PEOPLE v. OBRERO
He also claimed that after being informed of the
J. Mendoza
May 17, 2000
Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Manila
RATIO: Perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to the accused without any
effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him
is merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the
suspect.
QUICK FACTS: Accused is charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
He was apprehended and brought to the police station where he was provided
with a lawyer who is a station commander of another police station, and
interrogated.
FACTS:
Accused: Jimmy Obrero
Victim: Emma Cabrera robbery victim. Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta
(the two maids of Emma) murder victims
Jimmy Obrero is a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose
business was selling chickens to customers. Jimmy was asked to deliver
chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer.
In Jimmys extrajudicial confession, he stated that the day before the
robbery, his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma
in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On the day of the
robbery, they learned that only two helpers were then at the residence of
Emma Cabrera, thus they decided to pull the heist.
Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from
shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie
then gave the knife to Jimmy who stabbed the younger maid, Remedios Hitta
from which she died. Thereafter, they divided the money.
This extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by Jimmy in the
presence of Atty. De los Reyes. Atty. De los Reyes is a PC Captain of the WPD
Headquarters in UN Avenue. He was at Station 7 of the WPD because he was
representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Javier
of the WPD Homicide Section to assist Jimmy Obrero in executing an
extrajudicial confession.
At the trial, Jimmy Obrero pleaded not guilty of the crime charged. He
said that he came back from his errand and remitted the amount of P2000
which had been paid to him.
charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to
execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De
los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the
extrajudicial confession which he signed because he did not know how to read.
Trial court found Jimmy Obrero guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The court
held that the accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession and that
absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but
of another police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, the Court will hold
that the proceedings were regularly conducted.
ISSUE: WON Jimmy Obreros extrajudicial confession is valid and admissible
in evidence
NO. Jimmy Obrero won.
HELD:
There was no proof that his confession was obtained by force and
threat. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination.
The confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime
could have given, details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence
of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in the executing the
same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
What renders the confession of Jimmy inadmissible is the fact that he
was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. There was only a perfunctory
reading of the Miranda rights to Jimmy without any effort to find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel
or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings
has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit
meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should
have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that Jimmy was
specifically asked these questions considering he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school.
Moreover, the Constitution requires that counsel assisting suspects in
custodial interrogations be competent and independent. In the case at bar, he
cannot be considered an independent counsel as contemplated by the law
because he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted
Jimmy. As PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, Atty. De los
Reyes was part of the police force who could not be expected to have
effectively and scrupulously assisted accused in the investigation.
GR 129670, 1 February 2000
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON,
Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that
their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for
an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports
of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At
around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides
opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-
shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were
submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA
7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its
Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April
1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse
Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a
Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9
more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San
Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer
Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874).
In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the
informations, Lavides had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been
"exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of
sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed
separate applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court
issued an order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal
Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus
he must therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and
that the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the
right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed
in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion,
he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May
1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the
same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in
separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned
during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-
departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June
1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two
orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the
conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case was pending
in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides,
bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision,
invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and
maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure
his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.
RULING:
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if
the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure
Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering
his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of
bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant
of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay
his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash
so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with
a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides'
presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.
YAP vs. CA
G.R. No. 141529
06 June 2001
Right to Bail, Section 13 (Excessive if equal to civil liability)
FACTS
Petitioner was convicted of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,500,000.00. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional
Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The Solicitor General
opined that the petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5.5
million and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain
to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it
must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.
The CA upheld the Solicitor Generals recommendation. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by
CA, but was denied.
ISSUES
1) W/N the CA committed GADLEJ in fixing the bail in the amount of P5.5
million based on the petitioners civil liability
2) W/N the CA unduly restricted petitioners constitutional liberty of abode
and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
HELD
1) Yes.
The Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the
accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail.
The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfil this purpose. To bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of
which petitioner is charged is to permit the impression that the amount
paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged
of. Bail is not intended as a punishment nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court.
Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. The Court will not hesitate to exercise its
supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding
the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a
prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the
setting of amount of bail:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense
c) Penalty for the offense charged
d) Character and reputation of the accused
e) Age and health of the accused
f) Weight of the evidence against the accused
g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
h) Forfeiture of other bail
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested
j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail
2) No.
The condition imposed is simply consistent with the nature
and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
 presence. Besides, petitioner is not prevented from changing abode,
he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
Mejia vs. Pamaran (G.R. No. L-56741-42)
Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by
Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico
Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were
decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom
appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the
cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose P.
Alejandro.
On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered
into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al.
individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which
Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove their
houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of the
agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish
Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not
join her co-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that
stage of the cases.
In July 1979, Meimban went to Court where she met Atty. Mejia who told her
that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who
has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia
also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that
case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been
approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would help them
provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge
They were able to give partial amount of the money being asked. Atty. Mejia
also attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno),
through intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C,"
which the investigator returned through an employee. Corall-Paterno
investigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against
Atty. Aurora Mejia for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On
23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, Mejia was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to
an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to
7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and
to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing
the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal
Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as
maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to
indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money
given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent Sandiganbayan in
the case at bar is void ab initio. She argued that only one stage of appeal is
available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of
the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to
this Court, only issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has
become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner contends
this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.
Issue:
WON the accused is denied of due process and the equal protection of the
law.
Held:
There is no denial of equal protection of the law. The classification satisfies the
test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring
that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. To
repeat, the Constitution specifically makes the urgency of which cannot be
denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, is not necessarily offensive to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
There is no violation of due process. What is required for compliance with the
due process mandate in criminal proceedings? This Court with Justice Tuason
as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. In criminal proceedings
then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is
proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his conviction being
made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for
him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a valid law. It
is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of
competent jurisdiction. Thus: This court has had frequent occasion to consider
the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and,
generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes
of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority
of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.
GR No. L-5371, Mar 26, 1953 ]
PEOPLE v. AQUINO MINGOA +
DECISION
92 Phil. 856
REYES, J.:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal
treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund
amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant
Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in
the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as
charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on the ground that it involved
a constitutional question.
The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books
and accounts on September 1, 1949, defendant, as an accountable officer,
was found short in the sum above named and that, required to produce the
missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer
that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope
which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was
not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and
presented no evidence in his favor.
We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently
unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes,
if the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for
him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from
liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the
shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing,
he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the
prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid
meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for
sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the
town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that
defendant had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its
loss was pure invention.
It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual
misappropriation the trial court convicted defendant on mere presumptions,
that is, presumption of criminal intent in losing the money under the
circumstances alleged and presumption of guilt from the mere fact that he
failed, upon demand, to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to the first
presumption is irrelevant, for the fact is that the trial court did not believe
defendant's explanation that the money was lost, considering it a mere cloak to
cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether or not
he (defendant) is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment * * *."
And as to the other presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use."
The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be
sustained. The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been
raised in the court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
(Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)
In any event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal
cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations,
8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641, says that "there is no constitutional objection to the
passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human
conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such
presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the
United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been
proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference
of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common experience. (See annotation
on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive
or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A. L. R. 495-535; also,
State vs. Brown, 182 S. E., 838, with reference to embezzlement.) The same
view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court in
the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and
People vs. Merilo, G. R. No. L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951.
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain
facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he
is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that the officer has
malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption
is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to
have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but
a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is
no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes
only a prima faciepresumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the
test of validity laid down in the above citations.
There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
People vs Frisco Holgado
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information,
being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just
instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the
latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial
court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without
attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be
allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of
our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of
accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr.
Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the
offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate
the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with
the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for
the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the court.
People v. Ortega
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Indeterminate Sentence Law
Laws Applicable: Art. 4 RPC
FACTS:
October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay (courting Raquel Ortega),
Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and
Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking spree with gin and finger foods.
October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who
were already drank joined them. October 16, 1992 midnight: Andre answering
a call of nature went to the back portion of the house and Benjamin followed
him. Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre Dont, help me! (Huwag,
tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying
down being stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamins father while
Diosdado called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel
lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the well. They dropped stones
to Andres body to weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell
anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his
conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the police and
accompanied them to the crime scene.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:
o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds, contributory
o 13 stab wounds
o stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper left armpit and left
chest wall- front
o stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the
back right portion of the body back
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his mother-in-law who
performed a ritual called tawas on his sick daughter and stayed home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through
the room of his sister Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his
sister was. When he answered he didnt know, Andre punched him so he bled
and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the
left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left
arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help.
Quitlong came, seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre
then ran towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the
lips and armpit and slept.
RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and the taking advantage
of superior strength committed murder
ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.
HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide. Manuel
deserves acquittal
If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have immediately
reported the matter to the police authorities. If Ortegas version of the assault
was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times
successively, completely ignoring Benjamin who was grappling with
Masangkay and that Andre was choking him while being stabbed.
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to take advantage of such superiority none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 54
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
o The essential requisites
1. the intended act is felonious assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to
the well
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to
prevent its discovery
3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors
wrongful acts (praeter intentionem) still alive and was drowned to death
a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent
to kill
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant Ortega.
Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila vs. HON.
FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge,
there were commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions
against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana.

The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the
trial even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner
granted the request.(as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were
many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday,
Wednesday and Friday).

On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the
petioner judge order should be reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.

Held:

Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in

observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may
do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.

There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the

exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive
to decency or public morals." 21

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .