias
parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States.
Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had
then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Courtdismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

RULING:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity

and (c) incurability.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the
factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard
required to decree a nullity of marriage.