Art 226

(1) EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILS. And Facundo (as FFW President) VS. BAYER PHILS.
G.R. 162943
December 6 2010

Facts:
A wage hike was being negotiated between EUBP and Bayer, but EUBP did not accept under the direction of its
affiliation, FFW. A splinter group of the union led by Remigio, however, accepted the wage hike against the union
leadership.

Remigio started the Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines, or REUBP, which proceeded to reconstitute
itself as the new union for the employees, and to further unaffiliated itself with FFW. Remigio wrote to the Bayer
president demanding union dues be paid to it, while EUBP demanded the same, Facundo also accusing the
company of interfering in purely union matters, and filing a case for failure to pay the dues. Uncertain who to pay,
Bayer kept the dues in a trust fund. Despite repeated requests of EUBP for a grievance conference, Bayer turned
over the dues to REUBP.

EUBP filed a case with the LA against Remigios group praying for their expulsion with the DOLE, and another case
for the union dues: this time raising accusations of unfair labor practice (that the company was interfering with the
union) The LA dismissed the first union dues case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it was an intra-union conflict. The
second complaint was also dismissed.

While the case for the union dues was ongoing, the Regional Director of the DOLE Industrial Relations Division
dismissed the issue of expulsion, but EUBP appealed it with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) which reversed the
same. The BLR ordered Bayer to respect the original CBA with EUBP. However, the BLR award came too late, since a
new CBA was executed between Bayer and REUBP. The LA dismissed the second Union Dues complaint.

The EUBP prayed for injunction with the NLRC, arguing that the LA has no jurisdiction to rule on any of the cases:
because the issue at hand involves an intra-union dispute, Art. 226 of the Labor Code provides that it is the BLR
which has original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union disputes.

There are 3 important complaints:

(a) EUBPs first case against Bayer Philippines, and Remigios splinter group, filed in the LA for unfair labor
practice failure to pay dues;
(b) EUBPs case against Remigios splinter group, filed with the DOLE, appealed to the BLR an intra-union
dispute;
(c) EUBPs second case against Bayer Phils. Filed with the LA, for unfair labor practice failure to pay dues.

The NLRC dismissed the petition, ruling that it had no jurisdiction to issue injunction, as it was an inter-union dispute.

EUBP filed for 65 certiorari with the CA, raising jurisdictional issues, which ruled that it was not the BLR that had
jurisdiction to rule on the issues, because this intra-union dispute involved unfair labor practices. Art. 226 last
paragraph provides for resort to the Grievance Machinery and the Voluntary Arbitrator, not with the LA.

Issue:
Did the LA have jurisdiction to award the petitions? Was there unfair labor practice?

Held:
1. NO to (A), yes to (B) and (C)
Since (A) was an intra-union dispute, Art. 226 applies. Merely raising unfair labor practice will not
automatically bring the complaint within the jurisdiction of the LA. The complaint must show a prima facie
case of (1) gross violation of the CBA and (2) Violation of the economic provisions of said CBA. Clearly the
issue was an intra-union dispute which should have been submitted to the grievance machinery.
(B) was validly ruled upon but was superseded by a new CBA between Bayer and REUBP.
Which makes a valid complaint, because now it is evident that Bayer Phils. is guilty of unfair labor practice.
By supporting another bargaining body, it violated Sec. 1 (n) of Rule XI, D.O. no. 40-03, series of 2003.
Bayers support for REUBP is tantamount to violating EUBPs right to organization, union membership, and
collective bargaining.

2. There was unfair labor practice. Though Bayer argued it did not grossly violate the CBA, or its economic
provisions, it undermined EUBPs authority to bargain for its constituency.
(2) MONTANO v VERCELES
G.R. No. 168583
July 26 2010

Facts:
Petitioner was a lawyer and rank-and-file employee of FFW, a union. He also became President, and OIC of the legal
center. He ran for Vice President of the FFW, but the FFW COMELEC disqualified him, citing the unions by-laws and
constitution which disallowed members of the Governing Board to run for election. He challenged the same with the
COMELEC, but his name was included in the list of candidates anyway, and he won, was sworn into office.
Respondent challenged his victory with the BLR, submitting that he was sworn into office against the unions
constitution and by laws.

As a defense, petitioner raised jurisdictional issues: That it was the DOLE Regional Director, and not the BLR, which
had jurisdiction to rule on intra-union disputes. Further, that Verceles should have brought his case with the FFW
COMELEC.

The BLR ruled on the case, that it had jurisdiction to do so, and eventually ruled that Montano was qualified to run and
hold the office of vice president. The BLR interpreted the unions by-laws and cited its provisions to show that
Montano was not barred from running for office.

Verceles filed a 65 certiorari with the CA, again raising jurisdictional grounds. The CA ruled for Verceles, and reversed
the BLR ruling, finding that it had jurisdiction to rule on the same, and that by the nature of Montanos work as legal
officer of the FFW, his work was confidential. By the ambit of the unions by-laws, he is not embraced in the
exceptions to the rule.

Issue:
Did the BLR and/or CA have jurisdiction to rule on the case?

Held:
YES. But they are both wrong.

It is true that the BLR has jurisdiction over disputes involving intra-union disputes. Art. 226 is clear. Its finding,
however, that the unions by-laws would either permit or disqualify Montano, neglected the fact that the union has its
own COMELEC. By the tenor of the unions very own by-laws, it was the FFW COMELEC which had authority to
screen candidates and to determine their eligibility to run. Montano is disqualified to run for office, as ruled originally
by the FFW COMELEC. Yes, the BLR may rule on intra-union disputes. But when the issue here involves the by-laws
of the union, and the same by-laws provide that an authoritative office may rule on such issues, the BLR ought not
disturb such authority.
(3) DIOKNO V CACDAC
G.R. No. 168475
July 4 2007

Facts:
FLAMES is a union for the supervisory employees of MERALCO. They conducted their election of officers, to which
parties Daya et. al. were all disqualified. The COMELEC accepted the complaints from Diokno et. al. who accused
Daya et. al. of being affiliated with MERALCOs benefits and fund offices, and that some of them were not even
members of FLAMES. The COMELEC disqualified Daya et al.

Elections were held, and Daya et al. won. Diokno et al. question the validity of this election, citing that non-members
had interfered to help Daya win the elections.

Daya et. al. raised the issue with the Mediator-Arbitrator office of the DOLE, which ruled in favor of them. The Arbiter
interpreted the unions constitution to show that the grounds for removal of members is not the same as
disqualification for elections. Further, being voluntarily sought by the union to resolve an intra-union dispute, it is
within the jurisdiction of the Arbiter to hear the same.

Daya et al. then bypassed the COMELEC and went straight to the BLR, who affirmed in toto the Arbiters findings.
Diokno et al. raised jurisdictional issues, because Daya et al. did not exhaust all the remedies within the union to
resolve the issue. Thus, it was the argument of petitioners that the BLR could not rule on a union dispute still to be
decided upon by the COMELEC. The BLR, however, held that it had jurisdiction to rule on the same, citing elections as
an intra-union dispute, and that it was the right of Daya et al. to submit the election issue to an impartial body.
Then, they appealed to the CA, who affirmed it again. The CA held that it was the FLAMES Executive Board, and not
the COMELEC, which had the proper authority to disqualify candidates, as provided for in the unions by-laws. Thus,
even if the election case was entertained with the COMELEC, it could not categorically disqualify Daya et al.

With the Supreme Court, Diokno et al. challenges the affirmation of the CA by challenging the jurisdiction of the BLR.
It argues that Daya et al. should have exhausted remedies within the union before resorting to an action with the BLR.

Issue:
Did the BLR have jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes. The BLR, as provided for in Art. 226 of the Labor Code, has jurisdiction to rule on intra-union disputes. The facts
show that the COMELEC did not give Daya et al. ample time to respond to the accusations against them, thus they
were compelled to resort to the BLR for intervention. The procedural rule on exhaustion of remedies admits of
exceptions, as in this case. Further, the BLR may act even on its own initiative to settle intra-union disputes. No
investigations were conducted on Daya et al., and no voting was conducted to dismiss them as members of the
union. Thus, they were denied due process.
Art 227
(1) MAGBANUA v. UY G.R. No.161003 May 6, 2005

FACTS: In the case of Uy vs. NLRC the SC awarded Php. 1,487,312.69 to the 8 complainants therein as the amount of
wage differentials due them. Respondent Uy filed a manifestation requesting the case to be terminated stating that
the judgment award has been complied with to the satisfaction of petitioners. The manifestation was signed by the 8
petitioners and was accompanied by a joint affidavit attesting to the receipt of payment and waiving all other benefits
due them in connection with their complaint. Subsequently, petitioners filed an urgent motion for issuance of writ of
execution, alleging that they received only partial payments of the judgment award. Respondent claimed that the
award was fully satisfied. Six (6) of the eight (8) petitioners attested that they have no more collectible amount from
respondent and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving it.

LA RULING: The LA denied the motion for issuance of write of execution.

NLRC RULING: The NLRC directed the issuance of a writ of execution holding that a final and executor judgment can
no longer be altered.

CA RULING: The CA held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after final judgment, thus
petitioners validly released respondent upon execution of the waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.

ISSUE: Is the petitioners affidavit waiving the awards in the labor case executed without assistance of their counsel
and the labor arbiter valid?

SC RULING: Yes. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order
to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the manner they
have agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the
danger of losing. Verily, the compromise may be either extrajudicial (to prevent litigation) or judicial (to end a
litigation).

There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into after final judgment.
The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by
when it was entered into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements:
(1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise,
and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established. In the present factual milieu, compliance with the elements of
a valid contract is not in issue. Petitioners do not challenge the factual finding that they entered into a compromise
agreement with respondent.Instead, petitioners base their argument on the sole fact that the agreement was
executed despite a final judgment, which the Court had previously ruled to be allowed by law.

As regards the validity of the waiver, the presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not
determine its validity. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the
consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their consent
had been vitiated. The law is silent with regard to the procedure for approving a waiver after a case has been
terminated. Relevant, however, is this reference to the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure:

Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to
writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor
Arbiter.

The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the
parties and after having explained to them the terms and consequences thereof.

A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case
is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that
they understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them
and the agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.

This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation conference during the initial stage of the litigation.
Such provision should be made applicable to the proceedings in the pre-execution conference, for which the
procedure for approving a waiver after final judgment is not stated. There is no reason to make a distinction between
the proceedings in mandatory/conciliation and those in pre-execution conferences.
(2) SOLOMON et al v. POWERTECH CORPORATION, WILLIE CABOBOS and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Ng Powertech Corporation in
behalf of its 52 individual members and non-union members against their employer, Powertech. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of the employees awarding monetary claims in the total amount of P2,538,728.84.

Powertech appealed to the NLRC. During its pendency, Carlos Gestiada, for himself and on behalf of other
petitioners, executed a quitclaim, release and waiver4 in favor of Powertech in consideration of the amount of
P150,000.00. Earlier, Gestiada was appointed by his co-petitioners as their attorney-in-fact through a SPA.

Relying on the quitclaim and release, Powertech filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and cash bond. The
NLRC granted6 the motion, dismissed the appeal and ordered the release of the cash bond. The P150,000.00 check,
however, bounced due to a stop payment order of Powertech. Aggrieved, petitioners moved to nullify the release
and quitclaim for lack of consideration. In a Resolution the NLRC declared the quitclaim void for lack of consideration
and reinstated the appeal.

Gestiada then terminated the services of their counsel, Atty. Evangelista and, instead, retained Atty. Manuel Luis
Felipe of the Public Attorneys Office. A day later, Powertech paid P150,000.00 to Gestiada purportedly as
compromise amount for all of petitioners. That same day, Gestiada, through Atty. Felipe, and Powertech filed a joint
motion to dismiss10 with the NLRC based on the compromise agreement. Atty. Evangelista opposed11 the motion,
alleging that the compromise agreement is unconscionable and that the P150,000.00 was received by Gestiada as
payment solely for his backwages and other monetary claims.

Petitioners assert that the P150,000.00 paid to Gestiada was payment solely for himself. As proof, they rely on the
letter written in Filipino by Gestiada to Atty. Evangelista dated March 23, 2000.20 Right at the opening sentence,
Gestiada stated that "ang kinuha kong pera sa Powertech Corporation na halagang P150,000.00 ay bilang
kabayaran sa aking backwages na iginawad sa desisyon ni Kagalang-galang Labor Arbiter Joseph Rennel Dela
Cruz."

Powertech, on the other hand, argues that the P150,000.00 was given to Gestiada as compromise amount for all the
petitioners. It relies on the release and quitclaim signed by Gestiada indicating that he signed "for himself and
attorney-in-fact of all complainants." It is pointed out that Gestiada was given a special power of attorney to
negotiate with Powertech on behalf of petitioners.

NLRC: denied the joint motion to dismiss ; CA: reversed hence dismissed the case

ISSUE: Is the compromise agreement entered into by Gestiada on behalf petitioners valid?
SC RULING: No, it is not valid. If reliance is placed solely on the quitclaim release and waiver executed by Gestiada
and the special power of attorney, it would be an inevitable conclusion that the P150,000.00 compromise covered
the claims of petitioners, not merely that of Gestiada. That is apparent from the waiver and the special power of
attorney. There is much to be said, however, of the circumstances in the execution and the payment of the amount
which lead Us to conclude that the P150,000.00 was given to Gestiada solely as payment for his backwages and
other monetary claims.

To give effect to the collusion, Gestiada had to get rid of Atty. Evangelista, who had previously succeeded in nullifying
the compromise agreement. He fired Atty. Evangelista without cause basing his dismissal on his plenary authority as
agent of petitioners. He then procured the services of another lawyer, Atty. Felipe. We find it striking that Gestiada
was not authorized under the special power of attorney to terminate or retain another counsel for petitioners in the
labor dispute. The special power of attorney merely authorized Gestiada to negotiate with Powertech, nothing more.
Collusion is a species of fraud.27 Article 227 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC to void a compromise
agreement for fraud, thus:

Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon
the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved
therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained
through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

(3) PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ET. AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS:
Union filed a notice of strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board claiming that PJI was guilty of
unfair labor practice. PJI was then going to implement a retrenchment program due to "over-staffing or bloated work
force and continuing actual losses sustained by the company for the past three years resulting in negative
stockholders equity of P127.0 million." The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment certified4 the
labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. NLRC declared that the 31
complainants were illegally dismissed and that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioner's retrenchment
program. Declared that the retrenchment of 31 employees was illegal and ordered their reinstatement "to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where PJI
undertook to reinstate the 31 complainant-employees without loss of seniority rights and benefits; 17 of them who
were previously retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their respective monetary claims,
while 14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what they received by way of separation pay. The
agreement stated that the parties entered the agreement in a sincere effort at peace and reconciliation as well as to
jointly establish a new era in labor management relations. The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC
for approval. In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike. The Union claimed that 29
employees were illegally dismissed from employment, and that the salaries and benefits of 50 others had been
illegally reduced. After the retrenchment program was implemented, 200 Union members-employees who continued
working for petitioner had been made to sign five-month contracts. The Union also alleged that the company,
through its legal officer, threatened to dismiss some 200 union members from employment if they refused to
conform to a 40% to 50% salary reduction; indeed, the 29 employees who refused to accede to these demands were
dismissed.
NLRC RULING: It ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. The May 31, 2001 Resolution declaring the
retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it had been academically mooted by the compromise
agreement entered into between both parties. Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, this later resolution attained
finality upon the expiration of ten days from both parties' receipt thereof. Thus, the May 31, 2001 Resolution could not
be made the basis to justify the alleged continued employment regularity of the 29 complainants subsequent to their
retrenchment. Their separate acts of entering into fixed-term employment contracts with petitioner after their
separation from employment by virtue of retrenchment, they are deemed to have admitted the validity of their
separation from employment and are thus estopped from questioning it. Moreover, there was no showing that the
complainants were forced or pressured into signing the fixed-term employment contracts which they entered into.

CA RULING: It further held that the act of respondent in hiring the retrenched employees as contractual workers was
a ploy to circumvent the latter's security of tenure. This is evidenced by the admission of PJI, that it hired contractual
employees (majority of whom were those retrenched) because of increased, albeit uncertain, demand for its
publications.

ISSUE: W/O such a compromise agreement constitutes res judicata to a new complaint later filed by other union
membersemployees, not parties to the agreement, who likewise claim to have been illegally dismissed?

SC RULING: The nature of a compromise is spelled out in Article 2028 of the New Civil Code: it is "a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Parties to a
concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation, or, when litigation has already begun, to end it
because of the uncertainty of the result.27 Article 227 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise
agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State "to promote and
emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and
conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes." Thus, contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the
execution and subsequent approval by the NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the respondent Union did
not render the NLRC resolution ineffectual, nor rendered it "moot and academic." The agreement becomes part of
the judgment of the court or tribunal, and as a logical consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal.

In any event, the compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in the settlement itself
and gave specific individual consent. It must be remembered that a compromise agreement is also a contract; it
requires the consent of the parties, and it is only then that the agreement may be considered as voluntarily entered
into.

ARTICLE 232 (now Art. 238) Prohibition on Certification Election

1. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN v. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF

LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS
G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2000

DOCTRINE:
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry
date of such agreement. No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse
of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse
of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA
shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. Management has the prerogative to
discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with
the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

FACTS:
1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated
the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two
(2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of
officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President. Ambas wanted to
continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already
prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members,
who eventually rejected the said CBA.

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's decision was
reversed on appeal before the NLRC.

The union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the refusal to
bargain by petitioner.

On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year
CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the
union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the
meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work schedule
was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to
submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.

Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996
before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's
letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas'
dismissal.

On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner
stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition
for certification election.

ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the
ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for
certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization?
2. Is the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right to self-organization?

SC RULING:

1. YES. Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of
a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession.

Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to
this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on
February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.

Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still
had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second
notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not
yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply.

The company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where
the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear
evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.6 In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show a lack of sincere desire to
negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost
is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule"
under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " . If a
collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232,8 in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code.
No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom
period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed.9 Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.10 The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith
and for the stipulated original period.

In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994.1wphi1 The petition for certification election
by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof
was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar
to the ongoing negotiation.

2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in
order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas,
at the time of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a recipient
of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However,
things began to change when she was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA.
Thus, it was when she was the union president and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations when her
work schedule was altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge, although
her schedule was changed, she was outrightly dismissed for alleged insubordination.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise
of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to
union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the
Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the
Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to
oust her from the premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed
leadership. When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the
Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process."

Article 234 amended by RA 9481 (May 25, 2007)

1. MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS v. SEC. OF LABOR

G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009

DOCTRINE:
In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%)
of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate is one of the requirements of registration of a
labor organization.

FACTS:
Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc was issued a Certificate of Registration as a
legitimate labor organization. Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration
against respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20%
requirement, and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239.

The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration
as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102
employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173
union members at the time it applied for registration.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR: revoked the registration of respondent

BLE DIRECTOR: reversed and set aside the regional directors decision

CA: denied the petition for lack of merit

ISSUE: Are the affidavits of recantation valid?

SC RULING:
No. It is worthy to note, however, that the affidavit does not mention the identity of the people who allegedly forced
and deceived the affiant into joining the union, much less the circumstances that constituted such force and deceit.
Indeed, not only was this allegation couched in very general terms and sweeping in nature, but more importantly, it
was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after
the identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a petition for certification election on
May 23, 2005, since the names of the members were attached to the petition. The purported withdrawal of support
for the registration of the union was made after the documents were submitted to the DOLE, Region IV-A. The logical
conclusion, therefore, following jurisprudence, is that the employees were not totally free from the employers
pressure, and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
2. ELECTROMAT MANUFACTURING and RECORDING CORPORATION, v. HON. CIRIACO LAGUNZAD
G.R. No. 172699 July 27, 2011

REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY D.O 40-03

FACTS:
Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Electromat-Wasto, a charter affiliate of the Workers Advocates for
Struggle, Transformation and Organization applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations. Supporting the
application were the following documents: (1) copies of its ratified constitution and by-laws (CBL); (2) minutes of the
CBLs adoption and ratification; (3) minutes of the organizational meetings; (4) names and addresses of the union
officers; (5) list of union members; (6) list of rank-and-file employees in the company; (7) certification of
non-existence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the company; (8) resolution of affiliation with WASTO, a
labor federation; (9) WASTOs resolution of acceptance; (10) Charter Certificate; and (11) Verification under oath. The
BLR thereafter issued the union a Certification of Creation of Local Chapter pursuant to DO 40-03. Petitioner
Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation (company) filed a petition for cancellation of the unions
registration certificate, for the unions failure to comply with Article 234 of the Labor Code. It argued that D.O. 40-03 is
an unconstitutional diminution of the Labor Codes union registration requirements under Article 234.

DOLE: dismissed the petition

CA RULING: dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed BLR ruling. It brushed aside the companys objection to
D.O. 40-03, and its submission that D.O. 40-03 removed the safety measures against the commission of fraud in the
registration of unions

ISSUE: Is the DO 40-03 a valid exercise of the rule-making power of the DOLE

SC RULING:
Yes. Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a branch or local of a
registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national
union in order to increase the local unions bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. D.O. 40-03
represents an expression of the governments implementing policy on trade unionism. It builds upon the old rules by
further simplifying the requirements for the establishment of locals or chapters. As in D.O. 9, we see nothing contrary
to the law or the Constitution in the adoption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of D.O. 40-03 as this
department order is consistent with the intent of the government to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a
federation or national union to enhance the locals bargaining power. If changes were made at all, these were those
made to recognize the distinctions made in the law itself between federations and their local chapters, and
independent unions; local chapters seemingly have lesser requirements because they and their members are
deemed to be direct members of the federation to which they are affiliated, which federations are the ones subject to
the strict registration requirements of the law.

ARTICLE 232 (now Art. 238) Prohibition on Certification Election

1. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN v. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF

LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS
G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2000

DOCTRINE:
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry
date of such agreement. No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse
of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse
of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA
shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. Management has the prerogative to
discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with
the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

FACTS:
1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated
the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two
(2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of
officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President. Ambas wanted to
continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already
prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members,
who eventually rejected the said CBA.

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's decision was
reversed on appeal before the NLRC.

The union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the refusal to
bargain by petitioner.

On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year
CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the
union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the
meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work schedule
was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to
submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.

Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996
before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received petitioner's
letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas'
dismissal.

On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner
stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition
for certification election.

ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the
ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a petition for
certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization?
2. Is the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right to self-organization?

SC RULING:

1. YES. Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of
a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession.

Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to
this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on
February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.

Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still
had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second
notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not
yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply.

The company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the union's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where
the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear
evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.6 In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show a lack of sincere desire to
negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost
is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule"
under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " . If a
collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232,8 in relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code.
No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom
period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed.9 Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.10 The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the
workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith
and for the stipulated original period.

In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994.1wphi1 The petition for certification election
by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof
was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar
to the ongoing negotiation.

2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in
order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas,
at the time of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a recipient
of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However,
things began to change when she was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA.
Thus, it was when she was the union president and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations when her
work schedule was altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge, although
her schedule was changed, she was outrightly dismissed for alleged insubordination.

Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise
of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it amounts to
union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the
Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the
Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to
oust her from the premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed
leadership. When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the
Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process."
Article 234 amended by RA 9481 (May 25, 2007)

1. MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS v. SEC. OF LABOR

G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009

DOCTRINE:
In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%)
of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate is one of the requirements of registration of a
labor organization.

FACTS:
Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc was issued a Certificate of Registration as a
legitimate labor organization. Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration
against respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20%
requirement, and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239.

The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration
as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102
employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173
union members at the time it applied for registration.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR: revoked the registration of respondent

BLE DIRECTOR: reversed and set aside the regional directors decision

CA: denied the petition for lack of merit

ISSUE: Are the affidavits of recantation valid?

SC RULING:
No. It is worthy to note, however, that the affidavit does not mention the identity of the people who allegedly forced
and deceived the affiant into joining the union, much less the circumstances that constituted such force and deceit.
Indeed, not only was this allegation couched in very general terms and sweeping in nature, but more importantly, it
was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after
the identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a petition for certification election on
May 23, 2005, since the names of the members were attached to the petition. The purported withdrawal of support
for the registration of the union was made after the documents were submitted to the DOLE, Region IV-A. The logical
conclusion, therefore, following jurisprudence, is that the employees were not totally free from the employers
pressure, and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
2. ELECTROMAT MANUFACTURING and RECORDING CORPORATION, v. HON. CIRIACO LAGUNZAD
G.R. No. 172699 July 27, 2011

REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS AS SUPPLEMENTED BY D.O 40-03

FACTS:
Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Electromat-Wasto, a charter affiliate of the Workers Advocates for
Struggle, Transformation and Organization applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations. Supporting the
application were the following documents: (1) copies of its ratified constitution and by-laws (CBL); (2) minutes of the
CBLs adoption and ratification; (3) minutes of the organizational meetings; (4) names and addresses of the union
officers; (5) list of union members; (6) list of rank-and-file employees in the company; (7) certification of
non-existence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the company; (8) resolution of affiliation with WASTO, a
labor federation; (9) WASTOs resolution of acceptance; (10) Charter Certificate; and (11) Verification under oath. The
BLR thereafter issued the union a Certification of Creation of Local Chapter pursuant to DO 40-03. Petitioner
Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation (company) filed a petition for cancellation of the unions
registration certificate, for the unions failure to comply with Article 234 of the Labor Code. It argued that D.O. 40-03 is
an unconstitutional diminution of the Labor Codes union registration requirements under Article 234.

DOLE: dismissed the petition

CA RULING: dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed BLR ruling. It brushed aside the companys objection to
D.O. 40-03, and its submission that D.O. 40-03 removed the safety measures against the commission of fraud in the
registration of unions

ISSUE: Is the DO 40-03 a valid exercise of the rule-making power of the DOLE

SC RULING:
Yes. Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a branch or local of a
registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national
union in order to increase the local unions bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. D.O. 40-03
represents an expression of the governments implementing policy on trade unionism. It builds upon the old rules by
further simplifying the requirements for the establishment of locals or chapters. As in D.O. 9, we see nothing contrary
to the law or the Constitution in the adoption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of D.O. 40-03 as this
department order is consistent with the intent of the government to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a
federation or national union to enhance the locals bargaining power. If changes were made at all, these were those
made to recognize the distinctions made in the law itself between federations and their local chapters, and
independent unions; local chapters seemingly have lesser requirements because they and their members are
deemed to be direct members of the federation to which they are affiliated, which federations are the ones subject to
the strict registration requirements of the law.

Art 234

(3) EAGLE RIDGE GOLF COUNTRY CLUB VS CA

FACTS: Eagle Ridge is a corporation engaged in the business of maintaining golf courses. It had, at the end of CY
2005, around 112 rank-and-file employees. At least 20% of Eagle Ridges rank-and-file employeesthe percentage
threshold required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union registrationhad a meeting where they organized
themselves into an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU or Union), elected a set
of officers, and ratified their constitution and by-laws. EREU formally applied for registration before the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office IV (RO IV). DOLE RO IV granted the application. The EREU then
filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club. Eagle Ridge opposed this petition,
followed by its filing of a petition for the cancellation of the application. Eagle Ridges petition ascribed
misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws,
the numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its officers. Petitioner alleged that the EREU declared in
its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its organizational meeting showed it only had
26 members. Petitioner also contended that five employees who attended the organizational meeting had
manifested the desire to withdraw from the union.
As a counterpoint, EREU alleged that discrepancies are not real for before filing of its application four additional
employees joined the union thus raising the union membership to 30; that the understatement by one member who
ratified the constitution and by-laws was a typographical error, which does not make it either grave or malicious
warranting the cancellation of the unions registration; that the retraction of 5 union members should not be given any
credence for the reasons that:

(b) the sworn statements of the five retracting union members sans other affirmative evidence presented hardly
qualify as clear and credible evidence considering the joint affidavits of the other members attesting to the orderly
conduct of the organizational meeting;
(c) the retracting members did not deny signing the union documents;
(d) it can be presumed that "duress, coercion or valuable consideration" was brought to bear on the retracting
members; and
(e) once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the employees withdrawal from union membership
taking place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect the petition.

DOLE Regional Director issued an Order finding for Eagle Ridge. Aggrieved, the Union appealed to the BLR, which
affirmed the appealed order of the DOLE Regional Director. Undeterred by successive setbacks, EREU interposed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted. Eagle Ridge sought but was denied reconsideration. Eagle Ridge
thereupon went to the CA, which dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA later denied Eagle Ridges motion for
reconsideration, hence the recourse with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether there was fraud in the application to merit the cancellation of the EREUs registration.

RULING:
NO, a scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to
merit cancellation of its registration. The Supreme Court succinctly explained this decision in eight points:
First. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting.
Second. The members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it applied for registration. The Union thereby
complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c).
Third. The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy between the number of those who attended the
organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members showing 30.
Fourth. In its futile attempt to clutch at straws, Eagle Ridge assails the inclusion of the additional four members
allegedly for not complying with what it termed as "the sine qua non requirements" for union member applications
under the Unions constitution and by-laws, specifically Sec. 2 of Art. IV. We are not persuaded. Any seeming
infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of independent labor
unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
The right of employees to self-organization and membership in a union must not be trammeled by undue difficulties.
In this case, when the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been admitted as union members, it is
enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they had duly signified such desire by accomplishing the
membership form. The fact, as pointed out by Eagle Ridge, that the Union, owing to its scant membership, had not
yet fully organized its different committees evidently shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four employee
applicants rather than deter their admission as erroneously asserted by Eagle Ridge.
Fifth. The difference between the number of 26 members, who ratified the Unions constitution and by-laws, and the
25 members shown in the certification of the Union secretary as having ratified it, is, as shown by the factual
antecedents, a typographical error. It was an insignificant mistake committed without malice or prevarication. The list
of those who attended the organizational meeting shows 26 members, as evidenced by the signatures beside their
handwritten names.
Sixth. In theissue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, we hold that the probative value of
these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the
proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director
obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the
supporting affidavits.
The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE
Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relation. It is
settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-quoted rule, the six
affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the instant case.
Seventh. The fact that six union members, indeed, expressed the desire to withdraw their membership through their
affidavits of retraction will not cause the cancellation of registration on the ground of violation of Art. 234(c) of the
Labor Code requiring the mandatory minimum 20% membership of rank-and- file employees in the employees
union.
The six retracting union members clearly severed and withdrew their union membership. The query is whether such
separation from the Union can detrimentally affect the registration of the Union. We answer in the negative.
Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least
22 employees (112 x 205 = 22.4). When the EREU filed its application for registration on December 19, 2005, there
were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the
Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement. With the withdrawal of six union members, there
is still compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union
members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.
Eighth. Finally, it may not be amiss to note, given the factual antecedents of the instant case, that Eagle Ridge has
apparently resorted to filing the instant case for cancellation of the Unions certificate of registration to bar the holding
of a certification election. This can be gleaned from the fact that the grounds it raised in its opposition to the petition
for certification election are basically the same grounds it resorted to in the instant case for cancellation of EREUs
certificate of registration. This amounts to a clear circumvention of the law and cannot be countenanced.
(4) TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INC vs TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES
UNION-PGTWO

FACTS: Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU) Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization
(PTGWO), an organization said to represent majority of the rank- and-file employees of Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Incorporated (THIGCI), filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE Mediation-
Arbitration Unit. THIGCI opposed THEUs petition for certification election on the ground that the list of union
members submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of supervisors,
resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a
corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual
rank-and-file employees of THIGCI. THEU asserted that it complied with all the requirements for valid affiliation and
inclusion in the roster of legitimate labor organizations pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 9, series of 1997, on
account of which it was duly granted a Certification of Affiliation by DOLE on October 10, 1997; and that Section 5,
Rule V of said Department Order provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be subject to collateral attack,
and for as long as there is no final order of cancellation, it continues to enjoy the rights accorded to a legitimate
organization. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter should, pursuant to Article
257 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order No.
09, automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin ordered the holding of a certification election.
THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary which, by resolution, set aside the said Med-Arbiters Order and
accordingly dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground that there is a "clear absence of community
or mutuality of interests," it finding that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory
employees and rank-and- file employees) as well as employees of two separate and distinct corporate entities.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimalipis-Baldoz, dismissed the petition
for certification election. She held that since THEU is a local chapter, the twenty percent (20%) membership
requirement is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate status, hence, "the alleged retraction and withdrawal of
support by 45 of the 70 remaining rank-and-file members . . . cannot negate the legitimacy it has already acquired
before the petition". THIGCIs Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the DOLE Undersecretary hence it filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA denied THIGCIs Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution. It
held that while a petition for certification election is an exception to the innocent bystander rule, hence, the employer
may pray for the dismissal of such petition on the basis of lack of mutuality of interests of the members of the union
as well as lack of employer-employee relationship and petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to support its
allegations.

ISSUE: Whether the unions legal personality can be subject to collateral attack after a certificate of registration is
issued

HELD: NO. Petition is DENIED, and the records of the case are remanded to the office of origin.
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does
not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its members, or
vice-versa.

After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may
be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the
"Rules to Implement the Labor Code" (Implementing Rules) which section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed registered and
vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality
cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation in accordance with these Rules.

The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is
due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of
Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code.
THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered to have already acquired juridical
personality which may not be assailed collaterally.

(5) SS VENTURES INTERNATIONAL INC. vs SS VENTURES LABOR UNION

FACTS: The Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file
employees of Ventures. 542 signatures, 82 of which belong to terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the
basic documents supporting the petition.
Ventures filed a Petition to cancel the Unions certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in
Article 239(a) of the Labor Code. The petition alleged the following:

(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer
connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the
adoption/ratification of its constitution and by- laws held on January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the
Union forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to make it appear they took part in the
organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution;
(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond
Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;
(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and
(4) The Unions application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees
of Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197-employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 500 signatures
were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the
439 minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.

In its Answer, the Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and alleged that: (1) the
organizational meeting actually took place at the Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees
adverted to in Ventures petition were qualified Union members for, although they have been ordered dismissed, the
one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; (3) it had complied with the 20%-member
registration requirement since it had 542 members; and (4) the "double" signatures were inadvertent human error. In
its supplemental reply memorandum Ventures cited other instances of fraud and misrepresentation, claiming that the
"affidavits" executed by 82 alleged Union members show that they were deceived into signing paper minutes or were
harassed to signing their attendance in the organizational meeting. Ventures added that some employees signed the
"affidavits" denying having attended such meeting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Certification of Registration of the Union should be revoked

HELD: The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and
such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once
registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the
concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be
cancelled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a
legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in
Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of
the unions constitution and like documents.

To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must
also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for
registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the
corresponding papers is not ministerial on the part of the BLR. After a labor organization has filed the necessary
registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor
Code have been complied with. If the unions application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, a
union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.

Art 238-239 HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA vs NUWHRAIN-HHMSC

FACTS: Respondent filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition
and ordered the holding of a certification election. On appeal, the DOLE Secretary affirmed the Med-Arbiters order
and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a preelection conference. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied. The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year
later. Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent.
The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The preelection conference resumed. Subsequently,
petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial
report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the
said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondents Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its
name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further requested the suspension of the certification
election proceedings. Petitioner reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the Certification
Election Proceedings, arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the
legitimacy of respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Petitioner
maintained that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent is a legitimate labor organization is crucial to the
issue of whether it may exercise rights of a legitimate labor organization, which include the right to be certified as the
bargaining agent of the covered employees. Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through. Respondent
emerged as the winner. Petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner,7
stating that the certification election was an exercise in futility because, once respondents registration is cancelled, it
would no longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. Petitioner
also claimed that some of respondents members were not qualified to join the union because they were either
confidential employees or managerial employees. It then prayed that the certification of the election results and
winner be deferred until the petition for cancellation shall have been resolved, and that respondents members who
held confidential or managerial positions be excluded from the supervisors bargaining unit. Meanwhile, respondent
filed its answer to the petition for the cancellation of its registration. It averred that the petition was filed primarily to
delay the conduct of the certification election, the respondents certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the supervisory employees, and the commencement of bargaining negotiations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of registration should be cancelled.

HELD: Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code gives the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a petition
for cancellation of a unions registration, particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements
prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents as
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the
annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an
organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the
submission of the required documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.

We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for
cancellation of respondents registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the
union officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.

It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance
with Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the
cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance
with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and
requiring periodic documentation thereof. Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for
cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from
membership, or any appropriate penalty.

(2) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs KAWASHIMA TEXTILE MANUFACTURING

FACTS: Kawashima Free Workers Union (KFWU) filed a Petition for Certification Election to be conducted in the
bargaining unit composed of 145 rank-and-file employees of Kawashima Textile Mfg. Phils., Inc. Attached to its
petition are a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter issued on January 19, 2000 by DOLE Regional Office No. IV,
stating that it [KFWU] submitted to said office a Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation Phil.
Transport & General Workers Organization (PTGWO), and a Report of Creation of Local/Chapter. Kawashima Textile
Mfg. Phils., Inc. argues that KFWU did not acquire any legal personality because its membership of mixed
rank-and-file and supervisory employees violated Article 245 of the Labor Code, and its failure to submit its books of
account.
ISSUE: The Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition to seek closure on two issues:

1.) WON a mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union is a ground for the
dismissal of a petition for certification election in view of the amendment brought about by D.O. 9, series of
1997, which deleted the phraseology in the old rule that "[t]he appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file
employee shall not include the supervisory employees and/or security guards; and

2.) WON the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization can be collaterally attacked in a petition for a
certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer such as Kawashima Textile
Manufacturing Phils., Inc.

HELD:

1.) No. In short: here, RA 9481 did not apply. If it did, the ruling would have been NO. Yet, even without using RA
9481, the Court still ruled NO using 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay
Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines.

2.) No. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for
certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is
to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.
The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any
partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss
or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for
certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the
certification election.65 The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
(3) DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL vs BIGKIS NG MANGAGAWA sa DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL
FACTS: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the certified collective bargaining
representative of teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational
institution operating in Imus, Cavite. UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said
assessment from the employees salaries and wages. DELPILAR, however, refused to effect deductions claiming that
the non-union employees were not amenable to it. UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL PILAR,
however, refused to renew the same unless the provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation
leave with pay will be amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at least three (3) consecutive
academic years of satisfactory service. The UNION objected to the proposal claiming diminution of benefits. DEL
PILAR refused to sign the CBA, resulting in a deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case for
voluntary arbitration, but the latter allegedly refused, prompting the UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with
the Labor Arbiter. DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. DEL PILAR admitted its
failure to deduct the agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees, but justifies the non-deduction by the
absence of individual written authorization. It posits that Article 248(e) is inapplicable considering that its employees
derived no benefits from the CBA. Besides, the non-union employees objected to the deduction; hence, a written
authorization is indispensable to affect a valid check off. As regards the proposal to amend the provision on summer
vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make the
provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

LA RULING: There was an error on the part of DEL PILAR not to have collected agency fee due other workers who
are non-union members but are included in the bargaining unit being represented by the UNION. As stated in Art.
248, to wit:
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective
bargaining agency may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by
members of the recognized collective bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization
required under Article [241], paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent.
For receipt of CBA benefits brought about by the CBA negotiated with petitioners, non-union members are duty
bound to pay agency fees which may lawfully be deducted sans individual check-off authorization. Being recipients
of said benefits; they should share and be made to pay the same considerations imposed upon the union members.
The proposal to decrease the coverage of the 11th and 12th month vacation with pay was not done in bad faith but
rather in an honest attempt to make perfect procession following the DECS Manuals. It is of judicial notice that in the
course of negotiation, almost all provisions are up for grabs, amendments or change. This is something normal in the
course of a negotiation and does not necessarily connote bad faith as each everyone has the right to negotiate
reward or totally amend the provisions of the contract/agreement. It must be noted that a CBA is a contract between
labor and management and is not simply a litany of benefits for labor. For unfair labor practice to prosper there must
be a clear showing of acts aimed at stifling the workers right to self- organization. Mere allegations and mistake
notions would not suffice.

NLRC RULING: Affirmed LAs ruling, upheld the UNIONs right to agency fee, but did not consider DELPILARs failure
to deduct the same an unfair labor practice

CA RULING: Private respondent Del Pilar Academy is ordered to deduct the agency fees from non-union members.
The agency fees shall be equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the union members.

ISSUE: Can the Union collect agency fees from non-union members even without a written authorization and thus
constituting a valid check off?
HELD: YES, the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the non-union
employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits as well that surely benefited the non-union employees,
justifying the collection of, and the UNIONs entitlement to, agency fees.
Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to affect a valid check
off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable to
non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.

Article 241

1) Del Pilar Academy vs. Del Pilar Academys Employees Union 2008

Facts: Respondent UNIONandDELPILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)[3]granting salary
increase and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff.Among the salient provisions of the CBA provides
salary increase and vacation leave with pay.TheUNIONthen assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and
requestedDELPILAR to deduct said assessment from the employees salaries and wages.DELPILAR, however,
refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not amenable to it. In September 1997,
theUNIONnegotiated for the renewal of the CBA.DELPILAR, however, refused to renew the same unless the
provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation leave with pay will be amended by limiting the
same to teachers, who have rendered at least three (3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory
service.TheUNIONobjected to the proposal claiming diminution of benefits.DELPILAR refused to sign the CBA,
resulting in a deadlock.TheUNIONrequestedDELPILAR to submit the case for voluntary arbitration, but the latter
allegedly refused, prompting theUNIONto file a case for unfair labor practice with the Labor Arbiter
againstDELPILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo Ocampo, Jr., chairman of the Board of
Trustees.Traversing the complaint,DELPILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against theUNION.It
justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from the
non-union employees.As regards the proposal to amend the provision on summer vacation leave with
pay,DELPILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered unfair for it was done to make the provision of the
CBA conformable to the DECS Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Labor Arbiter came to the conclusion that it was an error on [the] part of [DEL PILAR] not to have collected agency
fee due other workers who are non-union members but are included in the bargaining unit being represented by [the
UNION].

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Arbiters ruling. In gist, it upheld theUNIONs right to
agency fee, but did not considerDELPILARs failure to deduct the same an unfair labor practice.

CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC.

Issue: whether or not theUNIONis entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an
individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
Ruling: Yes and no, respectively.

The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who are not union
members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code.When so stipulated in a collective bargaining
agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency
fees, from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off.[11]No
requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept
the benefits resulting from the CBA.[12]

DELPILAR admitted its failure to deduct the agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees, but justifies the
non-deduction by the absence of individual written authorization. It posits that Article 248(e) is inapplicable
considering that its employees derived no benefits from the CBA.The annual salary increase of its employee is a
benefit mandated by law, and not derived from the CBA.According toDELPILAR, the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) required all educational institutions to allocate at least 70% of tuition fee increases for the
salaries and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel; that even prior to the execution of the CBA in
September 1994,DELPILAR was already granting annual salary increases to its employees.The argument cannot be
sustained. Contrary to whatDELPILAR wants to portray, the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision
in the CBA that benefited the non-union employees.TheUNIONnegotiated for other benefits, namely, limitations on
teaching assignments to 23 hours per week, additional compensation for overload units or teaching assignments in
excess of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay.It also negotiated for entitlement to summer
vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of
service.For the non-teaching personnel, theUNIONworked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with
pay.[13]These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and
theUNIONs entitlement to, agency fees.

Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check
off.Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o),[14]requiring written authorization is inapplicable to
non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the
CBA.
2) Eduardo MARIO vs. Gamilia 2009

Facts: The 1986 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between UST and USTFU expired on31 May
1988.Thereafter, bargaining negotiations ensued between UST and theMario Group, which represented USTFU.As
the parties were not able to reach an agreement despite their earnest efforts, a bargaining deadlock was declared
and USTFU filed a notice of strike. Subsequently, then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Franklin Drilon assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued an Order on19 October 1990, laying the terms and
conditions for a new CBA between the UST and USTFU. Accordingly, on10 September 1992, UST and USTFU
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[6]whereby UST faculty members belonging to the collective
bargaining unit were granted additional economic benefits for the fourth and fifth years of the 1988-1993 CBA,
specifically, the period from1 June 1992up to31 May 1993.On12 September 1992, the majority of USTFU
members signed individual instruments of ratification,[7]which purportedly signified their consent to the economic
benefits granted under the MOA.USTFU, through its President, petitioner Atty. Mario, wrote a letter[8]dated1 October
1992to the UST Treasurer requesting the release to the union of the sum ofP4.2 million, which was 10% of theP42
million economic benefits package granted by the MOA to faculty members belonging to the collective bargaining
unit.TheP4.2 million was sought by USTFU in consideration of its efforts in obtaining the saidP42 million economic
benefits package.UST remitted the sum ofP4.2 million to USTFU on9 October 1992.[9]After deducting from theP42
million economic benefits package theP4.2 million check-off to USTFU, the amounts owed to UST, and the salary
increases and bonuses of the covered faculty members, a net amount ofP6,389,145.04 remained.The remaining
amount was distributed to the faculty members on18 November 1994.On15 December 1994, respondents[10]filed
with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR), a Complaint for the expulsion of the Mario Group as
USTFU officers and directors. This was followed by 4 more cases from both sides filed successively.

DOLE-NCR Regional Director ruled for the expulsion of the petitioners.

BLR modified its ruling only with regard to the attorneys fees.

CA dismissed the petition.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISALLOWED THE LUMP-SUM CHECK-OFF AMOUNTING TO P4.2 MILLION BY
RULING THAT THE P42 MILLION CBA ECONOMIC PACKAGE OBTAINED BY THE UST FACULTY UNION WAS
MERELY AN ALLOCATION OF THE SEVENTY PER CENT (70%) OF THE TUITION INCREASES AUTHORIZED BY LAW
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS.

Ruling: In an attempt to comply with the foregoing requirements, the Mario Group caused the majority of the general
membership of USTFU to individually sign a document, which embodied the ratification of the MOA between UST
and USTFU, dated 10 September 1992, as well as the authorization for the check-off ofP4.2 million, from theP42
million economic benefits package, as payment for attorneys fees.As held by the Court of Appeals, however, the
said documents constitute unsatisfactory compliance with the requisites set forth in the Labor Code, as amended,
and in the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws, even though individually signed by a majority of USTFU members.The
inclusion of the authorization for a check-off of union dues and special assessments for the Labor Education Fund
and attorneys fees, in the same document for the ratification of the 10 September 1992 MOA granting theP42 million
economic benefits package, necessarily vitiated the consent of USTFU members.For sure, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that no individual member of USTFU would casually turn down the substantial and lucrative award ofP42
million in economic benefits under the MOA.However, there was no way for any individual union member to
separate his or her consent to the ratification of the MOA from his or her authorization of the check-off of union dues
and special assessments.As it were, the ratification of the MOA carried with it the automatic authorization of the
check-off of union dues and special assessments in favor of the union.Such a situation militated against the
legitimacy of the authorization for theP4.2 million check-off by a majority of USTFU membership.Although the law
does not prescribe a particular form for the written authorization for the levy or check-off of special assessments, the
authorization must, at the very least, embody the genuine consent of the union member.

The failure of the Mario Group to strictly comply with the requirements set forth by the Labor Code, as amended, and
the USTFU Constitution and By-Laws, invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not
enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members.Their
express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which
must be followed to the letter.No shortcuts are allowed.[52]Viewed in this light, the Court does not hesitate to declare
as illegal the check-off ofP4.2 million, from theP42 million economic benefits package, for union dues and special
assessments for the Labor Education Fund and attorneys fees.Said amount rightfully belongs to and should be
returned by petitioners to the intended beneficiaries thereof,i.e., members of the collective bargaining unit, whether
or not members of USTFU.This directive is without prejudice to the right of petitioners to seek reimbursement from
the other USTFU officers and directors, who were part of theMario Group, and who were equally responsible for the
illegal check-off of the aforesaid amount.
Article 242

1) Heritage Manila vs. NUWHRAIN

Facts: On October 11, 1995, respondentfiled with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region
(DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election.[2]The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14, 1996 and
ordered the holding of a certification election.[3]On appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15,
1996, affirmed the Med-Arbiters order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a preelection
conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23,
1996.The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998.
Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The
latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The preelection conference resumed on January 29,
2000.Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in
1995. Consequently, on May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the
ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondents Certificate of Creation of
Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further
requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings.[4]n June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request
by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification Election] Proceedings,[5]arguing that the dismissal or
suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of respondent is seriously being
challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Petitioner maintained that the resolution of the issue of
whether respondent is a legitimate labor organization is crucial to the issue of whether it may exercise rights of a
legitimate labor organization, which include the right to be certified as the bargaining agent of the covered
employees.Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through on June 23, 2000. Respondent emerged as the
winner.[6]On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and
Winner,[7]stating that the certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in futility because, once
respondents registration is cancelled, it would no longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the supervisory employees. Petitioner also claimed that some of respondents members were not qualified to join
the union because they were either confidential employees or managerial employees. It then prayed that the
certification of the election results and winner be deferred until the petition for cancellation shall have been resolved,
and that respondents members who held confidential or managerial positions be excluded from the supervisors
bargaining unit.

Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of registration is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election.

Dole dismissed; CA denied the petition.

Ruling: Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is clearly provided in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and enunciated by the Court inAbbott. But as pointed out by the CA, the
present case involves a peculiar circumstance that was not present or covered by the ruling inAbbott.In this case,
the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case because he was a former counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall
resolve the case in his place? InAbbott, the appeal from the Regional Directors decision was directly filed with the
Office of the DOLE Secretary, and we ruled that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal
was filed by petitioner with the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the case. Once jurisdiction is
acquiredby the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the case.[25]Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR
despite the BLR Directors inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the appeal, she merely stepped into the
shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter could not himself perform. She did so pursuant to
her power of supervision and control over the BLR.[26]Expounding on the extent of the power of control, the Court,
inAraneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan,et al.,[27]pronounced that, if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon
the Department Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises
supervision and control over the departments. This principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code of 1987,
which defines supervision and control as including the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate.[28]Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that the DOLE
Secretary, as the person exercising the power of supervision and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly
exercise the quasi-judicial function entrusted by law to the BLR Director.It is true that the power of control and
supervision does not give the Department Secretary unbridled authority to take over the functions of his or her
subordinate.Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which are stated in Book IV, Chapter 8, Section 39(1)(a) of
the Administrative Code of 1987.[29]However, in the present case, the DOLE Secretarys act of taking over the function
of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latters inhibition from the case and the objective to
maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau itself.[30]Petitioner insists that the BLR Directors
subordinates should have resolved the appeal, citing the provision under the Administrative Code of 1987 which
states, in case of the absence or disability of the head of a bureau or office, his duties shall be performed by the
assistant head.[31]The provision clearly does not apply considering that the BLR Director was neither absent nor
suffering from any disability; he remained as head of the BLR. Thus, to dispel any suspicion of bias, the DOLE
Secretary opted to resolve the appeal herself.
2) Abaria vs. NLRC

Facts:MCCHIisahospitalownedbyUCCP.TheNFLisaNationalFederationwhichactsastheexclusivebargainin
grepresentativeof

therank-and-fileemployeesoftheMCCHI.NFLisrepresentedbyAtty.Alforque.NFLhasaLOCALchaptercalled
NAMA-MCCH-NFL

,whichisNOTINDEPENDENTLYREGISTERED.ThelocalchaptersPresidentisNAVA.In1995,sincetheCBAwasabouttoex
pireNAVAwrotetheadministratorofMCCHI,REV.IYOY,expressingtheUNIONsdesiretorenewtheCBA,attachingtoherlette
rastatementofproposalssigned/endorsedby153unionmembers.BeforerespondingtoNAVA,MCCHIfirstchec
kedwithAttyAlforqueasNFLrepresentativewhetherNFLendorsesNAVAsproposal.MCCHIfoundoutfromAtty.Alforq
uethattheproposedCBAsubmittedbyNAVAwasneverreferredtoNFLandthatNFLhasnotauthorizedanyothe
rlegalcounseloranypersonforcollectivebargainingnegotiations.Atty.AlforquecommunicatedwithNAVAandot
herUNIONofficersthattheyweresuspendedfromtheunionmembershipforseriousviolationoftheCBLofNFL.
TheletterrevealedthatNAVAandotherUNIONofficersofthelocalchapteropenlydeclaredduringaGeneralMe
mbershipMeetingoftheUnionthattheysubmittotheauthorityofanotherunionKMUandnolongertoNFL.Then
extday,severalunionmembersledbyNAVAandhergrouplaunchedaseriesofmassactionssuchaswearingbl
ackandredarmbands/headbands,marchingaroundthehospitalpremisesandputtingupplacards,postersandstr
eamers.NFLdisownedtheconcertedactivities.OnMarch13and19,1996,the

DOLERegionalOfficeissuedcertificationsstatingthatthereisnothingintheirrecordswhichshowsthatNAMA-MC
CH
NFLisaregisteredlabororganization,andthatsaidunionsubmittedonlyacopyofitsCharterCertificateonJanua
ry31,1995.BecauseofthisMCCHIthensentindividualnoticestoallunionmembersaskingthemtosubmitwithin
72hoursawrittenexplanationwhytheyshouldnotbeterminatedforhavingsupportedtheillegalconcertedactiviti
esofNAMA-MCCHNFLwhichhasnolegalpersonalityasperDOLErecords.TheLocalChapterfiledaNoticeofSt
rikewithNCMBbutthiswasdenied.Despitesuchdenial,NAVAandhergroupstillconductedastrike.Thestriking
UnionmembersfailedtoattendtheinvestigationsofMCCHI.Hence,MCCHIsentterminationletterstounionleader
sandothermemberswhoparticipatedinthestrikeandpicketingactivities.Fortheircontinuedpicketingactivitiesd
espitethesaidwarning,morethan100strikingemployeesweredismissed.

Unfazed,thestrikingunionmembersheld
Themeansofingresstoandegressfromthehospitalwereblocked,patientsandemployeeswerebarredfroment
eringthepremises;Placardswereplaced

atthehospitalsentrancegatestating:Pleaseproceedtoanotherhospitalandweareonprotest.;

Employeesandpatientsreportedactsofintimidationandharassmentperpetratedbyunionleadersandmembers.
Becauseofthis,MCCHIsufferedheavylossesduetolowpatientadmissionrates

Issue: Whether or not MCCHIisguiltyofunfairlaborpractice; Whether or not the labor union was legitimate.

Ruling:RecordsoftheNCMBandDOLERegion7confirmedthatNAMA-MCCH-NFLhadnotregisteredasalabor
organization,havingsubmittedonlyitschartercertificateasanaffiliateorlocalchapterofNFL.Notbeingalegitim
atelabororganization,NAMA-MCCHNFL
isnotentitledtothoserightsgrantedtoalegitimatelabororganizationunderArt.242.
Asidefromtheregistrationrequirement,itisonlythelabororganizationdesignatedorselectedbythemajorityofth
eemployeesinanappropriatecollectivebargainingunitwhichistheexclusiverepresentativeoftheemployeesins
uchunitforthepurposeofcollectivebargaining,asprovidedinArt.255.NAMA-MCCH-NFLisnotthelabororgani
zationcertifiedordesignatedbythemajorityoftherank-and-
filehospitalemployeestorepresentthemintheCBAnegotiationsbuttheNFL,asevidencedbyCBAsconcludedin
1987,1991and1994.Toprovemajoritysupportoftheemployees,NAMA-MCCH-NFLpresentedtheCBApropos
alallegedlysignedby153unionmembers.However,thepetitionsignedbysaidmembersshowedthatthesignator
iesendorsedtheproposedtermsandconditionswithoutstatingthattheywerelikewisevotingforordesignatingth
eNAMA-MCCH-NFLastheirexclusivebargainingrepresentative.EvenassumingthatNAMA-MCCH-NFLhadvalid
lydisaffiliatedfromitsmotherunion,NFL,itstilldidnotpossessthelegalpersonalitytoenterintoCBAnegotiations.
alocalunionwhichisnotindependentlyregisteredcannot,upondisaffiliationfromthefederation,exercisetheright
sandprivilegesgrantedbylawtolegitimatelabororganizations;thus,itcannotfileapetitionforcertificationelectio
nBesides,theNFLasthemotherunionhastherighttoinvestigatemembersoitslocalchapterunderthefederationsC
onstitutionandByLaws,andiffoundguiltytoexpelsuchmembers.MCCHIthereforecannotbefaultedfordeferringa
ctionontheCBAproposalsubmittedbyNAMA-MCCH-NFLinviewoftheunionleadershipsconflictwiththe

nationalfederation.Wehaveheldthattheissueofdisaffiliationisanintra-uniondisputewhichmustberesolvedin
adifferentforuminanactionattheinstanceofeitherorboththefederationandthelocalunionorarivallabororga
nization,nottheemployer.
Nature of CBA

1) Wesleyan University vs. Wesleyan University Faculty

FACTS: Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines.6Respondent Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff
Association, on the other hand, is a duly registered labor organization7acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner.8 In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year
CBA9effective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008.10 On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty.
Guillermo T. Maglaya (Atty. Maglaya), issued a Memorandum11providing guidelines on the implementation of
vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation. On August 25, 2005, respondents President,
Cynthia L. De Lara (De Lara) wrote a letter13to Atty. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the
unilateral changes made by petitioner.14De Lara questioned the guidelines for being violative of existing practices
and the CBA,15specifically Sections 1 and 2, Article XII of the CBA. On February 8, 2006, a Labor Management
Committee (LMC) Meeting was held during which petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the
implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy.17In the same meeting, petitioner announced its plan of
implementing a one-retirement policy,18which was unacceptable to respondent.

Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision20declaring the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August
16, 2005 contrary to law.

CA rendered a Decision22finding the rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supported by substantial evidence. It also
affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 on the ground
that these unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of respondent.2

Issue: Whether or not employee was proper in reducing the benefits already enjoyed by the employees

Ruling: The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 10039of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits employers from
eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies only if the benefit is
based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice.40To be considered a practice, it must
be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a long period of time.41In this case, respondent was able
to present substantial evidence in the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two retirement plans. Based
on the affidavits, petitioner has been giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997.44Petitioner, on the other hand,
failed to present any evidence to refute the veracity of these affidavits. Petitioners contention that these affidavits are
self-serving holds no water. The retired employees of petitioner have nothing to lose or gain in this case as they have
already received their retirement benefits. Thus, they have no reason to perjure themselves. Obviously, the only
reason they executed those affidavits is to bring out the truth. As we see it then, their affidavits, corroborated by the
affidavits of incumbent employees, are more than sufficient to show that the granting of two retirement benefits to
retiring employees had already ripened into a consistent and deliberate practice.Moreover, petitioners assertion that
there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same is not
supported by any evidence. There is nothing in Article XVI of the CBA to indicate or even suggest that the "Plan"
referred to in the CBA is the PERAA Plan. Besides, any doubt in the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA should
be resolved in favor of respondent. In fact, petitioners assertion is negated by the announcement it made during the
LMC Meeting on February 8, 2006 regarding its plan of implementing a "one-retirement plan." For if it were true that
petitioner was already implementing a one-retirement policy, there would have been no need for such
announcement. Equally damaging is the letter-memorandum45dated May 11, 2006, entitled "Suggestions on the
defenses we can introduce to justify the abolition of double retirement policy," prepared by the petitioners legal
counsel.These circumstances, taken together, bolster the finding that the two-retirement policy is a
practice.1wphi1Thus, petitioner cannot, without the consent of respondent, eliminate the two-retirement policy and
implement a one-retirement policy as this would violate the rule on non-diminution of benefits. As a last ditch effort to
abolish the two-retirement policy, petitioner contends that such practice is illegal or unauthorized and that the
benefits were erroneously given by the previous administration. No evidence, however, was presented by petitioner
to substantiate its allegations.Considering the foregoing disquisition, we agree with the findings of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, as affirmed by the CA, that there is substantial evidence to prove that there is an existing practice of giving
two retirement benefits, one under the PERAA Plan and another under the CBA Retirement Plan.

Article 243

1) Samahan ng mga Hanjin vs. Shipwreck

Facts: On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for
registration[5]of its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. Attached to the
application were the list of names of the association's officers and members, signatures of the attendees of the
February 7, 2010 meeting, copies of their Constitution and By-laws. The application stated that the association had a
total of 120 members. On February 26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, City of San Fernando, Pampanga
(DOLE-Pampanga), issued the corresponding certificate of registration[6]in favor of Samahan.On March 15, 2010,
respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), with offices at Greenbeach 1,
Renondo Peninsula, Sitio Agustin, Barangay Cawag, Subic Bay Freeport Zone, filed a petition[7]with
DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of Samahan's association on the ground that its
members did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite
employers may form a workers' association. It further posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the association
had definite employers and the continued existence and registration of the association would prejudice the
company's goodwill. On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental petition,[8]adding the alternative ground that
Samahan committed a misrepresentation in connection with the list of members and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its application for registration. Hanjin claimed that Samahan made it
appear that its members were all qualified to become members of the workers' association. On March 26, 2010,
DOLE-Pampanga called for a conference, wherein Samahan requested for a 10-day period to file a responsive
pleading. No pleading, however, was submitted. Instead, Samahan filed a motion to dismiss on April 14, 2010

DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of Hanjin. He found that the preamble, as stated in the
Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an admission on its part that all of its members were employees of
Hanjin

BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. It stated that the law clearly afforded
the right to self-organization to all workers including those without definite employers

CA rendered its decision, holding that the registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association was contrary
to the provisions of Article 243 of the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether or not the employees was entitled to form the union. Yes

Ruling: As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-organization includes the right to form,
join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection. This is
in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement
as well as to make sure that workers participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties
and welfare. The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the
liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself without
being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from
joining an association. In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization, the law expressly allows and
even encourages the formation of labor organizations. A labor organization is defined as "any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment."[44]A labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain
collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and conditions of employment. To bargain collectively
is a right given to a union once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the other hand, is a
generic description of interaction between employer and employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, even if the employees' group is not registered with the DOLE. In the case
at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of the CA that Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of
collective bargaining instead of a workers' association because the choice belonged to it. The right to form or join a
labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident
that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to
exercise such a conferred right.[53]Also inherent in the right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form
a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of providing mutual aid and
protection.
Art 245

(1) SMCC VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL & COATING CORP

FACTS:
Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National
Capital Region.

Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate
labor supervisory employees within petitioner union.

MED-ARBITER RULING: Sided with the company.

DOLE RULING: Granted the unions petition for a certification election.
CA RULING: Reversed the DOLE and upheld the Med-Arbiters Ruling.

ISSUE: Does the commingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in a union divest it of its personality as a
legitimate labor organization?

SC RULING:
NO. After a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its
legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought
about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

Applying this principle to the case at bar, petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor
organization even if some of its members were supervisory employees. It had the right to file the subject petition for
certification election. Besides, the legal personality of the union cannot be collaterally attacked by the company in the
certification election proceedings the latter being in the eyes of the law a mere bystander in such proceedings.

The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rank-and-file and supervisory employees. However,
petitioner union sought to represent the bargaining unit consisting of rank-and-file employees. Under Article 245of
theLabor Code,supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file
employees. Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be considered a legitimate labor organization
pursuant toToyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union(hereinafterToyota).

(2) Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v CA

Facts: Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its
Cainta Plant on 16 February 1990. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Personnel/Administrative Officer,
and later to that of Personnel Superintendent. Sometime in June 1996, the supervisory personnel of CAPASCO
launched a move to organize a union among their ranks, later known as private respondent CUSE. Private
respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in the formation of the union and was even elected as one of its
officers after its creation. Consequently, petitioner CAPASCO sent a memodated 3 February 1997, to private
respondent Tamondong requiring him to explain and to discontinue from his union activities, with a warning that a
continuance thereof shall adversely affect his employment in the company. Private respondent Tamondong ignored
said warning and made a reply letteron 5 February 1997, invoking his right as a supervisory employee to join and
organize a labor union. In view of that, on 6 February 1997, petitioner CAPASCO through a memoterminated the
employment of private respondent Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, citing his union
activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to the company.

Private respondent Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair labor practice
by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
According to him, there was no just cause for his dismissal and it was anchored solely on his involvement and active
participation in the organization of the union of supervisory personnel in CAPASCO. Though private respondent
Tamondong admitted his active role in the formation of a union composed of supervisory personnel in the company,
he claimed that such was not a valid ground to terminate his employment because it was a legitimate exercise of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.
On 7 August 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent
Tamondong, and rendered a decision finding [petitioner CAPASCO] guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal.
Hence, this present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: WON Tamondongs position as Personnel Superintendent was considered as a managerial employee and thus
be prohibited from joining a union and be elected as one of its officers.

The petition must fail.

[Private respondent] Tamondong may have possessed enormous powers and was performing important functions
that goes with the position of Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there was no clear showing that he is at liberty,
by using his own discretion and disposition, to lay down and execute major business and operational policies for and
in behalf of CAPASCO. [Petitioner] CAPASCO miserably failed to establish that [private respondent] Tamondong was
authorized to act in the interest of the company using his independent judgment. x x x. Withal, [private respondent]
Tamondong may have been exercising certain important powers, such as control and supervision over erring
rank-and-file employees, however, x x x he does not possess the power to hire, transfer, terminate, or discipline
erring employees of the company. At the most, the record merely showed that [private respondent] Tamondong
informed and warned rank-and-file employees with respect to their violations of CAPASCOs rules and regulations. x
x x. [Also, the functions performed by private respondent such as] issuance of warningto employees with irregular
attendance and unauthorized leave of absences and requiring employees to explain regarding charges of
abandonment of work, are normally performed by a mere supervisor, and not by a manager.

Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended, differentiates supervisory employees from managerial
employees, to wit: supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions, if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the
use of independent judgment; whereas, managerial employees are those who are vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Thus, from the foregoing provision of the Labor Code, it can be clearly inferred that
private respondent Tamondong was just a supervisory employee. With regard to the allegation that private
respondent Tamondong was not only a managerial employee but also a confidential employee, petitioners failed to
adduced evidence which will prove that, indeed, private respondent was also a confidential employee. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.
(3) ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT vs.ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATION|||

FACTS
Respondent Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association (AFA) filed apetition for certification
electionseeking to represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty (40) faculty members. Petitioner Asian
Institute of Management (AIM) opposed the petition, claiming that respondent's members are neither
rank-and-file nor supervisory, but rather, managerial employees.

Petitioner filed apetition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration docketed as DOLE
Case No. NCR-OD-0707-001-LRD on the grounds of misrepresentation in registration and that respondent is
composed of managerial employees who are prohibited from organizing as a union.

Med-Arbiter in DOLE denied the petition for certification election on the ground that AIM's faculty members are
managerial employees.
On appeal, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) reversed the decision.

Petition forCertioraribefore the CA, the petition is based on the arguments that 1) the bargaining unit within AIM
sought to be represented is composed of managerial employees who are not eligible to join, assist, or form any
labor organization, and 2) respondent is not a legitimate labor organization that may conduct a certification
election.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: AIM insists that the members of its tenure-track faculty are managerial
employees, and therefore, ineligible to join, assist or form a labor organization. It ascribes gave abuse of
discretion on SOLEfor its rash conclusion that the members of said tenure-track faculty are not managerial
employees solely because the faculty's actions are still subject to evaluation, review or final approval by the
board of trustees ("BOT").AIM argues that the BOT does not manage the day-to-day affairs, nor the making
and implementing of policies of the Institute, as such functions are vested with the tenure-track faculty.

Issue. Did CA commit an error in validating the respondents certificate of registration on the ground that ots
members are all managerial employees who are disqualified from joining, assisting or forming a labor
orgaization?

HELD.

Managerial employees are ineligible to join labor organizations, but the issue whether they are in fact
managerial employees is still pending in a separate case.

On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can be said that petitioner was correct in filing a
petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration. Petitioner's sole ground for seeking
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration that its members are managerial employees and for this
reason, its registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of theLabor
Codewhich declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join any labor organization is, in a sense, an
accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation for registering under the claim that its members are not
managerial employees.

However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is still pending
resolution by way of petition for review oncertiorariin G.R. No. 197089, which is the culmination of all
proceedings in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007 where the issue relative to the nature of respondent's
membership was first raised by petitioner itself and is there fiercely contested. The resolution of this issue cannot
be pre-empted; until it is determined with finality in G.R. No. 197089, the petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration on the grounds alleged by petitioner cannot be resolved. As a matter of courtesy and in
order to avoid conflicting decisions, We must await the resolution of the petition in G.R. No. 197089.

x x x If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend
on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was
in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. x x x Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely
identity of issues.
Art 247-249

(1) GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,
INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY)
FACTS: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian
economic crisis, decrease in sales, and tougher competition. To curb the negative effects on the company, it
implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program.
Meanwhile, there was an inter-office memorandum sent to all of CCBPIs Plant Human Resources
Managers/Personnel Officers, including those of the CCBPI General Santos Plant (CCBPI Gen San)
mandating them to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary
positions in the Head Office and in the Plants.
Because several employees availed of the early retirement program, vacancies were created in some
departments, including the production department of CCBPI Gen San, where members of petitioner Union
worked. This prompted petitioner to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee for filling up the
vacancies with permanent employees. No resolution was reached on the matter.
Faced with the freeze hiring directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation
(JLBP), a company in the business of providing labor and manpower services, including janitorial services,
messengers, and office workers to various private and government offices.
NCMB: Petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), a Notice of Strike on the ground
of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for contracting-out services regularly performed by
union members (union busting). After conciliation and mediation proceedings before the NCMB, the parties failed to
come to an amicable settlement.
CCBPI filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. The Secretary of Labor issued an Order enjoining the threatened strike and certifying the
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
NLRC: The NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. The NLRC
anchored its ruling on the validity of the Going-to-the-Market (GTM) system implemented by the company, which
called for restructuring its selling and distribution system, leading to the closure of certain sales offices and the
elimination of conventional sales routes.
The NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to curtail the
right to self-organization of petitioners members. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
NLRC denied in a Resolution.
CA: The CA issued the assailed Decision upholding the NLRCs finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor
practice. The CA based its decision on the validity of CCBPIs contracting out of jobs in its production department. It
held that the contract between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount to labor-only contracting. It found that JLBP was an
independent contractor and that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to
meet exigent circumstances. On the other hand, petitioner failed to adduce evidence to prove that contracting out of
jobs by the company resulted in the dismissal of petitioners members, prevented them from exercising their right to
self-organization, led to the Unions demise or that their group was singled out by the company. Consequently, the CA
declared that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not CCBPIs contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor practice.
HELD: NO. It is true that the NLRC erroneously concluded that the contracting- out of jobs in CCBPI Gen San was due
to the GTM system, which actually affected CCBPIs sales and marketing departments, and had nothing to do with
petitioners complaint. However, this does not diminish the NLRCs finding that JLBP was a legitimate, independent
contractor and that CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP to meet business exigencies created by the
freeze-hiring directive of the CCBPI Head Office.
On the other hand, the CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its assailed Decision and
 Resolution. The CA itself examined the facts and evidence of the parties and found that, based on the
evidence, CCBPI did not engage in labor-only contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor
practice.
The NLRC found and the same was sustained by the CA that the companys action to contract-out the
services and functions performed by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not
directed at the members right to self-organization.
Article 248 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYERS. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practices:
xxx
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
xxx
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the
workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are
not unfair labor practices.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the
Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which
burden it failed to discharge.
(2) UST FACULTY UNION v. UST

The Facts

UST Faculty Union [USTFU] demanded from [UST], through its Rector, Fr. Arceo, remittance of the total
amount of 65M plus legal interes, representing deficiency in its contribution to the medical and hospitalization
fund ("fund") of [UST's] faculty members.

Fr. Arceo informed [USTFU] that the benefits were not meant to be given annually but rather as a
onetime allocation or contribution to the fund.

USTFU sent [UST] another demand letter dated reiterating its position that [UST] is obliged to remit to the fund,
its contributions not only for the years 19961997 but also for the subsequent years, but to no avail. USTFU] filed
against [UST], a complaint for unfair labor practice, as well as for moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees
before the arbitration branch of the NLRC.

UST sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It contended that the case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators because it involves the
interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the CBA; and the conflict between the herein parties must be
resolved as grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.

USTs motion to dismiss was denied. UST appealed the Order to the NLRC.

NLRC dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the LA for further proceedings.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of USTFU.

The LA classified USTFU's complaint as one for "unfair labor practice, claims for sliding in of funds to
hospitalization and medical benefits under the CBA, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for slidein and
restoration of medical benefits under the CBA."
NLRC granted USTFU's appeal and denied UST's appeal for lack of merit. They noted that the subsequent CBAs
between UST and USTFU show that the parties intended that the amount appropriated each year to augment the
fund shall be carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment.

CA stated that since USTFU's ultimate objective is to clarify the relevant items in the CBA, then USTFU's complaint
should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP) filed by USTFU.

HELD: NO. Jurisdiction over the Present Case

- Reading the pertinent portions of the 19962001 CBA along with those of theLabor Code,we see that USTand
USTFU's misunderstanding arose solely from their differing interpretations of the CBA's provisions on
economic benefits, specifically those concerning the fund.

- Therefore, it was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present case. The case should have
been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

- Indeed, the present case falls under Section 1's definition of grievance: "[a]ny misunderstanding concerning
policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this [collective bargaining] agreement or
their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation
of any provisions of this Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the
UNIVERSITY."

(3) Philippine Skylanders Inc. v. NLRC

FACTS: In November 1993, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the
rank-and-file employees of Philippine Skylanders Inc (PSI). PSEAs rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees
Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU) protested the result of the election before the DOLE Secretary.

Pending settlement of the election controversy, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation, attached therewith was a
copy of the resolution adopted and signed by the officers and members (111 signatories out of 120
member-employees) of PSEA authorizing their local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation.

PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its name to Philippine
Skylanders Employees Association - National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within
the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected
officers in the newly-forged PSEA-NCW.

Thereafter, PSEA-NCW entered into a CBA with PSI which was immediately registered with DOLE.

Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA's shift of allegiance, PAFLU requested a copy of PSI's audited financial
statement in order to start negotiating for a CBA. The request was denied by PSI due to the disaffiliation of PSEA from
PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.

PAFLU filed before the Labor Arbiter a ULP complaint against PSI and its officers for the latters alleged violation of its
duty to bargain collectively and for its interference with its employees union activities. PAFLU amended its complaint
to implead the elected officers of PSEA-PAFLU averring that said officers were equally guilty of ULP for allowing
themselves to be manipulated by PSI.

LABOR ARBITER: declared as INVALID PSEAs disaffiliation and held PSI and officers of PSEA-PAFLU guilty of ULP.
The Decision explained that despite PSEA-PAFLU's status as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of PSI's rank
and file employees, PSI knowingly sanctioned and confederated with its personnel manager in actively assisting a
rival union.

PSI, PSEA and its respective officers then appealed to NLRC.

NLRC: upheld LAs Decision and conjectured that since an election protest questioning PSEA-PAFLU's certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent was pending resolution before the Secretary of Labor, PSEA could not validly
separate from PAFLU, join another national federation and subsequently enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with its employer-company.

ISSUE: WON PSEA, which is an independent and separate local union, may validly disaffiliate from PAFLU pending
the settlement of an election protest questioning its status as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of PSI's rank
and file employees

RULING: YES. Local unions have the right to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as separate
and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which
they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members.The sole essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective
action, the common bargaining power of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their
interests.

Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.

In the present case, there is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was
expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid
breakaway.As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the local union did
not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.Neither was it disputed by PAFLU that 111 signatories out of the 120
members of the local union, or an equivalent of 92.5% of the total union membership supported the claim of
disaffiliation and had in fact disauthorized PAFLU from instituting any complaint in their behalf.Surely, this is not a
case where one (1) or two (2) members of the local union decided to disaffiliate from the mother federation, but it is a
case where almost all local union members decided to disaffiliate.

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW.As PSEA had
validly severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from subsequently
affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members.

NOTE: SC also noted that the case at bar is an ISSUE OF DISAFFILIATION which is an INTER-UNION CONFLICT
which is properly within the jurisdiction of BLR, and not with LA. In order not to further delay the resolution of the
case, SC decided not to remand the case to BLR but to settle the controversy once and for all.
(4) TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES UNION vs. TROPICAL HUT
G.R. Nos. L-43495-99
January 20, 1990

Facts:
The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food, the Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU), immediately sought
affiliation with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). It appears however, that NATU itself as a labor
federation, was not registered with the Department of Labor. A collective bargaining agreement was concluded
between THEU and NATU.

On December 19, 1973, NATU received a letter that THEU was disaffiliating from the NATU federation and was
affiliating with the Confederation of General Workers (CGW). Encinas was elected as president, and he thereafter
informed the respondent company the result. The president of CGW wrote a letter in behalf of THEU-CGW to the
respondent company demanding the remittance of the union
dues collected by the Tropical Hut Food Mart, Inc. to the THEU-
CGW, but this was refused by the respondent company.

The following month, NATU informed Encinas of the request made by NATU to dismiss him in view of violating Art III.,
Sec. 31 of their CBA. Encinas was also advised that NATU was returning the letter of disaffiliation on the grounds that
the right to disaffiliate belongs to the union membership (which Encinas allegedly did not consult) and that withdrawal
from NATU shall be valid provided 3 months notice of intention to withdraw is served. Encinas was suspended
pending application for clearance with the DOLE to dismiss him. Members of the THEU-CGW protested, saying that
they ratify and approve the disaffiliation. They thereafter filed a case against private respondents, charging them of
unfair labor practice. THEU-CGW also wrote a letter to Juan Ponce Enrile, Sec. of Natl Defense, complaining of the
unfair labor practices committed by respondent. The actions caused respondent company suspending over 60
workers.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the issues raised by the parties became moot and academic with the issuance of an
NLRC Order which directed the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the respondent
company between THEU-NATU and THEU-CGW. He also ordered the reinstatement of all complainants.
NLRC reversed, but ruled to give the employees a second chance and reemploy them. The Secretary of Labor
affirmed.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal of petitioner employees resulting from their unions disaffiliation from the mother federation
was illegal and constituted unfair labor practice

Held:
YES.

The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and
voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when
circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.

Section 3 Any employee who is expelled from the UNION for

1

joining another federation or forming another union, or who fails or

refuses to maintain his membership therein as required, xxx shall,
upon written request of the UNION, be discharged by the
COMPANY.
When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join a new federation, it was merely exercising its primary
right to labor organization for the effective enhancement and protection of common interests. The alleged
non-compliance of the local union with the provision in the NATU Constitution requiring the service of three months
notice of intention to withdraw did not produce the effect of nullifying the disaffiliation for the following grounds:
firstly, NATU was not even a legitimate labor organization, it appearing that it was not registered at that time with the
Department of Labor, and therefore did not possess and acquire, in the first place, the legal personality to enforce its
constitution and laws, much less the right and privilege under the Labor Code to organize and affiliate chapters or
locals within its group, and secondly, the act of non-compliance with the procedure on withdrawal is premised on
purely technical grounds which cannot rise above the fundamental right of self-organization.

With regard to the process by which the workers were suspended or dismissed, this Court finds that it was hastily and
summarily done without the necessary due process. The respondent company sent a letter to petitioners herein,
advising them of NATU/Dilag's recommendation of their dismissal and at the same time giving them 48 hours within
which to comment. When petitioners failed to do so, respondent company immediately suspended them and
thereafter effected their dismissal. This is certainly not in fulfillment of the mandate of due process, which is to afford
the employee to be dismissed an opportunity to be heard.
( 5) PUREFOODS CORP. vs. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS
G.R. No. 150896
August 28, 2008

Facts:
Three labor organizations and a federation are respondents in this case NAGSAMA-Purefoods, the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Purefoods, STFWU, (Sto. Tomas, Batangas); and PGFWU (Sta.
Rosa, Laguna). These organizations were affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor
Organization (PULO). The three labor organizations manifested their desire to re-negotiate the collective bargaining
agreement, submitting their respective demands and proposals and authorizing a negotiating panel which included
among others a PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the unions proposals, but
refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel which resulted in a deadlock.
However, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas and
terminated the service of regular rank-and file workers in Sto Tomas. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical
workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in
its employ. The 4 respondent labor organizations jointly instated a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, illegal
lockout/dismissal and damages.

Purefoods defense was that PULO was not a legitimate labor organization or federation for it did not have the
required minimum number of member unions and that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was not arbitrary but was
the result of the financial non-viability of the operations therein, or the consequence of the landowner's
pre-termination of the lease agreement.

LA dismissed the case, declaring that the company neither committed ULP nor illegally dismissed the employees.

NLRC reversed, saying that the real motive of the company in the sudden closure of the Sto. Tomas farm and the
mass dismissal of the
STFWU members was union busting, as only the union members were locked out, and the company subsequently
resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract with the landowner. Because the requisites of a valid
lockout were absent, the NLRC concluded that the company committed ULP.

On appeal, CA dismissed.

Issue:
Whether the refusal of Purefoods to recognized PULO as a labor organizations affiliation constituted undue
interference in, and restraint on the exercise of the employees right to self-organization and free collective
bargaining

Held:
YES.

It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from
the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWUs and the other unions affiliation
with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the
collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile
environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the
Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the
subject farms lease agreement was pre-terminated. Ineluctably, the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented
the labor organizations right to collective bargaining and violated the members right to security of tenure.

The Court deems as proper the award of moral and exemplary damages.
The Court adds that the sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Thus, the petitioner
company is liable for the payment of the aforesaid damages.
(6) DLSU vs. DLSUEA-NAFTEU
G.R. No. 177283
April 7, 2009

Facts:
In 2001, a splinter group of respondents filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE alleging that the then
incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. Respondents officers claimed
that by virtue of RA 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to five years
or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of
collective bargaining negotiations.

Acting on the petitioner, the DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondents incumbent set of officers
had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA and ordered the conduct of elections subject to
pre-election conferences. Respondent wrote a letter to DLSU President to put on escrow all union dues/agency fees
and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until the election
of union officials has been scheduled and been held.

Petitioner in response ordered to do the following: (1) establish a savings account for the Union where all collected
union dues and agency will be deposited and held in trust; and (2) discontinue normal relations with any group within
the Union including the incumbent set of officers.

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) claiming that petitioner unduly
interfered with its internal affairs. During the pendency of this complaint, respondent filed a notice of strike.

LA dismissed the respondent ULP complaint.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of LA.

On respondents petition for certiorari before the CA, the Court set aside the decision of NLRC.

Hence, petitioners petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the acts of petitioners in withholding union and agency dues and suspension of normal relations with
respondent's incumbent set of officers pending the intra-union dispute did not constitute interference
Held:
The Court finds for respondent.

Pending the final resolution of the intra-union dispute, respondent's officers remained duly authorized to conduct
union affairs. The clarification letter issued by BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac enlightens:
We take this opportunity to clarify that there is no void in the
DLSUEA leadership. The decision of DOLE-NCR Regional Director should not be construed as an automatic
termination of the incumbent officers' tenure of office. As duly-elected officers of the DLSUEA, their leadership is not
deemed terminated by the expiration of their terms of office, for they shall continue their functions and enjoy the
rights and privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity, until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified.

It bears noting that at the time petitioners questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had been
entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on
union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor
organization and an employer become the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express
policy of the law
(7) MSMG-UWP vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. 113907
February 28, 2000

Facts:
Pursuant to a union security clause in the CBA between petitioner local union, affiliated with ULGWP, and respondent
M. Greenfield (B), Inc., the dismissal of several union officers and employees was sought after being expelled from
the federation. The company either suspended and terminated petitioners without any prior administrative
investigation.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield,

Inc., (B) (MSMG), hereinafter referred to as the "local union," is an affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation.

In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of
disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws.

Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and
independent investigation. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not
the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same.

Relying merely upon the federation's allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners from employment
when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the
union officers.

Respondent company's allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by the termination letters
received by the petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be immediately effective.

LA: Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding the termination valid and that the act of disaffiliation and declaration of
autonomy constitutes disloyalty.

NLRC affirmed. NLRC: Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent company was justified in dismissing petitioner employees merely upon the labor
federation's demand for the enforcement of the union security clause embodied in their collective bargaining
agreement.

HELD:
This ruling of the NLRC is erroneous. Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the
collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid.
this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of union
security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts 14 cannot override one's right to due process.

There is no disloyalty to speak of, neither is there any violation of the federation's constitution because there is
nothing in the said constitution which specifically prohibits disaffiliation or declaration of autonomy. Hence, there
cannot be any valid dismissal because Article II, Section 4 of the union security clause in the CBA limits the dismissal
to only three (3) grounds, to wit: failure to maintain membership in the union (1) for nonpayment of union dues, (2) for
resignation; and (3) for violation of the union's Constitution and By-Laws.

Dismissal of employees under the union security clause is authorized by law, NOT AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
but employees must be afforded their fundamental rights to due process.

(8) ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB VS NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION

466 SCRA 329 (2005)

Facts:

The court cannot interfere with managements prerogative to close orceaseitsbusiness operationjust because the
business is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.
Petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (ACCI) requested its InternalAuditorIrene Campos-Ugalde to conduct a study
on the profitability of its Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department). Irene found out that the business had
been incurring substantial losses. Consequently, the management decided to transfer the operation of the
department to La Tasca Restaurant Inc. (La Tasca). ACCI then sent its F & B Department employees individual letters
informing them that their services were being terminated and that they would receive separation pay.

The private respondent Alabang Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, regularization and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against ACCI.

The LaborArbiter(LA) dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal which was upheld by the NLRC. The Court
ofAppeals(CA) reversed the decisions of the LA and NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ACCI can terminate itsbusiness operation

HELD:
One of the prerogatives of management is the decision to close the entire establishment or to close or abolish a
department or section thereof for economic reasons, such as to minimize expenses and reducecapitalization. While
the Labor Code provides for the payment of separation package in case of retrenchment to prevent losses, it does
not obligate the employer for the payment thereof if there isclosureof business due to serious losses.

As in the case of retrenchment, however, for theclosureof a business or a department due to serious business
losses to be regarded as anauthorizedcause for terminating employees, it must be proven that the losses incurred
are substantial and actual or reasonably imminent; that the same increased through a period of time; and that the
condition of the company is not likely to improve in the near future.

Theclosureof operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses
includes both thecompletecessationof operations and thecessationof only part of a companys activities.

For anybonafide reason, an employer can lawfully close shop anytime. Just as no law forces anyone to go into
business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same. It would be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a
court interferes with managements prerogative to close orceaseitsbusiness operationsjust because the business
is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.

(9) Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor

Gr 114974 June 16, 2004 Callejo, Sr. J.

Doctrine: Failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Art. 248 (g), for violation of the duty to bargain. The duty to
bargain does not compel wither party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession

The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. If an employer interferes in the
selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the
Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to
right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Art. 248(a) in
connection with Art. 243 of LC is committed

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of the bank

Petition for certiorari seeking nullification of Secretary of labors order and her resolutions

Respondents

Hon. Ma. Nieves R. Confesor Secretary of Labor and Employment

Standard Chartered Bank is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines.

Facts:

August 1990 the Bank and Union signed a five year CBA with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the
third year

Prior to the expiration of the 3-year period but within 60 day freedom period the union initiated the negotiations

February 18, 1993 Union through its President Eddie L. Divinagracia sent a letter containing its proposals covering
political provisions and 34 economic provisions

It includes the names of the members of the unions negotiating panel

February 24, 1993 the Bank through its Country manager Peter H. Harris took note of the Unions proposals

Attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed by the union

Posited that it would be in a better position on economic items

Includes the names of the members of its negotiating panel.

Union suggest to exclude Bank lawyers (Bank acceded) and Diokno (HR offcer) suggest to exclude Federation
(NUBE) President Jose P. Umali but the latter was retained

March 12, 1993 parties met for the negotiation

There are provisions on which both did not agree and place such notation as DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED

March 18, 1993 the negotiation for economic provisions commenced

June 15, 1993 Union suggested that it would be best seek a third party assistance. The Bank presented its revised
counter proposal. Union made their part as well.

Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to agree on the remaining
eco

nomic provisions of the CBA

LA and NCMB

June 21, 1993 Union declared a deadlock and filed a notice of Strike before the NCMB

June 28, 1993 Bank filed a complaint for ULP and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Manila

Alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good Faith

Contended that Union demanded Sky high economic demands indicative of Blue-sky bargaining.

Union Violated its no strike no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before NCMB. Therefore illegal.

Bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced t litigate and hire the services of the lawyer

Secretary of Labor and Employment

July 21, 1993 Sec of Labor Hon. Confesor, pursuant to Art. 263(g) of Labor Code, issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the Labor dispute at the Bank.

Secretarys Order ordered both parties to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions contained herein which will
be retroactive to April 1, 1993 and shall remain effective for 2 years thereafter or until such superseded.

Dismissed for lack of merit the Banks charge for ULP and Unions charge for ULP is dismissed
Stated that ULP charges would prosper only if shown to have directly prejudiced the public interest

December 16, 1993 Sec. of Labor denies both Motions for Reconsideration

March 22, 1994 the Bank and Union signed the CBA

The wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the
employees covered by the CBA

Petition for Certiorari before the SC

Union - alleges that Sec of Labor
acted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
Jurisdiction when it found that the
Bank did not commit ULP when it
interfered with the Unions choice
of negotiator
Dioknos suggestion of Family
Affairs tantamount to suggesting
that the federation President
Umali be excluded
Contends that the bank merely
went through the motions of
collective bargaining without the
intent to reach an agreement and
made bad faith proposals
Accused the Bank of refusing to
disclose material and necessary
data, even after a request was
made by the Union to validate its
guestimates
Bank -Prayed that the petition
be dismissed as the Union
was estopped considering it
signed the CBA on April 22,
1994.
It was the Union that
committed ULP when
negotiator Umali hurled
invective at the Banks head
negotiator Diokno and
demanded that she be
excluded from the Bank
team.
Union was engaged in Blue
Sky Bargaining and Isolated
the no strike No Lockout
clause of the existing CBA
OSG - Petition be dismissed
and asserted that the Union
failed to prove its ULP
charges and that the public
respondent did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion

Issue: Whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of ULP against the bank arising from the latters
alleged Interference with its choice of negotiator. (NO)

Held: NO

Art 248 (a), LC considers it an ULP when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employers in the exercise of
their right to self-organization or the right to form association

The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining

If an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of
negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield
adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the
employees, ULP under Art. 248(a) in connection with Art. 243 of LC is committed

Substantial Evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion

In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali
from the Unions negotiating panel

It does not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be
inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects I the free exercise of the right to
self-organization and Collective bargaining of the emloyees

Surface bargaining defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an
agreement

Minutes of meetings do not show that the Bank had any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union

Failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Art. 248 (g) for Violation of the duty to bargain

The duty to bargain does not compel wither party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession

The records show that the Banks counter proposals on the non-economic provisions or political provisions did not
put up for grabs the entire work of the union and its predecessors.

Union is not guilty for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals and the
Bank failed such.

(10) GENERAL MILLING CORPORATIONvsHON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION

INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT

G.R. No. 146728 February 11, 2004

FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC)
employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor
Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the
issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent
GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had
received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union
membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had
standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.

On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter
stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was
nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on
how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991
disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its
members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.

NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP.

ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective bargaining with the union

HELD:The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years.The relation between
labor and managementshould be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year.Hence, it is indisputable that
when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991,it was still
the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers,because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5)
years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within
the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period.It
was obvious thatGMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union.For refusing to send a
counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an
unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.

ART. 253-A.Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties
may enter into shall,insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election
shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before
the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.

ART. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this
obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the
original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning
the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.

ART. 250.Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other partyshall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice.

GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in
bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it
turned out to be utterly baseless.

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to
bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
(11) Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation

Facts:

The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent employees have formed a union. When the union
became the collective bargaining representative in the certification election, the petitioner refused to sit down to
negotiate a CBA. Moreover, the respondents were not given work for a month amounting to unjustified dismissal. As
a result, the complainants staged a strike to protest but was settled through a memorandum of agreement which
contained a list of those considered as regular employees for the payroll.

The NLRC held that there was illegal dismissal and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: W/N the employees are regular workers

RULING: Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them to be excluded as regulars, it is not enough that
they perform work that is seasonal in nature but they also are employed for the duration of one season. The
evidence only proved the first but not the second requirement.

The ruling inMercado v. NLRCis not applicable since in that case, the workers were merely required to perform
phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which, their services are available to other employers.
The management's sudden change of assignment reeks of bad faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.
(12) ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., VS. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the St. Johns Academy
(later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary course only.
The high school then employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John
Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union).The CBA between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31,
1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an
increase in workers benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the
Union on November 10, 1997.In order to end the strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed
to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction. After
which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January19, 1998
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The partieswere required to
submit their respective position papers. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of
Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which
was approved by the stockholders on even date.

Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students and the Union of the impending closure of the high
school which took effect on March 31, 1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high
school agreed to the closure. Some 51 employees had received their separation compensation package while 25
employees refused to accept the same. Instead, these employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of
the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before
the NLRC. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements for holding a valid
strike under the Labor Code. Subsequently, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC, alleging that the closure of the high
school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA
deadlocked issues.

LA: Dismissed the Unions complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCIs petition to declare the strike
illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.[SOLE:
Union filed a manifestation to maintain the status quo on March 30, 1998 praying that SJCI be enjoined from closing
the high school. It claimed that the decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLEs assumption order
and the agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory action against the other. For its part, SJCI filed a motion to
dismiss with entry of appearance on October 14, 1998 claiming that the closure of the high school rendered the CBA
deadlocked issues moot. The SOLE denied SJCIs motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case to the
NLRC] After the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high school for school year
1999-2000. However, it did not restore the high school teaching and non-teaching employees it earlier terminated.
That same school year SJCI opened an elementary and college department.

NLRC: Rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal
and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits, and with full backwages. It also required SJCI to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
two (2) months summer/vacation pay. Moreover, it ruled that the mass actions conducted by the 25 employees on
May 4, 1998 could not be considered as a strike since, by then, the employer-employee relationship had already
been terminated due to the closure of the high school.

CA: Affirmed the Decision of the NLRC

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal

HELD: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of UPL and illegal dismissal, base on the following premise:

When SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members. Evidently, the closure had achieved its
purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union members.

Evidence provides that subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that
the high schools closure was done in bad faith.

Thus, the SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the
necessary strike vote and give a notice of strike. However, the High Court finds for the findings of the NLRC and CA
that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because, by then, the employer-employee
relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.

