PARAS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169

Facts:

Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the
petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioners opposition, COMELEC deferred the
election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a
petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996,
rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the
pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:

Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government
Code.

Hxeld:

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. Paras interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the
authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the
regular local election refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.

U.S. vs Hart, et al.,

G.R. No. 8848
November 21, 1913

TRENT, J.:

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

This case is about vagrancy

STATEMENT OF FACTS
 Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling and Vagrancy where they all appealed.

Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night one in Angeles and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He also
operated a hotel Angeles in which he did a business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs which he sold to the Army
garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in
Tacondo. With the power of an attorney, he furnished the same property and paid for the 1st public school in Tacondo.

Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that he was fined for gambling and was seen in houses of
prostitution. Miller was discharged from the Army last year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a rating as
"excellent" on being discharged. He had a partnership with one Buckered and invested P1000. The business netted him
P300 per month.

Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to saloons, he sometimes acted as a banker. His occupancy is that
of a tailor which was sufficient enough to support his family.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of Act No. 519, found guilty, and were

each sentenced to six months imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine

of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have committed the act of Vagrancy.

RULING:

Defendants are AQUITTED

Act No. 519 states that:

 "(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects
to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support; (3) every person
known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been convicted of
either said offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support when found loitering about any gambling
house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute person of associate of known thieves
or ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle person who lodges in any
barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposed, without the permission of the
owner or a person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person who lives in and about
houses of ill fame; every common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant."

It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible means of support, which are evident in the occupations of
the accused, would not be a bar to the conviction under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said act. The AG contends
that "visible means of support" only applies to those "staying through the country".

The courts decided that the mere missing of the punctuation cannot hold bar the argument of the AG, since the
intention of the legislators was to prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or wasting one's time. The
time spent in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is anything but that.

The three defendants were earning a living by legitimate means in a degree of comfort higher than the average. Their sole
offense was gambling, which the legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

For these reasons, the defendants are ACQUITTED, with the costs de oficio.

Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61

FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1943, the final proof
was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was
substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the
defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead
patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and
to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.

ISSUE:
WON, the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid.
HEsLD:
No. Conveyance made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement
of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader
that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made
with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by
the heirs of Nicolas was null and void.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956.]
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY AUDITOR and the
CITY ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.

FACTS:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953,
the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E.
Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health
Department to the Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition was not
heeded by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil
Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal
from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words Civil Service in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution
and the use of small letters for the same words, civil service, in section 670, Revised Administrative Code, indicates that
only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned sections of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the use of capital in the words "Civil Service" in the Constitution and the use of small letters for the "civil
service" in the Revised Administrative code indicates that the protection only pertains to the classified service.
DECsISION:
We see no validity in this argument. Capital C and S in the words Civil Service were used in the Constitution to
indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference
between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the
unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly declared
to belong to the Civil Service;chan Hence,

Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated
because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed
to the classified service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void
and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740,
47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778).
There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted by the attorneys
for the Respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that asPetitioner was removed on June 16, 1953 and only filed
his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15 days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the
remedy, he being considered as having abandoned his office.
association of small landowners vs secretary of agrarian reform

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power
and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose,
the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in
Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.

People v. Manantan Case digest

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)

Facts:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province,
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary
investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed
by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code

Held:
Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense
the term 'judge' includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including
justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude
the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed
itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of
First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of
the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial
on the merits.

TOPACIO NUENO v. ANGELES

FACTS:

Jose TopacioNueno, Manuel De La Fuente, EustaquioBalagtas and Carmen Planas were elected asmembers of the
Municipal Board in the general election on Dec 1940, and qualified on Jan. 1941. Nuenoand Planas subsequently
resigned from their office to run for the House of Representatives on Nov. 1941, but they were not elected.
The President of the Commonwealth then appointed Nueno to fill the vacancyhe created because of his resignation, and
Delia Dino to fill the vacancy created by Carmen Planas, sincethey were both from the same political party, The Young
Philippines.

On 1942, the Japanese Army invaded the country. The regular election as provided in theElection Code could not be held
because the Japanese still occupied the country. The special electionlikewise could not be held after the restoration of
the Commonwealth due to physical impossibility.Therefore the President of the Commonwealth appointed the six
respondents to the Municipal Board.

