G.R. Nos.
L-10817-18 February 28, 1958 refection credits are preferred could refer to buildings which are also classified as
ENRIQUE LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE OROSA, JR., and PLAZA THEATRE, INC., respondents.
Facts:
After agreeing to make an investment in Orosas theatre business and his
assurance that he would be personally liable for any account that the said
construction might incur, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the
construction of the Plaza Theatre. But of the total cost of the materials amounting
to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only P20848.50.
Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land formerly owned by Orosa, and was
acquired by the corporation. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of
remaining unpaid obligation, the latter promised to obtain a bank loan by
mortgaging the properties of Plaza Theatre. Unknown to Lopez, the corporation
already got a loan from a bank with Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the
corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of said
company as counter-security.
Persistent demand from Lopez caused Orosa to execute an alleged deed of
assignment of his 480 shares of stock of Plaza Theatre, at P100 per share; and as
the obligation still remain unsettled, Lopez filed a complaint against Orosa and
Plaza Theatre Inc, praying that xxx in case defendants fail to pay, the building and
land owned by corporation be sold at public auction, or the shares of the capital
stock be sold, and the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness.
As a defense, Orosa contended that the shares of stocks were personal properties
and cannot be made to cover and satisfy the obligation. it was thus prayed that he
be declared exempted from payment of deficiency in case the proceeds from the
sale of properties are not enough.
The surety company, upon discovery that the land was already registered, file a
petition to annotate the rights and interests of the surety company over the said
properties, which was opposed by Lopez who asserted that he has preferred lien
over the properties.
The two cases were heard jointly, and lower court held that Orosa were liable for
the unpaid balance of the cost of lumber used in the construction, and Lopez thus
acquired materialmans lien over it. In making the pronouncement that tyhe lien
was merely confined to the building and did not extend to the land where it was
built, the trial jduge took into consideration that xxx codal provisions specifying that
real properties upon which the refaction was made. Orosa were thus required to
xxx with respect tohe building, said mortgage was subject to materialmens lien in
favor of Lopez.
Lopez tried to secure a modification of decision in so far as it declared that lien did
not extend to the land, but was denied by court. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether a materialmens lien for the value of materials used in the construction of
building attaches to said structure alone, and does not extend to the land on which
building is adhered to.
Held:
Yes. Such lien attaches to structure alone, and does not extend to the land where
the building is.
In view of employment of the phrase, real estate or immovable property, and in as
much as said provision does not contain any specification delimiting the lien to the
building, said article must be construed as to embrace both the land and building
or the structure adhering thereto. SC cannot subscribe to this view, for while it is
true that real estate connotes land and building constructed thereon, it is obvious
that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the
enumeration of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing
that the building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in view of the
absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable
property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.
A close examination of the provision of the Civil Code reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate
upon the refection or work was made. The conclusion is that it must be that the
lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or
repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant
for the unpaid value of the lumber used in construction of the building attaches only
to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
TUMALAD V. VICENCIO

Although a building is an immovable; the parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property that which by nature is a real property
however they are estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.
FACTS:
Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and
Generosa Tumalad. To guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a land
which was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio defaulted in
paying, the house was extrajudicially foreclosed, pursuant to their contract. It was
sold to Tumalad and they instituted a Civil case in the Municipal Court of Manila to
have Vicencio vacate the house and pay rent.
The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and
pay rent until they have completely vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the
legality of the chattel mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it was
obtained thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an
immovable therefore can only be the subject of a REM. On appeal, the CFI found
in favor of Tumalad, and since the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent ordered, it
issued a writ of execution, however the house was already demolished pursuant to
an order of the court in an ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment of
rentals. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable
HELD:
NO.
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it would
be valid and good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. By
principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer
subsequently claim otherwise.
When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the
mortgagor cedes, sells and transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to
treat it as chattel therefore are now estopped from claiming otherwise. Also the
house stood on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be
personalty since it was placed on the land by one who had only temporary right
over the property thus it does not become immobilized by attachment.
[Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during
the period of redemption therefore Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession
of the property]
Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R. No. L-15334. January
31, 1964.]
Jun28
En Banc, Paredes (J): 8 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part.