In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and its reopening after only one year from
the time it was closed down, show that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the
Unions right to collective bargaining and its members right to security of tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP
and illegal dismissal.
(13) CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC v. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION-NLU

G.R. No. 188949 July 26, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

13th MONTH PAY

DOCTRINE:

The term basic salary of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th-month pay was interpreted to include all
remuneration or earnings paid by the employer for services rendered, but does not include allowances and monetary
benefits which are not integrated as part of the regular or basic salary, such as the cash equivalent of unused
vacation and sick leave credits, overtime, premium, night differential and holiday pay, and cost-of-living allowances.
However, these salary-related benefits should be included as part of the basic salary in the computation of the
13th-month pay if, by individual or collective agreement, company practice or policy, the same are treated as part of
the basic salary of the employees.

FACTS:

Central Azucarera de Tarlac is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of sugar manufacturing, while Central
Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union-NLU is a legitimate labor organization which serves as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the Central's rank-and-file employees. The controversy stems from the interpretation of the term
basic pay, essential in the computation of the 13th-month pay.

In compliance with P.D. No. 851, the Central granted its employees the mandatory 13th month pay since 1975. The
formula used was: Total Basic Annual Salary divided by 12. Included in the computation of the Total Basic Annual
Salary were the following: basic monthly salary; first 8 hours overtime pay on Sunday and legal/special holiday; night
premium pay; and vacation and sick leaves for each year. Throughout the years, the Central used this computation
until 2006.

After a strike staged by the Union, the Central gave the employees their 13th-month pay based on the employees
total earnings during the year divided by 12. The latter objected to this computation. The Union filed a complaint
against for money claims based on the alleged diminution of benefits/erroneous computation of 13th-month pay
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

LA RULING: dismissed the complaint and declared that the Central had the right to rectify the error in the computation
of the 13th-month pay of its employees.

NLRC RULING: reversed the Labor Arbiter.

CA RULING: affirmed the decision and resolution of the NLRC. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether there was an error in the computation of the employees' 13th month pay.

SC RULING: YES. The 13th-month pay mandated by P.D. No. 851 represents an additional income based on wage
but not part of the wage. It is equivalent to one-twelfth (1/12) of the total basic salary earned by an employee within a
calendar year. All rank-and-file employees, regardless of their designation or employment status and irrespective of
the method by which their wages are paid, are entitled to this benefit, provided that they have worked for at least one
month during the calendar year. If the employee worked for only a portion of the year, the 13th-month pay is
computed pro rata.

It is clear that there could have no erroneous interpretation or application of what is included in the term basic salary
for purposes of computing the 13th-month pay of employees. From the inception of P.D. No. 851 on December 16,
1975, clear-cut administrative guidelines have been issued to insure uniformity in the interpretation, application, and
enforcement of the provisions of P.D. No. 851 and its implementing regulations.

As correctly ruled by the CA, the practice of the Central in giving 13th-month pay based on the employees gross
annual earnings which included the basic monthly salary, premium pay for work on rest days and special holidays,
night shift differential pay and holiday pay continued for almost thirty (30) years and has ripened into a company
policy or practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.
(14) UFE-DFA-KMU vs. Nestle Phils. Inc, March 03, 2008

Facts:

UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestle belonging to
the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants. As the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Nestl and
UFE-DFA-KMU was to end, the Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestle
of their intent to open a new Collective Bargaining Negotiation. In response thereto, Nestle informed them that it was
also preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA
negotiations.

In another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU Nestl reiterated its stance that unilateral grants, one-time company grants,
company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight
Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore
shall be excluded therefrom.

The failed to reach a mutual agreement, so Nestle then requested the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), Regional Office No. IV, Imus, Cavite, to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between it and
UFE-DFA-KMU owing to an alleged impasse in the dialogue.

Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective, though, and the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB,
complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., retirement (plan), panel
composition, costs and attendance, and CBA. Another Notice of Strike was then filed by the union, this time
predicated on Nestles alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the
ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations.

The parties are further directed to meet and convene for the discussion of the union proposals and company
counter-proposals before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) who is hereby designated as the
delegate/facilitator of this Office for this purpose. If no settlement of all the issues is reached, this Office shall
thereafter define the outstanding issues and order the filing of position papers for a ruling on the merits.

Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU filed their respective position papers. Nestle addressed several issues concerning
economic provisions of the CBA as well as the non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement Plan in the collective
bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, UFE-DFA-KMU limited itself to the issue of whether or not the retirement
plan was a mandatory subject in its CBA negotiations

Order of Acting Secretary of DOLE:

Meanwhile, Acting Secretary of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with an Order ruling that they recognize
that the present Retirement Plan at the Nestle Cabuyao Plant is a unilateral grant that the parties have expressly so
recognized subsequent to the Supreme Courts ruling in Nestle, Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 90231, February 4,
1991, and is therefore not a mandatory subject for bargaining; the Unions charge of unfair labor practice against the
Company is hereby dismissed for lack of merit; the parties are directed to secure the best applicable terms of the
recently concluded CBSs between Nestl Phils. Inc. and it eight (8) other bargaining units, and to adopt these as the
terms and conditions of the Nestl Cabuyao Plant CBA; all union demands that are not covered by the provisions of the
CBAs of the other eight (8) bargaining units in the Company are hereby denied;

UFE-DFA-KMU moved to reconsider the aforequoted ruling, but such was subsequently denied

Appeal to the Court of Appeals:

For the second time, UFE-DFA-KMU went to the Court of Appeals via another Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul
the Orders of the Secretary of the DOLE, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The appellate court promulgated its Decision on the twin petitions for certiorari, ruling entirely in favor of
UFE-DFA-KMU. It found that the Retirement plan was not a valid issue to be tackled in the CBA and that Nestle was
free and clear of any unfair labor practice.

Both parties appealed the aforequoted ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not Nestle Philippines committed unfair labor practices.

Held:

1. As to the charge of unfair labor practice, the Court ruled in the negative

Even a perusal of the arguments of UFE-DFA-KMU in its petition and memorandum in consideration of the point
heretofore raised will not convince us to change our disposition of the question of unfair labor practice.

UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that Nestles refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision
constitutes unfair labor practice. It explains that Nestle set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining
negotiations the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan. In its words, respondent Nestle Phils., Inc. insisted that
the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue before respondent Nestle would agree
to discuss other issues in the CBA.

We are unconvinced still.

The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by Articles 252 and 253 of the Labor Code, as amended, which state

ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.

The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to
make any concession.

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.
 When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a
written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall
be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms of
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by
the parties.

Obviously, the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the
parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not
establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not
compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically
turns on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good
faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a
question of credibility. The effect of an employers or a unions individual actions is not the test of good-faith
bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn
therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.[26]

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestle was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x in disclaiming unilateral grants as
proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and
the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to
precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the
negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.

In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to
exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was
in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive
provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute
necessity.

Law applicable:

The foregoing things considered, this Court replicates below its clear disposition of the issue:

The concept of unfair labor practice is defined by the Labor Code as:

ART. 247. CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION THEREOF.
 Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization,
are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt
industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

The same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices committed by employers, to wit:

ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS.

It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization
or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in
order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law
shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining
agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective agreement.
Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the
nonmembers of the recognized collective bargaining agent; [The article referred to is 241, not 242. CAA]

(f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or
being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

(h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any
issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or

(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations associations
or partnerships who have actually participated, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally
liable.

(15) Malayang Mangawgawa ng Stayfast vs. NLRC G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) sought to be the exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast Philippines, Inc. A certification election was conducted.
Out of the 223 valid votes cast, petitioner garnered 109 votes while NLMS-Olalia received 112 votes and 2 votes were
for No Union.3

Med Arbiter Decision in Election of Exclusive Bargaining Agent:

Thus, the Med-Arbiter who supervised the certification election issued an Order certifying NLMS-Olalia as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of respondent company.

Petitioner appealed the Order of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Secretary of Labor and Employment Decision:

The Secretary of Labor and Employment initially set aside the Order of the Med-Arbiter and called for run-off election
between petitioner and NLMS-Olalia.

On motion of NLMS-Olalia, however, the Secretary of Labor and Employment reconsidered his earlier decision and
restored the Med-Arbiters Order.

Supreme Court Decision:

Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to this Court. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 125957, was
dismissed in a Resolution dated January 14, 1998.

Meanwhile, NLMS-Olalia demanded to collectively bargain with respondent company. The latter rejected petitioners
demand, insisting that it would negotiate a collective bargaining agreement only with whichever union is finally
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. Nevertheless, NLMS-Olalia went on strike until it
was temporarily restrained eight days later.

Subsequently, petitioner filed its own notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Respondent company opposed petitioners move and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner was not
the certified bargaining agent and therefore lacked personality to file a notice of strike.

National Conciliation Mediation Board Certification:

Thereafter, the parties were able to make concessions during the conciliation-mediation stage in the NCMB which
led petitioner to withdraw its notice of strike. In this connection, the NCMB issued a Certification dated July 31, 1997
which basically states that the Notice of Strike filed by MMSP-Independent against Stayfast Philippines was
considered dropped or withdrawn.

Memorandum by Respondent Company

However, Petitioners members still staged a sit-down strike to dramatize their demand for a fair and equal
treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to discriminate against them. Respondent company issued a
memorandum requiring the alleged participants in the sit-down strike to explain within 24 hours why they should not
be terminated or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and regulations pertaining to unauthorized
work stoppage, acts inimical to company interest, and disregard of instruction of immediate supervisor to perform
assigned task.

As no one complied with the memorandum within the 24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly terminated
the service of the participants in the sit-down strike on July 22, 1997.

Consequently, on July 23, 1997, petitioner staged a strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting
and illegal lockout against respondent company and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, in the NLRC.

In support of its complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had repeatedly committed acts of discrimination, such
as the denial of the use of the company canteen for purposes of conducting a strike vote, the constant denial of
applications of petitioners members for leave to attend hearings in relation to certain labor cases while similar
applications of members of the other union were approved, and the suspension of petitioners president for being
absent due to attendance in hearings of labor cases involving petitioners members. Petitioner further claimed that
the termination of about 127 of its officers and members constituted union busting and unlawful lockout.

On the other hand, respondent company claimed that petitioner lacked legal authority to go on strike since it is a
minority union. As petitioner withdrew its notice of strike during the proceedings in the NCMB, the strike conducted
by petitioner was illegal as it constituted a wildcat strike and later became a full-blown strike. Petitioner committed
illegal acts during the strike and obstructed the free ingress and egress from respondent companys premises.

Labor Arbiter Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision which ruled that, while petitioner may file a notice of strike on behalf of its
members, petitioner failed to cite any instance of discrimination or harassment when it filed its notice of strike and the
incidents mentioned as discriminatory occurred after the filing of the said notice. Moreover, assuming the strike was
legal at the beginning, it became illegal when petitioner committed acts prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor
Code, such as acts of violence, coercion and intimidation and obstruction of the free ingress to and egress from
respondent companys premises. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petition.14 The dispositive portion of the Labor
Arbiters Decision dated April 27, 1999 reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

NLRC Ruling:

Petitioner appealed but, in a Resolution, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiters Decision.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it in a Resolution dated April 10, 2000.18cralaw
virtualaw library

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated July 1, 2002, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner was seeking a review of the findings of
fact and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter which was sustained by the NLRC. The Court of Appeals found no cogent
reason to indulge petitioner.

It applied the rule that findings of fact made by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC are considered by the
appellate court as binding if supported by substantial evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not there was unfair labor practice in the case at bar committed by the respondent

Held:

The Court ruled in the negative

In discussing the above grounds, petitioner claims that the discriminatory acts of respondent company and its
General Manager against petitioners members constituted unfair labor practice under Article 248(e) of the Labor
Code, as amended. The termination of employment of petitioners 127 officers and members constituted
union-busting and unlawful lockout. As the said officers and members were unlawfully dismissed from employment,
they are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. The arbitrary action of respondent company and its General
Manager wantonly disregarded the legal rights of petitioners officers and members thereby entitling said officers and
members to damages and attorneys fees.

The case of petitioner has no leg to stand on.

Petitioners case rests on the alleged discriminatory acts of respondent company against petitioners officers and
members. However, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held that there was no sufficient proof of respondent
companys alleged discriminatory acts. Thus, petitioners unfair labor practice, union-busting and unlawful lockout
claims do not hold water. Moreover, the established facts as found by the NLRC are as follows: the sit-down strike
made by petitioners officers and members was in violation of respondent companys rules, and petitioners officers
and members ignored the opportunity given by respondent company for them to explain their misconduct, which
resulted in the termination of their employment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the said findings were supported by
substantial evidence. This Court finds that such ruling of the appellate court is not grave abuse of discretion, nor
could it be considered wrong.
(16) Holy Child Catholic School vs. Secretary of Labor,

The factual antecedents are as follows:

A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anak pawis Holy
Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS), alleging that:

PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS;

It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor
organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election, as held in Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union;11 and an inappropriate bargaining unit for want of
community or mutuality of interest, as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment12 and De La Salle University Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma.

Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that some of the employees
included in the petition for certification election holds managerial and supervisory positions.

Assuming it to be true, it argued that Section 11 (II),15 Rule XI of DOLE Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, Series of
1997, provided for specific instances in which a petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed by the
Med-Arbiter and that mixture of employees is not one of those enumerated.

Private respondent pointed out that questions pertaining to qualifications of employees may be threshed out in the
inclusion-exclusion proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification election, pursuant to Section 2,16 Rule XII of
D.O. No. 9.

Lastly, similar to the ruling in In Re: Globe Machine and Stamping Company, it contended that the will of petitioners
employees should be respected as they had manifested their desire to be represented by only one bargaining unit.
To back up the formation of a single employer unit, private respondent asserted that even if the teachers may receive
additional pay for an advisory class and for holding additional loads, petitioners academic and non-academic
personnel have similar working conditions. It cited Laguna College v. Court of Industrial Relations, as well as the case
of a union in West Negros College in Bacolod City, which allegedly represented both academic and non-academic
employees.

Med-Arbiter Decision on Certification:

Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which
private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate.
Private respondent appealed before the DOLE, who, on December 27, 2002, ruled against the dismissal of the
petition and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching
personnel, thus:

Regional Office of DOLE Decision :

We do not, however, agree with the Med-Arbiter that these differences are substantial enough to warrant the
dismissal of the petition. First, as pointed out by [private respondent], inappropriateness of the bargaining unit
sought to be represented is not a ground for the dismissal of the petition. In fact, in the cited case of University of the
Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the Supreme Court did not order the dismissal of the petition but ordered the
conduct of a certification election, limiting the same among the non-academic personnel of the University of the
Philippines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, per Resolution dated February 13, 2003, was denied.
Consequently, petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.

Court of Appeals Decision

The CA eventually dismissed the petition. As to the purported commingling of managerial, supervisory, and
rank-and-file employees in private respondents membership, it held that the Toyota ruling is inapplicable because
the vice-principals, department head, and coordinators are neither supervisory nor managerial employees. It
reasoned:

x x x While it may be true that they wield power over other subordinate employees of the petitioner, it must be
stressed, however, that their functions are not confined with policy-determining such as hiring, firing, and disciplining
of employees, salaries, teaching/working hours, other monetary and non-monetary benefits, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Further, while they may formulate policies or guidelines, nonetheless, such is merely
recommendatory in nature, and still subject to review and evaluation by the higher executives, i.e., the principals or
executive officers of the petitioner. It cannot also be denied that in institutions like the petitioner, company policies
have already been pre-formulated by the higher executives and all that the mentioned employees have to do is carry
out these company policies and standards. Such being the case, it is crystal clear that there is no improper
[commingling] of members in the private respondent union as to preclude its petition for certification of (sic)
election.33

Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel, the CA agreed with petitioner that the nature of
the formers work does not coincide with that of the latter. Nevertheless, it ruled that the SOLE did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for certification election, since it directed the conduct of two
separate certification elections based on Our ruling in University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja.34 A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but the CA denied the same;hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organizations membership
allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees

Held:

The Court held in the affirmative by denying the petition.

The issue of whether a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor organizations
membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees is actually not a novel one.

In the 2008 case of Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.,45 wherein the employer-company moved
to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground inter alia that the union membership is a mixture of
rank-and-file and supervisory employees, this Court had conscientiously discussed the applicability of Toyota and
Dunlop in the context of R.A. No. 6715 and D.O. No. 9, viz.:

It was in R.A. No. 875, under Section 3, that such questioned mingling was first prohibited, to wit:

Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals employed
as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but
may form separate organizations of their own.

Nothing in R.A. No. 875, however, tells of how the questioned mingling can affect the legitimacy of the labor
organization.

Under Section 15, the only instance when a labor organization loses its legitimacy is when it violates its duty to
bargain collectively; but there is no word on whether such mingling would also result in loss of legitimacy.

Thus, when the issue of whether the membership of two supervisory employees impairs the legitimacy of a
rank-and-file labor organization came before the Court En Banc in Lopez v. Chronicle Publication Employees
Association, the majority pronounced:

It may be observed that nothing is said of the effect of such ineligibility upon the union itself or on the status
of the other qualified members thereof should such prohibition be disregarded. Considering that the law is
specific where it intends to divest a legitimate labor union of any of the rights and privileges granted to it by
law, the absence of any provision on the effect of the disqualification of one of its organizers upon the legality
of the union, may be construed to confine the effect of such ineligibility only upon the membership of the
supervisor. In other words, the invalidity of membership of one of the organizers does not make the union
illegal, where the requirements of the law for the organization thereof are, nevertheless, satisfied and met.
(Emphasis supplied)

Then the Labor Code was enacted in 1974 without reproducing Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 875. The provision in the Labor
Code closest to Sec. 3 is Article 290, which is deafeningly silent on the prohibition against supervisory employees
mingling with rank-and-file employees in one labor organization.

Even the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules) merely provides in Section 11,
Rule II, thus:

Sec. 11. Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease operation. - All existing supervisory
unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as such and
their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled. However, existing collective
agreements with such unions, the life of which extends beyond the date of effectivity of the Code shall be
respected until their expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein are concerned.

Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to
join or assist the rank and file organization.

The determination of who are managerial employees and who are not shall be the subject of negotiation between
representatives of supervisory union and the employer. If no agreement s reached between the parties, either or both
of them may bring the issue to the nearest Regional Office for determination.

The obvious repeal of the last clause of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 875 prompted the Court to declare in Bulletin v. Sanchez that
supervisory employees who do not fall under the category of managerial employees may join or assist in the
formation of a labor organization for rank-and-file employees, but they may not form their own labor organization.

While amending certain provisions of Book V of the Labor Code, E.O. No. 111 and its implementing rules continued to
recognize the right of supervisory employees, who do not fall under the category of managerial employees, to join a
rank- and-file labor organization.

Effective 1989, R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against the questioned mingling in one labor organization, viz.:

Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees.

Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition
would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.

It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the
deficiency by introducing the following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):

Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees and security guards shall not be eligible for membership
in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of
their own; Provided, that those supervisory employees who are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit,
upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the
Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, held:

Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor
organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a
petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore,
anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any
labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of
the Labor Code.

xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27)
supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee
members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite
personality to file a petition for certification election.

In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was one for supervisory
employees, but in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that such labor
organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors
for as long as it counted rank-and-file employees among its members.

It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on
November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO in which the
core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for
certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop
and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the
Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a
legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership
cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling
was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation
of union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed
membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified
employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.

All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in
Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold
sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules.

In other words, TOYOTA AND DUNLOP CASES = BASURA UNTIL FURTHER REVIVED BY THE GULO COURT. THUS,
KAHIT MAGSAMA SAMA SILA SA ISANG UNIT, OKS SILA MGA BES. ALAMIN NALANG HISTORY. BAKA KASI
MATANONG SA RECIT.

When a similar issue confronted this Court close to three years later, the above ruling was substantially quoted in
Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(SMCC-Super) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation. In unequivocal terms, We reiterated that the alleged
inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.

Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super, it must be stressed that petitioner cannot
collaterally attack the legitimacy of private respondent by praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification
election:

Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it
cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a
mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial
employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the
proceeding is to be 1
(17) Employee of Bayer Phils vs Bayer Philippines, G.R. No. 162943

Facts: Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees of Bayer Philippines (Bayer), and is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).

In 1997, EUBP, headed by its president Facundo (Facundo), negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA).

During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayers 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining deadlock.

Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

Pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Remigio and 27 other union members, without any authority from
their union leaders, accepted Bayers wage-increase proposal.

EUBPs grievance committee questioned Remigios action and reprimanded Remigio and her allies.

Resolution of Secretary of Department of Labor:

The DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA retroactive to January 1,
1997 and to be made effective until December 31, 2001. The said CBAwas registered on July 8, 1998 with the
Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR).

Meanwhile, the rift between Facundos leadership and Remigios group broadened. Barely six months from the
signing of the new CBA, during a company-sponsored seminar, Remigio solicited signatures from union members in
support of a resolution containing the decision of the signatories to:

(1) disaffiliate from FFW,

(2) rename the union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP),

(3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for the union,

(4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers, and

(5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer.

The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued
affirming the first resolution.

A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking recognition from Bayer and demanding
remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-and-file members.
Facundo, meanwhile, sent similar requests to Bayer requesting for the remittance of union dues in favor of EUBP
and accusing the company of interfering with purely union matters.

Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues collected in a
trust account until the conflict between the two groups is resolved.

On September 15, 1998, EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (first ULP complaint) against Bayer for
non-remittance of union dues.

Apparently, the two groups failed to settle their issues as Facundo again sent respondent Dieter J. Lonishen two
more letters, asking for a grievance meeting with the management to discuss the failure of the latter to comply with
the terms of their CBA. Both requests remained unheeded.

While the first ULP case was still pending and despite EUBPs repeated request for a grievance conference, Bayer
decided to turn over the collected union dues amounting to P254,857.15 to respondent Anastacia Villareal, Treasurer
of REUBP.

Aggrieved by the said development, EUBP lodged a complaint against Remigios group before the Industrial Relations
Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from EUBP for commission of acts that threaten the life of the union.

Labor Arbiter Decisions in the Remittance of Union dues:

Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. dismissed the first ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Arbiter explained
that the root cause for Bayers failure to remit the collected union dues can be traced to the intra-union conflict
between EUBP and Remigios group and that the charges imputed against Bayer should have been submitted instead
to voluntary arbitration.

EUBP did not appeal the said decision.

Second complaint for Unfair Labor practices was filed:

Petitioners filed a second ULP complaint against herein respondents docketed as NLRC-RAB-IV Case No.
12-11813-99-L. Three days later, petitioners amended the complaint charging the respondents with unfair labor
practice committed by organizing a company union, gross violation of the CBA and violation of their duty to bargain.

Petitioners complained that Bayer refused to remit the collected union dues to EUBP despite several demands sent
to the management. They also alleged that notwithstanding the requests sent to Bayer for a renegotiation of the last
two years of the 1997-2001 CBA between EUBP and Bayer, the latter opted to negotiate instead with Remigios
group.

On even date, REUBP and Bayer agreed to sign a new CBA. Remigio immediately informed her allies of the
managements decision.

In response, petitioners immediately filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Labor Arbiter against respondents. Petitioners asserted
their authority as the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer and asked that a
temporary restraining order be issued against Remigios group and Bayer to prevent the employees from ratifying the
new CBA.

Later, petitioners filed a second amended complaint to include in its complaint the issue of gross violation of the CBA
for violation of the contract bar rule following Bayers decision to negotiate and sign a new CBA with Remigios group.
Regional Director of Industrial Relations Division Decision on Expulsion of Remigio:

The Regional Director of the Industrial Relations Division of DOLE issued a decision dismissing the issue on
expulsion filed by EUBP against Remigio and her allies for failure to exhaust reliefs within the union and
ordering the conduct of a referendum to determine which of the two groups should be recognized as union
officers.

Bureau of Labor Relations Decision:

EUBP seasonably appealed the said decision to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The BLR reversed the
Regional Directors ruling and ordered the management of Bayer to respect the authority of the duly-elected
officers of EUBP in the administration of the prevailing CBA.

Unfortunately, the said BLR ruling came late since Bayer had already signed a new CBA with REUBP. The said CBA
was eventually ratified by majority of the bargaining unit.

Labor Arbiters Decision on the second Unfair Labor Practice Case:

Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson R. Gan dismissed EUBPs second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Labor
Arbiter explained the dismissal as follows:

The case involves intra-union disputes, this Office is bereft of any jurisdiction pursuant to Article 226 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which provides pertinently in part, thus:

Bureau of Labor Relations The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of
the Department of Labor and Employment shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or
upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.

Resolution of NLRC on the TRO asked of petitioner:

The NLRC resolved to dismiss petitioners motion for a restraining order and/or injunction stating that the subject
matter involved an intra-union dispute, over which the said Commission has no jurisdiction.

Decision of the NLRC on Appeal:

NLRC denied the appeal and the MR.

Decision of the Court of Appeals:

Thus, petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The CA sustained both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRCs rulings.

Hence this petition:

Issue:

Whether the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with Remigios splinter group despite its
validly existing CBA with EUBP can be considered unfair labor practice and, if so, whether EUBP is entitled to any
relief.
Held:

The petition is partly meritorious.

Yes, Bayer is liable for ULP but upheld the dismissal of the case as to Remigios

An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including grievances arising from
any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the
unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following
circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes, viz:

SECTION 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:

(a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by another labor organization;

(b) conduct of election of union and workers association officers/nullification of election of union and workers
association officers;

(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers association funds;

(d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements;

(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation;

(f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;

(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers association officers and members;

(h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition;

(i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration;

(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers association constitution and by-laws;

(k) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations and collective bargaining agreements;

(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers association membership;

(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements;

(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union membership and collective
bargaining

(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;

(2) between and among members of a union or workers association.

SECTION 2. Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict between a labor union and the
employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a labor organization or workers association. This includes: (1)
cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a petition for interpleader.

It is clear from the foregoing that the issues raised by petitioners do not fall under any of the aforementioned
circumstances constituting an intra-union dispute. More importantly, the petitioners do not seek a determination of
whether it is the Facundo group (EUBP) or the Remigio group (REUBP) which is the true set of union officers. Instead,
the issue raised pertained only to the validity of the acts of management in light of the fact that it still has an existing
CBA with EUBP.

Thus as to Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso the question was whether they were liable for unfair labor practice, which
issue was within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. The dismissal of the second ULP complaint was therefore erroneous.

However, as to respondents Remigio and Villareal, we find that petitioners complaint was validly dismissed.

Petitioners ULP complaint cannot prosper as against respondents Remigio and Villareal because the issue, as against
them, essentially involves an intra-union dispute based on Section 1 (n) of DOLE Department Order No. 40-03.

To rule on the validity or illegality of their acts, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC will necessarily touch on the issues
respecting the propriety of their disaffiliation and the legality of the establishment of REUBP issues that are outside
the scope of their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaint was validly made, but only with respect to
these two respondents.

Bayer et al are liable for ULP.

It must be remembered that a CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation between labor
and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the duly certified bargaining agent
it had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew with a different group if there is no legitimate reason
for doing so and without first following the proper procedure.

Article 253 of the Labor Code, as amended, plainly provides:

ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. Where there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or
modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo
and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)

This is the reason why it is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization that
has been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining representative and the employer becomes the law between them.

(18) SWOFLU vs. Universal Robina, October 05, 2016

Facts:

Universal Robina Corporation Sugar Division - Southern Negros Development Corporation (URC-SONEDCO) and
Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), then the exclusive bargaining
representative of URC-SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (2002
Collective Bargaining Agreement) effective January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006.

Under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, rank-and-file employees were entitled to a wage increase of
P14.00/day for 2002 and P12.00/day for the succeeding years until 2006.

Days after the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed, a certification election was conducted.

SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won and replaced PACIWU-TUCP as the exclusive bargaining representative.

PACIWU-TUCP questioned the results of the certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment.

Med-Arbiters Certification of SONDECO and Labor Secretarys Resolution:

Med-Arbiter Romulo Sumalinog certified SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of URC-SONEDCO. This was affirmed by the Labor Secretary in a Resolution

URC-SONEDCO consistently refused to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with SONEDCO Workers
Free Labor Union, despite several demands from SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, allegedly due to the 2002
Collective Bargaining Agreement, which it signed with PACIWU-TUCP.

The 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired with no new collective bargaining agreement being signed.

With no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO informed the rank-and-file employees that they
would be granted the following economic benefits:

(1) Wage increase of P16.00/day effective January 1, 2007;

(2) Group life insurance of P50,000.00 coverage/year;

(3) Emergency leave in lieu of bereavement leave, up to five (5) days per year; and

(4) Cash loan in lieu of emergency loan of P5,000.00, payable in 11 months.

URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these-benefits to sign an acknowledgment
receipt/waiver (2007 and 2008 waiver), which basically stated that "[i]n the event that a subsequent [collective
bargaining agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement]
shall only be effective January 1, 2008/ January 1, 2009."

URC-SONEDCO claimed that the waivers was designed to avoid and/or prevent double compensation.

On August 20, 2008, a certification election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won again and
proceeded to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, which became effective January 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2013 (2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement).

SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a
complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO.

They argued that the requirement of a waiver before the release of the wage increase violated their right to
self-organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action.
Labor Arbiters Decision:

The Labor Arbiter found that URC-SONEDCO did not commit unfair labor practice when it increased the wages of the
rank-and-file employees for 2007 and 2008.

Decision of the NLRC:

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Labor Arbiter's Decision that the requirement of a
waiver before the release of the benefits for 2007 and 2008 did not constitute unfair labor practice

The National Labor Relations Commission likewise affirmed the decision to award the wage increase to the
employees who initially refused to sign the waiver.

Aggrieved, members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari assailing the National Labor Relations Commission Decision.

Court of Appeals Decision:

The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision and dismissed the Petition.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was ULP committed by the company

Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative by finding the respondent guilty of unfair labor practice.

Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals ruled that respondent did not commit unfair
labor practice since the requirement of a waiver for 2007 and 2008 did not interfere with the employees exercise of
their right to self-organization. However, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account that unfair labor practice not
only involves acts that violate the right to self-organization but also covers several acts enumerated in Article 259 of
the Labor Code, (Check notes section in UFE-DFA-KMU case.)

Under this provision, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it fails in its duty to bargain in good faith.

In ruling that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court
of Appeals failed to consider the totality of respondent's acts, which showed that it violated its duty to bargain
collectively. This constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 259(g) of the Labor Code.

Article 263 of the Labor Code defines the duty to bargain collectively:

ARTICLE 263. [252] Meaning of Duty to Bargain Collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession.
Respondent repeatedly refused to meet and bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the exclusive
bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees. In its Position Paper before the National Labor Relations
Commission, respondent cited the different instances when petitioners sent it letters trying to set meetings to discuss
a new collective bargaining agreement.

Respondent's argument has no merit. Respondent's reliance on the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement as basis
for not negotiating with petitioners is unjustified. The Collective Bargaining Agreement that respondent invoked had
been entered into when a Petition for Certification Election was already filed.

In Associated Trade Unions v. Trajano, this Court ruled on the temporary nature of this type of collective bargaining
agreement:

The Court will not rule on the merits and/or defects of the new CBA and shall only consider the fact that it was entered
into at a time when the petition for certification election had already been filed by TUP AS and was then pending
resolution. The said CBA cannot be deemed permanent, precluding the commencement of negotiations by another
union with the management. In the meantime however, so as not to deprive the workers of the benefits of the said
agreement, it shall be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis, subject to the results of the certification
election. The agreement may be continued in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the workers or may be rejected and replaced in the event that TUP AS emerges as the winner.