The four petitioners instituted an actionquo warrantoagainst six respondents, averring that their term of office of three
years has not yet expired since they have not served for such period due to theJapanese occupation. They also assert
their right to hold-over, or their right to continue in office until asuccessor has been elected. Also, that their
appointments are in contravention of Sec. 16, Act 357 sincethe party of Dino has
not been represented, and that such appointments were not submitted to theCommission on Appointments.
Respondents contend that petitioners have no right to hold public office since their term expiredon Dec 1943, and that
term of office must be distinguished from tenure. Also that the appointments arevalid under the emergency powers
granted upon the President.

ISSUES

(1)Whether or not the petitioners have a right to hold-over of office

(2)Whether or not the appointments of the President are valid.

RULING:

1.) NO.The term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term meansthe time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and fixes the intervalafter the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term duringwhich the incumbent actually holds office. The
term of office is not affected by hold-over, andthe tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be
extended by reasonof war.

Sec. 27 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code provided for the right to hold-over of a municipal and provincial
officer: the incumbent shall hold-over until a successor shall beduly qualified.

Such phrase was suppressed by a subsequent amendment (Act No. 2774), but
was provided by a different section in the act, so it was still in effect. However, the foregoing provisions
were all repealed by Sec. 184 of the Commonwealth Act No. 357. It provided: Theofficers elected shall assume office on
the first day of January next following.

2)YES.Sec. 16 of the Commonwealth Act provides for the appointments to be done by thePresident in case of vacancy in
an elective or municipal office. The vacancies enumerated thereof may be immediately filled in the manner provide,
therefore there will be no interregnum duringwhich the office may be temporarily without an incumbent.

The act provides for appointment duringtemporaryvacancyof office under subsection(a)

. Subsections (b),(c), (d ) and (e) provides for appointment to fill in avacancy

. Subsection (a)cannot be applied in this case since no vacancy, temporary or otherwise, exists in this case.

Temporary absence is not the same as vacancy since in vacancy, there is no incumbent in publicoffice.

The petitioners were also not appointed under subsection ( f), which provides for theappointed officer to serve for
the unexpired term of office.

Their terms, therefore, expired already on Dec. 1943, and the subsequent appointments of the respondents are valid
under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act 357.DISPOSITIVEAction quo arrant is dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20805 November 29, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
IGNACIO DESIDERIO, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Jose C. Azcarraga for defendant-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

As one of the three pillars of our Republic, the Judiciary has a role to play in giving life to the public policy against
smuggling. It has a share in the governmental effort to eradicate such pernicious malady, which imperils the nation's
economy, stifling the incentives of our businessmen and degrading the morality of our citizenry, as it breeds
corruption in the officialdom. Such role is invoked in the present case, within the Judiciary's own sphere of action.

From an order dismissing, upon a motion to quash, an information for violation of Section 3601 of Republic Act
1937, the Solicitor General has appealed.

The information was originally filed on February 17, 1958, in the Municipal Court, and subsequently on May 3, 1958,
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. It charged that Ignacio Desiderio, on or about November 28, 1958,
in Zamboanga City, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess, receive, conceal, buy, sell (after
illegal importation) eleven (11) cases and twenty (20) cartons of Chesterfield cigarettes and eleven (11) cartons of
Camel cigarettes of foreign brand and manufactured in a foreign country, knowing that the same have been
imported contrary to law."

A plea of not guilty was entered by the accused. On June 27, 1961, however, said accused presented a motion to
quash on the ground that his criminal liability had been extinguished by a compromise agreement with the Collector
of Customs, on February 10, 1958, in accordance with Section 2307 of the same Republic Act 1937. After
considering the arguments, pro and con, on said motion, the Court granted the same in its order of October 11,
1062, dismissing the case.

Stated briefly the issue here is whether settlement of the case under Section 2307 extinguishes criminal liability
under Section 3601, both of Republic Act 1937, otherwise called the Tariff and Customs Code.

Section 3601, penalizing smuggling, provides:

SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines,
or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner
facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law, shall be punished by a fine of not less than six hundred pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos and imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years and, if the
offender is an alien, he shall be deported after serving the sentence.

When, upon trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of
the article in question, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless
the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court.

Section 2307, relied upon by the accused, is as follows:

SEC. 2307. Settlement of Case by Payment of Fine or Redemption of Forfeited Property. If, in any
seizure case, the owner or agent shall, while the case is yet before the Collector of the district of seizure,
pay to such Collector the fine imposed by him or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the
property, or, if after appeal of the case, he shall pay to the Commissioner the amount of the fine as finally
determined by him, or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, such property shall
be forthwith surrendered, and all liability which may or might attach to the property by virtue of the offense
 which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might have been incurred under any bond given
by the owner or agent in respect to such property shall thereupon be deemed to be discharged.

Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely
prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would be
contrary to law.

It is urged by the accused that settlement under Section 2307, prior to the filing of the criminal action, discharges all
liabilities which may or might attach by virtue of the offense. Such interpretation would stretch the law too far.
Section 2307 expressly states what are deemed discharged thereunder, namely, "all liability which may or might
attach to the property by virtue of the offense which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might
have been incurred under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect to such property." It limits the effects of
the aforesaid settlement to the liability that attaches to the property, or to the bond that replaces the property. It does
not speak of the liability that falls on the person or offender. Clearly, therefore, the interpretation of the accused is
not supported by the law.

Furthermore, such interpretation, if adopted, would aggravate the problem of smuggling and pave the way to
national economic ruin. For it would encourage unlawful importation, since by the mere expedient of redeeming their
seized importation the smugglers would be freed from personal criminal liability for the offense. Such a course we
cannot in the least sanction.

All the more does the position of the accused become untenable when it is considered that prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act 1937 on July 1, 1957, the applicable law contained a provision allowing the Commissioner of Customs
to compromise the criminal liability of the offender in cases of unlawful importation. We refer to Section 1369 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Its elimination in Republic Act 1937 clearly shows the intent of Congress henceforth
not to allow compromises of the offender's criminal liability in said cases. Significantly, also, Section 2307 of
Republic Act 1937 falls under part 2 of Title VI of said Act, which is entitled "Administrative Proceedings." Settlement
of the administrative proceedings does not, in the absence of express provision to that effect, amount to settlement
of the criminal liability.

Appellee cites People v. Magdaluyo, L-16235, April 20, 1961. Said case, however, involved a violation of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Section 309 of said Code allows the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
compromise the civil as well as criminal cases arising thereunder. No similar provision exists, vis-a-vis the Collector
or Commissioner of Customs, in regard to violations of the Tariff and Customs Code.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the Court a quo for
further proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

GLORIA VS CA

306 SCRA 287(1999)

FACTS:

Private respondent Dr. BienvenidoIcasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon
recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos right to security of
tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in
violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
ISSUES:

. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

RULING:

Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction.

de guia vs comelec

FACTS:

[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines
in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with
only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation
of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No.
2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND.
92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11,
1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned
resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC
Resolutions.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO:

Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate
Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine
its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature
intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact
the statute.

The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3
of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall
all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

tanggaan vs philippine transmarine

FACTS:

Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-an with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf
of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief
engineer of the vessel the S.S. Kure. He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent to
15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount of US$700.00 a month. On February
2002, Tangga-an was deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral damages,
attorneys fees and interest.

The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitioners claim for back salaries, LA said he is
entitled not to four months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months,
inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3 months = US$24,600) pursuant to Section 10 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3months back salaries.

RULING:

No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, that an illegally
dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals
that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more. This is evident from the wording for every year of the unexpired term which follows the wording salaries x x x
for three months. To follow the thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply
because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving
effect to some.

Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract,
or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which
are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package.
Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 months).
Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. As we have time and again held, it is the obligation of the employer to pay an
illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses
and general increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped
working.

JMM Promotions v. NLRC

FACTS:

JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cashbond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of
P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by
POEA,the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond asrequired by Art. 223 of the Labor
Code.

ISSUE:

Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as requiredby Art. 223 of the Labor Code,
considering it has already posted a cash bond andsurety bond, as required by the POEA?

HELD:

Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of thePOEA Rules shows that, in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrowmoney, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
requiredto perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA

Office of the Solicitor General v. CA and Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao

del Sur
Facts:
The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for mandamus4 filed with RTC of Lanao del
Sur by the former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong, Amrosi
Macote Samporna, Alanie L. Dalama, Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S. Rataban. Therein petitioners sought
to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid
terminal leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Nos. 41, Series
of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999. The Municipality of Saguiran sought the trial courts dismissal of the petition
through its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition on the ground that the act being sought by therein petitioners was
not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary
process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. The Municipality of Saguiran partially
appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the
required memorandum, explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in connection with the case.
It asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such documents within which to file the required memorandum.
On April 23, 2010, the OSGs motion was denied by the CA on the ground that the relief sought was not among
the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. The OSG was instead given a non-extendible period of 90 days
from notice within which to file the memorandum. OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion12 requesting to be
excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority to represent the Municipality of
Saguiran but it was denied.

Issue:
The Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in compelling
the OSG to represent the municipal government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur in its lawsuit.

Held:
Meritorious. OSGs mandate under the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other
statutes that pertain to the same subject of representation in courts. As the Court explained in Philippine Economic
Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation:

Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things,
or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but
also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or
every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.

Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court
actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer.

Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government units
legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel
in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable
to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies
only as a general law on the subject matter.

Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran.

The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the required
memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the
Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have
validated an act that was beyond the scope of its authority.

RAUL SESBREO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS BANK

FACTS: Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000 with PhilFinance, with a term of 32
days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory
Note (DMC PN No. 2731), the Certificate of Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the Note with notation that
said security was in the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and
America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Philfinance delivered to petitioner Denominated Custodian Receipt (DCR).

Petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent Pilipinas, and handed her a demand letter informing
the bank that his placement with Philfinance in the amount reflected in the DCR had remained unpaid and outstanding,
and that he in effect was asking for the physical delivery of the underlying promissory note. Petitioner then examined
the original of the DMC PN No. 2731 and found: that the security had been issued on 10 April 1980; that it would mature
on 6 April 1981; that it had a face value of P2,300,833.33, with the Philfinance as payee and private respondent Delta
Motors Corporation (Delta) as maker; and that on face of the promissory note was stamped NON NEGOTIABLE.
Pilipinas did not deliver the Note, nor any certificate of participation in respect thereof, to petitioner.

Petitioner later made similar demand letters again asking private respondent Pilipinas for physical delivery of the
original of DMC PN No. 2731.

Petitioner also made a written demand upon private respondent Delta for the partial satisfaction of DMC PN No. 2731,
explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had assigned to him said Note to the extent of P307,933.33. Delta,
however, denied any liability to petitioner on the promissory note.

As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an action for damages against private
respondents Delta and Pilipinas.

ISSUE: WON DMC PN No. 2731 marked as non-negotiable may be assigned?

HELD: YES. Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated
either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone where the negotiable instrument is in bearer
form. A negotiable instrument may, however, instead of being negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal
consequences of negotiation as distinguished from assignment of a negotiable instrument are, of course, different. A
non-negotiable instrument may, obviously, not be negotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express
prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument:

The words not negotiable, stamped on the face of the bill of lading, did not destroy its assignability, but the sole effect
was to exempt the bill from the statutory provisions relative thereto, and a bill, though not negotiable, may be
transferred by assignment; the assignee taking subject to the equities between the original parties. 12 (Emphasis added)

DMC PN No. 2731, while marked non-negotiable, was not at the same time stamped non-transferable or non-
assignable. It contained no stipulation which prohibited Philfinance from assigning or transferring, in whole or in part,
that Note.

LALICAN v VERGARA

Facts

Petitioner in this case was charge for violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. Accordingly,
petitioners had in their possession and custody of 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on
board two passenger jeeps with a value of 14,000.00 pesos.
Issue

Petitioner questioned the charge of illegal possession of lumber is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of
timber as defined in Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 (Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashing
of an information charging the former offense on a nonexistence crime.

Held

The petitioner is devoid of merit. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by
law, nor so interpreted as afford as opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create inconsistency, or contravene
the plain words of the law; The phrase forest products is broad enough to encompass lumber which is manufactured
timber.

KING vs HERNAEZ

MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen

Import Meat and Produce"

Philippine Cold Stores, Inc

permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce and Industry) DENIED

petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First Instance of Manila) writ of preliminary

appeal

__

(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180

No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is
not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: . ." mphasis
supplied)

(x) merely to ban them from its ownership and not from its management control or operation.

(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134)
 which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the laws of nationalization of certain rights, franchises or privileges." Read in
connection with the Retail Trade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions of
the former law which nationalize the retail business.

Itchong Case

ISSUE

Is the employment of aliens in non-control position in a retail establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?

RULING

Yes, it is prohibited.

Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law

(X)unconsti-right of employer to choose

The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be branded as unjust,
arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and
welfare of the citizens of a country.

Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is
merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities.

falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme
welfare of its citizens

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on December 6,
1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against appellees.

Solid Homes v Teresita Payawal

Facts:

On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the Regional Trial Court alleging
that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a
deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because
defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company.

Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being
rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to reverse said
decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes
Inc. to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,developer,dealer,broker or salesman?

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction. As
amended by PD

As amended by PD No 1344 entitled Empowering the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the
enforcement of its decisions under Presidential Decree No 957 Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: a) unsound real
estate business practices, b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot owners or condo unit
buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and, c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.

The challenged decision of the respondent court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to
the filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.

FIESTAN VS CA Case Digest

FIESTAN VS CA

Facts:
Spouses Fiestan mortgaged their land to DBP as security for a loan. Uponfailure to pay, the land was foreclosed an.
DBP acquired lot as highest bidder.O n e y e a r r e d e m p t i o n p e r i o d h a v i n g e x p i r e d , D B P t i t l e o v e r
t h e l a n d w a s consolidated

Issue:
WON DBP is prohibited to acquire the property under Art. 1491(2)?

Ruling:
NO. The prohibition does not apply in the instant case where the sale in dispute was made pursuant to a special
power inserted in or attached to the real estate under Act No . 3135 as a mended. As special statu te , Act
3135 pre vails over provisions of Civil Code as general statute. Moreover, even in the absence of such pro vision,
the mortgagee ma y s till purchase the subject p roperty to protect his interest.

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was
this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HsELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Petitioner: Cynthia Bolos

Respondent: Danilo Bolos

Facts:

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos under Article
36 of the Family Code.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated
on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article
36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo
was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli to the
effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to
Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be
applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought
to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action
was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Issue:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,"
is applicable to the case at bench.

Held:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

The requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

LAPID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials
with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having
conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a
control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly
enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. The
Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner form is conduct for which they are meted out the penalty
of 1 year suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from the
premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of
prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed
decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending
appeal.

HELD: NO

. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and
unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without
pay for one month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. The clear import
of these statements taken together is impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appealtimely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the
immediate implementation of the decision

Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest

G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone
congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13
May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly
elected Representative of the District.

Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the absence of the
BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the
voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require
the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.

Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.

Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one
of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead,
be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long
as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials,
or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not
readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

Nos. 24116-17 August 22, 1968

Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al.
plaintiff-appellant defendants-appellees

Facts:
1. The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland Cement Company (CPCC)
municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No. 21 on cement factories located in the
same municipality.
2. The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to the remedies provided
under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Treasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the
account.
3. The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo
cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the
Plant Manager did not agree with the letter but acknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same
day he was notified.
4. The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the Revised Administrative
Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest bidder. The proceeds thereof shall be utilized
in part of the satisfaction of the municipal license tax & penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga,
Cebu.
5. The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale shall be on July 27, 1962.
However, no sale was held on the date specified & in the appealed decision, that there was a stipulation
by the parties where the auction took place on January 30, 1962.

WHO WHAT WHERE DECISION

Cebu Portland Petition (2 separate RTC Denied
Cement Company actions: Validity of the
distraint & the sale at
a public auction of the
bags of cement)
Cebu Portland Motion for Supreme Court Denied
Cement Company Reconsideration
Issue
1. Whether the distraint was valid.
2. Whether the auction sale was valid

Decision
Decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto. With costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
1. CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal Treasurer did not lapse and
therefore, the distrain is invalid. This is not true. According to the Revised Administrative Code, the
municipal treasurer may seize & distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any
property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question xxx. With
this, the law gives an authority to the municipal treasurer to seize & distrain properties regardless of
the provisions or conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for application and not for
interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend the law.

2. The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the sale cannot take place
less than 20 days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property xxx. Since the first notification
for distrait was in July 6, 1961 & the sale was on January 30, 1962, the requisite for the notification
was more than complied with. The sale was only delayed due to the deferment made by the CPCC.
Even if the sale was made only in January 1962, the Treasurer informed the CPCCs acting officer
that he would again advertise for the public sale of the said bags of cement. With this, the validity of
the date of the said auction sale cannot be contested.

Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.

FACTS:
Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was approved by appellee bank on April 80, 1953. they
executed the mortgage contract on March 23, 1954, and that the release of the amount of the said loan of
P19,500.00 was to be made in instalments subject to certain conditions. That the loan obtained from DBP is to
be received in several releases and to be paid later in instalments, under the terms and conditions specified in
the loan agreement. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were
made subsequent thereafter, then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than
June, 1953. Rodriguez paid the instalments as they fell due. When a balance of about P14,000.00 remained
unpaid, quijano offered to pay for the said outstanding balance with his back pay certificate pursuant to Republic
Act. No. 897, The Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953. The Bank refused to accept the said tender of payment in
certificate on the ground that the loan was not incurred before on June 20, 1953.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No.
897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304.
Whether or not there is a room for interpretation or construction.
HELD:
Thus even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay
certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.
Stat. Con.:
Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for interpretation or construction. The Supreme Court
has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according
to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process
of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.