Facts: On 20 October 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted Act 484 which
authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain
and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in
the City of Manila and its suburbs to the person or persons making the most
favorable bid. Charles M. Swift was awarded the said franchise on March 1903, the
terms and conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance 44 approved on 24
March 1903. Meralco became the transferee and owner of the franchise. Meralcos
electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls,
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission
wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric
transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators
attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its
hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila. Meralco has
constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
On 15 November 1955, City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel
towers for real property tax under Tax Declaration 31992 and 15549. After denying
Meralcos petition to cancel these declarations an appeal was taken by Meralco to
the Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required Meralco to pay
the amount of P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the
years 1952 to 1956. Meralco paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals which rendered a decision on 29 December
1958, ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the City Treasurer
of Quezon City to refund to Meralco the sum of P11,651.86. The motion for
reconsideration having been denied, on 22 April 1959, the petition for review was
filed.
Issue: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company constitute real
property for the purposes of real property tax.
Held: The steel towers of an electric company dont constitute real property for the
purposes of real property tax.
Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article 415.
The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned in
paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to
the soil. They are not constructions analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil.
As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely
attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could
easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Each
of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined
together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts
and reassembled by screwing the same.
These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not
machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they
are not intended for industry or works on the land.
Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel
supports or towers are constructed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs against the
petitioners.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
CITY OF PASAY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PASAY, CITY MAYOR
OF PASAY, CITY TREASURER OF PASAY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF PASAY,
Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates and
administers the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex under
Executive Order No. 903 (EO 903), otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the
Manila International Airport Authority. EO 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under Sections 3 and 22 of EO 903,
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways, the airport tower, and
other airport buildings, were transferred to MIAA. The NAIA Complex is located
along the border between Pasay City and Paraaque City.
On 28 August 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Property Tax
Delinquency from the City of Pasay for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City of
Pasay, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy for
the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA received the notices and warrants of levy on 28
August 2001.
Issue
Whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are exempt from real property
tax.
Held:
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals (2006 MIAA case),
this Court already resolved the issue of whether the airport lands and buildings of
MIAA are exempt from tax under existing laws. The 2006 MIAA case originated
from a petition for prohibition and injunction which MIAA filed with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real property tax
on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings
located in Paraaque City. The only difference between the 2006 MIAA case and
this case is that the 2006 MIAA case involved airport lands and buildings located in
Paraaque City while this case involved airport lands and buildings located in
Pasay City. The 2006 MIAA case and this case raised the same threshold issue:
whether the local government can impose real property tax on the airport lands,
consisting mostly of the runways, as well as the airport buildings, of MIAA. In the
2006 MIAA case, this Court held:
To summarize, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
because it is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a
government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic
viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing essential public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is
not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the
Local Government Code. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does
not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the Local
Government Code. Such exception applies only if the beneficial use of real
property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
 Manila International Airport Authority vs CA
GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy
International Airport located at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City
sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of
the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of
Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and buildings of
MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from the CA
but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the
public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was
received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction.
MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land
and building are with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and
as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of
public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the
other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a government owned
and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real estate tax.
Issues:
Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned and controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.
Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled
corporations are not exempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government
owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a
stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not
divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members.
MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and
government functions.
Under the civil code, property may either be under public dominion or
private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State and are
utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth.
The ports included in the public dominion pertain either to seaports or airports.
When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service,
they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support
of its operation and for regulation and does not change the character of the land
and buildings of MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion
the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them
to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public use, these
properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the land
and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines.
Victoria vs. Republic
(G.R. No. 179673, June 8, 2011)
NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 2004, Victoria applied for registration under the law (PD 1529) of a lot in
Bambang, Taguig City, before the MeTC.
The OSG opposed said application.
Natividad presented the following evidence:
o Documentary evidence showing that the subject lot was is a portion
of a parcel of land originally owned and declared in the name of
Victorias fatherGenaro, for tax purposes, and that upon the latters
death, she and her siblings inherited the land, divided it among
themselves (the subject lot being her share).
o Conversion/Subdivision plan showing that the land is inside the
alienable and disposable area, as certified by the Bureau of Forest
Development in 1968.
o Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly,
publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the early
1940s or for more than 30 years and have been declared as owners
for taxation purposes for the last 30 years.
MeTC granted the application for registration.
On Appeal, Victoria further attached to her brief a Certification dated
November 6, 2006 issued by the DENR verifying the subject property within
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
CA however, reversed MeTC decision, ruling that Victoria failed to submit the
DENR Certification during the hearing in the MeTC. (procedural)
ISSUES:
1. WON Victoria amply proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain YES.
2. WON she has amply proved her claim of ownership of the property. YES
HELD:
First Issue:
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as:
a. a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
b. an administrative action;
c. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
d. a legislative act or statute.