Let it be noted that based on the results of the certification election conducted in the establishment, Mediator-Arbiter
Sumalinog, declared and certified SWOFLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of SONEDCO. The office of the Secretary affirmed SWOFLU's certification in OS-A-6-63-01, and the
decision became final and executory on 15 April 2003.

In other words, as far as this Office is concerned, SWOFLU is the incumbent sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of SONEDCO. As such, there was actually no necessity for SWOFLU to file the subject
petition, as its representation status remains to be effective unless challenged by other legitimate labor organizations
during the freedom period of the CBA that was entered into by PACIWU-TUCP and employer SONEDCO.

Respondent's duty to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union as the incumbent bargaining agent is clear.

The wording of the waivers shows a clear attempt to limit petitioners' bargaining power by making them waive the
negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the collective bargaining agreement that would be entered into
would only be effective the year following the 2008 waiver, respondent limited when the collective bargaining
agreement could be deemed effective.

In other words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any benefits they might have received under a collective
bargaining agreement in exchange for the company-granted benefits.
(19) PEU vs. Esquivel, December 01, 2016

Facts:

PEU's Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing

(a) the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members thereto;

(b) the compliance with all the requirements therefor; and

(c) the Local President to sign the affiliation agreement with NUWHRAIN upon acceptance of such affiliation.

PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of the
rank and file employees' monthly salaries, brought about by PEU's affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly
requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.

Meanwhile, in a Decision (October 10, 2008 Decision), the OSEC resolved the collective bargaining deadlock
between PEU-NUWHRAIN and The Peninsula Manila Hotel (Hotel), ordering the parties to execute a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the dispositions therein (arbitral award).

The parties have yet to actually sign a CBA but have, for the most part, implemented the arbitral award.

PEU-NUWHRAIN then requested the OSEC for Administrative Intervention for Dispute Avoidance (AIDA) pursuant to
DOLE Circular No. 1, series of 200617 in relation to the issue, among others, of its entitlement to collect increased
agency fees from the non-PEU members, which was docketed as OSEC-AIDA-03-001-09.

The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing that:

(a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN
and the Hotel;

(b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for such increase.20
The OSEC's Ruling:

In a Decision (June 2, 2010 Decision), the OSEC upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees from the
non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the expired CBA, which was declared to be in full force
and effect pursuant to the October 10, 2008 Decision

Dissatisfied, PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration

On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration

Unperturbed, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the OSEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing PEU-NUWHRAIN to collection increased agency
fees despite non-compliance with the legal requirements therefor.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision the CA set aside the OSEC's March 6, 2012 Order, and reinstated the June 2, 2010 Decision.
PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence the present petition.

Issues: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ruling that PEU-NUWHRAIN had no right to collect the
increased agency fees.

Held:

The petition lacks merit.

The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the
right to collect a reasonable fee called "agency fee" from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate
bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the
benefits under the CBA.

While the collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as
amended, the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but
quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich
themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.

In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees is not disputed. However, the rate of agency fees
it seeks to collect from the non-PEU members is contested, considering its failure to comply with the requirements
for a valid increase of union dues, rendering the collection of increased agency fees unjustified.

Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o)45 (formerly Article 241) of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates the
submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues.

These are:

(a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly
called for the purpose;
(b) the secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes
cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and

(c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.

In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the foregoing requirements. It
attempted to remedy the "inadvertent omission" of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%)
union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union member through the July 1, 2010 GMR,48 entitled "A
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE DEDUCTION OF TWO PERCENT (2%) UNION DUES
FROM THE MONTHLY BASIC SALARY OF EACH UNION MEMBER," which stated, among others, that:

The General Membership Assembly (Assembly) "approved the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the
monthly basic salary of each union member" during its 8th General Membership Meeting, as shown in the October
28, 2008 minutes; "through inadvertence, the [October 28, 2008 GMR] failed to include the Assembly's approval of
the two percent (2%) deduction of union dues;"

It is evident from the foregoing that while the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up
during the PEU-NUWHRAIN's 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no sufficient
showing that the same had been duly deliberated and approved.

Corollarily, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008
check-off authorizations becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee
to any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the law,
which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one
percent (1%) of the employee's monthly basic salary.

Art 252

(1) UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO
(UFE-DFA-KMU) v. NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008

NESTL PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED v. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU) G.R. Nos. 158944-45 March 3, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS: UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestle
belonging to the latters Alabang and Cabuyao plants. The Presidents of the Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions of
UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestle of their intent to open a new CBA negotiations for the year 2001-2004. Nestle on its
part informed them it was preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending
conduct of CBA negotiations. Nestl reiterated its stance in a letter to UFE-DFA-KMU that "unilateral grants, one-time
company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan,
Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA
negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom. Nestle requested the NCMB, Regional Office, to conduct
preventive mediation proceedings as result of an impasse. However, the conciliation was ineffective and
UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues. It filed
another Notice of Strike this time on the ground of unfair labor practice on the part of Nestle. It alleged that Nestle is
bargaining in bad faith by setting preconditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the
Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations. Secretary of DOLE Sto. Tomas assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
upon Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction by Nestle. UFE-DFA-KMU filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals after Sec. Sto. Tomas denied their motion for reconsideration alleging that she committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the said orders. Acting Secretary of DOLE
Brion issued an order ruling in favor of Nestle. Another petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed by
UFE-DFAKMU. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of UFE-DFA-KMU but absolved Nestle of any unfair labor
practice.

ISSUE/S: Is Nestle liable for unfair labor practice?

RULING: No. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will,
"bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x" in disclaiming
unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for
the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the
commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties
should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement. Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to
exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was
in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive
provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute
necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an
impasse does not establish bad faith. It is but natural that at negotiations, management and labor adopt positions or
make demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the economic issue
proposed by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the former but it did not. And the
managements firm stand against the issue of the Retirement Plan did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It
had a right to insist on its position to the point of stalemate.

(2) UST FACULTY UNION VS. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, April 7, 2009

ULP BY EMPLOYER; DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH

DOCTRINE: It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of the Gamilla
Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter ofthe DOLE.

FACTS: (USTFU) wrote a letter to all its members informing them of a General Assembly (GA) that was to be held on
October 5, 1996. The letter contained an agenda for the GA which included an election of officers. The then
incumbent president of the USTFU was Atty. Eduardo J. Mario, Jr. (Mario group / USTFU) Secretary General of the
UST, issued a Memorandum allowing the request of the Faculty Clubs of the university to hold a convocation on
October 4, 1996.

Members of the faculties of the university attended the convocation, including members of the USTFU, without the
participation of the members of the UST administration. Also during the convocation, an election for the officers of
the USTFU was conducted by a group called the Reformist Alliance. Upon learning that the convocation was
intended to be an election, members of the USTFU walked out. Meanwhile, an election was conducted among those
present, (Gamilla Group) were elected as the president and officers, respectively, of the union. Such election was
communicated to the UST administration.

Mario Group filed a complaint for ULP against the UST with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. It also filed a
complaint with the Office of the Med-Arbiter of (DOLE), praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla
Group as officers of the USTFU.

(CBA) was entered into by the Gamilla Group and the UST. The CBA superseded an existing CBA entered into by the
UST and USTFU. Gamilla, accompanied by Chief Security Officer of the UST, padlocked the office of the USTFU.
Afterwards, an armed security guard of the UST was posted in front of the USTFU office.

MED-ARBITER: election of the Gamilla group as null and void and ordering that this group cease and desist from
performing the duties and responsibilities of USTFU officers.

(NOTE: THIS DECISION CAME ONLY AFTER THE SC HAS ALREADY DECIDED THIS CASE)

DIRECTOR OF BLR: Affirmed Med-Arbiter

NLRC: The complaint was dismissed on the ground that USTFU failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence
that indeed UST was guilty of ULP. UST merely granted the request of faculty members to hold such convocation.
Moreover, by USTFUs own admission, no member of the UST administration attended or participated in the
convocation.

As to the CBA, the labor arbiter ruled that when the new CBA was entered into, (1) the Gamilla Group presented more
than sufficient evidence to establish that they had been duly elected as officers of the USTFU; and (2) the ruling of the
med-arbiter that the election of the Gamilla Group was null and void was not yet final and executory. Thus, UST was
justified in dealing with and entering into a CBA with the Gamilla Group, including helping the Gamilla Group in
securing the USTFU office.

CA: affirmed NLRC.

Petitioner enumerates the acts constituting ULP as follows: (1) Atty. Domingo Legaspi, the legal counsel for the UST,
conducted a faculty meeting in his office, supplying derogatory information about the Mario Group; (2) respondents
provided the Gamilla Group with the facilities and forum to conduct elections, in the guise of a convocation; and (3)
respondents transacted business with the Gamilla Group such as the processing of educational and hospital benefits,
deducting USTFU dues from the faculty members without turning over the dues to the Mario Group, and entering into
a CBA with them.

ISSUE/S: WON UST Is Guilty of ULP

RULING: NO (NOTE: At the time of these events, the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group as the valid officers and
directors of the USTFU was already submitted to the med-arbiter and no decision had yet been reached on the
matter.)

The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. In order to show that the
employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

With regard to the alleged derogatory remarks of Atty. Legaspi, the three tribunals correctly ruled that there was no
evidence to support such allegation.

In no way can the contents of the memorandum be interpreted to mean that faculty members were required to
attend the convocation. Not one coercive term was used in the memorandum to show that the faculty club members
were compelled to attend such convocation. And the phrase we are allowing them to hold a convocation negates any
idea that the UST would participate in the proceedings.

ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or to make any concession.

In the instant case, until our Decision in G.R. No. 131235 that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office,
there was no reason to believe that the members of the Gamilla Group were not the validly elected officers and
directors of USTFU. To reiterate, the Gamilla Group submitted a Letter whereby it informed Secretary General of UST
that its members were the newly elected officers and directors of USTFU. In the Letter, every officer allegedly elected
was identified with the Letter signed by the alleged newly elected Secretary General and President.

The records are bereft of any evidence to show that the Mario Group informed the UST of their objections to the
election of the Gamilla Group.It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of
the Gamilla Group.

Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter of the DOLE.

Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the
Mario Group that the former was not validly elected into office.

The subsequent ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 131235 that the Gamilla Group was not validly elected into office
cannot support petitioners allegation of ULP. Had respondents dealt with the Gamilla Group after our ruling in G.R.
No. 131235 had become final and executory, it would have been a different story. As the CA ruled correctly, until the
validity of the election of the Gamilla Group is resolved with finality, respondents could not be faulted for negotiating
with said group.

As to the padlocking of the USTFU office, it must be emphasized that based on the Certification of person padlocking
that the Commander of security agency was merely present which cannot be equated to a positive act of aiding the
Gamilla Group in securing the USTFU office.

Having been shown evidence to support the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group with no counter-evidence from the
Mario Group, UST had to recognize the Gamilla Group and negotiate with it. Thus, the acts of UST in support of the
USTFU as the legitimate representative of the bargaining unit, albeit through the Gamilla Group, cannot be
considered as ULP.
(3) GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION
INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT

G.R. No. 146728 February 11, 2004

FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC)
employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor
Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the
issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent
GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had
received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union
membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had
standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.

On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter
stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was
nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on
how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991
disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its
members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.

NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP.

ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective bargaining with the union

HELD: The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between
labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that
when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still
the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5)
years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within
the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It
was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a
counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an
unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties
may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election
shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before
the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this
obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the
original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning
the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.

ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice.

GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in
bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it
turned out to be utterly baseless.

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to
bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
(4) KIOK LOY vs. NLRC and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)

G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986

FACTS: In a certification election, KILUSAN, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in
a resolution by the BLR as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company).

Thereafter, the Union furnished the Company with copies of its proposed CBA. At the same time, it requested the
Company for its counter proposals. The request were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.

Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the Union filed a Notice of
Strike, with the BLR on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.

The NLRC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondent [company] is hereby declared guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of
Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. xx

ISSUE: Did the NLRC act with grave abuse of discretion?

HELD: NO

Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic
frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to
create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and
is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a
contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.

We are in total conformity with respondent NLRCs pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor
practice. It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it
made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed CBA, to the Company not only once
but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal
whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. A Companys refusal to make
counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially
true where the Unions request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Companys approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of
postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements,
lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the
Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Companys) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latters
disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith.

NOTES: While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to
initiate contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following
jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,

(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees representative in accordance with any of the
means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;

(2) proof of majority representation; and

(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . all of which preconditions are
undisputedly present in the instant case.

(5) COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and
ELEONOR AMBAS

G.R. No. 141471.

Facts: During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor
Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA
but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However,
the union members rejected the said CBA. Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith
before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This decision was reversed on appeal with the
NLRC.
The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the
pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed. Ambas
protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.

After the petitioners inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike. After meeting with the NCMB to discuss
the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination. The petitioner
then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner
to accept them back. The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been
guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and

Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees right to
self-organization.

Held: The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

The petitioners failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of
the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in Kiok
Loy vs. NLRC, the companys refusal to make counter-proposal to the unions proposed CBA is an indication of bad
faith. Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying
tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA. Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the
bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.
Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation
by the employer.

The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in
order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table. While the
Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause,
nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of
equity and fair play. Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not
a valid ground to terminate her employment. When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees
tends to interfere with the employees right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a
prohibited act.
(6) PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INCORPORATED vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA)

FACTS: The present petition arose from a labor complaint,6 filed by respondent PALEA against petitioners PAL and
one Mary Anne del Rosario, Director of Personnel of petitioner PAL, on 1 March 1989. The labor complaint charged
both petitioners with unfair labor practice for the alleged non-payment of the 13th month pay of petitioner PALs
employees who had not been regularized as of the 30 of April 1988, allegedly in contravention of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) entered into by petitioner PAL and respondent PALEA. PAL countered that those rank
and file employees who were not regularized by 30 April of a particular year are, in principle, not denied their 13th
month pay considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas Bonus; that the Christmas
Bonus given to all its employees is deemed a compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851 and the latters
implementing rules; and that the foregoing has been the practice formally adopted in previous CBAs as early as
1970. On 12 March 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the respondent PALEAs complaint for
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner PAL was not guilty of unfair labor practice in withholding the grant
of the 13th Month Pay or Mid Year Bonus to the concerned employees. The giving of the particular bonus was said to
be merely an additional practice made in the past, "such being the case, it violated no agreement or existing practice
or committed unfair labor practice. In refusing payment of the mid-year bonus, petitioner PAL argues that 1) the CBA
does not apply to non-regular employees such that any benefits arising from said agreement cannot be made to
apply to them, including the mid-year bonus; and 2) it has always been the company practice not to extend the
mid-year bonus to those employees who have not attained regular status prior to the month of May, when payment
of the particular bonus accrues.

ISSUE/S: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the order of the NLRC for the
payment of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus to its employees regularized after 30 April 1988.

RULING: We rule in the negative. It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and
employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization.32 Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination. Hence, to be entitled to the benefits under the
CBA, the employees must be members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization
designated as the bargaining agent. A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicates to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.33 At this point, the allegation of petitioner
PAL that the non-regular employees do not belong to the collective bargaining unit and are thus not covered by the
CBA is unjustified and unsubstantiated. It is apparent to us that petitioner PAL excludes certain employees from the
benefits of the CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off date, 30 April 1988. There
is no showing that the nonregular status of the concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes
their interests from those of the regular employees so as to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit and the
benefits of the CBA. Having ruled that the benefits provided by the subject CBA are applicable even to non-regular
employees who belong to the bargaining unit concerned, the next and crucial query to be addressed is whether the
13th month pay or mid-year bonus can be equated to the Christmas bonus. it is crystal clear that petitioner PAL is
claiming an exemption from payment of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus provided in the CBA under the guise
of paying the Christmas bonus which it claims to be the equivalent of the 13th month pay under Presidential Decree
No. 851. Presidential Decree No. 851 mandates that all employers must pay all their employees receiving a basic
salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later
than 24 December of every year. Memorandum Order No. 28,35 dated 13 August 1986, removed the salary ceiling,
generally making all employees entitled to the 13th month pay regardless of the amount of their basic salary,
designation or employment status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, provided that they
have worked for at least one (1) month during a calendar year.

ART. 253-A: TERMS OF CBA

1. FVC Labor Union - Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-samang

Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations

(SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO)

G.R. No. 176249 27 NOV 2009

FACTS: FVCLU entered into a CBA with FVC for 5 years starting 1 Feb 1998. At the end of the 3rd year, FVCLU and

FVC entered into a renegotiation of the CBA and modified the CBA duration, extending it for an additional 4 months.

9 days prior to the original end of CBA term, SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO filed before DOLE a petition for certification

election for the same rank n file units covered by FVCLU. FVCLU motioned to DOLE to dismiss the petition on ground

that ceritfication election petition was outside the freedom period, or the 60 days before the expiration of CBA.

FVCLU contends the end of the CBA is on 31 May 2003, not 30 Jan 2003.

MED-ARB: outside the freedom period, dismiss certification petition.

SOLE: within freedom period, ordered the conduct of a certification election in FVC

(MR-ed) Acting-SOLE: outside freedom period, CBA has been extended 4 months and has been ratified by

members, known later as SANAMA-SIGLO.

CA: Within freedom period. Reinstates previous SOLE ruling.

ISSUE: WON the extension of the CBA term also changed the representation status and effectively moved the

reckoning point of the 60-day freedom period from 30 January to 30 May 2003, hence certification election was

filed outside the authorized period.

RULING: NO. By express provision of 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the

representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other worse, despite an
agreement for a CBA wit a life of more than 5 years, either as an original provision or amendment, the bargaining

unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for 5 years and can be challenged within 60 days prior to the

expiration of the CBAs first five years. The renegotiated term has no effect. SANAMA-SIGLO properly filed a petition

for certification election.

2. San Miguel Corportion Employees Union-PTGWO v. Hon. Ma. Nieves D. Confesor (SOLE), Magnolia Corporation

and San Miguel Foods, Inc.

FACTS: SMCEU entered into a CBA with SMC, effective on 1 Jul 1989 to 30 Jun 1994. During the time SMC had 4

major operating divisions, including Magnolia and Feeds and Livestocks. In 1991, Magnolia and Feeds were spun off

to be their own corporations, however the CBA remained in force. In 1992, CBA was renegotiated in accordance with

253-A of LC: SMCEU proposed to still include the employees of Magnolia and Feeds and that the renegotiated terms

shall be effective for the remaining 2 years SMC contends that employees in MAgnolia and SMFI have effectively

ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at SMC, and that CBAs are only effective for 3 years. SMC and SMCEU

declared a deadlock in 1990. Oct 1992, a Notice of Strike was filed against SMC. In turn, SMC requested with the

NCMB to conduction mediation, however no settlement was arrived. During the Strike of SMCEU, SMC, Magnolia

and SMFI filed a petition with SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, which SOLE acquiesced to.

SOLE: the renegotiated terms are effective for 3 years FROM 30 Jun 1992 covering only SMC employees.

SMCEU, dissatisfied with the SOLE order, comes to the SC on a Motion for Issuance of a TRO and Preliminary

Injunction to enjoin the holding of a certification election in the different companies.

ISSUE: WON the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for 3 years.

RULING: YES. Art. 253-A states that the CBA has a term of 5 years instead of 3, before the amendment of the law as

far as representation aspect is concerned.. Representation aspect refers to the identity and majority status of the

union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit. All other

provisions simply refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as wells as non-economic provisions. No outside union

can enter the establishment within 5 years and challenge the status of the incumbent, likewise terms and conditions

of employment can not be questioned by the employers or employees during the 5 year affectivity of the CBA.

Employees in SMFI and Magnolia were advised and assured that they will be absorbed by the new corporation

without loss of tenure and retaining their present pay and benefits according to existing CBAs. As Magnolia and SMFI

became new distinct corporations, employees therein cannot belong to a single bargaining unit.

Factors to determine proper constituency of a bargaining unit: (1) will of the employees; (2) affinity and unit of

employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)

employment status.
ART. 254

1. PAQUITO V. ANDO V. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET.AL.,

G.R. NO. 184007 16 FEB 2011

FACTS: Ando was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc., (PACSI) and independent labor

contractor hired Campo and others to haul and pile bags from Victorias Milling Company to trucks. Campo and et.al.,

were dismissed from employment, they filed an illegal dismissal case against PACSI with the LA.

LA: PACSI and Ando are to pay 422,702.28 for separation pay and atty.s fees.

NLRC:PACSI failed to perfect appeal for nonpayment of the supersedes bond, affirmed LA. (FEJ); Campo moved for

execution of judgment.

Acting Sheriff Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on Andos conjugal properties, which Ando filed an action for

prohibition and damages with TRO with RTC.

RTC: No jurisdiction. NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment states Andos remedy is tot file a third-party claiming

with the NLRC sheriff. However, it also decided on the merits and stayed execution.

Ando raised the case on Certiorari to the CA.

CA: Affirms RTC Order.

ISSUE: WON RTC has no jurisdiction and can stay the execution of the sheriff against his personal properties.

RULING: YES. The RTC has no jurisdiction to restrain the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the LA.

Regular courts have no jurisdiction on cases which arise from and are incidental to the enforcement of decision,

orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officer and tribunals of DOLE. Holding otherwise is to

sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Art.254 underscores the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over Andos complaint as it states that No temporary or permanent

injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor dispute shall be issued by any court or
other entity, except as otherwise provide in 218 and 264 of this code.
Ando has availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that Sc look

byron his procedural missteps and grant the petition.

ART. 255

1. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) V. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING (SOLE)

G.R.No. 128845 1 JUN 2000

FACTS: International School, Inc., is domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign

diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. They have 2 classifications for their faculty: foreign-hires and

local-hires. They adapted a four-fold test to classify each hire: 1) domicile; 2) home economy; 3) economic

allegiance; and 4) was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in ISI and was ISI responsible for brining that

individual to PH. If ANY of the answer points to the PH, the faculty is a local hire, else a foreign hire. Foreign-Hires are

granted certain benefits and a 25% higher salary rate not given to local-hires.

Negotiations were held in Jun 1995, ISAE contested the difference in salary rates and the issue on whether to include

foreign-hires in the bargaining unit. This eventually ended in a deadlock between ISI and ISAE. ISAE filed a strike for

failure of the NCMB to bring the parties to a compromise. DOLE assumed jurisdiction of the dispute and ordered the

parity and representation issues in favor of ISI. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit.

RULING: YES. It does NOT appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with

local-hire s for purpose of collective bargaining. History shows that this group always treated themselves separately

form the local-hires: limited tenures as opposed to security of tenure given to local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate tot be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and

duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provision of the law. Factors determinative of an appropriate

collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees; (1) affinity and unity of the employees interest, (3) prior

collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units

acceptability is WON it is fundamentally the combination which will be best assure to all employees the exercise of

their collective bargaining rights.

2. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU) V. MAINIT LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (MALDECOWU-ULGWP)

G.R. No. 79526 21 DEC 1990

FACTS: ULGWP filed with the regional Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election to

determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representing among rank n file employees of Mainit Lumber. Mainit

Lumber approximately had 136 rank n file employees. The hearings were scheduled and compulsory intervenor (now

petitioner) NAFTU requested for postponement, but agreed to submit their position papers to Mediation-Arbitration.

MED-ARB: grants certification election.

Bureau of Labor Relations: affirmed decision.

Election was held, and ULGWP won by 146-2. NATFU filed an election protest alleging massive vote-buying

accompanied by grave and serious threat, force and intimidation on the lives of the employees.

MED-ARB: Dismissed Protest.

BLR: Denied appeal.

NATFU claims that Mainit Lumber was composed of 2 Bargaining Units: the Sawmill Division and Logging Division,

they were 80km away from each other and had 2 separate CBAs. Hence the petition for certification election only

referred to one bargaining unit.

ISSUE: WON it was right for the Med-Arbiter to change the employer from two separate bargaining units to only one.

RULING: YES. 175 consented out of 201 employees of Mainit Lumber to change from 2 to only 1 bargaining

representative. While the existence of a history of 2 bargaining units is a factor, it is not conclusive. Other factors are

considered: such as, the test of grouping of community or mutuality of interests. Basic Test: WON it is fundamentally

the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights
There is mutuality of interests among the Logging and Sawmill division; their functions mesh with one another. There

may be a difference as to nature of their individual assignments but distinctions are not enough to warrant the

formation of a separate bargaining unit.

ART. 256: REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN ORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS

1. PICOP RESOURCES INC., v. DEQUILLA ET.AL.,

G.R. No. 172666; 7 DEC 2011

FACTS: Respondents Ricardo Dequilla, Elo Pabilando, Cesar Atienda and Aniceto Orbeta, Jr. were employees of

PICORP and members of NAMAPRI-SPFL. They were rank n file employees having a CBA thru NAMPRI-SPFL with

PICOP that expires on 22 May 2000. The President (Atty. Fuentes) of SPFL advised PICORP to terminate some of the

rank n file members of NAMAPRI-SPFL for disloyalty for allegedly signing a petition for the certification of rival union,

Free Works Union (FFW). PICOP issued a memorandum to the employees concerned, asking for their explanation,

and thereafter endorsed the same to Fuentes, who requested their termination as the freedom period starts after 22

May 2000. PICOP served them notices of termination due to acts of disloyalty, and 31/46 employees were dismissed

from employment. Thus the filing of a complaint for ULP and Illegal Dismissal.

LA: They were illegally terminated (Dequilla, et.al., wins)

NLRC: Appeal is dismissed, MR- granted: reversing the LA ruling for lack of merit (PICOP) No illegal dismissal or ULP

CA: They were illegally dismissed, and states that the act of signing the authorization for the filing of the petition for

certification election of a rival union, PICOP Democratic Trade Unionist- Federation of Free Workers such act was not

a sufficed ground to terminate employment.

ISSUE: WON an existing CBA can be given its full force and effect in all its terms and conditions including its union

security clause, even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been entered into.

RULING: NO. The acts of Dequilla, et.al., were not enough proof of a violation of the Union Security Clause which

would warrant their dismissal. PICOP failed to show in detail how Dequilla et.al., campaigned and supported FFW.

The mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election before the freedom period does not

necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty, because although it was signed prior to the freedom period it was filed

during the freedom period.

Art. 256 applies in this case, and while it is incumbent for PICOP to continue to recognize the majority status of

NAMAPRI-SPFL even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for

certification election was filed.

(2) NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION
HOTEL CHAPTER VS SECRETARY OF LABOR

FACTS:

A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila
Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel).

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC,
and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case to Med-Arbiter Ma.
Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially
segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees. Six other votes were segregated because the
employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other
votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote
of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was counted.

The Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by
the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.

Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), arguing
that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened considering that probationary employee
Gatbontons vote was tallied.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed
the Med-Arbiters Order. It held that pursuant to Section 5, Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code on exclusion and inclusion of voters in a certification election, the probationary employees cannot vote, as at
the time the Med-Arbiter issued the Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election, the six
probationary employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote. With respect to the votes cast by the 11
dismissed employees, they could be considered since their dismissal was still pending appeal. As to the votes cast by
the six alleged supervisory employees, the SOLE held that their votes should be counted since their promotion took
effect months after the issuance of the above-said Order of the Med-Arbiter, hence, they were still considered as
rank-and-file. Respecting Gatbontons vote, as the records show that during the pre-election conferences, there was
no disagreement as to his inclusion in the voters list, and neither was it timely challenged when he voted on election
day, hence, the Election Officer could not then segregate his vote.

The SOLE further ruled that even if the 17 votes of the dismissed and supervisory employees were to be
counted and presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes
garnered by HIMPHLU.

In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.

CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE.

ISSUE:

1. Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote

2. Whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent.

RULING:

1. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining
covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all
employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial
interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment
status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to all the employees in
the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the bargaining unit. (Emphasis
supplied)

The votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification
elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two
months before the election.

2. The Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to be a valid
certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered
majority of the valid votes cast.

Prescinding from the Courts ruling that all the probationary employees votes should be deemed valid votes
while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would
increase from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast
by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate
bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.

HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a
majority vote.

It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve
as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of
the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a
two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the
bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the
determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of
the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union they want to
represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it
follows that a run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent
the rank-and-file employees.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of
votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election
results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. With 346 votes
cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151
and the choice NO UNION receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is
in order.
(3) COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC vs ILOCOS PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION
(IPTEU)

FACTS:

On July 9, 2007, Ilocos Professional and Technical Employees Union (IPTEU) filed a verified Petition6 for certification
election seeking to represent a bargaining unit consisting of approximately twenty-two (22) rank-and-file
professional and technical employees of Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) Ilocos Norte Plant. CCBPI prayed for
the denial and dismissal of the petition, arguing that the Sales Logistics Coordinator and Maintenance Foreman are
supervisory employees, while the eight (8) Financial Analysts, five (5) Quality Assurance Specialists, Maintenance
Manager Secretary, Trade Promotions and Merchandising Assistant (TPMA), Trade Asset Controller and
Maintenance Coordinator (TACMC), Sales Information Analyst (SIA), Sales Logistics Assistant, Product Supply
Coordinator, Buyer, Inventory Planner, and Inventory Analyst are confidential employees;7 hence, ineligible for
inclusion as members of IPTEU. It also sought to cancel and revoke the registration of IPTEU for failure to comply with
the twenty percent (20%) membership requirement based on all the supposed employees in the bargaining unit it
seeks to operate.

Convinced that the union members are rank-and-file employees and not occupying positions that are supervisory or
confidential in nature, Mediator-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep granted IPTEU'S petition.

The Mediator-Arbiter denied CCBPI's challenge to the 16 votes. She found that the voters are rank-and-file
employees holding positions that are not confidential in nature, and who are not, or used to be, members of Ilocos
Monthlies Union (IMU) due to the reclassification of their positions by CCBPI and have been excluded from the CBA
entered into by IMU and CCBPI from 1997 to 2005. Consequently, the challenged votes were opened and
canvassed. After garnering 14 out of the 16 votes cast, IPTEU was proclaimed as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file exempt workers in CCBPI Ilocos Norte Plant.

CCBPI elevated the case to the SOLE but was denied. CA also denied the petition of CCBPI.

ISSUE:

Whether the 22 employees are confidential employees and should be excluded from the bargaining unit

RULING:

1. As proven by the certification of the IMU President as well as the CBAs executed between IMU and CCBPI, the 22
employees sought to be represented by IPTEU are not IMU members and are not included in the CBAs due to
reclassification of their positions. If these documents were false, the IMU should have manifested its vigorous
opposition. In fact, the Mediator-Arbiter noted:

The most tenacious resistance to the granting of the Petition as well as the holding of the CE has been Management.
On the other hand, the existing unions at CCBPI, especially the IMU of which most of the IPTEU members were once
part (until they were considered outside the ambit of its existing bargaining unit) never once opposed the Petition and
the Certification election, whether verbally or in written Opposition.

Between Management and IMU, it is the latter which has more to lose, as the creation of a separate bargaining unit
would reduce the scope of IMU's bargaining unit. Yet through all these proceedings, we take note of the substantial
moral support that has been extended to the Petitioner by the other Unions of CCBPI, so much so that, until objected
to by Management, they were even willing to be present during the Certification Election of 21 September 2007

Art 260-261
(1) SANTUYO ET, AL. VS REMERCO GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC.

FACTS: Petitioners, who had been employed as sewers, were among those recalled after a 2 year illegal strike staged
by Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Remerco Garments Manufacturing Inc.- KMM Kilusan (union) against Remerco
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI). They were recalled on the condition that they would no longer be paid a daily
rate but on a piece-rate basis.

Without allowing RGMI to normalize its operations, the union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). According to the union, RGMI changed the salary scheme from a daily rate to piece-rate
basis without consulting it. RGMI therefore not only violated the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but
also diminished the salaries agreed upon. It therefore committed an unfair labor practice.

On August 24, 1995, RGMI filed a notice of lockout in the NCMB.

While the union and RGMI were undergoing conciliation in the NCMB, RGMI transferred its factory site.

The union went on strike and blocked the entry to RGMIs (new) premises.

In an order dated November 21, 1995, The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code and ordered RGMIs striking workers to return to work immediately.

The Secretary of Labor held that RGMI did not lock out its employees inasmuch as it informed them of the transfer of
the worksite. However, he did not rule on the legality of the strike.

Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor found that the employees would receive higher wages if they were
paid on a piece-rate rather than on a daily rate basis. Hence, the new salary scheme would be more advantageous to
the employees. For this reason, despite the provisions of the CBA, the change in salary scheme was validated.

In an order, the Secretary of Labor ordered all employees to return to work and RGMI to pay its employees
their unpaid salaries (from September 25, 1995 to October 14, 1995) on the piece-rate basis. Neither the union nor
RGMI appealed the aforementioned order.

On October 18, 1995, while the conciliation proceedings between the union and respondent were pending,
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RGMI and respondent Victoria Reyes, accusing the latter of
harassment. Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint, demanding payment of their accrued salaries from
September 25 to October 14, 1995 (computed at the daily rate of P145 plus the CBA-decreed increase of P11 per
day) and the monetary equivalent of benefits they were entitled to under the CBA but allegedly withheld by RGMI.
Later, petitioners again amended their complaint, stating that respondents suspended them for questioning their
decision to pay salaries on a piece-rate basis.

Respondents, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the complaint in view of the pending conciliation
proceedings in the NCMB. Moreover, alleged violations of the CBA should be resolved according to the grievance
procedure laid out therein. Thus, the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

The labor arbiter found that respondents did not pay petitioners their salaries and deprived them of the
benefits they were entitled to under the CBA.

Respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) but it was denied.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC on the ground that the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction

RULING:

Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides:

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by
referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
(emphasis supplied)

This provision requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery
provided therein and to voluntary arbitration.

Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance machinery
and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.In this regard, Article
261 thereof states:

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the
immediately preceding Article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. (emphasis
supplied)

Under this provision, voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been
resolved by the grievance machinery.

(2) TENG V. PAHAGAC

FACTS:

Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing who owns boats (basnig), equipment, and other fishing
paraphernalia. As owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint venture agreements with
master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep sea fishing; they take charge of the
management of each fishing venture, including the hiring of the members of its complement. He avers that the
maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing
voyage.4

On February 20, 2003, the respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading,
Teng, and Chua before the NCMB.

They asserted that sometime in September 2002, Teng expressed his doubts on the correct volume of fish caught in
every fishing voyage.6 In December 2002, Teng informed them that their services had been terminated.7

In his defense, Teng maintained that he did not have any hand in hiring the respondent workers; the maestros, rather
than he, invited them to join the venture. According to him, his role was clearly limited to the provision of the
necessary capital, tools and equipment, consisting of basnig, gears, fuel, food, and other supplies.

The VA rendered a decision9 in Tengs favor and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between
Teng and the respondent workers.

On July 21, 2003, the respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA. In its decision of September 21, 2004, the CA
reversed the VAs decision.

ISSUE:

Whether VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration

RULING:

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 671523 took effect, amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code
which was originally worded as:

Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final, unappealable, and executory.

As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states:

Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word "unappealable" from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in
the amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law,
and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent.24 We recognized the intent of the change of phraseology
in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang,25 where we ruled that:

It is true that the present rule [Art. 262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be
reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period.26

In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,27 we
likewise ruled that the VAs decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably
filed within 10 days from receipt thereof.28 The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory
requirement to forestall the finality of such decision.29 We further cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which
implemented Article 262-A, viz:

[U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a
matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the
decision by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day period.

These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of
a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period.
(3) SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT VS. MAGSALIN

FACTS:

Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and the
certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila.

Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotels Cafe Al Fresco restaurant and a director of the union, refused to
be frisk by the security personnel twice, a violation of the memorandum issued informing all hotel employees that
hotel security have been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and
exit. He was reprimanded for the first violation and was suspended for 3 days for the second.

Subsequently, when Mike Moral, the manager of Hyatts Cafe Al Fresco and Caragdags immediate superior,
was about to counsel two staff members at the training room, Caragdag suddenly opened the door and yelled at the
two with an enraged look. Moral asked Caragdag what the problem was and informed him that he was simply talking
to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag that he did not have the right to interrupt and intimidate him during his
counseling session with his staff. Caragdag was imposed the penalty of seven days suspension in accordance with
the hotels Code of Discipline.

Still later, Caragdag committed another infraction. Caragdag left his work assignment during official hours
without prior permission from his Department Head. Caragdag was suspended for three days.
 Because of the succession of infractions he committed, the HRD also required Caragdag to explain why
the hotels OSDA 4.32 (Committing offenses which are penalized with three [3] suspensions during a 12-month
period) should not be enforced against him. However, despite notice of the scheduled hearing, both Caragdag and
the Union President failed to attend. Thereafter, the investigating board resolved on the said date to dismiss
Caragdag for violation of OSDA 4.32. Caragdag appealed but the investigating board affirmed its resolution after
hearing.

In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the Voluntary Arbitrator reasoned that the
union officers and members had no right to breach company rules and regulations on security and employee
discipline on the basis of certain suspicions against management and an ongoing CBA negotiation standoff.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision while respondent filed a motion for partial
reconsideration. However, the Voluntary Arbitrator denied both motions on May 26, 2003.[if

On August 1, 2003, petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator in a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition outright for being the wrong remedy.

ISSUE:

1. whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground that the
same is an improper mode of appeal

2. whether the CA erred in deleting the award of financial assistance in the amount of P100,000.00 to
Caragdag.

RULING:

In the case of Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, we repeated the well-settled
rule that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43.

Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.

2. The grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based
on equity.[29]InPhil. Long Distance Telephone Co.v. NLRC,[30]we ruled that severance compensation, or whatever
name it is called, on the ground of social justice shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than
serious misconduct or for causes which reflect adversely on the employees moral character.

Here,Caragdags dismissal was due to several instances of willful disobedience to the reasonable rules and
regulations prescribed by his employer.The Voluntary Arbitrator pointed out that according to the hotels Code of
Discipline, an employee who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve (12)-month period commits
serious misconduct.He stressed that Caragdags infractions were not even spread in a period of twelve (12) months,
but rather in a period of a little over a month.Records show the various violations of the hotels rules and regulations
were committed by Caragdag.He was suspended for violating the hotel policy on bag inspection and body
frisking.He was likewise suspended for threatening and intimidating a superior while the latter was counseling his
staff.He was again suspended for leaving his work assignment without permission.Evidently, Caragdags acts
constitute serious misconduct.

InPiedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.,[32]we ruled that a series of irregularities when put together may
constitute serious misconduct, which under Article 282 of theLabor Code, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal.

Caragdags dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he should not be entitled to financial
assistance.To rule otherwise would beto reward him for the grave misconduct he committed.We must emphasize
that social justice is extended only to those who deserve its compassion.[33]

(4) BARONDA VS CA

FACTS:

Respondent Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed the petitioner as a mud press truck driver. On May 1,
1998, he hit HIDECO's transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout. Power was
eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO damages totaling P26,481.11. The management conducted its
investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence, recommended his dismissal.
The petitioner filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a
complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO.

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. rendered his decision finding the petitioner's dismissal illegal, and ordering
his reinstatement. Voluntary Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. deemed the petitioner's separation from the service from June 16,
1998 to January 15, 1999 as a suspension from work without pay, and commanded him to pay on installment basis
the damages sustained by HIDECO from the May 1, 1998 incident he had caused.

HIDECO filed a motion for reconsideration,8 but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion. Accepting the outcome,
HIDECO reinstated the petitioner.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his manifestation with motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in the Office of
the Voluntary Arbitrator,11 praying for the execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to backwages and
other benefits.

HIDECO opposed the petitioner's motion for execution, and simultaneously presented its own motion for execution
12

to enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator directing the petitioner to pay the actual damages totaling
P26,484.41 at the rate of P1,500.00/month deductible from his salary starting in January 2001 until complete
payment was made.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the petitioner's motion for execution on the ground that the decision did not award
any backwages; and granted HIDECO's motion for execution by directing the petitioner to pay HIDECO P26,484.41 at
the rate of P1,500.00/month

On May 17, 2001, the petitioner filed another motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring HIDECO
to pay to him unpaid wages, 13th month pay and bonuses from January 16, 2001, the date when his reinstatement
was effected, until his actual reinstatement.15 HIDECO opposed the petitioner's second motion for execution because
"the items prayed for by the complainant in his Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution are not included in the
dispository portion of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator, neither are the said items mentioned in any part of the
same decision."16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

However, the Voluntary Arbitrator granted the petitioner's second motion for execution.

HIDECO instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioner countered that the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed considering that HIDECO should have appealed the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court because certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal. CA
treated HIDECO's petition for certiorari as a petition for review brought under Rule 43, and brushed aside the matters
raised by the petitioner. CA granted HIDECOs petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CA erred in granting HIDECOs petition for certiorari

RULING:

The proper remedy from such order was to appeal to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43 of theRules of
Court,whose Section 1 specifically provides:

Section 1.Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Boards of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulation Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, andvoluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

The period of appeal was 10 days from receipt of the copy of the order of July 25, 2001 by the parties. It is true that
Section 4 of Rule 43 stipulates that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agencya quo. However, Article 262-A of theLabor Code,the relevant portion of which follows, expressly
states that the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,viz.:

Art. 262-A. Procedures. - x x x x The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based.It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the
absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for any reason, may issue a writ of
execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may
designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award. (Emphasis supplied)

On account of Article 262-A of theLabor Code, the period to appeal was necessarily 10 days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators; otherwise, the order of July
25, 2001 would become final and immutable, because only a timely appeal or motion for reconsideration could
prevent the award or decision from attaining finality and immutability. Yet, HIDECO filed the petition forcertiorari,not
a petition for review under Rule 43, and the CA liberally treated the petition forcertiorarias a petition for review under
Rule 43. We hold that such treatment by the CA was procedurally unwarranted.
(5) COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. BACOLOD SALES FORCE UNION-CONGRESS OF INDEPENDENT
ORGANIZATION-ALU

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of non-alcoholic beverages. Sometime in 2001,

Cosmos Bottling Corporation (Cosmos) ceded its sales functions to petitioner which resulted in the integration
of a number of Cosmos's salesmen, including Fernando T. Oquiana, Norman F. Vinarta, and Santiago B.
Espino, Jr. (Cosmos integrees) into petitioner's workforce as route salesmen. The Cosmos integrees were
given salary adjustments that would align with that of petitioner's own route salesmen. At the time of
integration, petitioner's system of product distribution was by direct selling, but it subsequently adopted the
route-to-market (RTM) system of distribution which led to the abolition of the route salesman position and its
replacement by the account developer (AD) position.

Thus, through an internal selection process, the Cosmos integrees' positions were eventually designated as
ADs. AcICHD Meanwhile, petitioner hired new ADS who were, however, subject to a different set of
qualiBcations from the Cosmos integrees. The newly-hired ADs received a higher basic monthly pay
although, allegedly, occupying the same position, job description, and functions as that of the Cosmos
integrees. Furthermore, the newly-hired ADs were given, upon union membership, a monthly 45-kilogram
(kg.) rice provision with a corresponding monthly deduction of the amount of P550.00 from their salaries.

Aggrieved by the difference in treatment, respondent Bacolod Sales Force Union Congress of Independent
Organization-ALU, the recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-Ble sales personnel of
petitioner's Bacolod Plant 7 (respondent), submitted its concerns to the grievance machinery in accordance
with the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), demanding, among others, that: (a) the salary rates of the
Cosmos integrees be readjusted to equal to that of the newly-hired ADs' salary rates; 8 (b) the conversion of
the P550.00 monthly deduction from the salaries of the Bacolod Plant sales personnel into a 45-kg. rice
provision be declared as a violation of the nondiminution rule under Article 100 9 of the Labor Code, as
amended; and (c) the employees concerned be reimbursed for the amounts illegally deducted.

After the grievance process failed, the parties agreed to submit the unresolved matters to voluntary
arbitration pursuant to Article 5 of the CBA, and Bled a preventive mediation case before the NCMB raising
the aforesaid issues. 11 Respondent claimed that the Cosmos integrees were being discriminated against the
newly-hired ADs, in light of the disparity between their salaries 12 and reiterated that the monthly P550.00
deduction from the basic salaries of the new union members constitutes a violation of the non-diminution
rule.

For its part, petitioner maintained that the Bxing of hiring rates is a management prerogative, adding that the
Cosmos integrees and the newly-hired ADs were not similarly situated due to the apparent variance in the
manner by which they were appointed and hired, as well as their qualifications, skills, and responsibilities for
the position. 14 Further, it claimed that the Cosmos integrees failed to meet all the basic qualifications for the
AD position, such as age and educational attainment.

For another, it contended that the rice subsidy of P550.00 per month to non-union members was
automatically converted into an actual 45-kg. sack of rice upon union membership, which is, in reality, valued
more than the amount of said subsidy and, thus, was not tantamount to any diminution of benefits
VA:

In a Decision dated February 3, 2012 (VA Decision), the VA: (a) declared that the disparity in the wages of the
Cosmos integrees and the newly-hired ADs was discriminatory for lack of substantial basis or valid criteria

CA:

In a Decision dated December 22, 2014, the CA denied the petition on the ground that the VA Decision had
attained Bnality pursuant to Section 5, 33 Article 5 of the CBA

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that the VA Decision can no longer be the subject of its review for having
attained finality pursuant to the express provision under Section 5, Article 5 of the CBA

RULING:

Partially Granted

. . .However, in view of the nature of their functions, voluntary arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity; 38
hence, their judgments or Bnal orders which are declared Bnal by law are not so exempt from judicial review
when so warranted. 39 "Any agreement stipulating that 'the decision of the arbitrator shall be Bnal and
unappealable' and 'that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the
arbitrator's award may be availed of' cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review
which is inherent in courts."

In this case, petitioner availed of the correct mode of review of the VA Decision by Bling a petition for review
with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules, and in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence

The Court sees the prima facie reasonableness of petitioner's asseverations and Bnds that the merits of its
case, based on such argumentation, properly warrant judicial review.
Art 263-264

ABARIA, ET AL. V. NLRC

FACTS:

In a letter addressed to Nava, Ernesto Canen, Jr., Jesusa Gerona, Hannah Bongcaras, Emma Remocaldo,
Catalina Alsado and Albina Baz, Atty. Alforque suspended their union membership for serious violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws.

Upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members .The
next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as
wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up
placards, posters and streamers. For their continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than
100 striking employees were dismissed. Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. With
the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI
filed a petition for injunction. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued.

Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated
employees against MCCHI, Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.

LA:

Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing the complaints for unfair
labor practice. Complainants appealed to the Commission,

NLRC:

NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter.

CA:

Complainants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu Station) via a petition for certiorari. CAs
Eighth Division dismissed the petition on the ground that out of 88 petitioners only 47 have signed the
certification against forum shopping.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondents are illegally dismissed?

RULING:

Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate in an illegal
strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must
be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he
commits an illegal act during a strike.

Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the NCMB that their
union was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from NFLs legal counsel
informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and their filing of the notice of strike
and conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI
for collective bargaining purposes, there is no question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly
participated in the illegal strike. The CA therefore did not err in ruling that the termination of union officers
Perla Nava, Catalina Alsado, Albina Baz, Hannah Bongcaras, Ernesto Canen, Jesusa Gerona and Guillerma
Remocaldo was valid and justified.

(2) YSS EMPLOYEES UNION- PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS
LABORATORIES INC.

FACTS:

In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS Laboratories, a domestic corporation engaged in
Pharmaceutical business implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees purportedly
chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the company.

Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU, a duly registered
labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
YSS.

Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said
retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a valid strike. A number of conciliation proceedings were
made by the NCMB-NCR but still the dispute was not resolved.

This prompted the Sectary of Labor to intervene. Finding that the labor dispute was inimical to the national
 interest, it certifies the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

NLRC:

The NLRC issued two orders: first, directing all striking workers to return to work and for the Company to
accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike; second, that the
nine retrenched employees be included in the return to work order.

Aggrieved, YSS Laboratories filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals.

CA:

The CA reversed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and granted the petition of YSS Laboratories. The
appellate court found that YSS Laboratories validly carried out its retrenchment program, which effectively
severed the concerned employees employment with the company. Hence, YSSEU comes to this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from the coverage of the return-to-work-
order.

HELD:

The Orders of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code. Said provision reads:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.

xxxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike
or lockout.

It should be noted that the primary reason why the strike was conducted in the first place was to protest the
implementation of the retrenchment program, which clearly discriminated against union officers and
members. YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the
coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a
labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor
directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his
jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same, said the Supreme Court. Hence, the petition is granted. The orders of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby reinstated.
(3) NUWHRAIN-DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals
to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions.
Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), which was docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01.

Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote 8
was conducted by the Union on January 14, 2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a
strike.

Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office located
in the Hotel's basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The
next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The
Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming
Standards

In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were
also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced
a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.

Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending
them and charging them with the certain offenses

The next day, the Union Cled with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice
and violation of Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-01- 019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations
to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotel's compound.

On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61)
members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days,
four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared
a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the
Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.

Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting

On the same day, the Secretary, through her January 31, 2002 Order, assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration

NLRC:

Ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC
also held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed
by the Union; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA
CA:

Dismissed the Union's petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the Union failed
to demonstrate that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and capriciously exercised its judgment
or exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY
OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE

RULING:

With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable
for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons:

First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to
undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action.

Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No
Strike, No Lockout" provision

Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only
violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in
good faith

Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban
before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002

Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal
since, as shown by the pictures 21 presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human
barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.
( 4) JACKBILT INDUSTRIES,INC. VS JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU

FACTS:

In 1997,Jackbilt Industriesforced some of itsemployeesto go on a six-month leave as it was experiencing

financial difficulties due to the 1997 financial crisis.

In March 1998, the JackbiltEmployeesWorkers Union staged a strike without following the procedural
requirements of Article 264 of the Labor Code. During the said strike, they prevented private vehicles from
entering and exiting the premises of Jackbilt.

Eventually in May 1998, Jackbilt dismissedemployeeswho joined the strike.

NLRC:

In July 1998, the NationalLabor RelationsCommission (NLRC) ruled that the March 1998 strike was illegal.

LA:

In October 1999, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Jackbilt is guilty of illegally dismissing the strikingemployeeson
the ground that it terminated their services without first petitioning for the declaration ofillegal strikeagainst
the union (lack of due process).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jackbilt needs to have the union strike be declared illegal first before dismissing the
strikingemployees.

HELD:

No. In the case at bar, there is already a finding by the NLRC in July 1998 that the March 1998 strike was
 illegal for it was attended by the use of illegal means i.e. preventing vehicles from entering/exiting the Jackbilt
premises. Such judgment is conclusive upon the Labor Arbiter who issued the October 1999 decision. In
short, the filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary even though the May 1998 dismissal
actually came before the July 1998 NLRC declaration.

(5) PRIMER ON STRIKE, PICKETING AND LOCKOUT

1.WHAT IS STRIKE, PICKETING AND LOCKOUT?

A.1.STRIKE means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of the
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.(Art. 212 (o), Labor Code, as amended
by Sec. 4, R. A. 6715)

2.PEACEFUL PICKETING the right of workers during strikes consisting of the marching to
and fro before the premises of an establishment involved in a labor dispute, generally
accompanied by the carrying and display of signs, placards or banners with statements
relating to the dispute. (Guidelines Governing Labor Relations, October 19, 1987)

3.LOCKOUT means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.(Article 212 (p) Labor Code, as amended by Section 4, R.A. 6715).

2.WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF STRIKES?

A.1.LEGAL STRIKE one called for a valid purpose and conducted through means allowedby law.

2.ILLEGAL STRIKE one staged for a purpose not recognized by law, or if for a valid purpose,
conducted through means not sanctioned by law.

3.ECONOMIC STRIKE one staged by workers to force wage or other economic concessions
from the employer which he is not required by law to grant (Consolidated Labor Association
of the Phil. vs.Marsman and Company,11 SCRA 589)

4.ULP STRIKE one called to protest against the employers acts of unfair labor practice
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, as amended, including gross violation of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA)and union busting.

5.SLOWDOWN STRIKE one staged without the workers quitting their work but merely
slackening or by reducing their normal work output.

6.WILD-CAT STRIKE one declared and staged without filing the required notice of strike and
without the majority approval of the recognized bargaining agent.

7.SIT DOWN STRIKE one where the workers stop working but do not leave their place of work.

3.WHAT IS AN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE?

A.An industrial or labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation ofemployer and employee.(Article 212 (1) Labor Code, as amended
by Section 4, R.A. 6715)

4.WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND LOCKOUT?

A.The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of the workers as the employers have the inherent
and statutory right to lockout, all within the context of labor relations and collective bargaining.It is a
means of last resort and presupposes that the duty to bargain in good
faithhasbeenfulfilledandothervoluntarymodes ofdispute settlement have been tried
and exhausted.(Guidelines Governing Labor Relations).

5.WHO MAY DECLARE A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT?

Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining
deadlock and unfair labor practice.Likewise, the employer may declarea lockout in the same
cases.

In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor
organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on theground of unfair labor practice.
(Section 2, Rule XIII, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing The Labor Code, as amended).

6.WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF A LAWFUL STRIKE OR LOCKOUT?

A.The requirements for a valid strike or lockout are as

follows:
It must be based on a valid and factual ground;

A strike or lockout NOTICE shall be filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) at least 15 daysbefore the intended date of the strike or lockout if the issues raised
are unfair labor practices, or at least 30 days before the intended date thereof if the issue
involves bargaining deadlock.

In cases of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the
union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute UNION BUSTING where the existence
of the union is threatened,the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately afterthe strike vote is conducted and the result thereof submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment.

1.A strike must be approved by a majority vote of the members of the Union and a
lockout must be approved by a majority vote of the members of the Board of Directors of the
Corporation orAssociation or ofthe partners in a partnership, obtainedby secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose.

2.A strike or lockout VOTE shall be reported to the NCMB-DOLE Regional Branch at least
7 days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-offperiod.

In the event the result of the strike/lockoutballot is filed within the cooling-off period, the
7-dayrequirement shall be counted from the day followingthe expiration of the cooling-off
period. (NSFW vs. Ovejera, G.R.No. 59743, May 31, 1982)

In case of dismissal from employment of union officers which may constitute unionbusting,
the time requirement for the filing of the Notice of Strike shall be dispensed with but thestrike
vote requirement being mandatory in character, shall in every case be complied with.

The dispute must not be the subject of an assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, a certification for compulsory or voluntary arbitration nor
a subject of a pending case involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

7.WHAT ARE THE VALID GROUNDS FOR DECLARING A STRIKE OR

LOCKOUT?

The law recognizes two grounds for the valid exercise of the right to strike or lockout, namely:

Collective Bargaining Deadlock (CBD) and/or
Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)

8.MAY A UNION FILE A NOTICE OF STRIKEOR THEEMPLOYER FILE A NOTICE OF LOCKOUT IF THE LABOR
DISPUTE IS BASED ON A GROUND OTHER THAN ULP AND CBD?

A.No.The union/employer may not file a notice based on grounds other than ULP and CBD.Violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreements,except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its
economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable and no
strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and internal union disputes or on
issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration including legislated wage orders and labor
standard cases.

However, if improvidently filed and it appears on the face of the notice that the issues raised are
non-strikeable or the real issues discovered during conciliation proceedings are not proper subjects
of a Notice of Strike or Lockout, The NCMB RegionalBranch shall dismiss motu propio the notice
without prejudice to further conciliation, or upon request of either or both parties in which case, the
Notice of Strike or Lockout is treated as a Preventive Mediation Case.(See Definition of Preventive
Mediation Case under Appendix 3, Definition of Terms).

9.WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT?

A.The notice shall state, among others, the names and addresses of the employer and theunion involved,
the nature of the industry to which the employer belongs, the number of union members and of the
workers in the bargaining unit, and such other relevant data as may facilitate the settlement of the
dispute, such as a brief statement or enumeration of all pending labor disputes involving the same
parties.

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved
issues in the bargaining negotiationsandbeaccompaniedbythewrittenproposalsofthe
union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle the
differences.

In cases of unfair labor practice,the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of
and the efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.

10.WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE NCMB IN CASE A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT IS

FILED?

A.Upon receipt of a valid notice of strike or lockout, the NCMB, through its Conciliator-Mediators, shall call
the parties to a conference the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them to explore all
possibilities for amicable settlement.To this end, the Conciliator-Mediator may suggest/offer
proposals as an alternative avenue for the resolution of their disagreement/conflict which may not
necessarily bind the parties.Inthe event of failure in conciliation/mediationthe parties shall be
encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.

11.WHAT IS THE LEGAL IMPLICATION IF THE CONTENT-REQUIREMENT OF THE NOTICE OF STRIKE OR
LOCKOUT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH?
A.Any notice which does not conform with the foregoing requirements shall be deemed not having
been filed.

12.WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STRIKE VOTE?

A.To ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the Union members ingeneral
and not with a mere minority, at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even
corruption.

13.WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STRIKE VOTE REPORT?

A.To ensure that a strike vote was indeed taken and in the event that the report is false, to afford the
members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.

14.WHAT ISPURPOSE OF THE TIME REQUIREMENT IN THE NOTICE OF STRIKE/LOCKOUT?

A.The 15 and 30 days requirement is known as the Cooling-Off Period designed to afford parties the
opportunity to amicable resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB
Conciliator/Mediator.Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the required number of
days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may
commence a lockout after having complied with the 7-day requirement for the filing of thestrike or
lockout vote, as the case may be.

15.WHAT IS THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THEREQUIREMENT TO OBSERVE THE COOLING-OFF
PERIODS ANDTHE STRIKE BAN?

A.The prescribed cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after submission of report of strike vote
are mandatory.The observance of both periods must be complied with, although a labor union may
take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.The avowed intent of
the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation.The waiting period, on the other
hand, is intended to provide opportunityfor the members of the union or the management to take
the appropriate remedy in case the strike or lockout vote report is false or inaccurate.Moreover, the
cooling-off and7-day strike ban provisions of law are reasonable and valid restrictions on the right to
strike and these restrictions constitute a valid exercise of police power of the State.If only the filing of
the strike notice and the strike vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods
so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for which the filing of thestrike
notice andstrike vote report is required cannot be achieved.The submission of the report gives
assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of
the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.(National Federation of Sugar
Workers vs. Ovejera, 114 SCRA 354)

The seven (7) days waiting period is intended to givethe Department of Labor and Employmentan
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the
union members.

The need for assurance that the majority of the union members support the strike cannot be
gainsaid.Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concedeto its bargaining
demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management.It is a weapon that can
either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a
more equitable due oftheir labors.The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest
on a rational basis, freefrom emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few
hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be
 antithetical to the public welfare.

Thus, our laws require thedecision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority
is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error.In addition, a majority vote assures
the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with
better chance to succeed.(Lapanday Workers Union, Tomas N. Bascovs.NLRC and Lapanday
Agricultural Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 95494-97,7 September 1995)

16.WHAT ARE THE PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES?

A. 1.Declaring a strike or lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or on

issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.

2.Declaring a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively or without first having
filed the required notice or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been
obtained and reported to the Regional Branch of the NCMB.

Declaring a strike or lockout in defiance of a cease-and-desist order, or an order for the
striking employees to return to work and for the employer to accept the workers after
assumption of jurisdiction bythe President or Secretary of Labor and Employment, or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration, or during the
pendency of a case involving the authorized grounds for the strike or lockout.

4.Obstructing, impending or interfering with by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation
any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of their
right to self-organization or collective bargaining, or aiding or abetting such obstruction or
interference.

5.Employing any strike breaker or being employed as a strike-breaker.

6.No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, of the Philippine National Police, or any armed person shall bring in, introduce or
escort, in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the
premises of a strike area, or work in place of strikers.

Nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent the aforementioned officials, employees or
peace officers from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order and/or to
protect life and property.

7.Stationary picket and the use of means like placing of objects to constitute permanent
blockade or to effectively close points of entry or exit in company premises.

8.Any act of violence, coercion or intimidation by any picketer.

9.The obstruction of the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes.

10.Obstruction of public thoroughfares while engaged in picketing.

17.WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID
STRIKE OR LOCKOUT?

A.The requirements for a valid strike or lockout are mandatory in character and non-compliance
therewith is sufficient ground to declare the strike or lockout illegal.

If a strike is declared illegal, the employer may be authorized to terminate the employment of union
officials who knowingly participated in the illegal strike and/or any worker or union officer who
knowingly participated in the commission of other illegal acts during the strike.

In case the lockout is declared illegal, any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence thereof may be entitled to re-instatement including payment of full backwages and
other benefits.

18.WHEN A DISPUTE SUBJECT OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE IS FORTHWITHTREATED AS A PREVENTIVE
MEDIATION CASE, MAY THE UNION LATER ON STAGE A STRIKE ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAME
DISPUTE?

A.No. Once the dispute has been converted into a preventive mediation case, the notice of strike is
deemed dropped from the dockets as if no notice of strike has been filed.Since there is no more
notice of strike to speak about, any strike subsequently staged by the Union is deemed not to have
complied with the requirements of a valid strike.The same rule applies in the case of lockout by an
employer, (PAL vs. Sec. of Labor)

19.WHO HAS THE DUTY TO DECLARE THAT THE NOTICE OF STRIKE/LOCKOUT HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO
PREVENTIVE MEDIATION CASE?

A.Upon the recommendation of the Conciliator/Mediator handling the labor dispute, the Director of the
Regional Branch of the NCMB which has jurisdiction over the labor dispute has the duty to declare
and inform the parties that the issues raised or the actual issues involved are not proper subjects of a
Notice of Strike or Lockout andthat the Notice of Strike or Lockout has been converted into a
Preventive Mediation Case without prejudice to further conciliation or upon the request of either or
both parties.

20.MAY A LABOR DISPUTE SUBJECT OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT, MATURE INTO A VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATION CASE?

A.Yes.By mutual agreement, the parties may decide to bring the matter for resolution before an
accredited voluntary arbitrator of their choice, in which case the Notice is deemed automatically
withdrawn and dropped from the dockets.

21.WHEN MAY A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT BE DECLARED
ILLEGAL?
A.A strike or lockout may be declared illegal if any of the requirements for a valid strike or lockout is not
complied with.

It may also be declared illegal if it is based on non-strikeable issues or if the issues involved are
already the subjectof arbitration.

 During a strike or lockout, when either of the parties commit prohibited acts or practices, the strike or
lockout may be declared illegal.

22.WHO HASJURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF STRIKE ANDLOCKOUT?

A.In general,the Labor Arbiter in the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission has the power to determine questions involving the legality or the illegality of a strike or
lockout upon the filing of a proper complaint and after due hearing.

Where the matter of legality or illegality of strike is raised in the dispute over which the Secretary
assumed jurisdiction or in disputes certified by the Secretary to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration, the same may be resolved by the Secretary or the Commission,
respectively.(International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs.Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor
Union, G.R. No. 92981-83, January 9, 1992.)

23.MAY A VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF A STRIKE?

A.If the issue is voluntary and jointly submitted bythe parties to voluntary arbitration, the question may
be resolved by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

24.CAN ANY PERSON PERFORMING ANY OF THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN THE PROCEEDING
PARAGRAPH BE CHARGED BEFORE THE COURT?

Yes.They may be charged before the appropriate civil and criminal courts.

25.WHAT IS THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE?

A.Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of the Labor Code (performing any of the
above prohibited activities) shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding P500.00 and/or
imprisonment for not less than one (1) day nor more than six (6) months.

If the person so convicted is a foreigner, he shall be subjected to immediate and summary
deportation and will be permanently barred from re-entering the country without the special
permission of the President.

If the act is at the same time a violation of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), a prosecution under the
Labor Code will preclude prosecution for the same act under the RPC or vice-versa.

26.IS AN EMPLOYEE WHO PARTICIPATES IN A LAWFULSTRIKE DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED

HISEMPLOYMENT?

No.An employee who goes on strike is not deemed to have abandoned his employment but is merely
exercising his right to self-organization precisely to protect his rights as an employee and/or to obtain
better working conditions.

27.IS PARTICIPATION BY AN EMPLOYEE IN A STRIKE SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR AN EMPLOYER TO
TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT?

 A.No.The mere participation of a worker in lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for the
termination of his employment even if a replacement has been hired by the employer duringsuch
lawful strike.However, any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may bedeclared to have lost his employment status.

28.ARE THE STRIKERS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF WAGES DURING THE PERIOD OF A LAWFUL
STRIKE?

A.As a general rule, striking employees are not entitled to the payment of wages for unworked days
during the period of the strike pursuant to the principle of No work- No pay.However, this does not
preclude the parties from entering into an agreement to the contrary.

On the other hand, when strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the
existence of valid grounds but the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upontheir
reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices, the strikers, who refuse to accept
the new conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement, are entitled to the losses of pay they
may have suffered by reason of the employers discriminatory acts from the timethey were refused
reinstatement.

29.MAY A STRIKE/LOCKOUT BE ENJOINED/PREVENTED BY LEGAL PROCESS?

A.As a general rule, strikes and lockouts validly declared enjoy the protection of law and cannot be
enjoined unless illegal acts are committed in the course of such strikes or lockouts.Ordinarily, the
law vests in the NLRC the authority to issue injunctions to restrain the commission of illegal acts
during strikes and pickets.

In the national interest cases, the certification or assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor
over the dispute under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as a amended, has the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended strike or lockout whether ornot a corresponding return to work
order has been issued.The workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers underthe same terms and conditions of
employment prevailing before the strike.

30.WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THEPRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT TO ISSUE ASSUMPTION AND CERTIFICATION
ORDERS?
A.The power to issue assumption and certification orders is an extraordinary authority strictly limited to
national interest cases and granted to the President or to the Secretary of Labor, which can justifiably
rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interest.

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of Labor is
vested with the discretionary power to decide not only the question of whether to assume jurisdiction
over a given labor dispute or certify the same to the NLRC, but also the determination of the industry
indispensable to national interest.

The President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from intervening at any time and assuming
jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving industries indispensable to national interest in order to
settle or terminate the same.

Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the
event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment
before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in
the implementation of a mass lay-off.

31.WHEN A DISPUTE IS ASSUMED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF LABOR, OR CERTIFIED TO

THE NLRC FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION,MAY A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT BE VALIDLY DECLARED ON
ACCOUNT OF THE SAME DISPUTE?

A.No.The assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout.

32.WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RETURN-TO-WORK
ORDER?
A.The return-to-work order is a valid statutory part and parcel ofthe assumption and certification
orders given the predictable prejudice the strike could cause not only to the parties but more
especially to the national interest.Stated otherwise, the assumption of jurisdiction and the
certification tothe NLRC has the effect of automatically enjoining the strike or lockout, whether
actual or intended, even if the same has not been categorically stated or does not appear in the
assumption or certification order.Itis notamatter of option or voluntariness but ofobligation.It
must be discharged as a duty even against the workers will.The worker must return to his job
together with his co-workers so that the operation of the company can be resumedand it can
continue serving the public and promoting its interest. x x x.It is executory in character and shall be
strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity
x x x precisely to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made.(Union of Filipro
Employees vs.Nestle Philippines, Inc.,GR No. 88710-13, December 19, 1990).

33.WHAT ARE THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES IN CASE OF DEFIANCE OF THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER
BY THE EMPLOYER ANDBY THE EMPLOYEES?

A.In case of non-compliance with the return-to-work order in connection with the certification or
assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor, the employees concerned may be subjected to
immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the
locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief even criminal prosecution
against either or both ofthem.

The Secretary of Labor may cite the defiant party in contempt pursuant to the power vested in him
under the provisions of the Labor Code.

34.CAN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) BE DEPUTIZED TO ENFORCE ORDERS FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT?

A.Yes. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or
any Labor Arbiter may deputize the PNP to enforce any of its order, award or decision.

35.IN CASE THE PNP IS DEPUTIZED TO ENFORCE ORDERS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WHAT
WILL BE ITS ROLE?
 In such a case, the role of the PNP is merely to assist the sheriff or the appropriate DOLE Officers in
enforcing the decision, award or order.It shall maintain peace and order and public safety in the
area wherethe decision, award or order is to be enforced.It shall also give security to the officers
enforcing the decision, award or order.(Please see also Article 264 (d), Article 266 of the Labor
Code, as amended, and Guidelines for the Conduct of PNP During Strikes, Lockouts and Labor
Disputes in General, Oct. 22, 1987).

36.WHAT IS A STRIKE AREA?

A.A strike area includes:(a)the establishment of the employer struck against including run-away
shops, factories or warehouses and other premises where members of the bargaining unit carry out
the operations and business of the employer, and (b)the area immediately before points of entrance
and exit of establishment struck against.

37.IS THE INGRESS AND EGRESS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT PART OF THE STRIKE
AREA?

A.No. Since it is not part of the strike area, the same could not be blocked or picketed.

38.WHO IS A STRIKE-BREAKER?

A.A strike-breaker means any person who obstructs, impedes or interferes with by force, violence,
coercion, threats or intimidation any peaceful picket by employees during any labor controversy.

APPENDIX 1

Form 1

APPENDIX 2

DEFINITION OF TERMS

1.NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD or NCMB, for short, refers to the
agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment principally in charge of the settlement
of labor disputes through conciliation, mediation andthe promotion of voluntary approaches to labor
dispute prevention and settlement.

2.CONCILIATOR-MEDIATOR official of the NCMB whose principal function is to settle and
dispose potential and actual labor disputes through conciliation and preventive mediation including
the promotion and encouragement of voluntary approaches to labor dispute prevention and
settlement.

3.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION NLRC, for short, refers to the agency attached
to the Department of Labor and Employment incharge of deciding labor cases through compulsory
arbitration.

4.BARGAINING DEADLOCK failure to agree on the termsand conditions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the management and the union.

5.UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE- either by employers or labor organizations as enumerated under

Article 248 and 249 of the Labor Code, as amended.

6.PREVENTIVE MEDIATION CASE refers to the potential or brewing labor dispute which is the
subject of a formal or informal request for conciliation and mediation assistance sought by either or
both parties in order to remedy, contain or prevent its degeneration into a full blown dispute through
amicable settlement.

7.INTRA-UNION DISPUTE refers to a case involving the control, supervision and management
of the internal affairs of a duly registered labor union such as those relating tospecific violations of
the unions constitution and by-laws.

8.INTER-UNION DISPUTE-refers to cases involving a petition for certification election and

direct certification filed by a duly registered labor organization which is seeking to be recognized as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit of a company, firm or establishment.

9.VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION a third party settlement of a labor dispute involving the mutual consent
by the representative of the company andthe labor union involved in a labor dispute to submit their
case for arbitration.

APPENDIX 3

RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

I.RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 18 Article II. The State affirms labor as a prime social economic force.It shall protect the right
of workers and promote their welfare.

Sec. 3 Article XIII The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concertedactivities, includingthe right to strike in accordance with
law.They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and living wage.They
shall participate in policy and decision-making process affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between the workers and employers, recognizing the right
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable return on
 investments, and to expansion and growth.

II.PROVISIONS FROM THE LABORCODE

Art. 211 Declaration of Policy

A.It is the policy of the State:

a.To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of
settling labor or industrial disputes;

b.To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of
democracy and the promotion of social justice and developments;

c.To foster the free andvoluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement;

d.To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and

obligations as union members and as employees;

e.To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious

settlement of labor or industrial dispute;

f.To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace;and

g.To ensure the participation of workers in decision and

policy-makingprocesses affecting their rights, duties and welfare.

B.To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
and employees by means of agreement freely entered into through collective bargaining, no
court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of
pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except asotherwise
provided under this Code.

Art. 248.Unfair Labor Practices ofEmployers.

It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

a.To interfere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization;

b.To require as a condition ofemploymentthat a person or an employee shall not join

a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

c.To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such
will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization;

 d.To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;

e.To discriminate in regard to wages, hours or work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from
requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent.Employees of an
appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues
and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if
such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
agreement.Provided, that the individual authorization required under Art. 242,
paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent;

f.To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for

having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;

g.To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

h.To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or

i.To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provision of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of
corporation, association or partnership who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair
labor practice shall be held criminally liable.


Art. 249.Unfair Labor Practices of Labor Organizations.

It shall be unlawful for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives to commit
any of the following unfair labor practices:

a.To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization:
Provided, that labor organization shall have theright to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;

b.Tocause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied to or terminate an employee on
any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members;

c.To violate the duty or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is
the representative of the employees;

d.To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or agree to pay or deliver any
 money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not
performed or notto be performed including the demand for a fee for union
negotiations;

e.To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute;or

f.To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers,
members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified
unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.

Art. 263.Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts

a.It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective
bargaining;

b.Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.The right of legitimate
labor organization to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the
national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.However, no labor
union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving
inter-union and intra-union disputes;

c.Incases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent

may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Department at least 30 daysbefore the intended datethereof.In cases of unfair
labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any
legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members.However, incase of dismissal
from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws,which may constitute union busting where the existence
oftheunion isthreatened,the 15-day cooling-offperiod shall not apply and the
union maytake action immediately;

d.The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as
the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
promulgate;

e.During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Department to exert all efforts
at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement.Should the dispute
remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory
filing of the notice the labor union may declare a strike.

f.A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by a secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for that purpose.A decision to declare a lockout must be
 approved bythe majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association
or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose.The decision shall be valid for the duration of the disputes based on
substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was
taken.The Department may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected
party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting.In every case, the union or
employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting at least seven
daysbefore the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.

g.When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decideitorcertifythe sametotheCommission (National

Labor Relations Commission) for compulsory arbitration.Such assumption or

certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.If one has
already taken place at the time ofassumption of certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and condition
prevailing before the strike or lockout.The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
the Commission may seek assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such order as he may issue to enforce
the same.

In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of
patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical
institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only
by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted to substantially
minimize,if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health, through the
exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to
lockout.In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operationof such
hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or
locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of
medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be
unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate
protection of the life of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration
of the strike or lockout.

In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately
assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a
strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration.For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined
to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment orthe Commission, under pain of
immediatedisciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or
payment by the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and other affirmative
relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded
from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national
interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such
labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

h.The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator
shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be.The decision of the
President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary
arbitrator shall be final andexecutory ten (10 ) calendar days after receipt thereofby
the parties.

APPENDIX 4

GUIDELINES GOVERNING LABOR RELATIONS

In line with the program to promote industrial peace as an essential requirement to achieve national
economic and social programs, thefollowing guidelines shall be observed in the conductand disposition of labor
disputes by all concerned.

Right toStrike or Lockout

1.The right to strike is a constitutional and legal right of the workers as employers have the right to
lockout, allwithin the context of labor relations and collective bargaining.Subject to the enactment by
Congress of amendments or a new law on labor relations, the provisions of existing laws shall govern the
exercise of those rights.

Legal Requirements

2.The exercise ofthe right to strike or lockout shall be subject to the following requirements:

a.a strike or lockout shall be filed with the labor department at least 15 days if the issues raised
are unfair labor practice or at least 30 days if the issue involved bargaining deadlock;

b.the strike or lockout shall be supported by a majority vote of the members of the union or the
members of the board of directors of corporations or associations or partnership, obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for the purpose;and

c.strike or lockout vote shall be reported to the labor department at least 7 days before the
intended strike or lockout.

3.In case ofdismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constituteunion busting where the existence of the union is threatened,
the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

4.The requirements for valid strike or lockout are mandatoryin character and non-compliance therewith is
sufficient ground to declare the strike or lockout illegal, upon filing of a proper petition and after due hearing
with the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Valid Grounds for Strike or Lockout

5.The law recognizes two grounds for the valid exercise of the right to strike or lockout, namely:

a.unfair labor practice

b.bargaining deadlock


6.In order to be valid, the notice of strike or lockout on grounds of unfair labor practice, shall state the specific
acts complained of.In case of bargaining deadlock, the notice must specify the unresolved issues and must
show proof that the parties have exhausted all efforts to resolve the deadlock.

7.If on the face of the notice, the issues raised are non-strikeable, the Regional Office shall dismiss
motu-proprio the notice without prejudice to conciliation upon request of either or both parties.

CONCILIATION

8.Upon receipt of a valid notice of strike or lockout, it shall be the duty of labor conciliators to call the parties
to a conference immediately within a period not exceeding 48 hours.Notices of conference to the parties
shall be done through the fastest available means of communication such as telephones and telegrams.

9.During the initial conference, it shall be the duty of the conciliator to see to it that the issues raised in the
noticeare properly identified.

If the issue involves alleged unfair labor practice, the conciliator should clarify with the parties the
specificacts of unfair labor practice.If the acts complained of involved dismissal of duly elected union
officers which may constitute union busting and where the existence of the union is threatened,the
conciliator shall conduct marathon conferences and exert efforts to help the parties settle the issue.

10.If the unfair labor practice acts complained of involves alleged violation of CBA and questions of
interpretations or implementation of the agreement, the Conciliator shall encourage the parties to respect the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and to avail of the established grievance machinery
including voluntary arbitration.If the parties decide to designate the conciliator as voluntary arbitrator, his or
her acceptance of such designation shall be subject to Department Order No. 10, Series of 1987.

11.In cases of bargaining deadlocks,the conciliator shall conduct marathon or series of conferences to
enable the parties to reach an agreement before the expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period.

12.If the issues involves alleged violation of labor standards, the conciliator shall immediately assign a labor
inspector to act on the reported violationand to submit a report of his findings within 24 hours, copy
furnished the conciliator concerned.The labor inspector and the Regional director shall effect immediate
compliance by the employer with the labor standards violated.

13.If the issue involves inter-union disputes, the conciliator shall exert all efforts to enable the parties to
settle the issue either through voluntary recognition or consent election.Otherwise, the conciliator shall
immediately inform the Regional Director or BLRC Director as the case may be, in order that a Med-Arbiter
can be directed to resolve the case within a period of five (5) days.

14.It shall be the duty of the Conciliator to record in the minutes every point of agreement as well as the
unresolved issues.Referrals of representation cases and labor standards violations including those that are
grievable under the CBA, shall be duly noted in the minutes of the conference.The conciliator shall actively
monitor the progress and developments on these cases with concerned labor officials.

PICKETING

During strikes, workers enjoy the right to peaceful picketing which is the marching to and fro before the premises of
an establishment involved in a labor dispute, generally accompanied by the carrying and display of signs, placards or
banners with statements relating to the dispute.

15.The right to peaceful picketing shall be exercised by the workers with due respect for the rights of
others.No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation.Stationary picket, the use of means like placing of objects to constitute permanent blockade
orto effectively close points of entry or exit in company premises are prohibited by law.

INJUNCTIONS

16.No court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or lockout except as provided in Article 218 and 263
of the Labor Code, as amended.The National Labor Relations Commission proper shall have the power to
issue temporary injunctions but only afterdue notice and hearingand in accordance with its rules.It may
also issue restraining orders to appropriate cases subject asa general rule to the requirements of due notice
and hearing.

17.Petitions for injunctions or restraining orders shall be handled or resolved with extreme care and
caution.All efforts to conciliate or settle amicably the issues in the main dispute and those involved in
petitions for injunctions shall be exhausted.Injunctions and restraining orders therefore may be issued only
in case of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing
and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted.

19.Injunction orders shall be enforced only to the extent necessary to correct violations of law and shall not
prevent the workers from exercising the right to peaceful picketing.The right to ingress oregress may be
exercised only for lawful purposes as may be indicated in the injunctive orders in line with established
jurisprudence.

20.Injunctionorders issued under Article 218 and 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, shall be served and
enforced by appropriate officials or employees of the National Labor Relations Commission or by such
officials or employees of the Department of Labor and Employment who may be designed by the labor
secretary.

21.The assistance of other civilian authorities like national, local or city officials may be sought, if
necessary.Only under extreme circumstances shall the assistance of the PC/INP be enlisted and in such
cases, the police authorities shall also serve on a supportive capacity to the labor department officials or
employees.All efforts must be exerted in all cases to bring about voluntary and peaceful compliance with
injunctive orders.PC/INP representatives shall be guided by duly promulgated guidelines.

RETURN TO WORK ORDERS

22.The power to issue assumption andcertificationorders is an extraordinary authority granted to the

 President or the Secretary of Labor, the exercise of which shall be strictly limited to the national interest
cases.

23.The issuance of assumption or certification orders automatically enjoins the intended or impending
strike or lockout and if one has already taken place, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately
return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before thestrike or lockout.Assumption andcertification orders are
executory in character and shall be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any
petition questioning their validity.

24.In case of non-compliance with return-to-work-orders, in connection with the certification and assumption
of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor, the party concerned maybe subjected to the sanctions provided by
law.Employers who refuse to re-admit returning workers may be liable, upon filing of proper petition, for the
payment of wages and other benefits from the date of actual refusal until the workers are re-admitted.

REMEDIES

25.A strike or lockout maybe declared illegal if anyof the requirements for a valid strike or lockout is not
complied with or if declared based on non-strikeable issues, or when the issues involved are already the
subject of arbitration.During a strike or lockout, either of the parties are additionally prohibited from
committing illegal acts.

26.The employer or the union may file the proper petition to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
to seek a declaration of the illegality of the strike or lockout subject to the provision of Article 263 (g).It shall
be the duty of the Labor Arbiter concerned to act on the case immediately and dispose of the same subject
only to the requirements of due process.

27.If a strike is declared to be illegal, the employer may be authorized to terminate the employment of union
officials who knowingly participate in the illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during the strike or lockout.

28.In case of an illegal lockout, any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence
thereof, shall be reinstated with payment of full backwages and other benefits.

DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 7

29.Employers, workers and concerned labor department officials are enjoined to faithfully observe the
principles contained in Department Order No. 7 issued on 7 May 1987 which were basedon the agreement
reached during the National Tripartite Conference held on April 10-11, 1987 in Tagaytay City.

19 October 1987.

(Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON

Secretary of Labor and Employment

APPENDIX 5

Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDNATIONAL POLICE

EMPLOYMENTCOMMISSION

GUIDELINES IN THECONDUCT OF PNP PERSONNEL, PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS AND COMPANY GUARD
FORCES DURING STRIKES, LOCKOUTS AND LABOR DISPUTES IN GENERAL

In order to promote public interest and safety, industrial peace and stability, and peace and order, the
following guidelines are hereby prescribed to govern the official conduct of all members of the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) during strikes, lockout and labor disputes in general:

GENERAL POLICY

1.It is the essence of these guidelines that labor disputes are within the sole jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and/or through its appropriate agencies while matters involving peace
and order, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Police Commission(NAPOLCOM)through the
PhilippineNational Police (PNP); but as labor disputes involving strikes and lockouts have peace and order
implications, close coordination between the two departments is necessary.

2.The involvement of the PNP during strikes, lockouts and labor disputes in general shall be limited to
the maintenance of peace and order, enforcement of laws and legal orders of duly constituted authorities.

3.Any request for police assistance issued by duly constituted authorities shall specify the acts to
be performed or conducted by PNP personnel.

4.Whenever the assistance of the PNP is necessary, elements of the local police force should be
called upon to render assistance.Such request for assistance shall be addressed to the Regional Director, National
Capital Regional Command (NCRC), or the City Director in the case of cities, or the Provincial Director in the case of
provinces or cities not under the City Police Command.Unless directed by the President or personally by the
Chairman of the National Police Commission upon consultation with the Secretary of Labor and Employment or when
requested by the latter, personnel from the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall not intervene nor be utilized in any
labor dispute.

5.Insofar as practicable, no officer of the law shall be allowedto render servicesin connection
with a strike or lockout if there is question or complaint as regards his relationship by affinity or consanguinity to any
official/leader of the parties in the controversy or if he has financial or pecuniary interest therein.

6.A peace keeping detail shall be established in a strike or lockout area when requested by DOLE or as
the Regional Director, National Capital Regional Command, City Police Command/Provincial Director may deem
necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and order in the area.

7.Personnel detailed as peace keeping forcein a strike or lockout areas shall be in uniform, with
proper nameplate at all times.They shall exercise maximum tolerance and shall observe courtesy and strict
neutrality in their dealings with both parties to the controversy bearing in mind that the parties to the labor dispute are
not their adversaries but their partners in the quest for industrial peace and human dignity.As much as possible, they
shall not inflict any physical harm upon strikers and/or picketers or any person involved in the strike/lockout.When
called for by the situation or when all other peaceful and non-violent means have been exhausted, law enforcers may
employ, as alast resort only such force as may be necessary and reasonable to prevent or repel an aggression.

PEACE KEEPING DETAILS

8.The peace keeping detail shall not be stationed in the picket (or confrontation line) but should be
stationed suchthat their presence may deter the commission of criminal acts or any untoward incident from either
side.The members of the peace keeping detail shall stay outside a 50 meter radius from the picket line, except, if
the 50 meter radius includes a public thoroughfare, they may station themselves in such public thoroughfare for the
purpose of insuring the free flow of traffic.

ARRESTS/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

9.Arrests and searches in strike/lockout areas shall be effected only on the basis of an existing and
valid Warrant of Arrest/Search and Seizure or in accordance with Section5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.Whenever possible, union representatives (for laborers/workers) or management representatives (for
management personnel) shall be requested to facilitate the service of the Warrant of Arrest/ Search and Seizure
Order.

10.Any person who, during the strike/lockout, violates any law, statute, ordinance or any provision of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 or the Public Assembly Act may be arrested and charged accordingly in court.

11.Any person who obstructs the free and lawful ingress to and egress from the employers premises in
contemplation of Article 264, par. (e) of the Labor Code, as amended, or who obstructs public thoroughfares may be
arrested and accordingly charged in court.

12.The DOLE shall immediately be informed by the PNP unit concerned in cases of violence in the picket
line.When arrests are made pursuant to a warrant issued by competent authorities,the arresting officers shall
coordinate with the Leaders/ Representatives of the union and management,as the case may be, and also inform
them of the arrest and the reason thereof.

SERVICE OF DOLE, COURT OR LAWFUL ORDERS/WRITS

13.Theservice of DOLE, court or lawful order/writs is the primary concern of the DOLE
representative, sheriff, representative of the government agency issuing the order respectively.Before service of the
Order, the DOLErepresentative, sheriff or representative of the agency issuing the order shall coordinate and
dialogue with the leaders of the striking group and the representatives of management and shall inform them of the
nature and content of the Order to be enforced including possible consequences of any defiance thereto. Whenever
necessary, coordination withthe local government units shall be made by the DOLE and the other concerned
agencies issuingthe Order to facilitate the service of Order and to prevent unnecessary intervention.


14.Orders enjoining any picketing, strike, or lockoutare enforceable strictly in accordance with Articles
218 and 263 of the Labor Code, as amended.

 15.Any person who is not a laborer/worker of the company/ business establishment on strike but has joined
the striking laborers/workers in their picket or strike, shall be treated by the law enforcers in the same manner as the
strikers/picketers.If such persons presence in the strike area obstructs the peaceful picketing, the law enforcers
shall compel him to leave the area.The conduct of rallies and marches on issues not relation to the labor dispute
shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa 880.

ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION

16.Except as provided in these guidelines the matter of determining whether a strike, picket or lockout is
legal or not should be left to DOLE and its appropriate agencies.PNP elements are enjoined from interfering in a
strike, picket or lockout, except as herein provided, for the sole reason that is illegal.

17.Picketing as part of the freedom of expression during the strikes shall be respected provided it is
peaceful.Shanties and structures set-up to effectively block lawful ingress to and egress from company premises
for legal purposes and the free passage in public thoroughfares shall be summarily demolished in accordance with
Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

18.No personal escort shall be provided to any of the parties to the controversy unless so directed by the
competent authority.Whenever escorts are to be provided to any, the other party shall be informed accordingly.All
escorts shall be in uniform at all times.

SOCIALIZING

19.During the pendency of a strike/lockout, the police andthe military personnel concerned are
discouraged from socializing with any of the parties involved in the controversy.These personnel shall not, under
any pretext, accept an invitation from management personnel or union officials/personnel involved in the
controversy.

LIAISON

20.Liaison shall be established and maintained with the representatives of DOLE, management and the
union in the strike/lockout are for the purpose of maintaining peace and order as well asto maintain a continuing
peaceful dialogue between the parties to the strike/lockout.If possible, a monthly meeting between the
representatives of the PNP, NAPOLCOM and the DOLE concerned sectors shall be conducted to assess and monitor
compliance with and implementation of the guidelines.

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

21.All complaints/reports leveled against any personnel of the PNP on the occasion of
strike/lockout shall be possessed and resolved in accordance with the PNP Administrative Disciplinary Machinery
pursuant to Chapter III, paragraph(c) of Republic Act 6975.For DOLE personnel,the complaints shall be
processed in accordance with the DOLE Manual on the Disposition of Administrative Cases.Whenever applicable,
and ifthe evidence so warrants, appropriate disciplinary action shall be taken against the erring personnel.

ROLE OF SECURITY GUARDS

22.Conduct of security guards during strikes and lockouts shall be in accordance with Rule 18 of the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act 5487.

EFFECTIVITY

23.These guidelines shall take effect immediately.
(6) Airline Pilots vs. PAL

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and
ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that
PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP a notice of strike against PAL with the DOLE. The DOLE Secretary
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ruled that all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
whether actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited.

Despite such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike. This constrained the DOLE, through then
Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order which ALPAP did not immediately follow. As a
consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the
return-to-work order.

ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to
accept unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to pay whatever
salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.

Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution was rendered declaring the strike conducted by
ALPAP illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the
strike in defiance of the return-to-work order.

Then Acting DOLE Secretary, Imson, resolved ALPAP's motions and stated that NCMB-NCR-NS-12-514-97 has
indeed been resolved with finality by the highest tribunal of the land, the Supreme Court. Being final and executory,
this Office is bereft of authority to reopen an issue that has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the DOLE is final and immutable.

HELD:

YES. Finality and immutability of judgment

In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers
actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such
determination. However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would
entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court .Settled in law is that once a
decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect.
Subject to certain recognized exceptions, the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as "nothing
further can be done except to execute it."
(7) JAILE OLISA, ET. AL vs.DANILO ESCARIO, ET. AL

FACTS:

All the officers and some 200 members of the Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union)
walked out of Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA)s premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support
for Caete ,an officer of the Union, charged with oral defamation by personnel manager, and her secretary which
resulted in a settlement. As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union. And later on
terminated the officers of the Union.

PINA filed a complaint for ULP and damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout
constituting ULP; and that all the Unions officers, except Caete, had thereby lost their employment. The Union filed
a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers.
Because of a majority strike vote, a strike was held which was later on declared to be illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employees dismissed for joining an illegal strike are entitled to backwages considering they were
reinstated of being merely members of the striking union.

RULING:

No. Employees dismissed for joining an illegal strike are not entitled to backwages for the period of the strike even if
they are reinstated by virtue of their being merely members of the striking union who did not commit any illegal act
during the strike.

The petitioners contend that they are entitled to full backwages by virtue of their reinstatement, and submit that
applicable to their situation is Article 279.Article 279(Security of tenure) refers to a dismissal that is unjustly done, that
is, the employer dismisses the employee without observing due process, either substantive or procedural.

In contrast, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) provides that Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment statusOn the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision
distinguishes between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union member who is
merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the
benign consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who are misled into
supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal
strikes.

The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The NLRC ordered their
reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file
workers whom the Unions officers had misled into joining the illegal strike. They were not unjustly dismissed from
work.

(8) Visayas Community Medical Center vs Yballe

Facts:

The NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCH (now VCMC).
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a local affiliate whose union leaders proceeded to strike despite the fact that it is not a
legitimate labor organization. The respondents in this case are staff nurses and midwives of MCCH who actively
joined and were believed to have took part in committing illegal acts during the strike. Consequently, MCCH
terminated the union leaders of NAMA-MCCH-NFL as well as the respondents. The CA, however, found that
respondents cannot be considered to have committed illegal acts since their participation was limited to the wearing
of arm bands.

Issue 1: W/N the dismissal of the respondents is valid

Held:

No. Article 263 (a)(par 3) provides that any union officer who knowingly participated in an illegal strike and any union
officer or union member who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost his employment status. Here, the respondents merely participated in the illegal strike but did not commit
any of the illegal acts. Hence, their termination is not valid.

Issue 2: W/N the respondents are entitled to backwages

No. The principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor remains as the basic factor in determining the award of
backwages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless the laborer was
able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented
from working. For this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. Since the strike in this case was illegal,
the respondents cannot be awarded with backwages.

Issue 3: W/N the respondents are entitled to reinstatement

No. Considering that strained relations ensued, the grant of separation pay to respondents is the alternative in lieu of
reinstatement.

Jurisprudence states that the alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an
illegal strike is the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of
the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d)
reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers
continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations
between the employer and employee. ##

(9) TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

FACTS:

On the parties 41st meeting, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help
of a third party be sought. The union filed a Notice of Strike in the NCMB, alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of
the company. The NCMB immediately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings
but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The DOLE-Sec assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the
parties. The Secretary ruled that the company is not guilty of bargaining in bad faith and also proceeded to decide on
the matter of the wage increase and other economic issues of the new CBA.

The union questioned the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and the
company on the ground that the Secretary erred in assuming jurisdiction over the CBA case when it is not the
subject matter of the notice of strike because the case was all about ULP in the form of bad faith bargaining. For
the union, the DOLE-Sec should not have touched the issue of the CBA as there was no CBA deadlock at that time,
and should have limited the assumption of jurisdiction to the charge of unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employments assumption of jurisdiction is limited to the subject of strike.

RULING:

No. The labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unresolved matters between the parties in
relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The power of the DOLE-Sec to assume jurisdiction over this dispute
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the
unions allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the various unresolved provisions of the new
CBA such as compensation, particularly the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of
such wage increase, whether or not there was deadlock in the negotiations.

As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the DOLE-Sec need not wait for a
deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significance of the power of the DOLE-Sec
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a
preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have
preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have
taken place. As the term assume jurisdiction connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full
authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over
which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

(10) ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA (TPMA)

FACTS:

After 18 sessions of negotiations, it still resulted to a deadlock. After the union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB,
still they did not come to terms.

When union conducted a strike vote with a768/840 voted in favor of holding a strike, the corporation then petitioned
the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the parties labor dispute, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code. Union opposed the assumption of jurisdiction, reasoning therein that the business of petitioner corporation is
not in dispensable to the national interest. The public respondent, through Undersecretary/Acting Secretary issued
an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the Respondent union and petitioner corporation. It
then resolved the deadlock and granted arbitral awards.

Upon appeal to the CA, it ordered that the assailed Decision of the respondent Secretary with respect to the issue on
salary increases is remanded to her office for a definite resolution using as basis the externally audited financial
statements to be submitted by corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the CA remanding the issue on salary increase to the Secretary of Labor is proper.