The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
SC recognized the DENR Certification (Certification is valid proof)
SC required the OSG to verify with the DENR whether the person who
issued the certification is authorized, and to submit a copy of the Admin. Order or
proclamation that declares as alienable and disposable the area where the
property involved is located, if theres any. The OSG complied and submitted the
certification stating that the person who signed the DENR Certification was
authorized, and also a CTC of Forestry Admin Order 4-1141, which declared
portions of land which are approved as alienable and disposable.
Note: SC allowed/relaxed the rules of procedure. Denying the application for
registration now on the ground of failure to present proof of the status of the land
before the trial court and allowing Victoria to re-file her application would merely
unnecessarily duplicate the entire process, cause additional expense and add to
the number of cases that courts must resolve. The person who issued the DENR
certification was the Senior Forest Management Specialist of its NCR, Office of the
Regional Technical Director for Forest Management Services.
Second Issue (MAIN):
Victoria has, contrary to the SolGens allegation, proved that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lot continuously,
uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners since the
early 1940s. In fact, she has submitted tax declarations covering the land way
back in 1948 that appeared in her fathers name.
Other Concepts discussed:
Section 14(1) of PD1529 has three requisites for registration of title:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain;
(b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
(c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 3 CASE #3
G.R. No. 191667, April 22, 2015
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN
MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, LA UNION INTERVENOR
This is an amended decision by Justice Perlas-Bernabe
This case is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by LBP.
Facts:
The Municipality of Agoo entered into two loans with LBP in order to finance a
Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality authorized the mayor Eufranio Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan with
LBP for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct a
commercial center called Agoo Peoples Center within the Plazas premises. The
Municipality used as collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the south-eastern portion of
the Plaza.
Cacayuran and other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as
the means of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in the desecration of the public
plaza. Cacayurans request for the documents relating to the plazas
redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a
complaint against LBP and officers of the municipality but does not include the
municipality itself as party-defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan
agreements and prays that the redevelopment is enjoined.
The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but were denied. LBP asserted that
Cacayuran did not have any cause of action because he was not privy to the loan
agreements.
RTC Ruling:
Subject loans are null and void. Resolutions approving the procurement were
passed irregularly and are thus ultra vires. Municipality is not bound so it is the
officers that will be held liable. Plaza lot is property for public use and not valid as Subject motions are PARTLY GRANTED. Previous decisions are SET ASIDE.
collateral. Instant case is REMANDED to the RTC and Cacayuran is DIRECTED to implead
LBP and the officers appealed to the CA. The municipal officers appeal is deemed all indispensable parties.
abandoned for failing to file an appellants brief. LBP was given due course.

CA Ruling:
RTC decision affirmed with modification: Vice-Mayor Antonio Eslao is free from Dream Village v Bases Devt Authority (July 24, 2013)
personal liability. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and the issue is of
transcendental importance to public interest. Resolutions approving the loan are FACTS:
invalidly passed. Plaza lot is invalid as collateral. Procurement is ultra vires
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to
LBP files petition for certiorari with SC.
represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square
meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners
Proceedings Before the SC:
continuously, exclusively and notoriously." [6] The lot used to be part of
LBP petition is denied and CA decision affirmed. LBP moves for reconsideration,
the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and
Municipality of Agoo files a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Pleading-In-
registered under a Torrens title,[7] Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued
Intervention Attached praying to be included as party litigant. It contends that being
on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[8] Maricaban covered
a contracting party to the subject loans, it is an indispensable party. Cacayuran
several parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over
insists that they are not real party in interest because the complaint is against the
Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque.[9]
municipal officers in their personal capacity for their ultra vires acts not binding to
the municipality.
Dream Village claims to represent more than 2k families, in OCEN
occupation & possession of 7.8 ha land in Fort Bonifacio
Issue Before the SC:
DV filed petition b4 COSLAP, seeking
WON the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indaspensible party to the
o Declaration that subj property is alienable & disposable, thus
case and thus be ordered impleaded herein. YES it is an indispensable party
outside BCDA scope;
under Sec 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
o LMB order processing members sales patent application
BCDA asserts title per RA 7227 and questioned COSLAP jurisdiction
SC Ruling:
COSLAP ruled for Dream Village. On petition for review, CA held
Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it
COSLAP has no jurisdiction because of lands private ownership and its
is the party whose interest will be affected by the courts action and without whom
is registered under an indefeasible Torrens Title.
no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute
Dream Village MR is denied and filed petition for review in SC.
necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
ISSUE: WON area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by
the court null and void for want of authority to act.
prescription
Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint. The proper remedy is to implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to
HELD:
implead the Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party that
stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party DV petition is denied. Area is not susceptible of acquisition by
and the owner of the public plaza. It stands to be benefited or injured by the prescription.
judgment of the case.
Present petition involves land titled to and managed by a govt agency
The decision of the RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed
expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for
by the SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded as
settlement.
defendant in the case.
COSLAP jurisdiction limited to
o lands govt has proprietary or regulatory interests or
o public lands covered with specific license
 Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State.
Though declared alienable & disposable, it is reserved for some public
service or for the national wealth devt, in this case, for the conversion of
military reservations to productive civilian uses.
Ownership of land registered under Torrens title cannot be lost by
prescription or adverse possession.
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,v. EMMANUEL C.
CORTEZ,Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an
applicationfor judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay
(Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. In support of his
application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax
declarations for various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property,
with the annotation that the property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3)
technical description of the property, with a certification issued by a geodetic
engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate
conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion extrajudicial
dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas Cortez
mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and
Cortez was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot
No. 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, after his
parents died, he and his siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
over the properties of their deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to
him was the subject property. He alleged that the subject property had been in the
possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is
not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family of Cortez for over sixty
(60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since he came to know them.
The RTC granted Cortez application for registration, however, The Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration
despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration
of title. The petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time
immemorial, no document was ever presented that would establish his
predecessors-in-interests possession of the same during the period required by
law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez assertion that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh
incontrovertible evidence required in land registration cases; that it is a mere claim,
which should not have been given weight by the RTC.
The CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30
years, which, under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, sufficed
to convert it to private property. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in affirming the grant of the application for registration?
HELD: The Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for
the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No.
1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for
registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No.
1529] categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru
prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are considered private."
***
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that "all things which are within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription," and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only
begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development
of national wealth.
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial
may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before
acquisitive prescription could commence, the property sought to be registered must
not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be declared by the
State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the development
of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be property of public dominion.
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to
the patrimonial character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that
acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that he has
acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment that
Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. lt is
not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial.
SPOUSES FORTUNA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 173423, March 05, 2014]
Topic: Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, C.A. 141
FACTS:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a
2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San
Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC
No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the
lots survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC granted the application for registration
in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the
alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failed to show that they complied
with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945.
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA
No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the
public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and
instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The
amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977
and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and
published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling in Taada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be
deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By
these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the
RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest,
to 1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act
(PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 is applicable for registration of
a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457 in favor of the spouses
Fortuna.
HELD: NO. the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortunas
application of registration of title.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that [the] Decree shall take effect upon
its promulgation, the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
al. that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity.
[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the
decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore,
moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least
since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457
since May 8, 1947.
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for
registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they
possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
MILAGROS C. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX P. ASUNCION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 196083 | 2015-11-11
Third division
PERALTA, J.:
Simulated Contracts
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that since the early 80s, she and her late husband were the
owners, with the right to occupy and possess a parcel of land (subject land), which
is also a sugarcane plantation, with an area of more or less 3.5 hectares located at
Patling, Capas, Tarlac and forms part of a U.S. Military Reservation. Sometime in
1986, petitioner hired respondent as a caretaker of the subject land. In 1997, the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) launched a resettlement
program for the victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and began to look for possible
resettlement sites in Tarlac and the subject lot was among those considered.
Thereafter, according to petitioner, in order to prevent the BCDA from converting
her property into a resettlement site, she and respondent executed a contract,
antedated on June 15, 1993, transferring her rights over the subject land to the
respondent.
Issue: whether the transfer of the land to respondent is a simulated contract that
will void the transfer
Held: No.
So far, appellant's averments evince an obvious knowledge and voluntariness on
her part to enter into the alleged simulated contract. Without the slightest doubt,
appellant, as plaintiff in the court below, utterly foiled to adduce any evidence of
appellee's bad faith or fraud in procuring her signature to the contract or that he
violated their real intention, if any, in executing it. It must be stressed that the
determination of whether one acted in bad faith is evidentiary in nature. Indeed, the
unbroken jurisprudence is that "[b]ad faith [or fraud] under the law cannot be
presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The allegation
of simulation of contract as well as lack of consent and/or vitiated consent remains
to be proven. As it stands, We perceive that the contract by its very terms and
conditions, on June 15, 1993, appellant simply intended to transfer the subject land
to appellee. It is a cardinal rule that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi
Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the
Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former
during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of
public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot
be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the
case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex
situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is
asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of
the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And
the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by
Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be