RULING:

Yes. The remand of this case to the Secretary of Labor as to the issue of wage increase was proper. The Supreme
Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the study and settlement of labor disputes falling
under his power of compulsory arbitration. It is also well-settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if
supported by substantial evidence, are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality. But at the same time, the
Court also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend the exercise of the Secretarys arbitral
functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually based on position papers and their supporting documents (as
they are in the present case), and not on the thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be
present in a court trial and in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and
appreciation of evidence, etc.

The SC held that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused her discretion when she relied on the unaudited financial
statements of the corporation in determining the wage award because such evidence is self-serving and
inadmissible. Not only did this violate the Order of the Secretary of Labor herself to petitioner corporation to submit
its complete audited financial statements, but this may have resulted to a wage award that is based on an inaccurate
and biased picture of petitioner corporations capacity to pay one of the more significant factors in making a wage
award. The appellate court, thus, correctly remanded this case to the Secretary of Labor for the proper determination
of the wage award which should utilize, among others, the audited financial statements of petitioner corpora
(11) DO 40- G-3 Series of 2010

(12) DO 40-H-3- Series of 2013

(13) Operation Guidelines of DO 40-G-3 Series of 2010

(14) Escarino vs NLRC

Facts:

The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation
engaged in manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).

On March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the Union walked out of PINAs premises in a show of
support to another union officer facing charges of oral defamation. As a result of the walkout, PINA terminated the
employment of all the officers of the union and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and damage with the labor
arbiter, the labor arbiter ruled in its favor.

The employees subsequently filed for a notice of strike claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the
constructive dismissal of its officers. PINA then filed a case for ULP and abandonment of work because of the strike.
LA ruled that the strike was illegal and there was abandonment of work. NLRC concurred on the Illegal strike but
found no abandonment of work. CA affirmed the ruling.

Issue:

Whether the employees are entitled to full backwagesfrom the date of dismissal until the date of actual
reinstatement due to their not being found to have abandoned their jobs.

Held:

Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful lockout; and (b) participation in an
illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages only when the termination
of employment is a consequence of an unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision
distinguishes between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status,buta union member who is
merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the
benign consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who are misled into
supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal
strikes.

The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The NLRC ordered
their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere
rank-and-file workers whom theUnions officers had misled into joining the illegal strike. They were not unjustly
dismissed from work. Based on the text and intent of the two aforequoted provisions of theLabor Code, therefore, it
is plain that Article 264(a) is the applicable one. That backwages are not granted to employees participating in an
illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they do not render work for the employer during the period of the
illegal strike.

As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed employee for his loss of earnings during the
whole period that he is out of his job. Considering that an illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have left his
employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him from the employment. That backwages
are not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they do not render
work for the employer during the period of the illegal strike. The petitioners do not deny their participation in
thestrike. As such, they did not suffer any loss of earnings during their absence from work. Under the principle ofa
fair days wage for a fair days labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during the period of the strike (even
if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike.

(15) University of San Agustin Employees Union vs CA

Facts:
Petitioner Union is the duly recognized collective bargaining unit for teaching and non-teaching rank-and-file
personnel of the University while the other individual petitioners are its officers. Parties entered into a 5 year CBA,
with a provision that there will be a salary increase for SY 2000-2003 and a "no strike, no lockout" clause.

For failing to come to terms with the tuition increase for the remaining 2 years in the national conciliation and
mediation board (NCMB), the union filed a notice of strike, which the university opposed on the grounds of the clause
under the CBA. The union went ahead with the strike even after the secretary of labor and employment issued a
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO). The university filed Petition to Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment
Status with the NLRC. The secretary of labor ruled the strike was not illegal and there was no loss of employment. CA
reversed the ruling and declared the strike illegal, hence, the union officers are deemed to have lost their employment
status.

Issue:
Whether the strike was illegal.

Held:

The strike is declared illegal. When the Secretary assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if
one had already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. In this case when the AJO was issued,the strikers then should have returned to work immediately. However,
they persisted with their refusal to receive the AJO and waited for their union president to receive the same. The
Unions assertion of a well settled practice that the SOLE always gives twenty-four hours (24) to the striking workers
within which to return to work, offers no refuge. Aside from the fact that this alleged well settled practice has no basis
in law and jurisprudence.

For, the NCMBs inaction on the Universitys motion to refer the dispute to voluntary arbitration veritably forced the
hand of the University to seek and accordingly submit to the jurisdiction of the SOLE. Considering that the CBA
contained a no strike, no lockout and grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration clauses, the NCMB, under its
very own Manual of Procedures in the Settlement and Disposition of Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases,
should have declared as not duly filed the Unions Notice of Strike and thereafter, should have referred the labor
dispute to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 261

Court will not allow the no strike, no lockout, grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration clauses found in CBAs to
be circumvented by the simple expedient of filing of a notice of strike or lockout. A similar circumvention made
possible by the inaction of the NCMB on the Universitys Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute
to Voluntary Arbitration will not be countenanced. To rule otherwise would render meaningless Articles 261 and 262
of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as the voluntary arbitration clauses found in CBAs.

(16) PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL) vs. MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL
EMPLOYEES UNION

Facts:

Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Unionnotified petitioner of its intention to negotiate, by Notice to Bargain,a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its members. The Hotel, advised the union that since it was not certified
by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such. The union filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to unfair labor practice (ULP) in that the Hotel
refused to bargain with it and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented from joining it. The
employees subsequently went on strike. Employees who took part in the strike and were terminated filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, and petitioner filed petition to declare the strike illegal.
The DOLE secretary issued a order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and directing the
striking officers and members to return to work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the
unionofficersandmemberswho were reinstated to the Hotels payrollwere deemed to have lost their employment
status. CA affirmed the ruling with modification of reinstatementwith back wagesof unionmembers.

Issue:

Whether the strike is illegal.

Held:

The strike is illegal. ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN
POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING The labor organizationdesignated or selected by the majorityof the employees in
anappropriatecollective bargaining unit shall be theexclusiverepresentative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have
the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to
participate in policy and decision-making process of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said
processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form
labor-management councils:Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor management councils
shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment.

Only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit is theexclusiverepresentativeof the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The union is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could
not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.The principal ground for the strike was the
"refusal of the Hotel Management to bargain collectively with the Union for the benefit of the latters members." In the
instant case, it is not disputed that thepetitioner UNION is not a certified bargaining unit to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with private respondent Hotel.

As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal
strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that ". . .[a]ny union officer
whoknowingly participates in an illegal strikeand any worker or union officer whoknowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during strikemay be declared to have lost his employment status . . ."

An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike. Reinstatement without backwages of
striking members of respondent who did not commit illegal acts would thus suffice under the circumstances of the
case. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike,
the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order. It is
policy that "when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices," no backwages
during the strike is awarded, hence, only those members of the union who did not commit illegal acts during the
course of the illegal strike should be reinstated but without backwages.
(17) SUKHO T HA I C UI SI N E and REST A URA N T v s C A

Facts:

a m aj or ity of th e em p l oy ees of the p etition er or g aniz ed them selv es into a union w hich affiliated
w ith the P hilip p ine L abor A l liance C oun cil (P L A C ), and w as desig nated as P L A C L ocal 4 6 0
Su k hothai Restaur ant C hap ter (Union).

The Union filed a N otice of Str ik e w ith th e N C M B for UL P . R ep r esentativ e s of the p etition er
ag r e ed and g u ar anteed that ther e w ill be no ter m ination of the ser v ices of p r iv ate r esp onde nts
dur ing th e p endency of the case. P etitioner an d the Union enter ed into a Subm ission A g r e em en t,
the r e by ag r ee in g to subm it the issue of unf air labor p r actice the subj ect m atter of the f or eg oing
N otice of Str ik e and the Str ik e Vote for v olu ntar y ar bitr ation w ith a v iew to p r ev ent th e str ik e .
W hile this w as ong oing , sev er al m em ber s w er e ter m inated for v ar ious r easons, hence, th e u nion
and its m em ber s still w ent on str ik e. A com p laint to declar e the str ik e illeg al w as file d w ith th e
labor ar bite r . L A r ul ed that the union did not com p ly w ith the r eq uir em ents under the law for a
v alid str ik e an d ter m ination and susp ension of som e er r ing em p loy ees w as p ar t of v alid
m an ag em en t p r er og ativ e. N L RC r ev er sed the decision finding p etitioner g uilty of union bu stin g ,
that the p etitioner v iolated the Subm ission A g r eem ent in that no ter m ination shall be effe cted
dur ing th e v ol untar y ar bitr ation p r oceeding s and, hence, the str ik e w as j ustified. C A af fir m e d th e
N L RC r ul in g .

I ssue:

W he th er the str ik e is ill eg al .

Held:

Str ik es stag ed in v iolation of ag r eem ents p r ov iding f or ar bitr ation ar e illeg al, since the se
ag r e em ents m ust be str ictly adher ed to and r esp ected if their ends ar e to be ach ie v e d. T h e
dism issal of som e of the em p loy ees as the r eason f or the str ik e is not suff icient g r ou nds. F or
failing to ex h au st all ste p s in th e ar bitr ation p r oceeding s by v ir tue of the Subm ission A g r e em en t,
in v iew of t he p r oscr ip tion under A r ticle 2 6 4 of the L abor C ode, and the p r ev ailing state p olicy
as w el l as its under ly ing r ationale, the C our t declar es that the str ik e stag ed by the p r iv ate
r esp ondents is illeg al .

T he str ik e had been attended by the w idesp r ead com m ission of p r ohibited acts. W el l- se ttle d is
the r ule that ev en if th e str ik e w er e to be declar ed v alid because its obj ectiv e or p ur p ose is
law f ul, the str ik e m ay stil l be declar ed inv alid w her e the m eans em p loy ed ar e ille g al.
Resp on dents had eng ag ed in ill eg al acts dur ing the str ik e, such as the intim idation and
har assm en t of a consider able num ber of custom er s to tur n them aw ay and discour ag e them
fr om p atr on iz ing the business of the p etitioner ; w av ing their ar m s and shoutin g at th e
p asser sby , Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai! and Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain
dyan! as w el l as num er ous other statem ents m ade to discr edit the r ep utation of th e
establishm ent; p r ev enting the entr y of custom er s; ang r y and unr uly behav ior calculated to cau se
com m otion w hich affected neig hbor ing establishm ents w ithin the m all; op enly cu r sin g and
shou ting at th e p r esident in fr ont of custom er s and using loud and abusiv e lang u ag e, such
as Putang ina niyong lahat!, tow ar d the r est of the m anag em ent as w ell as their co- w or k e r s w ho
r ef used to g o on str ik e; p hy sicall y p r ev enting non- str ik er s fr om enter ing the p r em ises, as w ell
as deliber ately bl ock ing their m ov em ents inside the r estaur ant, at tim es by shar p ly bum p ing into
the m or thr ou g h indecent p hy sical con tact; op enly thr eatening non- str ik er s w ith bodily h ar m ,
such as Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo! ; and shouting at the secur ity g uar d Granada! w hich
cau sed p anic am ong the custom er s and p r om p ted secur ity to r ep or t a p ossible death th r eat to
m an ag em en t and the secur ity ag ency . F or em p loy ees w ho p ar ticip ated in these illeg al acts, ar e
dee m ed to hav e lost their em p loy m ent status.

(18) BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION vs FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and
BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC.

Facts:

The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective
collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations. Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial
and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in
one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they have a common
entrance.

Thelabor sector staged awelga ng bayanto protest the accelerating prices of oil. Petitioner-unions, led by their
officers, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days. Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked
out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that thewelga ng bayanrendered it difficult to get a ride and the
apprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in thewelgaand the authorities, respondents
workers were prevented from reporting for work. Respondents, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the
following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2)
securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.
The LA declared the strike illegal. NLRC reversed the ruling, holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or
industrial dispute existed between the parties. CA reversed the ruling and reinstated LA ruling.

Issue:

Whether the strike is illegal.

Held:

Stoppage of work due towelga ng bayanis in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affects
numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and
conditions of employment. Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are
scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join awelga ng bayancommit an illegal work stoppage. There being
no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed by respondents, to join
thewelga ng bayanon October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.

Even assumingarguendothat in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would
just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing shall obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares."

Article 264 (a); . . . Anyunion officerwhoknowingly participates in an illegal strikeand any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strikemaybe declared to have lost his
employment status:Provided,That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.

The Court, passing on the use of the word "may" in the immediately quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants
the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment." Reinstatement of a striker or retention of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is
a management prerogative which this Court may not supplant.
(19) SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES vs COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.

Facts:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The individual petitioners are Union officers, directors, and
shop stewards. Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
terms. The CBA meetings commenced. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa
Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted
that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the
Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company
in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. The Union filed a "Notice of Strike" with the NCMB. The
Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the
Companys premises. Union members, officers and members of the Board of Directors, and shop stewards,
individually filed applications for leave of absence the said date. The Company disapproved all leave applications and
notified the applicants accordingly.

The LA ruled that the strike conducted by theUnionwas illegal since there was no showing that theUnionconducted
a strike vote, observed the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to the DOLE within the
required time. Consequently, for knowingly participating in the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were considered
to have lost their employment status. The NLRC and the CA affirmed the LA decision.

Issue:
Whether there was a strike.

Whether such strike was illegal.

Held:

Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The term strike encompasses not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment
and facilities, and similar activities.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the
display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute.As applied to a labor dispute,
to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe.The purpose of pickets is
said to be a means of peaceable persuasion. That there was a labor disputebetween the parties, in this case, is not
an issue. Petitioners notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket.Petitioners
insistence to stage a strike is evident in the fact that an amended notice to strike was filed even as respondent moved
to dismiss the first notice. The basic elements of a strike are present in this case

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed:
(a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor
practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting
at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to
comply therewith renders the strike illegal.It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory
requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.

(20) MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs Manila hotel Corp.

Facts:

MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the with the NCMB on the grounds of unfair labor practices. An order was issued
by the SOLE which enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing
any acts that may exacerbate the situation.

MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE. The NLRC issued an Order
directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same terms
and conditions of employment.NLRC ruled that thestrike held by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the
return-to-work order.However, it determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their
employment.It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking employees were actually notified
of the return-to-work order, and therefore, such employees have not forfeited their employment. CA reversed the
ruling stating that both officers and employees lost their employment status.

Issue:

Whether the strike is illegal.

Held:

Once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout.Defiance of the assumption order or a return-to work
order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a member, is an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for
loss of employment status. A return-to-work order is immediatelyexecutorynotwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.It must be strictly complied with even during thependencyof any petition questioning its validity.

Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option orvoluntarinessbut of obligation.The worker must return
to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving
the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving
at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of
their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that
tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is
issued.They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their action.

(21) G&S transport corp. vs Infante

Facts:

Petitioner was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) by virtue of a
five-year concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport Authority.Under the terms of the contract,
the coupon taxi units assigned to service arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at
the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units assigned to service departing plane passengers would be
given their assignment by the garage dispatcherviaa two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after
taking arriving passengers to their destination.

petitioner claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport Taxi Service Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a
letter-memorandum demanding the dismissal from employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim
Alzaga (Alzaga), both drivers of petitioner on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty,
conduct unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of the Union.

Upon learning of the incident, several drivers of petitioner stopped driving their taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with
their dismissed colleagues. Petitioner alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the work
premises.
petitioner filed an action for illegal strike before the LA, said drivers then filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner. Labor Arbiter declared respondents concerted action as a form of an illegal strike. respondents Daramayo,
Borbo, Infante and Castaeda, though found to have participated in the illegal strike, were not meted out the penalty of
dismissal; instead, petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in lieu of reinstatement but without backwages.
The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. The appellate court scored the Labor Arbiter because the latter failed to
categorically rule on the validity of respondents dismissal and instead stood content in simply stating that
respondents should not have been meted out the severest penalty of dismissal for their inadequacies and wrongful
actions.The appellate court went on to declare respondents dismissal as illegal.

Issue:

whether respondents participated in the illegal strike.

Held:

Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor
dispute.The strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more aptly termed as a
sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no demands or grievances of their own, but they strike for the
purpose of directly or indirectly aiding others, without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the
strikers.It is indubitable that an illegal strike in the form of a sit-down strike occurred in petitioners premises, as a
show of sympathy to the two employees who were dismissed by petitioner.Apart from the allegations in its complaint
for illegal strike filed before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner presented the affidavits and testimonies of their other
employees which confirm the participation of respondents in the illegal strike. Petitioner has sufficiently established
that respondents remained in the work premises in the guise of waiting for orders from management to resume
operations when, in fact, they were actively participating in the illegal strike.

The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in such a strike from losing his
job, provided that he did not commit an illegal act during the strike.[34]It can be gleaned from the aforecited provision
of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the
commission of illegal act must be identified. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence
available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may
suffice. Court is not convinced that the affidavits of petitioners witnesses constitute substantial evidence to establish
that illegal acts were committed by respondents.Nowhere in their affidavits did these witnesses cite the particular
illegal acts committed by each individual respondent during the strike.

Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief.If
reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, the award
of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.

(22) Philippine Steel Corporation vs. SCP Employees Union-National Federation of Labor Unions
G.R. No. 168928-30; April 18, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner SCP is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying approximately 50% of the
domestic needs for roofing materials. On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders General
and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner. Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same was denied for having
been filed out of time. A consent election was conducted between FUEL GAS and NO UNION, but said election was
declared a failure due to number voters not being the majority. FUEL GAS filed an ELECTION PROTEST and was
denied by the MED ARBITER. On the other hand, SCPEU- NAFLUs petition for certification election was granted. The
election between SCPEU, FUELGAS and NO UNION was pushed through. FUELGAS participated without prejudice to
the decision on the appeal it filed to the CA. Respondent SCPEU NAFLU emerged as winner and a second election
protest was filed by FUELGAS. The MED ARBITER dismissed the second election protest but deferred the declaration
of SCPEU NAFLU as winner of the said election. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining
agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the
proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration. Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain
with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December
11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latter's
refusal to bargain with it. Again, on April 2, 2001, another Notice of Strike was filed by respondent for
non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain, et al.

NLRC DECISION ON Cert. Case No. 000200-01: declaring petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent
as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike. The
second certified case was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. The NLRC rendered a Decision ordering
petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the
reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of
seniority rights and diminution of salary. The CA nullified the second certification election where SCPEU NAFLU won.
Thus, NAFLU has no right to demand that petitioner bargain with it.

Issue/s: Is the dismissal of the union officers who participated in the illegal strike valid?

Held: Yes. The law, in Article 264 of the labor code, makes a distinction between union members and union officers.
A worker merely participating in illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits
illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an
illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law proides that a union officer may
be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the right and the prerogative to terminate union
officers from serice. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the
company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from filling
up their positions.
(23) CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS and CHRIS GARMENTS WORKERS
UNION-PTGWO LOCAL CHAPTER No. 832

G.R. No. 167426. January 12, 2009

Facts: Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO, Local Chapter No. 832, filed a petition for certification election with
the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent petitioner's rank-and-file employees not covered by its Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with the Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Chris Garments Corporation-Solidarity of Union in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCGC-SUPER), the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition that it has an existing CBA from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2004
with SMCGC-SUPER which bars any petition for certification election prior to the 60-day freedom period. The
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition holding that there was no employer-employee relationship since the union itself
admitted that its members are agency employees, the petition for certification election will still fail due to the contract
bar rule under Article 232. The Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The
union filed another certification election within the period alleged and thus was still denied by the Med Arbiter and
affirmed by the Secretary. On June 4, 2004, the union filed a third petition which the Med-Arbiter dismissed the
petition on the grounds that no employer-employee relationship exists. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to its
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision before filing the petition. A certification election was
conducted on June 21, 2005 among petitioner's rank-and-file employees where SMCGC-SUPER emerged as the
winning union.

Issues: 1. Whether or not a motion for reconsideration is necessary before a party can file a petition for certiorari from
the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. 2. Whether or not the third case is barred by res judicata.

Held: 1. No. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions,
such as when a motion for reconsideration would be useless under the circumstances. Under Department Order No.
40-03, Series of 2003, 19 the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory after
ten days from receipt thereof by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration. In this
case, the Decision dated January 18, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment was received by petitioner on
January 25, 2005. It would have become final and executory on February 4, 2005, the tenth day from petitioner's
receipt of the decision. However, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on even date.
Clearly, petitioner availed of the proper remedy since Department Order No. 40-03 explicitly prohibits the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Such motion becomes dispensable and not at all necessary.

2. No. The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" provides that issues actually and directly resolved in a former
suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Under
this doctrine, identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. There is no identity of causes of
action to speak of since in the first petition, the union has no cause of action while in the third, a cause of action
already exists for the union as they are now legally allowed to challenge the status of SMCGC-SUPER as exclusive
bargaining representative.
(24) University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor

GR 151379

Facts: This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate
Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching Personnel and Employees
Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY,
submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left
unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit. The UNION it
filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period,
two union members were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike. On January 23, 1995, the
then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. On
March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITYs termination of
the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents is
in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor. On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order
reiterating the directives contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate
the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. The UNIVERSITY
filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified
the two previous Orders by adding: Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed
under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. The CA affirmed the orders of the
Secretaty of Labor.

Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.

Held: No. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work
and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The phrase under the same terms and conditions makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This
is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the
national interest. In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose
S. Brillantes said: Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical
reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll
reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement
must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to
attaining the purposes of the law. The superseding circumstances mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no
doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve
private respondents, thereby rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to
exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore,
appears justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same.
(25) ERROL RAMIREZ, JULITO APAS, RICKY ROSELO AND ESTEBAN MISSION, JR., vs. POLYSON INDUSTRIES, INC.
AND WILSON S. YU

G.R. No. 207898, October 19, 2016

Facts: The officers of Obrero, led by the union president, herein petitioner Ramirez; asked that it be voluntarily
recognized by Polyson as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson, but the latter
refused and opted for a certification election; furious at such refusal, the Obrero officers threatened the management
that the union will show its collective strength in the coming days. On June 7, 2011, Polyson received a rush order
from one of its clients for the production of 100,000 pieces of plastic bags; the management of Polyson informed the
operators of its Cutting Section that they would be needing workers to work overtime because of the said order;
however, on the day itself, three of the five workers did not work overtime which resulted in the delay in delivery of
the client's order and eventually resulted in the cancellation of the said order by reason of such delay. When
management asked the workers, who initially manifested their desire to work overtime, to indicate in the time sheet
the reason for their failure to do so, two of the three workers, namely, Leuland Visca (Visca) and Samuel Tuting
(Tuting) gave the same reason, to wit: "Ayaw nila/ng iba na mag-OT [overtime] ako". The management then
conducted an investigation and a hearing where Visca affirmed his previous claim that petitioners were the ones who
pressured him to desist from rendering overtime work. The management gave the petitioners a chance to explain but
subsequently decided to terminate their employment on the ground that they instigated an illegal concerted activity
resulting in losses to the company.

DOLE Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for immediate compulsory arbitration. NLRC rendered its
Decision finding petitioners illegally dismissed from their employment. The NLRC initially ruled that petitioners were
illegaly dismissed but subsequently reversed the same upon Polyson's filing of MR. The CA ruled that petitioners'
defense, cannot overcome the categorical statements of Polyson's witnesses who identified petitioners as the
persons who induced or threatened them not to render overtime work.

Issue: Whether petitioners' dismissal from their employment was valid.

Held: Yes. The Court agrees with both the NLRC and the CA that petitioners are guilty of instigating their
co-employees to commit slowdown. There is a strike, whether one or more than one have ceased to work.
Procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there
was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. In the present case,
Polyson was able to establish that these requirements were sufficiently complied with. The petitioners' liability is
founded on Article 264 of the Labor Code. The responsibility of the union officers, as main players in an illegal strike,
is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to respect the law.
The policy of the State is not to tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order, where the
relationship between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one party's bargaining prerogative,
to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo, but the welfare of
the entire workforce though they may not be involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the
guilty parties is a natural consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.

Art 277 (b)

(1) St. Luke's Medical Center & Robert Kuan, Chairman v. Notario

G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010

FACTS: St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. employed respondent as In-House Security Guard. His work consisted mainly
of monitoring the video cameras. Justin Tibon reported to the management of petitioner hospital about the loss of his
mint green traveling bag at the time of respondent's duty. The cameras failed to record any incident of theft at room
257. Respondent explained that on the subject dates, he was the only personnel on duty as nobody wanted to assist
him. Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the Old and New Maternity Units, as these two units have
high incidence of crime. Finding the written explanation of respondent to be unsatisfactory, petitioner hospital served
on respondent a copy of the Notice of Termination. Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner hospital and its Chairman. Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners. On appeal by the respondent, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
stated that petitioners failed to submit proof that there was an existing Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in the
CCTV monitoring system, particularly on the focusing procedure. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied by the NLRC. CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari, affirming the NLRC's finding that
while respondent may appear to be negligent in monitoring the cameras on the subject dates, the same would not
constitute sufficient ground to terminate his employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract for the repurchase of the foreclosed properties was perfected between petitioner
and respondent bank?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained. To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the
Labor Code has set twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282
of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. This first
requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect, while the second is deemed as the procedural aspect. An employer
can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just
cause. Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee for gross and habitual
neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's
duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not
constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised
his best judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security within the hospital premises. Verily,
assuming arguendo that respondent was negligent, although this Court finds otherwise, the lapse or inaction could
only be regarded as a single or isolated act of negligence that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a
just cause for his dismissal. Where the dismissal was without just cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of
the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. The awards of
separation pay and backwages are not mutually exclusive and both may be given to respondent. An employee who is
illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable,
separation pay is awarded to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of
reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service.

(2) Armando Ailing, Petitioner vs. Jose B. Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo III, et al.,

G.R. No. 185829. April 25, 2012.

FACTS: Via a letter dated June 2, 2004, respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to
employ petitioner Armando Aliling (Aliling) as Account Executive (Seafreight Sales). The offer came with a six
(6)-month probation period condition with this express caveat: Performance during probationary period shall be
made as basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status. On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an
Employment Contract under the following terms, among others: Conversion to regular status shall be determined
on the basis of work performance; and Employment services may, at any time, be terminated for just cause or in
accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement. Training then started. However, instead of a
Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express (GX), a new company product
launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon. Marketing this product and
finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Alilings new assignment. Barely a month after, Manuel F. San Mateo
III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the latters
performance. Thereafter, in a letter of September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources Manager
of WWWEC, asked Aliling to report to the Human Resources Department to explain his absence taken without leave
from September 20, 2004. Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in question,
attaching to his reply-letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004.
Alilings explanation came with a query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to 25,
2004. In a separate letter dated September 27, 2004, Aliling wrote San Mateo stating: Pursuant to your instruction on
September 20, 2004, I hereby tender my resignation effective October 15, 2004. While WWWEC took no action on
his tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated
October 1, 2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign. Lariosas response-letter of October 1,
2004, informed Aliling that his case was still in the process of being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again
wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services effective as of that date owing to his
non-satisfactory performance during his probationary period. Records show that Aliling, for the period indicated,
was paid his outstanding salary which consisted of: PhP 4,988.18 (salary for the September 25, 2004 payroll) Php
1,987.28 (salary for 4 days in October 2004) PhP 6,975.46 Total

Earlier, however, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation,
nonpayment of salaries as well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was
Alilings Affidavit dated November 12, 2004, in which he stated: 5. At the time of my engagement, respondents did
not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular employee. Refuting Alilings basic
posture, WWWEC stated in its Position Paper dated November 22, 2004 that, in addition to the letter-offer and
employment contract adverted to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a letter of appointment on June 11, 2004
containing the following terms of engagement: Additionally, upon the effectivity of your probation, you and your
immediate superior are required to jointly define your objectives compared with the job requirements of the position.
Based on the pre-agreed objectives, your performance shall be reviewed on the 3rd month to assess your
competence and work attitude. The 5th month Performance Appraisal shall be the basis in elevating or confirming
your employment status from Probationary to Regular. Failure to meet the job requirements during the probation
stage means that your services may be terminated without prior notice and without recourse to separation pay.
WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September 20, 2004 in which San Mateo asked Aliling to
explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected job performance, considering that the load
factor for the GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as opposed to the allegedly agreed upon
load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to WWWEC, Aliling, instead of explaining himself, simply
submitted a resignation letter. In a Reply-Affidavit dated December 13, 2004, Aliling denied having received a copy of
San Mateos September 20, 2004 letter.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a due process.

HELD: No. The petition is partly meritorious. Petitioner is a regular employee. On a procedural matter, petitioner Aliling
argues that WWWEC, not having appealed from the judgment of CA which declared Aliling as a regular employee
from the time he signed the employment contract, is now precluded from questioning the appellate courts
determination as to the nature of his employment. Petitioner errs. The Court has, when a case is on appeal, the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error if their consideration is necessary in reaching a
just conclusion of the case. The Labor Arbiter cryptically held in his decision dated April 25, 2006 that: Be that as it
may, there appears no showing that indeed the said September 20, 2004 Memorandum addressed to complainant
was received by him. Moreover, complainants tasked where he was assigned was a new developed service. In this
regard, it is noted: Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the conditions of his
employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Article 281 of the Labor Code is the
requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement From our review, it appears that the labor arbiter, and later the NLRC, considered Aliling a probationary
employee despite finding that he was not informed of the reasonable standards by which his probationary
employment was to be judged. The CA, on the other hand, citing Cielo v. National Labor Relations Commission, ruled
that petitioner was a regular employee from the outset inasmuch as he was not informed of the standards by which
his probationary employment would be measured. The CA wrote: Petitioner was regularized from the time of the
execution of the employment contract on June 11, 2004, although respondent company had arbitrarily shortened his
tenure. As pointed out, respondent company did not make known the reasonable standards under which he will
qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Hence, he was deemed to have been hired from day
one as a regular employee. It is only but natural that the evaluation should be made vis--vis the performance
standards for the job. Private respondent Trifona Mamaradlo speaks of such standard in her affidavit referring to the
fact that petitioner did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude was below par compared to the
companys standard required of him. WWWECs contention is untenable. To note, the June 2, 2004 letter-offer itself
states that the regularization standards or the performance norms to be used are still to be agreed upon by Aliling and
his supervisor. WWWEC has failed to prove that an agreement as regards thereto has been reached. Clearly then,
there were actually no performance standards to speak of. And lest it be overlooked, Aliling was assigned to GX
trucking sales, an activity entirely different to the Seafreight Sales he was originally hired and trained for. Thus, at the
time of his engagement, the standards relative to his assignment with GX sales could not have plausibly been
communicated to him as he was under Seafreight Sales.
(3) Perez vs. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company

G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009

Facts: The petitioners, Perez and Doria, were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days because they allegedly
participated in jacking up freight costs and falsifying shipping documents. The suspension was extended for 15 days,
twice. After investigation of PT&T, they were terminated. Thus, Perez filed an illegal suspension and termination
before the Labor Arbiter.

The LA ruled in favor of petitioners. Such was reversed by the NLRC and later affirmed by the CA. The CA upheld the
dismissal due to the loss of confidence of PT&T to the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were illegally suspended and dismissed?

Held: Yes. The SC held that respondents evidence was insufficient to clarify and convincingly establish the facts from
which the loss of confidence resulted. It was never proven that petitioners alone had access to the subject
documents. Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process.
To meet the requirements of due process, petitioners must furnish two written notices 1) a written notice specifying
the grounds for termination and giving an employee reasonable time to explain 2) written notice specifying the
grounds why employer finally decided to terminate upon due consideration of all circumstances. On the issue
suspension, such was found to be illegal because an employer may only suspend for a period of 30 days. After
which, the employees must either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.